1 The Industrial Revolution When we think Industrial Revolution, we ...

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industrialization, and how did it relate to art, religion and politics? How did it ...... pleasure. A French novelist, Emile Zola, titled a work dealing with department.
The Industrial Revolution When we think Industrial Revolution, we think machines, work and factories. When we think Western civilization, we think artistic forms, science, Christianity, and political patterns. How do the two fit together? What was Western about industrialization, and how did it relate to art, religion and politics? How did it relate to Western values, and how did it relocate to the West in the world. This is a big set of connections to make, and not a familiar one: but it actually leads down interesting paths. I‘ve been studying the Industrial Revolution for years. I find its implications fascinating in terms of human change, and the adaptations and limitations of modern life. Industrial issues still define life today, as we think about work, or family, or even the nature of politics. This discussion deals with these implications, in the particular context of Western civilization. Here‘s an outline of how we‘ll proceed. We‘ll work first on when and what the industrial revolution was. Then, on what caused it and what was Western about it. Then on what consequences it had and what it did to Western civilization in turn. We can begin with a very specific little story. In the 1830s a French textile manufacturer began a practice of decorating the most productive machine each week with a garland of flowers. Pretty silly, of course, since the flowers must have wilted fast. But think of the values involved: machines, not the workers, now seemed to come first. Productivity, not Western religion or art or royal power, now seemed the basis of modern life. Tracing these new priorities is central to figuring out what the industrial revolution was and is all about, as one of the great changes in human history. Overview The Industrial Revolution began first in Great Britain about 1760, and soon spread to other parts of Western civilization and the United States. The Industrial 1

Revolution stretched out over many decades, from the time new machines were first significantly applied to production to the time the bulk of the population was directly affected by industrial processes. But most major Western societies became involved pretty quickly. This means that they shared key ingredients and needs for industrialization, and/ or that they had particularly good channels of communication that would allow rapid imitation of developments elsewhere within the civilization. Belgium, France and the United States, for example, all began industrialization by importing machines from England–smuggling them, actually, for the British tried to keep a monopoly on innovation for a time. You can also use maps to chart the spread of industrialization, looking at industrial centers and rail lines first in Western society and then beyond it. What parts of Western civilization were slow to industrialize? (Note the spread east, but more slowly south.) So what is the core definition? The industrial revolution centered on a massive increase in production, and related acceleration of transportation, communication and sales capacities. The heart of this increase was new technology, particularly technology based on coal or waterpower instead of human or animal power. Two examples, from the 18th century: a flying shuttle, a device that would automatically carry the thread on a weaving loom across the fibers–the machine

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was called the flying shuttle–allowed one weaver to run a loom without an assistant. Result: at least 50% more cloth production per worker. A spinning machine where the spindles turned on the basis of power supplied from a steam engine that was even more productive--a given worker could produce more than 100 times as much thread as purely manual workers had done. Other new technologies applied to the economy soon included steam locomotives, like ―Puffing Billy‖ here, plus ships, and coal-based metallurgical operations that expanded the amount of metal produced. The massive increase of production also resulted from new work arrangements, alongside the dramatic new technology. The factory system quickly arose, partly because the new power equipment required a concentration of workers near the engines. Here‘s an early steel plant in Germany, and now one in France. But factories had their own advantages for production, in allowing more specialized work and more top-down direction and discipline of workers. Fairly steady technology change, like the Bessemer process here, combined factories and machines. New organization spread to other areas. For example, the first department store opened in Paris in the 1830s. Here too, larger arrangements and more specialization facilitated operations, for with more production, innovation was essential in sales well. What was revolutionary about the industrial revolution 3

comes through in dry statistics about production levels, expansion of steam engines, spread of railway lines, and factory size. Throughout the industrial West, city growth accelerated greatly as production and distribution concentrated increasingly in cities. Between the mid-19th and the early 20th centuries, most Western societies would become half urban, the first time this had ever happened in history. Urban growth was about as dramatic as product growth. It meant in turn that during the industrial revolution literally millions of people abandoned a fairly traditional life in the countryside, to cast their lot with cities–a huge change in human terms. Industrial cities themselves changed the landscape, like the British city of Stockport with smokestacks becoming the new urban symbol, dominating the countryside; and with new areas of air and water pollution surrounding the cities. The Industrial Revolution was only the second basic change in the economic context for human life in history to that point–the first being the shift from hunting and gathering to agriculture, which occurred long before Western civilization had even emerged. Correspondingly, the amount of production, and particularly manufactured goods, per capita also began to rise beyond historic precedent. And though this did not mean wealth for everyone, it was also a revolutionary change. Technology, organization, manufacturing, and total product--these were the key features of the industrial revolution itself. What caused the Industrial Revolution? Obviously, a number of factors combined– there is no simple one-shot explanation. Obviously also, historians debate this combination. Causation is a vital part of historical analysis, helping to explain what a huge change like industrialization means. But causes cannot be retested in a laboratory, which makes historical analysis more challenging than its counterpart in science. Causes There are three kinds of debates, and they relate to how the industrial revolution fits into the history of Western civilization. For along with explaining why the

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industrial revolution took shape, we must also explain why Western civilization established such an industrial lead over the rest of the world. The first debate is the simplest. The industrial revolution depended on several preconditions, which were not however real causes. You‘re seeing on two screens a list of what a society needs to industrialize, but not all these factors are causes. It is very difficult to industrialize without ready access to basic raw materials, and in the initial industrial revolution this meant coal and iron above all. Many parts of Europe – particularly Britain, Belgium, northern France and Germany – had excellent holdings of coal and iron, often fairly close to each other. This was vital for industrialization – but obviously it did not cause it, because the minerals had been in the ground for ages without this use emerging. Iron and coal thus did not cause industrialization, for they did not change; but they were necessary nonetheless, and they help explain why Europe came first compared, say, to Japan, or the Middle East, or several other places. The second debate is central: it involves a tension between European and global causes. Historians long assumed that the industrial revolution flowed from internal factors primarily. Against this view of some special Western-ness comes an argument that emphasizes global factors. Industrialization was a global event. Europe‘s special place was the result of power position, nothing more. Europe had already pushed its way toward dominance in world trade. It learned from this how more money could be made from exporting manufactured goods, and importing cheaper raw materials. Industrialization merely extended this process, without any special Western values, save perhaps greed and commercial success, involved at all. Europe had also gained profits from previous world trade, including its sponsorship of the Atlantic slave trade. Profits accumulated into available capital, which made it much easier to invest in expensive and initially risky new equipment like steam engines. Again, no special Western values, just the unusual concentration of global advantage. And industrialization extended the economic power politics game. The industrial West increased its exploitation of other parts of the world, increasing 5

poverty as its own wealth expanded. Industrialization flowed from economic power politics, nothing more, even though it did have revolutionary results. Of course the western and global explanations approaches can be combined. The West, after all, was not the first society to benefit from world trade, but it was the first to industrialize. Sometimes also, special western policies helped trigger the global impact. For example, England encountered the charms of cotton cloth as it penetrated India in the 18th century. Soon it was trying to build a domestic cotton industry through laws that made Indian cotton imports more difficult; and this in turn led to massive unemployment in India, even as British cotton industrialization proceeded. Here is a global factor, but combined with a targeted colonial policy that reflects at least a certain kind of 18th-century Western values. But even if combining causes is possible, there is still the question of emphasis and priority. Did industrialization really flow from Western distinctiveness, or is it better seen as a global response? Which approach strikes you as having the richer explanatory power? Finally, there is a question of values vs. other factors, even where largely Western causes are concerned. How much was a Western spirit involved vs. impersonal factors. Let‘s focus here on two questions: first, again, what caused the industrial revolution, but also, what caused it to occur in the 18th and early 19th centuries. For obviously Western culture had not done the trick earlier; there must be some new ingredients. Here on the screen are three related Western values type causes. First, for some reason Westerners became particularly inventive. Obviously a number of English, and to some degree French and American, people did begin to produce new inventions, including the steam engine. Most of them were artisans. Was there some sort of special Western spirit that underlay their inventions? By itself this one probably doesn‘t work too well, because it doesn‘t explain the timing. So what about the huge cultural change involved in the scientific revolution and enlightenment. THIS IS western values type cause number two. Here were new sources of ideas about manipulating nature and causing material progress – including the idea that material progress was both possible and good. This new 6

spirit, and some of the new scientific knowledge, probably did move some of the inventors: James Watt, the inventor of the steam engine, has some knowledge of scientific work on gasses. Many of the leading early businessmen were full of Enlightenment ideas about progress. Add to this, changes in government policy, Western spirit cause number three, within the Western context of longstanding military and economic rivalries.

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British government began to do more things to benefit business, such as road paving, canal building, and the formation of a national bank. Governments in France and elsewhere did the same, and the French Revolution ultimately encouraged these new purposes. In France, for example, government-sponsored engineering schools improved. We have seen that governments were also involved in tariff policies to encourage industry and reduce competition from other parts of the world. Governments also stopped restricting new technology, particularly by abolishing guild systems. They also began to ban worker organizations that might impede business initiative, using police to break up protest. It is vital to note that government action was part of the policy process, and not simply leaving businessmen free to pursue their own interests. For example, governments everywhere took huge initiatives to launch railroad development, particularly in places like France, Germany and the United States, even though private businessmen might ultimately run the railroads. New policies thus cut in two directions: freeing businessmen in new ways but also actively intervening in the economy in favor of industrial growth. So: inventors and entrepreneurs, inspired by new knowledge and a new spirit of zeal, were aided further by changes in government policy. What more could you want for causation? But don‘t forget the other side: more anonymous forces that may better explain why people changed behavior – including inventing new techniques. Here are the highlights on the impersonal factors side as on the chart. We don‘t need some vague new spirit argument at all, for more concrete changes explain new behavior. Economic forces, not the essence of Western civilization, account for what 7

happened. We have seen that market opportunities improved, thanks to the expansion of European-dominated overseas trade and also new levels of consumerism at home, particularly in areas like textiles and household wares. Capital improved, thanks to overseas trade, thus facilitating new business behavior whether there were new ideas around or not. Above all, population began to expand rapidly, thanks to the impact of newly adopted crops such as the potato. Look at the huge population surge before and during the industrial revolution. West European population grew 50 to 100% in the last half of the 18th century. What did this do? It forced many rural workers to realize that they could no longer count on access to the land. This in turn, rather than any new ideas, explains why there was a labor force available – reluctantly available – to work in unpleasant new factories with noisy and dangerous new equipment. It‘s easy to ignore workers in the industrialization process, as if they automatically accepted whatever was thrown at them, but in fact their willingness to participate was crucial. And this willingness resulted from the inescapable prod of population growth and land shortage. And dramatic population growth had further effects. It forced new behavior among some businessmen. Jean Schlumberger, in eastern France, was a typical modest manufacturer in the 1760s, content to use established methods. But he had ten children, and none of them died – this was how population expansion affected him personally. To provide for them according to traditional middle-class standards, he began to grow his business and reluctantly to adopt some of the new textile manufacturing equipment. Soon he was a leading industrialist, and two of his sons took the process even further, becoming dynamic entrepreneurs. You don‘t really need Western values here, just the driving force of population and its own causes in impersonal new foods like the potato. But again, the debate: After all, other societies have experienced rapid population growth without generating an industrial revolution. Indeed, Western Europe had rapid population growth earlier in its history – for example, 13th-14th centuries – and it led to economic problems more than innovation. So maybe some less anonymous factors have to be granted. Two final points about causes, which also show why the discussion of causation is 8

important. First, in the long run it also has become clear that Western values are not the only basis for successful industrialization. Japan began to industrialize in the late 19th century, and it proved very successful against great odds. It imported some Western ideas, particularly Western science, and of course it could and did copy Western technology and aspects of factory organization. But it continued to use older Confucian values and a strong government role, and even today has a distinctive approach to economic issues. Japan‘s success does not prove that Western values did not cause initial industrialization, but they raise a note of caution. But finally, whatever the mix of causes you think works best, it‘s important to realize that, because of the West‘s industrial success, Westerners have long believed that distinctive aspects of their civilization do provide the basis for industrialization. On the strength of this, Western leaders and observers have frequently told other societies what they need to do – i.e., become more like the West culturally and politically – if they have any hope for industrial success. They criticized other societies for falling short of Western qualities in the 19th century, and they have been doing it again during the past decade. Needless to say, leaders in other regions don‘t necessarily like this approach. Is the approach at least accurate, in terms of what it takes to industrialize? Consequences We now turn to the consequences of industrialization, which really raises the most important set of issues of all. The economic definition of industrialization, in terms of production, technology and factories, is just the tip of the iceberg. The industrial revolution had huge consequences in the West and in the world from the early 19th century onward. We‘re still working out some of these consequences today, two centuries later. Historical understanding of our own world makes it crucial to explore what industrialization did to people‘s lives and to broader social patterns. And we need to apply Western civilization questions here too: how did the consequences of industrialization fit with other Western patterns? We will see that Westerners tried to keep control of industrial life in terms of some recognizable 9

styles and values, but we may decide that they were unable to do so, becoming more industrial than Western in the process. First, the impact on basic human life. The reason the industrial revolution was so important, in terms of the human experience, is because it substantially altered the nature of work life and of family life. We need to look at these aspects before we examine the more familiar Western civilization categories like religion or politics. People came to work in the factories or stores from a peasant or craft background. Not everything about the new work setting necessarily surprised them. They were accustomed to having children work, and they were accustomed to long hours on the job. But there were some startling new features. Machines were one: they were often dangerous, they were usually very noisy, and they moved fast, requiring workers to keep up a much more intense pace than they were accustomed to in more traditional jobs. Pace of work and nervous tension became a standard theme in industrial work life. Along with nervous pace, supervision was another theme. With the important exception of many slave systems, most traditional workers had enjoyed a period of life in which they were their own boss, in terms of daily activities. In the factories and department stores, this changed: most people now spent their whole lives under the direction of others, and active supervision increased as well. Foremen carefully monitored the motions of factory workers. Skill and pride also often fell victim to the new work systems. The typical industrial worker did a small part of an operation; he or she did not see the whole product. Many workers, particularly from a craft background, felt their skills had deteriorated. As industrial technology improved, even established factory workers found what had been important skill levels diminished into semi-skilled operations, which required little training and provided little job security. Some observers argued that these changes produced a profound worker alienation, in which it was difficult to find meaning in work. Intense pace, heavy supervision, and reduction in skill added up to powerful issues 10

in the industrial workplace. They affected factory workers most intensely, but also, as new machines spread, touched secretaries, salespeople, skilled construction workers, even farmers. Throughout the industrialization process, workers commented on the job changes they saw around them. Early on, some sought to attack machines directly, arguing that everyone would be better off if the industrial revolution could be rolled back. These reactions, called Luddism after a series of machine-breaking protests in England between 1810 and 1820, were rarely successful, but they could be intense. There were of course some bright spots, as on this joy chart. Some workers enjoyed factories as a place to meet new people. Others viewed factory jobs as temporary, planning to return to the countryside or get married. Others believed that higher earnings could compensate for reduced work satisfaction. Earnings were very low for most workers in early industrialization, which concealed this option, but gradually they tended to improve. Trading work satisfaction for a better material life off the job became a common impulse, though it was not automation. But even after industrialization was well underway, around 1900, workers could bitterly lament their lives, to the point of deep despair. You can read about worker reactions from what workers themselves said and wrote, in protest movements, letters and autobiographies. Around targets like those shown here. A key task of historical interpretation involves explaining why different workers reacted differently, and what reactions were most typical and most important. Overall, workers had to learn to adjust to work they found less engaging than what people had been accustomed to in pre-industrial societies. This adjustment involved new interests, for example in consumer goods, but also new protests, and new unhappiness. Has modern Western society even today managed an appropriate definition of work? A second area, even more important than work which was deeply affected by the industrial revolution was family life. Images of family life from the industrial period are varied. Workers in the cities faced crowded conditions and poverty, which

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obviously affected family life. Middle-class folks liked to convey images of united, supportive families. But even successful families were touched by deep change. Industrialization‘s impact involved two simple but profound alterations. These alterations operated beneath the surface of the diverse images of industrial family life. We‘re still dealing with the ramifications today, including our uncertainty about exactly what the family is for. Impact #1 was the removal of most productive work from the household and family context. Work was now outside the home, often at some distance. And this in turn weakened family cohesion. It also forced discussions of the division of family roles. In Western society, many families responded by assuming that men should work outside the home, and women, at least after marriage, should not. This meant a redefinition of fatherhood, toward much less involvement with household and children. Many men in fact began to assume that they had no skills with children, because they were away so much. The standard 19th-century definition of fatherhood emphasized breadwinner roles, supporting the family, rather than interacting with it extensively or serving as moral guide in the traditional manner. It meant also a redefinition of women‘s roles, toward more stress on housework and motherhood. The percentage of women in the labor force dropped steadily in Western society, except in wartime, until the 1950s. And finally the removal of work forced a larger reconsideration of what the family was for, what marriage even was for. If the family was no longer necessary as a production unit, was it as important as before? What emotional and leisure functions could replace the production emphasis? Family advocates could answer these questions, particularly by emphasizing the family as a warm emotional unit; but the discussion was anxious and it goes on still today. It was not surprising that divorce rates rose during industrialization as part of this new uncertainty. The second key question industrialization forced on families involved the purpose of children. In early industrialization, lots of children continued to work, as was traditional. But it soon became clear that factory work was harmful to children. Also, more advanced machinery began to reduce the routine tasks children could do. So the emphasis shifted to getting children out of work and into schools, a huge 12

change in the definition of childhood. In the process, children shifted from being economic assets, helping to support the family, to economic liability, costing money for clothes and books. In all industrial societies the response to this was a fairly rapid reduction in the birth rate. But this raised questions too. If families were smaller, with less focus on numbers of children, how could parental success be defined? Fewer children per family made them more valuable emotionally – soon, industrial societies managed dramatically to reduce the child death rate. But children themselves might face new confusions, as childhood was much more separate from adult roles. It was harder for adults to define exactly how children served the family, and here too, we‘re still arguing about this, in the family context produced by industrialization. The issues the industrial revolution raised about work and the family were not all bad. There were advantages in shaking up established patterns. Especially in the family area, children could benefit from less work pressure, and women began to reconsider the reactions that had pulled them out of the labor force. But the pressure of change was huge. Many people, and not just the very poor, found in industrialization an immense confusion and uncontrollable intrusion into personal habits and values. We can see the exterior signs of change, for example in the awful slums of industrial cities like Glasgow. But there were internal changes too, as people found their personal values under attack, and in the long run these changes may have been the most challenging. It was a French industrialist who put the point nicely, in talking about how change kept coming: ―It might be better if progress could stop, except that it is inevitable.‖ It was the sense of industrialization as a disruptive force, as well as the more direct implications of new technology, production, and wealth, that shaped how the industrial revolution affected other aspects of social and cultural life, such as art and religion. Everywhere, there was a strong impulse to put the breaks on change, to defend traditional styles and values or to invent new traditions to provide a sense of stability. But in all areas also, change in fact broke through, creating new, industrial modes of religion and culture that did alter the nature of Western civilization well beyond the economic sphere. Let‘s see how this process worked in 13

three key areas: religion, family imagery, and leisure. We‘ll then sum up the different impacts in terms of Western identity. Religion Western religion was already complex, of course, when the industrial revolution began. The division between Protestant faiths and Catholicism had not been resolved, and science made further inroads on religious belief. It was not surprising that industrialization‘s impact on religion established still further complexity. Like art, religion could be a solace amid the strangeness of industrialization, and so it was for many people. The 19th century saw many revivals of piety. Methodism, a new, intense Protestant faith, spread widely among workers in Britain, and then among many American farmers. Catholicism experienced a revival of miracles, including Lourdes, in France, where three young girls saw apparitions of the Virgin Mary and where a huge devotional center ensued. Even aside from offering spiritual alternatives to the industrial world, religion could provide identity and familiar moorings amid change. Many American immigrants clung to religion in a strange land, making the United States one of the vigorous new centers of Christianity and also Judaism. Industrial wealth also supported religion in many ways. Fancy new churches decked the growing cities. Missionary activity abroad expanded rapidly. Particularly striking was the new commitment of English and American Protestants to mission work in Asia and Africa, often with major impact on the areas involved. But at home, in the West, religion on the whole suffered in the wake of industrialization, for two reasons. First, economic opportunities and problems might make religion seem less relevant. People spent more time enjoying new affluence, or worrying about survival in harsh cities, than they did exploring the intricacies of faith. Values became more secular. Even when groups, like the middle class, maintained religious practice, and gave money to the churches, the intensity of belief often waned. In the United States, for examples, Protestant ministers were still attacking a consumer lifestyle in the 1830s, urging simpler habits in keeping 14

with making religion the primary focus in life. But by the 1870s, in the mainstream churches, they were embracing consumer spending, urging people to keep up with the latest fashions. With changes like this, the balance between religion and secular values had clearly shifted. The second reason for religion‘s decline focused on workers, but more in Europe than the United States. Many workers found established churches aligned with the ruling classes, and hostile to workers‘ political and social concerns. Many church leaders turned against working-class political movements, including socialism. Even the new urban churches seemed to fancy. In the United States, where church and state were separate, the churches‘ conservatism was less of a problem, and religion held its own much better in the United States as a result. But in most parts of Western Europe, religious practice declined fairly rapidly, a rend that continued in the 20th century. People began looking for new targets for belief. The decline of religion as a force in Western society was not launched by industrialization, but certainly the industrial revolution accelerated the process. One result was clearly anomalous: the West projected a more religious face to the rest of the world, through the missionaries, than it maintained at home. Why would this odd combination make sense amid the industrial disruptions of the 19th and 20th centuries? Family Here we‘re talking about an addition to Western culture which was very potent. We have seen that the 19th century was a tremendously disruptive period for family life, in various respects. But it also saw the creation of a powerful, nostalgic family ideology that was clearly meant to compensate for some of the actual changes in industrial life. Symbolically, the family became more important than before in Western culture, as a beacon of virtue and stability in a changing, materialistic world. The new family ideology was strongest in Britain and the United States, but it had wide resonance. The family ideology emanated from the middle class, but it was preached to other groups as well.

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The family was what one historian has called a ―haven in a heartless world.‖ Children, if properly treated, were loving, innocent creatures. The new family ideology explicitly contradicted traditional Christian ideas of original sin, or beliefs that children should be frightened into obedience. Women, unless they were harlots, were naturally pure and tender, the true anchors of family life. Families should be pictured in loving harmony, perhaps around the piano. Holidays, once occasions for group festivities, increasingly became family affairs. Christmas also received new attention, as a family occasion, increasingly spiced by store-bought, consumer gifts. Middle-class sections of cemeteries filled with family monuments. Here was a reaction similar to the reactions in religion and art, and related to them. It seemed vital to project a non-industrial space, that would be free from machines and competition, and the new family imagery was a powerful tool here. As with modern art, this was not a Western tradition. And this leads to an obvious question, when family culture is compared with family reality, in the 19th century or still today: has the result been a good thing, for actual families? Did Westerners place unrealistic expectations on family, as a compensation for the roughness of the industrial world? For another effect of industrialization on the family was to increase the divorce rate throughout Western society, though with particular vigor in places like the United States. Leisure and recreation The industrial revolution transformed the nature of leisure in Western society, and Western influence would soon disseminate the results to the whole world. Leisure offered obvious escape from the industrial routine, but its actual unfolding was complex. Indeed, observers are still trying to figure out the values of leisure in industrial society. Industrialization‘s first impact on leisure was decisive and negative. People had to work harder in the first industrial decades. Manufacturers also attacked traditional leisure forms as wasteful and dangerous. Traditional festivals took too much time away from work, and they involved too much carousing and mass assembly. Daily

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leisure habits, like taking naps or singing on the job, were fought as well. A few habits were not curtailed, like working-class drinking. But in the main early industrialization scaled back leisure. The most obvious leisure response to industrialization – getting more of it and using it as an anchor of tradition – was thus made impossible. By the later 19th century though, a new set of leisure opportunities emerged. And even though they were not really traditional, they could provide escape. Several main settings focused industrial-style leisure, besides family-based recreations. Vacations began to emerge; by the 1880s English workers took day excursions by train to popular seaside resorts, where they played games and sat soberly on the sand, fully dressed (for chances to learn to swim had not yet developed). In the United States, amusement parks were devised. Professional sports developed, with soccer football associations in Europe, baseball in the United States, and boxing in both spots. Popular theater, called music hall in England, vaudeville in the U.S., drew middle-class as well as worker audiences, eager to hear popular songs and broad-based humor. By 1900, this tradition was moving into the new medium called movies. This leisure assumed that many people, from various social groups, had money to spend above subsistence. It assumed that parts of each day or at least each week would be separate from work. It also reflected a reduction in average work hours. It was based in the main on commercial companies and professional entertainers providing recreation for fairly passive audiences of spectators. Some of the leisure obviously contrasted with work, like the bawdy songs in the music halls. Escapism was widely sought. But some of the new leisure meshed with work in unexpected ways. Modern sports stressed speed and records. Teams had specialized playing positions and rules enforced by ―foremen‖ called referees. Though some of the games drew on popular traditions – there were forms of football as early as the Middle Ages – their precise nature was quite new, and not only because they depended on factory-produced equipment. The question, which observers continue to debate about mass industrial leisure, is whether this new leisure provided as much real engagement and satisfaction as traditional leisure had once done, and as 17

the drawbacks of modern work seemed to require. People liked the leisure, but the verdict is still out on how meaningful it was. The industrial revolution helped shape a rebalancing among various facets of Western culture. Religion declined and the role of art changed. Family values were newly revered, while a dramatically new type of leisure emerged. The result reflected the need for some relief from industrial life in its starkest forms, but it also reflected some real disagreements about what kinds of escape to seek. The overall balance showed a cultural life, and a role for the creators of culture, quite different from the pre-industrial Western tradition. Some would argue that the nature of Western civilization blurred in the process, particularly when some of the new forms, like spectator leisure, were quickly copied in other parts of the world. Art was substantially new; so were many family images, even though they seem traditional. So was most leisure, while Western religion declined. Was all of this still Western? Not surprisingly other parts of the world picked up many of the new themes, like modern art or sports, very quickly. Did they become Western in the process? Industrialization and the state, war and diplomacy In political life, similar complexity prevailed. Prior to the industrial revolution, three key political trends had defined Western civilization: First, a persistent tendency to strengthen the state and expand its functions. Second, a debate about the most appropriate organizational form for the state, against pure feudalism or pure monarchy. Third, a long tradition of emphasizing warfare and expansionism. The French Revolution had most recently picked up both trends: it tended to expand the state‘s functions, talking for example about new roles in education and a new focus on national centralization. But it also ended by attacking the monarchy, promoting the idea of representative rule, and even suggesting expansion of voting rights. Finally, it intensified national rivalries and wars and led to various efforts at gaining new territories. The industrial revolution participated in all these trends, but it gave them all new

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meanings. As in culture, it was still possible to talk about a Western state, but this was a very different animal from what had existed prior to industrialization. By itself, the industrial revolution was an anti-democratic force, and it certainly created new concentrations of political and economic power. Factory owners steadily scaled back workers‘ rights, trying to compel them to accept direction from above. Ironically, some of the clearest moves toward factory authority came in the most democratic countries, like the United States. By 1900 Americans were leading in the movement to give new power to industrial engineers to regulate workers‘ motions and to defy trade union protest. Workers often struggled for greater workplace democracy, but they never, at least by the early 21st century, got very far. But this very tension, between beliefs in human rights and widespread participation and the facts of industrial life on the job, could promote greater pressure for representation and the vote in politics. And this helps explain why, building on earlier Western precedent, most Western countries, as they industrialized, began to create more rights for elected parliaments and gradually to expand the vote. Earlier ideals, as from the French Revolution, combined with the pressures of industrial life: people needed a political outlet and a sense that the state was on their side. Male workers gained the vote in most Western countries by the 1860s, by which time most countries had constitutions and significant parliaments as well. The idea of protecting individual rights in speech, press and religion also spread increasingly in the West during the 19th century. Freedom of assembly came harder, because all early industrial governments attacked worker organizations with laws and police intervention. But after 1870 greater freedom occurred here as well, though police still attacked big strikes even in the 20th century. But in industrial work, freedoms were cut back, as individuals were brought under strict factory rules and other requirements. Thus, while the industrial revolution was not a triumph of freedom or democracy, it did promote changes in political structure in part to balance the new constraints of work life.

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The results of industrialization in terms of government functions were much clearer: the industrial revolution promoted a further expansion of the Western state. Only two governments, and briefly, scaled back in the 19th century, Britain and Norway. Elsewhere, including in the United States, growth was the norm. It was true that with industrialization, governments pulled back from some forms of economic regulation, as in attempts to limit technological change for example. Most governments also gradually pulled back in the religious sphere as well, allowing greater freedom from state control. But these shifts were more than balanced by new functions such as: greater operations in assuring economic infrastructure, such as postal systems and transportation systems or portions of these systems. New responsibilities arose for public health, particularly as cities and industrial pollution tended to expand. New responsibilities arose for education, both for technical experts like engineers, and for mass education. And new responsibilities grew for regulating some industrial excesses, by inspecting factories for safety, limiting hours of work, and providing workers with some state-sponsored insurance in case of accidents or old age. Everywhere, government bureaucracies expanded and everywhere, governments devised new tax systems to make sure that part of industrial wealth came their way. Industrial transportation and communication systems made it far easier for central governments to establish routine contacts with remote parts of the country, and with ordinary citizens. Finally, industrialization everywhere increased the cost and clout of the military segment of the state. Armaments buildups began in the later 19th century, as military advocates combined with big businessmen to promote major weapons systems. It was going to be very difficult to stop government growth in this sector. The main point is clear: On a variety of fronts, the industrial revolution introduced a new chapter in the history of government expansion in the West that had begun way back in the Middle Ages. Most industrial protest also looked to a strong state. Workers might hope to win concessions directly from employers, through strikes and union action. Some early forms of socialism assumed that a better society could be introduced without 20

government help, that government itself might be abolished in favor of voluntary action. But by the later 19th century, most union leaders and socialists expected the government to help the working class, by more factory inspection, laws regulating hours of work, and some greater welfare benefits. Obviously, the two political results of industrialization – the encouragement to new government forms and greater democracy, on the one hand, and government expansion, on the other – might potentially clash. An obvious kind of clash occurred in the fury of World War I. In this emergency, industrial government expanded rapidly, commanding unprecedented control over allocation of resources, through rationing and industrial planning, and even labor. Industrial printing presses churned out posters designed to manipulate public opinion, not only to support the war effort but to believe that every hesitation was subversive, that the other side in the conflict was barbaric and evil. In Germany, late in the war, the military effectively took over government control. Here was a precedent that would show up again in the crisis of the depression, particularly again in Germany where the Nazi regime abolished effective democracy and parliament in favor of using the nation‘s great industrial resources to create an unprecedented authoritarian state. Normally, Western nations have continued to try to balance an industrial-strength state with effective parliamentary democracy, but the tension has been quite real, and indeed remains quite real. The industrial revolution had one final effect on the West, in further changing its position in the world. Here, industrialization initially accelerated a longstanding trend toward growing Western power and influence economically, of course, but also militarily and politically. The long-range implications of industrialization at the world level raise a final set of questions about what the industrial revolution and Western civilization have to do with each other. First, economics. Industrialization made it possible for Western countries to flood world markets with cheap manufactured goods, driving out local, traditional manufacturing workers in the process. Early in the 19th century Britain thus captured cloth markets in India and Latin America, displacing hundreds of 21

thousands of workers who could not match the new machines. In return, the West, increased its import of foods, raw materials and some other products from other parts of the world, most of which relied on very cheap labor. Increasing numbers of countries thus became dependent on a world economy under essentially Western control. The gap in living standards between the West and the rest widened steadily, partly because the West got richer, but partly because other areas became poorer. Steamships allowed rapid movements of weapons and troops, and also allowed the West to send gunboats upriver in places like Africa and China. Handfuls of Western troops could and did intervene in various parts of the world, defeating larger local forces. Finally, the tensions industrialization caused in Europe also promoted new outreach in the world at large. Western countries worried about their economic competitiveness, so they sought to dominate foreign supplies and markets. Governments also hoped to distract the urban masses with policies that would demonstrate national superiority and the excitement of conquest. In many places, like Africa and Southeast Asia, these changes were capped by outright political control. The 19th century was the heyday of Western imperialism. These developments had two further consequences. First, they increased the sense, outside the West, that Western civilization stood for power and intervention, and little else. When the Indian leader Gandhi was later asked what he thought about Western civilization, he answered that he thought it would be a very good idea. To Westerners, in the age of imperialism, the West stood for democracy, humanitarianism, high art, solid family life, and not just muscle. But the rest of the world might see it differently. Differences in what Western civilization means persist to an extent even today. But second, the sheer fact of Western dominance forced most parts of the world to 22

consider a fair amount of imitation, in order to limit Western penetration or roll it back. Different societies responded to this challenge in different ways and at different times. China, for example, was slower than Japan. But in general, there was a growing awareness that some aspects of the West had to be copied if possible: these aspects increasingly included military technology and organization; science; at least some components of industrialization; and at least some components of the Western political system including new states functions, like education and public health, and often at least a form of parliamentary and democratic government. Many individuals in societies like Japan also wanted to copy aspects of the West such as sports (Japan was playing American baseball by the 1890s) or consumerism (Japanese department stores began to open by the 1900s, and Western-style clothing spread widely). As this process carried forward, particularly in successful industrial societies like Japan, Western ideas and institutions penetrated considerably. This was a triumph for industrial Western society, but it also made it harder to define what was still Western about the West. The industrial revolution had reduced some aspects of what Western civilization used to involve, like intense Christianity or the classical tradition in the arts. Now, partially Westernized societies arose elsewhere, complete with industry, parliaments, and participation in modern art. What, then, did being Western mean, in the modern world? Does being Western mean more than being modern and industrial, and if a society is modern and industrial is it also Western? These questions can be answered, but they are complex and require careful comparisons. They remind us of the modern success of the West, but also the extent to which industrialization redefined what Western means. Conclusion To sum up: this discussion has tried to expand on what the industrial revolution was and why it was such a big deal historically. It has also tried to talk about its relation to Western civilization. The first part, the big deal part, comes through in technology and also in daily life: almost noone, in industrial societies, lives daily life 23

the same way as his or her counterpart did 200 years ago, whether the subject is children and how many to have, or work, or recreation, of family. The second part, concerning Western civilization, is harder. Industrialization resulted in part from some Western characteristics, but it is important not to overdo this. Certainly, many nonwestern societies have industrialized or are industrializing also. Industrialization in the West carried on some important trends, like changes in government form or the interest in science and secular values. But industrialization also changed what the West means, for example in art, or in the functions of governments. And finally, industrialization changed the Western picture in the world. It increased Western power, at least for a century and a half, but it also made many other societies less different from the West than had been the case earlier. It is not surprising that Westerners and others have some new problems in figuring out what the West is, and what the essential features are, in a modern, industrial context.

Mass Society and New Imperialism, 1870-1914 The paradox that Europe, especially Western Europe, at the turn of the century witnessed unparalleled prosperity and more people were able to partake of the products of industrialization, yet, at the same time, the term ―unemployment,‖ was introduced in the late 1880s. Working-class dissatisfaction and socialist politics were on the rise. Then, there was the paradox that ―reason‖ at a basic level had finally triumphed as most nations were finally providing elementary education to the majority of the population and democracy—in the form of extensions of the franchise and representative political bodies—were spreading. But at the same time the culture of the Enlightenment—belief in human goodness and perfectibility, in progress—were questioned as theories of race promoted new ideas of inequality. The paradox that Western powers dominated the globe militarily, economically and politically, yet the mood in the capitals of major European powers was that the

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respective power (read England, France, Germany) was under threat, struggling to survive in a hostile world. This lecture focuses on the period 1870-1914, a time of great paradox. In this lecture, I will: First, provide a framework for understanding the social and economic history of the period between the clear emergence of the urban industrial system and the early 20th century—a period often referred to by its French name, the fin de siècle—turn of the century. Isolating key aspects of this period I will focus on the development of what has been called “mass society‖—the emergence of new forms of large scale information, manufacturing and distribution, political participation, and social and cultural possibilities. The second salient feature of this period that I will focus on extensively is the growth of the ―New Imperialism‖ in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Let me suggest first, that my emphasis on paradoxes represents my view that the fin-de-siècle is a mixed story of achievement and prosperity alongside significant problems and—especially when looking at the race to acquire imperial possessions—some of the most troubling legacies of Western civilization. Second, I find that the notion of paradox is itself a profoundly fin-de-siècle concept—indeed, one could argue that the cultural challenge of the age was to understand and position oneself among the many paradoxes the period posed. Mid-century transition Industrialization brought about profound and often conflicting changes. The first half of the nineteenth century was a turbulent period—new economic processes and relationships and political movements aimed at enlarging the ranks of enfranchised male citizens marked this time. Between the 1850s and the 1880s, however, a relative calm seemed to have settled. This period saw a greater acceptance of the new economy and its new elite—the bourgeoisie, or the urban dwelling capitalist and professional middle classes. It is often this period that many commentators 25

then and now have in mind when they imagine an opulent (and often stuffy!) minutely regulated Victorian culture. Indeed, to symbolize the middle decades of the century we often turn to the Crystal Palace, a sort of World‘s Fair, held in London in 1851 to celebrate the technological and economic achievements of the age. Fin de Siècle and Mass Society That rosy glow cast by the middle decades of the nineteenth century had not exactly faded by the 1880s, but it was framed differently. There was a growing feeling of tension among many Europeans. There are many reasons for this. Let‘s examine some of the main characteristics of the period to locate the sources of tensions. First there were economic changes. More people produced and consumed more goods at cheaper prices—in relative terms—than at any previous time in European history. New housing was built— such as in Paris, in the 1860s, where Baron Haussmann, razed many of the older, narrow streets of the French capital and replaced them with grand boulevards lined by graceful and comfortable bourgeois homes. Like Paris, London in the 1880s was a grand city, a fine capital offering elegance, refined culture and all the pleasures of modernity. Yet the cities—which now constituted home for the majority of the people in more and more countries— continued to be identified with the problems associated with class divisions and poverty. Paradoxically, this was a period that witnessed ―a rediscovery of poverty‖—fully one third of the population was believed to be living below a level adequate for subsistence. This situation was chronicled in the minutely detailed studies conducted by social scientists as well as in the more sensationalist exposes of journalists and others—the most famous of these exposes was titled the ―Bitter Cry of Outcast London.‖ written in 1884 by a minister, the Reverend Andrew Mearns. Another crucial economic aspect of the era was the new scale of mass production. From the 1870s, there was significant turmoil in the agricultural economy.

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Improved transportation and communication introduced greater imports and exports of agricultural products. The wheat fields of the United States could now feed Europe; so could cattle from South America, and so on. This hit farmers hard, especially smaller farmers, who could not afford new machinery and barely eked a living. However, foreign competition in large-scale agriculture led to cheaper prices that benefited urban populations. Nevertheless, the slump in agricultural prices could—and sometimes did—have a destabilizing effect, on the entire economy. The slump further undermined small farmers in many countries thus giving way to greater agricultural concentrations in some countries, such as Britain and the United States. As domestic demand declined the depressed agricultural population was now less able to afford new machinery and thus less able to enjoy the benefits of industrialization. The cycles of boom and bust no longer seemed aberrations— they were beginning to be understood as part and parcel of modern industrial capitalist economies. The fin-de-siècle is sometimes referred to as a ―Second Industrial Revolution.‖ This was a period of change and economic development built upon the first phase, yet distinct from, the industrialization which took place 50 years earlier. This Second Industrial Revolution was based more in heavy industries, particularly steel, engineering, and chemicals. During this time, England was joined and even superseded by Germany and the United States as leading industrial powers and strong global competitors. Greater economic competition between nations was accompanied by a greater concentration of capital, labor force, and companies within specific sectors. This was the age of cartels and trusts, the combination of firms or corporations formed by a legal agreement; esp: one that reduces or threatens to reduce competition. It was also the age of the emergence of what has been termed monopoly capitalism: the capitalist economic system characterized by small groups of people or companies possessing control over a commodity or industry. This trend can be seen at many levels. In the late 1800‘s, the first department stores appear. (Galeries Lafayette; Harrod‘s) The late 1800s also saw the first grocery chains, for example, Sainsbury‘s in England. In the United States, the Great Atlantic and 27

Pacific Tea Company—or the A&P—which opened in 1859 and by the 1880s had stores stretching from the East Coast to the Midwest. By 1900, A&P had 200 stores, in 1925 it could boast 14,000. Monopoly capitalism also developed in the chemical industry.

The German Bayer

Company incorporated in 1881 into the larger chemical conglomerate Farbenfabriken.

By 1925 further growth and concentration would make

Farbenfabriken the world‘s largest chemical cartel. Monopolies were the trend in the sugar industry, petroleum, and the manufacture of soap and matches. The paradox here? The resulting monopolies could introduce greater efficiency and lower prices; but they could also produce price fixing and reduce competition, especially by marginalizing or pushing out the small producer. The independent corner grocery store and the small clothing store were often unable to stand up against industrial giants. And concentration did not guarantee stability—for if one of these giants encountered rough waters (in an economic sense) the ripple effect could feel like a tidal wave on the economy. Originally it was hoped that an industrial society could unlock the secret of how to stabilize supply, demand and distribution and somehow—miraculously?—produce prosperity and balance. But it seemed, instead, that industrialization brought instability, unemployment, and cyclical depressions. Democracy and liberal politics In addition to dramatic changes in the structure of the economy, another contributing factor that explains the tensions of the fin de siècle is disillusionment with the growth of democracy and liberal politics. By the 1880s some sort of franchise, or voting rights, for male workers had been established in most countries. In Britain for instance, an act passed in 1863 extended the vote to most stable male workers with a fixed residence. About two thirds of adult males could now vote. A further act, passed in 1884 extended the vote to agricultural laborers and other pockets of working-class men. Though a truly universal male franchise would have to wait for the 1900s, after 1884 it is fair to say that men of all classes had been enfranchised. Here‘s the paradox, this did not in fact translate into power 28

and access. Workers supported and looked to the Liberal Party to represent them. Politicians like William Gladstone and Joseph Chamberlain seemed to respond to their needs. William Gladstone was the popular Liberal party leader who stood for national self-determination and a laissez faire system tempered by a caring government. Joseph Chamberlain was the mayor of Birmingham who, as a Liberal party member of parliament, sought to use government power to provide services and improve living conditions. Nevertheless, both at the local and national level, the established political parties did not welcome working class participation and few working class representatives were elected to governing bodies. Furthermore, Gladstone and Chamberlain notwithstanding, late Victorians remained extremely reluctant to use the state to address social problems. The French Third Republic and Germany‘s Bismarck government grappled with similar issues. And although Germany proved more willing to experiment with state power, in all major industrial nations, this period witnessed a growing interest in the establishment of distinctly working class and even socialist political parties. Cultural changes The third and final characteristic that helps explain the tensions of the fin-de-siècle is cultural change. The economic and political changes we‘ve already examined came together and combined with other potent forces in the cultural arena. The end product was a set of striking fin-de-siècle cultural phenomena that collectively put a distinctive stamp on mass culture. Here, again, we can see the impact of the forces promoting concentration in growing urban centers creating new forms of expression as well as new forms of manipulation. Take, for example, the development of the mass press. The average Western European of the 1890s had achieved a basic literacy, thanks to the effect of compulsory elementary education that had been established in many countries. These new readers presented a new and potentially lucrative market, a market that was quickly provided for. In both Britain and the United States ―press barons‖ emerged such as Alfred Harmsworth in Britain, and William Randolph Hearst in the US. These men produced inexpensive newspapers which combined simple language, and short articles with vivid, often sensationalist imagery to feed the craving for information and diversion. It worked. 29

Circulation shot up.

Founded in 1896, Harmsworth‘s paper, the Daily Mail, was

selling more than 500,000 copies a day within three years—more than twice the number of copies sold by any other paper before. At peak points during the Boer War, circulation climbed to 1 million copies. Among Harmsworth‘s lasting innovations was the tabloid, a newspaper that was half the size of the traditional newspaper page allowing easier handling. It was a format more in line with the simplified approach of the popular mass press. Now the growth of a mass press, in and of itself, is undoubtedly a good thing. Western societies hold dear the concept of freedom of the press. The more accessible print is to the people, the more that concept can be realized. But this general truth has to be tempered. The mass press was not necessarily free—the press barons not only made huge profits, but they also wielded enormous power. Courted by politicians, press barons could mold public opinion and did not hesitate to do so. In the United States ―yellow journalism‖—a term coined to describe sensationalist scandal oriented writing—took credit for pushing the country into war with Cuba in 1898. Hearst‘s paper, the Morning Journal—was embroiled in a circulation war with another New York paper. To boost sales, the Journal exaggerated and exacerbated the political tensions between the United States and Spain. When war finally broke out, Hearst took credit in a headline asking ―How do you like the Journal’s War?‖ When an illustrator sent out to provide images of war atrocities reported back that he could find none to draw, Hearst reportedly answered: ―You furnish the pictures and I‘ll furnish the war.‖ So, the mass press provided information to people previously outside of the reading public—but it did not use this opportunity to enhance the possibilities of the masses to express themselves, but rather, to promote particular agendas and to inflame passions, often for destructive ends. In addition to the paradoxes of the mass press, there are many examples of paradoxes in late 1800s mass culture. Let me single out one other crucial aspect of the mass culture of this period, new consumer opportunities -- especially for women. This is the era when mass consumerism reached new levels, fueled by new production and distribution methods as well as by rising living standards among 30

many urban groups. The growth of advertising accompanied this new consumerism. Today we consider many of the advertisements of that period as significant forms of artistic expression. Then, as today, appeals to consumers could be read as invitations to spend money frivolously, to look for fulfillment outwardly in materials goods, rather than inwardly to spiritual growth or personal development. But, paradoxically, consumerism had its utopian aspects as well. For women, the opportunity to go out and shop in the bustling urban downtowns really was a significant freedom. Instead of being relegated to the home and rigidly chaperoned, women now could enjoy the previously male privileges of free movement on public conveyances, and huge department stores devoted to their pleasure. A French novelist, Emile Zola, titled a work dealing with department stores Au Bonheur des dames—which roughly translates ―The Ladies' Paradise.‖ Women could relax in restaurants and tearooms catering especially to them, they could enjoy themselves at the theater, the music hall, or, by the early 1900s, at the movies. These pleasures were easily compatible with bourgeois family ideology that defined women as first and foremost wives and mothers, not independent citizens or workers. But the sense of freedom and opportunity provided by expanded public activities inspired women to imagine new identities, to search for and explore new social and political arrangements. The new service and consumer-oriented economy not only took women‘s money, it also paid them by providing new jobs for women. The department stores employed female sales clerks and many stores even provided dormitories for their female employees. New forms of communication—the telegraph and telephone, for instance—also provided white-collar work for women. These women kept the new consumer economy going; they also turned around and participated in it. Women‘s roles were changing. They were the new service workers -- a group that included nurses and teachers, as well as women in retail and office work. Many middle class women developed a niche for themselves in philanthropic work. A smaller group of middle class women pursued secondary and higher education in new high schools and colleges devoted expressly to expanding women‘s 31

opportunities. Even smaller numbers sought to break down the barriers against women in traditionally male occupations such as medicine and journalism. Put all of these women together, and provide them with activities that make them visible in the heart of the great cities—then, indeed, you can understand why contemporaries were fascinated with what they perceived to be a novel social group, what they termed ―New Women.‖ Women’s Suffrage Feminism can trace its roots at least back to the French Revolution, but the sustained effort to grant women voting rights was of more recent origin. Women‘s suffrage was first formally raised in British Parliament in the 1860s by the leading Liberal theorist John Stuart Mill. By the 1890s feminists were in a relatively strong position to launch a mass suffrage movement. Building upon advances in women‘s education, their greater occupational presence, and their generally increased participation in public life, a broad spectrum of women‘s organizations joined together in 1897 to form the National Union of Women‘s Suffrage Societies. The NUWSS was an umbrella organization claiming a combined membership in the tens of thousands. Committed to lawful, ―constitutional‖ means, the NUWSS launched a campaign to pressure politicians to pass a Parliamentary bill granting adult women the right to vote. After the Liberal party came to power in Britain in 1906, the hopes of suffrage activists mounted since they expected the Liberals—and their working class Labor allies—to be more favorable to their cause. Nevertheless, by the early 1900s a number of women had grown disillusioned with the politics of polite petitioning. IN 1903, women eager to see more rapid progress formed the Women‘s Social and Political Union. Under the leadership of the charismatic Emmeline Pankhurst and her strong-minded daughters Sylvia and Christabel, the WSPU developed a more ―militant‖ style of political activity. The WSPU joined in mass demonstrations. These were impressive and striking events. Visually very savvy, the demonstrators filled the streets of London with powerful images of women‘s achievements and of their need for a political voice. Taking to the street in this fashion was a huge step for women. Remember that women were still supposed to be the guardians of the home, of private spaces and domestic life— 32

they did not belong on the dirty and dangerous streets. And, indeed the streets were, if not exactly dangerous for the demonstrators, at least challenging. Women were jeered and heckled and many suffrage demonstrators were imprisoned. Members of the Women‘s Social and Political Union were ardent participants in all the major suffrage demonstrations. The women of the WSPU—or, as they were derisively called, the ―suffragettes‖ (a term WSPU women adopted for themselves) became renowned among European and American feminists for their destruction of property. Suffragettes broke shop windows in West London; put bombs in mailboxes, poured acid on golf courses, they even slashed paintings, disrupting politicians and public life.

Instead of participating in the Census of 1911, for

instance, some groups of women organized ways of evading the census takers. Many suffragettes continued their political activity even after being imprisoned, by participating in hunger strikes. The militant suffragettes of the WSPU were renowned in many countries. They were connected through international networks, maintaining significant women‘s activism throughout Europe and in the United States. By 1914, the women‘s movement had made significant inroads. But World War I interrupted suffrage activity. Suffrage organizations voluntarily put their campaigns on hold as many women devoted their energies to the war effort. A minority used the international connections that had been established over the years of suffrage campaigning to mount a women‘s pacifist movement. By the end of World War I women in Britain, the United States, Germany, and Russia, among others achieved at least partial suffrage. The sight of respectable middle class women taking to the streets—even committing acts of violence and going to jail—was shocking to late Victorians. But women were not the only people dissatisfied with their lot. The years from 1880 to 1914 saw other forms of protest as well. The capitals of Europe were home to discontented workers in search of better work places and a greater voice in determining the conditions of their lives.

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Many nations were challenged by minority populations seeking greater selfdetermination. Britain encountered this challenge in Ireland. Here we see Irish leader Charles Stuart Parnell addressing an independence meeting.

Germany had

to contend with dissatisfied French in Alsace and Lorraine, two regions Germany controlled after the Franco Prussian War of 1870. France was awash in antisemitism as demonstrated by the Dreyfus affair where a Jewish French Army Captain was falsely accused of treason. The Austro-Hungarian Empire sought to control numerous groups of seething Slav nationalists. For the most part, those political challenges did not pose any revolutionary danger. But examining these discontented populations dispels notions that the tensions of the time would be easily resolved. While autocratic governments were continuously pressured to allow reform, liberal, urban, industrial societies were also faced with dissatisfied, vocal and, increasingly organized masses. Changes in Geo-Political Landscape—New Imperialism Let‘s now change our focus to the changes developing in the geopolitical landscape and the rise of New Imperialism. The first half of the 19th century can justly be considered as dominated by Britain. Having emerged least disrupted by the French Revolution and wars with Napoleon, its economic transformation and relative political stability put it in an enviable position when compared to the more volatile situation in France, or the disunited state of Germany. From its superior position, in the mid-century Britain espoused a policy of free trade trade based on the unrestricted international exchange of goods with tariffs used only as a source of revenue. Nations were not supposed to put up stiff tariffs against the merchandise of other nations or to provide unfair support to domestic industries. Instead, the belief was that a market as unfettered as possible should be allowed to determine the movement and prices of goods across national boundaries.b> In the middle decades of the century, ―free trade‖ essentially equaled British supremacy. By the last decades of the 19th century Britain was no longer able to set such favorable terms for itself. A very different political and economic map of Europe emerged. The rivalries and struggle for domination that ensued led to what has been called 34

New Imperialism. Italy and Germany had unified into stronger nations. The United States, France, and Germany—especially Germany -- were challenging Britain‘s global economic position. Free trade was challenged as new industrial powers introduced tariffs to protect and stimulate domestic industries. This challenge was also played out in global competition for colonial expansion, especially in Africa and Asia. Though empires and imperialism have old and complex histories, those histories are not continuous or linear. In order to understand different phases of massive conquest and empire building, we have to look at specific periods and the contexts within which those empires were built. The late Nineteenth Century is considered a specific phase of imperialism, different from the earlier European mercantilist imperialism which was primarily identified with the conquest of the New World and which ended symbolically, with the American Revolution and subsequent independence movements. The ―New Imperialism‖ of the turn of the century was different in many ways. It was a product of the struggle of modern, industrial or industrializing nations to achieve global domination. New Imperialism was also a product of the many problems modern industrial societies faced—unemployment, economic depression, the search for new markets and new sources of riches and resources. New Imperialism was defined by the carving up of Africa among European nations. It was also, in many ways, ―irrational,‖ producing few political and diplomatic 35

advantages for many of the participating nations. In addressing this new imperialism, I will focus on the British Empire, though I will be drawing in comparisons with the activities and interest of other nations. The focus on the British Empire is more than just a convenience. The British created the largest empire. Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Holland all created empires, but their size and scope could not hope to compete with Britain -- an empire on which the sun never set, they proudly claimed, because it stretched all around the globe. By the end of the 19th century, the British Empire comprised nearly one-quarter of the world's land surface and more than one-quarter of its total population. By the 1870s Britain already had extensive imperial possessions—the settler colonies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Jamaica and others; spheres of influence in Asia; and, ―the jewel in the crown, ‖ India. In the mid-century India had indeed witnessed two decisive turning points in the development of British imperialism: first, the brutal suppression of the Indian Mutiny —also known as the Sepoy rebellion. Sepoy is the term for native troops serving in the British military. The rebellion broke out because the British military used both lard and beef tallow to grease gun cartridges. The cartridges had to be bitten off and were thus offensive to both Muslim and Hindu troops whose religious beliefs prohibited them from eating animals and animal byproducts. This specific issue sparked a large scale rebellion which was not only put down, but which resulted in the British government establishing direct control over India, taking over from the British East India Company which had ruled the colony since the 1700s. Here we see a mutineer being executed. The second turning point occurred nearly two decades later when the Conservative Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli proclaimed Queen Victoria Empress of India. This act may have been symbolic, since the British already exerted control—but the symbolism was significant, demonstrating the new and increased interest in imperialism. This growing interest can be traced at many levels. In practice, the actual empire was growing even before the ―official‖ rise of New Imperialism. Crises over access 36

to the Suez Canal resulted in the British establishing control not only over Egypt, but also over the Sudan. Imperialism played a greater role in public discourse as well. Prime Minister Disraeli himself is credited with spurring a greater interest in imperialism in a speech he gave at the Crystal Palace in 1872. In his speech Disraeli painted a special destiny for Britain, one as not just a major Continental power, but a future ―where your sons, when they rise, rise to paramount positions, and obtain not merely the esteem of their countrymen, but command the respect of the world…‖ By the 1880s public political discourse was very much focused on questions of Britain‘s dominion over other areas. The most immediate and urgent aspect of this discussion focused on the fate of Ireland. Rent strikes, rural unrest and British coercion—all marked Anglo-Irish relations in this period and motions to grant Home Rule—a measure of domestic self-government—to Ireland failed in the 1880s and 1890s. Introduced by Liberals in the Gladstonian wing of the party, Home Rule led to a split in the Liberal Party. Among the many prominent politicians to break over the issue of Home Rule was Joseph Chamberlain. To Chamberlain and others like him, relinquishing control over Ireland spelled British withdrawal from its imperial destiny. Subsequent to his break over Home Rule, Chamberlain became a more and more adamant imperialist and eventually served as Colonial Secretary in the 1890s. We will return to Chamberlain‘s imperial policies shortly. Two other staunch imperialist voices—voices speaking in different ways and at a different pitches—were those of Cecil Rhodes and Rudyard Kipling. Kipling, represented usually by his poem ―The White Man‘s Burden‖ spoke for empire as a responsibility—an unwelcome one, as presented in the poem—that white people from the West had to take on in order to help the lower races of the world to improve their lot. Rhodes spoke in more strident tones: the white race—especially the British—was both unquestionably superior and engaged in a life and death struggle for survival with the darker races of the world. The spread of British rule, according to Rhodes, seen here in a contemporary cartoon was not only just, but it was also imperative because the British needed greater economic outlets and places where its population could establish themselves. For both Kipling and Rhodes 37

(who, by the way, were personal friends) the concept of b>race—of biologically distinct human populations—was crucial. They and others of their generation took Darwinian theories of evolution and sought to apply them to contemporary social conditions—an intellectual/social stance known as social Darwinism, the application of evolutionary principles to racial and ethnic groups, meaning that some races and ethnic groups deemed ―fitter‖ and more worthy of survival than others. According to Social Darwinism, different populations, countries, cultures—all were not just variations on the general theme of humanity, but rungs on the steep ladder of civilization. At the top of the ladder belonged Western European whites (perhaps joined by Americans); below them in ―scientific‖ order were the supposedly less intelligent and less civilized populations of the globe. According to Social Darwinists, because of their cunning and greater numbers (numbers which were increasing at a faster rate of growth than the rate of growth of the European population) the lower races were serious threats to white civilization—whites were engaged in a Darwinian struggle to survive, to maintain their rightfully superior position. These concepts of race were crucial both as motivating forces behind imperial expansion and for the way they shaped British society and culture (of which more later). Although they provide only part of the rationale contemporaries used to promote imperial expansion, these ideas were powerful because they were not just espoused by prominent individuals but were capable of combining with other explanations that promoted imperial expansion. And those explanations abounded. Empire was necessary, it was argued, in order to: --- develop new markets for European goods which might otherwise flood Western markets due to the tendency to overproduce on the part of large scale enterprises --- search for new sources of raw materials whether mineral, agricultural or other --- provide outlets for surplus domestic populations—young men who could not establish themselves within the crowded European social structure would find opportunities in imperial economic ventures and imperial administration 38

--- bring Christianity and Western civilization to populations suffering in ignorance and heathenism All of these reasons had their proponents and efforts linked to them. None of these reasons would actually pan out. The various costs of imperial adventures were often greater than the rewards, although in specific cases great fortunes and opportunities were realized and certain sectors of European society—the armaments industry for example—were net beneficiaries. In the final analysis, perhaps the greatest stimulus to imperial expansion was the least amenable to being pinned down: the diplomatic and strategic struggles of various European powers which impelled them to measure their strength in terms of the square miles of territory they controlled. But perhaps the most central feature distinguishing new imperialism was that it reflected the fierce competition among European nations for supremacy. Free Trade and liberal views of nationalism were giving way to ―struggles for survival‖ and mastery which were fought out not in Continental wars, but in the race for new imperial possessions. In this process Britain built the largest Empire and claimed the most territory in the ―Scramble for Africa‖ which dominated the imperial politics of the 1880s and 1890s. It is to that ―scramble‖ that we now turn to. Scramble for Africa Responding to frustrated nationalism within Europe and the economic/strategic anxieties arising out of the increased competition between nations, European powers saw African conquest as a way bolster their geo-political positions. Two meetings in the German capital of Berlin provide a sense of these developments. In 1878 Bismarck called the major European powers to the city in order to work out a settlement that would bring peace to the Balkans. Various adjustments were made to the territories claimed by various Balkan nations, numerous powers both gained and lost spheres of influence, nationalist aspirations were both met and limited as a result. Perfect diplomacy, it would seem, a process which seemed to stabilize the region. But in fact, the acceptance of limits on the European continent spurred the 39

powers to search out other areas which they could claim as theirs and Africa seemed the ―logical‖ place to do so. Only a few years after the meeting called to arrange a Balkan peace, the great powers met again in Berlin, in 1884. Called together to settle competing claims to African territory by Belgium, Portugal and France, this Berlin Conference laid down ground rules for what would constitute legitimate dominion in Africa by a European power. After this conference merely planting one‘s flag was not sufficient—―economic development‖ also had to be undertaken in the region. Again, it would seem that diplomacy worked, but it worked to continue the already begun scramble and it clearly ―worked‖ to legitimate European claims to a continent where native rulers and native populations were almost completely disregarded. Whether the process even made sense to European rulers is not clear: in 1898 the French President remarked ―We have behaved like madmen in Africa, having been led astray by irresponsible people called the ‗colonialists.‘‖ Let‘s turn to the efforts of the British in Southern Africa in order to both get a sense of how the scramble unfolded in a specific area and because Southern African was such a crucial area—not ―typical‖ but of great significance to world politics at the time and into our own day. European presence in Southern Africa had its origins well before the late 19th century. Settlers of Dutch origin—known as Boers—were coming to the region even before the 1700s. By the end of the 18th century they had significant white settlements, most notably the Cape colony, and they developed a distinct language—Afrikaans—and a culture hostile both to the Africans and the Dutch 40

government of the Cape. Primarily agricultural, the Boers were building a white enclave in Southern Africa. In 1806 Britain gained control of the Cape Colony as a result of the Napoleonic Wars, thus spurring a Boer Great Trek into the interior, into the area of the Transvaal, as a disgruntled response to the British imposed abolition of slavery. Recognized by the British as an independent state in 1852, the Boers developed an agricultural society governed by strict apartheid—strict inequality in both Church and State between black and white populations. Conflict between Boers and the British—which were never totally absent—escalated after 1867 when first significant deposits of both gold and diamonds were discovered Boer areas. By the 1880s British fortune hunters—prime among them Cecil Rhodes—flocked to the area, increasing the British population, challenging Boer authority and pressuring the British to extend their authority. Rhodes was a crucial player in this process, seeking both personal wealth and the promotion of his imperial vision which wanted to ―paint the map red‖ [meaning to claim the world for Britain] and establish a railway linking the whole African continent… from the Cape to Cairo Rhodes had the support of both the British crown and the British government. From the 1880s on, acting for the British Cape government, Rhodes sought to extent British interests north and to supplant Boer rule with British control. The tactics employed in doing so were varied: whether he was negotiating treaties between whites and Africans, or spurring the British to press for political rights and representation in Boer areas. Though he met with criticism and setbacks, Rhodes‘s goals were popular in the Colonial Office (especially after Chamberlain took control) and among British imperialists.

Chamberlain‘s accomplishments will

have spilled more blood in Africa than champagne in Kimberly. By the late 1890s, tensions between the British and the Boers had fermented to the point of war and between 1899 and 1902 Southern Africa was wracked by a war between the two white settler groups over who would exert control over the riches and native populations of the region. It was a war watched and commented upon by all of Europe. The Boer War pitted a British force of about 500,000 against a Boer force of at most 87,000 Boers and Boer supporters.

Given the inequality in

number one would think that the British could accomplish an easy victory. This was 41

not the case. Boer forces knew the terrain better, and they controlled the local agriculture. The Boers managed to trap the British in key cities—Kimberly, Mafeking and Ladysmith—and impose a siege that lasted for months. British inefficiency was glaringly exposed. And when the tide did turn in favor of the British, it exposed their adoption of brutal methods. To defeat the Boers the British instituted a ―scorched earth policy‖ where they burned Boer farms and forced Boer—and African—families into ―concentration camps.‖ Note that although we associate the term and the practice of employing such camps with the Nazis in World War II, their first appearance was actually in the Boer War. In the camps some 25,000 Afrikaner women and children died of malnutrition and disease; some 14,000 Africans died in separate camps. Instead of representing the triumph of Western Civilization, these camps and the British victory they promoted were seen as the deployment of barbarism by many pro-Boer ―anti-imperialists‖ in Britain and in Europe more generally. The Boer War and the British victory, which was finalized in 1902, can be seen as the point at which the cost and injustice of imperialism was finally forced into the public European discourse, raising public doubts about the whole imperial enterprise. Consequences and Legacies of Imperialism New Imperialism encountered opposition. In all European nations there were politicians who saw imperial expansion as an unnecessary drain on national resources and did not equate territorial expansion with national greatness. By the early 1900s opposition to European expansion had created new understandings of the nature of modern industrial societies that went well beyond previous antiimperialist sentiments. Let us look at two different anti-imperialist theorists and see how they argued against the imperial conquests of their time. John Hobson was a young British journalist with political aspirations and liberal views in the early 1900s. In 1902, in the shadow of the Boer War, he wrote Imperialism, A Study. Aware of the entrenched poverty and dissatisfaction of many working class citizens, he urged the country to focus on improving domestic social conditions. For Hobson, imperialism did not bring wealth and glory to the country. Instead, it benefited narrow, wealthy interest groups, such as the banking establishment and 42

armaments manufacturers, draining resources out of the hands of the people. Instead of imperialism, he urged policy makers to consider investing in the national economy and increasing the buying power of the average family as a way of promoting economic growth. For instance, if workers were paid more, they would be more active consumers thus increasing domestic demand which would in turn stimulate the growth of domestic industry, leading manufacturers to require more workers who would then be able to keep the cycle going—economic growth would occur without the costs, both financial and social, of imperial conquest. Vladimir Lenin, a leading Russian communist, active in international socialist circles agreed with many aspects of Hobson‘s analysis, but pushed it further. In Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, written during World War I, Lenin disagreed with Hobson on the possibility of capitalism reforming itself. Instead the problems Hobson identified, and many others were, argued Lenin, intrinsic to capitalism‘s drive to expand its reach while denying workers its benefits. Though criticism of imperialism was a part of turn of the century political discussion, it was a discussion that was both relatively marginal—it did not command the same kind of attention and support as pro-imperialist views—and the critiques of imperialism had their own, internal limits. For instance, in the Boer War, opposition to the War focused primarily on the unfair ways the white Boers were treated; concern for the fate of native Africans was less evident and less outraged. Instead, they were relegated to the background while the white Boers, a small minority of the population compared to the native African population, were portrayed as the true victims of the war. But there were unintended—though very predictable—consequences for the Europeans as well. Europeans met with opposition from the local rulers and people wherever they went. The Egyptian cartoon on your screen right now, showing how the French and the British benefited from their brutal treatment of Morocco and Egypt, is clear in its anger and rejection of European conquest. By the middle of the 20th century, such sentiments would fuel mass native anticolonial movements,

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leading to the formation of independent states in most of the areas which had been claimed by Europeans at the end of the 19th century Domestic imperialism Imperialism was not just a political policy of expansion and rule over foreign areas; it was a way of life shaping the practices and attitudes of both the conquered and the conquerors. In Britain, the language of imperialism and race permeated daily life. Politicians exhorted the people to support a policy—such as providing free lunches to poor schoolchildren—in order to ensure that the British at home would themselves be fit and worthy of being considered an ―imperial race,‖ a people who could claim superiority over the rest of the world. Imperialism also changed the way Europe looked and the ways Europeans saw things. Advertisements used imperial imagery—scantily dressed ―natives,‖ or lush ―primitive‖ settings—when they wanted something to seem exotic and both strange and alluring. But there were other influences as well: Europeans learned from and even appropriated the cultures of the people they conquered. Pablo Picasso, for instance, the great 20th century artist, was clearly influenced by African art works which had started to be exhibited in Europe. His great painting,the ―Demoiselles of Avignon‖ painted in 1907 and usually considered the first example of Cubist painting, a style that experimented with new ways of using geometric shapes to represent both the visual and more emotional aspects of reality—drew on traditional African sculpture. Picasso‘s ability to draw inspiration from African art was clearly an enriching process for European art. What was troubling about it was that the inspiration came with a big price tag—it was based on exploitation, and it did not produce many benefits or rewards for the Africans themselves. African culture was still deemed inferior, but Picasso was considered a great master. Conclusions As empires go, the vast dominions created at the end of the 19th century were short-lived—less than a 100 years later most of the British, French and other empires had been dismantled. But formal dissolution is only part of the story, for 44

we are still very much a world living in the shadow of those empires—indeed many analysts talk of today as an era of ―post-colonialism‖ or ―post-imperialism‖ (post meaning ―after‖)—a world still shaped by imperialism even if the formal control of territories around the globe is no longer the dominant political and military practice. We see the legacy in many different ways: Let‘s consider the recent history of South Africa. In the 1980s, the policy of apartheid was challenged by South African blacks—many of them not even out of high school—and a jailed lawyer and political activist, Nelson Mandela, symbolized the fight against that entrenched system of inequality. In the West, universities, companies and individuals were confronted by a strong anti-apartheid movement that urged boycotting the apartheid system by withdrawing from all investment that supported the regime. By the 1990s, in the West and elsewhere people had abandoned their South African investments; instead of investing in the region, they had been divested; international opinion was against the regime, and even within the South African government many were acknowledging the need for reform. By the 1990s Nelson Mandela had not only been released from prison, but had became the President of South Africa; today the country is struggling to develop a just, multi-racial society. But the poverty and social inequities built over generations are harder to root out and combined with a devastating AIDS epidemic, South African blacks still find themselves poor and with limited prospects. The legacy of imperialism is evident in the West as well. The period since the end of the Second World War has been one of significant global migrations, and a large part of those migrations have been of ―(ex)colonial subjects‖ from the Third World seeking to find work and settle in the First World, in the West. There have also been many political refugees—persons escaping from countries where they faced political and social persecution. In many cases the movement was from ex-colony to ―mother country‖—Indians and Jamaicans to Britain; Algerians, Vietnamese and West Africans to France; Philippines and Cubans to the United States. The United States has been the destination of many of these groups and we are currently in the midst of trying to understand how to create a national identity that benefits from and builds on the rich diversity as well as the complex histories of peoples 45

from all over the world. Like Europeans in the late 19th century we hope to ensure continuous prosperity and national well-being. Perhaps this time around, with knowledge of the accomplishments as well as the more tragic aspects of the fin de siècle, pursuing prosperity and a positive identity as a nation will not be at the expense of others around the world. That is one of the major challenges facing all of us.

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“Scramble for Africa”

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