Abstract Keywords 1. Background

Systemic Competence Assurance, Nurturing Knowledge Prof A G Hessami, Chief Engineer, Atkins Global, UK [email protected] 4th European Conference on Knowledge Management ECKM2003 18-19 Sept. 03, Oriel College, Oxford University, UK

Abstract The incessant desire to develop and exploit innovative technological products and solutions in response to the evolving needs of the society creates formidable challenges in various aspects of performance pertaining to products, systems, processes and undertakings ranging from economic, environmental, quality and reliability to safety. However, only certain aspects of performance are subjected to regulation whilst others are left at the discretion of an enterprise to manage within the competitive international markets. Organisations across the board, from public to private sector are facing increasing social, regulatory and litigatory pressures to improve the safety performance of their services, products and systems or face prosecution, loss of market share and compensation claims from affected parties. The role of human beings and their knowledge, capability and competence in carrying out their duties is increasingly recognized as a significant factor in the realisation and deployment of safe products, systems and services. In this spirit, understanding, management and development of competence is key to success in most endeavours. Competence is prudent application and the manifest dynamics of appropriately contextualized knowledge. Its recognition, nurturing and advancement lies at the very core of knowledge management.

Keywords Competence, Assurance, Knowledge, Life-cycle, Engineering, Weighted Factors Analysis, WeFA, Knowledge Capture, Knowledge Representation, Problem Resolution

1.

Background The deliverables of the engineering process applied to the creation and realization of parts, products, systems or processes often follows a life cycle from concept to decommissioning as popularized by engineering standards typically comprising; 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Concept & Feasibility Specification & Design Development Commissioning Deployment Maintenance & retrofit Decommissioning

In this spirit, the human resource involvement/employment within an engineering environment, organisation or project likewise follows a life-cycle comprising seven key phases namely; 1.

Search, which essentially involves constructing a role profile, advertising and attempting to attract applicants matching the requirements.

2.

Selection, which relates to deriving role focused criteria and relevant tests to assist with the systematic assessment, scoring and appointment tasks.

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Systemic Competence Assurance, Nurturing Knowledge –ECKM2003

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3.

Induction, which involves a period of briefing, familiarisation and possibly training the extent of which is determined by the familiarity and competence of the individual concerned and the complexity and novelty of the role.

4.

Deployment & Empowerment, which involves a holistic description depicting the scope of the responsibility, accountability and technical/managerial tasks associated with a specific role and empowering the individual to fulfil the demands of the job.

5.

Training, which involves the planning and provision of targeted tuition and mentoring synergistic to the demands of a role and the individual’s domain knowledge, aimed at ensuring all relevant and periphery aspects of the role are adequately addressed and the necessary provisions are made for learning where a need is identified.

6.

Development, this comprises identifying the synergistic aspects which may serve as a complementary and rewarding extension to an individual’s specific role. Development may involve managerial, technical, support functions or an appropriate blend of duties at the whole life-cycle level or extensions to the role specific activities.

7.

Progression, which may involve vision and career paths above an existing role into other parts of an organisation and even beyond.

The employment and project/product life-cycles are orthogonal in that securing the requisite human resource and competence for any phase of an engineering production activity would potentially involve all the seven phases of the employment life-cycle. A generic engineering competence assurance framework is developed around the engineering/product life-cycle concept which is pertinent to projects, products, services and processes. The framework is characterised by; • • • • • •

Currently applies to engineering roles Based on structured Life-Cycle model Can be customised or extended to other disciplines which have an underlying lifecycle Based on industry level public domain norms but goes beyond product/system focus Has been customised for cross-acceptance of safety critical products and systems Not just an assurance environment since the framework itself has an inherent lifecycle structure e.g. it relates to: o Concept and requirements o Design and customisation o Application and collection of evidence o Systematic expert driven evaluation and assessment o Implementation and feedback o Extension and enhancements

This paper develops the underlying concepts, principles and the framework for systematic assurance of competence principally within an engineering context.

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2.

The Process

2.1

UK Requirements

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The requirement to ensure that staff are suitably trained and supervised derives from the primary legislation of the Health and Safety Work etc. Act 1974 (HSW Act), with additional support from The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992 (MHSW Regulations). The HSW Act does not use the word ‘competence’, while MHSW Regulations do in the context of competent health and safety advice. However, the purpose of training and supervision (terms used in the HSW Act, section 2) is to ensure that activities are undertaken competently by competent staff. This concept is reinforced by the requirements of the MHSW Regulations. Further legislative support for the HSW Act is provided by the Railways (Safety Critical Work) Regulations 1994 (RSCW Regulations). This contains an operational definition of ‘safety-critical work’ which is based on work roles having a direct or immediate effect on the operational railway. A key measure within the RSCW Regulations is that staff should be competent to perform their duties. It is a requirement that records of any relevant assessments undergone by the employee should exist. The term ‘assessment’ in this context implies a process in which a judgment is made as to whether a set of competence parameters related to a safety-critical task have been met by and individual. The RSCW Regulations are directed towards those roles having a direct effect on the movement of trains. However, the supporting guidance notes that have since been produced (April 1999) recognise that some safety-related work can be as crucial for safety as work that has been defined as safety-critical. The guidance states that in such cases the people carrying out the work should be as competent as those carrying out safety-critical work. This implies the need for visible, objective and auditable systems for assessing staff competence, and for managing the work, such that it is adequately resourced with competent staff.

2.2

Safety Life cycle

2.2.1

Introduction The underpinning structure for the development of the engineering competence assurance process is a product life cycle. The life cycle process associated with ensuring the safe performance of products, processes and systems is more demanding and often referred to as Safety Life Cycle. The rationale being that due to the inherent demanding processes, the assurance of competence is more appropriate for those performing work classified as ‘safety-related’ or ‘safety-critical’ or ‘mission critical’. To this end, an extensive review of the Safety Life-cycle was carried out across a broad range of international, European and UK standards and codes of practice as detailed in the References section. These mainly relate to transport, space, defence and industrial sectors.

2.2.2

Holistic Safety Life Cycle Model Each class of synergistic safety standards usually focus on a specific aspect of the life cycle, for example some may give detailed requirement on Design stage; some place emphasis on general quality control; some give detailed safety activity requirement but with no reference to the actual project activity. By extracting useful information from these standards and combining them together, a comprehensive and detailed product/system safety life cycle model is built. The model comprises seven main stages that is similar to the one advocated by Yellow Book [ref. 30]. The processes and activities Page 3 of 15


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pertinent to each stage are consolidated and included under each phase of the safety life cycle. There’s no implied in the order of the processes and activities i.e. they may be parallel or sequential. The seven main stages of safety life cycle model are depicted as follows: • • • • • • •

Concept & Feasibility Requirements Definition Design Implementation Installation and Handover Operation and Maintenance Decommissioning and Disposal

Each stage and the associated activities are depicted in the diagram of Appendix A. Note that this represents a comprehensive hybrid devised from the inherent activities and processes from a wide range of standards as detailed in References.

3.

Competence Assurance Framework Using the Safety Life Cycle Model (SLCM) as a backbone, suitable, nationally recognised UK occupational standards were mapped against the requirements of each phase and selected. The aim was to provide complete coverage of the SLCM for a generic engineering development project. The suite of standards chosen for this purpose was the Engineering Occupational Standards for Higher Levels (Version 2.0, June 1999) published by OSCEng (the Occupational Standards Council for Engineering). In making this choice it was noted that, since publication, these standards had been adopted and contextualised for the purpose of creating qualifications (awards) by the Open University and a number of professional institutions. An extensive review of the suitability and sufficiency of the OSCEng Standards was carried out by conducting a mapping exercise onto the Safety Life Cycle phases. The subsequent analysis of the outcome of this mapping revealed that although the OSCEng Standards provide a very good fit with the SLCM, they would need to be supplemented as follows: • Bearing in mind the need to also assess Team Performance, additional elements to specifically address decision-making, information sharing, and productive team working, would be required. Suitable elements within the Management Standards produced by the Management Charter Initiative (MCI) were identified as being suitable for this purpose [ref. 12]. • In view of the distinct, safety-critical function of Testing, and the need to achieve careful segregation of this activity between installation and handover, additional competence standards would be required. To solve this problem, it was agreed that three additional elements of competence would be specially created for the purposes of this exercise. To ensure validity, this would be done by developing the material in three OSCEng elements. The revised mapping that finally emerged from this process is illustrated against one phase of the Safety Life Cycle in Appendix B. This is a generic competence framework that, in principle, could be applied to any engineering project, starting with project inception, and then following through all the development phases to commissioning, operation and then final decommissioning.

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3.1

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Competence Assessment The suite of competence standards and frameworks currently in vogue in industry lack a major implementation facet rendering them subjective and open to variation depending on the experience of the mentors and assessors. This relates to the objective assessment, verification and validation of the proof of competence and the credible identification of the additional/training needs for maintenance and furthering capabilities. The current practice tends to rely overwhelmingly on interview and human judgement often bearing in mind tens of complex issues which are judged as an overall fail or pass. To underpin the objective implementation and continual enhancement of the competence assurance framework, an objective evaluation and assessment dimension has been incorporated within the framework. This is based on a hierarchical knowledge capture and assessment methodology referred to as Weighted Factors Analysis, WeFA [ref. 31, 32].

3.1.1

Weighted Factors Analysis (WeFA) Whilst the underpinning philosophy for WeFA, the elicitation process and the representation schema is detailed in the published literature, a brief account is given here as a quick reference to the methodology and the notation employed for the development of the competence assessment according to the framework presented in this paper. WeFA is a group based knowledge capture, representation and evaluation methodology. The expert panel are chosen to represent related but diverse and non-overlapping aspects of the problem being studied. The focal point of a group study in WeFA is an AIM represented graphically by an oval annotated with brief relevant text. With the active participation of the expert panel, the AIM is defined, agreed and decomposed into a number of influencing factors (GOALs). The GOALs which are deemed to support the attainment of the AIM are classed as Drivers and those opposing the attainment of the AIM are considered Inhibitors. The Driver GOALs are represented by ellipses with yellow background linked upward to the AIM or other GOALs with green forward arrows implying positive influence. The Inhibitor GOALs are represented by ellipses with dark background colour, linked to the AIM or other GOALs that they influence with red arrows pointing backward (towards themselves) implying negative influence. All GOALs are annotated with brief text to indicate their nature and a unique numbering system to simplify referencing. In WeFA, each factor (GOAL) is in turn decomposed into its Driver and Inhibitors and the process is repeated until the AIM is studied and analysed at a desirable level of detail. The influences of factors in a WeFA schema, represented by green or red arrows, can be hierarchical as well as lateral. This creates a powerful and inter-related network capable of representing the factors, their influences, dependencies and relationships with respect to the AIM under scrutiny. WeFA diagrams are hierarchical and the GOAL numbering system is designed to reflect the hierarchy as well as type i.e. Driver or Inhibitor. The closest layer of GOALs to the AIM of a WeFA diagram is referred to as Level 1 and its GOALs are annotated by a G followed by a number. The numbering scheme for Driver GOALs is clockwise from 12:00 (top) starting from 1 e.g. G1, G2, G3 and anticlockwise for the Inhibitors e.g. G1, G2 etc. Deeper layers of the hierarchy are annotated as G1.1, G1.1.2 etc. These are referred to as level 2, 3 etc.

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The graphical representation of all the factors and their positive and detrimental influences upon an AIM is referred to as a WeFA schema. This form of knowledge representation is principally aimed at ease of comprehension and review due to the graphical representation of the key factors and their influences. The schema or the factors within can be supported by additional text if required. Each Goal in a schema has a value and a degree of influence on other Goals. These are elicited from the expert panel and incorporated in the schema permitting a weighted evaluation of all the Drivers and Inhibitors and assessment of their total effect on the value of the Aim. This underpins the approach to the development of an objective evaluation and assessment regime for the competence assurance framework.

3.1.2

Assessing Competence in Engineering Employing the Safety Life-cycle and the mapped elements of competence against each phase, an assessment environment based on 8 key aspects have been devised for crossacceptance of safety critical systems using the Weighted Factors approach. This is depicted in WeFA notation in Figure 1.

Competence in Org & Team Management Competence in Decommissioning & Disposal (Phase VII)

Competence in Concept & Feasibility (Phase I) 0

10 5

Competence in Operation & Maintenance (Phase VI)

CrossAcceptance Competence

25

25

25

Competence in Requirements Definition (Phase II)

10 0

Competence in Installation & Handover (Phase V)

Competence in Design (Phase III) Competence in Implementation (Phase IV)

Figure 1

WeFA schema for Assessment of Competence in Cross-acceptance

The cross acceptance case is a customised version of the generic competence assurance and applies to the circumstances where the successful application of a safety related or critical process, product or system in a native environment is being used as a basis to justify its application in a new (host) environment. This by necessity involves competence at team level comprising those who have been involved in earlier life-cycle phases of design, installation and operation in the native environment and those who are specifying the requirements of the new host environment and the essential adaptations which might be required. The level 1 (highest level of abstraction) WeFA schema is depicted in Figure 1. This is supported by 8 detailed schemas each incorporating all the elements of competence pertaining to the specific phase, their relationships and hierarchy. As for any WeFA schema, the cross acceptance assessment environment has been reviewed by a panel of experts for completeness, correctness and consistency Page 6 of 15


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against the general framework. The values of each factor and its normalised influence on other factors is also elicited from the experts and incorporated in the schema. This can generate a numerical index for the overall team competence achieved or demonstrated in a particular case for cross-acceptance.

having information systems for project objectives obtaining accurate client requirements

checking feasibility

ensuring designs protected

Developing project objectives [E7.1.1]

ensuring design brief comply with all relevant regulations and specification

identifying risks, benefits, and constraints

identifying variations from the design brief

Identifying client requirement [E1.1.1]

ensuring designs met the client's requirements

Create designs [E1.4.3] ensuring design comply with all relevant regulations and specification

obtaining accurate information on client requirements

confirming requirements and relevant issues

Concept and Feasibility Competence (Phase I)

identifying unique or specific features

identifying engineering issues with implications on organisation

ensuring new engineering processes were applied

having information systems for design brief

consultation regarding feasibility and desirability

Establishing design brief [E1.4.1]

Identifying and defining research [E1.2.1] establishing necessity and rationale for research

specification for reengineering

ensuring design brief comply with all relevant regulations and specification

determining the feasibility of achieving client's requirements

identifying risks, benefits, and constraints

encapsulating client requirements within brief

Figure 2

WeFA schema for Assessment of Concept & Feasibility Competence in Cross-acceptance

The WeFA schema for Phase I of the life-cycle relating to competence assurance as well as the overall human resource and organisational aspects are illustrated in Figures 2 & 3 respectively. These represent the lower levels of decomposition and detail in the hierarchy of elements, capabilities, skills and evidence which make up the required competence in each phase of the life-cycle. Note that the management aspect is an additional facet to the life-cycle within the Competence Assurance Framework. This was largely determined during the customisation of the generic engineering competence framework for cross-acceptance and highlighted the limitation of the OSCEng standards [ref. 11] which are more focused on products and delivery rather than the subtleties of the human resource and project/team management.

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Systemic Competence Assurance, Nurturing Knowledge –ECKM2003 dealing with inadequate, contradictory or ambiguous information

dealing with conflict between individuals

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identifying information needed to take the decisions

20 30 informing colleagues and team members

40

40 communicated progress and concern with customer

Obtaining information for critical decisions making [D6.1]

Developing trust and support and Minimising conflict [C5.1 &5.3]

taking consultation at the appropriate time and in a manner

10

30

15

using suitable methods to achieve the objectives 50

Organization & Team Management

50

explaining plans to relevant people in sufficient detail

assuring sources of information reliable, accurate, relevant, sufficient and wide ranging

assuring methods of obtaining information reliable, effective and consistent

15

Implementing plans to meet customer requirements [A2.11]

10

10 25

10 given people opportunities for recommendations

50

15

Analysing information for decision making [D6.2]

planning requirements in sufficient detail

20

using clear and consistent objectives for decisions making

10 15 15 using recipients feedback to improve the advice and information

20

Advising and informing others [D6.4]

5 providing reasoned argument and appropriate evidence

Figure 3

10

10

developing conclusions clear and supported by reasoned argument and appropriate evidence

identifying patterns and trends significant to decisions making

communicating decisions to those who needed

15

confirming recipients' understanding

recording assumptions and decisions made at each stage

15

15 30

60 20

Taking critical decisions [D6.3]

providing appropriate information to recipients

making decisions on sufficient, valid, reliable information and analysis including risks and rewards

10 10 assuring advice accurate, current, relevant, sufficient and consistent

obtaining advice on insufficient information or conflicted

ensuring that the decisions are consistent

WeFA schema for Assessment of Organisation & Team Management Competence in Cross-acceptance cases

The illustrative schema in Figures 1-3 represent the structure, relationships and influences of various factors on the assurance of competence within a specific phase relating to a team performance in cross-acceptance. Note that the influences of each factor within the schema represented by green arrows are normalised and depicted on the diagram. This is referred to as “primed schema”. The competence assurance framework for cross acceptance has been calibrated (primed) for all the influences based on the consensus between the expert panel members who have contributed to the mapping of the individual elements of competence to the life-cycle phases. A primed WeFA schema is in principle, a ready template for application and evaluation of the individual elements in a probabilistic and numerical form. The discussion of this methodology is beyond the scope of the current paper however, with the degree of coupling/influence coded in the schema, the evaluation of the degree of competence demonstrated in a particular cross-acceptance case requires an expert driven judgement on the weight (current value) of each factor in the schema. This results in a numerical index representing the degree of assurance for the AIM of the schema (as per Figure 1) for a specific application case.

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4.

A G Hessami

The Way Forward The role of human element in the assurance of desirable properties of products, processes, systems and undertakings is increasingly recognised but not well understood or managed. Amongst many facets of products and systems, safety and increasingly environmental performance are subject to pervasive social interest, scrutiny, standardisation and regulation. However, in view of the inherent complexities and the subtle cause-effect relationships, the influence of human organisation and competence on safety and environmental performance of the end deliverables of an engineering process has not been adequately understood, assessed nor managed satisfactorily. A structured approach to the development of a holistic Safety Life-cycle model has resulted in a comprehensive perspective on all the essential activities inherent in the realisation of products, processes and systems within an engineering context. This has provided a robust foundation for the development of a comprehensive, auditable and objective regime for the assurance of competence as detailed in this paper. Competence in turn represents the dynamics of knowledge, skills and attitudes which are key to gaining clear benefits from tacit knowledge whilst enhancing confidence in the desirable properties of the end deliverables. This is recognised in the European Guide to Good Practice in Knowledge Management [ref. 33], where a structured and systemic approach to competence and learning is advocated. The understanding, development, utilisation and management of human competence as the outward manifestation of tacit and explicit knowledge has an inherent life-cycle as described in the Background section of this paper. In this spirit, a holistic competence assurance regime underpinning the successful utilisation of knowledge by individuals and organisations should ideally be the ultimate goal in Knowledge Management. A systematic approach as developed and depicted in this paper enhances confidence in this endeavour and can be extended beyond the engineering context illustrated here. It is the assurance and continual enhancement of competence not development and management of knowledge which creates benefit and value to the enterprise and the society. In management of knowledge, the sights should be set higher at this worthy goal focused on the outcome.

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References UK Legislation [1] HSW Act: Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 Act. [2] MHSW Regulations: Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992. [3] RSCW Regulations: Railways (Safety Critical Work) Regulations 1994. UK Health and Safety Guidance [4] Health and Safety Commission Guidance on the Definition of Activities Regarded as Safety Critical Under the Railway (Safety Critical Work) Regulations 1994, Issue 1; 12th April 1999. [5] Health and Safety Executive Developing and Maintaining Staff Competence (Railway Safety Principles and Guidance, Part Three Section A) 2002 ISBN 0-7176-1732-7. ISO Standards (International Organisation for Standardisation) [6] ISO9000 series of standards relating to Quality Management Systems. Railtrack, Railway Group Standards [7] GK/RT0101 Competence Standards for S&T Staff, Issue One; May 1994. [8] GO/RT3260 Competence Management for Safety Critical Work, Issue 2; August 1998. Railtrack Company Standards [9] RT/LS/P/017 Railtrack Line Procedure: Competence Management and Assurance, Issue 1; December 1997. [10] RT/E/C/10117 Railtrack Line Code of Practice: Competence Management Systems for Work on Control and Communication Systems, Issue 1; June 1998. UK Competence Standards [11] OSCEng (the Occupational Standards Council for Engineering): Engineering Occupational Standards for Higher Levels, Version 2.0; June 1999. [12] Management Charter Initiative: Management Standards; Key Role C - ISBN 1 897587 97 X, 1997/8. Key Role A-Manage Activities Key Role B-Manage Resources Key Role C-Manage People Key Role D-Manage Information Key Role E-Manage Energy Key Role F-Manage Quality Key Role G-Manage Projects British Standard Institution - BSI [13] BS 6079: Project Management [14] BS 5760: Reliability of System, Equipment and Components [15] BS 7000: Design Management Systems [16] BS 13290, Space Project Management International Electro-technical Commission - IEC [17] IEC 61508, Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic SafetyRelated Systems. [18] IEC 61160: 1992, Formal Design Review European Committee for Electro-technical Standardization – CENELEC [19] EN 60300, Dependability Management [20] EN 50126:1999, Railway Applications - The specification and demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS)

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Systemic Competence Assurance, Nurturing Knowledge –ECKM2003 [21]

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EN 50129:2002, Railway applications - Safety Related Electronic Systems for Signalling

Ministry of Defence - Def Stan [22] 00-55, Requirements for Safety Related Software in Defence Equipment [23] 00-56, Safety Management Requirements for Defence Systems [24] 00-56 Emphasis On Hazard Analysis And Risk Assessment in the Initial Part of a Project Life Cycle. [25] 00-42, Reliability and Maintainability Assurance Guides Department of Defence - MIL-STD [26] MIL-STD-882C: 1993, System safety program requirements (superseded) European Cooperation for Space Standardization --- ECSS [27] ECSS-M series, Space Project Management [28] ECSS-Q series, Space Product Assurance [29] ECSS-E series, Space Engineering Standards Rail Industry [30] Engineering Safety Management: Issue 3. (Yellow Book), Railtrack plc Weighted Factors Analysis [31] Risk, a Missed Opportunity, Risk & Continuity-The International Journal for Best Practice Management, Volume 2, Issue2, June 1999. [32] Formalisation of Weighted Factors Analysis, Knowledge Based Systems 15 (2002) 377390. Knowledge Management [33] European Guide to Good Practice in Knowledge Management, Work Item 5: Culture Working Draft 6.0, CEN-ISSS, July 2003. [34] Creativity, the Final Frontier? A Hessami & R Gray, The 3rd. European Conference on Knowledge Management ECKM 2002, Trinity College Dublin, 24-25 September 2002.

Acknowledgement Support from the following colleagues at Atkins ia gratefully acknowledged; Steve Purcell, Mike Moore, Simon Zhang and Robin Gray

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Appendix A: Holistic Safety Life Cycle Model 1. Concept & Feasibility

• • •

• •

2. Requirement Definition

Concept Formulation Project inception Analysis of opportunities and business concept Formulation of project Feasibility Preliminary evaluation Feasibility Study

•

• • • •

Preliminary Safety Activities Preliminary hazard identification Establish preliminary Hazard Log Preliminary Hazard analysis Preliminary Safety Plan

Overall Scope Definition System definition and application condition

System Hazard System Requirements Analysis • System requirements • System • Overall safety requirements hazard • System RAM requirements analysis • Safety criteria Apportionment of System definition Requirements • Risk • Refine characteristics estimation Overall planning including: • Quality plan • Dependability plan • Safety plan • Overall operation and maintenance planning • Verification, validation and test plan • Overall safety validation planning • Overall installation and commissioning planning • Develop project configuration

• •

Review System requirements review Preliminary design review

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3. Design

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• • • •

Full Development Assemble design team Concept and outline system design Risk assessment System architecture design including hardware and software

• • •

Design Control Design review and evaluation Design verification Design validation Design Certification

4. Implementation

Provision for Manufacture and Delivery • Control of production and service provision • Validation of processes for production and service i i

5. Installation & Handover

6. Operation and Maintenance

• •

Purchasing Supplier control Verification of purchased product

Manufacture/Production

Introduction and Product launch • • •

Overall Installation and Commissioning Assemble and install Commissioning Staff training

• •

Validation System validation Overall safety validation

• •

System Acceptance Safety audit/assessment Safety endorsement (approval)

Overall Operation, Maintenance and Repair • Feedback • Performance monitoring and evaluation

7. • Decommissioning • & disposal • •

Overall Modification and Retrofit • Impact analysis • Authorization • Return to appropriate life cycle phase

Impact analysis Decommissioning and disposal plan Decommissioning and disposal activity Further evaluation and final report

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Appendix B: Generic Competence Framework for Engineering Projects Concept & Feasibility Phase

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Product Life Cycle Phase

OSCEng Elements 1.1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.4.1 4.4.1 6.1.1 6.1.2 7.1.1

Identify client requirements Identify & define research Develop research methods Propose research of other products Establish design brief Propose products for decommissioning Analyse risks Specify risk-reduction methods Develop project objectives

Team Organisation & Management Phases Related team working performance criteria for which evidence should be available for competent management by the cross acceptance team. These relate to those stages of the life cycle where the team working competences affect the decisions Unit C5 Develop productive working relationships Element C5.1 Develop the trust and support of colleagues and team members a) You consult with colleagues and team members about proposed activities at appropriate times in a manner which encourages open, frank discussions b) You keep colleagues and team members informed about organisational plans and activities, emerging threats and opportunities c) You honour your commitments you make to colleagues and team members d) You treat colleagues and team members in a manner which shows your respect for individuals and the need for confidentiality e) You give colleagues and team members sufficient support for them to achieve their work objectives Element C5.3 Minimise interpersonal conflict c) you take action promptly to deal with conflicts between individuals h) You make recommendations for improving procedures and reducing the potential for conflict promptly to the relevant people

1. Concept & Feasibility Concept Formulation • Project inception • Analysis of opportunities and business concept • Formulation of project

Unit C6 Enhance productive working relationships Element C6.1 Enhance the trust and support of colleagues a) you consult with colleagues about proposed activities at appropriate times and in a manner which encourages open, frank discussion b) you keep colleagues informed about organisational plans and activities, emerging threats and opportunities c) you honour the commitments you make to colleagues d) you treat colleagues in a manner which shows your respect for individuals and the need for confidentiality e) you give colleagues sufficient support for them to achieve their work objectives Related activities covering teamwork planning to meet requirements

Feasibility • Preliminary evaluation • Feasibility Study

Preliminary Safety Activities • Preliminary hazard identification • Establish preliminary Hazard Log • Preliminary Hazard

Unit A2 Manage activities to meet requirements Element A2.1 Implement plans to meet customer requirements a) you agree requirements with customers in sufficient detail to allow work to be planned effectively b) your plans allow requirements to be met within agreed time scales c) you explain plans to relevant people in sufficient detail and at an appropriate level and pace d) you confirm with relevant people their understanding of, and commitment to, your plans e) you follow organisational procedures for recording your plans f) you give opportunities to relevant people to make recommendations for improving plans.

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MCI Elements Decision making competences relevant to the cross acceptance team’s ability to competently manage information to take critical decisions. These relate to all 7 life cycle stages. D6 Use information to take critical decisions Element D6.1 Obtain the information needed to take critical decisions a) you identify the information you need to make the required decisions b) the sources of information which you use are reliable and sufficiently wide ranging to meet current and likely future information requirements c) your methods of obtaining information are reliable, effective and make efficient use of resources d) your methods of obtaining information are consistent with organisational values, policies and legal requirements e) the information you obtain is accurate, relevant, and sufficient to allow you to take decisions f) where information is inadequate, contradictory or ambiguous you take prompt and effective action to deal with this Element D6.2 Analyse the information for decision making a) you identify objectives for your analysis which are clear and consistent with the decisions you need to make b) you select information which is accurate, relevant to the objectives, and sufficient to arrive at reliable decisions c) you use methods of analysis which are suitable to achieve the objectives d) your analysis of the information correctly identifies patterns and trends significant to the decisions you need to take. e) you develop clear conclusions which you support with reasoned arguments and appropriate evidence f) in presenting the results of your analysis, you differentiate clearly between fact and opinion g) your records of your analysis are sufficient to show the assumptions and decisions made at each stage Element D6.3 Take critical decisions a) your decisions are based on sufficient, valid and reliable information and analysis b) your decisions are consistent with organisational values, policies, guidelines and procedures c) you obtain advice from relevant people if there is insufficient information or your decisions conflict with organisational values, policies, guidelines & procedures d) you take decisions in time for appropriate action to be taken. e) you communicate your decisions to those who need to know Element D6.4 Advise and inform others a) you research the advice and information needs of your recipients in ways which are appropriate & sufficient and take account of your organisational constraints. b) you provide advice and information at a time and place and in a form and manner appropriate to the needs of your recipients. c) the information you provide is accurate, current, relevant and sufficient d) your advice is consistent with organisational policy, procedures and constraints e) your advice is supported by reasoned arguments and appropriate evidence f) you confirm your recipients’ understanding of the advice and information you have given g) you maintain confidentiality according to organisational and legal requirements h) you use feedback from recipients to improve the way you provide advice and information

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