'&2)2

‫ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻘﺎﺕ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻱ ‪ /‬ﺩﻭﺭﻩ ‪ ،53‬ﺷﻤﺎﺭﺓ ‪ ،3‬ﭘﺎﻳﻴﺰ ‪ /97‬ﺹ ‪513-542‬‬

‫ﻣﺪﻝﺳﺎﺯﻱ ﺗﺮﺟﻴﺤﺎﺕ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸﮕﺎﻫﻲ‪ :‬ﻣﻌﺮﻓﻲ ﻭ‬ ‫ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸﮕﺎﻫﻲ‬ ‫‪1‬‬

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‫ﻋﻠﻴﺮﺿﺎ ﺟﻠﻴﻠﻲ ﻣﺮﻧﺪ ‪ ،‬ﻣﺤﻤﺪﻋﻠﻲ ﻣﺘﻔﻜﺮ ﺁﺯﺍﺩ ‪ ،‬ﻓﻴﺮﻭﺯ ﻓﻼﺣﻲ‬ ‫‪ .1‬ﺩﺍﻧﺸﺠﻮﻱ ﺩﻛﺘﺮﺍ‪alireza. [email protected] ،‬‬ ‫‪ .2‬ﺍﺳﺘﺎﺩ‪ ،‬ﺩﺍﻧﺸﮕﺎﻩ ﺗﺒﺮﻳﺰ‪m. [email protected] ،‬‬ ‫‪ .3‬ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻴﺎﺭ‪ ،‬ﺩﺍﻧﺸﮕﺎﻩ ﺗﺒﺮﻳﺰ‪[email protected] ،‬‬ ‫ﺗﺎﺭﻳﺦ ﺩﺭﻳﺎﻓﺖ‪ 1395/08/17 :‬ﺗﺎﺭﻳﺦ ﭘﺬﻳﺮﺵ‪1396/10/05 :‬‬

‫ﭼﻜﻴﺪﻩ‬ ‫ﺗﺤﻠﻴﻞﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻱ ﻣﻌﻤﻮﻻً ﺑﺮ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻓﺮﺽ ﻛﻪ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺑﻪ ﺩﻧﺒﺎﻝ ﺣﺪﺍﻛﺜﺮ ﻛﺮﺩﻥ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼـﻲ ﻳـﺎ‬ ‫ﻓﺮﺩﻱ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﺳﺘﻮﺍﺭ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻴﺎﻥ ﺷـﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﻭ ﭘﺪﻳـﺪﻩﻫـﺎﻳﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺮﺧـﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺁﺯﻣـﺎﻳﺶﻫـﺎﻱ‬ ‫ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻱ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﻧﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﺑﺎ ﺍﺗﻜﺎ ﺑﺮ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﻧﻤﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﺭﺍ ﺗﻔﺴﻴﺮ ﻭ ﺗﺒﻴﻴﻦ ﻛـﺮﺩ‪ .‬ﺍﻳـﻦ‬ ‫ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻉ ﺳﺒﺐ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﺩﺍﻧﺎﻥ ﺩﺭ ﭘﻲ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎﻱ ﺟﺪﻳﺪﻱ ﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎ ﻋﻼﻭﻩ ﺑـﺮ‬ ‫ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ‪ ،‬ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﻱ ﻣﺎﻧﻨـﺪ ﻋـﺪﺍﻟﺖ‪ ،‬ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠـﻪ ﺑـﻪﻣﺜـﻞ ﻭ ﻧـﻮﻉﺩﻭﺳـﺘﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺭﻓﺘـﺎﺭ ﺍﻓـﺮﺍﺩ‬ ‫ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮﮔﺬﺍﺭ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﻟﻪ ﺳﻪ ﻧﻮﻉ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﻲ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺍﻭﻝ ﻭ ﻣـﺪﻝ ﺩﻭﻡ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻓﺮﺽ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻳﻲ ﺗﻤﺎﻳﻼﺕ ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧﻪ ﻭ ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑﻪ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﻧـﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮ ﺣﺴـﺎﺱ ﻫﺴـﺘﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻣـﺪﻝ‬ ‫ﺳﻮﻡ ﻓﺮﺽ ﺑﺮ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺑﻪ ﺩﻧﺒﺎﻝ ﺣﺪﺍﻛﺜﺮ ﻛﺮﺩﻥ ﺩﺭﻳﺎﻓﺘﻲ )ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ( ﻛﻞ ﻣـﻲﺑﺎﺷـﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ‬ ‫ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﺩﺭﺳﺘﻲ ﻫﺮﻛﺪﺍﻡ ﺍﺯ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎ‪ ،‬ﻳﻚ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﺩﻭﻧﻔﺮﻩ ﺩﺭ ﻗﺎﻟـﺐ ﺑـﺎﺯﻱ ﺩﻳﻜﺘـﺎﺗﻮﺭ ﻃﺮﺍﺣـﻲ ﺷـﺪﻩ‬ ‫ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ )ﺑﺎﺯﻱ( ﻣﻮﺭﺩﻧﻈﺮ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺩﻭ ﮔﺮﻭﻩ ﺍﺯ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﺠﻮﻳﺎﻥ ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ .‬ﻧﺘـﺎﻳﺞ ﺑـﻪﺩﺳـﺖ‬ ‫ﺁﻣﺪﻩ ﻧﺸﺎﻥ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﺪ ﺑﺨﺶ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﺗﻮﺟﻬﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺍﺯ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻋﺪﺍﻟﺖ ﻭ ﻧﻔـﻊ ﺷﺨﺼـﻲ‪ ،‬ﮔﺰﻳﻨـﻪ ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧـﻪ ﺭﺍ‬ ‫ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﻨﺪ‪ ،‬ﻫﺮ ﭼﻨﺪ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪ ﻣﺬﻛﻮﺭ ﭘﻮﻝ ﻛﻢﺗﺮﻱ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﺩﺭ ﭘﻲ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ .‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ‬ ‫ﺍﺳﺘﺤﻜﺎﻡ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ‪ ،‬ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﮔﺮﻭﻩ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﻱ ﺗﻜﺮﺍﺭ ﺷﺪﻩ‪ ،‬ﺑﺎ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺗﻔـﺎﻭﺕ ﻛـﻪ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺑـﺎﺭ ﺍﮔـﺮ ﮔﺰﻳﻨـﻪ‬ ‫ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧﻪ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﺷﻮﺩ ﻧﻪﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﭘﻮﻝ ﻛﻢﺗﺮﻱ ﻧﺼﻴﺐ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﺑﻠﻜﻪ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻉ ﺩﺭﻳﺎﻓﺘﻲﻫﺎ )ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ‬ ‫ﻛﻞ( ﻧﻴﺰ ﻛﻢﺗﺮ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺑﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﺑﺎ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﻃﺒﻖ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﻣﻼﺣﻈﻪ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ ﺳﻬﻢ ﻗﺎﺑـﻞ ﺗـﻮﺟﻬﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻓـﺮﺍﺩ‬ ‫ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪ ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧﻪ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﻨﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻃﺒﻘﻪﺑﻨﺪﻱ ‪C7, A13, D63, D64 :JEL‬‬ ‫ﻭﺍژﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﻛﻠﻴﺪﻱ‪ :‬ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ‪ ،‬ﻋﺪﺍﻟﺖ‪ ،‬ﻛﺎﺭﺍﻳﻲ‪ ،‬ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ‪ ،‬ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺩﻳﻜﺘﺎﺗﻮﺭ‬ ‫‪ .1‬ﺍﺯ ‪ Alvin Roth‬ﺑﻪﺩﻟﻴﻞ ﺍﻳﻨﻜﻪ ﻣﺘﻦ ﺩﺳﺘﻮﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﻤـﻞ ﺁﺯﻣـﺎﻳﺶ ﺍﻧﺠـﺎﻡ ﺷـﺪﻩ ﭘﻴﺮﺍﻣـﻮﻥ ﺑـﺎﺯﻱ ﭘﻴﺸـﻨﻬﺎﺩ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺭ ﺍﺧﺘﻴـﺎﺭ‬ ‫ﻧﮕﺎﺭﻧﺪﮔﺎﻥ ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﺩﺍﺩﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﺻﻤﻴﻤﺎﻧﻪ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﺸﺎﻥ ﻗﺪﺭﺩﺍﻧﻲ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﻫﻤﭽﻨﻴﻦ ﺗﺸﻜﺮ ﻭﻳﮋﻩ ﺍﺯ ‪ Gray Bolton‬ﺑﻪﺩﻟﻴـﻞ‬ ‫ﺭﺍﻫﻨﻤﺎﻳﻲﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺎﺕ ﻣﺪﻝ ‪ ERC‬ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫*‪ .‬ﻧﻮﻳﺴﻨﺪﻩ ﻣﺴﺌﻮﻝ‪ ،‬ﺷﻤﺎﺭﻩ ﺗﻤﺎﺱ‪ :‬‬

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‫ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻘﺎﺕ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻱ ‪ /‬ﺩﻭﺭﻩﻱ ‪ ،53‬ﺷﻤﺎﺭﻩﻱ ‪ ،3‬ﭘﺎﻳﻴﺰ ‪1397‬‬

‫‪ -1‬ﻣﻘﺪﻣﻪ‬ ‫ﺍﻣﺮﻭﺯﻩ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸﮕﺎﻫﻲ ﺭﻭﺷﻲ ﭘﺬﻳﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺁﺯﻣـﻮﻥ ﻓﺮﺿـﻴﻪﻫـﺎ ﻭ ﺑﺮﺭﺳـﻲ‬ ‫ﺩﺭﺳﺘﻲ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻱ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﻫﺴﺘﻪ ﻱ ﺍﺻﻠﻲ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸﮕﺎﻫﻲ ﻧﻈﺮﻳﻪ ﺑﺎﺯﻱﻫﺎﺳﺖ ﻭ‬ ‫ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸﮕﺎﻫﻲ ﺑﺴﺘﺮﻱ ﺗﺠﺮﺑـﻲ ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﺟـﺮﺍﻱ ﺑـﺎﺯﻱﻫـﺎ ﻭ ﻣﻘﺎﻳﺴـﻪ ﻧﺘـﺎﻳﺞ ﻋﻤﻠـﻲ ﺑـﺎ‬ ‫ﭘﻴﺶﺑﻴﻨﻲﻫﺎﻱ ﻧﻈﺮﻱ ﺑﻪﺷﻤﺎﺭ ﻣﻲﺭﻭﺩ‪ .‬ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸﮕﺎﻫﻲ ﺩﺭ ﻃﻴﻒ ﻭﺳﻴﻌﻲ ﺍﺯ ﻣﻮﺿـﻮﻋﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﻛﺎﺭﺑﺮﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ ﻛﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﺎﺕ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﻣﻜﺎﻧﺴﻴﻢ ﺑﺎﺯﺍﺭ‪ ،‬ﻧﻈﺮﻳﻪ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺗﻜﺎﻣﻠﻲ‪ ،2‬ﻓﺮﺁﻳﻨـﺪ‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻤﻴﻢﮔﻴﺮﻱ‪ ،‬ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﻣﺎﻟﻲ‪ ،‬ﻳﺎﺩﮔﻴﺮﻱ ﻭ ﺑﺴﻴﺎﺭﻱ ﺍﺯ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻱ ﻭ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻳﻜﻲ ﺍﺯ ﻓﺮﻭﺽ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺍﺳﺘﺎﻧﺪﺍﺭﺩ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸﮕﺎﻫﻲ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺍﻓـﺮﺍﺩ ﺑـﻪ ﺩﻧﺒـﺎﻝ‬ ‫ﺣﺪﺍﻛﺜﺮ ﻛـﺮﺩﻥ ﻧﻔـﻊ ﺷﺨﺼـﻲ‪ 3‬ﻫﺴـﺘﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻋﻤـﻞ ﻧﻴـﺰ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﻣﻮﺿـﻮﻉ ﺗﺄﻳﻴـﺪ ﻣـﻲﺷـﻮﺩ ﻭ‬ ‫ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶﻫﺎﻱ ﻓﺮﺍﻭﺍﻧﻲ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﻧﺪ ﻛـﻪ ﻧﺘـﺎﻳﺞ ﺁﻥﻫـﺎ ﻣﻄـﺎﺑﻖ ﺑـﺎ ﻓـﺮﺽ ﺣﺪﺍﻛﺜﺮﺳـﺎﺯﻱ ﻧﻔـﻊ‬ ‫ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﺑﻮﺩﻩ ﻭ ﺑﺮ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﺳﺎﺱ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺑﻪﺩﺳﺖ ﺁﻣﺪﻩ ﺭﺍ ﺗﻔﺴﻴﺮ ﻭ ﺗﻮﺟﻴﻪ ﻛﺮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻴﺎﻥ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﻧﺪ ﻛﻪ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﺑﺎ ﭘﻴﺶﺑﻴﻨـﻲ ﻣـﺪﻝ ﺍﺳـﺘﺎﻧﺪﺍﺭﺩ‬ ‫ﻧﻈﺮﻳﻪﻱ ﺑﺎﺯﻱﻫﺎ ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺩﻭﺭ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻧﺘﻈﺎﺭ ﺑﺮﺧﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶﻫﺎ ﻛﻪ ﺍﺯ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﺑﺎ ﻋﻨـﻮﺍﻥ‬ ‫ﺷﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺧﺎﺭﺝ ﺍﺯ ﻗﺎﻋﺪﻩ‪ 4‬ﻳﺎﺩ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪ ،‬ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸﮕﺮﺍﻥ ﺭﺍ ﺑﺮ ﺁﻥ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺗﺎ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶﻫـﺎ ﺭﺍ‬ ‫ﺑﺎ ﺩﻗﺖ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﻭ ﻧﻤﻮﻧﻪﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﺘﻨﻮﻉﺗـﺮ ﺍﻧﺠـﺎﻡ ﺩﻫﻨـﺪ؛ ﺍﻣـﺎ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺗﻜﺮﺍﺭﻫـﺎ‪ 5‬ﺩﺭ ﺑﻴﺸـﺘﺮ ﻣـﻮﺍﺭﺩ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺗﻐﻴﻴﺮﻱ ﺩﺭ ﻳﺎﻓﺘﻪﻫﺎﻱ ﻗﺒﻠﻲ ﺍﻳﺠﺎﺩ ﻧﻜﺮﺩﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﺯﺟﻤﻠﻪﻱ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﺯﻱﻫـﺎ ﻣـﻲﺗـﻮﺍﻥ ﺑـﻪ ﺑـﺎﺯﻱ‬ ‫ﺍﻭﻟﺘﻴﻤﺎﺗﻮﻡ‪ ،6‬ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺩﻳﻜﺘﺎﺗﻮﺭ‪ 7‬ﻭ ﺑـﺎﺯﻱ ﻛـﺎﻻﻱ ﻋﻤـﻮﻣﻲ ﺍﺷـﺎﺭﻩ ﻛـﺮﺩ‪) .8‬ﺍﻧـﺪﺭﻭﻧﻲ ﻭ ﺑـﺮﻧﻬﻴﻢ‪،9‬‬ ‫‪(2007‬‬ ‫ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﺍﻧﺘﻈﺎﺭ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﻭ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﺑـﺎ‬ ‫ﭘﻴﺶﺑﻴﻨﻲ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺍﺳﺘﺎﻧﺪﺍﺭﺩ ﺳﺎﺯﮔﺎﺭ ﻧﻤﻲﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪ‪ ،‬ﺳﺒﺐ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺗﺎ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﺩﺍﻥ ﺑﻪﺩﻧﺒـﺎﻝ ﺍﻳـﻦ‬ ‫ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻉ ﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺑﻪﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﻫﻤﺰﻣﺎﻥ ﻭ ﺩﺭ ﻗﺎﻟﺐ ﻳﻚ ﻣﺪﻝ‪ ،‬ﻧﺘـﺎﻳﺞ ﺭﺍ ﺗﻔﺴـﻴﺮ ﻭ ﻧﺎﺳـﺎﺯﮔﺎﺭﻱ‬ ‫ﺑﻪﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺁﻣﺪﻩ ﺭﺍ ﺑﺮﻃﺮﻑ ﻛﻨﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﻳﻜﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺭﺍﻩﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺣﻞ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺴﺌﻠﻪ ﻣﻄﺮﺡ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪،‬‬ ‫‪1‬‬

‫‪1. Experimental Economics‬‬ ‫‪2. Evolutionary Game Theory‬‬ ‫‪3. Self-Interest‬‬ ‫‪4. Anomalies‬‬ ‫‪5. Replication‬‬ ‫‪6. Ultimatum Game‬‬ ‫‪7. Dictator Game‬‬

‫‪ .8‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺁﺷﻨﺎﻳﻲ ﺑﺎ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﺯﻱﻫﺎ ﻣﺮﺍﺟﻌﻪ ﺷﻮﺩ ﺑﻪ ﻓﻴﺸﺒﺎﭼﺮ ﻭ ﻫﻤﻜﺎﺭﺍﻥ )‪(2009‬‬ ‫‪9. Andreoni and Bernheim‬‬

‫ﻣﺪﻝﺳﺎﺯﻱ ﺗﺮﺟﻴﺤﺎﺕ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸﮕﺎﻫﻲ‪ :‬ﻣﻌﺮﻓﻲ ﻭ ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ‪...‬‬

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‫ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺕ ﺍﺯ ﺑﺎﺯﺑﻴﻨﻲ ﺩﺭ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺍﺳﺘﺎﻧﺪﺍﺭﺩ ﻭ ﺍﻳﺠﺎﺩ ﺗﻐﻴﻴﺮﺍﺕ ﺩﺭ ﺁﻥ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻣـﺪﻝﻫـﺎﻱ ﺟﺪﻳـﺪ‬ ‫ﻫﻤﻮﺍﺭﻩ ﺗﺄﻛﻴﺪ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ ﻛﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎ ﺑﻪ ﺩﻧﺒﺎﻝ ﺍﻧﺤﺮﺍﻑ ﺍﺳﺎﺳـﻲ ﺍﺯ ﻓـﺮﻭﺽ ﻭ ﺍﺻـﻮﻝ ﻣـﺪﻝ‬ ‫ﺍﺳﺘﺎﻧﺪﺍﺭﺩ ﻧﻴﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﻭ ﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﺑﺎ ﺍﻳﺠﺎﺩ ﺗﻐﻴﻴﺮﺍﺕ ﺍﻧﺪﻙ ﺗﻼﺵ ﺩﺍﺭﻧﺪ ﻗﺪﺭﺕ ﭘﻴﺶﺑﻴﻨﻲ ﻣـﺪﻝﻫـﺎ ﺭﺍ‬ ‫ﺍﺭﺗﻘﺎ ﺩﻫﻨﺪ )ﻓﻬﺮ ﻭ ﻓﻴﺸﺒﺎﭼﺮ‪.(2003 ،1‬‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺭﺍﺳﺘﺎ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺍﺩﺑﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸﮕﺎﻫﻲ ﻣﻄـﺮﺡ ﺷـﺪﻩ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻫﺮﻛﺪﺍﻡ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎ ﺗﻼﺵ ﻛﺮﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ ﻛﺎﺭﺍﻳﻲ ﻭ ﻗﺎﺑﻠﻴﺖ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺧﻮﺩ ﺭﺍ ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑـﻪ ﻣـﺪﻝﻫـﺎﻱ‬ ‫ﺭﻗﻴﺐ ﻧﺸﺎﻥ ﺩﻫﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﮔﺮﻭﻫﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎ ﺳﻌﻲ ﺩﺍﺭﻧﺪ ﺑﺎ ﺍﻓﺰﻭﺩﻥ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧﻪ ﻭ ﮔﺮﻳـﺰ‬ ‫ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺍﺯ ﻧﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮﻱ‪ ،2‬ﻣﺸﻜﻠﻲ ﺭﺍ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺗﻔﺴﻴﺮ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺑﺎﺯیﻫﺎ ﺑـﻪ ﻭﺟـﻮﺩ ﺁﻣـﺪﻩ ﺍﺳـﺖ ﺑﺮﻃـﺮﻑ‬ ‫ﻛﻨﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﻣﺸﺎﻫﺪﺍﺕ ﻧﺸﺎﻥ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﻨﺪ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﻧﺴـﺒﺖ ﺑـﻪ ﻧﺤـﻮﻩﻱ ﺗﻮﺯﻳـﻊ ﻋﻮﺍﻳـﺪ ﺑـﺎﺯﻱ ﻛـﻪ ﺑـﻴﻦ‬ ‫ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻛﻨﻨﺪﮔﺎﻥ ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﻣﻲﮔﻴﺮﺩ ﺣﺴﺎﺱ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ‪ 3.‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺴﺌﻠﻪ ﺑـﻪﻗـﺪﺭﻱ ﻣﻬـﻢ ﻫﺴـﺖ ﻛـﻪ‬ ‫ﺑﺮﺧﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺩﻭﺭﻱ ﺍﺯ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﻧﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮ ﺣﺎﺿﺮﻧﺪ ﺍﺯ ﻧﻔـﻊ ﺷﺨﺼـﻲ ﺧـﻮﺩ ﻭ ﻧﻔـﻊ ﺩﻳﮕـﺮﺍﻥ‬ ‫ﭼﺸﻢﭘﻮﺷﻲ ﻛﻨﻨﺪ ﻭ ﺍﺻﻄﻼﺣﺎً ﺭﻓﺘﺎﺭ ﺿﺪ ﻛﺎﺭﺍﻳﻲ‪ 4‬ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﺩﻫﻨﺪ‪ .5‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻳﻦ ﮔـﺮﻭﻩ ﺍﺯ ﻣـﺪﻝﻫـﺎ‬ ‫ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺑﻪ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ ﻭ ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ‪ (1999) 6‬ﻭ ﻣـﺪﻝ ﺑـﻮﻟﺘﻦ ﻭ ﺍﻛﻨﻔﻠـﺰ‪ (2000) 7‬ﺍﺷـﺎﺭﻩ ﻛـﺮﺩ‬ ‫)ﻛﺎﭘﻠﻦ‪ 8‬ﻭ ﻫﻤﻜﺎﺭﺍﻥ‪.(2007 ،‬‬ ‫ﺩﺳﺘﻪﺍﻱ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ﺍﺯ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﻓﺮﺽ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ ﻋﻼﻭﻩ ﺑـﺮ ﻧﻔـﻊ ﺷﺨﺼـﻲ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺑﻪ ﺩﻧﺒﺎﻝ ﺁﻥ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﻛﻪ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﺍﻥ ﺭﺍ ﻧﻴﺰ ﺍﻓﺰﺍﻳﺶ ﺩﻫﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺑﻪ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺕ ﺑﻬﺘﺮ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﻫـﺪﻑ ﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎ ﺑﻪﺟﺎﻱ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩﻱ‪ ،‬ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺕ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺍﺯ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻉ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱﻫﺎ ﻳﺎ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻛﻞ‪ 9.‬ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳـﻦ‬ ‫ﮔﺮﻭﻩ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﻣﺪﻝ ﭼﺎﺭﻧﺲ ﻭ ﺭﺍﺑﻴﻦ‪ (2002) 10‬ﺭﺍ ﻧﺎﻡ ﺑـﺮﺩ‪ .‬ﻋـﻼﻭﻩ ﺑـﺮ ﺍﻳـﻦ‪ ،‬ﻣـﻲﺗـﻮﺍﻥ ﺑـﻪ‬

‫‪1. Fehr & Fischbacher‬‬ ‫‪2. Inequality Aversion‬‬

‫‪ .3‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩ ﻭﺍژﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ‪ Equity ،Fairness‬ﻭ ‪ Equality‬ﺍﺳﺘﻔﺎﺩﻩ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬

‫‪4. Pareto-Damaging Behavior‬‬

‫‪ .5‬ﻳﻜﻲ ﺍﺯ ﻣﻬﻢﺗﺮﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﺯﻱﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺁﻥ ﺑﺮﺧﻼﻑ ﭘﻴﺶﺑﻴﻨﻲ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺍﺳﺘﺎﻧﺪﺍﺭﺩ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺑـﺎﺯﻱ ﺍﻭﻟﺘﻴﻤـﺎﺗﻮﻡ ﻣـﻲﺑﺎﺷـﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺩﻭ ﻧﻔﺮﻩ ﻳﻜﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﻣﺒﻠﻎ ﺩﺍﺩﻩ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺭﺍ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺧﻮﺩ ﻭ ﻧﻔﺮ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﺗﻘﺴﻴﻢ ﻛﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﻧﺘـﺎﻳﺞ ﺑـﻪﺩﺳـﺖ ﺁﻣـﺪﻩ‬ ‫ﻧﺸﺎﻥ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﺪ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﻣﺒﻠﻎ ﺭﺍ ﺑﻪﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺒﺎ ﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮ ﺗﻘﺴﻴﻢ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﻨﺪ‪ ) .‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺎﺕ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺑـﺎﺯﻱ ﺍﻭﻟﺘﻴﻤـﺎﺗﻮﻡ‬ ‫ﻣﺮﺍ ﺟﻌﻪ ﺷﻮﺩ ﺑﻪ )ﻓﻬﺮ ﻭ ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ‪.((1999 ،‬‬

‫‪6. Schmidt‬‬ ‫‪7. Bolton & Ockenfels‬‬ ‫‪8. Cappelen‬‬

‫‪ .9‬ﺍﺻﻄﻼﺡ ﺑﻪ ﻛﺎﺭ ﺭﻓﺘﻪ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩ ‪ Quasi-Maximin ،Altruism‬ﻳﺎ ‪ Efficiency‬ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪.‬‬

‫‪10. Charness & Rabin‬‬

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‫ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﻱ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﻪ ﺑـﻪ ﻣﺜـﻞ‪ 1‬ﺍﺷـﺎﺭﻩ ﻛـﺮﺩ ﻛـﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺮﺧـﻲ ﺍﺯ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌـﺎﺕ ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ‬ ‫ﻣﺪﻝﺳﺎﺯﻱ ﺍﺯ ﺁﻥ ﺍﺳﺘﻔﺎﺩﻩ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﻳﻨﻜﻪ ﻛﺪﺍﻡ ﻳﻚ ﺍﺯ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎﻱ ﻳﺎﺩ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺑﻬﺘﺮ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﻨـﺪ‬ ‫ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶﻫﺎ ﺭﺍ ﺗﻔﺴﻴﺮ ﻭ ﭘﻴﺶﺑﻴﻨﻲ ﻛﻨﻨﺪ‪ ،‬ﻣﻮﺿـﻮﻋﻲ ﺍﺳـﺖ ﻛـﻪ ﻫـﻢﭼﻨـﺎﻥ ﺩﺭ ﺍﺩﺑﻴـﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﻣﺮﺑﻮﻃﻪ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﻣﻨﺎﻗﺸﻪ ﻭ ﺳﺆﺍﻝ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﻻﺯﻡ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌﺎﺕ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮﻱ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺯﻣﻴﻨﻪ ﺻـﻮﺭﺕ‬ ‫ﮔﻴﺮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺑــﺎ ﺗﻮﺟــﻪ ﺑــﻪ ﺍﻫﻤﻴــﺖ ﻭ ﮔﺴــﺘﺮﺵ ﻣــﺪﻝﺳــﺎﺯﻱ ﺗﺮﺟﻴﺤــﺎﺕ ﺍﺟﺘﻤــﺎﻋﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻗﺘﺼــﺎﺩ‬ ‫ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸﮕﺎﻫﻲ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﻟﻪ ﺳﻪ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎ ﻛﻪ ﺍﺯ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﻧﺎﻣﺒﺮﺩﻩ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﻣـﺮﻭﺭ ﻭ‬ ‫ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ‪ ،‬ﻓﺮﻡ ﻛﻠﻲ‪ ،‬ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺎﺕ ﻭ ﻭﻳﮋﮔﻲﻫﺎﻱ ﻫﺮﻛﺪﺍﻡ ﺍﺯ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎ‪ ،‬ﺑﻴـﺎﻥ‬ ‫ﻭ ﺳﭙﺲ ﺑﺎﻫﻢ ﻣﻘﺎﻳﺴﻪ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﻨﺪ ﺷﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﺩﺍﻣﻪ ﺑﻪﻣﻨﻈﻮﺭ ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﺻﺤﺖ ﻫﺮ ﻳﻚ ﺍﺯ ﻣـﺪﻝﻫـﺎ ﻭ‬ ‫ﺳﻨﺠﺶ ﻗﺪﺭﺕ ﭘﻴﺶ ﺑﻴﻨﻲ ﺁﻥ ﻫﺎ‪ ،‬ﺍﺯ ﺭﻭﺵ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸﮕﺎﻫﻲ ﺍﺳﺘﻔﺎﺩﻩ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﻳـﻚ‬ ‫ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻌﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻗﺎﻟﺐ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺩﻳﻜﺘﺎﺗﻮﺭ ﻃﺮﺍﺣﻲ ﺷـﺪﻩ ﻭ ﻣـﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧـﺪ ﺍﻧﮕﻴـﺰﻩﻫـﺎﻱ‬ ‫ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧﻪ ﺭﺍ ﺍﺯ ﻛﺎﺭﺍﻳﻲ )ﺣﺪﺍﻛﺜﺮ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻛﻞ( ﺟﺪﺍ ﻛﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺳﭙﺲ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﻣﺬﻛﻮﺭ ﺑﻪﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﻋﻤﻠـﻲ ﻭ‬ ‫ﺑﺎ ﺍﺳﺘﻔﺎﺩﻩ ﺍﺯ ﭘﺮﺩﺍﺧﺖ ﭘﻮﻝ ﺍﺟﺮﺍ ﺷﺪﻩ ﻭ ﺑﺎ ﺑﻬـﺮﻩﮔﻴـﺮﻱ ﺍﺯ ﻧﺘـﺎﻳﺞ ﻋﻤﻠـﻲ ﺑـﻪﺩﺳـﺖ ﺁﻣـﺪﻩ ﺍﺯ‬ ‫ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ‪ ،‬ﺳﺎﺯﮔﺎﺭﻱ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎ ﻭ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﺒﺘﻨﻲ ﺑﺮ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺷـﺪ‪ .‬ﺍﺯﺁﻧﺠـﺎﻳﻲﻛـﻪ‬ ‫ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻱ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﺑﺴﻴﺎﺭ ﻧﻮﭘﺎﺳﺖ ﻭ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌﺎﺕ ﻛﻤﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺣﻮﺯﻩ ﻭﺟـﻮﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻻﺯﻡ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻉ ﭘﮋﻭﻫﺶﻫﺎﻱ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮﻱ ﺍﻧﺠـﺎﻡ ﺷـﻮﺩ ﻭ ﺍﺯ ﺭﻭﺵ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸـﮕﺎﻫﻲ ﻛـﻪ‬ ‫ﻳﻜﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺭﻭﺵﻫﺎﻱ ﺁﺯﻣﻮﻥ ﻓﺮﺿﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺍﺳﺘﻔﺎﺩﻩ ﺷﻮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺭﺍﺳﺘﺎ ﺍﺑﺘﺪﺍ ﺩﺭ ﻓﺼﻞ ﺩﻭﻡ‪ ،‬ﺳﻪ ﻣﺪﻟﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺑﻪ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﺍﺷﺎﺭﻩ ﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬـﺮ ﻭ‬ ‫ﺍﺷــﻤﻴﺖ )‪ ،(1999‬ﻣــﺪﻝ ﺑــﻮﻟﺘﻦ ﻭ ﺍﻛﻨﻔﻠــﺰ )‪ (2000‬ﻭ ﻣــﺪﻝ ﭼــﺎﺭﻧﺲ ﻭ ﺭﺍﺑــﻴﻦ )‪،(2002‬‬ ‫ﺑﻪﺗﺮﺗﻴﺐ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﻲ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﺩﺍﻣﻪ ﻭﻳﮋﮔﻲﻫﺎﻱ ﻫﺮﻛـﺪﺍﻡ ﺍﺯ ﺁﻥﻫـﺎ ﺍﺳـﺘﺨﺮﺍﺝ ﻭ ﺗﻔـﺎﻭﺕﻫـﺎ ﻭ‬ ‫ﺷﺒﺎﻫﺖﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ ﺑﻴﺎﻥ ﻣﻲﮔﺮﺩﺩ‪ .‬ﺑﺨـﺶ ﺳـﻮﻡ‪ ،‬ﺑـﻪ ﻗﺴـﻤﺖ ﺁﺯﻣـﺎﻳﺶ‬ ‫ﺍﺧﺘﺼﺎﺹ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺨﺶ ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺎﺕ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﻟـﻪ ﻃﺮﺍﺣـﻲ ﺷـﺪﻩ ﺍﺳـﺖ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﺮﻓﻲ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺑﺨﺶ ﭼﻬﺎﺭﻡ‪ ،‬ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﺍﺯ ﺍﺟـﺮﺍﻱ ﻋﻤﻠـﻲ ﺁﺯﻣـﺎﻳﺶ ﮔـﺰﺍﺭﺵ ﺷـﺪﻩ‬ ‫ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺑﺨﺶ ﺑﻌﺪﻱ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺳﻨﺠﺶ ﺍﺳﺘﺤﻜﺎﻡ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ‪ ،‬ﻧﻤﻮﻧﻪﻱ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﻱ ﺍﻧﺘﺨـﺎﺏ ﻭ ﺁﺯﻣـﺎﻳﺶ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺩﻭﺑﺎﺭﻩ ﺗﻜﺮﺍﺭ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﻭ ﺑﺎﻻﺧﺮﻩ ﺑﺨﺶ ﭘﺎﻳﺎﻧﻲ ﺑﻪ ﺟﻤـﻊﺑﻨـﺪﻱ ﻧﺘـﺎﻳﺞ ﻭ ﺧﻼﺻـﻪﻱ ﻣﻘﺎﻟـﻪ‬ ‫ﺍﺷﺎﺭﻩ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪.‬‬

‫‪1. Reciprocity‬‬


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‫‪ -2‬ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺮﺟﻴﺤﺎﺕ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ‬ ‫ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻉ ﺗﺮﺟﻴﺤﺎﺕ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ‪ 2‬ﺑﻪﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺟﺪﻱ ﺍﺯ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺍﻭﻟﺘﻴﻤﺎﺗﻮﻡ ﺁﻏﺎﺯ ﺷﺪﻩ ﻛﻪ ﺗﻮﺳـﻂ‬ ‫ﮔﺎﺙ‪ 3‬ﻭ ﻫﻤﻜﺎﺭﺍﻥ )‪ ،(1982‬ﻃﺮﺍﺣﻲ ﻭ ﺍﺟﺮﺍ ﺭﺳـﻴﺪﻩ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ .‬ﻧﺘـﺎﻳﺠﻲ ﻛـﻪ ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺑـﺎﺯﻱ‬ ‫ﺑﻪﺩﺳﺖ ﺁﻣﺪﻩ ﺭﺍ ﺑﻪ ﻫﻴﭻ ﻭﺟﻪ ﻧﻤﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺑﺎ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺍﺳﺘﺎﻧﺪﺍﺭﺩ ﺗﻔﺴﻴﺮ ﻭ ﺗﻮﺟﻴﻪ ﻛﺮﺩ‪ .‬ﻧﺘـﺎﻳﺞ ﺍﻳـﻦ‬ ‫ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﻣﻘﺪﻣﻪﺍﻱ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻭﺭﻭﺩ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻉ ﺗﺮﺟﻴﺤﺎﺕ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﺩﺭ ﻣﺪﻝﺳﺎﺯﻱ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸـﮕﺎﻫﻲ‬ ‫ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﺯ ﺁﻥ ﺗﺎﺭﻳﺦ ﺑﻪ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶﻫﺎﻱ ﻓﺮﺍﻭﺍﻧﻲ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺑﺮﺭﺳـﻲ ﺑﻴﺸـﺘﺮ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﻣﻮﺿـﻮﻋﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﻭ ﻫﻤﭽﻨﺎﻥ ﺩﺭ ﺣﺎﻝ ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻃﻮﻝ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺳﺎﻝﻫﺎ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻧﺸﺎﻥ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﺪ ﻋﻼﻭﻩ ﺑﺮ ﻧﻔﻊ‬ ‫ﺷﺨﺼﻲ‪ ،‬ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﻱ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺭﻓﺘﺎﺭ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮﮔﺬﺍﺭ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﻭ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺑﻪﺩﻟﻴﻞ‬ ‫ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫﺎ ﺣﺘﻲ ﺣﺎﺿﺮﻧﺪ ﺍﺯ ﻧﻔﻊ ﻓـﺮﺩﻱ ﺧـﻮﺩ ﭼـﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻛﻮﺗـﺎﻩﻣـﺪﺕ ﻭ ﭼـﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺑﻠﻨﺪﻣـﺪﺕ‬ ‫ﺻﺮﻑﻧﻈﺮ ﻛﻨﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫﺎ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺑﻪ‪ :‬ﻋﺪﺍﻟﺖ ﻭ ﮔﺮﻳـﺰ ﺍﺯ ﻧـﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮﻱ‪ ،‬ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠـﻪ ﺑـﻪ ﻣﺜـﻞ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻧﻮﻉﺩﻭﺳﺘﻲ ﻳﺎ ﻛﺎﺭﺍﻳﻲ ﺍﺷﺎﺭﻩ ﻛﺮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺑﺎﺯیﻫﺎﻱ ﻳﺎﺩ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺑﻪﻗﺪﺭﻱ ﻣﺴﺘﺤﻜﻢ ﻭ ﻏﻴﺮﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﺧﺪﺷﻪ ﺍﺳـﺖ ﻛـﻪ ﻧﻤـﻲﺗـﻮﺍﻥ‬ ‫ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﺭﺍ ﻧﺎﺩﻳﺪﻩ ﮔﺮﻓﺖ ﻭ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﻂ ﺑﺎ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺭ ﻧﻈـﺮ ﻧﮕﺮﻓـﺖ‪ .4‬ﺑـﻪ ﻫﻤـﻴﻦ ﺩﻟﻴـﻞ‬ ‫ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﺩﺍﻧﺎﻥ ﺑﻪﺩﻧﺒﺎﻝ ﺁﻥ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﻛﻪ ﭼﻨﻴﻦ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﺭﺍ ﻣﺪﻝﺳﺎﺯﻱ ﻛﻨﻨﺪ ﺗﺎ ﺑﺘﻮﺍﻧﻨﺪ ﻧﺘـﺎﻳﺞ‬ ‫ﻋﻤﻠﻲ ﻭ ﻣﺸﺎﻫﺪﻩ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺭﺍ ﺗﺒﻴﻴﻦ ﻧﻤﺎﻳﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﻧﻜﺘﻪﻱ ﻣﺸﺘﺮﻙ ﻣـﺪﻝﻫـﺎﻱ ﺟﺪﻳـﺪ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺍﺳـﺖ ﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﻋﻼﻭﻩ ﺑﺮ ﺁﻧﻜﻪ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﺗﺎﺑﻌﻲ ﺍﺯ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩﻱ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭﻳﺎﻓﺘﻲ ﻭ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺍﻓـﺮﺍﺩ ﺩﻳﮕـﺮ‬ ‫ﻧﻴﺰ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﻓﺮﺩﻱ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮﮔﺬﺍﺭ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﻣﺎ ﭼﮕﻮﻧﮕﻲ ﻭ ﻧﺤﻮﻩﻱ ﺗـﺄﺛﻴﺮ‪ ،‬ﻣﻮﺿـﻮﻋﻲ ﺍﺳـﺖ‬ ‫ﻛﻪ ﺳﺒﺐ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﺘﻔﺎﻭﺗﻲ ﺷﻜﻞ ﺑﮕﻴـﺮﺩ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﺩﺍﻣـﻪ ﺳـﻪ ﻧﻤﻮﻧـﻪ ﺍﺯ ﻣﻬـﻢﺗـﺮﻳﻦ‬ ‫ﻣﺪﻝ ﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺍﺩﺑﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸﮕﺎﻫﻲ ﻣﻄﺮﺡ ﻭ ﺑﻪ ﺁﻧﻬﺎ ﺍﺳﺘﻨﺎﺩ ﻓﺮﺍﻭﺍﻧﻲ ﺷـﺪﻩ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻣﻌﺮﻓﻲ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﺳﭙﺲ ﻭﻳﮋﮔﻲﻫﺎ ﻭ ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺎﺕ ﻫﺮ ﻳﻚ ﺍﺯ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﻭ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺁﻥﻫـﺎ ﻣﻘﺎﻳﺴـﻪ‬ ‫ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﻣﻲﮔﻴﺮﺩ‪.‬‬

‫‪1. Social Preferences‬‬

‫‪ .2‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﺩﺑﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸﮕﺎﻫﻲ ﻣﻨﻈﻮﺭ ﺍﺯ ﺗﺮﺟﻴﺤﺎﺕ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ‪ ،‬ﻫﻤﻪﻱ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩ ﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﻋﻼﻭﻩ ﺑﺮ ﻧﻔـﻊ ﺷﺨﺼـﻲ‬ ‫ﻣﻤﻜﻦ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺩﺭ ﺭﻓﺘﺎﺭ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻱ ﺗﺎﺛﻴﺮ ﮔﺬﺍﺭ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ‪ :‬ﻋﺪﺍﻟﺖ‪ ،‬ﻧﻮﻉ ﺩﻭﺳﺘﻲ‪ ،‬ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻣﺜﻞ ﻭ ‪.....‬‬

‫‪3. Guth‬‬

‫‪ .4‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻧﻤﻮﻧﻪ ﻣﺮﺍﺟﻌـﻪ ﺷـﻮﺩ ﺑـﻪ ﺭﻭﺙ ﻭ ﻫﻤﻜـﺎﺭﺍﻥ )‪ ( 1991‬ﻛـﻪ ﺑـﺎﺯﻱ ﭘﻴﺸـﻨﻬﺎﺩ ﺭﺍ ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ ﭼﻬـﺎﺭ ﻛﺸـﻮﺭ ﻣﺨﺘﻠـﻒ ﺑـﺎ‬ ‫ﻓﺮﻫﻨﮓﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﺘﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﺍﺟﺮﺍ ﻛﺮﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ‪.‬‬

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‫‪ -1-2‬ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ‪ -‬ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ‬

‫ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻘﺎﺕ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻱ ‪ /‬ﺩﻭﺭﻩﻱ ‪ ،53‬ﺷﻤﺎﺭﻩﻱ ‪ ،3‬ﭘﺎﻳﻴﺰ ‪1397‬‬ ‫‪1‬‬

‫ﻧﺨﺴﺘﻴﻦ ﻣﺪﻟﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺑﻪﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺟﺪﻱ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻣﺪﻝﺳﺎﺯﻱ ﺗﺮﺟﻴﺤﺎﺕ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﻣﻄﺮﺡ ﺷﺪﻩ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ ﻭ ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ )‪ (1999‬ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ‪ -‬ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ‪ ،‬ﺑﺮ ﭘﺎﻳﻪﻱ ﺗﻤﺎﻳﻞ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺑـﻪ ﻋـﺪﺍﻟﺖ ﻭ‬ ‫ﮔﺮﻳﺰ ﺍﺯ ﻧﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮﻱ ﺷﻜﻞ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻣﺪﻋﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺑﺎ ﺍﻓـﺰﻭﺩﻥ ﺍﻧﮕﻴـﺰﻩﻫـﺎﻱ ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧـﻪ‬ ‫ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺑﺴﻴﺎﺭﻱ ﺍﺯ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶﻫﺎ ﺭﺍ ﺗﻔﺴﻴﺮ ﻭ ﭘﻴﺶﺑﻴﻨﻲ ﻛﺮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﺮﺽ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ ﻋﻼﻭﻩ ﺑـﺮ ﺍﻳﻨﻜـﻪ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴـﺖ ﺑـﻪ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ ﻣﺴـﺘﻘﻴﻢ ﻓـﺮﺩﻱ‬ ‫ﺑﺴﺘﮕﻲ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ ،‬ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺑﺎ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﻧﻴﺰ ﺑﺮ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮﮔﺬﺍﺭ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺗـﺄﺛﻴﺮ‬ ‫ﺩﻭﻃﺮﻓﻪ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ﻓﺮﺩ ﭼﻪ ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑﻪ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﺍﻥ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻛﻢﺗﺮﻱ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻭ ﭼـﻪ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ‬ ‫ﺍﻭ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺍﺯ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﺍﻥ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﻫﺮ ﺩﻭ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﭼﻨﻴﻦ ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺗﻲ ﺳـﺒﺐ ﻛـﺎﻫﺶ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴـﺖ‬ ‫ﻓﺮﺩ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﻓﺮﺩ ﻫﻤﺎﻥﮔﻮﻧﻪ ﻛﻪ ﻧﻤﻲﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺍﻭ ﻛﻢﺗﺮ ﺍﺯ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﺍﻥ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﺯﻣﺎﻧﻲ ﻫﻢ ﻛﻪ‬ ‫ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﻧﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮ ﺑﻪ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺍﻭ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻭ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻭﻱ ﺍﺯ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﺍﻥ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﺑﺎﺯﻫﻢ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻉ ﺳـﺒﺐ‬ ‫ﻧﺎﺭﺿﺎﻳﺘﻲ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﺍﻟﺒﺘﻪ ﻧﺎﺭﺿﺎﻳﺘﻲ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺍﺯ ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱﻫﺎ ﻣﺘﻘﺎﺭﻥ ﻧﻴﺴـﺖ ﻭ ﻓـﺮﺽ ﺑـﺮ‬ ‫ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺯﻣﺎﻧﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻓﺮﺩ‪ ،‬ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻛﻢﺗﺮﻱ ﺍﺯ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﺍﻥ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ 2،‬ﻧﺎﺭﺿﺎﻳﺘﻲﺍﺵ ﺑﻴﺸـﺘﺮ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ ،‬ﺍﻣـﺎ‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﺣﺎﻟﺘﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺍﻭ ﺍﺯ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﺍﻥ ﺑﻴﺸـﺘﺮ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ ،‬ﻛـﻢﺗـﺮ ﺍﺯ ﻗﺒـﻞ ﺩﭼـﺎﺭ ﻧﺎﺭﺿـﺎﻳﺘﻲ‬ ‫‪3‬‬ ‫ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻓﺮﻡ ﺍﺻﻠﻲ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ‪ -‬ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ :‬ﺍﮔﺮ ﻓـﺮﺽ ﺷـﻮﺩ ‪ n‬ﻓـﺮﺩ ﺩﺭ ﺑـﺎﺯﻱ‬ ‫ﺣﻀﻮﺭ ﺩﺍﺭﻧﺪ ﻭ ﻫﺮ ﻳﻚ ﺍﺯ ﺑﺎﺯﻳﻜﻨﺎﻥ ﺑﺎ ﺍﻧﺪﻳﺲ ‪ i‬ﻣﺸﺨﺺ ﺷﻮﺩ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ‬ ‫ﻓﺮﺩ ‪ i‬ﺑﻪﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺯﻳﺮ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺑﻮﺩ‪:‬‬ ‫‪1‬‬ ‫‪Ui Si Si Di‬‬ ‫¼‪¦ max ª¬ S j Si ,0º‬‬ ‫‪n 1 jzi‬‬ ‫‪4‬‬ ‫)‪(1‬‬ ‫‪1‬‬ ‫‪ Ei‬‬ ‫¼‪¦ max ª¬ Si S j ,0º‬‬ ‫‪n 1 jzi‬‬ ‫ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺕ ﻓﻮﻕ‪ ،‬ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻫﺮ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺑﺎ ‪ S‬ﻧﻤﺎﻳﺶ ﺩﺍﺩﻩ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ؛ ﺩﺭ ﻣـﻮﺭﺩ ﭘﺎﺭﺍﻣﺘﺮﻫـﺎﻱ‬ ‫ﻣﺪﻝ ﻧﻴﺰ ﻓﺮﺽ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ ‪ Di t Ei‬ﻭ ‪ 0 d Ei 1‬ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺣﺎﻝ ﺍﮔـﺮ ﺗﻌـﺪﺍﺩ ﺑﺎﺯﻛﻨـﺎﻥ ﺩﻭ ﻧﻔـﺮ‬ ‫ﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺕ )‪ (1‬ﺑﻪ ﺷﻜﻞ ﺯﻳﺮ ﺳﺎﺩﻩ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺷﺪ‪:‬‬ ‫‪ .2‬ﻃﺒﻖ ﭼﺎﺭﻧﺲ ﻭ ﺭﺍﺑﻴﻦ )‪ (2002‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﻭﺿﻌﻴﺖ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺭ ﺍﺻﻄﻼﺡ »ﭘﺴﻴﻦ« ﮔﻮﻳﻨﺪ‪(Behind) .‬‬ ‫‪ .3‬ﻃﺒﻖ ﭼﺎﺭﻧﺲ ﻭ ﺭﺍﺑﻴﻦ )‪ (2002‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﻭﺿﻌﻴﺖ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺭ ﺍﺻﻄﻼﺡ »ﭘﻴﺸﺘﺎﺯ« ﮔﻮﻳﻨﺪ‪(Ahead) .‬‬ ‫‪ .4‬ﻣﻌﺎﺩﻟﻪ ﻣﺬﻛﻮﺭ ﻓﺮﻡ ﺍﺻﻠﻲ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ‪ -‬ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬

‫‪1. Fehr-Schmidt‬‬

‫‪519‬‬


‫)‪(2‬‬

‫ ‬

‫‬

‫ ‬

‫‬

‫‪Si Di max ª S j Si ,0º Ei max ª Si S j ,0º‬‬

‫¼‬

‫¬‬

‫¼‬

‫¬‬

‫ ‪Ui Si‬‬

‫ﺟﻤﻠﻪﻱ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺩﺭ ﻫﺮ ﺩﻭ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺕ )‪ (1‬ﻭ )‪ (2‬ﻧﺸﺎﻥ ﺩﻫﻨﺪﻩﻱ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻴﻢ ﻓـﺮﺩ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺟﻤﻠﻪ ﺩﻭﻡ ﺑﻪ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻉ ﺍﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺑﺎ ﻛﺴﺎﻧﻲ ﺍﺷﺎﺭﻩ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ ﻛﻪ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﺍﺯ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ‬ ‫ﻓﺮﺩ ‪ i‬ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻭ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺩﺭ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﭘﺴﻴﻦ ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑﻪ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﻗـﺮﺍﺭ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ 1.‬ﺿـﺮﻳﺐ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺟﻤﻠـﻪ‬ ‫ﻣﻨﻔﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ﻫﺮ ﭼﻪ ﺍﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴـﺖ ﻓـﺮﺩ ﻛـﺎﻫﺶ ﻣـﻲﻳﺎﺑـﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺟﻤﻠﻪﻱ ﺳﻮﻡ )ﺟﻤﻠﻪ ﻣﺮﺑﻮﻁ ﺑﻪ ﺿﺮﻳﺐ ‪ ( E‬ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻉ ﺍﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺑﺎ ﻛﺴﺎﻧﻲ ﺭﺍ ﻧﺸـﺎﻥ‬ ‫ﻣﻲﺩﻫﺪ ﻛﻪ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﻛﻢﺗﺮ ﺍﺯ ﻓﺮﺩ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻭ ﺍﻭ ﺩﺭ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﭘﻴﺸﺘﺎﺯ ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑﻪ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ‬ ‫ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﭼﻮﻥ ﻋﺪﻡ ﺭﺿﺎﻳﺖ ﺍﺯ ﻧﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮﻱ ﻧﺎﻣﺘﻘﺎﺭﻥ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻫﻤﻴﻦ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻓﺮﺽ ﺩﺭ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﻧﻈﺮ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ ﻛﻪ ‪ Di t E i‬ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ .‬ﺑﻪ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺗﻲ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮ ﺟﻤﻠﻪ ﺩﻭﻡ )ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﭘﺴﻴﻦ( ﺑﻴﺸـﺘﺮ‬ ‫‪2‬‬ ‫ﺍﺯ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮ ﺟﻤﻠﻪﻱ ﺳﻮﻡ )ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﭘﻴﺸﺘﺎﺯ( ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻣﺤﺪﻭﺩﻳﺖ ‪ 0 d Ei 1‬ﺑﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻋﻠﺖ ﺩﺭ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺍﻋﻤﺎﻝ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﻣﺜﺒـﺖ ﺑـﻮﺩﻥ ‪ Ei‬ﺭﺍ‬ ‫ﺗﻀﻤﻴﻦ ﻛﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﻣﻨﻔﻲ ﺑﻮﺩﻥ ‪ Ei‬ﻧﺸﺎﻥ ﺩﻫﻨﺪﻩ ﺁﻥ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛـﻪ ﻫـﺮ ﭼـﻪ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ ﻓـﺮﺩ ﺑﻴﺸـﺘﺮ ﺍﺯ‬ ‫ﺩﻳﮕﺮﺍﻥ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﻭﻱ ﺍﻓﺰﺍﻳﺶ ﻣﻲﻳﺎﺑﺪ‪ ،‬ﻛﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻉ ﺑﺮﺧﻼﻑ ﻓـﺮﺽ ﺍﺻـﻠﻲ ﻣـﺪﻝ‬ ‫ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻱ ﮔﺮﻳﺰ ﺍﺯ ﻧﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮﻱ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﻫﻢﭼﻨﻴﻦ ﺍﮔـﺮ ‪ Ei t1‬ﺑﺎﺷـﺪ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳـﻦ‬ ‫ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺍﮔﺮ ﻳﻚ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ ﺍﺯ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺧﻮﺩ ﻛﻢ ﻛﻨﺪ ﺗﺎ ﻧﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮﻱ ﻛﺎﻫﺶ ﻳﺎﺑﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﻣﺮ ﻣﻮﺟـﺐ‬ ‫ﺍﻓﺰﺍﻳﺶ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﻭﻱ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺷﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺖ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻓﺮﺽ ﺑﻴﺎﻥ ﻣﻲﺩﺍﺭﺩ ﻛﻪ ﻓـﺮﺩ ﺑـﻪﺻـﻮﺭﺕ‬ ‫ﺧﺎﻟﺺ ﻭ ﺻﺪ ﺩﺭﺻﺪ ﻧﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮ ﮔﺮﻳﺰ ﻧﻴﺴﺖ‪ ،‬ﺑﻠﻜﻪ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﻧﻴﺰ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻭ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﺍﻫﻤﻴﺖ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻳﻨﻜﻪ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﻓﺮﺩ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ ﺍﺯ ﺗﻌـﺪﺍﺩ ﺍﻓـﺮﺍﺩ ﺑﺎﺷـﺪ‪ ،‬ﻫـﺮ ﺩﻭ ﺟﻤﻠـﻪ ﺩﻭﻡ ﻭ ﺳـﻮﻡ‬ ‫ﺑﻪﻋﺒﺎﺭﺕ ‪ n 1‬ﺗﻘﺴﻴﻢ ﺷﺪﻩﺍﻧﺪ ﺗﺎ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺟﻤـﻼﺕ ﻧﺮﻣـﺎﻝ ﺷـﻮﻧﺪ‪ .‬ﻫـﻢﭼﻨـﻴﻦ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﻣـﺪﻝ‬ ‫ﻧﺎﺭﺿﺎﻳﺘﻲ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺍﺯ ﻧﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮﻱ ﺑﻪﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺧﻮﺩ ﻣﺤﻮﺭ‪ 3‬ﺍﺳﺖ؛ ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﻧﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮﻱ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ‬ ‫ﺧﻮﺩ ﺑﺎ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﺍﻥ ﺭﺍ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﻧﻈﺮ ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﺪ ﻭ ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺗﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺳﺎﻳﺮ ﺍﻓـﺮﺍﺩ ﻭﺟـﻮﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‬ ‫ﻣﻮﺟﺐ ﻧﺎﺭﺿﺎﻳﺘﻲ ﻭﻱ ﻧﻤﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺩﻭ ﻧﻔﺮﻩ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺕ )‪ (2‬ﺭﺍ ﺑﺎﺯﻧﻮﻳﺴﻲ ﻛﺮﺩ‪ .‬ﺍﮔﺮ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓـﺮﺩ ‪ i‬ﺑﻴﺸـﺘﺮ ﺍﺯ‬ ‫ﻓﺮﺩ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺟﻤﻠﻪ ﺩﻭﻡ ﺍﺯ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺕ )‪ (2‬ﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮ ﺑﺎ ﺻﻔﺮ ﺑﻮﺩﻩ ﻭ ﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﺟﻤﻠـﻪﻱ‬ ‫ﺍﻭﻝ ﻭ ﺳﻮﻡ ﺩﺭ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﻇﺎﻫﺮ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﺑﺮﻋﻜﺲ ﺍﮔﺮ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩ ‪ i‬ﻛﻢﺗﺮ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑـﺎﺭ‬ ‫‪ .1‬ﻋﻤﻠﮕﺮ ‪ max‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺩﻭ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺕ ﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﻘﺎﺩﻳﺮ ﻣﺜﺒﺖ ﺭﺍ ﻣﺤﺎﺳﺒﻪ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫‪ .2‬ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺍﻧﺪﻳﺲ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺿﺮﺍﻳﺐ ‪ D‬ﻭ ‪ E‬ﻧﺸﺎﻥ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﺪ ﻣﻘﺎﺩﻳﺮ ﺿﺮﺍﻳﺐ ﺍﺯ ﻓﺮﺩﻱ ﺑﻪ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ﻣﺘﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫‪3. Self-Centered‬‬

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‫ﺟﻤﻠﻪﻱ ﺳﻮﻡ ﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮ ﺻﻔﺮ ﺑﻮﺩﻩ ﻭ ﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﺟﻤـﻼﺕ ﺍﻭﻝ ﻭ ﺩﻭﻡ ﻋﺒـﺎﺭﺕ )‪ (2‬ﺩﺭ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴـﺖ ﻇـﺎﻫﺮ‬ ‫ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﻭﺿﻌﻴﺖ ﺭﺍ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺩﺭ ﻗﺎﻟﺐ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺕ ﺯﻳﺮ ﻧﺸﺎﻥ ﺩﺍﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪( 3‬‬

‫‪Si ! S j‬‬

‫‪if‬‬

‫‪Si S j‬‬

‫‪if‬‬

‫‪1 Ei Si Ei S j‬‬ ‫‪1 Di Si Di S j‬‬

‫ﻣﻨﺒﻊ‪ :‬ﻳﺎﻓﺘﻪﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ‬

‫‬ ‫‪° Ui‬‬ ‫®‬ ‫‪°‬‬ ‫‪¯ Ui‬‬

‫ﺑﺮ ﺍﺳﺎﺱ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺕ )‪ (3‬ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﻧﻤﻮﺩﺍﺭﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﻓـﺮﺩ ‪ i‬ﺭﺍ ﺭﺳـﻢ ﻛـﺮﺩ‪ .‬ﻧﻤـﻮﺩﺍﺭ ‪،1‬‬ ‫ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﻓﺮﺩ ‪ i‬ﺭﺍ ﺑﻪ ﺍﺯﺍﻱ ﻣﻘﺪﺍﺭ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ) ‪ ( S j‬ﻧﺸﺎﻥ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﺪ‪.‬‬

‫ﻧﻤﻮﺩﺍﺭ ‪ .1‬ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﻓﺮﺩ ‪ i‬ﺑﻪ ﺍﺯﺍﻱ ﻣﻘﺎﺩﻳﺮ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ‬ ‫ﻣﻨﺒﻊ‪ :‬ﻓﻬﺮ ﻭ ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ )‪((1999‬‬

‫ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻧﻤﻮﺩﺍﺭ ﻓﺮﺽ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺧﻮﺩ‪ ،‬ﻓﺮﺩ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﻭ ﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻧﻔﺮ ﻣﻘﺎﺑـﻞ ﺗﻐﻴﻴـﺮ‬ ‫ﻣﻲﻛﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﻫﻤﺎﻥﻃﻮﺭ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻧﻤﻮﺩﺍﺭ ﻣﻼﺣﻈﻪ ﻣﻲﺷـﻮﺩ‪ ،‬ﺑـﺎ ﻓـﺮﺽ ﺛﺎﺑـﺖ ﺑـﻮﺩﻥ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ ﻓـﺮﺩ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﺍﻭ ﻭﻗﺘﻲ ﺑﻪ ﺣﺪﺍﻛﺜﺮ ﻣﻲﺭﺳﺪ ﻛﻪ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻃﺮﻑ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮ ﺑـﺎ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ ﻓـﺮﺩ ﻣـﻮﺭﺩ‬ ‫ﻧﻈﺮ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ ‪ . S j S j‬ﺑﺮﺍﺳﺎﺱ ﺳﻄﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺍﺯ ﺭﺍﺑﻄﻪﻱ )‪ ،(3‬ﺯﻣﺎﻧﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﻛﻢﺗـﺮ‬ ‫ﺍﺯ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩ ‪ i‬ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﻫﺮ ﭼﻪ ‪ S j‬ﺍﻓﺰﺍﻳﺶ ﻳﺎﺑﺪ‪ ،‬ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﺑﺎ ﺷﻴﺐ ﻛﻢﺗﺮ ﺍﺯ ﻭﺍﺣـﺪ ﺍﻓـﺰﺍﻳﺶ‬ ‫ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﻳﺎﻓﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﺭﻭﻧﺪ ﺍﺩﺍﻣﻪ ﻣﻲﻳﺎﺑﺪ ﺗﺎ ﺍﻳﻨﻜﻪ ‪ S j‬ﺑﺎ ‪ Si‬ﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮ ﺷﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﻪ ﺑـﻪ ﺑﻌـﺪ‬ ‫ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺑﺮﺍﺳﺎﺱ ﺳﻄﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ ﺭﺍﺑﻄﻪﻱ )‪ (3‬ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﺩﺍﺩ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﻪ ﻫﺮ ﭼﻪ ﻣﻘـﺪﺍﺭ ‪S j‬‬ ‫ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺷﻮﺩ‪ ،‬ﺑﻪ ﻋﻠﺖ ﻣﻨﻔﻲ ﺑﻮﺩﻥ ﺿﺮﻳﺐ ‪ ، S j‬ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﻛﺎﻫﺶ ﻣﻲﻳﺎﺑﺪ‪.‬‬


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‫ﻧﻤﻮﺩﺍﺭ ‪ .2‬ﺭﺍﺑﻄﻪﻱ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﻭ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻴﻢ‬ ‫ﻣﻨﺒﻊ‪ :‬ﻳﺎﻓﺘﻪﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ )ﺭﺍﺑﻄﻪﻱ ‪(3‬‬

‫ﺩﺭ ﻧﻤﻮﺩﺍﺭ ‪ 2‬ﻓﺮﺽ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻲ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺧﻮﺩ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺗﻐﻴﻴﺮ‬ ‫ﻣﻲﻳﺎﺑﺪ‪ .‬ﻃﺒﻖ ﺭﺍﺑﻄﻪﻱ )‪ ،(3‬ﺿﺮﺍﻳﺐ ‪ Si‬ﺩﺭ ﻫﺮ ﺩﻭ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﭘﺴﻴﻦ ﻭ ﭘﻴﺸﺘﺎﺯ ﻣﺜﺒﺖ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﻧﺘﻴﺠﻪ ﻧﻤﻮﺩﺍﺭ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﻓﺮﺩ ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑﻪ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻴﻢ ﻫﻤﻮﺍﺭﻩ ﺻـﻌﻮﺩﻱ ﺧﻮﺍﻫـﺪ ﺑـﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﺍﻣـﺎ‬ ‫ﺷﻴﺐ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻧﻤﻮﺩﺍﺭ ﺩﺭ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﭘﺴﻴﻦ ﻭ ﭘﻴﺸﺘﺎﺯ ﻣﺘﻔـﺎﻭﺕ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ .‬ﺯﻣـﺎﻧﻲ ﻛـﻪ ﻓـﺮﺩ ﺩﺭ ﻭﺿـﻌﻴﺖ‬ ‫ﭘﺴﻴﻦ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﺷﻴﺐ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ‪ 1 Di‬ﺑﻮﺩﻩ ﻭ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺗﻲ ﺑﺰﺭگﺗﺮ ﺍﺯ ﻳـﻚ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ ،‬ﺍﻣـﺎ ﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﻭﺿﻌﻴﺖ ﭘﻴﺸﺘﺎﺯ ﺷﻴﺐ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ‪ 1 Ei‬ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻭ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴـﺖ ﺑـﺎ ﺁﻫﻨـﮓ ﻣﻼﻳـﻢﺗـﺮ‬ ‫ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑﻪ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺍﻓﺰﺍﻳﺶ ﻣﻲﻳﺎﺑﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﺍﺳﺘﺎﻧﺪﺍﺭﺩ‪ ،‬ﺑﻴﻦ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻣﺴـﺘﻘﻴﻢ ﻭ‬ ‫ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﺭﺍﺑﻄﻪﻱ ﺧﻄﻲ ﺑﺎ ﺿﺮﻳﺐ ﻳﻚ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ ﻛﻪ ﺍﺯ ﻧﻈـﺮ ﻧﻤـﻮﺩﺍﺭﻱ ﻧﻴﻤﺴـﺎﺯ ﻧﺎﺣﻴـﻪﻱ‬ ‫ﺍﻭﻝ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺷﺪ‪ .‬ﺍﮔﺮ ﺍﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱﻫﺎ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻓـﺮﺍﺩ ﻣﻬـﻢ ﺑﺎﺷـﺪ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺻـﻮﺭﺕ ﺭﺍﺑﻄـﻪﻱ‬ ‫‪1‬‬ ‫ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﻭ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻴﻢ ﺑﺮﺍﺳﺎﺱ ﻧﻤﻮﺩﺍﺭ ‪ 2‬ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺑﻮﺩ‪.‬‬

‫‪ -2-2‬ﻣﺪﻝ ﺑﻮﻟﺘﻦ ﻭ ﺍﻛﻨﻔﻠﺰ‬ ‫ﻳﻜﻲ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ﺍﺯ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎﻱ ﺟﺪﻳﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﻔﺴﻴﺮ ﻳﻜﭙﺎﺭﭼﻪﻱ ﺑـﺎﺯﻱﻫـﺎﻱ ﮔﻮﻧـﺎﮔﻮﻥ ﺍﺭﺍﺋـﻪ‬ ‫ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﻣﺪﻝ ‪ 2ERC‬ﻣﻲ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﻛﻪ ﺗﻮﺳﻂ ﺑﻮﻟﺘﻮﻥ ﻭ ﺍﻛﻨﻔﻠﺰ )‪ (2000‬ﻣﻌﺮﻓﻲ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫‪ .1‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺁﺷﻨﺎﻳﻲ ﺑﺎ ﺗﻌﺎﺩﻝﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ‪ -‬ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺑﺎﺯﻱﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﭘـﻴﺶﺑﻴﻨـﻲ ﻣـﻲﻛﻨـﺪ ﺑـﻪ ﺿـﻤﻴﻤﻪﻱ ‪2‬‬ ‫ﻣﺮﺍﺟﻌﻪ ﺷﻮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫‪2. Equity, Reciprocity, Competition‬‬

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‫ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﻧﻴﺰ ﻫﻤﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ‪ -‬ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ ﻣﻌﺘﻘﺪﻧﺪ ﺑـﺎ ﺍﺿـﺎﻓﻪ ﻛـﺮﺩﻥ ﻋﻨﺼـﺮ ﻋـﺪﺍﻟﺖ ﺑـﻪ ﻣـﺪﻝ‬ ‫ﺍﺳﺘﺎﻧﺪﺍﺭﺩ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﭘﺪﻳﺪﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﮔﻮﻧﺎﮔﻮﻥ ﻣﺸﺎﻫﺪﻩ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺎﺯﻱﻫﺎ ﺭﺍ ﺗﺒﻴﻴﻦ ﻛﺮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫‪1‬‬ ‫ﺗﺎﺑﻌﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺟﺎﻳﮕﺰﻳﻨﻲ ﺑﺎ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺍﺳﺘﺎﻧﺪﺍﺭﺩ ﭘﻴﺸﻨﻬﺎﺩ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﻨﺪ‪ ،‬ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩ ﻧـﺎﻡ‬ ‫ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﺩﻭ ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﺑﺎ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺍﺳﺘﺎﻧﺪﺍﺭﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﻧﺨﺴﺖ ﺍﻳﻨﻜﻪ‪ ،‬ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩ ﺗﺎﺑﻌﻲ ﺍﺯ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ‬ ‫ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻴﻢ ﻓﺮﺩ ﻭ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻧﺴﺒﻲ )ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩ ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑـﻪ ﺩﻳﮕـﺮﺍﻥ( ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﻭﻡ ﺍﻳﻨﻜـﻪ ﺍﻓـﺮﺍﺩ ﺍﺯ‬ ‫ﻣﻘﺎﺩﻳﺮ ﭘﺎﺭﺍﻣﺘﺮﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻱ ﻳﻜﺪﻳﮕﺮ ﺍﻃﻼﻋﻲ ﻧﺪﺍﺭﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ﺍﻳﻨﻜﻪ ﭼﻘﺪﺭ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺑﻪ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ‬ ‫ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻴﻢ ﺍﻫﻤﻴﺖ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﺪ ﻭ ﭼﻘﺪﺭ ﺑﻪ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻧﺴﺒﻲ‪ ،‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻉ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺳـﺎﻳﺮ ﺍﻓـﺮﺍﺩ ﻧـﺎﻣﻌﻠﻮﻡ‬ ‫ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﻟﺒﺘﻪ ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻊ ﻣﺮﺑﻮﻁ ﺑﻪ ﭘﺎﺭﺍﻣﺘﺮﻫﺎ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻫﻤﻪﻱ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺣﺎﺿﺮ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﻣﺸﺨﺺ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ .‬ﺑـﺎ‬ ‫ﻓﺮﺽ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻛﻪ ‪ n‬ﻧﻔﺮ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺣﻀﻮﺭ ﺩﺍﺭﻧﺪ ﻭ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺑﻪﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺗﻚ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﻪ ﺍﺟﺮﺍ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪ ،‬ﺗـﺎﺑﻊ‬ ‫ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩ ﻓﺮﺩ ‪ i‬ﺑﻪﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺯﻳﺮ ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻒ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪:‬‬ ‫ ‪Qi Qi yi , Vi‬‬ ‫)‪(4‬‬ ‫ﻣﻨﺒﻊ‪ :‬ﺑﻮﻟﺘﻮﻥ ﻭ ﺍﻛﻨﻔﻠﺰ )‪(2000‬‬

‫ﺩﺭ ﺭﺍﺑﻄﻪﻱ ﺑﺎﻻ ‪ yi‬ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻴﻢ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﻓﺮﺽ ﻣـﻲﺷـﻮﺩ ﻣﻘـﺪﺍﺭ ﺁﻥ ﻧـﺎﻣﻨﻔﻲ‬ ‫ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ Vi .‬ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻧﺴﺒﻲ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺕ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺍﺯ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺗﻘﺴـﻴﻢﺑـﺮ ﻣﺠﻤـﻮﻉ ﻛـﻞ‬ ‫ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱﻫﺎ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺖ ‪ Vi‬ﺳﻬﻢ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺍﺯ ﻛﻞ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱﻫـﺎﻳﻲ ﺍﺳـﺖ ﻛـﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺑـﻴﻦ ﺍﻓـﺮﺍﺩ ﺗﻮﺯﻳـﻊ‬ ‫ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪(5‬‬ ‫ﻣﻨﺒﻊ‪ :‬ﺑﻮﻟﺘﻮﻥ ﻭ ﺍﻛﻨﻔﻠﺰ )‪(2000‬‬

‫‪n‬‬

‫‪¦yj‬‬ ‫‪j 1‬‬

‫‪c‬‬

‫‪yi‬‬ ‫‪c‬‬

‫‪Vi‬‬

‫ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩ ‪ Q i‬ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﻓﺮﻭﺽ ﺯﻳﺮ ﺍﺳﺖ‪:‬‬ ‫‪Qi1 t 0‬‬ ‫‪ -1‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑﻪ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻴﻢ ﺻﻌﻮﺩﻱ ﻭ ﻣﻘﻌﺮ ﺍﺳﺖ‪Qi11 d 0 .‬‬ ‫‪ -2‬ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩ ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑﻪ ‪ yi‬ﻭ ‪ Vi‬ﭘﻴﻮﺳﺘﻪ ﻭ ﺩﻭ ﺑﺎﺭ ﻣﺸﺘﻖﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫‪Qi 2 0‬‬ ‫‪ -3‬ﺯﻣﺎﻧﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺳﻬﻢ ﻓﺮﺩ ‪ Vi 1 n‬ﺍﺳﺖ ‪Qi22 0‬‬ ‫‪ -4‬ﺷﻜﻞ ﺻﺮﻳﺢ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩ ﺍﺯ ﻓﺮﺩﻱ ﺑﻪ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ﻣﺘﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻭ ﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﻛﺎﻓﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ‬ ‫ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩ ﻫﺮ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺍﺯ ﺳﻪ ﻓﺮﺽ ﻗﺒﻠﻲ ﭘﻴﺮﻭﻱ ﻛﻨﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻓﺮﺽ ﺍﻭﻝ ﻣﺮﺑﻮﻁ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻭ ﻧﺸﺎﻥ ﻣـﻲﺩﻫـﺪ ﺑـﺎ ﺛﺎﺑـﺖ ﺑـﻮﺩﻥ‬ ‫ﺳﻬﻢ ﻓﺮﺩ ﻫﺮ ﭼﻘﺪﺭ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻴﻢ ﺍﻭ ﺍﻓﺰﺍﻳﺶ ﻳﺎﺑﺪ‪ ،‬ﻣﻘﺪﺍﺭ ﺗـﺎﺑﻊ ﺍﻧﮕﻴـﺰﻩ ﻧﻴـﺰ ﺑـﺎﻻ ﻣـﻲﺭﻭﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻓﺮﺽ ﺩﻭﻡ‪ ،‬ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎﺕ ﺭﻳﺎﺿﻲ ﺑﺎ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩ ﺭﺍ ﺗﺴﻬﻴﻞ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﻓـﺮﺽ ﺳـﻮﻡ ﺑـﻪ ﺍﺛـﺮﺍﺕ‬ ‫‪1. Motivation Function‬‬

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‫ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻧﺴﺒﻲ ﺍﺷﺎﺭﻩ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ ﻭ ﺑﻴﺎﻧﮕﺮ ﺁﻥ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺑﺎ ﻓﺮﺽ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﺑﻮﺩﻥ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻴﻢ‪ ،‬ﺯﻣـﺎﻧﻲ‬ ‫ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩ ﺣﺪﺍﻛﺜﺮ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺷﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺳﻬﻢ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺍﺯ ﻛﻞ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱﻫﺎ ﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮ ﺑﺎ ﻣﻴﺎﻧﮕﻴﻦ ﺳﻬﻢ ﺍﻓـﺮﺍﺩ‬ ‫ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ .‬ﺑﻪ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺗﻲ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻣﻌﻴﻦ‪ ،‬ﺯﻣﺎﻧﻲ ﺑﻴﺸـﺘﺮﻳﻦ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴـﺖ ﺭﻭﻱ ﻣـﻲﺩﻫـﺪ ﻛـﻪ ﻓـﺮﺩ‬ ‫ﺑﻪﺍﻧﺪﺍﺯﻩﻱ ﻣﻴﺎﻧﮕﻴﻦ ﺳﺎﻳﺮ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺍﺯ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻛﻞ ﺳﻬﻢ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ .‬ﻭ ﺩﺭ ﻧﻬﺎﻳﺖ ﻓـﺮﺽ ﭼﻬـﺎﺭﻡ‬ ‫ﺑﻪ ﻧﺎﻫﻤﺴﺎﻧﻲ ﺗﺮﺟﻴﺤﺎﺕ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺍﺷﺎﺭﻩ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ ﺑﺮﺧـﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻓـﺮﺍﺩ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ ﻣﺴـﺘﻘﻴﻢ ﺗـﺮﺟﻴﺢ‬ ‫ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ ﻭ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺑﺮﺧﻲ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ﺍﻫﻤﻴﺖ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻧﺴﺒﻲ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻧﻜﺘﻪﻱ ﻣﺸﺘﺮﻙ ﻣﺪﻝ ‪ ERC‬ﺑﺎ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ‪ -‬ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻫﺮ ﺩﻭ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻋﻼﻭﻩ‬ ‫ﺑﺮ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ‪ ،‬ﻧﺤﻮﻩﻱ ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻊ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻫـﺎ ﻫـﻢ ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ ﻓـﺮﺩ ﺍﻫﻤﻴـﺖ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻫـﺮ ﺩﻭ ﻣـﺪﻝ‬ ‫ﭘﻴﺎﻣﺪﻫﺎﻱ ﻧﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮ ﺳﺒﺐ ﻛﺎﻫﺶ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﻓﺮﺩ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪ ،‬ﺍﻣـﺎ ﻧﮕـﺎﻩ ﺍﻓـﺮﺍﺩ ﺑـﻪ ﻧـﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮﻱ ﺩﺭ ﺩﻭ‬ ‫ﻣﺪﻝ ﻣﺘﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ ﻫﺮﮔﻮﻧﻪ ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺗﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ ﻓـﺮﺩ ﺑـﺎ ﺩﻳﮕـﺮﺍﻥ‬ ‫ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﺳﺒﺐ ﻧﺎﺭﺿﺎﻳﺘﻲ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭﺣﺎﻟﻲﻛـﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻣـﺪﻝ ‪ ERC‬ﺗﻨﻬـﺎ ﺯﻣـﺎﻧﻲ ﻛـﻪ‬ ‫ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺍﻭ ﺍﺯ ﻣﻴﺎﻧﮕﻴﻦ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻧﺴﺒﻲ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﻳﺎ ﻛﻢﺗﺮ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﺩﭼﺎﺭ ﻧﺎﺭﺿﺎﻳﺘﻲ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻋﻠﺖ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻉ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺍﺳـﺖ ﻛـﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻣـﺪﻝ ‪ ERC‬ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴـﺖ ﺗﻨﻬـﺎ ﺗـﺎﺑﻌﻲ ﺍﺯ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ‬ ‫ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻴﻢ ﻭ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻧﺴﺒﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻣﺪﻝ ‪ ERC‬ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﺍﻥ ﺑﻪﺻـﻮﺭﺕ ﻣﺴـﺘﻘﻴﻢ ﺩﺭ ﺗـﺎﺑﻊ‬ ‫ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴــﺖ ﻧﻘﺸــﻲ ﻧــﺪﺍﺭﺩ ﻭ ﺗﻨﻬــﺎ ﺍﺯ ﻃﺮﻳــﻖ ﻋﺎﻳــﺪﻱ ﻧﺴــﺒﻲ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴــﺖ ﺍﺛﺮﮔــﺬﺍﺭ ﺍﺳــﺖ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺩﺭﺣﺎﻟﻲﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ‪ -‬ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺑـﻪﻃـﻮﺭ ﻣﺴـﺘﻘﻴﻢ ﺩﺭ ﺗـﺎﺑﻊ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴـﺖ‬ ‫ﻇﺎﻫﺮ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺩﻭ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺭﺍ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺑﺎ ﻳـﻚ ﻣﺜـﺎﻝ ﺗﻮﺿـﻴﺢ ﺩﺍﺩ‪ .‬ﭼـﻮﻥ ﻣـﺪﻝ ‪ ERC‬ﺷـﻜﻞ‬ ‫ﺻﺮﻳﺢ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩ ﺭﺍ ﻣﺸﺨﺺ ﻧﻜﺮﺩﻩ ﻭ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻓﺮﻭﺽ ﻛﻠﻲ ﺁﻥ ﺑﻴﺎﻥ ﺷـﺪﻩ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ ،‬ﺑـﻪ ﻫﻤـﻴﻦ‬ ‫ﺩﻟﻴﻞ ﺗﺎﺑﻌﻲ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻣﺬﻛﻮﺭ ﺩﺭ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ ﺗﺎ ﺑﻪﺭﺍﺣﺘﻲ ﺑﺘﻮﺍﻥ ﺩﻭ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺭﺍ ﻣﻘﺎﻳﺴﻪ‬ ‫ﻛﺮﺩ‪ .‬ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﺯﻳﺮ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﺗﻤﺎﻡ ﻓﺮﻭﺽ ﭼﻬﺎﺭﮔﺎﻧﻪﺍﻱ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺑﻮﻟﺘﻦ ﻭ ﺍﻛﻨﻔﻠﺰ ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ ﺗـﺎﺑﻊ ﺍﻧﮕﻴـﺰﻩ‬ ‫ﺑﻴﺎﻥ ﻛﺮﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫‪2‬‬ ‫ﻳﻚ ﺗﺼﺮﻳﺢ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ‪ERC‬‬ ‫§‪b‬‬ ‫·‪1‬‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫)ﻳﺎﻓﺘﻪﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ(‬

‫¸ ‪Qi yi , Vi ayi ¨ Vi‬‬ ‫©‪2‬‬ ‫‪2¹‬‬

‫‪y‬‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫‪¦ ci‬‬

‫‪n‬‬

‫‪n‬‬

‫)‬

‫‪yi‬‬ ‫‪c‬‬

‫( ‪1.‬‬

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‫ﺟﺪﻭﻝ ‪ ،1‬ﻳﻚ ﻣﻮﻗﻌﻴﺖ ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻌﻲ ﻓﺮﺿﻲ ﺭﺍ ﻧﺸﺎﻥ ﻣﻲﺩﻫـﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺟـﺪﻭﻝ ﺩﻭ ﺍﻟﮕـﻮﻱ‬ ‫ﻓﺮﺿﻲ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻊ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱﻫﺎ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺳﻪ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﺭﺍﺋﻪ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﻃﺒﻖ ﻣﺪﻝ ‪ ،ERC‬ﻓﺮﺩ ‪ B‬ﻧﺴـﺒﺖ‬ ‫ﺑﻪ ﻫﺮ ﺩﻭ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻳﻲ ‪ 1‬ﻭ ‪ 2‬ﺑﻲﺗﻔﺎﻭﺗﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﭼﺮﺍ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻫـﺮ ﺩﻭ ﺍﻟﮕـﻮ ﻫـﻢ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ ﻛـﻞ ﻭ ﻫـﻢ‬ ‫ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻧﺴﺒﻲ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻓﺮﺩ ‪ B‬ﻳﻜﺴﺎﻥ ﻭ ﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺑﺮﺍﺳﺎﺱ ﺭﺍﺑﻄﻪﻱ ﻓﻮﻕ ﻣﻘـﺪﺍﺭ ﺗـﺎﺑﻊ ﺍﻧﮕﻴـﺰﻩ‬ ‫ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻫﺮ ﺩﻭ ﺍﻟﮕﻮ ﻳﻜﺴﺎﻥ ﻭ ﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮ ﺑﺎ ‪ 9a b 72‬ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺑـﻮﺩ؛ ﺍﻣـﺎ ﺑﺮﺍﺳـﺎﺱ ﻣـﺪﻝ ﻓﻬـﺮ‪-‬‬ ‫ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ ﻭ ﺭﺍﺑﻄﻪﻱ )‪ ،(2‬ﺑﻪ ﻋﻠﺖ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺍﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩ ‪ B‬ﺑﺎ ﺩﻭ ﻓـﺮﺩ ﺩﻳﮕـﺮ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺩﻭﻡ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﻛﻢﺗﺮﻱ ﺍﺳﺖ‪1.‬‬ ‫ﺟﺪﻭﻝ ‪ .1‬ﻣﻘﺎﻳﺴﻪﻱ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺩﻭ ﻣﺪﻝ ‪ ERC‬ﻭ ﻓﻬﺮ‪ -‬ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻮﻗﻌﻴﺖ ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻌﻲ‬

‫ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩ‬ ‫ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩ ‪B‬‬ ‫ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩ ‪C‬‬ ‫ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩ ‪B‬‬ ‫ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻧﺴﺒﻲ ﻓﺮﺩ ‪B‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻲ ﻣﺪﻝ ‪ERC‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻲ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ‪ -‬ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ‬ ‫‪A‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ‪1‬‬ ‫‪8‬‬ ‫‪9‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬ ‫‪9‬‬ ‫‪0/33‬‬ ‫‪9‬‬ ‫‪9‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ‪2‬‬ ‫‪3‬‬ ‫‪9‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬ ‫‪9‬‬ ‫‪0/33‬‬ ‫‪9‬‬ ‫‪8‬‬

‫ﻣﻨﺒﻊ‪ :‬ﻳﺎﻓﺘﻪ ﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ‬

‫‪ -3-2‬ﻣﺪﻝ ﺭﻓﺎﻩ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ‬ ‫ﻳﻜﻲ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ﺍﺯ ﻣﺪﻝﻫـﺎﻱ ﻣﻄـﺮﺡ ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﻔﺴـﻴﺮ ﺷـﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺧـﺎﺭﺝ ﺍﺯ ﻗﺎﻋـﺪﻩ ﻭ ﮔﻨﺠﺎﻧـﺪﻥ‬ ‫ﺗﺮﺟﻴﺤﺎﺕ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﺩﺭ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺍﺳﺘﺎﻧﺪﺍﺭﺩ‪ ،‬ﻣﺪﻟﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﭼﺎﺭﻧﺲ ﻭ ﺭﺍﺑﻴﻦ )‪ (2002‬ﺑﺎ ﻋﻨـﻮﺍﻥ‬ ‫»ﻣﺪﻝ ﺭﻓﺎﻩ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ«‪ 2‬ﻣﻌﺮﻓﻲ ﻛﺮﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ‪ .‬ﺑﻪ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺁﻥﻫـﺎ ﺑـﺎﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺁﻧﻜـﻪ ﻣـﺪﻝﻫـﺎﻱ ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧـﻪ‬ ‫ﻗﺎﺑﻠﻴﺖ ﺗﻔﺴﻴﺮ ﺑﺨﺶ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﺗﻮﺟﻬﻲ ﺍﺯ ﻭﺍﻗﻌﻴﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺑـﺎﺯﻱﻫـﺎﻱ ﻣﺨﺘﻠـﻒ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺍﺭﺍ ﻫﺴـﺘﻨﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﻣـﺎ‬ ‫ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﻛﻪ ﭼﺎﺭﻧﺲ ﻭ ﺭﺍﺑﻴﻦ )‪ (2002‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺳﻨﺠﺶ ﻋﻤﻠﻜﺮﺩ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺩﻭ ﮔﺮﻭﻩ ﺍﺯ ﻣـﺪﻝﻫـﺎ‬

‫‪ .1‬ﻃﺒﻖ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ‪ -‬ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﻫﺮ ﻛﺪﺍﻡ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻫﺎﻱ ﺟﺪﻭﻝ ‪ 2‬ﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺑﺎ‪:‬‬ ‫ ‪9 D(9 8) E(10 9) 9 D E‬‬ ‫ ‪9 D(9 3) E(15 9) 9 6 D E‬‬

‫‪U‬‬ ‫‪U‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ‪1‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ‪2‬‬

‫‪2. Social-Welfare Model‬‬


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‫ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﺩﺍﺩﻩ ﺍﻧﺪ ﻧﺸﺎﻥ ﺍﺯ ﺁﻥ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ ﻛﻪ ﻣـﺪﻝ ﺭﻓـﺎﻩ ﺍﺟﺘﻤـﺎﻋﻲ ﻋﻤﻠﻜـﺮﺩ ﺑﻬﺘـﺮﻱ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻘﺎﻳﺴـﻪ ﺑـﺎ‬ ‫ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎﻱ ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧﻪ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎﻱ ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧﻪ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ‪ -‬ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ ﻭ ﻣﺪﻝ ‪ ERC‬ﻛـﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻗﺴـﻤﺖﻫـﺎﻱ ﻗﺒﻠـﻲ‬ ‫ﻣﺮﻭﺭ ﺷﺪﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﺑﺮ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻓﺮﺽ ﺍﺳﺘﻮﺍﺭ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﻋﻼﻭﻩ ﺑﺮ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﺑﻪ ﺩﻧﺒـﺎﻝ ﻛـﺎﻫﺶ‬ ‫ﺍﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺧﻮﺩ ﺑﺎ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﺍﻥﺍﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﻣﺎ ﺩﺭ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺭﻓﺎﻩ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﻓـﺮﺽ ﻣـﻲﺷـﻮﺩ‬ ‫ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺗﻤﺎﻳﻞ ﺩﺍﺭﻧﺪ ﻋﻼﻭﻩ ﺑﺮ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ‪ ،‬ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﺍﻥ‪ ،‬ﺑﻪﺧﺼﻮﺹ ﺁﻥﻫـﺎﻳﻲ ﻛـﻪ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ‬ ‫ﻛﻢﺗﺮﻱ ﺩﺍﺭﻧﺪ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻓﺰﺍﻳﺶ ﺩﻫﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺖ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺑـﻪ ﺩﻧﺒـﺎﻝ ﺣـﺪﺍﻛﺜﺮ ﻛـﺮﺩﻥ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ ﻛـﻞ‬ ‫ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﻧﻪ ﺣﺪﺍﻗﻞ ﻛﺮﺩﻥ ﻓﺎﺻﻠﻪﻱ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱﻫﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫ﭼﺎﺭﻧﺲ ﻭ ﺭﺍﺑﻴﻦ )‪ ،(2002‬ﺍﺑﺘﺪﺍ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺭﻓﺎﻩ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﺭﺍ ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ ﺑـﺎﺯﻩﻱ ﺩﻭ ﻧﻔـﺮﻩ ﻣﻌﺮﻓـﻲ‬ ‫ﻛﺮﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ‪ 1.‬ﺩﺭ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﺟﻤﻊ ﻣﻮﺯﻭﻥ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩ ﻭ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻧﻔﺮ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺍﻣﺎ ﻭﺯﻥ ﻭ ﺍﻫﻤﻴﺘﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺧﻮﺩ ﻭ ﻧﻔﺮ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﻗﺎﺋﻞ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺑﺴـﺘﮕﻲ ﺑـﻪ ﻭﺿـﻌﻴﺘﻲ‬ ‫ﺩﺍﺭﺩ ﻛﻪ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺩﺭ ﺁﻥ ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﻣﻲﮔﻴﺮﺩ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻛﻞ ﭼﻬﺎﺭ ﻭﺿﻌﻴﺖ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﺭﻓـﺎﻩ ﺍﺟﺘﻤـﺎﻋﻲ ﺗﻌﺮﻳـﻒ‬ ‫ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻳﻚ ﻭﺿﻌﻴﺖ ﻣﺮﺑﻮﻁ ﺑﻪ ﻣﺴﺌﻠﻪ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻣﺜﻞ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﮔﺮ ﺑﺎﺯﻳﻜﻦ ﺭﻗﻴﺐ‪ ،‬ﺭﻓﺘـﺎﺭﻱ ﻋﻠﻴـﻪ‬ ‫ﻣﻨﺎﻓﻊ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﺩﻫﺪ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺁﻥ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺿﺮﺍﻳﺐ ﺍﻫﻤﻴﺖ ﺩﺭ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﺭﻓﺎﻩ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﺗﻐﻴﻴـﺮ ﺧﻮﺍﻫـﺪ‬ ‫ﻛﺮﺩ‪ .‬ﻭﺿﻌﻴﺖ ﺩﻭﻡ ﻣﺮﺑﻮﻁ ﺑﻪ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﭘﻴﺸﺘﺎﺯ ﻭ ﭘﺴﻴﻦ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ‪ -‬ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﻲ‬ ‫ﺷﺪﻩﺍﻧﺪ‪ .‬ﺿﺮﺍﻳﺐ ﺩﺭ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﭘﻴﺸﺘﺎﺯ ﺑﺎ ﺿﺮﺍﻳﺐ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﭘﺴﻴﻦ ﺩﺭ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﺭﻓـﺎﻩ ﺍﺟﺘﻤـﺎﻋﻲ ﻣﺘﻔـﺎﻭﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻓﺮﻡ ﻛﻠﻲ ﻣﺪﻝ ﭼﺎﺭﻧﺲ ﻭ ﺭﺍﺑﻴﻦ ﺑﻪﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺯﻳﺮ ﻣـﻲﺑﺎﺷـﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﻣﻌﺎﺩﻟـﻪ ﺳـﻪ ﻣﺘﻐﻴـﺮ‬ ‫ﻣﺠﺎﺯﻱ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﻣﺘﻐﻴﺮ ﻣﺠﺎﺯﻱ ‪ r‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻭﺿﻌﻴﺖ ﭘﻴﺸﺘﺎﺯ ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻒ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﻳـﻦ ﻣﺘﻐﻴـﺮ‬ ‫ﺯﻣﺎﻧﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺩﺭ ﻭﺿﻌﻴﺖ ﭘﻴﺸﺘﺎﺯ ﺑﺎﺷـﺪ‪ ،‬ﺑﺮﺍﺑـﺮ ﻳـﻚ ﺑـﻮﺩﻩ ﻭ ﺩﺭ ﻏﻴـﺮ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺻـﻮﺭﺕ ﺻـﻔﺮ‬ ‫ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ .‬ﻣﺘﻐﻴﺮ ﻣﺠﺎﺯﻱ ‪ s‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﭘﺴﻴﻦ ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻒ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﮔﺮ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻮﻗﻌﻴﺖ ﭘﺴﻴﻦ‬ ‫ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺘﻐﻴﺮ ﻣﻘﺪﺍﺭ ﻳﻚ ﺑﻪ ﺧﻮﺩ ﻣﻲﮔﻴﺮﺩ‪ .‬ﻣﺸﺨﺺ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛـﻪ ﺩﻭ ﻣﺘﻐﻴـﺮ ﻣﺠـﺎﺯﻱ ‪ r‬ﻭ ‪s‬‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﺗﻀﺎﺩ ﺑﺎ ﻫﻢ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ‪ ،‬ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ﻳﺎ ‪ r‬ﻣﺴﺎﻭﻱ ﻳﻚ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻭ ﻳﺎ ‪ .s‬ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺩﻭ ﻧﻤـﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﻨـﺪ ﻫﻤﺰﻣـﺎﻥ‬ ‫ﺻﻔﺮ ﻭ ﻳﺎ ﻳﻚ ﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻣﺘﻐﻴﺮ ﻣﺠﺎﺯﻱ ﺳﻮﻡ ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ‪ q‬ﻣﺘﻐﻴﺮ ﻣﺠﺎﺯﻱ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻭﺿﻌﻴﺖ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻣﺜﻞ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺯﻣـﺎﻧﻲ‬ ‫ﻛﻪ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺍﺯ ﻃﺮﻑ ﺑﺎﺯﻳﻜﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﺑﺎ ﺭﻓﺘﺎﺭﻱ ﻛﻪ ﺑﺮﺧﻼﻑ ﻣﻨﺎﻓﻌﺶ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺭﻭﺑـﺮﻭ ﺷـﻮﺩ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳـﻦ‬ ‫ﻭﺿﻌﻴﺖ ﻣﺘﻐﻴﺮ ﻣﺬﻛﻮﺭ ﻣﻘﺪﺍﺭ ﻳﻚ ﺑـﻪ ﺧـﻮﺩ ﻣـﻲﮔﻴـﺮﺩ ﻭ ﺿـﺮﻳﺐ ‪ T‬ﺩﺭ ﻋﺒـﺎﺭﺕ ﻣﺮﺑـﻮﻁ ﺑـﻪ‬ ‫‪ .1‬ﻣﺪﻝ ﻛﺎﻣﻞﺗﺮ ﺑﺎ ﻋﻨﻮﺍﻥ ﻣﺪﻝ ﭼﻨﺪ ﻧﻔـﺮﻩ ﺗﻌﺎﻣـﻞ‪ -‬ﻋـﺪﺍﻟﺖ ) ‪multiperson model of reciprocal-fairness‬‬ ‫‪ (equilibrium‬ﺩﺭ ﻗﺴﻤﺖ ﺿﻤﻴﻤﻪ ﻣﻘﺎﻟﻪ ﺁﻧﻬﺎ ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬

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‫ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﻓﻌﺎﻝ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺷﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻏﻴﺮ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﻣﻘﺪﺍﺭ ‪ q‬ﺑﺮﺍﺑـﺮ ﺻـﻔﺮ ﺑـﻮﺩﻩ ﻭ ﺑـﻪ ﺿـﺮﻳﺐ ‪T‬‬

‫ﺣﺬﻑ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺷﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻣﻌﺎﺩﻟﻪ ‪ 6‬ﻓﺮﻡ ﻛﻠﻲ ﻣﺪﻝ ﭼﺎﺭﻧﺲ ﻭ ﺭﺍﺑﻴﻦ ﻧﺸﺎﻥ ﺩﺍﺩﻩ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫‪1‬‬ ‫‪Ui ª¬1 U.r V.s T.q º¼ Si >U.r V.s T.q @ S j‬‬ ‫)‪( 6‬‬

‫‪q 0‬‬

‫‪r 0‬‬

‫‪otherwise‬‬

‫‪Si ! S j ,‬‬

‫‪r 1 if‬‬

‫‪s 0‬‬


‫‪Si ! S j ,‬‬

‫‪s 1 if‬‬


‫‪1 if J misbehaves,‬‬

‫‪q‬‬

‫ﺩﺭ ﺗﻔﺴﻴﺮ ﺭﺍﺑﻄﻪﻱ ﻓﻮﻕ ﺍﺑﺘﺪﺍ ﻓﺮﺽ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠـﻪ ﺑـﻪ ﻣﺜـﻞ ﻣﻄـﺮﺡ ﻧﺒـﻮﺩﻩ ﻭ ﻣﺘﻐﻴـﺮ‬ ‫ﻣﺠﺎﺯﻱ ‪ q‬ﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮ ﺑﺎ ﺻﻔﺮ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ .‬ﺍﮔﺮ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺩﺭ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﭘﻴﺸﺘﺎﺯ ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﻭﺿـﻌﻴﺖ‬ ‫ﻣﺘﻐﻴﺮ ﻣﺠﺎﺯﻱ ‪ r‬ﻣﻘﺪﺍﺭ ﻳﻚ ﻭ ﻣﺘﻐﻴﺮ ﻣﺠﺎﺯﻱ ‪ s‬ﻣﻘﺪﺍﺭ ﺻﻔﺮ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﻨﺪ ﺩﺍﺷﺖ‪ .‬ﺑﺮ ﻋﻜﺲ ﺍﮔﺮ ﻓﺮﺩ‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﭘﺴﻴﻦ ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﻣﺘﻐﻴﺮ ﻣﺠﺎﺯﻱ ‪ s‬ﻣﻘﺪﺍﺭ ﻳـﻚ ﻭ ﻣﺘﻐﻴـﺮ ﻣﺠـﺎﺯﻱ ‪ r‬ﻣﻘـﺪﺍﺭ‬ ‫ﺻﻔﺮ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﻨﺪ ﺩﺍﺷﺖ‪ .‬ﺑﻨﺎﺑﺮﺍﻳﻦ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺕ )‪ (6‬ﺑﻪ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺕ ﺯﻳﺮ ﺗﺒﺪﻳﻞ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪(7‬‬ ‫‬ ‫‪if Si ! S j‬‬ ‫‪° Ui 1 U Si US j‬‬ ‫ﻣﻨﺒﻊ‪) :‬ﻳﺎﻓﺘﻪﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ(‬

‫‪Si S j‬‬

‫‪if‬‬

‫‪1 V Si VS j‬‬

‫®‬ ‫‪°‬‬ ‫‪¯ Ui‬‬

‫ﭘﺎﺭﺍﻣﺘﺮ ‪ U‬ﻭﺯﻧﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﻓﺮﺩ ‪ i‬ﺑﻪ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻧﻔﺮ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﺧﻮﺩ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﺪ ﺁﻥ ﻫـﻢﺯﻣـﺎﻧﻲ ﻛـﻪ‬ ‫ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺍﻭ ﺍﺯ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﭘـﺎﺭﺍﻣﺘﺮ ‪ V‬ﻧﻴـﺰ ﺿـﺮﻳﺐ ﺍﻫﻤﻴـﺖ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ ﻓـﺮﺩ‪‬‬ ‫ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﺩﺭ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﭘﺴﻴﻦ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻣﺸﺎﺑﻪ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺕ ﺑﺎﻻ ﺭﺍ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻭﺿﻌﻴﺘﻲ ﻧﻮﺷﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺑﺎﺯﻳﻜﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﺑـﻞ‪ ،‬ﺭﻓﺘـﺎﺭﻱ ﻋﻠﻴـﻪ‬ ‫ﻓﺮﺩ ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﺪ‪ .‬ﺑﻪﺩﻟﻴﻞ ﭼﻨﻴﻦ ﺭﻓﺘﺎﺭﻱ ﻓﺮﺩ ‪ i‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﺭ ﺍﻫﻤﻴﺘﻲ ﻛﻢﺗﺮﻱ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ ﻓـﺮﺩ‬ ‫ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﻗﺎﺋﻞ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻧﺘﻴﺠﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺭﺍﺑﻄﻪﻱ )‪ (6‬ﺿـﺮﻳﺐ ﺍﻫﻤﻴـﺖ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ ﻧﻔـﺮ ﻣﻘﺎﺑـﻞ ﻫـﻢ ﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﻭﺿﻌﻴﺖ ﭘﻴﺸﺘﺎﺯ ﻭ ﻫﻢ ﺩﺭ ﻭﺿﻌﻴﺖ ﭘﺴﻴﻦ ﺍﺯ ﻧﻈﺮ ﻓﺮﺩ ‪ i‬ﻛﺎﻫﺶ ﻣﻲﻳﺎﺑﺪ ﻭ ﺍﺯ ﻫـﺮ ﺩﻭ ﭘـﺎﺭﺍﻣﺘﺮ‬ ‫‪ U‬ﻭ ‪ V‬ﺑﻪ ﺍﻧﺪﺍﺯﻩ ‪ T‬ﻛﺎﺳﺘﻪ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ ﻭ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﻓﺮﺩ ‪ i‬ﺑﻪﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺯﻳـﺮ ﺑﺎﺯﻧﻮﻳﺴـﻲ ﺧﻮﺍﻫـﺪ‬ ‫ﺷﺪ‪:‬‬ ‫‪VoVT‬‬

‫)‪(8‬‬

‫‪Si ! S j‬‬

‫‪if‬‬

‫‪Si S j‬‬

‫‪if‬‬


‫‪ .1‬ﻓﺮﻡ ﺍﺻﻠﻲ ﻣﺪﻝ ﭼﺎﺭﻧﺲ ﻭ ﺭﺍﺑﻴﻦ )‪(2002‬‬

‫‪U oUT‬‬

‫‪1 U T Si U T S j‬‬ ‫‪1 V T Si V T S j‬‬

‫‬ ‫‪° Ui‬‬ ‫®‬ ‫‪°‬‬ ‫‪¯ Ui‬‬


‫‪527‬‬

‫ﺍﮔﺮ ﺑﺨﻮﺍﻫﻴﻢ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺍﺗﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺭﻭﺍﺑﻂ )‪ (7‬ﻭ )‪ (8‬ﺑـﻪ ﺁﻥﻫـﺎ ﺍﺷـﺎﺭﻩ ﺷـﺪﻩ ﺭﺍ ﺗﺤـﺖ ﻳـﻚ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﺎﺩﻟﻪ ﺑﺎﺯﻧﻮﻳﺴﻲ ﻛﻨﻴﻢ ﺩﺭ ﺁﻥ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺭﺍﺑﻄﻪﻱ )‪ (6‬ﺑﻪ ﻫﻤـﺮﺍﻩ ﺳـﻪ ﻣﺘﻐﻴـﺮ ﻣﺠـﺎﺯﻱ ﺗﻌﺮﻳـﻒ‬ ‫ﺷﺪﻩ ﺑﻪﺩﺳﺖ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺁﻣﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ )‪ (6‬ﻓﺮﺽ ﻣـﻲﺷـﻮﺩ ﺑـﻴﻦ ﺿـﺮﺍﻳﺐ ﻣﺤـﺪﻭﺩﻳﺖ ‪ 0 V d U d 1‬ﺑﺮﻗـﺮﺍﺭ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻫﻤﺎﻥﻃﻮﺭ ﻛﻪ ﺍﺷﺎﺭﻩ ﺷﺪ ﺩﺭ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺭﻓﺎﻩ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﻓﺮﺽ ﺍﺳﺎﺳﻲ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﺳـﺖ ﻛـﻪ ﻓـﺮﺩ ﻫﻤـﻮﺍﺭﻩ‬ ‫ﺑﻪﺩﻧﺒﺎﻝ ﺍﻓﺰﺍﻳﺶ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺧﻮﺩ ﻭ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﺍﻥ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﻣﺤﺪﻭﺩﻳﺖ ‪ 0 V d U d 1‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﺄﻣﻴﻦ ﺍﻳـﻦ‬ ‫ﻣﻨﻈﻮﺭ ﺍﻋﻤﺎﻝ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﻃﺒﻖ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺤﺪﻭﺩﻳﺖ ﻫﺮ ﺩﻭ ﺿﺮﻳﺐ ﻣﺜﺒﺖ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ﻓـﺮﺩ ﻫـﻢ ﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﻭﺿﻌﻴﺖ ﭘﻴﺸﺘﺎﺯ ﻭ ﻫﻢ ﺩﺭ ﻭﺿﻌﻴﺖ ﭘﺴـﻴﻦ ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ ﻓـﺮﺩ ﻣﻘﺎﺑـﻞ ﻭﺯﻥ ﻣﺜﺒـﺖ ﺩﺭ ﻧﻈـﺮ‬ ‫ﻣﻲﮔﻴﺮﺩ ﻭ ﻓﺮﺩ ﻫﻴﭻﮔﺎﻩ ﺣﺎﺿﺮ ﺑﻪ ﻛﺎﻫﺶ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﻧﻴﺴﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﻟﺒﺘﻪ ﺯﻣﺎﻧﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻓـﺮﺩ ﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﻭﺿﻌﻴﺖ ﭘﻴﺸﺘﺎﺯ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻭﺯﻥ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮﻱ ﺑﻪ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓـﺮﺩ ﻣﻘﺎﺑـﻞ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻘﺎﻳﺴـﻪ ﺑـﺎ ﺣـﺎﻟﺘﻲ ﻛـﻪ ﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﻭﺿﻌﻴﺖ ﭘﺴﻴﻦ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﺪ‪ .‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻉ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻋﻠﺖ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺍﺯ ﻛﺴﺎﻧﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ‬ ‫ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﻛﻢﺗﺮ ﺍﺯ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺍﻭﺳﺖ ﺣﻤﺎﻳﺖ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮﻱ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻓﺮﺽ ﺍﺳﺎﺳﻲ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺭﻓﺎﻩ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﻫﻤﻮﺍﺭﻩ ﺩﺭ ﺟﻬﺖ ﺑﻬﺒﻮﺩ ﭘـﺎﺭﺗﻮﻳﻲ‬ ‫ﺭﻓﺘﺎﺭ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﻨﺪ؛ ﻫﺮ ﺭﻓﺘﺎﺭﻱ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺟﻬﺖ ﻛﺎﻫﺶ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻛﻞ ﻭ ﺿـﺪ ﻛـﺎﺭﺍﻳﻲ ﺑﺎﺷـﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﺯ ﻧﻈـﺮ‬ ‫ﻣﺪﻝ ﺭﻓﺎﻩ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﺗﻔﺴﻴﺮ ﻧﻴﺴﺖ‪ .‬ﭼﺎﺭﻧﺲ ﻭ ﺭﺍﺑﻴﻦ )‪ ،(2002‬ﺑﻪﻃـﻮﺭ ﺁﺷـﻜﺎﺭ ﺑـﻪ ﺍﻳـﻦ‬ ‫ﻧﻜﺘﻪ ﺍﺷﺎﺭﻩ ﺩﺍﺭﻧﺪ ﻛﻪ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﻧﻤﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﺭﻓﺘﺎﺭ ﺿﺪ ﻛﺎﺭﺍﻳﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺍﻭﻟﺘﻴﻤـﺎﺗﻮﻡ ﺭﺍ ﺗﻮﺟﻴـﻪ‬ ‫ﻛﻨﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﻣﺎ ﻣﻌﺘﻘﺪﻧﺪ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﻔﺴﻴﺮ ﺭﻓﺘﺎﺭ ﺿﺪ ﻛﺎﺭﺍﻳﻲ ﺑﻪﺟـﺎﻱ ﻣﺮﺍﺟﻌـﻪ ﺑـﻪ ﻣـﺪﻝﻫـﺎﻱ ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧـﻪ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺍﺯ ﻋﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻣﺜﻞ ﺍﺳﺘﻔﺎﺩﻩ ﻛﺮﺩ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻦ ﺿﺮﻳﺐ ‪ T‬ﻧﻴﺰ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺭﺍﺳـﺘﺎ ﻭ‬ ‫ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﻔﺴﻴﺮ ﺭﻓﺘﺎﺭﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺟﻬﺖ ﻛﺎﻫﺶ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻛﻞ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﻣﻲﮔﻴﺮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﭘﺎﻳﺎﻥ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺨﺶ ﻭ ﺩﺭ ﺟﻤﻊﺑﻨﺪﻱ ﺳﻪ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺍﺭﺍﺋﻪ ﺷﺪﻩ‪ ،‬ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻧﻜﺘﻪ ﺍﺷﺎﺭﻩ ﻛـﺮﺩ‬ ‫ﻛﻪ ﻧﻜﺘﻪ ﻣﺸﺘﺮﻙ ﻫﺮ ﺳﻪ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎ ﻋﻼﻭﻩ ﺑﺮ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩﻱ‪ ،‬ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ‬ ‫ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﻧﻴﺰ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﺍﺛﺮﮔﺬﺍﺭ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﺯ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺳﻪ ﻣـﺪﻝ‪ ،‬ﺩﻭ ﻣـﺪﻝ ﻧﺨﺴـﺖ ﻣﺒﺘﻨـﻲ ﺑـﺮ‬ ‫ﺗﻤﺎﻳﻼﺕ ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧﻪ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺍﻟﺒﺘﻪ ﻫﻤﺎﻥﮔﻮﻧـﻪ ﻛـﻪ ﺍﺷـﺎﺭﻩ ﺷـﺪ‪ ،‬ﻧﺤـﻮﻩﻱ ﺍﺛﺮﮔـﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﺗﻤـﺎﻳﻼﺕ‬ ‫ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺩﻭ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺑﺎ ﻫﻢ ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ‪ -‬ﺍﺷـﻤﻴﺖ ﻓﺎﺻـﻠﻪ ﺑـﻴﻦ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱﻫـﺎ‬ ‫ﻣﻬﻢ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﺍﻣـﺎ ﺩﺭ ﻣـﺪﻝ ‪ ERC‬ﺗﻨﻬـﺎ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ ﻧﺴـﺒﻲ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴـﺖ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮﮔـﺬﺍﺭ ﻣـﻲﺑﺎﺷـﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻫﻢﭼﻨﻴﻦ ﺩﺭ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ‪-‬ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ ﺷﻜﻞ ﺻﺮﻳﺢ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﺑﻴﺎﻥ ﺷـﺪﻩ ﺍﻣـﺎ ﺩﺭ ﻣـﺪﻝ ‪ERC‬‬ ‫ﻓﻘﻂ ﺑﻪ ﻭﻳﮋﮔﻲﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩ ﺍﺷﺎﺭﻩ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﺗﻌﺎﺩﻝﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺩﻭ ﻣـﺪﻝ ﻧﺸـﺎﻥ‬

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‫ﻣﻲﺩﻫﺪ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ‪ -‬ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ ﺑﻬﺘﺮ ﺍﺯ ﻣـﺪﻝ ‪ ERC‬ﻣـﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧـﺪ ﻧﺘـﺎﻳﺞ ﺑـﺎﺯﻱﻫـﺎﻱ ﮔﻮﻧـﺎﮔﻮﻥ ﺭﺍ‬ ‫‪1‬‬ ‫ﭘﻴﺶﺑﻴﻨﻲ ﻛﻨﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﻛﻨﺎﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺩﻭ ﻣﺪﻝ‪ ،‬ﻣﺪﻝ ﺭﻗﻴﺐ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ ﻛﻪ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺕ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺍﺯ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺭﻓﺎﻩ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺑﺮ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻓﺮﺽ ﺍﺳﺘﻮﺍﺭ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺑﻪﺟﺎﻱ ﺍﻳﻨﻜﻪ ﺑﻪ ﺩﻧﺒﺎﻝ ﻛﺎﻫﺶ ﻧـﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮﻱ ﺑﺎﺷـﺪ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﭘﻲ ﺣﺪﺍﻛﺜﺮ ﻛﺮﺩﻥ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻛﻞ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﻫﺮ ﭼﻨـﺪ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﻛـﺎﺭ ﻳﻌﻨـﻲ ﺍﻓـﺰﺍﻳﺶ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ ﻛـﻞ‪،‬‬ ‫‪2‬‬ ‫ﻧﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮﻱ ﺭﺍ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﻛﻨﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺭﻓﺎﻩ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﻫﻤﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ‪ -‬ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ‪ ،‬ﺷﻜﻞ ﺻﺮﻳﺢ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴـﺖ ﺑﻴـﺎﻥ‬ ‫ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﻣﺪﻝ ﺭﻓﺎﻩ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﻧﻴﺰ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ‪ -‬ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ ﻳـﻚ ﻣـﺪﻝ ﺧﻄـﻲ ﺍﺯ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ‬ ‫ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﻣﻘﺎﻳﺴﻪ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺭﻓﺎﻩ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﻭ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ‪ -‬ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ ﻧﺸـﺎﻥ ﻣـﻲﺩﻫـﺪ ﻫـﺮ ﺩﻭ‬ ‫ﻣﺸﺎﺑﻪ ﻫﻢ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﺩﺭ ﻓﺮﻭﺿﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺑﺮ ﺭﻭﻱ ﺿﺮﺍﻳﺐ ﺍﻋﻤﺎﻝ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﻨـﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻫﻤﻴﻦ ﻓﺮﻭﺽ ﺳﺒﺐ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ‪ -‬ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ ﺑﻪﺩﻧﺒﺎﻝ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧﻪ ﺑﺎﺷـﺪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟـﻲ‬ ‫‪3‬‬ ‫ﻣﺪﻝ ﺭﻓﺎﻩ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﺩﺭ ﭘﻲ ﺣﺪﺍﻛﺜﺮ ﻛﺮﺩﻥ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻛﻞ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺣﺎﻝ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺳﺆﺍﻝ ﭘﻴﺶ ﻣﻲﺁﻳﺪ ﻛﻪ ﻛﺪﺍﻡ ﻳﻚ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫﺎ ﻣﺤـﻮﺭﻱﺗـﺮ ﺑـﻮﺩﻩ ﻭ ﻧﻘـﺶ‬ ‫ﺍﺻﻠﻲ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺭ ﺭﻓﺘﺎﺭ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺍﻳﻔﺎ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﺪ ﭼﺮﺍ ﻛﻪ ﻭﺿﻌﻴﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺑﺴﻴﺎﺭﻱ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﻧـﺪ ﻛـﻪ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺩﻭ‬ ‫ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩ ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ﻋﺪﺍﻟﺖ ﻭ ﻛﺎﺭﺍﻳﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺗﻀﺎﺩ ﺑﺎ ﻫﻢ ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﺩﺍﺭﻧﺪ‪ .‬ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ‪ -‬ﺍﺷـﻤﻴﺖ ﻭ ﻣـﺪﻝ ‪ERC‬‬ ‫ﺑﺮ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻓﺮﺽ ﺍﺳﺘﻮﺍﺭ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺑﻪﺩﻧﺒﺎﻝ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪ ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧـﻪ ﻫﺴـﺘﻨﺪ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭﺣـﺎﻟﻲﻛـﻪ ﻣـﺪﻝ ﺭﻓـﺎﻩ‬ ‫ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﺑﺮ ﭘﺎﻳﻪﻱ ﻛﺎﺭﺍﻳﻲ ﺷﻜﻞ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﭘﺎﺳﺦ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺳﺆﺍﻝ ﻭ ﺁﺯﻣﻮﻥ ﺩﺭﺳﺘﻲ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺩﻭ ﮔﺮﻭﻩ ﺍﺯ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎ )ﻣﺪﻝﻫـﺎﻱ ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧـﻪ‬ ‫ﻭ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎﻱ ﻛﺎﺭﺍﻳﻲ(‪ ،‬ﻻﺯﻡ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺭﻭﺵ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸﮕﺎﻫﻲ ﺑﻪﻛﺎﺭ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﺷﺪﻩ ﻭ ﺳﭙﺲ ﺑﺎ ﺍﺳﺘﻔﺎﺩﻩ ﺍﺯ‬ ‫ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺑﻪﺩﺳﺖ ﺁﻣﺪﻩ ﺩﺭ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﻣﻴﺰﺍﻥ ﺳﺎﺯﮔﺎﺭﻱ ﻫﺮﻛﺪﺍﻡ ﺍﺯ ﻣﺪﻝﻫـﺎ ﺑﺤـﺚ ﺷـﻮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﺍﺩﺍﻣﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺎﺕ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﻭ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺑﻪﺩﺳﺖ ﺁﻣﺪﻩ ﺻﺤﺒﺖ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺷﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫‪ -3‬ﺷﻴﻮﻩ ﻭ ﻣﻜﺎﻧﺴﻴﻢ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ‬ ‫ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻣﻘﺎﻳﺴﻪﻱ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ ﻃﺮﺍﺣﻲ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻳﻚ ﺁﺯﻣـﺎﻳﺶ‬ ‫ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻌﻲ‪ 4‬ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺑﻪ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺕ ﺑﻬﺘﺮ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﻫﻤﺎﻥ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺩﻳﻜﺘﺎﺗﻮﺭ ﺩﻭ ﻧﻔﺮﻩ ﺑﺎ ﺍﻧﺘﺨـﺎﺏﻫـﺎ ﻳـﺎ‬ ‫‪ .1‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺎﺕ ﻣﺮﺑﻮﻃﻪ‪ ،‬ﺑﻪ ﺿﻤﻴﻤﻪ ‪ 2‬ﻭ ﻣﻘﺎﻻﺕ ﻫﺮ ﻛﺪﺍﻡ ﺍﺯ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎ ﻣﺮﺍﺟﻌﻪ ﺷﻮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫‪ .2‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺎﺕ ﻣﺮﺑﻮﻃﻪ‪ ،‬ﺑﻪ ﺿﻤﻴﻤﻪ ‪ 2‬ﻭ ﻣﻘﺎﻻﺕ ﻫﺮ ﻛﺪﺍﻡ ﺍﺯ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎ ﻣﺮﺍﺟﻌﻪ ﺷﻮﺩ‬ ‫‪ .3‬ﺑﺎ ﻣﻘﺎﻳﺴﻪ ﺭﺍﺑﻄﻪ )‪ (3‬ﻭ ﺭﺍﺑﻄﻪ )‪ (7‬ﺷﺒﺎﻫﺖ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺩﻭ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺑﻪﺧﻮﺑﻲ ﺁﺷﻜﺎﺭ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫‪4. Distributional‬‬


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‫ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﻌﻴﻦ )ﮔﺴﺴﺘﻪ( ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺁﻥ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻧﻔـﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺣـﻖ ﺍﻧﺘﺨـﺎﺏ ﻭ ﺗﺼـﻤﻴﻢﮔﻴـﺮﻱ‬ ‫ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﺍﻳﺪﻩﻱ ﺍﺻﻠﻲ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺍﺯ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌﻪ ﺍﻧﮕﻠﻤﻦ ﻭ ﺍﺳﺘﻮﺭﻭﺑﻞ‪ (2004) 1‬ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺑﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻋﻠﺖ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺩﻳﻜﺘﺎﺗﻮﺭ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺭﻓﺘﺎﺭﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﺳـﺘﺮﺍﺗﮋﻳﻚ‬ ‫ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﻧﺪﺍﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﻣﺤﻴﻂ ﺳﺎﺩﻩ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﻛﻤﻚ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﺪ ﺳﺎﻳﺮ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫـﺎ ﻭ ﻋـﻮﺍﻣﻠﻲ ﻛـﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺭﻓﺘـﺎﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﻣﺆﺛﺮ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﺑﻪ ﻧﻮﻋﻲ ﺣﺬﻑ ﺷﺪﻩ ﻭ ﻓﻘـﻂ ﺍﻧﮕﻴـﺰﻩﻫـﺎﻳﻲ ﻛـﻪ ﻣـﻮﺭﺩ ﭘـﮋﻭﻫﺶ ﻣﻄـﺮﺡ‬ ‫ﻣﻲﺷﻮﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﻣﻜﺎﻥ ﺑﺮﻭﺯ ﻳﺎﺑﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺑﺎﺯﻱﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﺳﺘﺮﺍﺗﮋﻳﻚ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺍﻭﻟﺘﻴﻤﺎﺗﻮﻡ ﺍﻧﮕﻴـﺰﻩ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠـﻪ‬ ‫ﺑﻪ ﻣﺜﻞ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﻧﻘﺶ ﻣﻬﻤﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺭﻓﺘﺎﺭ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻮﺿـﻮﻉ ﺳـﺒﺐ ﻣـﻲﺷـﻮﺩ‬ ‫ﺗﻔﻜﻴﻚ ﺍﺛﺮﺍﺕ ﻫﺮﻛﺪﺍﻡ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫﺎ )ﻋﺪﺍﻟﺖ‪ ،‬ﻛﺎﺭﺍﻳﻲ‪ ،‬ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ‪ ،‬ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻣﺜﻞ( ﺑﻪﺳـﺨﺘﻲ‬ ‫ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﮔﻴﺮﺩ‪ .‬ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺩﻳﻜﺘﺎﺗﻮﺭ ﺩﺭ ﻋﻴﻦ ﺳﺎﺩﮔﻲ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻗﺎﺑﻠﻴـﺖ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ ﻛـﻪ ﺷـﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﻭ ﻳﺎﻓﺘـﻪﻫـﺎﻱ‬ ‫ﻣﻔﻴﺪ ﻭ ﻣﺴﺘﺤﻜﻤﻲ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﺭﻓﺘﺎﺭ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺩﺭ ﺍﺧﺘﻴﺎﺭ ﮔﺬﺍﺭﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺷﻴﻮﻩ ﺍﺟﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺩﻭ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪ ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻧﺘﺨـﺎﺏ‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﻫﺮﻛﺪﺍﻡ ﺍﺯ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪﻫﺎ ﭼﮕﻮﻧﮕﻲ ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻌﻲ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻧﻔـﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﻭ ﺩﻭﻡ‬ ‫ﺭﺍ ﻧﺸﺎﻥ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﺪ‪ .‬ﻫﺮ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪﺍﻱ ﻛﻪ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛﻨﺪ ﺑﺮﺍﺳﺎﺱ ﻫﻤﺎﻥ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪ‪ ،‬ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺑـﻴﻦ‬ ‫‪2‬‬ ‫ﺍﻭ ﻭ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻊ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺷﺪ ﻭ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ ﻫﻴﭻ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪﺍﻱ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻗﺪﺍﻡ ﻧﺨﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺩﺍﺷﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺑﺎﻳـﺪ ﺍﻧﺘﺨـﺎﺏ ﻛﻨـﺪ ﺑـﻪﺻـﻮﺭﺗﻲ ﻃﺮﺍﺣـﻲ ﺷـﺪﻩﺍﻧـﺪ ﻛـﻪ ﺑﺘﻮﺍﻧـﺪ‬ ‫ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﺘﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﻭ ﮔﺎﻩ ﻣﺘﻀﺎﺩ ﺭﺍ ﺍﺯ ﻫﻢ ﺟﺪﺍ ﻭ ﺗﻔﻜﻴﻚ ﻛﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺟﺪﻭﻝ ‪ ،2‬ﮔﺰﻳﻨـﻪﻫـﺎﻳﻲ ﻛـﻪ‬ ‫ﻧﻔﺮﺍﺕ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛﻨﻨﺪ ﺑﻪ ﺗﻔﻜﻴﻚ ﻫﺮ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩ )ﻧﻤﻮﻧﻪ( ﻧﻤﺎﻳﺶ ﺩﺍﺩﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﻧﺤﻮﻩ ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻊ ﺍﻣﺘﻴﺎﺯ )ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ( ﺑﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ :‬ﺍﻟﮕـﻮﻱ ﺍﻟـﻒ‬ ‫ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪﺍﻱ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﻧﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮﻱ ﺩﺭ ﺁﻥ ﻛﻢﺗﺮ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻭ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪﻱ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﻧﻈﺮ ﻣﺆﻟﻔﻪ ﻋﺪﺍﻟﺖ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪،‬‬ ‫ﭼﺮﺍ ﻛﻪ ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﻭ ﺩﻭﻡ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻧﺪﺍﺯﻩﻱ ‪ 2‬ﺍﻣﺘﻴﺎﺯ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻋـﻮﺽ ﺍﻟﮕـﻮﻱ ﺏ‬ ‫ﺍﺯ ﻧﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮﻱ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮﻱ ﺑﺮﺧﻮﺭﺩﺍﺭ ﺍﺳﺖ )‪ 4‬ﺍﻣﺘﻴﺎﺯ(‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻲ ﺍﮔﺮ ﺑﻨـﺎ ﺑﺎﺷـﺪ ﻧﻔـﻊ ﺷﺨﺼـﻲ ﺍﻭﻟﻮﻳـﺖ‬ ‫ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪ ﺏ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﭼﺮﺍ ﻛﻪ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ‪ ،‬ﺑﻴﺸـﺘﺮ ﺍﺯ‬ ‫ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺍﻭ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺍﻟﻒ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬

‫‪ .2‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺁﺷﻨﺎﻳﻲ ﺑﺎ ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺎﺕ ﻣﺮﺑﻮﻁ ﺑﻪ ﭼﮕﻮﻧﮕﻲ ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺑﻪ ﺿﻤﻴﻤﻪ ‪ 1‬ﻣﺮﺍﺟﻌﻪ ﺷﻮﺩ‪.‬‬

‫‪1. Engelmann & Strobel‬‬

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‫ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻘﺎﺕ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻱ ‪ /‬ﺩﻭﺭﻩﻱ ‪ ،53‬ﺷﻤﺎﺭﻩﻱ ‪ ،3‬ﭘﺎﻳﻴﺰ ‪1397‬‬ ‫ﺟﺪﻭﻝ ‪ .2‬ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻊ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱﻫﺎ ﺑﻪ ﺗﻔﻜﻴﻚ‬

‫ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﻭ ﺑﺮﻕ‬

‫ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ‬ ‫‪1‬‬

‫ﺍﻣﺘﻴﺎﺯ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ‬ ‫ﺍﻣﺘﻴﺎﺯ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ‬ ‫ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﺑﺮﻕ‬ ‫ﺍﻣﺘﻴﺎﺯ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ‬ ‫ﺍﻣﺘﻴﺎﺯ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ‬

‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺍﻟﻒ‬ ‫‪11‬‬ ‫‪9‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ‬ ‫‪12‬‬ ‫‪8‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺍﻟﻒ‬ ‫‪6‬‬ ‫‪4‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ‬ ‫‪7‬‬ ‫‪3‬‬

‫ﻣﻨﺒﻊ‪ :‬ﻳﺎﻓﺘﻪ ﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ‬

‫ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺍﮔﺮ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺍﻟﻒ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛﻨﺪ ﺑﻪ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ‪ 11‬ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺭﺳﻴﺪ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭﺣـﺎﻟﻲﻛـﻪ ﺍﮔـﺮ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛﻨﺪ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ‪ 12‬ﻧﺼﻴﺐ ﺍﻭ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺷﺪ‪ .‬ﺑﺎﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺁﻧﻜﻪ ﺍﻟﮕـﻮﻱ ﺏ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ‬ ‫ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮﻱ ﻧﺼﻴﺐ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﻛﺮﺩ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻲ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﺑﺎ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ ﻧﻔـﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ‬ ‫ﻛﺎﻫﺶ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﻳﺎﻓﺖ‪ .‬ﭘﺲ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛﻨﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺁﻳﺎ ﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﻣﻬﻢ ﺍﺳـﺖ‬ ‫ﻳﺎ ﺍﻳﻨﻜﻪ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻧﻔﺮ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﻫﻢ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻭ ﺍﻫﻤﻴﺖ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩﻱ ﻛﻪ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩ ﻋـﺪﺍﻟﺖ ﻭ‬ ‫ﻛﺎﻫﺶ ﻧﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮﻱ ﻣﻬﻢ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺍﻟﻒ ﻭ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩﻱ ﻛﻪ ﺑﻪﺩﻧﺒﺎﻝ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺧﻮﺩ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﻭ ﺗﻮﺟﻬﻲ ﺑﻪ‬ ‫‪2‬‬ ‫ﻧﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮﻱ ﻧﺪﺍﺭﺩ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﻨﺪ ﻛﺮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻣﻬﻢﺗﺮﻳﻦ ﻭﻳﮋﮔﻲ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﺣﺎﺿﺮ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻘﺎﻳﺴﻪ ﺑﺎ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻌﻲ ﻭ ﮔﺴﺴـﺘﻪ ﻗﺒﻠـﻲ‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﺗﻼﺵ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺩﻭ ﺍﻟﮕﻮ ﺣـﺪﺍﻗﻞ ﻣﻘـﺪﺍﺭ ﻣﻤﻜـﻦ‬ ‫ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ .‬ﺍﮔﺮ ﺍﻣﺘﻴﺎﺯ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ ﺑﺴﻴﺎﺭ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻣﺘﻴﺎﺯ ﺍﻭ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺍﻟـﻒ ﺑﺎﺷـﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﻳـﻦ‬ ‫ﺍﻣﻜﺎﻥ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ ﻛﻪ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﺑﺮ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ﻏﻠﺒﻪ ﻛﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﻫﻤﺎﻥﻃﻮﺭ ﻛـﻪ‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﺑﺨﺶ ﻣﺮﺑﻮﻁ ﺑﻪ ﻣﺮﻭﺭ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎ ﻋﻨﻮﺍﻥ ﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﻫﻤﻴﺖ ﻭ ﺿﺮﻳﺒﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ ﻧﻔـﺮ‬ ‫ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﻗﺎﺋﻞ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﻫﻤﻮﺍﺭﻩ ﻛﻢﺗﺮ ﺍﺯ ﺿﺮﻳﺐ ﻣﺮﺑﻮﻁ ﺑﻪ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻴﻢ ﻓﺮﺩﻱ ﻣـﻲﺑﺎﺷـﺪ‪ .‬ﻫـﺮ‬ ‫ﭼﻪ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻴﻢ ﻓﺮﺩﻱ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺑﺎﺷـﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﺣﺘﻤـﺎﻝ ﺍﻧﺘﺨـﺎﺏ ﮔﺰﻳﻨـﻪﺍﻱ ﻛـﻪ ﺑﻴﺸـﺘﺮﻳﻦ ﻧﻔـﻊ‬ ‫ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻴﻢ ﻓﺮﺩﻱ ﺭﺍ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺩﺍﺷﺖ ﺍﻓﺰﺍﻳﺶ ﻣﻲﻳﺎﺑﺪ ﻭ ﺍﻣﻜﺎﻥ ﺑﺮﻭﺯ ﺍﻧﮕﻴـﺰﻩﻫـﺎﻱ ﺩﻳﮕـﺮ ﻛـﺎﻫﺶ‬ ‫‪ .1‬ﻫﺮ ﺍﻣﺘﻴﺎﺯ ﺩﺭ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﻣﻌﺎﺩﻝ ‪ 1000‬ﺗﻮﻣﺎﻥ ﻭ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩ ﺑﺮﻕ ‪ 2000‬ﺗﻮﻣﺎﻥ ﺑﻮﺩﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫‪ . 2‬ﺩﺭ ﺑﺮﮔﻪ ﭘﺎﺳﺦ ﻧﺎﻣﻪ ﻋﻼﻭﻩ ﺑﺮ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻫﺎ ﺳﻮﺍﻻﺕ ﺟﻤﻌﻴﺖ ﺷﻨﺎﺧﺘﻲ ﭘﺮﺳﻴﺪﻩ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺗﻨﺪ ﺍﺯ‪ :‬ﺟﻨﺴﻴﺖ ﻭ ﻣﻘﻄـﻊ‬ ‫ﺗﺤﺼﻴﻠﻲ‪.‬‬


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‫ﻣﻲﻳﺎﺑﺪ‪ .‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌﺎﺕ ﻗﺒﻠﻲ ﻛـﻢﺗـﺮ ﺑـﻪ ﺁﻥ ﭘﺮﺩﺍﺧﺘـﻪ ﺷـﺪﻩ ﺍﺳـﺖ ﻭ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﻤﻮﻻً ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﻛﻢﺗﺮﻱ ﺑﻪ ﻓﺎﺻﻠﻪﻱ ﺑﻴﻦ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪﻫﺎ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫‪ -4‬ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺟﺪﻭﻝ ‪ 2‬ﺩﺭ ﻗﺎﻟﺐ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺩﻳﻜﺘـﺎﺗﻮﺭ ﻣـﻮﺭﺩ ﺁﺯﻣـﺎﻳﺶ ﻗـﺮﺍﺭ ﮔﺮﻓﺘـﻪ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ .‬ﻧﺘـﺎﻳﺞ‬ ‫ﺑﻪﺩﺳﺖ ﺁﻣﺪﻩ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻧﻤﻮﻧﻪ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺩﺍﻧﺸـﻜﺪﻩ ‪38‬‬ ‫ﻧﻔﺮ ﺩﺭ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﺷﺮﻛﺖ ﻛﺮﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺍﺯ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ‪ 19‬ﻧﻔﺮ ﺑﻪﻋﻨﻮﺍﻥ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﺷﺪﻩﺍﻧـﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻃﺒﻖ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺟﺪﻭﻝ ‪ 8 ،3‬ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺍﻟﻒ ﻭ ‪ 11‬ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ ﺭﺍ ﺗﺮﺟﻴﺢ ﺩﺍﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ‪ ،‬ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ‪ 57/9‬ﺩﺭﺻﺪ ﺍﺯ ﻧﻔﺮﺍﺕ ﺍﻭﻝ‪ ،‬ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪ ﺏ‪ ،‬ﻳﻌﻨـﻲ ﮔﺰﻳﻨـﻪﺍﻱ ﻛـﻪ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ‬ ‫ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓﺮﺩﻱ ﻭ ﻫﻢﭼﻨﻴﻦ ﻧﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮﻱ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮﻱ ﻫﺴﺖ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛﺮﺩﻩﺍﻧـﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻣـﻮﺭﺩ ﺟﻨﺴـﻴﺖ‬ ‫ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻛﻨﻨﺪﮔﺎﻥ‪ ،‬ﺍﺯ ﺑﻴﻦ ‪ 6‬ﻧﻔﺮ ﺷﺮﻛﺖ ﻛﻨﻨﺪﻩﻱ ﻣﺮﺩ‪ 50 ،‬ﺩﺭﺻﺪ ﺍﻟﮕـﻮﻱ ﺍﻟـﻒ ﻭ ‪ 50‬ﺩﺭﺻـﺪ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛﺮﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺑﻴﻦ ‪ 13‬ﺷﺮﻛﺖ ﻛﻨﻨﺪﻩﻱ ﺯﻥ‪ 5 ،‬ﻧﻔﺮ ﻳﻌﻨـﻲ ‪ 38/5‬ﺩﺭﺻـﺪ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺍﻟﻒ ﻭ ‪ 8‬ﻧﻔﺮ ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ‪ 61/5‬ﺩﺭﺻﺪ ﺍﺯ ﺁﻧﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛﺮﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺟﺪﻭﻝ ‪ .3‬ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ‬

‫ﻛﻞ‬ ‫ﻣﺮﺩﺍﻥ‬ ‫ﺯﻧﺎﻥ‬

‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺍﻟﻒ‬ ‫‪(42/1) 8‬‬ ‫‪(50) 3‬‬ ‫‪(38/5) 5‬‬

‫*‬

‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ‬ ‫‪(57/9) 11‬‬ ‫‪(50) 3‬‬ ‫‪(61/5) 8‬‬

‫* ﺍﻋﺪﺍﺩ ﺩﺭﻭﻥ ﭘﺮﺍﻧﺘﺰ ﺩﺭﺻﺪ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻫﺮ ﺍﻟﮕﻮ ﺍﺳﺖ‬ ‫ﻣﻨﺒﻊ‪ :‬ﻳﺎﻓﺘﻪ ﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ‬

‫ﻃﺒﻖ ﺟﺪﻭﻝ ‪ ،2‬ﻧﺤﻮﻩﻱ ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻊ ﺍﻣﺘﻴﺎﺯﻫﺎ ﺩﺭ ﺩﺍﻧﺸـﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﻣﻬﻨﺪﺳـﻲ ﺑـﺮﻕ ﻧﻴـﺰ ﻫﻤﺎﻧﻨـﺪ‬ ‫ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱﻫﺎ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺍﻟﻒ ﻛﻢﺗﺮ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻲ ﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﻋﻮﺽ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻟﮕـﻮﻱ ﺏ ﺑﻴﺸـﺘﺮ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ .‬ﺑـﺎ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﻭﺟـﻮﺩ ﻧﺘـﺎﻳﺞ ﺩﺭ ﺩﺍﻧﺸـﻜﺪﻩﻱ‬ ‫ﻣﻬﻨﺪﺳﻲ ﺑﺮﻕ ﻛﺎﻣﻼً ﻣﺘﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ .‬ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩ ‪ 24‬ﻧﻔﺮ ﺷﺮﻛﺖ ﻛﺮﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ ﻛـﻪ ﺍﺯ ﺑـﻴﻦ‬ ‫‪ 12‬ﻧﻔـﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ‪ 8 ،‬ﻧﻔـﺮ ﮔﺰﻳﻨـﻪ ﺍﻟـﻒ ﻭ ‪ 4‬ﻧﻔــﺮ ﮔﺰﻳﻨـﻪ ﺏ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨـﺎﺏ ﻛـﺮﺩﻩﺍﻧـﺪ‪ ،‬ﺑﻨــﺎﺑﺮﺍﻳﻦ ﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﻣﻬﻨﺪﺳﻲ ﺑﺮﻕ ﺑﺮﺧﻼﻑ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻛﻨﻨﺪﮔﺎﻥ‪ ،‬ﻳﻌﻨـﻲ ‪66/6‬‬ ‫ﺩﺭﺻﺪ‪ ،‬ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪ ﺍﻟﻒ ﻭ ‪ 33/4‬ﺩﺭﺻﺪ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪ ﺏ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛﺮﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ‪.‬‬

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‫ﺍﺯ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺟﻨﺴﻴﺖ ﻧﻴﺰ ﺍﺯ ﺑﻴﻦ ‪ 9‬ﻧﻔﺮ ﻣﺮﺩ‪ 6 ،‬ﻧﻔﺮ ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ﻫﻤﺎﻥ ‪ 66/6‬ﺩﺭﺻﺪ ﮔﺰﻳﻨـﻪ ﺍﻟـﻒ ﻭ‬ ‫‪ 3‬ﻧﻔﺮ )‪ 33/4‬ﺩﺭﺻﺪ( ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪ ﺏ ﺭﺍ ﺗﺮﺟﻴﺢ ﺩﺍﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ‪ .‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﮔـﺮﻭﻩ ﺯﻧـﺎﻥ ﻧﻴـﺰ ﺩﺭﺻـﺪﻫﺎ ﻣﺸـﺎﺑﻪ‬ ‫ﺩﺭﺻﺪ ﻛﻞ ﻭ ﺩﺭﺻﺪ ﻣﺮﺩﺍﻥ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﺯ ‪ 3‬ﻧﻔﺮ ﺯﻥ ﺷـﺮﻛﺖﻛﻨﻨـﺪﻩ ‪ 2‬ﻧﻔـﺮ ﮔﺰﻳﻨـﻪ ﺍﻟـﻒ ﻭ ‪ 1‬ﻧﻔـﺮ‬ ‫ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪ ﺏ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛﺮﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺟﺪﻭﻝ ‪ .4‬ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﻣﻬﻨﺪﺳﻲ ﺑﺮﻕ‬


‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺍﻟﻒ‬ ‫‪(66/6) 8‬‬ ‫‪(66/6) 6‬‬ ‫‪(66/6) 2‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ‬ ‫‪(33/4) 4‬‬ ‫‪(33/4) 3‬‬ ‫‪(33/4) 1‬‬


‫ﺑﺎ ﻣﻘﺎﻳﺴﻪﻱ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﺩﺭ ﺩﻭ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﻧﻜﺎﺕ ﺫﻳﻞ ﺭﺍ ﺑﻴﺎﻥ ﻛﺮﺩ‪ :‬ﻧﻜﺘﻪ ﺍﻭﻝ‬ ‫ﺍﻳﻨﻜﻪ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺩﺭ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛﺮﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭﺣـﺎﻟﻲﻛـﻪ ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ‬ ‫ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﺑﺮﻕ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺍﻟﻒ ﻛﻪ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﻣﺘﻮﺍﺯﻥﺗﺮﻱ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ ،‬ﺗﻮﺳـﻂ ﺍﻛﺜﺮﻳـﺖ ﺑﺮﮔﺰﻳـﺪﻩ ﺷـﺪﻩ‬ ‫ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﻣﺸﺎﺑﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺮﺧـﻲ ﺍﺯ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌـﺎﺕ ﺍﺯﺟﻤﻠـﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻓﻬـﺮ ﻭ ﻫﻤﻜـﺎﺭﺍﻥ )‪ (2006‬ﻧﻴـﺰ‬ ‫ﺑﻪﺩﺳﺖ ﺁﻣﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﺍﻧﺸﺠﻮﻳﺎﻥ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﺑﻪ ﻋﻠﺖ ﺁﺷﻨﺎﻳﻲ ﺑﺎ ﻣﺒﺎﺣﺚ ﻛـﺎﺭﺍﻳﻲ ﻭ ﺗﺄﻛﻴـﺪﻱ ﻛـﻪ‬ ‫ﻣﻨﺎﺑﻊ ﺩﺭﺳﻲ ﺑﺮ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﺩﺍﺭﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﻣﻘﺎﻳﺴﻪ ﺑﺎ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﺠﻮﻳﺎﻥ ﻏﻴﺮﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻱ ﺗﻤﺎﻳﻞ ﺑﻴﺸـﺘﺮﻱ‬ ‫ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﺩﺍﺭﻧﺪ ﻛﻪ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼـﻲ ﻭ ﻳـﺎ ﻛـﺎﺭﺍﻳﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺁﻥ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻫـﺎ ﺑﻴﺸـﺘﺮ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪،‬‬ ‫‪1‬‬ ‫ﺩﺭﺣﺎﻟﻲﻛﻪ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﺠﻮﻳﺎﻥ ﺳﺎﻳﺮ ﺭﺷﺘﻪﻫﺎ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﺑﺎ ﺍﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﻛﻢﺗﺮ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﻨﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺑﺎ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺣﺘﻲ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩ ﻱ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﻧﻴـﺰ ﺍﻗﻠﻴـﺖ ﻗﺎﺑـﻞ ﺗـﻮﺟﻬﻲ ﻳﻌﻨـﻲ‪42/1 ،‬‬ ‫ﺩﺭﺻﺪ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪﺍﻱ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛﺮﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ ﻛـﻪ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ ﻛـﻢﺗـﺮﻱ ﺩﺍﺷـﺘﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟـﻲ ﺩﺭ ﻋـﻮﺽ ﺗﻮﺯﻳـﻊ‬ ‫ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱﻫﺎ ﺍﺯ ﺗﻮﺍﺯﻥ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮﻱ ﺑﺮﺧﻮﺭﺩﺍﺭ ﺑﻮﺩﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻉ ﻫﻤﺎﻥﻃﻮﺭ ﻛـﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻣـﺪﻝﻫـﺎﻱ‬ ‫ﻓﻬﺮ ﻭ ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ ﻧﻴﺰ ﺍﺷﺎﺭﻩ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﺍﻫﻤﻴﺖ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻱ ﻋﺪﺍﻟﺖﺧﻮﺍﻫﻲ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺭﺍ ﻧﺸﺎﻥ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫‪ . 1‬ﺩﺭ ﺭﻭﺵ ﺷﻨﺎﺳﻲ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸﮕﺎﻫﻲ ﻓﺮﺽ ﺍﻭﻟﻴﻪ ﺁﻥ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﻣﺘﻐﻴﺮﻫﺎﻱ ﻓﺮﺩﻱ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﺩﺭﺁﻣﺪ ﻭ ﺟﻤﻌﻴـﺖ ﺷـﻨﺎﺧﺘﻲ‬ ‫ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﺟﻨﺴﻴﺖ‪ ،‬ﺳﻦ ﻭ ‪ ....‬ﺩﺭ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﻛﻠﻲ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶﻫﺎ )ﻧـﻪ ﺟﺰﺋﻴـﺎﺕ( ﺗـﺎﺛﻴﺮ ﮔـﺬﺍﺭ ﻧﻴﺴـﺘﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺍﮔـﺮ ﺍﺩﻋـﺎ ﺷـﻮﺩ ﭼﻨـﻴﻦ‬ ‫ﻣﺘﻐﻴﺮﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﺩﺭ ﻛﻠﻴﺖ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﺍﺛﺮﮔﺬﺍﺭ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﺩﻋﺎ ﺑﺎﻳـﺪ ﻣﺴـﺘﻨﺪ ﺑـﻪ ﻧﺘـﺎﻳﺞ ﻳـﻚ ﺁﺯﻣـﺎﻳﺶ ﺑﺎﺷـﺪ‪ ،‬ﻳـﺎ ﺍﻳﻨﻜـﻪ‬ ‫ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﺩﺭ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻘﻲ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ﺑﻪﺻﻮﺭﺗﻲ ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﺷﻮﺩ ﻛﻪ ﻣﺘﻐﻴﺮ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺩﺭ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﻭﺍﺭﺩ ﺷـﻮﺩ ﻭ ﻣﺸـﺨﺺ ﺷـﻮﺩ ﻳـﺎ‬ ‫ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﻛﻠﻲ ﺗﻐﻴﻴﺮ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﺪ ﻳﺎ ﻧﻪ‪) .‬ﮔﻮﺁﻻ‪ ،2005 ،‬ﺹ ‪ .(21-13‬ﺩﺭ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌﻪﻱ ﺣﺎﺿﺮ ﻧﻴﺰ ﺍﺩﻋﺎ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺗﺤﺼـﻴﻞ ﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﺭﺷﺘﻪﻱ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﺑﺮ ﺗﺼﻤﻴﻢ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻮﻗﻌﻴﺖ ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻌﻲ ﺍﺛﺮ ﮔـﺬﺍﺭ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺍﺩﻋـﺎ ﺑﺮﺍﺳـﺎﺱ ﻧﺘـﺎﻳﺞ ﺁﺯﻣـﺎﻳﺶ ﻓﻬـﺮ ﻭ‬ ‫ﻫﻤﻜﺎﺭﺍﻥ )‪ (2006‬ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬


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‫ﺩﺭ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﺗﺮﻛﻴﺐ ﺟﻨﺴﻴﺘﻲ ﻧﻴﺰ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﻭ ﺑﺮﻕ ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ‬ ‫ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﺑﺮﻕ ﺩﺭﺻﺪ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻫﺎ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻫﺮ ﺩﻭ ﮔﺮﻭﻩ ﻣﺮﺩﺍﻥ ﻭ ﺯﻧﺎﻥ ﻳﻜﺴﺎﻥ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﻣـﺎ ﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﻣﺮﺩﺍﻥ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻣﺘﻮﺍﺯﻥﺗﺮﻱ ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑﻪ ﺯﻧﺎﻥ ﺩﺍﺭﻧﺪ ﻭ ﺯﻧﺎﻥ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺍﺯ ﻣﺮﺩﺍﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﺑﺎ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛﺮﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫‪ -5‬ﺗﺤﻠﻴﻞ ﺣﺴﺎﺳﻴﺖ‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﺍﺩﺍﻣﻪ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﻗﺒﻞ ﻭ ﺩﺭ ﺟﻬﺖ ﺗﻘﻮﻳﺖ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺑـﻪﺩﺳـﺖ ﺁﻣـﺪﻩ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺑﺨـﺶ ﺑـﻪ‬ ‫ﺗﺤﻠﻴﻞ ﺣﺴﺎﺳﻴﺖ ﻣﻲﭘﺮﺩﺍﺯﻳﻢ‪ .‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻨﻈﻮﺭ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻌﻲ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﻱ ﺑﺎ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﻣﺘﻔـﺎﻭﺕ‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﺟﺪﻳﺪ ﻣﺸﺎﺑﻪ ﺁﺯﻣـﺎﻳﺶ ﻗﺒـﻞ ﺍﺳـﺖ ﻭ ﺗﻨﻬـﺎ ﺗﻔـﺎﻭﺕ ﺁﻥ ﺑـﺎ‬ ‫ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﻗﺒﻞ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﺭ ﭼﮕﻮﻧﮕﻲ ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻊ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱﻫﺎ ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﻛﺮﺩﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺠﻲ‬ ‫ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺨﺶ ﻗﺒﻞ ﺑﻪﺩﺳﺖ ﺁﻣﺪ ﻣﻤﻜﻦ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺑﺎ ﺗﻐﻴﻴﺮ ﺗﺮﻛﻴﺐ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻫﺎ ﺗﻐﻴﻴـﺮ ﻛﻨﻨـﺪ ﻟـﺬﺍ ﻻﺯﻡ‬ ‫ﺍﺳﺖ ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮﻱ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﺣﺴﺎﺳﻴﺖ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺑﻪ ﭼﮕﻮﻧﮕﻲ ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻊ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻫﺎ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﮔﻴﺮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﺟﺪﻳﺪ ﻃﺒﻖ ﺟﺪﻭﻝ ‪ ،5‬ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻫﺎ ﺑﻪﺻﻮﺭﺗﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﻋﻼﻭﻩ ﺑﺮ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼـﻲ ﻭ‬ ‫ﻋﺪﺍﻟﺖ‪ ،‬ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻉ ﻛﺎﺭﺍﻳﻲ ﻧﻴﺰ ﻣﻄﺮﺡ ﺍﺳﺖ ﭼﺮﺍ ﻛﻪ ﻫﻤـﺎﻥﻃـﻮﺭ ﻛـﻪ ﻣﺸـﺨﺺ ﺍﺳـﺖ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳـﻦ‬ ‫ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻉ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱﻫﺎﻱ ﺩﻭ ﺍﻟﮕﻮ ﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮ ﻧﻴﺴﺘﻨﺪ‪ ،‬ﺑﻠﻜﻪ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻉ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ ﺑﻴﺸـﺘﺮ‬ ‫ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﻟﺬﺍ ﻫﻢ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﻭ ﻫﻢ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩ ﻛﺎﺭﺍﻳﻲ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ ﺭﺍ ﭘﻴﺸﻨﻬﺎﺩ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﻨﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻋﻼﻭﻩ ﺑﺮ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﻱ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﺮﻛﻴﺐ ﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻫﺎ ﺩﺭ ﺩﺍﻧﺸـﻜﺪﻩ ﻛﺸـﺎﻭﺭﺯﻱ ﻭﺟـﻮﺩ‬ ‫ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﮔﻮﻧﻪ ﺍﻱ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻧﻤﻮﻧﻪ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩ ﻛﺸﺎﻭﺭﺯﻱ ﻧﻔـﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺩﺭ ﻫـﺮ ﺩﻭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺍﻟﻒ ﻭ ﺏ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻛﻤﺘـﺮﻱ ﻧﺴـﺒﺖ ﺑـﻪ ﻧﻔـﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ ﺍﺳـﺖ؛ ﺩﺭ ﺣﺎﻟﻴﻜـﻪ ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ ﺩﻭ‬ ‫ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩ ﻗﺒﻠﻲ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮﻱ ﺩﺭ ﻫﺮ ﺩﻭ ﺍﻟﮕﻮ ﺩﺍﺷﺖ‪ .‬ﺑﻨﺎﺑﺮﺍﻳﻦ ﺗﺮﻛﻴـﺐ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻫـﺎ ﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻳﻦ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩ ﺑﺼﻮﺭﺗﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺍﻟﻒ‪ ،‬ﻛﺎﻫﺶ ﺩﺍﺩﻥ ﺍﺧﺘﻼﻑ‬ ‫‪1‬‬ ‫ﺑﻴﻦ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱﻫﺎ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻭ ﺳﺎﻳﺮ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫﺎ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ ﺭﺍ ﺣﻤﺎﻳﺖ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﻨﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻋﻼﻭﻩ ﺑﺮ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﻱ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﺮﻛﻴﺐ ﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻫﺎ ﺩﺭ ﺩﺍﻧﺸـﻜﺪﻩ ﻛﺸـﺎﻭﺭﺯﻱ ﻭﺟـﻮﺩ‬ ‫ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﮔﻮﻧﻪﺍﻱ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻧﻤﻮﻧﻪ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩ ﻛﺸﺎﻭﺭﺯﻱ ﻧﻔـﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺩﺭ ﻫـﺮ ﺩﻭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺍﻟﻒ ﻭ ﺏ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻛﻤﺘـﺮﻱ ﻧﺴـﺒﺖ ﺑـﻪ ﻧﻔـﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ ﺍﺳـﺖ؛ ﺩﺭ ﺣﺎﻟﻴﻜـﻪ ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ ﺩﻭ‬ ‫ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩ ﻗﺒﻠﻲ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮﻱ ﺩﺭ ﻫﺮ ﺩﻭ ﺍﻟﮕﻮ ﺩﺍﺷﺖ‪ .‬ﺑﻨﺎﺑﺮﺍﻳﻦ ﺗﺮﻛﻴﺐ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻫﺎ ﺩﺭ‬

‫‪ .1‬ﺑﺮ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﺳﺎﺱ ﺣﺘﻲ ﺍﺻﻞ ‪ Maximin‬ﺭﺍﻟﺰ ﻧﻴﺰ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ ﺭﺍ ﺣﻤﺎﻳﺖ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﺪ‪.‬‬

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‫ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻘﺎﺕ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻱ ‪ /‬ﺩﻭﺭﻩﻱ ‪ ،53‬ﺷﻤﺎﺭﻩﻱ ‪ ،3‬ﭘﺎﻳﻴﺰ ‪1397‬‬ ‫ﺟﺪﻭﻝ ‪ .5‬ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻊ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱﻫﺎ ﺩﺭ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﻛﺸﺎﻭﺭﺯﻱ‬

‫ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﻛﺸﺎﻭﺭﺯﻱ‬ ‫ﺍﻣﺘﻴﺎﺯ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ‬ ‫ﺍﻣﺘﻴﺎﺯ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ‬

‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺍﻟﻒ‬ ‫‪9‬‬ ‫‪11‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ‬ ‫‪10‬‬ ‫‪13‬‬


‫ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﺩﺭ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﻛﺸﺎﻭﺭﺯﻱ ﺩﺭ ﺟﺪﻭﻝ ‪ 6‬ﮔﺰﺍﺭﺵ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ .‬ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻳـﻦ‬ ‫ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩ ‪ 42‬ﻧﻔﺮ ﺩﺭ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸﮕﺎﻩ ﺷﺮﻛﺖ ﻛﺮﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﻛـﻪ ﺍﺯ ﺑـﻴﻦ ‪ 21‬ﻧﻔـﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ‪ 10 ،‬ﻧﻔـﺮ )‪47/6‬‬ ‫ﺩﺭﺻﺪ( ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺍﻟﻒ ﻭ ‪ 11‬ﻧﻔﺮ )‪ 52/4‬ﺩﺭﺻﺪ( ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ ﺭﺍ ﺗﺮﺟﻴﺢ ﺩﺍﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ‪ .‬ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ ﺗﻮﺳـﻂ‬ ‫ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻛﻨﻨﺪﮔﺎﻥ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻲ ﺑﺎ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺍﻗﻠﻴﺖ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﻣﻼﺣﻈﻪﺍﻱ ﻳﻌﻨـﻲ‬ ‫‪ 47/6‬ﺩﺭﺻﺪ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺍﻟﻒ ﺭﺍ ﺑﺮﮔﺰﻳﺪﻩﺍﻧﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺖ ﺍﻳﻦ ﮔﺮﻭﻩ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪﺍﻱ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛـﺮﺩﻩﺍﻧـﺪ‬ ‫ﻛﻪ ﻫﻢ ﺑﺮﺧﻼﻑ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﺑﻮﺩﻩ ﻭ ﻫﻢ ﺍﻳﻨﻜﻪ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻛﻞ ﻛﻢﺗﺮ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺟﺪﻭﻝ ‪ .6‬ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﻛﺸﺎﻭﺭﺯﻱ‬


‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺍﻟﻒ‬ ‫‪(47/6) 10‬‬ ‫‪(37/5) 3‬‬ ‫‪(53/8) 7‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ‬ ‫‪(52/4) 11‬‬ ‫‪(62/5) 5‬‬ ‫‪(46/2) 6‬‬


‫ﺩﺭ ﻇﺎﻫﺮ ﺑﻪ ﻧﻈﺮ ﻣﻲﺭﺳﺪ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺑﻪﺩﺳﺖ ﺁﻣﺪﻩ ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ ﺩﺍﻧﺸـﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﻛﺸـﺎﻭﺭﺯﻱ ﺑـﺎ ﻧﺘـﺎﻳﺞ‬ ‫ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﺑﺮﻕ ﺳﺎﺯﮔﺎﺭﻱ ﻧﺪﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﺑﺮﻕ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﮔﺰﻳﻨـﻪﻱ ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧـﻪﺗـﺮ ﺭﺍ‬ ‫ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛﺮﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﻛﺸﺎﻭﺭﺯﻱ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧﻪﺗـﺮ ﺭﺃﻱ ﺩﺍﺩﻩﺍﻧـﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﻣـﺎ‬ ‫ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻧﻜﺘﻪ ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﻛﺮﺩ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﻛﺸﺎﻭﺭﺯﻱ ﻫﻤﻪ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫـﺎ ﺩﺭ ﺣﻤﺎﻳـﺖ‬ ‫ﺍﺯ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﻏﻴﺮﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧﻪ ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ ﺑﻮﺩﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﻋﻼﻭﻩ ﺑﺮ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ‪ ،‬ﺣﺪﺍﻛﺜﺮ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻛﻞ‬ ‫ﻧﻴﺰ ﺩﺭ ﺣﻤﺎﻳﺖ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ ﺑﻮﺩﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﺍﻣﺎ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻧﻤﻮﻧﻪ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﺑﺮﻕ ﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﺍﻧﮕﻴـﺰﻩﻱ ﻧﻔـﻊ‬ ‫ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ ﺭﺍ ﺣﻤﺎﻳﺖ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺩﺭ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﻛﺸﺎﻭﺭﺯﻱ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺏ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨـﺎﺏ ﻛـﺮﺩﻩﺍﻧـﺪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟـﻲ ﺑـﺎ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺣـﺎﻝ‬ ‫ﻧﺰﺩﻳﻚ ﺑﻪ ‪ 48‬ﺩﺭﺻﺪ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺑﺎﺯﻫﻢ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺍﻟﻒ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺭ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﻛﺸـﺎﻭﺭﺯﻱ ﺑﺮﮔﺰﻳـﺪﻩﺍﻧـﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ‬


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‫ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺖ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺗﺄﻛﻴﺪ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫـﺎﻱ ﺑﺮﺍﺑـﺮﻱ ﺧـﻮﺍﻫﻲ ﻭ ﻗـﺪﺭﺕ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮﮔـﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﺁﻥ ﺭﺍ‬ ‫ﻧﺸﺎﻥ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﺪ‪ ،‬ﭼﺮﺍ ﻛﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﺭ ﺑﺎﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺁﻧﻜﻪ ﻫﻤﻪ ﺷﺮﺍﻳﻂ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩ ﺑﻮﺩﻩ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻲ ﺑـﺎﺯﻫﻢ‬ ‫ﺷﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﺍﺗﻜﺎﻳﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺗﺄﻳﻴﺪ ﺁﻥ ﻣﺸﺎﻫﺪﻩ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﻫﺮ ﺳﻪ ﺁﺯﻣـﺎﻳﺶ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﻧﻤﻮﺩﺍﺭ ‪ 3‬ﻣﺸﺎﻫﺪﻩ ﻛﺮﺩ‪.‬‬

‫ﻧﻤﻮﺩﺍﺭ ‪ .3‬ﺩﺭﺻﺪ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻫﺮﻛﺪﺍﻡ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻫﺎ ﺑﻪ ﺗﻔﻜﻴﻚ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩ‬ ‫ﻣﻨﺒﻊ‪ :‬ﻳﺎﻓﺘﻪﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ‬

‫ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺨﺶ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺸﮕﺎﻫﻲ ﻭ ﺑﺨﺶ ﺗﺤﻠﻴﻞ ﺣﺴﺎﺳﻴﺖ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌﺎﺗﻲ ﻛـﻪ‬ ‫ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺩﻳﻜﺘﺎﺗﻮﺭ ﺭﺍ ﺑﻪﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﮔﺴﺴﺘﻪ ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﺩﺍﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﺗﻌﺪﺍﺩ ﺑﺴﻴﺎﺭ ﺍﻧﺪﻛﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﻧـﺪ‬ ‫ﻛﻪ ﻧﺤﻮﻩﻱ ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻊ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺩﺭ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﺑﺎ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌﻪﻱ ﺣﺎﺿﺮ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ .‬ﺁﺯﻣـﺎﻳﺶ ﺷـﻤﺎﺭﻩﻱ ‪29‬‬ ‫ﭼﺎﺭﻧﺲ ﻭ ﺭﺍﺑﻴﻦ )‪ ،(2002‬ﻧﺰﺩﻳﻚﺗﺮﻳﻦ ﻣـﻮﺭﺩ ﺑـﻪ ﺁﺯﻣـﺎﻳﺶ ﻣﻘﺎﻟـﻪ ﺣﺎﺿـﺮ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳـﻦ‬ ‫ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺍﺯ ﺑﻴﻦ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪ )‪ (4،4‬ﻭ )‪ (8،0‬ﻳﻜﻲ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛﻨﻨﺪ‪ 78 .‬ﺩﺭﺻـﺪ ﺍﻓـﺮﺍﺩ‬ ‫ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻛﻨﻨﺪﻩ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪ ﺩﻭﻡ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛﺮﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ‪ .‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪ ﺑﻴﺸـﺘﺮﻳﻦ ﺳـﻮﺩ ﺭﺍ ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ ﻧﻔـﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ‬ ‫ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻲ ﺍﺯ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻊ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻛﺎﻣﻼً ﻧﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺑﻪ ﻧﻈﺮ ﻣﻲﺭﺳﺪ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌـﻪ ﺣﺎﺿـﺮ ﻭ‬ ‫ﻣﻘﺎﻟﻪ ﭼﺎﺭﻧﺲ ﻭ ﺭﺍﺑﻴﻦ )‪ (2002‬ﺑﺎ ﻫﻢ ﻣﺘﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﻣﺎ ﺑﺎ ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﺑﻪ ﺗﻮﺿﻴﺤﺎﺗﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻗـﺒﻼً ﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﻓﺎﺻﻠﻪ ﺑﻴﻦ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪﻫﺎ ﺩﺍﺩﻩ ﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﻧﺎﺳﺎﺯﮔﺎﺭﻱ ﭼﻨﺪﺍﻧﻲ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﻧﺪﺍﺭﺩ‪ ،‬ﭼﺮﺍ ﻛـﻪ ﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﭼﺎﺭﻧﺲ ﻭ ﺭﺍﺑﻴﻦ ﻓﺎﺻﻠﻪﻱ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺩﻭ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪ ﺯﻳﺎﺩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬

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‫‪ -6‬ﺧﻼﺻﻪ ﻭ ﻧﺘﻴﺠﻪﮔﻴﺮﻱ‬ ‫ﺗﺤﻠﻴﻞﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻱ ﻣﻌﻤﻮﻻً ﺑﺮ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻓﺮﺽ ﺍﺳﺘﻮﺍﺭ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺑﻪ ﺩﻧﺒـﺎﻝ ﺣـﺪﺍﻛﺜﺮ‬ ‫ﻛﺮﺩﻥ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﻳﺎ ﻓﺮﺩﻱ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻴـﺎﻥ ﺷـﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﻭ ﭘﺪﻳـﺪﻩﻫـﺎﻳﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺮﺧـﻲ ﺍﺯ‬ ‫ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻱ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ ﻛﻪ ﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﺑﺎ ﺍﺗﻜﺎ ﺑﺮ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﻧﻤﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﺭﺍ ﺗﻔﺴـﻴﺮ‬ ‫ﻭ ﺗﺒﻴﻴﻦ ﻛﺮﺩ‪ .‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻉ ﺳﺒﺐ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺗﺎ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﺩﺍﻧﺎﻥ ﺩﺭ ﭘﻲ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎﻱ ﺟﺪﻳﺪﻱ ﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪ‬ ‫ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎ ﻋﻼﻭﻩ ﺑﺮ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ‪ ،‬ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﻱ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﻋﺪﺍﻟﺖ‪ ،‬ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻣﺜﻞ ﻭ‬ ‫ﻧﻮﻉﺩﻭﺳﺘﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺭﻓﺘﺎﺭ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮﮔﺬﺍﺭ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﻟﻪ ﺳﻪ ﻧـﻮﻉ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﻣـﺪﻝﻫـﺎ ﻣﻌﺮﻓـﻲ‬ ‫ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺗﻨﺪ ﺍﺯ‪ :‬ﻓﻬﺮ ﻭ ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ )‪ ،(1999‬ﻣﺪﻝ ﺑﻮﻟﺘﻦ ﻭ ﺍﻛﻨﻔﻠـﺰ )‪(2000‬‬ ‫ﻭ ﻣﺪﻝ ﭼﺎﺭﻧﺲ ﻭ ﺭﺍﺑﻴﻦ )‪.(2002‬‬ ‫ﻧﻜﺘﻪﻱ ﻣﺸﺘﺮﻙ ﻫﺮ ﺳﻪ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﻋﻼﻭﻩ ﺑﺮ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻓـﺮﺩﻱ‪ ،‬ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ‬ ‫ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﻧﻴﺰ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﺍﺛﺮﮔﺬﺍﺭ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﺯ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺳـﻪ ﻣـﺪﻝ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺩﻭ ﻣـﺪﻝ ﻧﺨﺴـﺖ ﻓـﺮﺽ‬ ‫ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺑﻪ ﺩﻧﺒﺎﻝ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧﻪ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺗﻔـﺎﻭﺕ ﺩﻭ ﻣـﺪﻝ ﺩﺭ ﭼﮕـﻮﻧﮕﻲ ﻣـﺪﻝﺳـﺎﺯﻱ‬ ‫ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧﻪ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺳﻮﻡ ﻛﻪ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺭﻓﺎﻩ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﻧﺎﻡ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ ،‬ﻓﺮﺽ ﺑﺮ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛـﻪ ﻓـﺮﺩ ﺑـﻪﺟـﺎﻱ‬ ‫ﺍﻳﻨﻜﻪ ﺑﻪ ﺩﻧﺒﺎﻝ ﻛﺎﻫﺶ ﻧﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮﻱ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﭘﻲ ﺣﺪﺍﻛﺜﺮ ﻛﺮﺩﻥ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻛﻞ ﺍﺳﺖ؛ ﻫﺮ ﭼﻨﺪ ﺍﻳﻦ‬ ‫ﻛﺎﺭ ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ﺍﻓﺰﺍﻳﺶ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻛﻞ‪ ،‬ﻧﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮﻱ ﺭﺍ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﻛﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺣﺎﻝ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺳﺆﺍﻝ ﭘـﻴﺶ ﻣـﻲﺁﻳـﺪ ﻛـﻪ‬ ‫ﻛﺪﺍﻡ ﻳﻚ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫﺎ ﻣﺤﻮﺭﻱﺗﺮ ﺑﻮﺩﻩ ﻭ ﻧﻘﺶ ﺍﺻﻠﻲ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺭ ﺭﻓﺘﺎﺭ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺍﻳﻔﺎ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﺪ‪ ،‬ﭼـﺮﺍ‬ ‫ﻛﻪ ﻭﺿﻌﻴﺖﻫﺎﻱ ﺑﺴﻴﺎﺭﻱ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺩﺍﺭﻧﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺩﻭ ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩ ﻳﻌﻨـﻲ ﻋـﺪﺍﻟﺖ ﻭ ﺣـﺪﺍﻛﺜﺮ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱ‬ ‫ﻛﻞ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺗﻀﺎﺩ ﺑﺎ ﻫﻢ ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﻣﻲﮔﻴﺮﻧﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﭘﺎﺳﺦ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺳﺆﺍﻝ ﻭ ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﺗﺮﺟﻴﺤﺎﺕ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ‪ ،‬ﺍﺑﺘﺪﺍ ﻳـﻚ ﺁﺯﻣـﺎﻳﺶ ﺗـﻮﺯﻳﻌﻲ‬ ‫ﻃﺮﺍﺣﻲ ﻭ ﺳﭙﺲ ﺩﺭ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﺠﻮﻳﺎﻥ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﮕﺎﻩ ﺗﺒﺮﻳﺰ ﺍﺟﺮﺍ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﺍﻓـﺮﺍﺩ‬ ‫ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺩﻭ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪ ﻳﻜﻲ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛﻨﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪﻱ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻊ ﻋﺎﻳـﺪﻱﻫـﺎ‪ ،‬ﻣﺘـﻮﺍﺯﻥ ﻭ ﺑـﻪ‬ ‫ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺗﻲ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪ ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧﻪ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪﻱ ﺩﻭﻡ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ ﻭ ﺑﻪ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺗﻲ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪ‬ ‫ﻣﻨﻄﺒﻖ ﺑﺮ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﺩﺭ ﺩﻭ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﻭ ﻣﻬﻨﺪﺳﻲ ﺑﺮﻕ ﺍﺟﺮﺍ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ .‬ﻧﺘـﺎﻳﺞ ﺑـﻪﺩﺳـﺖ‬ ‫ﺁﻣﺪﻩ ﻧﺸﺎﻥ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﺪ ﺑﺨﺶ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﺗﻮﺟﻬﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪﺍﻱ ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧﻪ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨـﺎﺏ ﻣـﻲﻛﻨﻨـﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﺣﺪﻭﺩ ‪ 42‬ﺩﺭﺻﺪ ﺍﺯ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻛﻨﻨﺪﮔﺎﻥ ﻭ ﺩﺭ ﺩﺍﻧﺸـﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﺑـﺮﻕ ‪ 66‬ﺩﺭﺻـﺪ‬ ‫ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪ ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧﻪ ﺭﺍ ﺑﺮﮔﺰﻳﺪﻩﺍﻧﺪ‪.‬‬


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‫ﺑﻪﻣﻨﻈﻮﺭ ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﺍﺳﺘﺤﻜﺎﻡ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ‪ ،‬ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﻱ ﺍﺟﺮﺍ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺁﺯﻣـﺎﻳﺶ‬ ‫ﺗﺮﻛﻴﺐ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻫﺎ ﺗﻐﻴﻴﺮ ﻳﺎﻓﺘﻪ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺑﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺟﺪﻳﺪ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﻭ ﺣﺪﺍﻛﺜﺮ‬ ‫ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻛﻞ‪ ،‬ﻳﻜﺪﻳﮕﺮ ﺭﺍ ﺣﻤﺎﻳﺖ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺑﻪ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺕ ﺑﻬﺘﺮ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪﻱ ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧﻪ‪ ،‬ﻫﻢ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ‬ ‫ﻛﻢﺗﺮﻱ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ ﻭ ﻫﻢ ﺳﺒﺐ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ ﺩﺭ ﻛﻞ‪ ،‬ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱ ﻛﻢﺗﺮﻱ ﻧﺼﻴﺐ ﻫﻤﻪﻱ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺷﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﺑﻌـﺪ ﺍﺯ‬ ‫ﺍﻋﻤﺎﻝ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺗﻐﻴﻴﺮ‪ ،‬ﺑﺎﺯﻫﻢ ﻣﺸﺎﻫﺪﻩ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ ﻧﺰﺩﻳﻚ ﺑﻪ ﻧﺼﻒ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻛﻨﻨﺪﮔﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻳﻲ ﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧـﻪ‬ ‫ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺷﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺑﻪ ﺩﺳﺖ ﺁﻣﺪﻩ ﺍﺯ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﺍﺧﻴﺮ ﺩﻭﺑﺎﺭﻩ ﺗﺄﻛﻴﺪ ﺑﺮ ﻋﺪﺍﻟﺖ ﺑﻴﺸـﺘﺮ‬ ‫ﺗﺄﻛﻴﺪ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﻣﺎ ﺩﺭ ﻋﻴﻦ ﺣﺎﻝ ﻧﻤﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺍﺯ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﻭ ﻣﺆﻟﻔﻪ ﻛﺎﺭﺍﻳﻲ ﭼﺸﻢﭘﻮﺷﻲ ﻛﺮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌﻪ ﺣﺎﺿﺮ ﻛﻪ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﺑﺎ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌﺎﺕ ﻣﺸﺎﺑﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺯﻣﻴﻨﻪ ﺑﺎﺯﻱﻫـﺎﻱ ﺗـﻮﺯﻳﻌﻲ‬ ‫ﺍﺳﺖ ﺩﻭﺑﺎﺭﻩ ﻧﺸﺎﻥ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﺪ ﻋﻼﻭﻩ ﺑﺮ ﻧﻔﻊ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ‪ ،‬ﺍﻧﮕﻴﺰﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﺩﻳﮕـﺮﻱ ﺩﺭ ﺭﻓﺘـﺎﺭ ﺍﻗﺘﺼـﺎﺩﻱ‬ ‫ﻓﺮﺩ ﺍﺛﺮﮔﺬﺍﺭ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻉ ﻧﺸﺎﻧﮕﺮ ﺍﻫﻤﻴﺖ ﻧﮕﺮﺵ ﭼﻨﺪ ﺑﻌﺪﻱ ﺩﺭ ﻧﮕـﺎﻩ ﺍﻗﺘﺼـﺎﺩﻱ ﺑـﻪ‬ ‫ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﻟﺬﺍ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪﺭﻳـﺰﻱﻫـﺎ ﻭ ﺳﻴﺎﺳـﺖﮔـﺬﺍﺭﻱﻫـﺎ‪ ،‬ﺿـﺮﻭﺭﻱ ﺍﺳـﺖ ﺍﻧﮕﻴـﺰﻩﻫـﺎ ﻭ‬ ‫ﻣﺆﻟﻔﻪﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﻋﺪﺍﻟﺖ‪ ،‬ﻛﺎﻫﺶ ﻧﺎﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮﻱ ﻭ ﻛﻤﻚ ﺑﻪ ﻫﻢ ﻧﻮﻋﺎﻥ ﺑﻴﺸـﺘﺮ ﻣـﻮﺭﺩ ﺗﻮﺟـﻪ ﻗـﺮﺍﺭ‬ ‫ﮔﻴﺮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺿﻤﻴﻤﻪ ‪ -1‬ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺎﺕ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ‬ ‫ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﻣﺬﻛﻮﺭ ﺩﺭ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﺠﻮﻳﺎﻥ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﮕﺎﻩ ﺗﺒﺮﻳﺰ ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﻣﺰﻳـﺖ ﺍﺳـﺘﻔﺎﺩﻩ ﺍﺯ‬ ‫ﺩﺍﻧﺸﺠﻮﻳﺎﻥ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑﻪ ﺳﺎﻳﺮ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺟﺎﻣﻌﻪ ﺳﺮﻳﻊﺗـﺮ ﻭ ﺑـﺎ ﺩﻗـﺖ ﺑﻴﺸـﺘﺮﻱ‬ ‫ﻣﻲ ﺗﻮﺍﻧﻨﺪ ﻓﺮﺁﻳﻨﺪ ﻭ ﺷـﻴﻮﻩ ﺍﻧﺠـﺎﻡ ﺑـﺎﺯﻱ ﺭﺍ ﻳـﺎﺩ ﮔﺮﻓﺘـﻪ ﻭ ﻧﺴـﺒﺖ ﺑـﻪ ﭘﻴﺎﻣـﺪ ﺍﻧﺘﺨـﺎﺏﻫـﺎﻱ‬ ‫ﺧﻮﺩﺁﮔﺎﻫﻲ ﻭ ﺍﻃﻼﻋﺎﺕ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮﻱ ﺩﺍﺭﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﻟﺬﺍ ﺩﺭ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶﻫﺎﻱ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﮔﺮﻓﺘـﻪ ﺑـﺎ ﺩﺍﻧﺸـﺠﻮﻳﺎﻥ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻓﺮﺽ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺍﻃﻼﻋﺎﺕ ﻛﺎﻣﻞ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺑﺎﺯﻳﻜﻦ ﻫﺎ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻋﺘﺒﺎﺭ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮﻱ ﺑﺮﺧﻮﺭﺩﺍﺭ ﺑﻮﺩﻩ ﻭ ﺍﺣﺘﻤﺎﻝ ﺑﺮﻭﺯ‬ ‫ﺍﻃﻼﻋﺎﺕ ﻧﺎﻗﺺ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﮔﺮﻭﻩ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﻛﻢﺗﺮ ﺍﺯ ﺳﺎﻳﺮ ﮔﺮﻭﻩﻫﺎﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺷﺮﻛﺖ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﺠﻮﻳﺎﻥ ﺩﺭ ﺁﺯﻣﺎﻳﺶ ﺍﺯ ﺁﮔﻬﻲ ﺍﺳﺘﻔﺎﺩﻩ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﺑﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﻛـﻪ‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﺳﻄﺢ ﺳﻪ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩ ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﻣﻬﻨﺪﺳﻲ ﺑـﺮﻕ‪ ،‬ﺩﺍﻧﺸـﻜﺪﻩﻱ ﺍﻗﺘﺼـﺎﺩ‪ ،‬ﻣـﺪﻳﺮﻳﺖ ﻭ‬ ‫ﺑﺎﺯﺭﮔﺎﻧﻲ ﻭ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﻜﺪﻩ ﻱ ﻛﺸﺎﻭﺭﺯﻱ‪ ،‬ﺁﮔﻬﻲ ﺷﺮﻛﺖ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﭘﺨﺶ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳـﺖ ﻭ ﺩﺍﻧﺸـﺠﻮﻳﺎﻥ‬ ‫ﻛﺎﻣﻼً ﺩﺍﻭﻃﻠﺒﺎﻧﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺷﺮﻛﺖ ﺟﺴﺘﻪﺍﻧﺪ‪ .‬ﻫﻢﭼﻨﻴﻦ ﻣﻜﺎﻧﺴﻴﻢ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﻃﻮﺭﻱ ﻃﺮﺍﺣـﻲ ﺷـﺪﻩ‬ ‫ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺍﺟﺮﺍﻱ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺑﻪ ﻫﻴﭻ ﻭﺟﻪ ﻭﺍﺑﺴﺘﮕﻲ ﺑﻪ ﺗﻌﺪﺍﺩ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻛﻨﻨﺪﮔﺎﻥ ﻧﺪﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪.‬‬

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‫ﻣﻜﺎﻧﺴﻴﻢ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺑﻪ ﺷﻜﻠﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺍﺻﻞ ﻧﺎﺷﻨﺎﺱ ﺑﻮﺩﻥ‪ 1‬ﻭ ﻫﻢﺯﻣﺎﻧﻲ ﻛﺎﻣﻼً ﺭﻋﺎﻳﺖ ﺷﺪﻩ‬ ‫ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺍﺯ ﻫﻮﻳﺖ ﻳﻜﺪﻳﮕﺮ ﺍﻃﻼﻋﻲ ﻧﺪﺍﺭﻧﺪ‪ .‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﻣﺮ ﻣﺎﻧﻊ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﻣـﻲﺷـﻮﺩ ﺗـﺎ ﺑـﻴﻦ‬ ‫ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﺒﺎﺩﻝ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱﻫﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺍﺯ ﭘﺎﻳﺎﻥ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺗﻮﺍﻓﻘﻲ ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﮔﻴﺮﺩ ﻭ ﻳﺎ ﺍﻳﻨﻜـﻪ ﺍﻓـﺮﺍﺩ ﺩﺭﺻـﺪﺩ‬ ‫ﺍﻗﺪﺍﻣﺎﺕ ﺗﻼﻓﻲﺟﻮﻳﺎﻧﻪ ﻭ ﻛﺴﺐ ﺍﻋﺘﺒﺎﺭ‪ 2‬ﺑﺮﺁﻳﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻛﻨﻨﺪﮔﺎﻥ ﺍﺑﺘﺪﺍ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻜﺎﻧﻲ ﻛـﻪ ﺍﺯ ﻗﺒـﻞ‬ ‫ﻣﺸﺨﺺ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺭﺃﺱ ﺳﺎﻋﺖ ﻣﻌﻴﻦ ﺣﻀﻮﺭ ﻳﺎﻓﺘﻪ ﻭ ﺩﺭ ﺍﺑﺘﺪﺍﻱ ﻭﺭﻭﺩ ﺑﻪ ﻫﺮﻛﺪﺍﻡ ﺍﺯ ﺁﻥﻫـﺎ‬ ‫ﺑﺮﮔﻪﺍﻱ ﺣﺎﻭﻱ ﻳﻚ ﻋـﺪﺩ ﭼﻬـﺎﺭ ﺭﻗﻤـﻲ ﺍﺧﺘﺼـﺎﺹ ﺩﺍﺩﻩ ﺷـﺪﻩ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺍﻋـﺪﺍﺩ ﻭ ﻧﺤـﻮﻩ‬ ‫ﺗﺨﺼﻴﺺ ﺁﻥﻫﺎ ﻛﺎﻣﻼً ﺗﺼﺎﺩﻓﻲ ﺑﻮﺩﻩ ﻭ ﺣﺘﻲ ﺑﺮﮔﺰﺍﺭﻛﻨﻨﺪﮔﺎﻥ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﻨﻜﻪ ﻛﺪﺍﻡ ﻛﺪ ﺑﻪ ﻛﺪﺍﻡ ﻓـﺮﺩ‬ ‫ﺍﺧﺘﺼﺎﺹ ﺩﺍﺩﻩ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﺍﻃﻼﻋﻲ ﻧﺪﺍﺭﻧﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺖ ﺁﻧﭽﻪ ﺑﺮﮔﺰﺍﺭﻛﻨﻨﺪﮔﺎﻥ ﺍﺯ ﺁﻥ ﺁﮔﺎﻫﻨﺪ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻛﺪﻫﺎ ﻭ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﻛﺪﻫﺎ ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﻨﺪ؛ ﺍﻣﺎ ﺍﻳﻨﻜـﻪ ﻫـﺮ ﻛـﺪ ﻣﺘﻌﻠـﻖ ﺑـﻪ ﻛـﺪﺍﻡ‬ ‫ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻛﻨﻨﺪﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺳﺎﻳﺮ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻛﻨﻨﺪﮔﺎﻥ ﻭ ﺑﺮﮔﺰﺍﺭﻛﻨﻨﺪﻩ ﻫﺎ ﻧﺎﻣﻌﻠﻮﻡ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﻫـﻢﭼﻨـﻴﻦ‬ ‫ﮔﺮﻭﻩﺑﻨﺪﻱ ﻭ ﺟﺎﻳﮕﺎﻩ ﻫﺮ ﻓﺮﺩ )ﻛﺪ( ﺩﺭ ﮔﺮﻭﻩ ﻧﻴﺰ ﻛﺎﻣﻼً ﺗﺼﺎﺩﻓﻲ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺑﻌﺪ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﻨﻜﻪ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻛﻨﻨﺪﮔﺎﻥ ﺑﺮﮔـﻪ ﻣﺮﺑـﻮﻁ ﺑـﻪ ﺭﺍﻫﻨﻤـﺎﻱ ﺑـﺎﺯﻱ ﺭﺍ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌـﻪ ﻛﺮﺩﻧـﺪ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺑﺮﮔﻪﺍﻱ ﺑﺎ ﻋﻨﻮﺍﻥ ﭘﺎﺳﺦﻧﺎﻣﻪ ﺩﺍﺩﻩ ﻣﻲ ﺷﻮﺩ ﻛﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺮﮔﻪ ﺣﺎﻭﻱ ﺟﺎﻳﮕﺎﻩ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺩﺭ ﮔﺮﻭﻩ )ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ‬ ‫ﻳﺎ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ( ﻭ ﻫﻢﭼﻨﻴﻦ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛﻨﻨﺪ ﻣﻲﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﺑـﺎ ﺗﻮﺟـﻪ ﺑـﻪ ﺗﺼـﺎﺩﻓﻲ‬ ‫ﺑﻮﺩﻥ ﻛﺪﻫﺎ‪ ،‬ﻫﻴﭻﻛﺪﺍﻡ ﺍﺯ ﺷﺮﻛﺖﻛﻨﻨﺪﮔﺎﻥ ﻫﻢﮔﺮﻭﻫﻲ ﺧﻮﺩ ﺭﺍ ﻧﻤﻲﺷﻨﺎﺳﻨﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﻫﺮ ﺑﺮﮔﻪﻱ ﭘﺎﺳﺦﻧﺎﻣﻪ‪ ،‬ﺩﻭ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻱ ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻌﻲ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺩﺭ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﺷـﺪﻩ‬ ‫ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺍﺯ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺩﻭ ﺍﻟﮕﻮ ﻳﻜﻲ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﻫﺮﻛﺪﺍﻡ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻟﮕﻮﻫـﺎ ﻧﺸـﺎﻥ ﺩﻫﻨـﺪﻩﻱ‬ ‫ﭼﮕﻮﻧﮕﻲ ﺗﻮﺯﻳﻊ ﻋﺎﻳﺪﻱﻫﺎ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﻭ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺖ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﻣﻌﻴﻦ ﻛﻨﺪ‬ ‫ﭼﻪ ﻣﻘﺪﺍﺭ ﭘﻮﻝ ﺑﻪ ﺧﻮﺩﺵ ﻭ ﺑﻪ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺭﺳﻴﺪ‪ .‬ﭘﻮﻟﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻫﺮ ﻧﻔـﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﻭ ﺩﻭﻡ ﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﻫﺮ ﺍﻟﮕﻮ ﻳﺎ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪ ﻣﻌﻴﻦ ﺷﺪﻩ‪ ،‬ﻣﺘﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻭ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛﻨﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺑﺮﺍﺳـﺎﺱ ﻛـﺪﺍﻡ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﮕﻮ ﭘﻮﻝﻫﺎ ﺗﻘﺴﻴﻢ ﺷﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﺍﻟﺒﺘﻪ ﺑﻪﺟﺎﻱ ﺍﻳﻨﻜﻪ ﺑﻪﻃﻮﺭ ﻣﺴـﺘﻘﻴﻢ ﻣﺒﻠـﻎ ﺩﺭﻳـﺎﻓﺘﻲ ﻫـﺮ ﺑـﺎﺯﻳﻜﻦ‬ ‫ﻧﻮﺷﺘﻪ ﺷﻮﺩ‪ ،‬ﺍﺯ ﻭﺍژﻩﻱ ﺍﻣﺘﻴﺎﺯ‪ 3‬ﺍﺳﺘﻔﺎﺩﻩ ﺷﺪﻩ ﻭ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺮﮔﻪ ﺭﺍﻫﻨﻤﺎ ﺑﻴـﺎﻥ ﺷـﺪﻩ ﻛـﻪ ﻫـﺮ ﺍﻣﺘﻴـﺎﺯ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﺎﺩﻝ ﭼﻪ ﻣﺒﻠﻎ ﭘﻮﻝ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺑﻌﺪ ﺍﺯ ﺁﻧﻜﻪ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺧﻮﺩ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻛﺮﺩ‪ ،‬ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺗﻤﺎﻡ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﭘﺲ ﺍﺯ‬ ‫ﺁﻥ‪ ،‬ﺑﺮﺍﺳﺎﺱ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻧﻔـﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺍﻧﺠـﺎﻡ ﺩﺍﺩﻩ‪ ،‬ﻣﻌـﺎﺩﻝ ﺍﻣﺘﻴﺎﺯﻫـﺎ ﭘـﻮﻝ ﻧﻘـﺪ ﺑـﻪ ﻧﻔـﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﻭ‬ ‫ﻫﻢﮔﺮﻭﻫﻲ ﺍﻭ ﻛﻪ ﮔﺰﻳﻨﻪﺍﻱ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﻧﺪﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﺩﺍﺩﻩ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺷﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﻪ ﻧﻴـﺰ‬ ‫‪1. Anonymous‬‬ ‫‪2. Reputation‬‬ ‫‪3. Point‬‬

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‫ﻫﻤﭽﻨﺎﻥ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ‪ ،‬ﻫﻢﮔﺮﻭﻫﻲﻫﺎﻱ ﺧﻮﺩ ﺭﺍ ﻧﻤﻲﺷﻨﺎﺳﻨﺪ ﻭ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻣﻲﺩﺍﻧﻨﺪ ﻫﻢﮔﺮﻭﻫﻲ ﺁﻥﻫـﺎ ﭼـﻪ‬ ‫ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻲ ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﺩﺍﺩﻩ ﻭ ﺑﺮﺍﺳﺎﺱ ﺁﻥ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ ﭘﻮﻝ ﻧﻘﺪ ﺩﺭﻳﺎﻓﺖ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﻨﺪ ﻛﺮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺿﻤﻴﻤﻪ ‪ -2‬ﺗﻌﺎﺩﻝ ﻣﺪﻝﻫﺎ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻒ( ﻗﻀﺎﻳﺎﻱ ﻣﺮﺑﻮﻁ ﺑﻪ ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ‪ -‬ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ )ﺑﺮﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﺍﺯ ﻓﻬﺮ ﻭ ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ )‪(1999‬‬ ‫ﻗﻀﻴﻪ ‪) 1‬ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺍﻭﻟﺘﻴﻤﺎﺗﻮﻡ(‪ :‬ﻗﺴﻤﺖ ﺍﻭﻝ‪ -‬ﺍﮔﺮ ‪ s‬ﺳﻬﻤﻲ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻛﻪ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻧﻔﺮ‬ ‫ﺩﻭﻡ ﭘﻴﺸﻨﻬﺎﺩ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﺳﺘﺮﺍﺗﮋﻱ ﻏﺎﻟﺐ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﭘﺎﺳﺦﺩﻫﻨﺪﻩ )ﻧﻔﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ( ﭘﺬﻳﺮﺵ ﭘﻴﺸـﻨﻬﺎﺩﻫﺎﻱ‬ ‫ﺯﻳﺮ ﺍﺳﺖ‪:‬‬ ‫)‪(9‬‬

‫‪s t 0.5‬‬ ‫‪D2‬‬ ‫‪1 D2‬‬

‫) ‪/ ( D2‬‬

‫‪/(D2 ) d s 0.5‬‬

‫)‪i‬‬ ‫‪°‬‬ ‫®‬ ‫)‪°ii‬‬ ‫¯‬

‫ﻭ ﺭﺩ ﺗﻤﺎﻡ ﭘﻴﺸﻨﻬﺎﺩﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺁﻥ ‪. s /(D2 ) 0.5‬‬ ‫ﻗﻀﻴﻪ ‪ :1‬ﻗﺴـﻤﺖ ﺩﻭﻡ‪ -‬ﺣﺎﻟـﺖ ﺍﻭﻝ‪ :‬ﺍﮔـﺮ ﻧﻔـﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﭘﺎﺭﺍﻣﺘﺮﻫـﺎﻱ ﻧﻔـﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ‪ ،‬ﻳﻌﻨـﻲ‬ ‫ ‪ D2 , E2‬ﺭﺍ ﺑﺪﺍﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺍﺳﺘﺮﺍﺗﮋﻱ ﺑﻬﻴﻨﻪ *‪ s‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻭ ﺑﺪﻳﻦ ﺗﺮﺗﻴﺐ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺑﻮﺩ‪:‬‬ ‫)‪(10‬‬

‫‪if E1 ! 0.5‬‬

‫‪ 0.5‬‬

‫‪*°‬‬

‫‪s ® > /(D2 ),0.5@ if E1 0.5‬‬ ‫) ‪° / (D‬‬ ‫‪if E1 0.5‬‬ ‫‪2‬‬ ‫¯‬

‫ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﺩﻭﻡ‪ :‬ﺍﮔﺮ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ ﭘﺎﺭﺍﻣﺘﺮﻫـﺎﻱ ﻧﻔـﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ ﺭﺍ ﻧﺪﺍﻧـﺪ ﻭ ﺗﻨﻬـﺎ ﺍﺯ ﺗـﺎﺑﻊ ﺗﻮﺯﻳـﻊ ‪ D2‬ﻭ‬ ‫ﻛﺮﺍﻥﻫﺎﻱ ﺁﻥ ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ‪ D‬ﺑﻪﻋﻨﻮﺍﻥ ﻛﺮﺍﻥ ﺑﺎﻻ ﻭ ‪ D‬ﺑﻪﻋﻨﻮﺍﻥ ﻛﺮﺍﻥ ﭘﺎﻳﻴﻦ ﺍﻃـﻼﻉ ﺩﺍﺷـﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷـﺪ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺍﺳﺘﺮﺍﺗﮋﻱ ﺑﻬﻴﻨﻪ *‪ s‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻭ ﺑﺪﻳﻦ ﺗﺮﺗﻴﺐ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺑﻮﺩ‪:‬‬ ‫)‪(11‬‬

‫‪if E1 ! 0.5‬‬

‫‪ 0.5‬‬

‫‪*°‬‬

‫@‪s ® > /(D),0.5‬‬ ‫‪if E1 0.5‬‬ ‫‪°‬‬ ‫‪¯ > /(D), / (D)@ if E1 0.5‬‬

‫‪540‬‬


‫ﻗﻀﻴﻪ ‪) 2‬ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺍﻭﻟﺘﻴﻤﺎﺗﻮﻡ ﺑﺎ ﺭﻗﺎﺑﺖ ﭘﻴﺸﻨﻬﺎﺩ ﺩﻫﻨﺪﻩﻫﺎ(‪ :‬ﺍﮔﺮ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﺖ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﺑﺎ‬ ‫@ ‪i >1, 2,...., n‬‬

‫ﻣﺪﻝ ﻓﻬﺮ‪ -‬ﺍﺷﻤﻴﺖ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻫﻤﻪﻱ ﻣﻘﺎﺩﻳﺮ ﺩﻟﺨﻮﺍﻩ ‪ Di , Ei‬ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺁﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﺗﻌﺎﺩﻝ ﻣﻨﺤﺼﺮﺑﻪﻓﺮﺩ ‪ SPNE‬ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺕ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﻨﻜﻪ ﺣﺪﺍﻗﻞ ﺩﻭ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﺯ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻧﻔﺮﺍﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻭﻝ ‪ s 1‬ﺭﺍ ﭘﻴﺸﻨﻬﺎﺩ ﻛﻨﻨﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺁﻥ ﭘﻴﺸﻨﻬﺎﺩ ﻧﻴﺰ ﺗﻮﺳﻂ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ ﭘﺬﻳﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﺷﻮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻗﻀﻴﻪ ‪) 3‬ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺍﻭﻟﺘﻴﻤﺎﺗﻮﻡ ﺑﺎ ﺭﻗﺎﺑﺖ ﭘﺎﺳـﺦﺩﻫﻨـﺪﻩﻫـﺎ(‪ :‬ﺍﮔـﺮ ‪E1 n 1 / n‬‬ ‫ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﻳﻜﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺗﻌﺎﺩﻝﻫﺎﻱ ‪ SPNE‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﻧﻔﺮﺍﺕ ﺩﻭﻡ ﻫﺮ ﭘﻴﺸـﻨﻬﺎﺩﻱ ﺭﺍ‬ ‫ﺑﭙﺬﻳﺮﻧﺪ ﻭ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﻧﻴﺰ ﭘﻴﺸـﻨﻬﺎﺩ ‪ s 0‬ﺭﺍ ﺍﺭﺍﺋـﻪ ﺧﻮﺍﻫـﺪ ﺩﺍﺩ‪ .‬ﻫـﻢﭼﻨـﻴﻦ ﻋﺒـﺎﺭﺕ ﺯﻳـﺮ ﻧﻴـﺰ‬ ‫ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﺗﻌﺎﺩﻝ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫‬ ‫½‬ ‫‪Di‬‬ ‫‪°‬‬ ‫‪° 1‬‬ ‫® @ ‪min i>2,...,n‬‬ ‫¾‬ ‫‬ ‫‪E‬‬ ‫‬ ‫‬ ‫‪D‬‬ ‫‬ ‫‪E‬‬ ‫‪n‬‬ ‫‪1‬‬ ‫‪1‬‬ ‫‪2‬‬ ‫ ‬ ‫‪°‬‬ ‫‪° 2‬‬ ‫ ‪i‬‬ ‫‪i‬‬ ‫¿‪i‬‬ ‫¯‬

‫‪s*max‬‬

‫ﻛﻪ ﺍﮔﺮ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻳﻜﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺑﺎﺯﻳﻜﻨﺎﻥ ‪ Di 0‬ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺕ ﺑﺎﻻ ﻳﻌﻨـﻲ ‪ s*max‬ﺑﺮﺍﺑـﺮ ﺑـﺎ ﺻـﻔﺮ‬ ‫ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺑﻮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫***‬

‫ﻗﻀﻴﻪ ‪) 4‬ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺩﻳﻜﺘـﺎﺗﻮﺭ(‪ :‬ﺍﮔـﺮ ﻧﻔـﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺩﺍﺭﺍﻱ ﺿـﺮﻳﺐ ‪ E1 ! 0.5‬ﺑﺎﺷـﺪ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳـﻦ‬ ‫ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺍﺳﺘﺮﺍﺗﮋﻱ ﺑﻬﻴﻨﻪﻱ ﺍﻭ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺩﻳﻜﺘﺎﺗﻮﺭ ‪ s* 0.5‬ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ .‬ﺑـﺮ ﻋﻜـﺲ ﺍﮔـﺮ ‪E1 d 0.5‬‬ ‫ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﺳﺘﺮﺍﺗﮋﻱ ﺑﻬﻴﻨﻪ ‪ s* 0‬ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺏ( ﻗﻀﺎﻳﺎﻱ ﻣﺮﺑﻮﻁ ﺑﻪ ﻣﺪﻝ ‪) ERC‬ﺑﺮﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﺍﺯ ﺑﻮﻟﺘﻦ ﻭ ﺍﻛﻨﻔﻠﺰ )‪:((2000‬‬ ‫ﻗﻀﻴﻪ ‪) 5‬ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺩﻳﻜﺘﺎﺗﻮﺭ(‪ :‬ﺍﮔﺮ ‪ VD‬ﺳﻬﻤﻲ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ .‬ﻛـﻪ ﻧﻔـﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ ﻧﻔـﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ ﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﻧﻈﺮ ﻣﻲﮔﻴﺮﺩ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﻴﻢ ﺩﺍﺷﺖ‪:‬‬ ‫‪ -1‬ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﻫﻤﻪﻱ ﻣﺒﻠﻎ ﺍﻭﻟﻴﻪ ﺭﺍ ﺗﻘﺴﻴﻢ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﻛﺮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫‪ V*D >01‬ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺑﻮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫‪ -2‬ﺳﻬﻢ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻲ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺍﻭﻝ @‪, 2‬‬ ‫‪VD 01‬‬ ‫‪ -3‬ﻣﻴﺎﻧﮕﻴﻦ ﺳﻬﻢ ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻲ ﻧﻔﺮﺍﺕ ﺍﻭﻝ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺕ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺍﺯ ‪, 2‬‬ ‫ﻗﻀﻴﻪ ‪) 6‬ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺍﻭﻟﺘﻴﻤﺎﺗﻮﻡ ‪ -‬ﻧﻔﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ(‪ :‬ﺍﮔﺮ ‪ VD‬ﺳﻬﻤﻲ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻛﻪ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺑـﻪ ﻧﻔـﺮ‬ ‫ﺩﻭﻡ ﭘﻴﺸﻨﻬﺎﺩ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﺪ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﻴﻢ ﺩﺍﺷﺖ‪:‬‬ ‫‪ -1‬ﺍﺣﺘﻤﺎﻝ ﺭﺩ ﭘﻴﺸﻨﻬﺎﺩ ﺍﺯ ﻃﺮﻑ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ ﺯﻣـﺎﻧﻲ ﻛـﻪ ‪ VP 1 2‬ﺑﺎﺷـﺪ‪ ،‬ﺻـﻔﺮ ﺍﺳـﺖ؛‬ ‫ﺑﻪﻋﺒﺎﺭﺗﻲ ﻧﻔﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ ﭘﻴﺸﻨﻬﺎﺩ ﻛﺎﻣﻼً ﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮ ﺭﺍ ﺑﻪ ﻫﻴﭻ ﻭﺟﻪ ﺭﺩ ﻧﻤﻲﻛﻨﺪ‪.‬‬


‫‪541‬‬

‫‪ -2‬ﻧﻔﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ ﻧﺎﻋﺎﺩﻻﻧﻪﺗﺮﻳﻦ ﭘﻴﺸﻨﻬﺎﺩ ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ‪ VP 0‬ﺭﺍ ﺣﺘﻤﺎً ﺭﺩ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫‪ -3‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﭘﻴﺸﻨﻬﺎﺩﻫﺎﻱ @‪, 2‬‬ ‫‪ VP >01‬ﺑﺎ ﻛﺎﻫﺶ ﻣﻘﺪﺍﺭ ﺳـﻬﻢ ﭘﻴﺸـﻨﻬﺎﺩﻱ‪ ،‬ﺍﺣﺘﻤـﺎﻝ ﺭﺩ‬ ‫ﭘﻴﺸﻨﻬﺎﺩ ﺍﻓﺰﺍﻳﺶ ﻣﻲﻳﺎﺑﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫‪ -4‬ﺑﺎ ﺍﻓﺰﺍﻳﺶ ﻣﺒﻠﻎ ﺍﻭﻟﻴﻪ ﻭ ﺑﺎ ﻓﺮﺽ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﺑﻮﺩﻥ ‪ ، VP‬ﺍﺣﺘﻤﺎﻝ ﭘﺬﻳﺮﺵ ﺗﻐﻴﻴﺮ ﻧﻤﻲﻛﻨﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻗﻀﻴﻪ ‪) 7‬ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺍﻭﻟﺘﻴﻤﺎﺗﻮﻡ ‪ -‬ﻧﻔﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ(‪ :‬ﺳﻬﻢ ﭘﻴﺸﻨﻬﺎﺩﻱ ﺗﻮﺳـﻂ ﻧﻔـﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ ﺩﺭ ﺑـﺎﺯﻩ‬ ‫‪ VP 01‬ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫@‪, 2‬‬ ‫ﻗﻀﻴﻪ ‪) 8‬ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺍﻭﻟﺘﻴﻤﺎﺗﻮﻡ ﻭ ﺩﻳﻜﺘﺎﺗﻮﺭ(‪ -1 :‬ﺑﻪﻃﻮﺭ ﻣﻴﺎﻧﮕﻴﻦ ﺳـﻬﻢ ﭘﻴﺸـﻨﻬﺎﺩﻱ ﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺍﻭﻟﺘﻴﻤﺎﺗﻮﻡ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺍﺯ ﻣﻴﺎﻧﮕﻴﻦ ﺳﻬﻢﻫﺎ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺩﻳﻜﺘﺎﺗﻮﺭ ﺍﺳﺖ‪VD ! VP .‬‬ ‫‪ -2‬ﺳﻬﻤﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻫﺮ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺩﻳﻜﺘﺎﺗﻮﺭ ﺍﺭﺍﺋﻪ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﺪ‪ ،‬ﺣﺪﺍﻗﻞ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻧـﺪﺍﺯﻩﻱ ﭘﻴﺸـﻨﻬﺎﺩ‬ ‫ﻭﻱ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺍﻭﻟﺘﻴﻤﺎﺗﻮﻡ ﺍﺳﺖ‪VD t VP .‬‬ ‫‪ -3‬ﻓﻘﻂ ﺑﺎﺯﻳﻜﻨﺎﻧﻲ ﺩﺭ ﻫﺮ ﺩﻭ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺍﻭﻟﺘﻴﻤﺎﺗﻮﻡ ﻭ ﺩﻳﻜﺘﺎﺗﻮﺭ ﺳـﻬﻢ ﻳﻜﺴـﺎﻧﻲ ﺭﺍ ﭘﻴﺸـﻨﻬﺎﺩ‬ ‫ﻣﻲﻛﻨﻨﺪ ﻛﻪ ﻛﺎﻣﻼً ﺑﺮﺍﺑﺮﻱ ﺧﻮﺍﻩ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻗﻀﻴﻪ ‪) 9‬ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺑﺮﺗﺮﺍﻧﺪ ﻭ ﻛﻮﺭﻧﻮ(‪ :‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻫﺮ ﺩﻭ ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﻛﻮﺭﻧـﻮ ﻭ ﺑﺮﺗﺮﺍﻧـﺪ‪ ،‬ﺗﻌـﺎﺩﻝﻫـﺎﻱ‬ ‫ﻣﺪﻝ ‪ ERC‬ﻫﻤﺎﻥ ﺗﻌﺎﺩﻝﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﺪﻝ ﺍﺳﺘﺎﻧﺪﺍﺭﺩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻗﻀﻴﻪ ‪) 10‬ﺑﺎﺯﻱ ﺍﻭﻟﺘﻴﻤﺎﺗﻮﻡ ﺑﺎ ﺭﻗﺎﺑﺖ ﺑﻴﻦ ﭘﻴﺸﻨﻬﺎﺩ ﺩﻫﻨﺪﻩﻫﺎ(‪ :‬ﺑﺎ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻓـﺮﺽ ﻛـﻪ‬ ‫ﻧﻔﺮﺍﺕ ﺩﻭﻡ ﻫﺮ ﭘﻴﺸﻨﻬﺎﺩﻱ ﺭﺍ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﻨﺪ ﭘﺬﻳﺮﻓﺖ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﻫﻤﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﺩﻝ ‪ ،ERC‬ﻧﻔﺮ ﺩﻭﻡ‪ ،‬ﺑـﺎﺯﻱ ﺭﺍ ﺑـﺎ‬ ‫ﭘﻴﺸﻨﻬﺎﺩ ‪ s 1‬ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺑﺮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻣﻨﺎﺑﻊ‬ ‫‪Andreoni, J., & Bernheim, B. D. (2009). Social Image and the 50–50‬‬ ‫‪Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects.‬‬ ‫‪Econometrica, 77(5), 1607-1636.‬‬ ‫‪Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000). ERC: A Theory of Equity,‬‬ ‫‪Reciprocity, and Competition. The American Economic Review, 90(1),‬‬ ‫‪166-193.‬‬ ‫‪Cappelen, A. W., Hole, A. D., Sørensen, E. Ø., & Tungodden, B.‬‬ ‫‪(2007). The Pluralism of Fairness Ideals: An Experimental Approach.‬‬ ‫‪American Economic Review, 97(3), 818-827.‬‬ ‫‪Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002). Understanding social preferences‬‬ ‫‪with simple tests. Quarterly journal of Economics, 817-869.‬‬ ‫‪Engelmann, D., & Strobel, M. (2004). Inequality Aversion, Efficiency,‬‬ ‫‪and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments. The‬‬ ‫‪American Economic Review, 94(4), 857-869.‬‬

‫‪1.‬‬ ‫‪2.‬‬ ‫‪3.‬‬ ‫‪4.‬‬ ‫‪5.‬‬

1397 ‫ ﭘﺎﻳﻴﺰ‬،3 ‫ ﺷﻤﺎﺭﻩﻱ‬،53 ‫ ﺩﻭﺭﻩﻱ‬/ ‫ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻘﺎﺕ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻱ‬ 6.

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