A Multidimensional Semantics for Discourse Particles: Evidence from ...

International Review of Pragmatics 4 (2012) 29–57

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A Multidimensional Semantics for Discourse Particles: Evidence from Spanish Neuter Demonstratives* Iker Zulaica-Hernández and Javier Gutiérrez-Rexach Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis and The Ohio State University, USA [email protected] and [email protected]

Abstract Demonstratives are a fertile source of discourse-particle formation in Spanish. These particles, which we will be calling demonstrative discourse operators, combine a demonstrative pronoun plus additional material in lexicalized complex expressions. In this paper, we argue that these demonstrative expressions contribute to discourse coherence and cohesion by establishing specific rhetorical relations such as Contrast or Elaboration between discourse utterances. Building on the discourse deictic and anaphoric nature of demonstratives as well as on their quantificational properties we also present a novel characterization for these demonstrative discourse operators as operators with a tripartite structure. We argue that the expressive content of these units contains two basic components, namely, a particular rhetorical relation and the speaker’s attitude towards the expressed content. Our proposal not only can have implications for general theories of demonstrative expressions and rhetorical structure but also for recent semantic perspectives dealing with how discourse particles structure and possibly articulate meaning into different dimensions. Keywords

rhetorical relations, discourse particles, quantifiers, deixis, expressive content, demonstratives

1. Introduction The study of cohesion-building mechanisms and particles in natural language is of capital importance in order to attain a better understand ing of the processes underlying discourse construction and processing. * In this paper we have focused on Peninsular Spanish. All the examples that appear in this study are natural examples from the Corpus de Referencia del Español Actual (CREA), which is accessible online at http://corpus.rae.es/creanet.html and, to the best of our knowledge, all the analysed demonstrative discourse particles can be found across all varieties of modern Peninsular Spanish. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2012

DOI 10.1163/187731012X632054

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I. Zulaica-Hernández and J. Gutiérrez-Rexach / International Review of Pragmatics 4 (2012) 29–57

Certain specific multi-functional expressions are essential in natural languages, since they appear to preserve grammatical functionality while being able to play various roles in the production and maintenance of discourse cohesion and coherence, significantly contributing to procedural meaning. For example, different word classes such as conjunctions (but, as, because, etc.), adverbs (now, then, well, etc.) and other discourse particles (oh, I mean, you know, etc.)1 are commonly assumed to have various functions at the discourse level, namely by establishing relations among parts of utterances, relationships between the speaker and the utterance, or between the speaker and the hearer. These expressions have been labelled discourse markers (Schiffrin, 1987) in the literature in English or partículas discursivas or marcadores del discurso in Spanish, in the sense given to these elements by, for example, Briz-Gómez (1998) and Portolés-Lázaro (1998), respectively. To date, different theories have been proposed with the aim of explaining how discourse particles contribute to the global structure of discourse fragments, to discourse meaning, and to the discourse participants’ communicative goals. For Blakemore (2002), for example, the main role of English discourse markers is to facilitate the inferential processes involved in utterance understanding along the lines of Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986). By combining the general relevance-theoretic approach to discourse markers developed by Blakemore (1987, 1992) and Wilson and Sperber (1993) with Anscombre and Ducrot’s Argumentation Theory (1983), Martín-Zorraquino and Portolés-Lázaro (1999) present a thorough study and comprehensive taxonomy of Spanish discourse markers. For these authors, Spanish

1 The status of interjections, such as English oh or Spanish ah, as discourse particles has been the subject of intense debate. While some authors have identified the functions of interjections with that of pragmatic markers (Schiffrin, 1987; Montes, 1999) or even particles (Zwicky, 1985), others have argued that only a small subset of interjections can be used for this function (Ameka, 1992: 114). Generally speaking, it appears that interjections encode a particular type of procedural information. Thus, Wharton (2003) argues that interjections encode procedural information that may activate various attitudinal concepts or types of concepts (e.g. interrogative propositional attitudes, dissociative attitudes, attitudes involving delight, surprise, excitement, etc.) depending on the type of interjection involved. As Wharton puts it: “What a hearer does with the attitudinal or speech act information activated might vary in different situations. […] A hearer may use it to construct a higher-level explicature, […] might also lead to propositional embedding, though it may be that many interjections are primarily geared to suddenly perceived objects and events, and only by extension to propositions” (Wharton, 2003:60). Another detailed study on interjections with a focus on Spanish can be found in Torres-Sánchez (2000), where she also offers a classification of interjections into categories and advocates for specific procedural meanings depending on the category involved.


discourse markers play a regulatory role in discourse-argumentation activity by guiding the inferences that arise in human communication. Recent formal semantic perspectives on the analysis of discourse particles seem to point in the direction of a reassessment of how meaning is structured and how potentially different dimensions are articulated. In this view, discourse particles can be seen as expressions connecting descriptive meaning and expressive meaning (Kratzer, 1999; Potts, 2003), as presupposition triggers (Zeevat, 2002), or as context markers (Zeevat, 2004). It appears that demonstratives and discourse markers share a number of features, as they contribute to discourse integration and general procedural meaning in various ways. As purely deictic elements, demonstra tives are commonly accompanied by a pointing gesture that serves to directly refer to the relevant entity in the utterance context (Kaplan, 1989).2 Demonstratives also play an important role in discourse anaphora processes, normally when they are not associated to an ostension mechanism (King, 2001; Higginbotham, 2003). In these cases, speakers use demonstratives to refer to a variety of entities such as individuals, events, facts or propositions (Asher, 1993; Webber, 1979). For some authors, the procedural content of demonstratives in deictic and anaphoric uses is better explained as encoding an indication of the cognitive or informational status of the referent (Prince, 1981; Gundel et al., 1993), by contributing to the joint focus of attention of the discourse participants (Diessel, 2006), or marking the referent’s degree of accessibility (Ariel, 1990). Demonstratives may also have additional functions like, for example, topic maintenance (Bosch and Umbach, 2007). Several authors have advocated presuppositional characterizations for demonstrative expressions in order to better explain their range of discourse properties (Zeevat, 1999; Roberts, 2002) Such a characterization is clearly advantageous as it enables us to explain the directly referential and quantificational uses of 2 Demonstratives are not necessarily accompanied by a pointing gesture. Most commonly, the pointing serves to single out the intended referent when other competing potential referents are present in the utterance situation or when reference is simply too vague or ambiguous. Even in deixis proper and when the referent is salient enough, use of a pointing gesture would be redundant. Although, by definition, demonstratives are pointers, there are uses of demonstratives where such “pointing” – if any – is not transparent. That is the case of demonstratives in discourse deictic/anaphoric uses when reference is transferred from the physical coordinates of the utterance context to the textual domain. Such pointing function has been characterized as a procedure encoding the cognitive status of the referring expression (Gundel et al., 1993) or as a focus shift mechanism (Gundel and Mulkern, 1998).

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demonstratives, as well as the discourse anaphoric properties of demonstrative pronouns. In certain specific constructions, several Spanish demonstratives have developed a clear status as discourse particles. It seems likely that this has occurred through a process of grammaticalization over time (Hopper and Traugott, 2003), and the anaphoric nature of demonstratives may have well contributed to their new linguistic function as discourse particles. In fact, demonstratives seem to constitute a productive source for discourseparticle formation in Spanish. Some of these particles have already been recognized as such and are included in the Diccionario de Partículas Discursivas del Español (henceforth DPDE): eso sí/esto sí, con eso y todo (con todo y con eso, con todo y eso) – see also Casado (1991) on the particle esto es-.3 In these new discourse uses, demonstrative pronouns eso (“that”) and, less frequently esto (“this”), frequently combine with other elements into discourse particles that appear to retain the deictic/anaphoric basic component of demonstrative expressions. Additionally, they incorporate content contributing to the rhetorical structure of discourse, to the overall cohesion and coherence of discourse, or to specific argumentative roles. Examples (1)-(4) illustrate the use of these complex discourse particles containing demonstratives: (1) Lo que todavía no tienen claro es el precio; eso sí, prometen que será asequible. It that still not have.PRES clear is the price; that yes, promise.PRES that be.FUT affordable “The are not quite sure about the price yet; however/nevertheless they promise it will be affordable”. [CREA: 20 Minutos. 14/01/2004]

(2) (The coach of a football team talking about their possible rivals) Para mí el más complicado es el Liverpool y eso que ya los eliminamos una vez. For me the most complicated is the Liverpool and that that already them eliminate.PAST one time “In my opinion the most difficult team to win is Liverpool, however/nevertheless we

already knocked them out once”. [CREA: La Voz de Galicia, 13/12/2000]

3 The particle eso sí/esto sí is characterized in the DPDE as a particle whose main function is to weaken a conclusion that may be inferred from a previous discourse segment. On the other hand, the role of the particle con eso y todo (and its variants con todo y con eso and con todo y eso) would be to present a contrary conclusion to one that may be inferred from the previous discourse. Finally, the particle esto es (lit. “this is”) is characterized by Casado as having a meaning akin to the particle o sea (“that is to say”).


(3) Quedan todavía muchos cargos por adjudicar y hay muchas mujeres idóneas para ocuparlos… Está muy bien eso de la paridad. “There are still many state jobs left to assign and there are many ideal women to occupy them… That about employment parity is very good…”. [CREA: La Razón Digital, 22/04/2004]

(4) Lo he conocido cuando estaba yo comprando los cuadernos para el instituto;

Him have met when was I buying the notebooks for the institute; en eso que entró él y le dijo a la dependienta… in that that enter.PAST he and to-her say.PAST to the assistant “I met him when I was buying my notebooks for school, at that moment he entered and said to the shop assistant…”. [CREA: Aldecoa, Josefina R. 1995. Mujeres de negro. Barcelona: Anagrama]

We claim that demonstrative discourse particles introduce a rhetorical function in discourse, as defended in Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (Asher and Lascarides, 2003), henceforth SDRT. In (1), the particle eso sí (lit. “that yes”) helps the addressee infer a relation of Contrast between two propositions, which is similar to the adversative and/or concessive meaning conveyed by the English sentence connectors “however” and “nevertheless/nonetheless”. This particle forces the hearer to revise an assumption triggered by the previous clause(s). Similarly, the particle y eso que (lit. “and that-DEM that-CONJ”) in (2) also seems to indicate a relation of Contrast between the two propositions involved. Regarding example (3), the particle eso de (lit. “that of”) seems to be expressing a relation of Elaboration between two discourse segments. Finally, the particle en eso/esto (lit. “in that”) conveys a relation of Narration between two events in discourse. Explaining these uses is not only essential for a theory of demonstratives and for current theories of discourse markers but it can also contribute to a better characterization of how linguistic elements encode procedural meaning. Additionally, a clear discussion of the integration of procedural elements in the determination of meaning seems critical for the proper analysis of incremental discourse interpretation (Stenning, Lascarides and Calder, 2006), quantifiers (Szabolcsi, 1997), and for recent debates on the expressive and descriptive dimensions of particles (Kratzer, 1999; Potts, 2003). Thus, in this paper, we undertake the study of these demonstrative discourse particles with the aim of formally characterizing their discoursesemantic properties. We propose that demonstrative discourse particles are operators that contribute to the rhetorical structure of discourse by signalling different discourse relations, following the postulates of SDRT. These operators bind a contextual variable at logical form. This is a

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common property of all demonstrative discourse operators, irrespective of their specific descriptive content. These operators convey relations between discourse utterances (Contrast, Elaboration, Narration, etc.), as illustrated in examples (1)-(4). The restriction of the operator is the relevant proposition(s) previously asserted or presuppositionally accommodated (Lewis, 1979; Von Fintel, 1994; Kadmon, 2000, etc.) Since in Spanish only neuter pronouns can refer to propositions or abstract objects, this would predict the fact that only neuter demonstrative pronouns (and no other demonstrative expressions) are a productive source for this class of discourse operators. Finally, it is argued that demonstratives are used to convey different attitudes, which lends support to a view of discourse particles as multidimensional expressions articulating a descriptive and an expressive meaning. The descriptive content of the operator specifies a satisfying circumstance, which is normally linked to the speaker’s perspective or evaluative judgment on what makes the proposition(s) in the operator’s restrictor relevant or salient. Regarding the expressive meaning of the particle, it relates to the speaker’s attitude toward the expressed content. This property explains why these particles tend to introduce exclamatory utterances and they are also associated with an exclamatory intonational contour. Formally, certain properties of exclamative expressions (Portner and Zanuttini, 2003) can be extended to characterize these uses: there is a high degree of expectation/desire by the speaker for the asserted proposition to be the case. 2. Discourse Relations and Procedures in SDRT Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (SDRT) constitutes a holistic approach to discourse. The central hypothesis of SDRT is that discourse has a hierarchical structure upon which discourse interpretation depends. Discourse interpretation involves pragmatics, word meaning and compositional semantics, and SDRT’s main goal is to account for how these different knowledge sources interact. The key hypothesis about the propositional content of discourse is that it crucially depends on a discourse structure consisting of rhetorical relations that link utterances together or, more accurately, the meanings or “contents” that these utterances convey. Rhetorical relations, also called discourse relations, describe the rhetorical roles that propositions play in the global discourse content. According to Asher, Prévot and Vieu (2007), SDRT is constructed around the following basic assumptions:


• Segmented Discourse Representation Structures (henceforth, SDRSs) are recursive structures which are SDRT’s representations or logical forms for discourse. A basic SDRS is a labelled logical form for a clause, and a complex SDRS will involve one or more discourse-relation predications on labels, where each label is associated with a constituent, i.e., a basic or a complex SDRS. SDRS’s are commonly represented as graphs. • An SDRS for a discourse is constructed incrementally with a logic of information packaging that uses several information sources and that is responsible for the final form of the SDRS. The logic of information packaging, or Glue Logic, which encodes reasoning about the structure of SDRSs, is different from the logic of information content, in which we formulate the semantic consequences of an SDRS. • The rules for inferring discourse relations are typically rules that use a weak (non-monotonic) conditional relation (>). They are part of the Glue Logic, which allows to incrementally “glue” constituents in a given discourse context through discourse relations. • The discourse relations used in SDRT, which have definite discourse (e.g. spatial-temporal, causal, etc.) effects, are binary and either coordinating or subordinating. • The structure induced by all the edges in graphical SDRS’s (Figure 1) allows visualizing the so-called “right frontier”, i.e. the path that goes from the last label up to the topmost constituent. The right frontier is the basis for the expression of an important constraint in discourse. The right-frontier constraint governs anaphora resolution, defining which referents are available, and possible discourse continuations, characterizing the nodes open for attachment of new constituents. • Certain coordinating relations such as Narration (where constituents describe a sequence of events) and Continuation (where linked constituents bear a common single relation to another constituent) require a topic; i.e. there must be a basic constituent that summarizes the two related constituents and that is linked to a complex constituent containing them via the subordinating Elaboration relation. If this third constituent has not been explicitly introduced in the previous discourse, it must be “constructed”, i.e., abstracted from the elements of the complex constituent it dominates. In this case, it is necessary to update the logical form of the topic constituent each time the complex constituent is extended (Asher, 2004). SDRSs are commonly represented as graphs in which coordinating relations are represented as horizontal edges, and subordinating relations as vertical ones. The dashed edges mark the link between a complex

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constituent and its sub-constituents. The short discourse in (5) is a classic illustrative example. Figure 1 represents the resulting SDRS. (5) a. John had a great evening last night. b. He had a great meal. c. He ate salmon. d. He devoured lots of cheese. e. He then won a dancing competition.

The graph in Figure 1 shows the basic features of the rhetorical structure of discourse (5). In general, the horizontal lines linking two constituents signal coordination relations, whereas vertical lines signal subordination relations between the utterances involved. Thus, node πA, which branches out into πb and πe, provides more detail about the event in (5a). In turn, πB provides more detail about the event in (5b), which branches out into πc and πd. As shown in this graph, Elaboration relations are subordinating and Narration relations are coordinating. Regarding the temporal progression of discourse, the events that elaborate on others are understood as temporally subordinate to them, whereas the events that form a narrative with others follow each other. As shown clearly in Figure 1, the order of the sentences in a discourse does not match the order of events as they actually occurred; as pointed out in Asher, Prévot and Vieu (2007: 4): “Clearly, the ordering of events does not follow the order of sentences, but rather obeys the constraints imposed by discourse structure”. πa

Elaboration πA

Narration πb

πe

Elaboration πB

Narration πc

πd

Figure 1. SDRS for discourse (5).


A proposition can be the argument of several rhetorical relations, since a given utterance can make more than one illocutionary contribution. This is shown in (6), where two relations Narration/Contrast arise between the two utterances. The Contrast relation is indicated by the particle but, whereas the temporal information (via Narration) is not signalled by any explicit marker. It must be rather inferred via world-knowledge and common-sense reasoning. (6) John bought an apartment but he rented it out.

SDRT captures very clearly the way different lexical items contribute to the development of relations between discourse segments, but also how these items can contribute to blocking certain (defeasible) inferences. The interpretation of discourse relations is encoded in rules of the form: SEM R(α, β) → Condition (α, β) Thus, generally speaking, the Narration relation entails temporal precedence, as shown in (6) where the purchase event precedes the renting event. This can be captured with the semantic interpretation rule SEM 1. SEM1 Narration(α, β) → eα < eβ Consider now examples (7a-c). In the most salient reading, the two events in (7a) and (7b) are causally related and a relation of Explanation is inferred between the two utterances. In (7b), this relation is expressed with the particle because and it can be characterized with the Glue Logic rule GL1, where condition ?(α, β) indicates that the two segments α and β are related by an underspecified relation, and [φ](α) expresses that the formula φ appears in the propositional content of α (Vieu, 2007). (7) a. Max fell. Sue pushed him. b. Max fell because Sue pushed him. c. Max fell. Then Sue pushed him.

GL1 (?(α, β) λ [push (e1, x, y)] (α) > [ fall(e2, y)] (β)) > Explanation (α, β) In (7c), though, the causal reading, and the corresponding inferred Explanation relation, is not available as the particle then denotes Narration in a non-defeasible way. Explanation and Narration are incompatible because Narration entails temporal precedence of the events while Explanation entails reversed causation, which excludes temporal precedence. As Vieu (2007) points out: “reversed causation imposes reversed temporal precedence or simultaneity”.

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SEM 2 Explanation(α, β) → cause (eβ, eα) SEM 3 cause(e, e’) → ¬e’ < e Thus, the particle then would block the inference to the Explanation relation as it denotes non-defeasible Narration. GL2 (?(α, β) λ [then](β)) → Narration(α, β) 3. Spanish Demonstrative Particles and Discourse Relations The demonstrative particles under consideration in this paper (eso sí, y eso que, eso de, en esto/eso) add additional rhetorical content to their strictly anaphoric, discourse deictic, or referential component. These demonstrative particles establish rhetorical relations among discourse segments or help the hearer infer a (possibly salient) rhetorical relation between propositions. In certain instances, the particle does not need to be present for the rhetorical relation to be inferred by the hearer. In these cases, a specific rhetorical relation may be salient enough (via lexical meaning or world knowledge) so that the particle, if present, acts just as a “facilitator”. In other cases, though, a discourse particle seems to be absolutely necessary for the right rhetorical relation between propositions to be inferred. Otherwise, the relation would be underspecified and the utterances involved would simply remain rhetorically unconnected. This point is illustrated with examples (8a-d). In (8a), the particle eso sí (lit. “that yes”) can co-occur with the adversative particle pero (“but”). In (8b), the demonstrative particle is not present, yet the sentence is still perfectly grammatical. The same applies to (8c), where the particle pero is absent. Finally, in (8d), there is no particle connecting the two sentences. (8) (A man who has participated in the shooting of a film in a well-known theme park) a. La grabación fue muy agradable y estoy deseando volver al parque the recording was very pleasant and am willing come.INF to-the park pero, eso sí, esta vez como turista. but, that yes, this time as tourist. b. La grabación fue muy agradable y estoy deseando volver al parque the recording was very pleasant and am willing come.INF to-the park pero esta vez como turista. But this time as tourist. c. La grabación fue muy agradable y estoy deseando volver al parque, the recording was very pleasant and am willing come.INF to-the park eso sí, esta vez como turista. that yes, this time as tourist.

I. Zulaica-Hernández and J. Gutiérrez-Rexach / International Review of Pragmatics 4 (2012) 29–5739 d. La grabación fue muy agradable y estoy deseando volver al parque. the recording was very pleasant and am willing come.INF to-the park Esta vez como turista. This time as tourist. “The recording was very pleasant and I am willing to come back to the park, however this time as a tourist”. [CREA: El Mundo, 01/06/1996]

Generally speaking, we will characterize the construction eso sí as a demonstrative particle that triggers or helps the hearer infer a Contrast rhetorical relation between two propositions. This relation can be characterized with the Glue logic rule GL3. GL3 (?(α, β) λ [eso sí](β)) → Contrast(α, β) In view of example (8d), it may be argued that demonstrative particles are not responsible for the emergence of specific rhetorical relations in discourse. It may be argued that some type of contrast relation between the two propositions involved is salient enough (e.g. there is a contrast between visiting a theme park as a worker and visiting it as a tourist) in (8d) so the particle does not contribute any particular rhetorical proce dure of its own.4 However, in many cases, the Contrast relation is not so evident when no particle is present. This is the case of (1), repeated here as (9). (9) Lo que todavía no tienen claro es el precio. Pro prometen que será asequible. “They do not know the price yet. They promise it will be affordable”. [CREA: 20 Minutos. 14/01/2004: Madrid]

In (9), no Contrast relation is necessarily inferred from the two propositions involved. In fact, a potential hearer might infer other competing relations; for example, Elaboration via a particle such as además (“moreover”), or even Cause or Consequence via an inferred particle such as por eso (“because of that”). When no particle is present, as in (9), the propositions remain rhetorically underspecified (?(α,β)). In consequence, some demonstrative particles seem to be strictly necessary in certain discourses in Spanish, so that the addressee is able to process the proper rhetorical connection originally intended by the speaker. 4 In our opinion, the existence of the structural Contrast relation does not preclude the hearer from inferring additional rhetorical relations between the propositions involved. In (8), for example, an Explanation or Cause relation is possible between the two propositions: having had a pleasant time in a theme park may be the cause for this person to be willing to come back as a tourist some time in the future.

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On the other hand, the Spanish construction eso de (lit. “that of”) appears to have developed a hybrid anaphoric-cataphoric nature.5 In (10), it refers to an element in the previous clause la cirugía estética “cosmetic surgery” (anaphoric use) and also refers forward, introducing the NP la anestesia “anaesthesia” (cataphoric use). (10) Muchas veces pienso

que debería hacerme la cirugía estética, que Many times think.PRES that I-should make.INF-rflxv the surgery aesthetic, that sería el momento justo, pero me da mucho miedo eso de la anestesia. be.COND the moment right but rflxv give.PRES much fear that of the anaesthesia “I often think about undergoing cosmetic surgery, that this would be the right time, but anaesthesia really scares me”. [CREA: Tiempo, 29/01/1990]

In this particular use, the demonstrative expression acts as a facilitator in cases of associative anaphora (Löbner, 1998), illustrated by the lexical items cirugía estética-anestesia (“cosmetic surgery-anaesthesia”). Thus, the demonstrative introduces the new topic la anestesia in discourse, a topic that is directly related to having plastic surgery by virtue of common knowledge (the information that the conversation participants share about the world), or by virtue of the direct relation topic-subtopic marked by the two lexical items under consideration. It is in this respect that the discourse function of this demonstrative construction may well be that of signalling a relation of Elaboration between the propositions involved. This relation is characterized via the GL4 rule. GL4 (?(α, β) λ [eso de](β)) → Elaboration(α, β) The particle en esto/eso “in this/that” is made up of the preposition en (“in/ at”) plus the proximal or medial demonstrative pronouns esto (“this”) and eso (“that”). The Diccionario de la Real Academia (Dictionary of the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language) classifies this expression as an adverbial phrase. In this particle, the demonstrative expression appears to have lost all traces of its primary deictic nature but not its anaphoric character. Clearly, the demonstrative refers back to the event denoted by the preceding sentence and connects it to the event immediately following the demonstrative, marking a relation between the two events involved and contributing to the optimal interpretation of the temporal structure of 5 In purely discourse cataphoric uses, demonstratives appear to have a presentational use that not only contributes to discourse cohesion via co-reference, but it may also contribute a rhetorical effect (technically, not a rhetorical relation in SDRT’s sense), namely, that of creating uncertainty via the utterance of the demonstrative and the subsequent introduction of the relevant presuppositional material.


discourse. Thus, the complex demonstrative expressions in (4) and (11) can be argued to establish a Narration relation between two events. (11) Iba yo a comprar el pan y en esto que me encuentro go.PAST I to buy.INF the bread and in this that rflxv find.PRES a Margot Cottens, la gran actriz argentino-española. to Margot Cottens, the great actress argentine-spanish “As I was going to buy some bread, I came across Margot Cottens, the great Argentine-Spanish actress”. [CREA: El País, 17/09/1977]

The Glue Logic rule GL5 characterizes the non-defeasible relation Narration denoted by this particle. GL5 (?(α, β) λ [en esto/eso](β)) → Narration(α, β) Finally, the construction y eso que (literally, and that-DEM that-CONJ) shown in examples (2) and (12) appears to have evolved into a discourse particle encoding an adversative or concessive meaning that helps to direct the hearer to contradicting (and possibly eliminating) an assumption presumed to have been made explicit by the first conjunct (Blakemore, 2002). In this respect, the Spanish construction y eso que may establish a Contrast relation between the two propositions involved. Upon processing the first conjunct of (12), the hearer would normally infer that the president must be a smart person. The content of the second conjunct, with the help of the demonstrative construction, helps to establish the counterevidence required for a proper understanding of the whole utterance. (12) El presidente de estados unidos se ha marcado otro nuevo éxito. Y the president of states united rflxv AUX score.PART other new success. And eso que el ex gobernador americano fue calificado de paleto that that-CONJ the ex governor American be.PAST described of redneck sin ideas sobre política internacional. without ideas about policy international “The president of the United States has achieved a new success, even if the ex-governor was described as a redneck, clueless about international policy”. [CREA: El Mundo, 03/12/1995]

GL6 is the corresponding Glue Logic rule for the Contrast relation commonly inferred when this particle is present. GL6 (?(α, β) λ [y eso que](β)) → Contrast(α, β) Likewise, upon processing the first conjunct in example (2) above, repeated below, the hearer would normally infer that the coach of the football team thinks that it will be very hard for them to beat their rival. The counterevidence to that inference comes from the content of the second conjunct

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(they knocked them out once) and the Contrast relation conveyed by the demonstrative particle. (2) (The coach of a football team talking about their possible rivals) Para mí el más complicado es el Liverpool y eso que ya los eliminamos una vez. For me the most complicated is the Liverpool and that that already them eliminate.PAST one time “To me the most complicated is Liverpool, however/nevertheless we already knocked them out once”. [CREA: La Voz de Galicia, 13/12/2000]

In many respects, the analysis set forth for demonstrative particles in this study coincides with previous work on discourse markers and, more specifically, with some relevance-theoretic accounts on discourse markers or sentence connectives. Some of the demonstrative operators analysed in this paper appear to combine all the typical features of discourse markers. Fraser (1990, 1999)6 defines discourse markers as: “a class of lexical expressions…[that] signal a relationship between the interpretation of the segment they introduce (S1) and the prior segment (S2). They have a core meaning, which is procedural, not conceptual, and their more specific interpretation is ‘negotiated’ by the context, both linguistic and conceptual” (Fraser, 1999: 1). All our demonstrative operators signal a relationship between two segments in the discourse and indicate the hearer how the segment they introduce has to be interpreted relative to the previous segment. The specific rhetorical relation (contrast, elaboration, narration, etc.) that is part of the procedural meaning of the operators accomplishes this task. Along the lines of Blakemore’s (1987) work on discourse connectives, the demonstrative operators analysed here would guide the hearer to restrict the space of possibilities in the inferential interpretation process by establishing a rhetorical connection among the discourse segments involved. Thus, for example, the notion of contrast that we have proposed for the constructions y eso que and eso sí is, in many ways, similar to the proposal put forward by Olmos and Ahern (2009) for the Spanish connectives pero (“but”) and aunque (“although”). Olmos and Ahern argue in favour of a procedural notion of contrast encoded by pero (“but”) rather than a conceptual one. This goes in line with the procedural notion of contrast that we put forward in this paper. On the other 6 Other approaches and refinements to the notion of discourse marker from different theoretical standpoints are, but do not exhaust, the following: Schiffrin, 1987; Blakemore, 1987, 1992; Redeker, 1990, 1991; Halliday and Hasan, 1976; Schourup, 1985.


hand, we agree with these authors in the way this procedural instruction has to be defined: “we consider the purpose of but and although to consist, rather than principally in denying, or warning the hearer to avoid implication of another proposition, in leading the hearer to recognize the fact that there are possible alternative propositional representations that contrast with what the speaker is actually affirming” (Olmos and Ahern, 2009: 55). Finally, Fraser also emphasizes the importance of context in the interpretation of discourse markers. In the semantic characterization that we propose for our demonstrative operators in sections 4 and 5, context plays a central role in the interpretation of these elements. In this paper we argue that the original anaphoric/discourse deictic nature of the “neuter” demonstrative is compatible with its function as a demonstrative particle and we propose to characterize the demonstrative constructions (eso de, en eso/esto, y eso que, etc.) as operators that bind an abstract object variable in their restrictor. In our opinion this proposal is not only feasible but convenient in that it allows us to make the discourse marker view of these constructions compatible with the most widely accepted semantic and pragmatic views on demonstrative expressions. In other words, the demonstrative word in each of these expressions still retains a trace of its anaphoric or deictic nature as it binds an abstract object variable in the previous context (implicit or explicit); a view which is compatible with the productivity of the neuter demonstratives in discourse particle formation in Spanish. In this line, the demonstrative would contribute to the overall meaning of the particle the pointing that is necessary to signal a relationship between a previous discourse segment (S1) with the segment the particle introduces (S2). The anaphoric/cataphoric original nature of the demonstrative in the operators y eso que and eso sí is weak, yet still present, and that indicates that these specific constructions are close to a complete lexicalization. On the other hand, characterizing the demonstrative particles or operators en eso and eso de as discourse markers per se is more difficult and, perhaps, inadequate. This is the principal reason that led us to suggest the label demonstrative operators instead of demonstrative discourse markers to the set of constructions analysed in this paper. While en eso and eso de share some of the typical features of discourse markers, i.e. they signal a relationship between two dis course segments which, in our opinion, is primarily of a rhetorical nature and their interpretation is clearly dependent on the communicative context; the anaphoric character of the demonstrative is still too transparent. All of this might be an indication that the construction is not completely lexicalized yet.

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4. The Quantificational Nature of Demonstratives Proper or pure deixis, i.e. the use of deictic expressions to point at objects and make them salient in the actual or real context of utterance, is only part of the range of uses shown by demonstratives in discourse. In proper deixis, demonstratives are frequently, though not necessarily, accompanied by a pointing gesture (a pointing finger, a nod of the head, etc.) In example (13), the speaker utters the demonstrative along with a hand gesture to single out an entity from a range of potential surrounding entities, thus contributing to disambiguate its referent by pointing at an exact location in the mountain. In (14), the entity referred to is salient enough so no pointing is needed; in Gundel et al.’s terminology (1993) the entity is in focus. (13) (Context: Mary pointing at a spot in the mountain) Esa es la cabaña donde pasaremos la noche. “That is the cabin where we’ll stay overnight”. (14) (Context: In the supermarket, John is picking up a lobster to take home) Prefiero esta porque esa no tiene buena pinta. “I will take this one because that one does not look good”.

Language speakers commonly use demonstratives to refer to a variety of discourse entities either anaphorically, cataphorically or discourse deictically.7 Thus, demonstrative NPs may have other NPs as antecedents, as definites and other pro-forms do in cases of strict anaphora. In (15), the demonstrative NP ese director (‘that film director’) is anaphoric to the proper name Stanley Kubrick in the previous segment. (15) A Ana le gusta Stanley Kubrick pero a mí no me gusta nada ese director. “Ana likes Stanley Kubrick, but I do not like that film director”.

Demonstrative pronouns usually play a discourse deictic role by pointing to the entity associated with a preceding discourse segment, which is sometimes more complex than a noun phrase (e.g. a clause, a sentence, a paragraph, etc.) In example (16), the demonstrative expression aquel acontecimiento (“that event”) refers to the proposition or event denoted by the previous discourse segment. (16) El doce de octubre de 1492 Cristóbal Colón ponía pie en América por primera vez. Dentro de cinco años se cumplen los quinientos años de aquel acontecimiento.

7 See Diessel (1990) on the conceptual differences between discourse anaphora and discourse deixis.

I. Zulaica-Hernández and J. Gutiérrez-Rexach / International Review of Pragmatics 4 (2012) 29–5745 “On October 12th, 1492 Christopher Columbus set his foot on American soil for the first time. In five years we will be marking the five-hundred-year anniversary of that event”.

4.1. The Problem of Demonstrative Reference Theories of direct reference are generally able to account for demonstrative use in proper deixis, that is, those cases in which a demonstrative is accompanied by a demonstration [δ] that fixes the intended referent in a particular context of utterance. A view of demonstratives as expressions of direct reference8 essentially postulates that these elements are rigid designators. For example, Kaplan (1989) characterizes demonstratives as incomplete expressions, which are only made complete by a demonstration gesture (a pointing finger, a nod, etc.). Only when explicit ostension (δ) is performed along with the utterance of a demonstrative expression (d) we obtain the complete demonstrative expression d[δ]. In most occasions, these are typical cases of visual deixis in which the demonstrated object – aka the demonstratum – is a physical, three-dimensional entity in the perceivable world surrounding the conversation participants, as illustrated in examples (13)-(14). Nevertheless, in many languages demonstrative expressions have uses that clearly deviate from a strictly referential use. For example, cases abound where there is no demonstratum in the canonical sense or, in other words, there is no particular concrete entity to which the demon strative may anchor its reference. These cases, whose referent could be better represented as a variable, are frequent in discourse anaphora processes and represent a high percentage of the overall use of demon stratives in discourse so they cannot be neglected in any rigorous studies on demonstrative expressions. As King (1999) points out, cases abound where a proper demonstration and a clear speaker’s reference seem to be absent. (17) ¡Lo espantosa que debe ser la vida de ese hombre que va a una oficina donde se aburre! “How terrible must be the life of that man who works in an office where he is bored!”

A possible interpretation for (17) is that the speaker only knows about the existence of a non-specific individual who does a tedious job in an office. He might have read it in a newspaper or he might have just been told about 8 In the Russellian view of direct reference (Russell, 1905), the content of a proper name such as John or the content of an indexical such as he is just its referent. In other words, a singular term (name, pronoun, definite description, etc.) is directly referential if and only if its content directly fixes its extension (its referent).

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him, or he might simply be talking in general about non-specific men who do non-specific tedious jobs in non-specific offices. We might even get a generic reading out of the demonstrative expression. What is clear is that the speaker does not need to have any specific individual in mind in uttering the demonstrative expression ese hombre (“that man”). Furthermore, the speaker does not perform any explicit pointing act, simply because he is not referring to someone who is present in the utterance situation. Any theories treating demonstratives as directly referential elements would not account for this type of use. In (18b), the referent of the demonstrative is an event type, a similar but not exactly the same event described by (18a). The event type could be represented as “x’s being given a ticket for not wearing x’s seat belt”. (18) a. A Juan le pusieron una multa por no llevar el cinturón. “John got a ticket for not wearing his seat belt”. b. Eso me pasó a mí también. “That/it happened to me too”.

In (19), the presence of the quantifier siempre (“always”) forces an eventtype reading. Thus, the demonstrative pronoun in the second clause does not refer to a unique event that is temporally anchored to some specific reference point. Rather it refers to all instantiations of the event-type introduced in the first sentence. (19) Juan siempre baña a su rottweiler con champú. Eso pone al perro de muy mal humor. “John always baths his rottweiler with shampoo. That makes the dog feel very angry”.

Another rather common construction that challenges the directly referential view is the one in which a complex demonstrative contains a bound pronoun which, in turn, behaves as a variable bound by an external quantifier. (20) Todo lingüista recuerda ese día en que presenta su primer trabajo en un congreso. “Every linguist remembers that day when he presented his first paper at a conference”.

The variable-like nature of the pronoun in (21) is the reason why the embedding demonstrative aquel (“that”)9 cannot be viewed as a directly referential expression. Rather, the most natural interpretation of the above 9 Spanish has a three-way demonstrative system: proximal este (“this”), medial ese (“that”) and distal aquel (“that”). As suggested by an anonymous reviewer, the closest equivalent to distal aquel in English (used to identify an object remote from both the speaker and the person spoken to) would be the old demonstrative yon, which is still used in some Northern English varieties.


sentence is as a general statement about non-particular linguists and nonparticular conference papers that were presented on a non-particular day. There are also instances where the demonstrative can take narrow scope with respect to the universal distributive Spanish quantifier cada (“each”); hence the demonstrative is quantificationally dependent on it. (21) Sólo se ascenderá a aquel empleado con más experiencia de cada departamento. “Only the most experienced worker in each department will be promoted”.

The fact that the referent of the demonstrative noun phrase varies with respect to the value taken by the distributive quantifier cada explains why a possible continuation for (21) is one in which we assert that in total ten workers will be promoted. Here it is also clear that the demonstrative is not accompanied by any gesture. In fact, an utterance of the complex demonstrative expression aquel empleado con más experiencia de cada departamento (lit. “that employee with the longest experience in each department”) along with an accompanying demonstration would be infelicitous, since this act would go against the universal distributive meaning of the quantifier cada (“each”) by fixing the intended reference to some specific individual. More evidence in favour of a view of demonstratives as quantificational elements and against a strict view of direct reference comes from so-called Bach-Peters sentences. In this type of constructions, two quantified elements occur, each one of them containing a pronominal expression bound by the other. Bach-Peters sentences have been traditionally viewed as instances of the semantic process of quantifier absorption or intrinsic dependence undergone by two quantificational elements (May, 1985, 1989). A typical Bach-Peters construction is given in (22). (22) Every pilot who shot at it hit the Mig that was chasing him.

The critical point here is that the crossing anaphora pattern still obtains if we substitute a demonstrative for the definite expression the or the universal quantifier every. This can be observed in the following example. (23) Aquel estudiante tuyo que lo preparó aprobó aquel examen que tanto temía. “That student of yours who prepared for it passed that test he was so afraid of”.

Finally, there are also instances where the antecedent of a demonstrative is commonly an NP that needs to be inferred via a pragmatic bridging mechanism. These are typically cases of associative/indirect anaphora (Hawkins, 1978) or bridging anaphora as the one illustrated in (24). (24) Ayer cenamos en un restaurante japonés. Aquella camarera fue muy atenta. “Yesterday we ate dinner at a Japanese restaurant. That waitress was very kind”.

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What actually differentiates associative anaphora from other types of discourse anaphora is the fact that the relation between the anaphor and the antecedent is different from identity in the former type. The referent of the expression aquella camarera (“that waitress”) can only be identified if we assume certain propositions belonging to common world knowledge and the association that obtains between the restaurant and the waitress. In Hawkins’ terminology, the antecedent would be the trigger and the anaphor its associate. 4.2. A Quantificational Characterization of Spanish Demonstratives In view of the evidence presented in section 4.1, it appears appropriate to characterize demonstratives as quantificational elements to explain the uses that theories of direct reference are not able to account for (Perry, 1993; Recanati, 1993; Soames, 2002). Zulaica-Hernández and Gutiérrez-Rexach (2009) propose a presuppositional characterization for demonstrative pronouns and determiners that is able to account both for their uses in proper deixis as well as the non-referential ones. As regards demonstrative pronouns, they propose to characterize these elements as generalized quantifiers, that is, functions from sets to truth-values.10 Due to their pronominal status, demonstrative pronouns show a behavior similar to any other pronouns but, since they commonly refer to abstract entities, they bind an abstract entity variable in the preceding discourse. Consider the following discourse sequence: (25) Juan vino. Eso me sorprendió. John come.3sg-PAST That to-me surprise.3sg-PAST “John came. That surprised me”.

The discourse in (25) represents a case of inter-sentential anaphora that must be understood dynamically. The discourse proceeds incrementally so the second segment cannot be properly understood without the contribution of the first segment in terms of the introduction of discourse referents in the common cognitive space/model shared by speaker and addressee. The first clause Juan vino (“John came”) constitutes a complete proposition by itself. Let us assume that it expresses an event and let us represent it

10 Semantically, generalized quantifiers denote families of sets. A generalized quantifier can be represented using the logical expression Q(λx.P(x)), which is a true formula if and only if the set denoted by (λx.P(x)) belongs to the denotation of the quantifier. Thus, for example, that (λx.P(x)) will be considered a true formula if and only if the set denoted by (λx.P(x)) is a member of the denotation of the quantifier that.


with the variable symbol μ for abstract discourse entities, including events. The event discourse referent associated with the clause Juan vino constitutes a potential antecedent for the individual discourse referent contributed by the demonstrative pronoun. Since we are analysing demonstrative pronouns as a set of properties (the properties that can be truthfully asserted of the demonstrative pronoun eso “that”), and since properties are extensionally sets of individuals, we take the denotation of the demonstrative as a family of sets, that is, the set of all those sets X such that μ is a member of X. Gutiérrez-Rexach (2007) analyses a small class of Spanish complex discourse markers and argues that these operators should be viewed as adverbs of quantification (Lewis, 1975; Heim, 1982; etc.) with a systematic contrasting semantic behaviour. We think that this analysis can be generally extended to the demonstrative expressions considered in this paper, with certain restrictions due to the specific features of each expression. Based on the basic quantificational nature of demonstrative pronouns we propose to characterize the descriptive content of complex demonstrative particles as expressing operators with a tripartite structure. This constitutes a convenient characterization as it allows for an integration of the discoursemarker role of the demonstrative marker and its general properties within a theory of demonstratives as quantificational elements. In the discourseoperator function analysed here, the complex particle (Dem.Operator) [RP][NS Q] connects a proposition or set of propositions (P), the restriction, with the proposition that it introduces (Q), the nuclear scope. The restriction of the demonstrative operator is the relevant proposition or propositions previously asserted as a discourse fragment or may also be a presuppositionally-accommodated proposition (Lewis, 1979; Von Fintel, 1994; Partee, 1995; Kadmon, 2000; etc.). Thus, P can be viewed as the conjunction of the propositional assertions or presuppositions available in the common ground that determine the evidence underlying the assertion of the nuclear scope. In (26), for example, from the assertion that someone’s gaze is cold as ice when she speaks we can infer the proposition that she is not kind, sympathetic or warm-hearted and such inference contrasts with the proposition in the nuclear scope of the operator (y eso que), which leads the hearer to associate them through a contrastive rhetorical relation and not through others. (26) Su mirada al hablar es casi de hielo. Y eso que en Barcelona, Marlene Ottey mostró el lado amable de su persona. “Her gaze is cold as ice when she speaks. However, Marlene Ottey showed the kind side of her persona”. [CREA: La Vanguardia, 02/11/1995]

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In agreement with the quantificational view of demonstratives sketched in this section, the complex demonstrative particles analysed here can be seen as selective quantificational elements that introduce an “abstract object” variable in their restriction, associated with the relevant assertions or presuppositions in the common ground. By abstract object we mean a fact, event (or state) or proposition (Asher, 1993), or the proposition derived by presupposition accommodation. (27) (Dem. Operator)[Φ][Ψ] where the operator binds an abstract object variable μ in [Φ]

5. Expressive Content In recent work by Kratzer (1999) and Potts (2003), among others, discourse particles are viewed as multidimensional expressions articulating a descriptive and an expressive meaning. The nature of the latter is not sufficiently clear yet and will probably be subject to further debate in the coming years. Expressive meaning can be viewed as comprising conventional implicatures in the sense of Grice (1975), appropriateness conditions in a given context, or even more generalized constraints of a pragmatic nature like constraints on higher-level explicatures (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995). In this paper, we argue that the procedural meaning of the demonstrative operators analyzed here can be divided in two components. First, it establishes a rhetorical relation between discourse segments, as we have extensively shown so far. This rhetorical relation may instantiate several types (e.g. Contrast, Elaboration or Narration) and it has to hold between the restrictor and the nuclear scope of the particle. This set of rhetorical relations is not intended to be exhaustive as described. Other particles may establish additional relations. Formally, the constraints in (28) have to be satisfied (where CG stands for the conversational common ground and ⊨ is not the logical entailment relation but a weaker relation of contextual entailment or inference). (28) CG ⊨ Contrast/Elaboration/Narration ([Ψ] [Φ])

The relations of Contrast, Elaboration and Narration may require the identification of a discourse topic or “question under discussion” in [Ψ](Roberts, 1996; Büring, 2003). This topic is the element that becomes contrasted in some fashion with the nuclear scope of the particle ([Φ]) or is elaborated by it. The determination of the precise nature of the topic or question under discussion and of how the relevant contrastive or elaboration relation arises requires additional inferences on the part of the hearer. In this


respect, particles might signal or serve to navigate through a “strategy” (Eckardt, 2004). The second procedural meaning component encoded in the demonstrative operators is related to the speaker’s attitude towards the content expressed in the nuclear scope (NS) of the operator. In the case of the demonstrative operators eso sí and y eso que the speaker expects [[Φ]] to be the case, and expects so to a high degree. She is committed to the soundness of his expectation and she believes that the circumstances in question warrant the intended inference. Thus, the following also holds: (29) CG + [Ψ] |= EXPECT(s, [Φ], δ) & High(δ)

Informally, updating a given common ground with the relevant assertion or presupposition expressed by [Ψ] contextually entails that the speaker s expects [Φ] to a high degree δ. This expressive component could be pragmatically characterized as constraining the construction of higher-level explicatures in the sense given to this concept within the framework of Relevance Theory developed by Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995). Sperber and Wilson distinguish between the basic explicature11 (the proposition expressed which determines the truth conditions of the utterance) and the higher-level explicatures, which make no contribution to the truth conditions of the utterance. The basic explicature (or proposition expressed) can be recovered by enriching a linguistically encoded logical form via different linguistic processes such as disambiguation, reference assignment, gap filling, bridging, etc. On the other hand, the construction of higher-level explicatures would require the embedding of the basic truth-conditional content under a speech act or propositional attitude description. Consider the following examples where (30b), (30c) and (30d) might be higher-level explicatures of John’s utterance (30a). (30) a. John (happily): Mary is smart. b. John says that Mary is smart. c. John believes that Mary is smart. d. John is pleased that Mary is smart.

We suggest that the demonstrative operators y eso que and eso sí might be indicators of higher-level explicatures, containing speech-act or propositional attitude information, whereas the particles eso de and en eso would

11 An explicature is: “an explicitly communicated assumption … a combination of linguistically encoded and contextually inferred conceptual features” (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 182).

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not encode any expressive component.12 There is an extensive relevancetheoretic literature on how linguistic elements constraint the construction of higher-level explicatures and what type of attitudinal meaning they may communicate (Andersen and Fretheim, 2000; Ifantidou-Trouki, 1993ab). The emotional attitude expressed by the speaker towards the proposition conveyed by S2 (the segment that the operator introduces or the nuclear scope) might form the higher-level explicature (31b), or even (31c), where Ψ and Φ stand for the propositions conveyed by S1 and S2, respectively. (31) a. John: Ψ eso sí Φ b. John expects that Φ to a high degree. c. John is very confident that Φ.

The proposal put forth in this paper suggests that two of the demonstrative operators analysed (eso sí and y eso que) might encode a twofold procedural meaning, i.e. (A) a procedural meaning guiding the hearer about how to relate informational units in the discourse by signalling a specific rhetorical connection between two (or more) discourse segments and (B) a procedural meaning, we call it expressive, guiding the construction of higherlevel explicatures. In our view, the first procedural meaning component (A) would operate constraining inference at the implicit level (akin to Blakemore’s procedural expressions so and after all). On the other hand, the second component (B), the speaker’s propositional attitude towards the proposition expressed, would be part of what is explicitly expressed in an utterance as it is argued in Relevance Theory. In the case at hand, the higher-level explicatures would be recovered via non-linguistic cues, i.e. the particular prosody of the demonstrative particles and/or the intonational cues used by the speaker when uttering them. The expressive meaning encoded in our demonstrative operators finds a close parallel in the analysis of the expressive meaning of certain linguistics elements like, for example, interjections. As we noted above (cf. footnote 2), Wharton (2003) suggests that interjections encode procedural meaning that might activate a range of attitudinal descriptions that a hearer might use to construct higher-level explicatures or lead to propositional embedding.13 Our analysis of demonstrative discourse operators is 12 In Speech Act Theory (Searle, 1969), expressives are illocutionary speech acts in which a speaker conveys an emotional attitude towards the proposition expressed. We believe that the expressive component that we propose for our demonstrative particles could also be analyzed along the lines of Searle’s expressives. 13 See also Cueto-Vallverdú and López-Bobo (2003) and Padilla-Cruz (2009ab) on interjections and procedural meaning and on the difficulties to assign a core semantic meaning to interjections.


also similar to Olmos and Ahern (2009) analysis of pero and aunque. These authors argue that these two particles encode contrast as a procedural instruction that constrains the inferential phases of the interpretation process, which eventually contributes to the identification of the speaker’s propositional attitude. While there are obvious and important differences between Olmos and Ahern’s analysis and ours (i.e. in their analysis, the derivation of higher-level explicatures is characterized as a by-product of the contrastive meaning) the similarities are straightforward. As they point out: “our proposal suggests that these connectives have two main and parallel constraining functions: firstly, the idea of the contrast with alternatives, affecting either propositions (but), or relations (although) among pairs of propositions; in addition, such contrasts also constraint the derivation of higher-level explicatures in processes which lead to the identification of different propositional attitudes that will be determined by the context” (Olmos and Ahern, 2009: 60). 6. Conclusions On a par with proper names, noun phrases and other expressions, demonstratives are referring expressions that “pick out” a referent (an individual, a place, an object or sets of these entities) from the discourse context. Generally speaking, demonstratives play a role in discourse as anaphoric elements in many languages. In this role, demonstratives establish a referential link between discourse entities, be it individuals or propositions in discourse deictic uses. In this paper, we have focused on the use of demonstrative pronouns as a productive source of discourse particle formation in Spanish. We have shown that the use of these demonstrative discourse particles is widespread and commonly found in natural conversation. The approach to the demonstrative particles developed here integrates the descriptive and expressive meaning of the particle as a relation between semantic content and discourse context. Following previous research on the quantificational treatment of a set of Spanish reformulative particles we have proposed a uniform characterization for these elements as operators with a tripartite structure connecting a proposition or set of propositions (P) with the proposition that it introduces (Q). The complex demonstrative particles can be seen as selective quantificational elements that bind an abstract object variable (event, fact, proposition, etc.) in their restriction, associated with the relevant assertions or presuppositions in the common ground. Such a characterization is clearly advantageous, since it allows us to reconcile the directly referential and quantificational uses of

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demonstratives, the discourse anaphoric properties of demonstrative pronouns and their discourse particle nature. Regarding the non-descriptive meaning of our demonstrative operators, it can be generally seen as having two components, which are of a procedural nature. On the one hand, one procedural meaning component establishes a rhetorical relation between discourse utterances and we argued that this rhetorical link can be of a different nature depending on each specific operator. The second procedural meaning component is related to the speaker’s attitude towards the expressed content. In operators establishing a rhetorical relation of Contrast (eso sí and y eso que) the speaker expects the content in the nuclear scope of the operator to be the case to a high degree. As regards the other demonstrative particles (i.e. those establishing Narration or Elaboration relations), characterizing their expressive meaning is not so straightforward. In these cases, the particle may have lost its expressive meaning over time or it may be of a different nature. Unfortunately, we cannot provide an adequate characterization for the expressive meaning of these two particles at this point. Finally, it is obvious that not all discourse markers are amenable to a compositional analysis and it is expected that some of them will lack most, if not all, quantificational properties of the sort discussed here. In this respect, it would be interesting to consider whether there is a historical relationship or development by which more complex and semantically stronger discourse particles get “bleached” or lose their quantificational properties in time and become standard discourse connectors. This issue remains as an open question for further research. References Anscombre, Jean Claude and Oswald Ducrot. 1983. L’argumentation dans la langue. Brussels: Pierre Mardaga. Ameka, Felix. 1992. Interjections: the universal yet neglected part of speech. Journal of Pragmatics 18: 101-118. Andersen, Gisle and Thorstein Fretheim. 2000. Pragmatic Markers and Propositional Attitude. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Ariel, Mira. 1990. Accessing Noun Phrase Antecedents. London: Routledge. Asher, Nicholas. 1993. Reference to Abstract Objects in Discourse. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Asher, Nicholas and Alex Lascarides. 2003. Logics of Conversation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Asher, Nicholas. 2004. Discourse topic. Theoretical Linguistics 30: 161-201. Asher, Nicholas and Laure Vieu. 2005. Subordinating and coordinating discourse relations. Lingua 115: 591-610. Asher, Nicholas, Laurent Prévot and Laure Vieu. 2007. Setting the background in discourse. Discours 1. Downloadable at http://discours.revues.org


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