On December 27, 2012 this manuscript was accepted for publication in the Review of African Political Economy. This is the accepted version before copyediting. The final version (early view) is available from the journal: Hunsberger, C. 2013. Jatropha as a biofuel crop and the economy of appearances: experiences from Kenya. Review of African Political Economy, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2013.831753. Jatropha as a biofuel crop and the economy of appearances: experiences from Kenya Carol Hunsberger* Abstract Jatropha curcas, an oilseed shrub, raised hopes that it could produce biofuel in a ‘sustainable’ manner, though early results fell short of these expectations. Drawing on field research from 2009, this paper examines the political economy of Jatropha in Kenya using Tsing’s ‘economy of appearances’ concept. Tsing’s observation that start-up enterprises perpetuate ‘myth’ and ‘spectacle’ to build momentum fits patterns observed in this case. Jatropha’s promoters reinforced an optimistic discourse, defended it against dissent and linked Jatropha to global, national and local goals. However, the emergence of stronger critiques raises questions about how long its positive appearances can be maintained. Keywords: biofuel; Jatropha curcas; economy of appearances; discourse; NGOs; Kenya *International Institute of Social Studies Kortenaerkade 12 2518 AX The Hague, Netherlands Email:
[email protected] Tel: +31 70 426 0460 Fax: +31 70 426 0799 Acknowledgments This research was supported by a Canada Graduate Scholarship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and a Doctoral Research Award from the International Development Research Centre. While in Kenya I was hosted by the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) as a Degree Fellow. I am grateful to Mike Brklacich, Blair Rutherford, Patricia Ballamingie, Miyuki Iiyama, James Washika, Saturnino Borras and all research participants for their assistance, as well as to participants in the Canadian Association of African Studies 2012 annual meeting and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
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Introduction Biofuels have received an enormous amount of recent attention as a potential solution to linked problems of climate change mitigation, energy security, and rural development (Ulmanen, Verbong, and Raven 2009; Borras, McMichael, and Scoones 2010). Numerous governments have endorsed biofuels by establishing fuel blending targets (Bailis and Baka 2011). However, in 2007-8 many blamed biofuels for causing a significant share of historic food price increases (Muller et al. 2008; Rosegrant 2008; Pimentel et al. 2009). Attention has also focused on negative impacts of biofuel production on people and environments at sites of production (Hall et al. 2009; German, Schoneveld, and Pacheco 2011). Together, these issues have compelled some governments and investors to shift their interest to biofuels that appear to be ‘sustainably’ produced (European Union 2010). Jatropha curcas, a small tree with inedible oilseeds, has been promoted as a source of biodiesel that could satisfy these concerns. Jatropha’s proponents claim that it flourishes in dry areas that cannot sustain food crop production (Francis, Edinger, and Becker 2005), thus avoiding the trade-off of ‘food versus fuel.’ Reports suggesting that Jatropha produces abundant seeds using little irrigation, fertiliser or pest control (Green Africa Foundation 2008; Mathews 2006) further supported a perception that it is a low-input, high-output crop. Large plantations have been portrayed as a way to produce commercial quantities of fuel for domestic blending or export (Jain and Sharma 2010), while smallholder cultivation has been presented as a ‘pro-poor’ strategy for improving rural livelihoods (Achten et al. 2010; Brittaine and Lutaladio 2010). These framings have been used to promote Jatropha as a sustainable energy crop and attract funds for Jatropha activities throughout the tropics. How these framings have been constructed, contested, sustained and sometimes revised – through media reports, academic literature and empirical experience – is the focus of this discussion. This paper uses Anna Tsing’s (2000) ‘economy of appearances’ concept to interrogate the rise of interest in the crop internationally and its promotion in Kenya specifically. Reflecting on the rise and fall of the Bre-X mining company in Indonesia, Tsing describes how ‘spectacle’ plays a pivotal role in attracting investment and building momentum for start-up companies, stating: ‘In speculative enterprises, profit must be imagined before it can be extracted… The more spectacular the conjuring, the more possible an investment frenzy’ (Tsing 2000: 118). While Bre-X conducted fraudulent business, Tsing’s insights are equally applicable to legitimate enterprises and that is the context in which I consider them here. Whether the behaviour of the actors promoting Jatropha in Kenya – especially the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who played a leading role – corresponds to that of Tsing’s mining companies and investors will be examined throughout this paper. Of course, various other concepts have been developed to explore the role that intangible perceptions play in advancing economic projects. Jessop (2004) proposes that ‘economic imaginaries’ – discursively constituted subsets of the economy – help explain how institutions define the meaning attached to particular activities and develop strategies around them. His claim that the existence of competing imaginaries usually means that each one can be only partially fulfilled is particularly salient to this discussion. Hay and Rosamond (2002) argue that ‘discursive constructions’ can have causal economic implications; that is, that actors’ understandings and normative interpretations of a particular discourse can condition their sense
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of what is possible, in some cases leading them to make decisions that actually help produce the outcomes that the discourse predicted. Finally, Igoe (2010) explores the ‘spectacular productions’ practiced by conservation NGOs by combining Tsing’s ideas with Debord’s argument that ‘spectacle’ operates through processes of alienation and fetishisation to deliver coherent representations of late capitalism. These are all relevant contributions that share several themes with this work. I have chosen Tsing’s concept as a reference point for this analysis because of the intriguing cross-sector comparison between her depiction of startup enterprises and the entrepreneurial behaviour of development NGOs, and because this approach does not presuppose that ‘spectacular’ conjurings reflect a particular ideological project. While governments, corporations and international institutions are generally portrayed as the main mobilisers of economic transformation (Ferguson 2005; Currie and Ray 1987), in this paper I argue that NGOs also perform this role – and when they do, the political economy of the NGO sector carries particular implications. African NGOs tend to rely heavily on international donor support and face pressure, via unequal power relations that take many forms, to reflect the priorities of those donors (Hearn 2007; Bebbington, Hickey, and Mitlin 2008). NGO staff also have great personal incentive to ensure that funding continues to maintain their jobs and social standing (Gary 1996), which links to problems of over-reporting successes and downplaying failures (Vivian 1994) – in other words, ‘maintaining coherent representations regardless of events’ (Mosse 2005: 2). While Hearn (2007) sees the North acting through NGOs to achieve its ambitions in the South (comprador theory) and domestic rent-seeking by African NGOs to help elites maintain their position (prebendalism) as based on fundamentally different analytical frames, I interpret these as mutually reinforcing processes. Both show that NGOs ‘keeping up appearances’ to satisfy donors is a well-established phenomenon. However, seeing NGOs as agents of a specific ideological project, i.e. neoliberalism – a major stream in critical scholarship on NGOs (Wallace 2004; Petras 1999) – can be limiting in at least two ways. First, it overlooks the context-specific ‘particular alignments of projects, fears, and desires’ that produce outcomes and possibilities from ‘civil society’ activities that may be very different from what the imposition of a Western neoliberal agenda would predict (Rutherford 2004: 145). Second, assuming that the range of political and economic interests influencing African NGOs fits within the neoliberal paradigm precludes the possibility that multiple discourses or paradigms of development could be simultaneously at play (Hilhorst 2001). Research on Jatropha in Kenya suggests that different actors have indeed drawn selectively on multiple themes and development paradigms to advance contrasting strategies for biofuel production (Hunsberger 2012). Thus, while NGOs can and do face incentives to act as vehicles for external agendas, these agendas cannot always be neatly classified nor do they guarantee particular outcomes. Purpose, methods and structure The purpose of this article is to examine, empirically and theoretically, how competing claims about Jatropha have influenced its promotion as a biofuel crop. In particular I focus on the role played by NGOs as promoters of Jatropha in Kenya, asking to what extent their actions resonate with Tsing’s interpretation of startup enterprises. These questions are important for two reasons: i) they challenge the notion that biofuel production is necessarily part of a capitalist agenda pushed by governments and the private sector (see for example White and Dasgupta 2010); and
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ii) they allow for critical reflection on the particular implications that arise when biofuel activities are led by the NGO sector. The research presented here is part of a larger project on the politics of development surrounding Jatropha in Kenya (Hunsberger 2012). It employs a qualitative case study approach to explore ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions related to a contemporary phenomenon (Yin 1996). The research was developed not to test theory but to generate it through a cyclical process of observation, reflection and comparison to literature to develop and refine explanatory ideas (Baxter 2010). Indeed, Tsing’s framework was not used in designing the study but was adopted later to help interpret its findings. The section on Jatropha’s international spread reviews media reports, literature and investor announcements to identify broad patterns in discourses and activities. The Kenyan case draws on field research conducted in 2009 involving interviews with three government, nine NGO, five private sector, three donor and four research representatives, as well as field visits, surveys and interviews with over 40 farmers and 14 local experts in two case study areas. To maintain anonymity interviewees are cited using codes with prefixes that correspond to their broad affiliations, recognizing that some fit into more than one category.1 The paper proceeds as follows: the next section reviews claims and counter-claims surrounding Jatropha, traces its global spread and describes the dynamics of activities in Kenya. Then, a more detailed exploration of the framings and strategies used by key actors in Kenya is presented. The final sections discuss the relationship between the empirical work and the economy of appearances concept and reflect on broader contributions of the research. Jatropha and its international spread Jatropha curcas is a perennial plant that produces seeds containing inedible oil. Indigenous to Latin America, Portuguese traders are believed to have introduced it to Africa (Jongschaap et al. 2007). Jatropha is widely grown as a hedge since it can be planted densely from cuttings and is not grazed by animals. It has medicinal uses (Heller 1996, Orwa 2009) and has been used for ‘soil and water conservation, soil reclamation, erosion control, living fences, firewood, green manure, lighting fuel’ and insecticides (Jongschaap et al. 2007: 27). Recent attention has focused on Jatropha’s potential to produce biofuel. Straight vegetable oil (SVO) obtained by crushing the seeds can be used in lamps and some diesel engines; further processing allows it to be used in automobiles (Jain and Sharma 2010). Enthusiasm over Jatropha as a biofuel crop hinges on the belief that it produces abundant oil, thrives in dry conditions, requires little fertiliser and is resistant to pests and diseases. These claims have driven the argument that Jatropha can be productively grown in ‘marginal’ areas with few input costs, thereby offering economic opportunities or rural access to energy without threatening food production. Media reports and scholarly literature on Jatropha’s potential are briefly reviewed here to illustrate the range and tone of existing narratives about Jatropha. Competing claims Jatropha has received highly contrasting media coverage. Positive news reports have called it a ‘wonder shrub’ (Mutua 2007), ‘trophy tree’ (Obala 2010), ‘saviour’ (Cheboi 2008), or ‘resource of dreams’ (Thomas 2009), praising it using themes of clean energy, rural income, job creation, 1
The prefixes are: DN = donor; GO = government; NGO = NGO; PS = private sector; RS = researcher
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and anticipated environmental benefits. However, media coverage that questions or criticises Jatropha’s potential has used equally strong language, such as ‘blunder crop’ (Lane 2009) and ‘biofuel gone bad’ (Time 2009). A dominant message in negative media stories has been that Jatropha has performed poorly or fallen short of expectations, for example: ‘Wonder weed plans fail to flourish’ (Sanderson 2009), ‘Don’t fall for Jatropha plants, warns UN body’ (Jagannathan 2010), and ‘Hailed as a biofuel miracle, Jatropha falls short of hype’ (Luoma 2009). A survey of 49 headlines from Kenyan and international news sources shows that positive and negative messages about Jatropha coexisted in the media from 2007-2010 (Hunsberger 2012). Academic literature has questioned many of the optimistic claims about Jatropha. For example, problems have been reported with the quality of the data used to calculate its oil production potential (Jongschaap et al., 2007). Early results from India and Tanzania show seed yields so low that some farmers stopped growing Jatropha (Ariza-Montobbio et al. 2010; Messemaker 2008). Organic fertiliser has been found to significantly improve Jatropha’s growth (in Jongschaap et al. 2007); thus in order to produce abundant oil, existing varieties of Jatropha likely need nutrient levels higher than those found in the semi-arid areas where many have recommended planting it. Jatropha’s carbon balance is fundamental to its status as a ‘clean’ fuel. Achten et al. (2007) report that Jatropha yields more energy than it takes to produce and emits fewer greenhouse gases (GHG) throughout its life cycle than fossil fuel diesel - but these outcomes depend on the type of land used as well as the production intensity and distance to market. Life cycle analyses in West Africa (Ndong et al. 2009) and Thailand (Prueksakorn and Gheewala 2008) likewise find that biodiesel from Jatropha, under some conditions, can emit fewer GHGs than fossil fuel. Bailis and Baka (2010) find mixed results: that jet fuel from Jatropha grown in Brazil can reduce GHG emissions by 86% or increase them by 60% depending on the land use change involved. Thus, Jatropha does not always reduce GHGs and can even have the opposite effect. Overall, these studies do not provide strong backing for the positive claims about Jatropha made in the media. Researchers have expressed concerns over the financial, social and ecological risks of a large-scale experiment, doubts that such a production system would benefit farmers, skepticism that enough is known about Jatropha’s agronomy for such ventures to succeed commercially, or disbelief that Jatropha can produce commercial quantities of oil (Weyerhaeuser et al. 2007; Brittaine and Lutaladio 2010; Achten et al. 2007; Jongschaap et al. 2007). The persistence of optimistic messages in the media despite increasingly critical research findings suggests that neither of these perspectives has become dominant over time. Global uptake The spread of Jatropha activities and investment gives a further indication of confidence in its potential. In 2008, an inventory conducted in 55 countries identified 242 Jatropha projects covering 900,000 hectares worldwide (GEXSI 2008a). Crucially, very few of the projects documented were more than two years old, and ‘hardly any’ were reportedly producing significant quantities of Jatropha oil (GEXSI 2008). Still, the report estimated that global cultivation would increase dramatically: to five million ha by 2010, and 13 million ha by 2015. A review of project announcements from Biofuels Digest, a daily compilation of biofuel industry news, shows that investors continued to make ambitious plans in the years that followed. From
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July 2008 until the end of 2010, 84 new Jatropha projects were announced, of which 58 were proposed plantations, contracts with farmers or land allocations. These announcements claimed that almost 12 million ha would be planted with Jatropha for these new projects (Table 1). Table 1: Area to be newly planted with Jatropha, reported in Biofuels Digest Jul 2008–Dec 2010 These announcements show that investors’ plans for new plantations were growing at a rate consistent with GEXSI’s predictions. Although not all of these plans will have been implemented, the level of commitment required to make a public announcement reflects a certain threshold of buy-in. Together, these sources show that Jatropha investments grew quickly and sustained that momentum over time. Jatropha in Kenya Farmers have grown Jatropha in parts of Kenya for decades, most often as a living fence or grave marker (Government of Kenya and GTZ 2008). A few farmers in Western Kenya began to use Jatropha as a support plant for vanilla vines in about the year 2000 (GTZ 2009). Starting in about 2006, at least four Kenyan NGOs – all with international funding – encouraged farmers to plant Jatropha as an energy crop. The following years saw Jatropha spread to small-scale farmers in many parts of the country. A variety of research projects, test plantations and seedling nurseries were also established. In 2008, GEXSI identified Jatropha projects covering 780 ha in Kenya and estimated that 4,480 ha were under cultivation in the country (GEXSI 2008b). Estimates of the number of Kenyan farmers growing Jatropha vary widely. GTZ (2009) estimated that only 472 farmers were growing Jatropha in 2009, while leaders of three of Kenya’s Jatropha NGOs – Green Africa Foundation (GAF), Vanilla Development Foundation (VDF) and Vanilla Jatropha Development Foundation (VJDF)2 – reported in interviews that they worked with ‘thousands’ of farmers each, with Norwegian Church Aid reporting a further 1,400 participants in its Mpeketoni project. Even if accurate, these high estimates presumably include farmers who were reached by Jatropha organizations and not necessarily those who planted or continued growing the crop. GTZ (2009) documented a drop-off in farmer participation in Shimba Hills, Coast Province, where a private company distributed planting material to 800 farmers and signed contracts with 200 of them, but by 2009, only 75 who were still growing Jatropha could be found. Farmers in several parts of Kenya reported that Jatropha grew more slowly and produced fewer seeds than they were led to believe (GTZ 2009; Hunsberger 2009; Wadhams 2009), while those in Mpeketoni project remained largely optimistic about its prospects (Hunsberger 2010). In 2009, commercial cultivation on large plantations had not begun (GTZ 2009, NGO7, PS1, PS3). However, rumours abounded about investors negotiating access to large tracts of land (Miriri 2008; Bii 2009) and subsequent debates have intensified over proposed large-scale Jatropha plantations in the Dakatcha Woodlands (Ross 2011) and Tana Delta (Smalley and Corbera 2012). Most activities at the time of research focused either on distributing seeds and seedlings to farmers and providing training on how to manage the crop, or on research and development. Very little processing and virtually no marketing or end use of Jatropha products was taking place (GTZ 2009). The few projects that were extracting SVO from Jatropha were 2
VDF and VJDF initially formed as a single organisation which later split into two.
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either doing so on an experimental basis or were at such an early stage that it was too soon to tell whether lasting markets or local consumption patterns would become established. One NGO representative lamented, ‘If you get oil, what will you do with it? There’s no market’ (NGO9). A government official agreed, saying, ‘NGOs should invest in machines where they’re supplying seedlings. They should focus on particular areas where they’ve been working and get good [oil] volumes instead of running around distributing more and more’ (GO2). Generally, Jatropha’s proponents had not found it possible or necessary to complete the production cycle. The resulting market for Jatropha resembled a cycle where seeds were sold as planting stock rather than as feedstock for bioenergy, and the spread of Jatropha was treated as an end in itself rather than as a means to the end of energy production. Despite this, NGO and government interviewees stated that Jatropha was the most important biodiesel crop in the country, a message that was echoed in government documents, a national research workshop, and numerous media stories (Hunsberger 2010). This suggests a prevailing view that Jatropha occupied a prominent, if not dominant, position in discussions about biofuels in Kenya in 2009 among government, donor, NGO, research, and media actors. Patterns of influence Actors interviewed for this research identified three NGOs (GAF, VDF and VJDF) as the most vocal and influential promoters of Jatropha in Kenya because of the reach of their activities and their engagement with policy development. Leaders of these NGOs identified environmental, economic, livelihood and personal motivations for working with Jatropha including objectives related to clean energy, carbon storage, afforestation, exports, local economic opportunities, household lighting and food security. By extension, donors3 played a crucial supporting role. Government agencies, private investors and researchers also supported – and occasionally contested – this trend.4 Table 2 summarises the main forms of influence associated with each group. Table 2: Forms of influence of Jatropha actors in Kenya The government endorsed Jatropha in its 2008 draft biodiesel strategy, emphasising the potential benefits of domestic consumption over export (Government of Kenya 2008). While the government held considerable power to direct the course of future Jatropha activities in the form of authority over the policy development process, it was actively sharing this control through multi-stakeholder bodies such as the National Biodiesel Committee5 and its policy subcommittee. In other words, organisations that were funded to promote Jatropha had opportunities to give direct input into the policy process that would eventually regulate it. In terms of power associated with knowledge, researchers affiliated with government, private sector, and international institutions were in a strong position regarding the production of 3
Including the World Bank and Prince Albert of Monaco Foundation A more detailed discussion of these actors, their activities and perspectives on Jatropha can be found in Hunsberger (2010). 5 Private sector and NGO members of this committee included: Petroleum Institute of East Africa, KenGen, Green Fuels Kenya Ltd., Chanka Oils, Green Africa Foundation, Vanilla Development Foundation, Total Kenya Limited, and International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications (Government of Kenya 2008). 4
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knowledge – but not its distribution. The media and NGOs played important roles in controlling the spread of information: the media by broadcasting to the public, and NGOs by directly mediating the relationship between farmers and Jatropha. The following section explores further the roles played by the quality of existing information and the ability to control its spread in perpetuating the promotion of Jatropha. State of information NGO, government, private sector, and research representatives described major gaps in understanding about Jatropha even as it was being promoted to farmers. An NGO leader attributed this to Jatropha’s newness in Kenya, stating: ‘We don’t have improved varieties. We are still talking of a variety in the wild; Jatropha has not been domesticated. And yet, investors and even the development people are promoting it as, I would say, as a business’ (NGO2). Other interviewees pointed out specific knowledge gaps related to intercropping (GO3) and pests and diseases (RS2). A researcher (RS4) described how Jatropha’s unpromising early results were directly connected to a lack of knowledge about the crop on the part of farmers who tried to grow it. These comments suggest that, prior to 2009, there was little reliable information about how to effectively grow Jatropha and even less about growing it in Kenya. These knowledge gaps created uncertainty. One private sector actor stated: ‘There’s been complete misinformation in newspapers about the expectations, and there’s been misinformation from government… talking about huge schemes and enormous yields’ (PS2). Another (PS5) objected to the estimates of seed yields that some of Jatropha’s promoters had circulated, concluding, ‘I think most of the people who blow it out of proportion don’t have the facts and … they haven’t really experienced it on the ground.’ One NGO representative (NGO7) suggested that misinformation had caused problems for farmers: ‘The biggest thing that has been lacking is education. People don’t know, and the wrong information that was given to them was taken like bible truth.’ In reference to a particular project, another (NGO6) stated that farmers had uprooted bananas to plant Jatropha based on bad information and were now disappointed. Interviewees identified a lack of consolidation of what knowledge there was as a further problem. NGO7 described how research efforts were being duplicated: ‘people on one side, they don’t know what the other is doing on the left. Consolidation of all information is not being done… Whether it is deliberate or not, it is a missing link.’ A researcher (RS4) said that the packaging and delivery of credible information about Jatropha in Kenya needed to improve. Although research efforts were beginning to be coordinated through the research subcommittee of the National Biofuels Committee, much remained to be done to bring together research findings and practical experiences to make a more useful set of information available. Control over information In the absence of reliable information about Jatropha, influencing what messages were disseminated became important. NGO actors employed strategies that included publicly challenging dissenting views and seeking to shape how Jatropha was portrayed in the media. At a National Workshop on Biodiesel convened by the Ministry of Energy in June 2009, actors gathered in Nairobi to discuss recent research findings about Jatropha. When one speaker presented an unfavourable economic outlook based on a survey carried out across the country, a
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few delegates argued fervently that it was essential not to share these results with farmers – in the words of one, to ‘crush their hopes’ – even in the face of decidedly discouraging evidence. While this may have been an isolated incident, it showed reluctance on the part of some NGO representatives to adopt new information that was incompatible with their activities. The vehemence with which this particular actor spoke against sharing the results with farmers signalled that the research was perceived as a serious threat. By defending existing, optimistic messages about Jatropha’s potential and suppressing new, critical messages about it, this actor also made an unspoken statement about the importance of influencing discourse. Some interviewees suspected that covert forms of exclusion were also taking place. One (NGO6) questioned how the government’s steering committee was chosen, noting that some views were not represented and some actors were not included despite having actively participated in previous workshops. One NGO representative (NGO5) who had previously participated in the Kenya Biodiesel Association, a multi-stakeholder group convened on the recommendation of the National Biodiesel Committee, stated: There was an exclusion, slowly by slowly, with no word…. You’re not called for meetings, and when they happen you don’t even know. You just get to meet with other committee members and they ask you, you were not in the meeting? …Only some of the stakeholders had the most correct and up-to-date information. Whether overt, covert or merely suspected, these stories of exclusion and suppression of particular points of view raise questions about the supposedly participatory nature of decisionmaking around Jatropha in Kenya. Those who participated in workshops and meetings – and made use of such occasions to argue persuasively for their positions – were able to wield a form of power by influencing dominant narratives about Jatropha. A second way in which actors influenced messages about Jatropha was through the media. While some interviewees lamented that the media had been too optimistic about Jatropha (NGO6, DN1) and others blamed it for spreading misinformation (RS4, NGO7), at times the Kenyan media also served as a platform for actors who were heavily involved with Jatropha to publicly share their views. At least two interviewees had written opinion pieces published under their own names, while two others were quoted extensively in newspaper articles written by reporters. Taking this approach further, NGO7 described plans to start a TV and radio station to spread ‘proper information’ throughout Africa – meaning, to have greater control over the messages being spread. These ambitions acknowledge both the power of the media to shape discourse and the importance of this shaping to actors in carrying out their objectives. Responses to the state of information Actors responded in different ways to the politics of knowledge just discussed. Several revealed that as experience taught them more about Jatropha, their views had become more cautious. One private sector actor stated that farmers needed to be given better information: ‘The harm being done by overly promoting, enthusiastically maybe, but knowingly over-promoting the crop has been done, and now it’s about being realistic, not just optimistic, in giving the farmers accurate information and the media accurate information’ (PS2). A researcher (RS1) concurred, stating that distorted perceptions had strongly influenced Jatropha activities in the country, but this was
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beginning to change: ‘I think people are starting to realise that the reality and the hype are much different from each other, and farmers are becoming disenchanted.’ A donor (DN1) explained how, as a result of farmer experiences, ‘it became increasingly clear that [Jatropha] may not be that wonder crop that people present it to be.’ A private sector actor (PS4) summarised a cautious position in light of the state of information: ‘We’ve got no idea about a lot of things. So to go large scale right now, even frankly to give this out to smallholders to say, “here’s something that will really benefit you,” I couldn’t do that right now.’ These comments reflect a tempering of enthusiasm among several key actors linked to their recognition that insufficient experience with the crop was producing unwanted outcomes. However, others argued that enough was known about Jatropha to continue promoting it. NGO2 endorsed such an approach, saying, ‘let us make mistakes… I am an advocator that we should start growing it despite the problems. We solve those problems along the way.’ NGO7 used stronger words to dismiss critics of Jatropha projects: We are just yapping and not getting anywhere. People are still saying, ‘oh! You are misleading, oh! You are doing this, oh! This thing is not viable.’ What is not viable if an airplane has been flown on this oil? And there is land that is available and there are people whom you can create work for them to participate in? I think I can use hard language, let me just say it is doable and we should not be wasting time. We should just be going ahead. Thus, while some advocated slowing down Jatropha activities until knowledge had a chance to catch up, others favoured continuing with a trial-and-error approach. The coexistence of these differing perspectives on how to proceed under circumstances of limited knowledge highlights the importance of how discourses are presented and controlled. Vivian’s (1994) assertion that NGOs have an interest in overstating success and downplaying failure to maintain their activities is corroborated by some, though not all, of the perspectives presented above. The suppression of inconvenient research findings and endorsement of a trialand-error approach by some NGO actors are consistent with this view, while those who adopted a more cautious stance provide counter-examples. Jatropha and the ‘economy of appearances’ Given the lack of experience with Jatropha as a biofuel crop and the weak state of knowledge about it demonstrated above, it is not obvious how or why the promotion of Jatropha in Kenya proceeded to the level it did. Literature on other start-up enterprises provides illumination. Anna Tsing (2000) describes how the Bre-X mining company drew on ‘myth,’ ‘mystery,’ ‘drama’ and ‘spectacle’ in order to perpetuate a belief that it had discovered large deposits of gold in an area where there were none. The company managed to attract significant investment despite using falsified geological samples. Bre-X succeeded in constructing a discourse – in this case, a fictitious one – of its own potential that was taken up by investors and in turn built further momentum for the company’s activities. Reflecting on the case, Tsing writes (2000, p. 118): The self-conscious making of a spectacle is a necessary aid to gathering investment funds. The dependence on spectacle is not peculiar to Bre-X and other
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mining scams: It is a regular feature of the search for financial capital. Start-up companies must dramatise their dreams in order to attract the capital they need to operate and expand. The combination of media coverage, promotional reports, and optimistic speculation about Jatropha’s performance in its early days as a biofuel crop, both internationally and within Kenya, created a ‘buzz’ that attracted donor, NGO, government and private sector interest. To some extent, in Kenya these messages became mutually reinforcing, for example through the embedding of NGO perspectives in the policy development process by way of the National Biofuels Committee. NGO behaviour such as suppressing dissent or planning to start a new radio station to better control public messaging about Jatropha is consistent with the kind of ‘conjuring’ Tsing describes. NGOs that were heavily involved in promoting Jatropha had an interest in keeping up appearances that the crop could achieve development objectives; it appears that these organizations’ revenue streams came to depend more on spreading Jatropha than on achieving the goals Jatropha was supposed to make possible. In particular, the lack of a market for Jatropha products at the time of research supported the impression that the triumphant discourse of Jatropha’s potential, presented by its promoters and in the media, was an illusion. Still, the persistence of positive messages and project funding represents at least a partial success for the economy of appearances. The multiplicity of roles played by key actors is another area of convergence between the economy of appearances and the case of Jatropha. Tsing (2000) observes that in junior mining companies, geologists must also act as promoters to get funds to continue their work, and stock analysts are supposed to understand geology well enough to evaluate mining companies’ claims. In other words, individuals are expected to practice a mixing of roles. This observation coincides with the comments of interviewees who alleged that Jatropha’s promoters talked about the plant as though they were agronomists when they lacked technical knowledge. Here this analysis aligns with Tsing’s: in both cases, under the uncertain conditions that surrounded a new venture, the promotion of a product was disconnected from the technical knowledge needed to support it. For Jatropha, this knowledge did not exist, while in the case of Bre-X, it was fabricated. For Tsing, the Bre-X story also provides lessons about the social construction of scale. She writes that projects that are portrayed as ‘global’ have a better chance of succeeding if they become embedded with goals at other scales: ‘It seems likely that successfully conjuring the globe is possible, at least now, only in thick collaboration with regional and national conjurings; certainly financial conjuring has been deeply implicated in promises of making regional and national dreams come true’ (2000, p. 121). This resonates with the case of Jatropha in Kenya: global stories about climate change and clean energy were rolled together with national (government) objectives around import substitution, poverty alleviation and agricultural development, while ‘local’-focused institutions embraced the potential for Jatropha to create rural economic opportunities and benefit livelihoods (Hunsberger 2010). These stories represented ‘conjurings’ at different scales, their coexistence and convergence strengthening the overall case for Jatropha. Some of the patterns emerging from the early days of Jatropha’s promotion thus have much in common with the pattern Tsing describes: building up an optimistic discourse by repeating
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positive messages; guarding (or suspecting that others were guarding) information; and challenging or suppressing dissenting views. Certainly Tsing’s language about drama and spectacle is consistent with fantastic claims that appeared in the media (e.g. ‘trophy tree’ or ‘green gold’). Interestingly, sensational phrases such as ‘rumble in the jungle’ and ‘bungle in the jungle’ also characterised media coverage of Bre-X (Tsing 2000: 128). The successful attraction of funds that Tsing describes is consistent with descriptions of Jatropha activities elsewhere, particularly the ‘virtual deluge of foreign investment’ that Caniëls and Romjin (2010) reported in Tanzania. On the other hand, the Kenyan government appeared to be trying to open a dialogue about the potential risks as well as challenges of Jatropha, and national newspapers ran both positive and negative stories. The case of Jatropha in Kenya provides a compelling link between the economy of appearances concept, developed to interpret and explain private sector activities, and critical literature on development NGOs. As mentioned, many have critiqued NGOs for acting opportunistically and tailoring their activities to donors’ desires in order to secure funding. Vivian (1994) sees the perpetuation of myths by the NGO sector being encouraged by donors’ excessive focus on ‘success stories’ as a condition for future funding, with the result that NGOs may cover up their failures. NGOs seek to minimise risk by engaging in activities that are popular at the moment, as well as ‘magic bullet’ interventions where a simple solution is expected to solve a complex problem. In other words, NGOs can reap tangible rewards by perpetuating myths of success. Jatropha fits the ‘magic bullet’ pattern because of the ‘win-win’ discourse attached to claims about its ability to provide clean energy and rural development on land that cannot sustain food production – despite the challenges to this claim documented in the literature review. An interesting question is whether the doubts and questions about Jatropha documented in interviews and media headlines reflect the emergence of an equally powerful counter-discourse about Jatropha. Could this be interpreted as a ‘spectacle of tragedy’? The Bre-X saga ended abruptly when the fact that there was no gold came to light, and the company’s story was exposed for what it was: a fabrication. There is no simple ending for the story of Jatropha in Kenya, where both initial euphoria and emergent cynicism persist, along with intermediate positions such as those in which interviewees wanted to keep working with Jatropha and learn from mistakes along the way. Indeed, a nascent project in Mpeketoni, Coast Province, appears to have potential to benefit small-scale farmers if it proceeds according to plan (Hunsberger 2010). The discursive space remains open for continued jostling between these perspectives; although dented, the economy of appearances rolls on. Conclusions Tsing developed the economy of appearances concept to explain private sector behaviour, but this research finds that her insights are just as relevant to the realm of development NGOs. Internationally, from 2007-2010 Jatropha received intense media, donor and investor interest, and the area of land planted or slated for planting increased rapidly. In some places this expansion was driven by the private sector, consistent with the Bre-X pattern of a start-up enterprise quickly gaining momentum (Ariza-Montobbio et al. 2010). However, in Kenya NGOs were Jatropha’s leading promoters, and many examples of their behaviour were consistent with the ‘self-conscious making of a spectacle’ that Tsing described. Especially relevant is the fact
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that despite the attention given to propagating the crop, almost no one was processing Jatropha seeds into usable products. The economy of appearances is helpful in understanding the rapid increase of interest in Jatropha, particularly the importance of controlling discourse and the dissemination of knowledge. Bre-X was in a special position regarding its ability to control the release of (mis)information about its activities because it was a single company operating in a remote location. Jatropha activities are more diffuse, occurring in many locations and involving many actors, meaning that it should be harder for claims of Jatropha’s potential to be sustained if they were not supported by experiences on the ground. However, in Kenya the small number of NGOs actively promoting Jatropha and their potential to coordinate themselves through ‘multistakeholder’ bodies opens the possibility that they could achieve greater control over messages about their projects than might otherwise be expected. In both the international and Kenyan contexts, positive messages about Jatropha have persisted even as strong critiques have emerged. On one hand this suggests that Jatropha’s promoters have successfully maintained Jatropha’s positive image. On the other, it is possible that the very strength with which these messages have been expressed has allowed critics to position their rebuttals as ‘myth-busting,’ making it easier for them to attack something that seems too extreme to believe. All of this leads to an important question: What does the economy of appearances mean for critique of, and resistance to, the spread of biofuel crops as a ‘development’ initiative? First, understanding the motivations for and means of keeping up appearances might help critics to contest unsubstantiated claims about Jatropha or similar undertakings. Many are already doing so: resistance by some (though not all) local actors to a large-scale plantation in Tana Delta, Kenya, demonstrates such a challenge to positive messages about Jatropha (Smalley and Corbera 2012). Recognising that NGOs can be key actors in consolidating as well as contesting a biofuel agenda opens a new political space in debates over bio- or agrofuels, which have tended to focus on the influence of state and capital actors to date (Borras, Fig, and Suárez 2011; White and Dasgupta 2010). Second, viewing the spread of Jatropha and other development interventions from this perspective could help to challenge the institutional environment that encourages actors to engage in the kind of performance described here. Critical literature on NGOs shows how difficult it can be to break the cycle of positive reporting that organizations practice to secure ongoing funding. Donors too are subject to these pressures, wanting to show their money has not been wasted. The analysis presented here aligns with recent work on the importance of admitting and learning from development failures (Harford 2011). Perhaps adopting such an approach can help peel away the appearance of success and motivate more honest reflection, assessment and reporting on project outcomes, creating enabling conditions for better alternatives to emerge.
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