A Canada-US Comparison of Highly Skilled Chinese ...

New Geographies of Migration?: A Canada-U.S. Comparison of Highly Skilled Chinese and Indian Migration Wei Li Lucia Lo

Journal of Asian American Studies, Volume 15, Number 1, February 2012, pp. 1-34 (Article) Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: 10.1353/jaas.2012.0005

For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jaas/summary/v015/15.1.li.html

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New Geographies of Migration? A Canada-U.S. Comparison of Highly Skilled Chinese and Indian Migration Wei Li and Lucia Lo The US has always had the luxury of being arrogant about immigration because it has been the strongest magnet for the world’s best and brightest, . . . there are other strong magnets now. —Vivek Wadhwa (quoted in the Birmingham Star, 2009)

T

he sentiment expressed in the above quote reflects the changing nature

of highly skilled international migration. Already, there is a queue of one million H-1B visa holders and their families seeking permanent residency in the United States who have to wait for their cases to be processed and approved against their respective country’s employmentbased visa quotas; the problem is especially prevalent among Chinese- and Indian-born immigrants given their large numbers and shares of H-1B visa holders. Reportedly, their wait to get a green card can be as long as ten years.1 The United States may start losing its image as the greenest grassland in terms of highly skilled international migration given the competition from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and some European countries. These countries either have points systems for immigrant admission or their equivalent of H-1B visa programs that are not subject to immigration quotas while offering direct permanent residency, instead of going through another temporary visa, for international students who are educated in their respective country.2 Globalization and the advent of the knowledge economy have created a new context where highly skilled workers and entrepreneurs are in great jaas february 2012 • 1–34 © the johns hopkins university press

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demand, and their mobility is increasingly being scrutinized by both academics and policy makers.3 With a worldwide shortage of talent required to fuel the burgeoning knowledge economy,4 the competition for highly skilled migrants has acquired unprecedented complexity, particularly as emerging economies such as China and India have become the new “tigers” of economic growth in twenty-first-century Asia. China and India have been the top sources of talent to the West for the most of the past two decades. Both countries possess rapidly growing economies of their own and a burgeoning highly educated middle class, and are among the top five source countries of both highly skilled and professional immigrants and temporary migrants in Canada and the United States. Highly skilled Chinese and Indian migrants are well prepared for, and fit into, the employment needs of the global economy. The emergence of China and India as global economic powerhouses raises the uncertainty whether they will continue to be the dominant sources of supply of global talent, a process that only a decade ago was seen to be “an invisible phenomenon.”5 This uncertainty is further exacerbated by the global financial crisis. The worst economic recession since the Great Depression and the resulting protectionist measures to save jobs for the domestic labor pool have exerted negative impacts on the race for highly skilled international migrants, which was considered as “recession proof ” earlier on during the crisis.6 In the meantime, some of the world’s emerging economies have recovered faster in part as a result of the economic stimulus packages provided by their governments.7 Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC), in particular, began to exert their influence on the world stage by holding the first-ever BRIC summit in June 2009 and increasing their power within the International Monetary Fund (IMF).8 While the extent to which BRIC may be able to make a difference in the global economic order remains to be seen, their rise as geo-economic-political powerhouses, coupled with the global economic crisis, is going to change the contours of highly skilled international migration, which reacts not only to immigrant-receiving countries’ admission and integration policies but also source-country development. As such, what has been happening in China and India on the economic and political fronts has been potent in luring back not only

New Geographies of Migration?

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their expatriates and children but other highly skilled professionals from developed countries as well.9 A major challenge to achieving the celebrated “win-win-win” for migrants as well as their origin and receiving countries—a primary goal of the U.N. agenda for international migration and development—is to resolve some of the complex contradictions either existing or emerging between innovations taking place in the receiving countries’ immigration policies and the development priorities and imperatives of major sources of talent. This article aims to understand how highly skilled Chinese and Indian migrants settle in Canada and the United States and to speculate on how a changing geo-economic-political order would affect the flow of highly skilled migrants. After a brief literature review that lays out the theoretical corners of return migration, we discuss the outcome of various immigrant recruitment and integration policies in Canada and the United States, and examine their impacts on immigrants’ decision to stay in Canada and the United States, return to their countries of origin, or remigrate to other countries. In particular, we review and synthesize existing research and current policy settings on (return) migration and development, review available data in Canada and the United States, and investigate the ways in which social and economic environments in both receiving and sending countries can redraw the geographies of migration.

Global Migration of the Highly Skilled In examining whether there is going to be new geographies of highly skilled international migration or a return of the highly skilled from the West and the North to the East and the South, it is useful to review the literature on return migration. Return migration, as a subprocess of international migration, has long been subject to various interpretations and can be explained by various theoretical approaches on international migration.10 With the neoclassical economic approach, migrants focus on wage differentials and expect higher earnings in receiving countries;11 return migration is perceived as the outcome of a failed migration. The new economics of labor migration approach, however, views migration as a calculated household strategy, and only successful experience abroad would lead to

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return migration.12 Migrants are expected to exert a higher level of work efforts, experience higher savings and higher level of socialization, and/or acquire additional skills and training in receiving countries. These two economic approaches emphasize the purely financial motivations for return. On the other hand, the structural approach argues that there are social and institutional factors (such as family need, economic and political progress, and business institutional environment) in the sending countries that influence return, although the amount and type of resources migrants can bring back to their origins are crucial to their decision to return. This approach argues that locality or the local context matters.13 Transnational and social network theorists add to this approach the importance of recognizing the influence of structural micro and macro factors in origin countries. Transnationalists see regular and sustained social contacts over time across borders as necessary,14 and do not see return as the end of a migration cycle, but rather a circularity of movements. Supporters of social network theory see in migrants their intent to secure and prepare their return by mobilizing resources that stem from the commonality of interests and that are available at the level of social and economic crossborder networks. In this regard, returnees are viewed as bearers of tangible and intangible resources who have strong linkage with their country of origin through either past experiences of migration, composition of networks, or social capital provided by families. In sum, transnationalists and social network theorists argue that the maintenance of linkages between sending and receiving countries fosters the ability of migrants to prepare and secure their own return. With the movement of the highly skilled gaining particular attention since the 1990s, two new theories were proposed. First, based on the twin concepts of brain circulation and human capital investment, DeVoretz and his associates propose an economic-based model in which highly skilled immigrants leave the sending country, move to an entrepôt country (or initial receiving country), accumulate subsidized human capital or receive free public goods (citizenship and an internationally recognized passport), and then choose to stay or return or move on to the rest of the world.15 The argument is that returning home, moving on, or staying is part of an iterative strategy, which can be predicted by comparing expected


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economic returns. Deng tests this model against immigrants who moved from Hong Kong to Canada in the 1980s and 1990s primarily for political reasons, and subsequently gained and accumulated human capital through acquiring Canadian citizenship and receiving highly subsidized postsecondary education.16 He finds that a Canadian passport that allows greater flexibility in traveling, the English skills gained in Canada, and overseas qualifications are desirable resources in Hong Kong. By comparing the earnings streams in Canada, a third country such as the United States, and Hong Kong, migrants make their decision to stay, migrate, or return home. Chen makes similar observations: immigrants’ decision to stay or leave generally depends on expectations; while higher expected income will initially induce people to immigrate to the receiving countries, some will return home due to both competitive wages being offered in their home countries and unmet expectations encountered in the receiving countries.17 While this model applies specifically to highly skilled migration, Cassarino introduces a more generalized model that argues that return migration is an interactive outcome of immigrants’ degree of return preparedness, their ability to mobilize resources, and the conditions existing in their receiving as well as sending countries.18 Preparedness refers to the willingness to return as well as the readiness to return (or the returnees having enough resources and information about post-return migration). The pattern of resource mobilization includes tangible resources (for example, financial capital), intangible resources (for example, contacts and skills acquired during migration experience aboard), and social capital (especially in possession before migration); all of these are affected by experience abroad and specific institutional-political-economic conditions at home, and can be shaped by pre- and post-return migration conditions. Finally, receiving- and sending-country conditions also include home country public programs aimed at repatriating skilled and business returnees, and economic downturn or political tensions in receiving countries. The argument is that those with high levels of preparedness are obviously those who believe they have gathered enough tangible and intangible resources to carry out their projects at home, and those with low levels of preparedness would be those whose length of stay abroad is too short to allow for resource mobilization, or those who have not had real opportunities for social and professional advancement in the receiving countries.

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This model is supported by empirical work. For example, Salaff et al. observe three main contributing factors on the residency decisions of 1.5 generation adults who migrated with their families from Hong Kong to Toronto when they were children and teens. They include institutional factors (such as whether labor markets recognize their training, credentials, and experience), social relations on a transnational level, and their identity (notion of home and personal belonging).19 Alberts and Hazen identify professional, societal, and personal factors as motivations that shape international students’ intention to stay or leave the United States.20 Both studies find that social relations or societal and personal factors are more likely to draw migrants back to their home countries whereas professional opportunities in the receiving country and difficult political circumstances in the home country encourage the migrants to stay. Also examining the reasons for international students’ inclination to stay in the United Kingdom and the United States, Baruch et al. find their perceptions of labor markets, their adjustment process to the receiving country, and their family ties in both receiving and sending countries all affect their intention to stay.21 Similar conclusions are reached by a study of mainland Chinese students in Saskatchewan, Canada.22 Home country recruitment policies and institutional environment also affect migrants’ decision making. Chang shows how an ambitious program initiated by the Taiwanese government to recruit Taiwan’s highly trained talent from overseas reversed the brain drain situation.23 Song indicates that while the South Korean government had long instituted policy to recruit highly skilled South Korean immigrants back to South Korea, it was not until the South Korean economy’s takeoff in the 1980s that the policy reached some degree of success.24 Cohen points out that the active recruitments of return migrants by the Israeli government have been selective since the 1990s and focused on highly skilled migrants.25 Harvey studies U.K. and Indian highly skilled migrants in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sector in the Boston area, and finds while 93% of Indians intended to return to India and work there, the lack of full development of this sector in India has prevented them from doing so.26 Cao indicates that despite the Chinese government’s intense recruitment efforts, institutional factors in China (such as guanxi and high opportunity costs


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in career development) have made such efforts of luring back first-rate Chinese academics not highly successful.27 Cassarino’s reconceptualization of return migration is inclusive of all major categories of return migration and considers a wider array of factors. In this article, we use this framework to assess the mobility pattern of the highly skilled Chinese and Indian migrants, especially those who have already experienced cross-border mobility, by focusing on the immigration policies and realities in Canada and the United States.

Immigration Admission United States

and

Integration Policies

in

Canada

and the

Historical Convergences From the late nineteenth century to the mid-1960s, both American and Canadian immigration admission policies discriminated against racial minority groups not of Anglo-Saxon origin. Chinese and Indian migrants, largely manual laborers, faced discriminative legislation, government policies, court rulings, and daily practices. In the United States, as early as 1850 the foreign miners’ tax of $20 per month was applied to Chinese. Anti-Chinese movement on the West Coast had the California Constitution declare the Chinese as “undesirable”. The U.S. Congress passed the Page Law in 1875 prohibiting the importation of Chinese women based on the claim that they were imported for prostitution. The Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 was the first and remained the only U.S. immigration legislation that excluded a particular group from immigrating to its land based on race and class, and prevented Chinese immigrants from becoming naturalized citizens.28 In Canada, the fate of the Chinese was similar. Discrimination against Asian immigration started with an anti-Chinese bill in 1885 after the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway was completed with the help of some 15,000 Chinese migrants. It took the form of a head tax. With few exceptions, every person of Chinese origin entering the country had to pay $50. The amount was increased to $100 in 1900 and to $500 in 1903 (equivalent to two years’ wages of a Chinese laborer at the time). The

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head tax led to an intermission in Chinese immigration. The Canadian parliament later also passed the Chinese Immigration Act (also known as the Chinese Exclusion Act) in 1923, forty-one years after the U.S. Chinese Exclusion Act, allowing only Chinese merchants and students to immigrate as a policy to address postwar economic dislocation. Even native-born Canadians of Chinese descent were unable to vote.29 Early Indian immigrants to Canada and the United States, most of them farmers from the Punjab in the nineteenth century, also faced prejudice and discrimination. As a result of the head tax against the Chinese, there was a substantial increase in Indian manual labor immigrants working in railway construction and in the logging and lumber industries in British Columbia. Seeing in them the same racial threat as in the Chinese and Japanese migrants before them, the government of British Columbia quickly limited their rights and privileges. Beginning in 1907, Indians not born of Anglo-Saxon parents were disfranchised despite their being British subjects. In 1908, Indians were kept out of Canada by an order-in-council requiring them to come to Canada by continuous passage from India when the government knew that no steamship line provided the service. Further discriminative measures took effect when Indians were denied voting rights and access to political office, jury duty, and professional and public-service jobs. This resulted in many returnees to India. Vigorous court challenges of the regulations proved ineffective, and frustration culminated in the Komagata incident in 1914, when a freighter carrying 376 prospective Indian migrants from Hong Kong to Vancouver was isolated by immigration officials in Vancouver harbor for two months. These discriminatory measures were only repealed by the government of British Columbia in 1947 and by the Canadian federal government in 1951.30 In the United States, the 1917 Immigration Act denied entry to Indians and created an “Asiatic Barred Zone,” which essentially curbed almost all Asian immigration. Lower federal courts in the United States initially allowed Indian immigrants to naturalize as they were considered Caucasians and thus “white persons” as permitted by the 1790 and 1870 Naturalization Laws. But the Supreme Court, in the 1923 U.S. v. Bhagat Singh Thind ruling, declared that Indians were no longer considered white persons albeit being Caucasians. As such, all naturalization certificates issued to Indians previously were subject to annulment.31


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What is worthy of mentioning is that during the entire exclusion era for both groups, skilled migrants (including students and teachers) were allowed to enter the United States. The continuous educational exchange fostered the growth of generations of prominent Chinese American scientists, including a number of Nobel Laureates. The dark immigration history in the United States was largely based on intertwined ideology and politics of race, class, and gender to serve the best interests of the country. In Canada, the 1923 Chinese Exclusion Act similarly permitted students as one of the four categories of Chinese to be able to enter or land in Canada.32 The exclusion laws and practices in both countries did not end until World War II. In the United States, the Repeal Act in 1943 and the LuceCeller Bill in 1946 granted annual immigration quotas of 105 and 100 to Chinese and Indians, respectively, while making both groups eligible for naturalization. In Canada, the Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed in 1947, and native-born Chinese Canadians were permitted to vote. The 1952 Immigration Act allowed an annual immigration quota of 150 from India, which was increased to 300 five years later. Both countries, however, still had racial preference in their immigrant admission policies during the first two decades after World War II. Repealing the Chinese Exclusion Act in Canada only permitted immediate family members to immigrate.33 Moreover, the 1952 Immigration Act in Canada favored British subjects and French citizens, whereas the 1952 McCarren-Walter Act in the United States established an “Asian Pacific Triangle” and allowed annually only 2,000 migrants from the region. Such restrictive measures against Chinese and Indian immigrants in both countries were not revoked until the mid-1960s. The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act in the United States and the 1967 Immigration Act in Canada mark fundamental changes by abolishing race-based immigration quotas. They have, however, led to different migration patterns in the two countries. Immigration Admission Policies Canada’ immigration admission policies are based on four principles— demographic, economic, social, and humanitarian, admitting economic class, family class, and refugee migrants. The primary focus, in the way of establishing an immigration admission points system since 1967, has been

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valuing human capital (age, education credentials, and official language proficiency) and Canadian experiences and connections. These policies place more emphasis on skilled migration than family reunification. Until the 1980s, skilled immigrants arriving from various source countries were doing relatively well in the labor market. Subsequent arrivals, dominated by people of color—Chinese and South Asians in particular—however, performed dismally. Compared to the Canadian-born and white immigrant groups from Europe, a larger percentage of them were unemployed or underemployed. A vast Canadian literature attributes this to discrimination and foreign credential devaluation.34 In response to the declining economic performance of Canada’s skilled immigrants, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in 2002 alters the selection criterion of skilled immigrants in two ways: it raises the total number of points required for entry from 70 to 75 (out of 100), and the new criteria emphasizes language, formal education, and prior experience in the labor market. These new criteria give French- and English-language speakers easier access to Canada, thereby sharply reducing the supply of acceptable applicants from China, which was the top source country since 1997,35 and leading to an increasing number of skilled immigrants from India, which became the top immigrant-sending country to Canada between 2008 and 2010, when the Philippines overtook its place. The points system was the sole basis of recruiting highly skilled migrants until the introduction of the Canadian Experience Class in August 2008, one of whose aims is to retain foreign students who graduated in Canada. In contrast, since the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, the United States has been using an immigration admission quota system. The primary focus is on family reunification. The 1965 act designates up to 80% of the annual immigration quota of 20,000 per country for this cause, and leaves the remaining quota for employment-based immigrants or humanitarian-clause refugees. As a response to the global race for talent, the 1990 Immigration Act triples the worldwide annual quota for employment-based immigrants to 140,000. It also creates an H-1B visa category as a three-year temporary work visa program for those who are at least college-educated or the equivalent. H-1B visa holders are eligible for becoming permanent immigrants. Since its inception, the program


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has been widely used by Chinese but especially Indian migrants.36 The immigration reform debates in the United States have discussed ways to revamp the immigration admission system to better serve the national interests of the United States, such as continuing to serve as “the ultimate ‘IQ magnet’ for highly skilled migrants.”37 Such consensus has been evident in the plans laid out in various bills introduced in recent years, including the suggestions to adopt Australian-, Canadian-, and New Zealand–style points system.38 Whatever the outcome of the immigration reform debate may be, there is no doubt that the aim of attracting and retaining highly skilled international migrants will remain unchanged, if not further enhanced. Immigrant Integration Ideals Canada and the United States also have marked differences regarding immigrant integration ideals. The Canadian government has adopted multiculturalism as a federal policy framework since 1972. The concept of multiculturalism was officially enshrined in the Canadian constitution in 1982 and the Multiculturalism Act in 1988. Multiculturalism asserts that “every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination . . . based on race, national or ethnic origin, color and religion.”39 It espouses pluralism as the basis of an inclusive Canadian identity and places emphasis on the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians through programs that will increase intercultural contact and calls for respect for traditions and customs of all people within the state. In this regard, both the federal and provincial governments spend considerable efforts and resources on settling and integrating newcomers to Canada. On the contrary, the dominant paradigm of immigration adaptation in the U.S. academia, media, government policy, and public’s mindset remains assimilation.40 Immigration admission policies are made at the federal level whereas integration programs are often state- or local-based, or privately managed. There is no federally coordinated and funded nationwide research network such as the Metropolis Project (1996–2012) in Canada.41 While multiculturalism is discussed, there are no national debates on its merits and pitfalls. In the meantime, the melting pot ideal,

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or lack thereof in reality, is invoked in studies premised on the clash of civilizations thesis.42 Unlike Canadian studies focusing on integration, a large number of U.S. immigration studies continue to center on the cultural, spatial, and social assimilation of immigrants.43 While the outcomes of such policy differences in the two countries are debatable and require further research, especially in relation to highly skilled international migration, there have been noticeable differences in the demographic and economic outcomes among Chinese and Indian migrants in both countries, a subject to which we now turn.

Immigration Realities among Highly Skilled Chinese Canada and the United States

and

Indians

in

Immigration Trends Tables 1a and 1b show that in Canada and the United States, the total number of Chinese and Indian immigrants and their respective shares in their country’s total foreign-born population has increased dramatically since the 1960s as a result of changing immigration admission policies in both countries. In the United States, the growth rates of Indian immigrants are consistently higher compared to those of Chinese immigrants; their numbers are about to catch up with the Chinese numbers. In Canada, the situation is rather similar except that the growth of Indian immigrants increased substantially since 1961, whereas that of the Chinese did not take off until the early 1990s as a result of the Canadian response to the Tiananmen incident and the furthering of the Chinese exit policy. In comparison, the United States has higher numbers of both immigrant groups; it admits about three to seven times more Chinese and two to three times more Indians as legal permanent immigrants than Canada. Yet the shares of Chinese and Indian immigrants are generally higher in Canada than in the United States. The only exception is the surge of Chinese immigrants in 1970 and 1980 as a result of the emphasis on family migration in the 1965 Immigration Act. Until 2010, China and India have been Canada’s top two immigrant source countries since the late 1990s.

44.0%

46.8%

332,825

231,050

157,405

52,395

57,150

36,724

2001 (3)

1996 (3)

1991 (3)

1981 (3)

1971 (2)

1961 (1) 1.3%

1.6%

1.4%

3.6%

4.6%

6.1%

7.5%

Share of All Foreign-Born

9,025

38,875

109,660

173,670

235,935

314,685

443,690

Total Number of Immigrants

-

182.1%

58.4%

233.1%

35.9%

33.4%

41.0%

Growth Rate(4)

22

15

9

6

5

4

3

Rank among All Source Countries

0.3%

1.1%

2.8%

4.0%

4.7%

5.8%

7.2%


Sources: Dominion Bureau of Statistics 1963; Statistics Canada 1974, 1983, 1992; Statistics Canada 1996, 2001, 2006.44 Notes: (1) In 1961, place-of-birth data only refer to China (which may include Hong Kong and Taiwan), and India and Pakistan. (2) In 1971, place-of-birth data refer to China (which may include Hong Kong and Taiwan), and India. (3) From 1981 on, place-of-birth data refer to the People’s Republic of China (as separate from Hong Kong and Taiwan) and India (as separate from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and so forth). (4) Growth rates are calculated based on the data in this table.

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18

8

6

2

2


Immigrants born in India

•

-

55.6%

-8.3%

200.4%

40.3%

466,945

2006 (3)

Growth Rate(4)

Total Number of Immigrants

Year

Immigrants born in China

Table 1a. Chinese and Indian immigrants in Canada 1961–2006

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1,551,316

1,193,685

676,968

366,500

172,132

99,735

2006

2000

1990

1980

1970

1960

n.a.

73%

113%

85%

76%

30%

Growth Rate

21

14

10

6

3

3


1.0%

1.8%

2.6%

3.4%

3.8%

4.1%


12,296

51,000

206,087

450,406

1,022,552

1,519,157

Total Number

n.a.

315%

304%

119%

127%

49%

Growth Rate

42

30

16

12

4

4


0.1%

0.5%

1.5%

2.3%

3.3%

4.0%


•

Sources: U.S. census, various years, and American Community Survey, 2006; modified from Table 1 in Terrazas and Devani 2008; Table 1 in Terrazas 2008.

Total Number

JAAS

Year

Immigrants born in India

•

Immigrants born in China

Table 1b. Chinese and Indian immigrants in the United States 1960–2006

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It can be seen from Table 2 that the flow of immigrants from China and India to Canada and the United States accelerated especially since 1990: 71.3% of the Chinese and 64.7% of the Indian immigrants in Canada, and 63.7% of the Chinese and 70.0% of the Indian immigrants in the United States are post-1990 arrivals. In both countries, prior to 1990 the percentage of Chinese immigrants is higher than that of Indian immigrants; this is a reflection of the earlier history of Chinese settlement in the two countries. The higher percentage of Indians admitted to Canada prior to 1981 as compared to the United States may be explained by the colonial ties with their earlier British subject status and likelihood of moving to another Commonwealth country. While the share of Indian immigrants admitted during 1990s is identical between Canada and the United States, the 2000s witness a much higher percentage of Indians to the United States, partly the result of the larger number of Indian H-1B visa holders becoming eligible for green cards (permanent residency).

Demographic and Socioeconomic Profiles As a consequence of an immigration selection points system in Canada and the institutionalization of employment-based immigrants and H-1B temporary visas in the United States, large numbers of Chinese and Indian migrants in both countries are increasingly well educated with professional credentials. But their occupational profiles in the two countries are rather different. United States In the United States, many Indian migrants, highly educated with good English-speaking capabilities, are admitted under the employment-based category. In 2006, almost three-quarters (73.8%) of Indian migrants above twenty-five years old had at least a bachelor degree, with 40.5% holding advance degrees, whereas only 8.5% did not have a high school diploma or equivalent. Of those age five and older, 73.1% considered themselves speaking English only or very well. In the same year, India became the fourth largest source of international students/scholars after South Korea, Japan, and China. Its 69,790 total accounted for 6% of the

15

35.6

38.1 33.2

1991–2000

2001–2006

2000–2006

1990–1999

1980–1989

Before 1980

Period of Immigration

28.6

35.1

21.1

14.9

Percentage of All Chinese-born Immigrants

34.4

35.6

17.3

12.7

Percentage of All Indian-born Immigrants

Sources: Canada: Canadian Census 2006 Statistics Canada 2009; United States: U.S. census various years, and American Community Survey 2006; Terrazas and Devani 2008; Terrazas 2008

29.1

14.9

28.7

20.4

1981–1990

Before 1981

Percentage of All Indian-born Immigrants

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Percentage of All Chinese born Immigrants

JAAS

Period of Immigration

United States

•

Canada

Table 2. Chinese and Indian immigrant inflow by period of arrival

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international students/scholars population. Of the Indian migrants, 75% were at primary working age (ages eighteen to fifty-four), and 43.9% of the 65,353 Indian-born who gained legal permanent resident status in 2007 were employment-based immigrants.45 The 2007 median household income among Indian-born immigrants was $91,195, almost $40,000 higher than the U.S.-born population.46 Compared to Indian immigrants, Chinese immigrants are much more polarized in their demographic and socioeconomic profiles. While 43.7% of the Chinese immigrants had at least a bachelor’s degree, more than a quarter (25.6%) did not have a high school diploma or its equivalent in 2006. Only slightly over a third (34.1%) spoke English only or very well. Of the 76,655 China-born who gained legal permanent resident status in 2007, 61% were of primary working age in 2006. Only 18.1% were employment-based immigrants, and 55.3% were in the family-sponsored category.47 Such differences in human capital are reflected in their occupational structures (Table 3). In both groups, more men than women are in the civilian workforce. This includes 64.5% of the Indian men (a reflection of a major pitfall of the H-1B visa program, which does not allow the spouse, often the wife, to work in the United States) who are primarily engaged in management/business/finance, information technology, and sales. Compared to Chinese migrants, Indian migrants are much more likely to be engaged in health-related professions as a result of U.S. recruiting policies for Indian-trained health professionals.48 Occupations among Chinese immigrants, as expected, are bifurcated. At the higher end of the spectrum, both Chinese men and women are more engaged in other sciences and engineering categories compared to their respective Indian counterparts, but their involvement in information technology is not as prominent as the Indian migrants. Although both Chinese men and women are more likely than all U.S. foreign-born to be in management/ business/finance occupations, Chinese men are trailing behind Indian men in these occupations. Chinese men and women are also more likely to have careers in education/training and media/entertainment than their Indian counterparts. At the lower end, however, Chinese migrants are much more likely to have service and manufacturing/installation/repair jobs compared to their Indian counterparts. Compared to the overall U.S. foreign-born

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population, both Chinese and Indian migrants, men and women, are doing better job-wise as a result of their relatively high human capital. Canada Similar to the United States, immigrants from both China and India increasingly arrived with higher educational qualifications and professional and skilled/technical occupation credentials. Between the mid-1980s and the early 2000s, the percentage of Indians (including principals and their dependents) arrived with tertiary education doubled to 40% whereas for those over twenty-four years of age, the proportion with less than a thirteen-year formal or secondary education decreased from 30% to about 12%. Recent cohorts of immigrants from India are also getting younger and more proficient in English. For instance, 57.3% of the 2001–2003 arrival cohort are English-speakers.49 Immigrants from China also exhibit very high educational qualifications. A third of those who arrived between 1980 and 2000 had a university education, and the share of those with a postgraduate degree increased from less than 2% in the 1980s to almost 13% in the 1990s.50 They arrived mostly as skilled workers or professionals, which accounted for 44% of all immigrants from China.51 Their Canadian official language proficiency was lower than that of the Indian immigrants. Only 35% of the 1980–2000 arrivals did not possess the required Canadian-language skills at the time of immigration, much lower than for members of the general immigrant population. However, the proportion possessing the required Canadian-language skills has been increasing, from 9% in the 1980s to 39% in the 1990s. Compared to immigrants from India, Chinese immigrants (62.5% of all immigrants and 89.5% of recent immigrants were born in China) are on average older, slightly more educated (43% Chinese vs. 38% Indian with at least one university degree in 2006), yet less proficient in English. Table 3 compares their occupational profiles. While their share in management, business, and finance is similar (around 25%), those born in China are more heavily represented in the information technology, science, and engineering fields (17% vs. 8%) as well as in sales and services (28% vs. 20%), whereas those born in India are heavily concentrated in construc-


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tion and manufacturing (33% vs. 19%). The combination of an older age structure, lesser English-language proficiency, and an occupational structure that evidences a strong participation in the Chinese ethnic economy (22% vs. 9%) probably explains why the median income of the China-born immigrants is almost a quarter lower than that of the Indians ($16,470 vs. $21,126) and why there are more low-income people among the Chinese than the Indians (32% vs. 17%). Canada versus the United States Overall, Indian immigrants to the United States have higher levels of human capital compared to those to Canada, and the human capital of the Chinese in Canada and the United States are more similar. Yet the utilization of the highly skilled differs significantly between the two countries. As Table 3 shows, a much higher percentage of Chinese (21%) and Indian immigrants (32%) in the United States are engaged in science, engineering, and technology whereas in Canada many immigrants (33% Indians and 19% Chinese vs. 9% Indians and 13% Chinese in the United States) are working in the construction and manufacturing sectors. Table 3 also shows that in general the skills of highly educated immigrants in Canada are underutilized. Li estimates that of the 53,480 university-educated immigrants from China who immigrated to Canada between 1996 and 2000, only 59% participated in Canada’s labor market earning an employment income in 2001.52 The poor economic outcomes of highly educated immigrants to Canada, especially those from minority ethno-racial backgrounds, are well documented in the Canadian literature. There is no question that they contradict the intent of the immigrant points system.

Changing Economies and New Geographies of Highly Skilled Migration? United States The rapid economic growth of China and India increasingly offers opportunities for their emigrants and offspring, especially among those highly skilled. The U.S. New Immigrant Survey finds that among the 2003

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Table 3. Comparing occupational distribution between Canada and the United States, 2006 Indian-born Immigrants

Chinese-born Immigrants

Canada

U.S.

Canada

U.S.

Total number in civilian labor force

283,760

975,951

243,885

736,962

Management, business, finance

24.6

18.0

24.5

14.8

Info technology, sciences, and engineering

8.1

31.7

17.0

21.4

Social services and legal, education/ training, and media/entertainment

5.7

7.1

7.5

9.5

Health

4.2

11.9

3.9

5.1

Sales and services, administrative support

20.4

22.5

27.8

29.4

Farming, fishing, and forestry

3.6

0.2

0.8

0.1

17.3

4.0

7.0

4.6

16.1

4.5

11.6

8.2

Construction, extraction, and transportation Manufacturing, installation, and repair

Sources: Statistics Canada 2009; U.S. census various years, and American Community Survey 2006; Table 3 in Terrazas and Devani 2008; Table 3 in Terrazas 2008.

cohort for permanent residency, only 59% of EB-1 visa holders (those with extraordinary ability, outstanding researchers, and multinational executives), 52% of EB-2 visa holders (those with advanced degrees or exceptional ability), and 71% of EB-3 visa holders (those with college degrees and skills) intended to stay, compared to the 78% among all immigrants.53 Wadhwa et al. surveyed 1,203 Chinese and Indian highly skilled


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migrants who have studied or worked in the United States for at least one year prior to returning to their home country. The findings indicate the majority of these returnees have master’s or Ph.D. degrees, and believe their home countries offer better career opportunities (79% Indians and 87% Chinese) and quality of life; family reasons are also important in drawing them back (79% Chinese and 89% Indians). Moreover, over half of those surveyed plan to start their own business in the next five years (50% Chinese and 57% Indians), as they consider that the business environment is better there compared to the United States (54% Indians and 61% Chinese).54 The situation makes an industry researcher worry that America is “sending entrepreneurship and economic stimulus to places like Bangalore and Beijing.”55 Moreover, the United States is losing ground among potential highly skilled immigrants—international students. Wadhwa et al. find that among the 1,224 foreign students who were studying in the United States or had already graduated at the end of the 2008 academic year, only 6% Indians and 10% Chinese intended to stay in the United States permanently, compared to 15% Europeans, whereas 54% Chinese and 58% Indians planned to stay in the United States for a few years after graduation. These latter percentages are much smaller than those reported in previous studies. The same study also indicates that obtaining a work visa is a leading concern among 85% of both Chinese and Indian students. On the other hand, over half of the Chinese students and less than a third of the Indian students surveyed believe that their home country offers better job opportunities compared to the United States.56 They suggest the leading role of the United States in the world economy, an open market, a high level of research and development investment, and an innovative environment as the conditions for the United States to be able to attract and retain a large number as well as share of the worldwide highly skilled international migrants. The economic recession has negative impacts on these conditions; the declining economy and the restrictive measures in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act curb the hiring of foreign nationals under H-1B visas especially by financial institutions that received Troubled Asset Relief Program money.

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It is estimated that 100,000 Chinese or Indians may leave the United States and return to their home countries in the next few years.57 The media also reports on increasing return flow of highly skilled migrants to their respective countries of origin consequent to the global recession.58 The recent U.S. data already show the applications for employment-based immigrant categories decreased drastically from almost 235,000 in fiscal year 2007 to about 104,000 in fiscal year 2008 and fewer than 36,000 in the first eight months in 2009.59 The limited existing research on return migration supports Cassarino’s thesis that changing environments in sending and receiving countries affect highly skilled migrants’ decision-making on whether to stay or to return. In this regard, international students may stay in the United States for a few years after graduation as a strategy to heighten their return preparedness and accumulate their resource capacity. Canada “Brain drain” and “return migration” have been among the most significant Canadian migration issues in the twenty-first century.60 Canada lost to the United States in good times and to immigrants’ home countries during bad times.61 The questions often asked include: What is the size of return/onward migration, especially among immigrants from China and India, the top source countries to Canada? Who are the leavers? And why do some immigrants choose to leave as others stay? The literature is inconsistent on the size of return/onward migration by immigrants. Using Canadian census data, Jasso and Rosenzweig62 and Lam63 show a substantial amount of return or onward migration with substantial variation by country of origin.64 Using the Landed Immigrant Data System and Canadian tax files to follow over time a cohort of male immigrants, twenty-five to thirty years of age at the time of landing, Aydemir and Robinson find the rate of return among immigrants ranged from 17.7% among the 1985 cohort to 24.6% for the 1989 cohort, and was highest among those in the business class and the skilled worker class, with four in ten leaving within ten years after arrival.65 While DeVoretz66 reports that emigration from Canada has historically averaged about 30%


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of gross annual immigration, Dryburgh and Hamel note that only a small percentage of immigrants emigrate (4.3% of all immigrants who landed during their study period and who filed taxes during the 1990s had emigrated by 2000). Emigration is highest for immigrant physicians/health care managers and IT workers, 11.7% and 6.9%, respectively, compared to 4.1% of those not in the in-demand occupation groups.67 The literature confirms that leavers have more desirable quality, and outperform stayers in education, income, and occupation distribution.68 Consistent with the notion of a global labor market, skilled labor and entrepreneurs are the most likely to experience mobility induced by changing relative labor market conditions. It is worth noting that highly skilled migrants capable of finding work quickly are more likely to leave, suggesting that a good and immediate job may not be enough to keep the highly skilled who are in demand.69 Key findings about return migration are also consistent with Cassarino’s notions of preparedness, resource mobilization, and a more desirable employment environment in the home country. For example, Zweig finds returnees to China who have postgraduate studies in Canada are better connected back in China, have less difficulty in finding a job, have better jobs, and earn more—their top reasons for return being precisely their ability to do better and to attain higher status in China in addition to being better able to take care of their parents and the difficulty of getting into mainstream Canada.70 Lin et al., in their study of Chinese transnational entrepreneurs, identify two major forces pulling emigrants back home.71 Besides the social capital or personal ties in China and the belief that opportunities are embedded in the social structure, various efforts by the Chinese government to lure diasporic professionals back “home” are powerful. In Canada, return migration is especially prevalent among recent Chinese immigrants to Canada, including 1.5 generations and second generations,72 first with those from Hong Kong73 and then with those from China.74 It was estimated that of the 300,000 Hong Kong Chinese in Canada in 2001, 40,000 returned to Hong Kong between 1996 and 2001.75 After 2001, the number of returnees increased significantly, and according to Statistic Canada Daily (March 2006), about 50% of past Hong Kong arrivals to Canada will have left within ten years of landing. This estimate

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implies that there are about 150,000 Canadian Hong Kongese returnees now living in Hong Kong. There has not been any estimates on returnees to China or India except cited anecdotally76 or from discussions on the Canadian diaspora.77 Zhang estimates that the Canadian diaspora has a size of 2.7 million, with over 644,000 (or 24%) living in Asia (a third in Hong Kong alone), some of whom are obviously Canadian-born or nonAsian (non-Chinese or non-Indian) in ethnic origin.78 So how does/will the recent economic crisis affect highly skilled migration to Canada and return/onward migration of the highly skilled Chinese and Indian immigrants currently in Canada? Historically, since the 1920s there have been strong business cycle effects whereby the immigration rate increased in booms and declined in recessions. During the recession of the early 1980s, the number embedded in the economic class of immigrants declined while the family class immigrants increased. The early 1990s recession was the first during which the immigration rate increased as a result of then prime minister Mulroney’s policy to stabilize annual immigrant intake. As a result, economic class immigration, like family class, increased. All these are outcomes of policy interventions. While Canada has a strongly procyclical immigration policy toward skilled immigrants, current trends are driven by other factors as well. The concentration of immigrants in the three major cities of Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal and the sparse distribution in other parts of the country have resulted in Provincial Nominee Programs, which allow employers and corporations to nominate/fast-track applicants for immigration based on labor needs (including professionals) and provincial priorities. These programs are growing (for example, Ontario doubled its annual quota from 500 to 1,000 in early 2009)79 and spreading (for example, to the Northwest Territories).80 It has been proved valuable to bringing in in-demand skilled workers such as in the health sector.81 Further, the inability of internationally educated professionals to enter a profession for which they were trained has led the Canadian federal government to revamp its points system in 2002 and launch the Canadian Experience Class in 2008. The 2002 policy changes have already dramatically reduced the number of successful skilled Chinese immigrants.82 In particular, data on economic class immigrant targets in various immigration offices indicate a drop of 30% in Beijing but an


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increase of 43% in New Delhi between 2003 and 2008.83 The same source reports that the number of student visas granted in Beijing in 2008, at 13,526, was the highest of all immigration offices and a historical high in that office, indicating not only increasing affluence in Chinese households but also an implication that the source of skilled immigrants from China will likely shift from the economic class to the Canadian Experience Class. With respect to return/onward migration, unlike the situation in the United States, we doubt there would be drastic increase. Although Finnie finds immigrant departure rates between 1982 and 2003 were generally in synch with the state of the Canadian economy, and Aydemir and Robinson show that the cohorts most affected by the 1990/91 recession had particularly prompted early departures, there is ample evidence in the literature as well as anecdotally that suggests those who left in the 1990s were primarily immigrants from Hong Kong who were not particularly highly skilled compared with today’s highly skilled from China and India.84 With the latter countries, it is those with more human capital and strong marketable skills who manage to find good jobs quickly in Canada and who meet the criteria of immigrant selection of other countries that are more enticed to return to their country of origin or to go to other countries. Those who have encountered employment difficulties are less likely to return, not only for face-saving reasons but also because of lesser ability to mobilize resources. Moreover, immigrants in general are aware of the situations of those who have left—their opportunities back home have not been the same. In China, there is a distinction between returnees known as “sea turtles” (or overseas returnees returning to work) and those known as “seaweed” (or overseas returnees waiting to find a job). “Sea turtles” refers to those who left early on and returned in the late 1990s and early 2000s and found good jobs immediately upon their return. Returnees not familiar with the home situation or not well connected will have to wait for a job. A survey finds that less than 1% of Chinese firms intend to search for overseas returnees to fill their vacancies if any exists.85 This indicates that there will not be mass return to China at least. According to data from the monthly Labor Force Survey, the global recession has hit recent migrants in manufacturing and construction the most.86 Immigrants in health care, public administration, social assistance,

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information, culture, and recreation industries actually fare well. Those who suffer the most, even if they are highly skilled, are less prepared to return. Canada weathers this economic downturn better than any other Western country. None of the five banks that dominate Canada’s banking sector required bailouts, although they have had to write down large losses on subprime and the like. This makes return migration or onward migration (usually to another developed country) less urgent. The recession may discourage highly skilled migration from China and India to Canada and onward migration to the United States, but it will not stop the tide of foreign students.

Conclusion Global migration of the highly skilled is driven by different push and pull factors. In addition to immigration legislation, these factors include benefits from studying abroad or expanding business opportunities, quality of work and life, openness in communication, taxation rules, and labor market supply and demand signals, all of which pertain to both the origin and destination countries. Return migration of the highly skilled, in the simplest level, can also be summarized into a set of push and pull factors. On the push side are the barriers associated with “glass-ceiling” and racial discrimination in receiving countries, both at individual and institutional levels, which do not match the vision and ability of the highly skilled immigrants. On the pull side is the state of the economy and other conditions existing in the origin countries. But there is more to these simple push and pull forces. Migrants’ degree of return preparedness and their ability to mobilize resources are also important considerations. This article employs such a framework to assess the international movement of the highly skilled from China and India. Our contribution is to compare and contrast the immigration admission policies and integration ideals as well as the economic integration realities between Canada and the United States. Canada offers a more direct route to permanent residency, and a faster track for citizenship (three-year residency eligibility rule). In contrast, the United States relies heavily on the temporary migrant program, H-1B visa, to recruit skilled international migrants; it imposes annual quotas for employment-based visa applications, and a five-year


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citizenship eligibility rule upon receiving permanent residency. Highly skilled international migrants from China and India are facing different challenges in these two countries. In Canada, many are unemployed or underemployed albeit their permanent residency status and political rights, and more are waiting for their applications to be processed in their home countries. In the United States, on the other hand, many are employed in occupations that utilize their human capital and technical skills; but without permanent residency, they are disfranchised politically. In the case of H-1B visa holders, the brain waste of their spouses (mostly women H-4 visa holders), who themselves are often highly educated and professionally trained, and the long wait for green card application processing are dreadful. They also have profound gender and family implications. The recent global economic recession has altered the global financial order and economic landscape. The economic prospects in China and India present even more opportunities and needs for highly skilled people, including potential return migrants. Even without the global recession, the booming economies in China and India would have stemmed their desire to move overseas and lured back many already abroad. The recent global recession could only add to the changing contours. It, however, would not preclude students from studying abroad; nor would it prepare return of those highly skilled who are still struggling in the receiving countries’ labor markets. Given the different admission policies and integration realities of the highly skilled Chinese and Indian migrants in Canada and the United States, and the differential impacts on the economic prospects of Canada and the United States, it is anticipated there will be less inflow of highly skilled Chinese and Indians especially to the United States, and less return migration to China and India from Canada. The changing geography of international migration of the highly skilled from China and India will have important implications for working toward fair and just societies. The global race for talents involves cherry-picking of the most desirable not only by receiving societies such as Canada and the United States but also by traditional sending countries such as China and India now experiencing tremendous economic booms. At the same time, it increases the capability of the increasingly footloose mobility of highly skilled migrants to mobilize various kinds of resources. These situations further contribute to the racial, class, and

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gender inequality in these societies. Immigrants and racial minorities with fewer class resources and lower skills, as well as those whose human capital are not fully recognized or utilized, will be further marginalized in receiving societies. Similarly, the labor class in sending countries would be in further disadvantaged position in their own country as Chacko and Ong demonstrate.87 Alleviating such situations requires fair policy intervention and international cooperation as well as collaboration in international migration.

Acknowledgments The authors are grateful to the feedback on the earlier versions by many individuals listening to our various presentations, two anonymous reviewers, and JAAS Editor Huping Ling. We thank Wan Yu at Arizona State University for her invaluable assistance. Notes 1. Moira Herbst, “Skilled Immigrants on Why They’re Leaving the U.S.,” Business Week, July 26, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/ jul2009/db20090724_178761.htm. 2. Ayelet Shachar, “The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration Regimes,” New York University Law Review 81 101–158 (April 2006); University of Toronto, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 883739, http:// ssrn.com/abstract=883739. 3. Abdurrahman Aydemir and Chris Robinson, Return and Onward Migration among Working Age Men, Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series, Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 11F0019MIE—No. 273 (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, 2006); Sami Mahroum, “Highly Skilled Globetrotters: Mapping the International Migration of Human Capital,” R&D Management, 30 (2000): 23–32. 4. Stephen Castles, “New Migrations in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Force for Social and Political Change,” International Social Science Journal 156 (1998): 215–228. 5. Allan M. Findlay, “Skilled Transients: The Invisible Phenomenon?,” in The Cambridge Survey of World Migration, ed. Robin Cohen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 515–522. 6. Migration Policy Institute (MPI), The Recession-Proof Race for Highly Skilled Migrants (Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, 2008), www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=712. 7. Wim Naude, “The Global Economic Crisis after One Year: Is a New Paradigm


8.

9.

10.

11.

12. 13.

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for Recovery in Developing Countries Emerging?” WIDER Policy Brief series (2009), http://unu.edu/publications/briefs/policy-briefs/2009/UNU_PolicyBrief_02-09.pdf. See Andrew Kramer, “Emerging Economies Meet in Russia,” New York Times, June 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/17/world/europe/17bric. html?_r=1&emc=tnt&tntemail0=y; Clifford J. Levy, “Emerging Powers Prepare to Meet in Russia,” New York Times, June 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes. com/2009/06/16/world/europe/16bric.html?_r=1&emc=tnt&tntemail0=y; Geoffrey Garrett, “G2 in G20: China, the United States and the World after the Global Financial Crisis,” Global Policy 1, no. 1 (2010): 29–39; Ngaire Woods, “Global Governance after the Financial Crisis: A New Multilateralism or the Last Gasp of the Great Powers?” Global Policy 1, no. 1 (2010): 51–63. Hannah Seligson, “New Graduates Finding Jobs in China,” New York Times, August 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/11/business/ economy/11expats.html?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y. Jean-Pierre Cassarino, “Theorizing Return Migration: The Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited,” International Journal on Multicultural Societies 6, no. 2 (2004): 253–279. Michael P. Todaro, “A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less Developed Countries,” American Economic Review 59, no. 1 (1969): 138–148. Oded Stark, The Migration of Labor (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell 1991). J. Lewis and Arthur Williams, “The Economic Impact of Return Migration in Central Portugal,” in Return Migration and Regional Economic Problems, ed. Russell King (London: Croomhelm, 1986), 100–128. Alejandro Portes et al., “The Study of Transnationalism: Pitfalls and Promise of an Emergent Research Field,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 22, no. 2 (1999): 217–237. Don J. DeVoretz and John Ma, “Triangular Human Capital Flows between Sending, Entrepôt and the Rest of the World Regions,” Canadian Population Studies 29, no. 1 (2002): 53–69; Don J. DeVoretz, John Ma, and Kenny Zhang, “Triangular Human Capital Flows: Some Empirical Evidence from Hong Kong,” in Host Societies and the Reception of Immigrants, ed. Jeffrey G. Reitz (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, 2003), 469–492; Don J. DeVoretz and Kangqing Zhang, “Citizenship, Passports and the Brain Exchange Triangle,” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 6, no. 2 (2004): 199–212. Nuowen Deng, Why Do Immigrants from Hong Kong to Canada Stay or Leave? Metropolis British Columbia, Working Paper #07–03, 2007. Chen Bo, A Model of the Brain Drain and Circulation, Metropolis British Columbia, Working Paper #05–19, 2005. Jean-Pierre Cassarino, “Theorizing Return Migration: The Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited,” International Journal on Multicultural Societies 6, no. 2 (2004): 253–279.

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19. Janet Salaff, Angela Shik, and Arent Greve, “Like Sons and Daughters of Hong Kong: The Return of the Young Generation,” China Review 8, no. 1 (2008): 31–57. 20. Heike C. Alberts and Helen D. Hazen, “‘There Are Always Two Voices’: International Students’ Intentions to Stay in the United States or Return to Their Home Countries,” International Migration 43, no. 3 (2005): 131–154. 21. Yehuda Barucha, Pawan S. Budhwarb, and Naresh Khatri, “Brain Drain: Inclination to Stay Abroad after Studies,” Journal of World Business 42, no. 1 (2007): 99–112. 22. Yixi Lu, Li Zong, and Bernard Schissel, “To Stay or Return: Migration Inten. tions of Students from People’s Republic of China in Saskatchewan, Canada,” Journal of International Migration and Integration 10 (2009): 283–310. 23. Shirley L. Chang, “Causes of Brain Drain and Solutions: The Taiwanese Experience,” Studies in Comparative International Development 27, no. 1 (1992): 27–43. 24. Hahzoong Song, “From Brain Drain to Reverse Brain Drain: Three Decades of Korean Experience,” Science Technology Society 2 (1997): 317–345. 25. Nir Cohen, “Come Home, Be Professional: Ethno-nationalism and Economic Rationalism in Israel’s Return Migration Strategy,” Immigrants & Minorities 27, no. 1 (2009): 1–28. 26. William S. Harvey, “British and Indian Scientists in Boston Considering Returning to Their Home Countries,” Population Space Place 15 (2009): 493–508. 27. Cong Cao, “China’s Brain Drain at the High End: Why Government Policies Have Failed to Attract First-Rate Academics to Return,” Asian Population Studies 4, no. 3 (2008): 331–345. 28. Bill Ong Hing, Making and Remaking Asian America through Immigration Policy, 1850–1990 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994); Wei Li, Ethnoburb: The New Ethnic Community in Urban America (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009). 29. Anthony B. Chan, “Chinese Canada: Reflections on Historical Eras and Watersheds,” Polyphony: The Bulletin of the Multicultural History Society of Ontario: The Chinese in Ontario 15 (2000): 1–13; Peter Li, The Chinese in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998). 30. The Canadian Encyclopedia, Section on Ethnic Groups, http://www.canadianencyclopedia.ca/. 31. See Hing, Making and Remaking Asian America; Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans (New York: Little, Brown, 1998). 32. See Li, Chinese in Canada. 33. Li, Chinese in Canada. 34. N. Albiom, R. Finnie, and R. Meng, “The Discounting of Immigrants’ Skills in Canada: Evidence and Policy Recommendations,” IRPP Choices 11, no. 2 (2005): 1–26, Institute for Research on Public Policy, www.irpp.org; A.


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Aydemir and M. Skuterud, “Explaining the Deteriorating Entry Earnings of Canada’s Immigrant Cohorts, 1966–2000,” Canadian Journal of Economics 38 (2005): 641–671; G. Picot and A. Sweetman, “The Deteriorating Economic Welfare of Immigrants and Possible Causes,” Analytical Studies Research Paper 262, Statistics Canada, 2005; J. G. Reitz, “Immigrant Employment Success in Canada, Part I: Individual and Contextual Causes,” Journal of International Migration and Integration 8, no. 1 (2007): 11–36; J. G. Reitz, “Immigrant Employment Success in Canada, Part II: Understanding the Decline,” Journal of International Migration and Integration 8, no. 1 (2007): 37–62. Yan Shi, The Impact of Canada’s Immigration Act on Chinese Independent Immigrants, Vancouver Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Integration in the Metropolis, Working Paper No. 03–07, 2003. Wei Li and Emily Skop, “Diasporas in the U.S.: Indians and Chinese Compared,” Journal of Overseas Chinese 6, no. 2 (2010): 286–310, table 4 See Shachar, “Race for Talent.” See H. J. Holzer, Immigration Policies and Less-Skilled Workers in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, 2011), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Holzer-January2011.pdf; MPI, Side-by-Side Comparison of 2006 and 2007 Senate Legislation and 2009 CIR ASAP Bill, 2009, http:// www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/CIRASAPsidebyside.pdf; D. M. West, Creating a “Brain Gain” for U.S. Employers: The Role of Immigration (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/ rc/papers/2011/01_immigration_west/01_immigration_west.pdf. Canadian Constitution, section 27, subsection 15(1). Richard Wright and Mark Ellis, “Race, Region and the Territorial Politics of Immigration in the US,” International Journal of Population Geography 6, no. 3 (2000): 197–211. http://canada.metropolis.net. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); Samuel Huntington, Who Are We: The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004). Audrey Kobayashi, Wei Li, and Carlos Teixeira, “Immigrant Geographies: Issues and Debates,” in Immigrant Geographies of North American Cities, ed. Carlos Teixeira et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Dominion Bureau of Statistics 1963, Canadian Census 1961, Ottawa; Statistics Canada 1974, 1971 Census: 20% Sample, Ottawa; Statistics Canada 1983, 1981 Census: 20% Sample, Ottawa; Statistics Canada 1992, 1991 Census: 20% Sample, Ottawa; Statistics Canada 1996 Census of Population, http:// www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/index-eng.cfm; Statistics Canada 2001, Census of Population, http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/ index-eng.cfm; Statistics Canada 2006, Census of Population, http://www12. statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/index-eng.cfm.

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45. Aaron Terrazas, “Indian Immigrants in the United States,” Migration Information Source, July 2008, http://migrationinformation.net/Feature/display. cfm?id=687. 46. U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Data Show Characteristics of the U.S. Foreign-Born population, 2009, http://www.census.gov/Pressrelease/www/ releases/archives/american_community_survey_acs/013308.html. 47. Aaron Terrazas and Bhavna Devani, Chinese Immigrants in the United States, 2008, http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?id=685. 48. Emily Skop, Living in the “Burbs”: The Creation of an Indian Immigrant Community (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, forthcoming). 49. Sandeep K. Aggrawal and Alexander Lovell, “Indian Immigrants in Canada: The Shades of Economic Integration,” seminar presentation, Ontario Metropolis Centre, November 28, 2008. 50. Shuguang Wang and Lucia Lo, “Chinese Immigrants in Canada: Their Changing Composition and Economic Performance,” International Migration 43, no. 3(2005): 35–71. 51. Wang and Lo, “Chinese Immigrants in Canada,” Table 1. 52. Peter Li, “Immigration from China to Canada in the Age of Globalization: Issues of Brain Gain and Brain Loss,” Pacific Affairs 81, no. 2 (2008): 217–224, http://find.galegroup.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/itx/start.do?prodId=EAIM. 53. Guillermina Jasso, “A Work Force in Motion,” 2009, http://roomfordebate. blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/do-we-need-foreign-technology-workers/?hp. 54. Vivek Wadhwa, Anna Lee Saxenian, Richard Freeman, and Alex Salkever, America’s Loss Is the World’s Gain: America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs, Part 4, 2009, http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/americas_loss.pdf. 55. See Seligson, “New Graduates Finding Jobs in China”; Kauffman Foundation, “Economic and Professional Opportunities Top List of Reasons,” http:// www.kauffman.org/newsroom/united-states-losing-immigrants-who-spurinnovation-and-economic-growth.aspx. 56. Vivek Wadhwa, Anna Lee Saxenian, Richard Freeman, and Alex Salkever, Losing the World’s Best and Brightest: America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs, Part 5, 2009, http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/ResearchAndPolicy/Losing_the_World%27s_Best_and_Brightest.pdf. 57. See Wadhwa et al., Losing the World’s Best and Brightest. 58. See Herbst, “Skilled Immigrants”; Stephanie McCrummen, “A Better Life Beckons in Africa, U.S. Downturn Drives Immigrant Professionals Back Home,” Washington Post, May 26, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ wpdyn/content/article/2009/05/25/AR2009052502313.html?wprss=rss_business. 59. Associate Press (AP), “Green Card Petitions Down Sharply,” 2009, http:// www.azcentral.com/business/articles/2009/08/06/20090806greencards. html?source=nletter-business#START. 60. Shibao Guo and Don J. DeVoretz, “Chinese Immigrants in Vancouver: Quo Vadis?” Journal of International Migration and Integration 7, no. 4 (2006):


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“A Limited Engagement: Mainland Returnees from Canada,” Asian Pacific Foundation of Canada Research Report, 2008, http://www.asiapacific.ca/files/ Analysis/2008/ChinaReturnees.pdf. See DeVoretz, Ma, and Zhang, “Triangular Human Capital.” See Teo, “Vancouver’s Newest Chinese Diaspora”; A. Biswas, “Indian Diaspora in Canada: Some Realities,” n.d., http://students.cs.tamu.edu/amitabi/ Publications/Canada_IndianDiaspora.pdf. Kenny Zhang, “Recognizing the Canadian Diaspora,” Canada Asia Commentary, No. 41. Asia Pacific Foundations of Canada, 2006 http://www.asiapacific.ca. Zhang, “Recognizing the Canadian Diaspora.” Nicholas Keung, “Fast-Track Immigrant Program Expanded: Ontario Hopes Changes to Provincial Initiatives Will Keep Professionals from Going Elsewhere,” Toronto Star, February 21, 2009, A10. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “New PNP on the Horizon for the Northwest Territories,” news release, August 21, 2009, http://www.abajournal. com/blawgs/canada_immigration/. Nicholas Keung, “Does Immigration Help or Hurt during a Recession?” Toronto Star, March 22, 2009, http://www.thestar.com/article/606237. Jack Jedwab, “Canadian Immigration 2002 and Beyond: Expectation and Reality,” unpublished manuscript, quoted in DeVoretz, Asian Skilled-Immigration Flows to Canada. Ming Pao Daily, “Canada Substantially Cut Immigrant Targets from China and Hong Kong,” May 27, 2009, A1. See Finnie, International Mobility; Abdurrahman Aydemir and Chris Robinson, “Global Labor Markets, Return, and Onward Migration,” Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienned’ Economique 41, no. 4 (2008): 1285–1311. Sing Tao Daily, “Going to Study Overseas May Become “Seaweed” upon Return,” August 30, 2009, B9. Jamie Pitts, “Impact of the Current Economic Recession on Immigrants in Ontario’s Labor Force,” presentation to PPMT, Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration, Ontario, June 25, 2009. Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006); Elizabeth Chacko, “From Brain Drain to Brain Gain: Reverse Migration to Bangalore and Hyderabad, India’s Globalizing High-Tech Cities,” GeoJournal 68 (2007): 131–140.