Aeronautical Study of Alice Springs - Civil Aviation Safety Authority

Aeronautical Study of Alice Springs January 2010

Office of Airspace Regulation

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DOCUMENT SPONSOR: OFFICE OF AIRSPACE REGULATION (OAR) PROJECT NUMBER: 08/41 TRIM REF: ED10/8583 FILE REF: ED09/87857

Aeronautical Study of Alice Springs (YBAS) January 2010

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1

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Executive summary

This aeronautical study was commissioned in response to a requirement under the 2007 Australian Airspace Policy Statement (AAPS 2007)1 for the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) to undertake regular and ongoing studies to meet its obligations under Section 13 of the Airspace Act 2007 (Act). The Office of Airspace Regulation (OAR) undertakes a risk based approach in determining which locations are studied. The purpose of the study was to review the airspace classification above Alice Springs aerodrome in the Northern Territory with particular emphasis placed on the safety of Passenger Transport (PT)2 operations. 1.1

Operational Context

Alice Springs aerodrome is operated by Alice Springs Airport Pty Ltd, a 100 per cent holding of Northern Territory Airports Pty Ltd, which in turn is a 100 per cent holding of the Airport Development Group (ADG). ADG also wholly own Darwin International Airport Pty Ltd and Tennant Creek Airport Pty Ltd. Located between the East and West MacDonnell Ranges, Alice Springs is one of the largest regional outback towns with a population of over 27,000. The aerodrome is located 15 kilometres to the south of the township and is the primary entry point and transport hub for Central Australia in support of tourism and the region’s resources sector. The Alice Springs aerodrome currently supports in excess of 620,000 passengers3 annually. Current growth trends suggest that the 700,000 passenger milestone might be easily achieved in the next three to five years; however the impact of the recent economic downturn on both the tourist and resources sector suggests a stagnation of growth in the near future. The aerodrome services both business and tourist travellers with major Regular Public Transport (RPT) operations provided by Alliance Airlines, Qantas and Tiger Airlines. Numerous smaller passenger charter operators also provide services to the tourism and resources sectors. Air Traffic Services (ATS) are provided by Airservices Australia (Airservices) with Alice Springs aerodrome commonly referred to as operating as a Class D Tower. During Tower hours the aerodrome operates within Class D terminal airspace below Class C airspace control steps. Up to and including 8,500 feet (ft) above mean sea level (AMSL), the Class D airspace and Class C airspace steps are controlled by the Alice Springs ATC Tower. Above 8,500 ft AMSL, the Class C airspace steps are controlled by the Melbourne Control Centre. Outside of Tower hours the Class D and Class C airspace within the Alice Springs Control Area (CTA) below Flight Level (FL) 180 is reclassified as Class G airspace, with Common Traffic Advisory Frequency (Radio required) (CTAF(R)) procedures applicable when in the vicinity of the aerodrome. There is no radar surveillance at Alice Springs.

1

A full list of acronyms used within this report can be found at Annex A For the purposes of this study, PT services can be defined as activities involving Regular Passenger Transport (RPT) and non-freight carrying Charter operations. 3 From Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics (BITRE), http://www.bitre.gov.au/publications/91/Files/Airport%20traffic%20tables%20Web.xls Note: BITRE only records Regular Public Transport movements whereas this study is concerned with total aircraft movements at the location aerodrome. 2


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Issues

The following points are a summary of the issues raised during the study:

The aerodrome operator perceived a lack of airspace for training activities to the east of the aerodrome. However this comment was not supported by any other stakeholder feedback. No further action is intended as a result of this study. The aerodrome operator was unaware of any significant consultation with CASA reference the preparation of its Final Master Plan 2004 to 2024. The aerodrome operator expressed their concern relating to the lead time required for information to be updated in aeronautical publications, particularly Enroute Supplement Australia (ERSA). One major RPT operator requested public access to existing Required Navigation Performance (RNP) approaches. Airservices is reviewing public access to RNP approaches. No further action is intended by this study. The reported airspace related incident data recorded separately by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) and Airservices was consistent in type and frequency. Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) coverage within 250 nautical miles (NM) at and above 30,000 ft Above Ground Level (AGL) was reported as available at Alice Springs. This coverage could be provided to ground level with additional investment in existing infrastructure. However, currently there are insufficient ADS-B compatible aircraft using the airspace at lower flight levels and within terminal airspace to warrant this additional investment. Therefore the installation of an ADS-B compatible Tower Situational Awareness Display (TSAD) into Alice Springs Tower is not considered warranted. Post publication of this study seeking feedback on its initial conclusions and recommendations the additional stakeholder issues / comments were received: a. That the study was lacking in it’s lack of discussion and support for a then extant ACP, proposing a minor change to existing airspace control steps to contain the approach profiles of new generation aircraft; and b. That the study did not address the Governments policy to pursue reform of the airspace as detailed within the AAPS 2007. It was considered by the respondent that the existing airspace design surrounding the aerodrome, without adequate means of surveillance, was ineffective in addressing the level of risk and that the study required further review to incorporate comparison of the level of safety that Class E airspace might offer over existing Class C airspace. In response to the stakeholder feedback above CASA makes the following comment: a. It is accepted by CASA that the original study omitted full discussion on the extant ACP proposing a change to the Class C steps (at 36 and 45 DME) to the south east of the aerodrome. However in mitigation it was felt that the proposal was developed to such a stage that other than to identify that the ACP had been accepted by all stakeholders and that approval was pending no value would be added by to the study’s outcome by further discussion. As this ACP is now complete with all airspace change and subsequent amendment to charts having been made, previous reference to the ACP has been removed from this revision of the study; and


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b.

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The opportunity to review the Alice Springs airspace architecture in accordance with the AAPS 2007 remains. As detailed in the AAPS 2007 the Government requires CASA to assess the remaining United States National Airspace System (NAS) Characteristics for application in Australian airspace and determine an implementation plan. For Alice Springs this broadly requires review of the safety benefit of existing Class C airspace steps overhead Alice Springs versus possible reclassification of those steps to Class E airspace. Below any proposed Class E airspace the Class D control zone (CTR) would also be subject to review to a lower level than currently exists. When the tower is not operational the airspace currently reclassified Class G would be subject to review, looking to introduce Class E airspace down to lower levels, ensuring that any instrument approaches remain within controlled airspace. Discussion on the NAS characteristics and the CASA proposed implementation strategy can be found at Section 6.

Conclusions

Based upon stakeholder consultation and data analysis, the OAR has concluded that Alice Springs aerodrome and airspace is operated and managed in a safe and efficient manner, consistent with the requirements of the Act. This conclusion is further supported by the findings of the Airspace Risk Model (ARM) tool which, based on current air traffic and passenger movements, has assessed the current level of Class D Tower Air Traffic Control (ATC) services as the minimum level of service required. Outside of tower operational hours the traffic mix and movement numbers do not represent a significant risk. However as required by the AAPS 2007, CASA is still required to review the remaining NAS characteristics for implementation at this location, which includes a review of the existing Class D control zone and the overlying Class C airspace (see Section 6 for discussion). Currently Alice Springs has no form of radar surveillance, and Airservices has not provided advice of any plans to introduce such infrastructure improvements. Modelling carried out by Airservices and reported in their ‘Preliminary Risk Assessment of 10 Class D Towers’ study, released in 2008, found that the risk mitigation offered by the provision of a radar service was small. There is potential to make use of existing ADS-B technology by the further development and use of data supplied from an ADS-B ground station positioned nearby at West Gap. Although currently targeted at providing surveillance of suitably equipped aircraft at higher flight levels, with further investment the facility would be capable of providing ADS-B surveillance to ground level at Alice Springs. Any surveillance data could then be relayed to Alice Springs Tower for analysis by controllers via a TSAD. The utility of ADS-B surveillance technology is reliant on all aircraft being suitably equipped with ADS-B compatible equipment. This is not the case with aircraft operating within airspace in the vicinity of Alice Springs aerodrome. More stringent cost:benefit analysis (CBA) and a regulatory impact assessment would be required before the option to employ ADS-B surveillance technology at Alice Springs could be pursued. Currently the number of aircraft frequenting Alice Springs that are ADS-B equipped is relatively low. Any safety benefit or airspace management efficiencies flowing from the use of ADS-B as a surveillance method at Alice Springs will remain insignificant until all aircraft are suitably equipped. Wide Area Multi-lateration offers similar surveillance benefits to that of ADS-B, provided that aircraft are transponder equipped. Similar to any increased use of ADS-B technology, Aeronautical Study of Alice Springs (YBAS) January 2010

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stringent CBA and a regulatory impact assessment would be required before this option could be pursued. It is a reasonable expectation that the introduction of either form of surveillance would offer an increase in efficiency and safety for aircraft operating in the Alice Springs airspace and would allow the air traffic service provider to manage the airspace in a more effective manner. It is important to note that the study may make recommendations based on existing and projected data. The following comment as summarised by Justice Gibbs of the High Court of Australia has been considered while conducting the study: Where it is possible to guard against a foreseeable risk which, though perhaps not great, nevertheless cannot be called remote or fanciful, by adopting a means which involves little difficulty or expense, the failure to adopt such means will in general be negligent. CASA applies a precautionary approach when conducting aeronautical studies and therefore the following recommendations must be considered: 1.4

Recommendations 1.4.1 CASA to reinforce awareness of the Aeronautical Information Regulation and Control (AIRAC) cycle, to allow for improved planning when requesting updates to aeronautical publications. 1.4.2 Based upon stakeholder feedback and supported by risk assessment and modelling, the OAR has concluded that the current airspace design and level of air traffic services provided are adequate in addressing the level of risk that exists. Therefore the OAR does not propose to make any change to the current airspace architecture or level of ATS provided. 1.4.3 In order to address the requirements of the AAPS 2007, CASA to review its implementation strategy in considering the proven international best practice airspace systems, including the outstanding NAS characteristics. This strategy must take into account changes being proposed to airspace at General Aviation Aerodrome Procedures (GAAP) aerodromes and where possible standardisation of airspace at all aerodromes with Class D Control Zones (CTRs). The implementation strategy will be finalised by CASA’s OAR in 2010.


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Contents 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................... 3 2 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 8 3 AIRSPACE ............................................................................................................ 9 4 AERODROME ...................................................................................................... 10 5 STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION ............................................................................ 11 6 RELEVANT MINISTERIAL DIRECTIONS AND NAS CHARACTERISTICS ......................... 13 7. SUMMARY OF INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS ............................................................. 15 8 MODELLING METHODOLOGY AND RISK ASSESSMENT ............................................. 16 9 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 22 10 RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................... 24 11 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................... 25 Annex A – Acronyms ............................................................................................... 26 Annex B – Australian Airspace Structure ................................................................. 28 Annex C – Charts .................................................................................................... 29 Annex D – Stakeholders .......................................................................................... 31 Annex E – ARA Data ............................................................................................... 32 Annex F – Class D and Class E Airspace under NAS and US Model...................... 35 Annex G – ATSB Data – 01 January 2007 to 31 December 2008 ........................... 40 Annex H – BITRE Data ............................................................................................ 46


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Introduction

2.1

Overview of Australian Airspace

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The OAR within CASA has sole carriage of the regulation of Australian-administered airspace, in accordance with section 11 of the Airspace Act 2007 (Act). Section 12 of the Act requires CASA to foster both the efficient use of Australian-administered airspace and equitable access to that airspace for all users. CASA must also take into account the capacity of Australian-administered airspace to accommodate changes to its use. In line with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 11, and as described in the AAPS 2007, Australian airspace is classified as Class A, C, D, E and G depending on the level of service required to manage traffic safely and effectively. ICAO’s Class B and F are not currently used in Australia. The airspace classification determines the category of flights permitted and the level of air traffic services provided. Annex B provides details of the classes of airspace used in Australia. Within this classification system, aerodromes are either controlled (i.e. Class C or Class D) or non-controlled. Non-controlled aerodromes in Australia are designated either a Common Traffic Area Frequency (CTAF) or a CTAF (radio required) (CTAF(R)); the latter requiring all aircraft operating at the aerodrome to be equipped with a serviceable Very High Frequency (VHF) radio. 2.2

Purpose

The purpose of this aeronautical study was to conduct a risk assessment of the airspace within the vicinity of Alice Springs aerodrome, Northern Territory (NT). The study forms part of the OAR Work Program as required by the Act. The outcome of the study is to demonstrate that all sensible and practicable precautions are in place to reduce the risk to acceptable levels. For the purpose of this study, a multifaceted approach was used including quantitative and qualitative analysis consisting of:

2.3

Stakeholder consultation; and

Airspace Risk Modelling (relative modelling).

Scope

The scope of the study includes identification and consultation with stakeholders to gather necessary data and information related to airspace issues around the Alice Springs aerodrome. As a minimum, this includes consultation with Passenger Transport (PT) operators; which includes Regular Passenger Transport (RPT) and all non-freight only charter operators. Feedback on the existing airspace design was also sought from resident flying training schools, flying clubs, emergency services operators, the aerodrome operator and the Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP), Airservices Australia (Australia). The study’s scope must also consider CASA’s responsibilities in adopting a proactive approach to assessing the Australian airspace system and its operations, and to identify and pursue reform opportunities. The AAPS 2007 offers very clear guidance to CASA on the Government’s priorities and principles and processes to be followed when changing the classification or designation of particular volumes of Australian administered airspace. The study was not intended to examine aerodrome facilities and infrastructure issues unless any weakness or failings in these areas have a significant impact on the safety of airspace operations in the vicinity of Alice Springs.


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Objective

The objective of this study is to examine the airspace around Alice Springs aerodrome to determine the appropriateness of the current airspace classification. This was accomplished by: a.

b.

c. d. e. f. g. h. i.

Investigating through stakeholder consultation, the appropriateness of the current airspace classification, access issues, expected changes to the current traffic levels and mix of aircraft operations within the existing airspace; Assessing the opportunity to implement the remaining NAS characteristics to the airspace in the vicinity of the aerodrome. Further detail on these characteristics can be found in the AAPS 2007, part 64; Analyses of current traffic levels and mix of aircraft operations within the existing airspace in relation to the level of services provided; Identifying any threats to the operations, focussing as a priority on the safety and protection of PT services; Carrying out a qualitative and quantitative risk assessment of the current airspace environment and the expected impact of any changes; Identifying appropriate and acceptable risk mitigators to the known threats; Reviewing extant Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) entries for applicability; Ensuring that the issues are passed onto the relative stakeholder group for their consideration; and Providing assurance to the Executive Manager (EM) Office of Airspace Regulation of the levels of airspace risk associated with Alice Springs.

Recommendations where applicable will be supported by a Cost:Benefit Analysis (CBA).

3

Airspace

3.1

Airspace Control

Alice Springs Tower operates daily between the hours of 0730 and 1900 local subject to Notice to Airman (NOTAM). During Tower hours, Alice Springs aerodrome operates as Class D terminal airspace under Class C airspace control steps. Up to and including 8,500 feet (ft) Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL), the Class D and Class C airspace steps are controlled by the Alice Springs Tower on 118.3 Megahertz (MHz). Above 8,500 ft AMSL, the Class C airspace is controlled by Melbourne Control Centre on 119.8 MHz. Outside of Tower hours, the Class D and Class C airspace within the Alice Springs Control Area (CTA) below Flight Level (FL) 180 is reclassified as Class G airspace, with CTAF(R) procedures applicable when in the vicinity of the aerodrome. Within the Class G airspace, Melbourne Control Centre provides a Flight Information Service (FIS) on 119.8 MHz. All Air Traffic Services (ATS) are provided by Airservices.

4

To view the AAPS 2007 visit http://casa.gov.au/wcmswr/_assets/main/rules/miscinst/2007/aaps.pdf


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Airspace Structure

The Alice Springs CTA has Class D and Class C airspace steps that extend radially outward to 80 nautical miles (NM) from the Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) beacon to allow for the safe containment of approach and departure flight profiles of large passenger transport aircraft. Within the CTA steps, Class C airspace extends upwards to FL245 where the airspace is classified Class A. At 80 DME, the CTA ends and airspace is classified Class E with a Lower Level (LL) of FL180 below Class A airspace with a LL of FL245. A clearer illustration of the airspace architecture can be found in the Alice Springs AIP chart extracts found at Annex C.

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Aerodrome

4.1

Background

Figure 1: Aerial view of Alice Springs aerodrome

Alice Springs aerodrome, depicted in Figure 1, is located seven NM south of the town of Alice Springs, adjacent to the Stuart Highway. The aerodrome is set within approximately 3,550 hectares of land, although only 750 hectares has direct aerodrome / aeronautical use. The excess land is provided as a buffer zone to eliminate any dust hazard to aircraft operations. Currently a large portion of the excess land is not considered usable, nor is there sufficient demand for development. The aerodrome is operated on a 50 year lease by the Airport Development Group (ADG). ADG is the parent company of Northern Territory Airports Pty Ltd, which in turn is the parent company of Alice Springs Airport Pty Ltd, the aerodrome operator. The major PT operators servicing Alice Springs include Qantas, QantasLink and Tiger Airlines. Other regular users of the Alice Springs aerodrome and airspace include the Royal Flying Doctor Service (RFDS), Alliance Airlines, Pearl Aviation, Chart Air, Direct Air


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Charter, Outback Airlines, Pel-Air Aviation and Australian National Helicopters. RPT services operate from Alice Springs to all major cities within the Australian mainland, except Canberra, with local services to Ayers Rock. Charter operations take in regional destinations such as Telfer and Tenants Creek. Based on June 2009 Alice Springs airport monthly movement data, there are currently 64 RPT flights per week operating to and from the aerodrome, as well as charter flights, General Aviation (GA) training and airfreight operations. In 2008 Alice Springs airport reported passenger movements of 630,000 which is a minimal increase on the previous year’s figure of 628,000. Figure 2 shows the lay-out of the runways and taxiways as found in ERSA.

Figure 2: ERSA extract (effective 19 November 2009) showing Alice Springs Aerodrome Runway & Taxiway configuration

5

Stakeholder Consultation

5.1

CASA

Consultation with CASA Aviation Safety Advisors and Aerodrome Inspectors raised no major or significant airspace issues that required further investigation. Anecdotal comments were made in reference to operator confusion over radio calls to be made during changeover from Class D Tower control to the Class G airspace subject to CTAF(R) procedures. This comment was investigated further during consultation with the ANSP; refer to Section 5.6. This issue was not raised by other stakeholder feedback. 5.2

Aerodrome Operator

Communication with the aerodrome operator, Northern Territory Airports Pty Ltd, was established at the commencement of this study. The aerodrome operator was very helpful in supplying the OAR with a list identifying the majority of stakeholders associated with operations at Alice Springs. No airspace infrastructure issues were raised other than a perceived lack of airspace for training activities to the east of the aerodrome. This comment was not supported by any other stakeholder feedback. They clarified the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that exists between the local gliding club and Airservices and identified the periods when balloon flights were operating in the vicinity of the aerodrome. Neither the gliding nor ballooning activities were felt to have serious impact on operations within the Alice Springs CTA.


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The aerodrome operator provided the OAR with an electronic copy of their Final Master Plan 2004 to 2024, with their environment strategy available via their website5. Prior to this study they felt very little consultation had occurred with CASA reference projected growth of aircraft and passenger movements. The aerodrome operator also expressed frustration with the lead time required for information to be added to or updated in ERSA. 5.3

Passenger Transport

A list of those stakeholders who provided feedback to this study can be found at Annex D. In general, it appears that all PT operators who use Alice Springs as a destination or operate within the Alice Springs CTA are very satisfied with the level of service provided and the airspace structure. No negative feedback or adverse comments were received in reference to the standard / quality of radio calls or frequency chatter / congestion. A major RPT operator is also working closely with Airservices to facilitate public access to the existing Required Navigation Performance (RNP) approaches, but currently this remains an unresolved issue. 5.4

Royal Flying Doctor Service

Feedback was sought from the Royal Flying Doctor Service (RFDS) operating out of Alice Springs. No airspace issues were raised. 5.5

Department of Defence

Feedback was sought from the Department of Defence. No airspace issues were raised. 5.6

Airservices Australia

Feedback from Airservices was sought on general airspace issues with particular focus on the management of the changeover period from Class D Tower control to Class G airspace subject to CTAF(R) procedures. Airservices commented that the Air traffic Control (ATC) Tower closing and opening procedures were straight forward with no issues being raised by operators. Opinion was sought with respect to the reclassification of airspace outside of Tower hours, with particular focus on the retention of the 80 DME Class C section of airspace from FL180 to FL245. Whilst it was accepted by Airservices that out of ATC Tower hours, reclassification of this section of airspace to Class E would be nugatory, it was felt that it remaining Class C airspace allowed a certain level of flexibility / contingency in providing Class C airspace protection above FL180. Airservices also clarified that overflight of the Pine Gap Prohibited Area (PA) was well managed and understood by both Visual Flight Rules (VFR) and Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) operators, again with no issues raised. In 2008, Airservices carried out a ‘Preliminary Risk Assessment of 10 Class D Towers’ study as part of their monitoring program to review levels of service and safety. The study discussed the merits of the installation of a Tower Situational Awareness Display (TSAD) at Alice Springs Tower to provide visibility of the movements of ADS-B equipped aircraft, utilising a feed from the recently installed West Gap ADS-B ground station. Based on the number of ADS-B capable aircraft frequenting Alice Springs, Airservices has no plans to install a TSAD in Alice Springs Tower in the near future. Airservices records various aircraft movement data in the Airspace Research Application (ARA) system. A summary of ARA data for Alice Springs for the 12 month period to October 2008 can be found at Annex E.

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To view Alice Springs Airport Environment Strategy visit http://www.alicespringsairport.com.au/Environment/ASAEnvironmentStrategy/tabid/143/Default.aspx Aeronautical Study of Alice Springs (YBAS) January 2010

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Relevant Ministerial Directions and NAS Characteristics

The Ministerial Directive 2004-4 to Airservices Australia, dated 31 August 2004, stated that, if a volume of airspace above Class D airspace above an airport was classified as Class E airspace, and that volume of airspace was reclassified as Class C airspace, then Airservices must provide an operating ATC control tower at the airport and an approach radar control service at the earliest time one can be supplied and installed. The OAR is preparing a comprehensive report and updated airspace determinations for the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government to assist the Minister in making his final decision. Airspace models evaluated in this review took into consideration the following National Airspace System (NAS) Characteristics.6 Class D: •

7 – Introduce VFR implied clearance into Class D airspace: procedures for VFR aircraft will follow the North American model in respect of clearances where establishment of communication with ATC constitutes a clearance (Class D CTRs).

•

16 – Establish North American model Class D airspace at non-radar controlled Terminal Control Areas where an Aerodrome Control service is provided.

•

18 – The lateral and vertical dimensions of the Class D airspace will be individually tailored. Generally the CTR will extend to 2,500 ft AGL.

Class E: •

23 – Class E Terminal Airspace: Class E terminal airspace to be introduced at specific locations.7

•

25 – Low-level Class E corridors: this NAS characteristic deals with low level Class E corridors, where required, above 1,200 ft AGL and above 8,500 ft AGL.

Descriptions of Class D and E airspace requirements under NAS and the United States (US) Model are contained in Annex F. 6.1

Class D

Implementation of NAS characteristic 7, VFR implied clearances may further assist in gaining improved accessibility to the Alice Springs Class D airspace. Under the US Model8 Class D airspace, establishment of two way communications with air traffic control provides an authorisation for arriving VFR aircraft to enter and/or transit the airspace as advised by the pilot in the initial transmission. This does not constitute a clearance and deviations are to be notified to air traffic control. Any positive control instruction given by air traffic control is deemed a clearance and must be read back/acknowledged. It was observed by the NAS Implementation Group that positive control instructions were issued to VFR aircraft in the majority of cases. Call sign acknowledgement was utilised only in times of minimal traffic. The VFR implied clearance trial planned for Maroochydore is currently on hold pending the availability of Airservices’ resources.

6

National Airspace System Implementation Group, Concept, version 5.0, pp. 23-26. Two locations were selected for a trial of Class E terminal airspace: Mt Isa and Longreach. 8 Federal Aviation Administration, Aeronautical Information Manual, Chapter 3, Section 2, Controlled Airspace, 3-2-5. 7


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The majority of the North American Class D airspace characteristics are already met at Alice Springs with the exception of the following differences: •

Minimum airspeed operational limitations vary between the North American and Australian models.

•

Class D airspace is marked differently on charts.

•

In Australian Class D airspace, VFR aircraft receive separation services during take off and landing.

•

At Alice Springs, Class C airspace overlies the existing Class D CTR and steps to contain any extensions to instrument approach procedures. In the North American model approach extensions are contained within Class E airspace. These differences do not impact the safety of the Alice Springs airspace.

Any changes to the dimensions of Class D CTR would need to take into account NAS Characteristic 18. The OAR is reviewing the dimensions of all Class D CTRs. 6.2

Class E

The OAR will shortly release consultation papers on the following NAS characteristics in relation to Class E airspace: •

Characteristic 23 – Class E terminal airspace at non-continuous Class C and D CTRs and at non-controlled aerodromes with Passenger Transport (PT) operations (i.e. Regular Public Transport and all non-freight-only Charter operations).

•

Characteristic 25 – Low-level Class E corridors where required, either at 1,200 feet (ft) Above Ground Level (AGL) or above 8,500 ft AGL.

Additionally, the OAR is progressing an Airspace Change Proposal (ACP) to lower the base of non-radar Class E from Flight Level (FL) 180 to FL145 in line with NAS Characteristic 44. This ACP addresses the airspace titled YBBB / YMMM / Continental Australia CTA E1 in the Designated Airspace Handbook.


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7.

Summary of Incidents and Accidents

7.1

Electronic Safety Incident Reports

Electronic Safety Incident Reports (ESIRs) are used by Airservices staff to submit reports on air safety incidents. ESIRs are maintained in a system, which permits systemic analysis and trend monitoring. In the period 01 January 2007 to 31 December 2008, 128 ESIRs were recorded by Airservices. The incidents were analysed for this study and those related directly to airspace issues were grouped into types as shown in Table 1.

Type of Incident Violation of Controlled Airspace Failure to comply with ATS instructions or procedures Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Resolution Advisory Go around Runway Incursions Loss of Separation Assurance

Number of Incidents 10 28 0 2 4* 2

Table 1: Breakdown of airspace related ESIRs in the vicinity of Alice Springs (01 January 2007 to 31 December 2008)

*Note: Two incidents reported as “Runway Incursions” were duplicate reports. Each incident has been investigated, or is currently being investigated by Airservices or CASA. In each applicable case, the pilot in command has been or will be contacted, and offered re-education in regards to the correct procedures to be employed to prevent a reoccurrence of the reported incident. Currently none of the 128 ESIRs recorded during the sample period have resulted in the requirement to generate an ACP. 7.2

Aviation Safety Incident Reports

All accidents and incidents involving Australian registered aircraft, or foreign aircraft in Australian airspace, must be reported to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). The ATSB maintains its own database (Safety Investigation Information Management System) in which all reports assessed by the ATSB as an accident, incident or serious incident are recorded. Each individual report is known as an Aviation Safety Incident Report (ASIR) and for identification purposes is allocated its own serial number. Incidents and accidents reported to ATSB are investigated and acted upon subject to their categorisation and prioritisation guidelines, details of which can be found on their website9. ATSB incident data for the period 01 January 2007 to 31 December 2008 was analysed as part of this study. One hundred and thirteen incidents were recorded as having occurred within a 20 NM radius of Alice Springs aerodrome, with no significant accidents or serious incidents. Currently none of the 113 ASIRs have resulted in the requirement to generate an ACP. A more detailed summary of all ASIRs recorded during the reporting period can be found at Annex G, with those ASIRs related to airspace issues summarised in Table 2.

9

http://www.atsb.gov.au/aviation/procedures.aspx


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Type of Incident Violation of Controlled Airspace Failure to comply with ATS instructions or procedures TCAS Resolution Advisory Go around Runway Incursions Loss of Separation Assurance Breakdown in ATS coordination activities Failure to comply with CTAF(R) procedures when tower closed Failure to comply with Flight Plan

Number of Incidents 5 28 1 1 2 2 6 3 3

Table 2: Breakdown of ASIRs at Alice Springs (01 January 2007 to 31 December 2008)

7.3

Summary of all recorded incident data (ESIRs vs. ASIRs)

Significant similarities exist between the types and frequency of incidents reported as either ESIRs or ASIRs, particularly when comparing the reported occurrences of pilot in command “Failure to comply with ATS instructions or procedures”. Both ESIRs and ASIRs are subject to investigation by their respective controlling authorities. The reported frequency of ESIRs or ASIRs events approximately equates to 0.25% of all traffic movements, based on Airservices’ ARA traffic movement data for the 12 months ending October 2008.

8

Modelling Methodology and Risk Assessment

8.1

Methodology Outline

CASA has developed ‘acceptable risk’ criteria with regards to the risk of midair conflicts within regional aerodrome terminal areas. The Airspace Risk Model (ARM), developed by CASA in 1996, is focused on a non-radar controlled terminal area model and no significant changes have been made since its development and presentation to the Review of the General Concept of Separation Panel, now the Separation and Airspace Safety Panel of ICAO. The OAR uses the ARM, a cause:consequence model, to calculate the probability of midair collisions (MACs) in various airspace environments. The ARM and a FN-curve (a Frequency/Severity Risk Curve) were developed by CASA and are the primary modelling tools utilised by the OAR. This method is used to calculate benefits in terms of fatalities avoided by implementing safety measures. The ARM presumes that there is a ‘Potential Conflict Pair’, i.e. a pair of aircraft whose manoeuvres are such that, if no intervening action is taken, the aircraft will reach a point where it will be too late to take evasive action and chance becomes the determining factor in whether the aircraft collide or not. This is called the Loss of Control (LoC) point in this study. The ARM model is based on the Linear Criterion concept which stipulates that the frequency of an accident should be inversely proportional to its severity, i.e. an accident involving one fatality or more may happen ten times as often as an accident involving ten fatalities or more. Using the ARM, the existing scenario was modelled for Alice Springs – Class D Tower. Conflict pairs for this study were calculated applying the CASA regression formula. It was established that this formula over estimates conflict pairs, therefore it is reasonable to assume that the real risk figures calculated for this study could be lower. Aeronautical Study of Alice Springs (YBAS) January 2010

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8.2

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Airspace Risk Assessment 8.2.1

Assumptions

The operational environment referred to in the model is a controlled non-radar, Class D terminal area. It has a radius of 15 NM and extends to 5,000 ft AGL. 8.2.2

Summary of Movement Data

A summary of the two different data sets analysed and used during the risk assessment modelling process, the first from the Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics (BITRE) and the second from Airservices, can be found at Table 3. The data summarised covers the 12 month reporting period to the end of June 2009. A more comprehensive breakdown of the data used during the modelling analysis process used in this study can be found at Annexes E (Airservices) and G (BITRE). It should be noted that the BITRE data shown at Annex H represents data recorded by financial year (July to June) and was used for comparison and verification purposes only.

Data Source

Traffic Movements

Scheduled Passenger Movements 674,215

Non-scheduled Passenger Movements -

Total Passenger Movements

674,215 BITRE 6,657 Airservices 24,251 674,215 35,934 710,149 (ARA Data) Table 3: Summary of Alice Springs Movement Data for the 12 months to June 2009

The BITRE data summarised above is noticeably lower than the Airservices data as it only reflects the traffic and passenger movements by scheduled RPT operators. The Airservices data represents a much larger traffic movement figure as it more accurately captures both scheduled and unscheduled movements and includes known circuit traffic. The total passenger numbers captured by Airservices data is larger than the BITRE passenger count as it includes an estimation of the non-scheduled passenger movements and GA passenger movements (local charter movements). For the purpose of this study, the Airservices ARA data for the 12 months ending June 2009 has been used in the modelling analysis as it is considered to reflect the most accurate traffic and passenger movement trends at Alice Springs.


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8.2.3

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Estimated Traffic Mix

A brief summary of the estimated traffic mix utilising Airservices’ data at Alice Springs is shown in Table 4 and Figure 3 shows a graphical breakdown of the traffic mix using the following traffic types:

VFR including gliders and helicopters;

IFR Light (IFR (L)) – less than 10 passengers;

IFR Medium (IFR (M)) – 10 to 38 passengers; and

IFR Heavy (IFR (H)) – more than 38 passengers.

Traffic Type VFR IFR L IFR M

No of movements 8,457 7,755 1,147

% of movements 34.87% 31.98% 4.73%

IFR H 6,892 28.42% Total 24,251 100.00% Table 4: Traffic mix for Alice Springs aerodrome

Traffic Mix for Alice Springs

VFR

IFR - L

VFR IFR - L IFR - M IFR - H

IFR - M IFR - H

Figure 3: Graphical breakdown of traffic mix at Alice Springs aerodrome

As indicated the majority of aircraft movements are by VFR and IFR L aircraft.


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8.2.4

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Conflict pair calculation

Conflict pairs were calculated by applying the CASA conflict formula. Conflict pairs are listed in Table 5, grouped into 16 categories based on traffic type and weather condition – Visual Metrological Conditions (VMC) or Instrument Metrological Conditions (IMC). Conflict Pairs VFR - VFR 55.67 IFR( L) - VFR 45.38 IFR(L) - IFR(L) in VMC 37.45 IFR(L) - IFR(L) in IMC 9.36 IFR (M) - VFR 6.71 IFR(M) - IFR(L) in VMC 4.92 IFR(M) - IFR(L) in IMC 1.23 IFR(M) -IFR(M) in VMC 0.82 IFR(M) -IFR(M) in IMC 0.20 IFR(H) - VFR 40.33 IFR(H) - IFR(L) in VMC 29.58 IFR(H) - IFR(L) in IMC 7.40 IFR(H) - IFR(M) in VMC 4.38 IFR(H) - IFR(M) in IMC 1.09 IFR(H) - IFR(H) in VMC 29.58 IFR(H) - IFR(H) in IMC 7.39 Table 5: Estimated conflict pairs for Alice Springs aerodrome Conflict Types

As part of the aerodrome conflict risk calculation process, the conflict pairs were grouped in proportion to traffic. In addition, the following calculations were applied to the traffic pairs, assuming each aircraft type has an equal probability of conflicting with any other aircraft type:

Factor up like pairs by 1½.

Factor down unlike pairs by ⅔.

IFR-IFR pairs are 80 per cent in VMC and 20 per cent in IMC.

In total 281.49 conflict pairs were estimated.

8.2.5

Evaluation of Airspace Models and Data Analysis Results

Annualised total traffic movement data was applied to the ARM developed by CASA. The results are shown in the FN-curve at Figure 4.


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Acceptable Risk Criteria

Alice Springs 1

1 0.1 0.01 0.001 0.0001 0.00001 0.000001

0.1

Annual Frequency of N or More Fatalities (Likelihood)

0.01

0.001

0.0001

Scrutiny Risk Line

0.00001

0.000001

Middle ALARP Line

0.0000001 1

10

100

1000

Acceptable Risk Line

Fatalities (Consequence)

D Tower

Figure 4: Risk Model for Alice Springs


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In Figure 4 the blue line represents the current level of risk when Class D Tower services are provided at Alice Springs. The blue line generally remains below the Middle As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) line and it is reasonable to assume that, while Class D Tower services are provided, Alice Springs can be considered ALARP. Therefore, the risks associated with Alice Springs remain tolerable. It should be noted that outside of Class D Tower hours Alice Springs aerodrome and surrounding airspace is reclassified Class G subject to CTAF(R) procedures. During these periods of decreased activity, where the mix of traffic is not as complex, Class G airspace with CTAF(R) procedures are regarded by stakeholders as adequate in the safety mitigation offered. The modelling results estimate that with a Class D Tower service, approximately 0.0121 fatalities per annum can be expected. In addition, it is estimated that Alice Springs has a likelihood of having one MAC approximately every 3,604 years with an estimated 44 fatalities. These key results are summarised in Table 6.

Scenario (A)

CASA Estimated Conflict Pairs (B)

CASA Estimated lives at Risk per accident (C)

CASA Estimated Years to an accident (D)

CASA Estimated Lives at Risk per annum (E)

Airservices Current Fatality Risk per 100 years (F)

Class D Tower Service

281.49

44

3,604

1.21E-02

8.90E-02

Table 6: Key ARM results

It is important to note from the above table that the CASA fatality risk per annum figure (column E) differs from the Airservices fatality risk per 100 years (column F) sourced from their 2008 ‘Preliminary Risk Assessment of 10 Class D Towers’ study. The CASA fatality risk per annum is higher and the difference can be attributed to several factors:

fatality risk for the Airservices study only considers conflicts above 3,300 ft AMSL (1,500 ft AGL) and does not consider possible conflicts in the circuit; and

the data used by Airservices during their Total Airspace and Airport Modeller (TAAM) modelling process and the impact of this on their results cannot be fully quantified by CASA.


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Conclusion

Based upon stakeholder consultation and data analysis, the OAR has concluded that Alice Springs airspace is operated and managed in a safe and efficient manner, consistent with the requirements of the Act. This conclusion is further supported by the findings of the ARM tool which, based on current air traffic and passenger movements, has assessed the current level of Class D Tower ATC services as the minimum level of service required. Outside of tower operational hours the traffic mix and movement numbers do not represent a significant risk. However as required by the AAPS 2007, CASA is still required to review the remaining NAS characteristics for implementation at this location.

Currently Alice Springs has no form of radar surveillance, and Airservices has not provided any advice of plans to introduce such infrastructure improvements. Modelling carried out by Airservices for their ‘Preliminary Risk Assessment of 10 Class D Towers’ study in 2008 found that the benefit offered by the provision of a radar service was negligible. An extract from the Airservices report showing the estimated fatality risk at Alice Springs Class D Tower when modelled using their TAAM tool is shown in Table 7. Location Alice Springs

Current Fatality Risk

Fatality Risk with Additional Radar

(per 100 years)

(per 100 years)

0.089

0.080

Table 7: Estimated decrease in Fatality Risk by introduction of radar at Alice Springs (Extracted from Airservices’ ‘Preliminary Risk Assessment of 10 Class D Towers’ study, 2008)

There is potential to make use of existing ADS-B technology, by the further development and use of data supplied from an ADS-B ground station positioned nearby at West Gap. Although currently targeted at providing surveillance of suitably equipped aircraft at higher flight levels, with further investment the facility would be capable of providing ADS-B surveillance to ground level at Alice Springs. Any surveillance data could then be relayed to Alice Springs Tower for analysis by controllers via a TSAD. However, the utility of ADS-B surveillance technology is heavily reliant on all aircraft being suitably equipped with ADS-B compatible equipment. This is not the case with aircraft operating within airspace in the vicinity of Alice Springs aerodrome. More stringent cost:benefit analysis (CBA) and a regulatory impact assessment would be required before the option to employ ADS-B surveillance technology at Alice Springs could be pursued. Any safety benefit or airspace management efficiencies flowing from the use of ADS-B as a surveillance method at Alice Springs will remain insignificant until all aircraft are suitably equipped. Wide Area Multi-lateration offers similar surveillance benefits to that of ADS-B, provided aircraft are transponder equipped. Similar to any increased use of ADS-B technology, stringent CBA and a regulatory impact assessment would be required before this option could be pursued. It is a reasonable assumption that the introduction of either form of surveillance would offer an increase in efficiency and accordingly safety for aircraft operating in the Alice Springs airspace; however the true safety benefit at this point remains unquantifiable. The introduction of surveillance would offer the opportunity to study the current airspace design, possibly supporting reclassification of Class C airspace to Class E at this location.


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The following points are a summary of the issues raised during the study:

The aerodrome operator perceived a lack of airspace for training activities to the east of the aerodrome. However this comment was not supported by any other stakeholder feedback. No further action is intended as a result of this study. The aerodrome operator was unaware of any significant consultation with CASA reference the preparation of its Final Master Plan 2004 to 2024. The aerodrome operator expressed their concern relating to the lead time required for information to be updated in ERSA. One major RPT operator expressed their concern at the progress of an outstanding ACP relating to proposed changes to the CTA steps. This ACP has since been completed with the proposed changes supported and incorporated in AIP and charts. One major RPT operator requested public access to existing RNP approaches. Airservices is reviewing public access to RNP approaches. No further action is intended by this study. The reported airspace related incident data recorded separately by ATSB and Airservices is consistent in type and frequency. ADS-B coverage within 250 NM at and above 30,000 ft AGL was reported as available at Alice Springs. This coverage could be provided to ground level with additional investment in existing infrastructure. However, currently there are insufficient ADS-B compatible aircraft using the airspace at lower flight levels and within terminal airspace to warrant this additional investment. Therefore the installation of an ADS-B compatible TSAD into Alice Springs Tower is not considered warranted. Post publication of this study seeking feedback on its initial conclusions and recommendations the additional stakeholder issues / comments were made: a. That the study was lacking in it’s lack of discussion and support for a then extant ACP, proposing a minor change to existing airspace control steps to contain the approach profiles of new generation aircraft; and b. That the study did not address the Governments policy to pursue reform of the airspace as detailed within the AAPS 2007. It was considered by the respondent that the existing airspace design surrounding the aerodrome, without adequate means of surveillance, was ineffective in addressing the level of risk and that the study required further review to incorporate comparison of the level of safety that Class E airspace might offer over existing Class C airspace. In response to the stakeholder feedback above CASA makes the following comment: a. It is accepted by CASA that the original study omitted full discussion on the extant ACP proposing a change to the Class C steps (at 36 and 45 DME) to the south east of the aerodrome. However in mitigation it was felt that the proposal was developed to such a stage that other than to identify that the ACP had been accepted by all stakeholders and that approval was pending no value would be added by to the study’s outcome by further discussion. As this ACP is now complete with all airspace change and subsequent amendment to charts having been made, previous reference to the ACP has been removed from this revision of the study; and b. The opportunity to review the Alice Springs airspace architecture in accordance with the AAPS 2007 remains. As detailed in the AAPS 2007 the Government requires CASA to assess the remaining United States


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National Airspace System (NAS) Characteristics for application in Australian airspace and determine an implementation plan. For Alice Springs this broadly requires review of the safety benefit of existing Class C airspace steps overhead Alice Springs versus possible reclassification of those steps to Class E airspace. Below any proposed Class E airspace the Class D CTR would also be subject to review to a lower level than currently exists. When the tower is not operational the airspace currently reclassified Class G would be subject to review, looking to introduce Class E airspace down to lower levels, ensuring that any instrument approaches remain within controlled airspace. Discussion on the NAS characteristics and the CASA proposed implementation strategy can be found at Section 6. It is important to note that the study makes recommendations based on existing and projected data. The following comment as summarised by Justice Gibbs of the High Court of Australia has been considered while conducting the study: Where it is possible to guard against a foreseeable risk which, though perhaps not great, nevertheless cannot be called remote or fanciful, by adopting a means which involves little difficulty or expense, the failure to adopt such means will in general be negligent. CASA applies a precautionary approach when conducting aeronautical studies and therefore the following recommendations must be considered:

10

Recommendations

10.1

CASA to reinforce awareness of the AIRAC cycle, to allow for improved planning when requesting updates to AIP.

10.2

Based upon stakeholder feedback and supported by risk assessment and modelling, the OAR has concluded that the current airspace design and level of air traffic services provided are adequate in addressing the level of risk that exists. Therefore the OAR does not propose to make any change to the current airspace architecture or level of ATS provided.

10.3

In order to address the requirements of the AAPS 2007, CASA to review its implementation strategy in considering the proven international best practice airspace systems, including outstanding NAS characteristics. This strategy must take into account changes being proposed to airspace at GAAP aerodromes and where possible standardisation of airspace at all aerodromes with Class D CTRs. The implementation strategy will be finalised by CASA’s OAR in 2010.


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References

The following publications were referred to or used during the compilation of this report: The Airspace Risk Model (ARM) MBZ/CTAF Analysis by Robert Philips, updated February 2002. Manual of the Airspace Risk Model (ARM), Acceptable Risk Criteria (ARC) and Value of Statistical Life by Robert Philips, Version 1 - June 2006. Establishment and Discontinuance Criteria for Air Traffic Control Towers by Federal Aviation Administration, Washington DC, Office of Aviation Policy and Plans – August 1990. Enroute Supplement Australia (ERSA), effective 19 November 2009. Alice Springs Visual Terminal Chart (VTC), effective 19 November 2009. Australia Terminal Area Chart (TAC)-2, effective 19 November 2009. Australia En-route Chart (ERC) Low L7, effective 19 November 2009. Departure and Approach Procedures (DAP) (West), effective 19 November 2009. Airservices Australia ‘Preliminary Risk Assessment of 10 Class D Towers’ paper, 2008.

Annexes: A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H.

Acronyms Australian Airspace Structure Charts Stakeholders ARA Data Class D and Class E Airspace under NAS and US Model ATSB Data BITRE Data


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Annex A – Acronyms AAPS 2007 ACAS ACP Act ADG ADS-B AGL AI AIP AIRAC Airservices ALARP AMSL ANSP ARA ARM ASA ASIR ATC ATS ATSB BITRE CASA CBA CTA CTAF CTAF(R) CTR DAP DME ERC ERSA ESIR FIS FL FN Curve FOI ft GA GAAP IAS ICAO IFR IFR (H) IFR (L) IFR (M) IMC KT LL

2007 Australian Airspace Policy Statement Airborne Collision Avoidance System Airspace Change Proposal Airspace Act 2007 Airport Development Group Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast Above Ground Level (in feet) Aerodrome Inspector (CASA) Aeronautical Information Publication Aeronautical Information Regulation and Control Cycle (AIP) Airservices Australia As Low As Reasonably Practicable Above Mean Sea Level (in feet) Air Navigation Service Provider Airspace Research Application Airspace Risk Model Aviation Safety Advisor (CASA) Aviation Safety Incident Report Air Traffic Control Air Traffic Services Australian Transport Safety Bureau Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics Civil Aviation Safety Authority Cost:Benefit Analysis Control Area Common Traffic Advisory Frequency Common Traffic Advisory Frequency (Radio required) Control Zone Departure and Approach Procedures (AIP) Distance Measuring Equipment Enroute Chart (AIP) Enroute Supplement Australia (AIP) Electronic Safety Incident Report Flight Information Service Flight Level Frequency/Severity Risk Curve Flight Operations Inspector (CASA) Feet General Aviation General Aviation Aerodrome Procedures Indicated Air Speed International Civil Aviation Organization Instrument Flight Rules IFR Heavy – more than 38 passengers IFR Light – less than 10 passengers IFR Medium – 10 to 38 passengers Instrument Meteorological Conditions Knots Lower limit


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LoC MAC MBZ MHz MOA NM NOTAM NT OAR PA PT RFDS RIS RNP RPT SAR SVFR TAAM TAC TCAS TSAD VFR VHF VIS VMC VTC

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Loss of Control Midair Collision Mandatory Broadcast Zone Megahertz Memorandum of Understanding Nautical Miles Notice to Airmen Northern Territory Office of Airspace Regulation (CASA) Prohibited Area Passenger Transport Royal Flying Doctor Service Radar Information Service Required Navigation Performance Regular Public Transport Search and Rescue Special Visual Flight Rules Total Airspace and Airport Modeller Terminal Area Chart (AIP) Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System Tower Situational Awareness Display Visual Flight Rules Very High Frequency (radio) Visibility Visual Meteorological Conditions Visual Terminal Chart (AIP)


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Annex B – Australian Airspace Structure Class

Description

Summary of Services/Procedures/Rules

A

All airspace above Flight Level (FL) 180 (where surveillance exists) or FL 245

Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) only. All aircraft require a clearance from Air Traffic Control (ATC) to enter airspace and are separated by ATC. Continuous two-way radio and transponder required. No speed limitation.

B

Not currently used in Australia

C

In control zones (CTRs) of defined dimensions and control area steps generally associated with controlled aerodromes

D

General Aviation Aerodrome Procedures (GAAP)

E

F

G

Regional locations such as Hobart and Alice Springs

High density General Aviation aerodromes

Controlled airspace not covered in classifications above

Not currently used in Australia Non-controlled

All aircraft require a clearance from ATC to enter airspace. All aircraft require continuous two-way radio and transponder. IFR separated from IFR, Visual Flight Rules (VFR) and Special VFR (SVFR) by ATC with no speed limitation for IFR operations. VFR receives traffic information on other VFR but not separated from each other by ATC. SVFR separated from SVFR when visibility (VIS) is less than Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC). VFR and SVFR speed limited to 250 knots (kt) Indicated Air Speed (IAS) below 10,000 feet (ft) Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL)*. All aircraft require a clearance from ATC to enter airspace. As in Class C airspace all aircraft are separated on take off and landing. All aircraft require continuous two-way radio and are speed limited to 250 kt IAS below 10,000 ft AMSL*. IFR separated from IFR and SVFR. Traffic information provided on all VFR. VFR receives traffic on all other aircraft but not separated by ATC. SVFR separated from SVFR when VIS is less than VMC. All aircraft require a clearance from ATC to enter airspace. All aircraft require continuous two-way radio and are speed limited to 250 kt IAS. In VMC all operations are VFR, traffic information only provided. In Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC), IFR separated from all traffic. SVFR separated from SVFR when VIS is less than VMC. All aircraft require continuous two-way radio and transponder. All aircraft are speed limited to 250 kt IAS below 10,000 ft AMSL*. IFR require a clearance from ATC to enter airspace and are separated from IFR by ATC, traffic information provided on known VFR. VFR do not require a clearance from ATC to enter airspace and are provided with Flight Information Service (FIS). On request and ATC workload permitting, a Radar / ADS-B Information Service (RIS) is available within surveillance coverage. Clearance from ATC to enter airspace not required. All aircraft are speed limited to 250 kt IAS below 10,000 ft AMSL*. IFR receive a FIS, including traffic information on other IFR and require continuous two-way radio. VFR receive a FIS. On request and ATC workload permitting, a RIS is available within surveillance coverage. VHF radio required above 5,000 ft AMSL and at aerodromes where carriage and use of radio is required.

* Not applicable to military aircraft Aeronautical Study of Alice Springs (YBAS) January 2010

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Annex C – Charts

Alice Springs VTC to 22 DME


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Annex C – Charts (continued)

Alice Springs TAC 2


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Annex D – Stakeholders Position

Organisation

Alice Springs Airport Operations Manager

Northern Territory Airports Pty Ltd

Manager Regulatory Affairs

Qantas

Flight Operations Manager

Tiger Airlines

Flight Operations Safety Advisor

Alliance Airlines

Air Traffic Control Tower Supervisor

Airservices Australia

Base Senior Pilot

Royal Flying Doctor Service

Chief Pilot

Australian National Helicopters

Chief Pilot

ChartAir

Chief Pilot

Outback Airlines

Chief Pilot

Pel Air

Chief Pilot

Pearl Aviation Australia

General Manager

Cobham Aviation

Secretary

Alice Aeroclub

Aviation Safety Advisor (ASA)

Operations, CASA

Flying Operations Inspector (FOI)

Operations, CASA

Aerodrome Inspector (AI)

Airspace and Aerodrome Regulation, CASA


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Annex E – ARA Data


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Annex E – ARA Data (continued)


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Annex E – ARA Data (continued)

Alice Springs Trigger Data Summary for 12 months to June 2009


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Annex F – Class D and Class E Airspace under NAS and US Model CLASS D NAS1 Application Class D airspace will exist at non-radar controlled TMAs where a tower service is provided. GAAP aerodromes will be designated Class D aerodromes, and if necessary, a difference lodged with ICAO with respect to VMC minima. Design The control zone will be of minimum dimensions so as to protect IFR and visual circuit and approach procedures in accordance with the MOS. The CTR and associated Class D steps will capture the arrival and departure profile of high performance aircraft and extend to 4,500ft AMSL to abut overlying Class E airspace. The end state model will follow North American architecture. Procedures Class D procedures will be aligned to the FAA application. While VFR aircraft in Class D airspace are subject to an airways clearance (ICAO Annex 11, Appendix 4), the clearance may be implicit as is current practice at GAAP Zones and in US Class D airspace. US MODEL CLASS D2 3-2-5. Class D Airspace a. Definition. Generally, that airspace from the surface to 2,500 feet above the airport elevation (charted in MSL) surrounding those airports that have an operational control tower. The configuration of each Class D airspace area is individually tailored and when instrument procedures are published, the airspace will normally be designed to contain the procedures. b.

Operating Rules and Pilot/Equipment Requirements:

1. Pilot Certification. No specific certification required. 2. Equipment. Unless otherwise authorized by ATC, an operable two-way radio is required. 3. Arrival or Through Flight Entry Requirements. Two-way radio communication must be established with the ATC facility providing ATC services prior to entry and thereafter maintain those communications while in the Class D airspace. Pilots of arriving aircraft should contact the control tower on the publicized frequency and give their position, altitude, destination, and any request(s). Radio contact should be initiated far enough from the Class D airspace boundary to preclude entering the Class D airspace before two-way radio communications are established. 1

.National Airspace System (NAS) Australia, 14 December 2001, p. 7. Federal Aviation Administration, Aeronautical Information Manual, Chapter 3, Section 2 Controlled Airspace.

2


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NOTE1. If the controller responds to a radio call with, “[aircraft callsign] standby,” radio communications have been established and the pilot can enter the Class D airspace. 2. If workload or traffic conditions prevent immediate entry into Class D airspace, the controller will inform the pilot to remain outside the Class D airspace until conditions permit entry. EXAMPLE1. “[Aircraft callsign] remain outside the Class Delta airspace and standby.” It is important to understand that if the controller responds to the initial radio call without using the aircraft callsign, radio communications have not been established and the pilot may not enter the Class D airspace. 2. “Aircraft calling Manassas tower standby.” At those airports where the control tower does not operate 24 hours a day, the operating hours of the tower will be listed on the appropriate charts and in the A/FD. During the hours the tower is not in operation, the Class E surface area rules or a combination of Class E rules to 700 feet above ground level and Class G rules to the surface will become applicable. Check the A/FD for specifics. 4.

Departures from:

(a) A primary or satellite airport with an operating control tower. Two-way radio communications must be established and maintained with the control tower, and thereafter as instructed by ATC while operating in the Class D airspace. (b) A satellite airport without an operating control tower. Two-way radio communications must be established as soon as practicable after departing with the ATC facility having jurisdiction over the Class D airspace as soon as practicable after departing. 5. Aircraft Speed. Unless otherwise authorized or required by ATC, no person may operate an aircraft at or below 2,500 feet above the surface within 4 nautical miles of the primary airport of a Class D airspace area at an indicated airspeed of more than 200 knots (230 mph). c. Class D airspace areas are depicted on Sectional and Terminal charts with blue segmented lines, and on IFR En Route Lows with a boxed [D]. d. Arrival extensions for instrument approach procedures may be Class D or Class E airspace. As a general rule, if all extensions are 2 miles or less, they remain part of the Class D surface area. However, if any one extension is greater than 2 miles, then all extensions become Class E. e.

Separation for VFR Aircraft. No separation services are provided to VFR aircraft.


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CLASS E NAS3 Application Class E airspace is established below Class A and/or Class C airspace, providing an IFR to IFR separation service in lower density enroute and terminal airspace. Design A goal in Australian airspace design is to provide maximum IFR/IFR separation services. In the North American application, Class E airspace provides IFR/IFR separation at altitudes down to 1,200ft AGL or 700ft AGL associated with a non-tower terminal aerodrome. In remote areas, and where radar coverage does not exist at lower altitudes, the main base of Class E airspace is established at FL145. In this more remote airspace, Class E Corridors are established to lower levels to provide IFR/IFR separation on IFR routes and to terminals with IFR let-down procedures. Services in Class E In addition to IFR/IFR separation, the following services will be available in Class E airspace:

Flight following and SAR Alerting (IFR aircraft)

Hazard alerting service (directed to IFR, on request to VFR)

Traffic information service to IFR aircraft with respect to known VFR aircraft

A Radar Advisory Service will be available to VFR aircraft on a workload permitting basis

Flight information service (FIS) (on request)

New traffic management procedures New procedures will be introduced to improve traffic management, especially in the case of ATC clearance non-availability or restrictions. These initiatives include:

3

VMC climb and descent procedures to enable self-separation between IFR aircraft subject to specific criteria. This is an IFR procedure where ATC delegate responsibility for separation to the two aircraft subject to their mutual acceptance and satisfying other criteria.

Ability for VFR climb in Class E airspace after departure pending availability of an airways clearance. This procedure will be available to aircraft which have filed IFR details and operating in VMC. ATC will provide flight following and known traffic.

Provision of a pop-up clearance for climb and descent through Class E airspace, or to cross Class E corridors, in IMC conditions.

“VFR on top” services (known in Australia as full position VFR) will be available. ATC will provide flight following and known traffic. Normal ATS charges will apply.

14 December 2001. National Airspace System (NAS) Australia, pp. 7-9.


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US MODEL CLASS E4 3-2.6 Class E Airspace a. Definition. Generally, if the airspace is not Class A, Class B, Class C, or Class D, and it is controlled airspace, it is Class E airspace.

Airspace Classes

Types of Class E Airspace: 1. Surface area designated for an airport. When designated as a surface area for an airport, the airspace will be configured to contain all instrument procedures. 2. Extension to a surface area. There are Class E airspace areas that serve as extensions to Class B, Class C, and Class D surface areas designated for an airport. Such airspace provides controlled airspace to contain standard instrument approach procedures without imposing a communications requirement on pilots operating under VFR. 3. Airspace used for transition. There are Class E airspace areas beginning at either 700 or 1,200 feet AGL used to transition to/from the terminal or en route environment. 4. En Route Domestic Areas. There are Class E airspace areas that extend upward from a specified altitude and are en route domestic airspace areas that provide controlled airspace in those areas where there is a requirement to provide IFR en route ATC services but the Federal airway system is inadequate. 4

Federal Aviation Administration, Aeronautical Information Manual, Chapter 3, Section 2 Controlled Airspace.


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5. Federal Airways. The Federal airways are Class E airspace areas and, unless otherwise specified, extend upward from 1,200 feet to, but not including, 18,000 feet MSL. The colored airways are green, red, amber, and blue. The VOR airways are classified as Domestic, Alaskan, and Hawaiian. 6. Offshore Airspace Areas. There are Class E airspace areas that extend upward from a specified altitude to, but not including, 18,000 feet MSL and are designated as offshore airspace areas. These areas provide controlled airspace beyond 12 miles from the coast of the U.S. in those areas where there is a requirement to provide IFR en route ATC services and within which the U.S. is applying domestic procedures. 7. Unless designated at a lower altitude, Class E airspace begins at 14,500 feet MSL to, but not including, 18,000 feet MSL overlying: the 48 contiguous States including the waters within 12 miles from the coast of the 48 contiguous States; the District of Columbia; Alaska, including the waters within 12 miles from the coast of Alaska, and that airspace above FL600; excluding the Alaska peninsula west of long. 160°00'00''W, and the airspace below 1,500 feet above the surface of the earth unless specifically so designated.


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Annex G – ATSB Data – 01 January 2007 to 31 December 2008 ATSB Reference Number

Occurrence Date

Occurrence Type Level 1



Model

200700425

12/01/2007

Airspace

Operational non‐compliance

Verbal instruction

340A

Airspace Type Airspace Class

CTA

C

200700428

14/01/2007

Operational

Bird / animal strike

Birdstrike

Aeroplane

CTR

D

200700472 200700473

25/01/2007 25/01/2007

Operational Operational

Bird / animal strike Bird / animal strike

Birdstrike Birdstrike

737‐838 Aeroplane

CTR CTR

D D

200700510

6/02/2007

Operational

Significant event

Decompression

B300

CTA

C

200700531

15/01/2007

Airspace


Verbal instruction

172N

CTA

D

200700556

20/01/2007

Airspace


Published information

R22 BETA

CTR

D

200700844

12/02/2007

Operational

Ground operations

Incursion

172N

CTR

D

200700881

3/02/2007

Mechanical

Systems

Avionics

210N

CTA

C

200701008

8/02/2007

Operational

Communications

Air‐ground‐air

FU‐24‐950

CTR

D

200701012

23/02/2007

Mechanical

Powerplant / propulsion

Abnormal engine indications

210M

OCTA

G

200701510

7/03/2007

Operational

Aircraft control

Other

PA‐32R‐300

CTR

D

200701867

29/03/2007

Mechanical



PA‐31

CTA

C

200701886

27/03/2007

Airspace


Verbal instruction

58

CTA

D

200701923

1/04/2007

Operational

Warning device

Landing gear unsafe indication

58

CTR

D

200702075

4/04/2007

Airspace


Verbal instruction

PC‐12/45

CTA

C

200702258

12/04/2007

Operational

Ground operations

Incursion

A36

CTAF (R)

G

200702346

17/04/2007

Airspace

Airspace incursion

Controlled airspace

172

CTA

C


ATSB Summary The aircraft was cleared to track to Alice Springs at 9,500 ft with a requirement to report at 30 NM. The pilot reported at 30 NM descending through 6,500 ft. ATC queried the altitude and the pilot reported descending through 5,800 ft. ATC cleared the aircraft for a visual approach. During an inspection of runway 12/30, aerodrome staff retrieved a bird carcass. During rotation, the aircraft struck a bird. Inspection by aerodrome staff revealed a bird carcass on runway 12/30. On 6 February 2007, at approximately 1130 Central Summer Time, while operating a passenger charter flight from Melbourne, Vic. to Alice Springs, NT, the pilot of a Beech Aircraft Corporation 300 aircraft, registered VH‐MLG, reported feeling his ears ‘pop’ while at flight level 280 and the aircraft rapidly depressurised. There were eight persons on board the aircraft. The pilot reported looking at the aircraft pressurisation panel and noticing that the needles were rapidly moving. The passenger seated in the right seat (also a pilot) called to the pilot to ‘put on oxygen’. While donning his oxygen mask, the passenger reported that the oxygen hose blew out of the mask when pressurised. He managed to reattach the hose and remain on oxygen. After checking that the passengers had donned their oxygen masks, the pilot advised air traffic control of the depressurisation and commenced an emergency descent. The aircraft subsequently landed at Alice Springs with no injuries reported. The pilot reported that it is possible that, while adjusting his seat position prior to top of descent, he inadvertently activated the switch to the DUMP position On departure, the aircraft was cleared via VFR Route 5 and subsequently reported established on that route. Some time later the crew reported on VFR Route 6 for which no clearance had been issued. The helicopter became airborne within the CTR without a clearance. While taxiing for takeoff on runway 12, the aircraft crossed the holding point without a clearance and held short of the main runway markings. The ADC lost communications with the inbound aircraft until he was able to contact the pilot via mobile telephone. On departure, the pilot did not give a departure report to ATC. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot reported returning for a landing due to an abnormal cylinder head temperature indication. The ADC initiated local standby and the aircraft landed without incident. The pilot advised returning for a landing due to an uncommanded control problem with the aircraft. ATC activated local standby and the aircraft was landed without incident. Shortly after departure, the pilot reported an engine problem and requested to return for a landing. ATC initiated local standby and the aircraft landed safely. On approach, the aircraft was assigned descent to 4,000 feet but the pilot reported at 3,300ft. On final for runway 12, the pilot advised of an unsafe landing gear indication before commencing a go‐around. The landing gear was recycled and the aircraft subsequently landed without incident. The aircraft was given clearance to climb to FL200, the crew read back FL220. The discrepancy was not picked up by ATC until the aircraft reported maintaining FL220. The Beech A36 Bonanza entered runway 12 and commenced its take‐off run while another aircraft was occupying runway 30. The aircraft entered controlled airspace without a clearance.

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Annex G – ATSB Data – 01 January 2007 to 31 December 2008 (continued) ATSB Reference Number

Occurrence Date




Model

200702367

18/04/2007

Operational

Navigation / flight planning

Other

717‐200

200702495

22/04/2007

Airspace



206B (III)

Airspace Type Airspace Class CTA

CTR

A

D

200702775

5/05/2007

Operational


Birdstrike

737‐838

CTR

D

200702983

12/02/2007

Operational


Birdstrike

737‐838

CTR

D

200703074

16/05/2007

Airspace


Verbal instruction

340A

CTA

C

200703189

13/05/2007

Operational


Birdstrike

SA227‐DC

CTAF (R)

G

200703421

29/05/2007

Operational


Birdstrike

737‐838

CTR

D

200703464

25/05/2007

Operational

Significant event

Fumes

210M

OCTA

G

200703635

9/06/2007

Operational


Birdstrike

Unknown

CTR

D

200703692

17/06/2007

Operational


Birdstrike

717‐200

CTR

D

200703702

7/03/2007

Operational

Warning device


210M

CTR

D

200703735

30/05/2007

Mechanical


Partial power loss / rough running

PA‐32‐300

OCTA

G

200703923

15/06/2007

Airspace

Procedural error

B350

CTA

C

200704085

12/06/2007

Airspace


Verbal instruction

KC‐10

CTR

D

200704088

12/06/2007

Airspace


Verbal instruction

Unknown

CTR

D

200704128

23/06/2007

Mechanical



182P

CTA

D

200704161

27/06/2007

Mechanical

Systems

Avionics

210N

CTA

D


ATSB Summary The crew were navigating a different route from the flight plan submitted to ATC. The pilot attempted to contact Alice Springs Tower but even though the ADC responded to all calls, communications were not established. The pilot subsequently made a taxi call on the CTAF frequency and broadcast his departure details. The helicopter then departed without an airways clearance. The ADC was finally able to contact the pilot and issued a clearance. During the landing roll the aircraft struck two birds. During the landing roll on runway 12, the aircraft struck two birds that impacted a wing. The ADC cleared the aircraft to climb to 8,000 ft. Clearance for climb above this level is normally issued by the sector controller but the sector frequency failed before the crew called for clearance. When communication was re‐established the aircraft had climbed to FL125 without clearance. Duing the take‐off run, the aircraft struck a bird that impacted the propeller. The aircraft diverted to Archerfield. Investigation by the pilot during the walkaround, revealed the aircraft had struck a bird that impacted the left wing leading edge. During cruise, the pilot noticed a burning smell and oil on the cowl. The aircraft was returned to Alice Springs for a normal landing. Post flight inspection revealed a dislodged oil filler cap. Investigation by aerodrome ground staff revealed a bird carcass on runway 12. During the landing roll on runway 30, the aircraft struck a bird that impacted the windshield. When the landing gear was selected down, the pilot received an unsafe indication and notified the tower. The pilot extended the gear manually and conducted a flypast of the tower for inspection. The aircraft landed safely. During cruise, the pilot reported that the aircraft was returning to the departure aerodrome due to a rough running engine. The aircraft landed safely. ATC re‐cleared the outbound Beech 350 (B350) onto the 300 radial for separation from inbound traffic. Once separation had been confirmed, the B350 was not re‐ cleared direct to Hooker Creek as coordinated with Melbourne Centre. After transfer, the sector controller called the ADC to confirm that the B350 could be recleared direct to Hooker Creek, and issued a clearance. The crew did not comply with an ATC instruction to join the circuit on a right downwind leg. The aircraft tracked for a left downwind leg of the circuit. The crew did not comply with an ATC instruction and transferred frequency without instruction. During climb, the pilot reported engine abnormalities and returned to land. ATC declared local standby. The aircraft landed safely. During the approach, the aircraft lost all communications with ATC. The pilot phoned ATC and was issued with landing instructions and told to expect a green light on base leg of the circuit. The aircraft landed safely.

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Page 42 of 47


Occurrence Date



200704172

29/06/2007

Mechanical

Systems

200704242

11/07/2007

Airspace

200704388

1/07/2007

200704390


Avionics

Model


340A

CTA

C

Breakdown of co‐ordination

PC‐12/45

CTA

D

Airspace


35

CTA

A

3/07/2007

Airspace


Unknown

CTR

D

200704445

1/07/2007

Airspace


737‐838

CTA

A

200704687

20/07/2007

Operational


PC‐12/45

CTR

D

Verbal instruction

Birdstrike

200704698

13/07/2007

Operational

Communications

Air‐ground‐air

172RG

CTA

D

200704881

18/07/2007

Airspace


Verbal instruction

PA‐39

CTA

C

200704915

22/07/2007

Operational


Other

747‐4H6

CTA

A

200704972

28/07/2007

Airspace


Verbal instruction

8KCAB

CTR

D

200705018

1/08/2007

Airspace



210M

CTR

D

200705334 200705336

23/08/2007 23/08/2007

Airspace Airspace

Airspace incursion Airspace incursion

Controlled airspace Controlled airspace

PA‐28‐181 PA‐28R‐200

CTA CTA

C C

200705337

23/08/2007

Airspace


Verbal instruction

210N

CTA

D

200705371

29/08/2007

Airspace

Aircraft separation

Breakdown of separation

CA22

CTR

D

200705465

28/08/2007

Operational


Animal strike

737‐838

CTR

D

200705785

23/08/2007

Airspace


Verbal instruction

PA‐28‐181

CTR

D

200705804

26/08/2007

Operational

Weather / environment

Turbulence

A320‐232

CTA

A

200705836

14/09/2007

Operational


Birdstrike

737‐838

CTAF (R)

G

200705854

11/09/2007

Operational


Birdstrike

PC‐12/45

CTR

D


ATSB Summary The pilot attempted to contact both Melbourne ATC and Alice Tower but could not establish communication. The aircraft entered controlled airspace without a clearance, flew south of the field and conducted several orbits. When the pilot considered there was no traffic, he landed and taxied clear of the runway. Incorrect coordination details on a departing aircraft were passed from Alice Springs ATC to the adjoining ATC sector. The pilot reported on climb to FL160 but the level coordinated, FL180, was incorrect. The aircraft's cleared route was changed form Darwin ‐ J251 ‐ Whyalla to Darwin ‐ A461 ‐ Alice Springs ‐ Whyalla. The Alice Springs Sector Controller noted that the route held was Alice Springs direct Whyalla , not via J251, and confirmed with both Brisbane Centre and the crew that the aircraft was cleared via J251. The crew did not comply with an ATC instruction to report ready and commenced the takeoff without clearance. A change in the aircraft's route was not coordinated between Brisbane ATC and Melbourne ATC. During the landing roll, the aircraft stuck a bird that impacted the landing gear. The pilot called the tower but did not respond to the ADC's transmissions. A clearance was issued through Flightwatch, who were in two way communication with the aircraft. Some time later, the aircraft regained two way communication with the tower and proceeded as cleared. The aircraft reported an incorrect VOR radial inbound to Alice Springs. As the aircraft approached Alice Springs, the controller confirmed with the pilot that they would be tracking via A576. The route designator had been omitted on the flight plan. The pilot did not comply with an ATC instruction and entered a left circuit instead of a right circuit as instructed. The aircraft entered the taxiway for departure without clearance. Amended ATC tower hours were in operation at the time as per issued NOTAM. ATC instructed the pilot to stop and appropriate clearances were issued. The aircraft entered the CTA without clearance. The aircraft entered the CTA without clearance. The aircraft descended without clearance. During approach the aircraft struck a bird that impacted the VHF antenna. After the strike the pilot reported that the aircrafts radio was receiving transmissions but was unable to make transmissions. The pilot continued the approach and landed on runway 12 without a clearance causing a breakdown in the runway separation standard with a vehicle that was operating within the flight strip. During the landing roll, the aircraft struck a bearded dragon lizard. On circuit entry, the pilot did not comply with the joining instructions issued by the ADC resulting in a delay to two aircraft. While en route, the aircraft encountered unanticipated turbulence causing three cabin crew members to fall and sustain minor injuries. During the take‐off run on runway 12, the aircraft struck a bird. During the take‐off run on runway 12, the aircraft struck a bird that impacted the nose.

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Page 43 of 47


Occurrence Date




Model


CTA

C

200705866

11/09/2007

Operational

Warning device

TCAS

Unknown ‐‐‐‐‐ PC‐12/45

200706000

11/09/2007

Airspace


Verbal instruction

182C

CTA

C

200706008

19/09/2007

Mechanical

Systems

Electrical

210N

CTA

C

200706051

22/09/2007

Operational


Other

737‐838

CTR

D

200706131

14/09/2007

Operational


Birdstrike

Unknown

CTR

D

200706431

18/10/2007

Operational

Significant event

Fire

500‐S

CTAF (R)

G

200706514

27/09/2007

Operational

Warning device

200707353

26/10/2007

Airspace


200707744

25/11/2007

Operational


Other

Birdstrike

717‐200

CTA

D

PA‐31‐350

OCTA

G

717‐200

CTAF (R)

G

200707845

30/11/2007

Operational

Warning device


PA‐31

CTR

D

200708117

13/12/2007

Mechanical

Airframe

Control surface

747‐47UF/SCD

CTA

A

200708168

14/12/2007

Mechanical

Airframe

Landing gear

210N

CTR

D

200708570

6/05/2007

Airspace


Verbal instruction

PC‐12/45

CTA

C

200800330

11/01/2008

Operational

Warning device

Other

717‐200

CTA

A

200800409

20/01/2008

Operational

Significant event


Missed approach / go‐around

PA‐31T

CTR

D

ATSB Summary While descending through 6,500 ft, the crew received a TCAS warning indicating `proximity traffic' which immediately changed to a `traffic advisory' warning accompanied by an aural annunciation. The pilot observed the traffic and initiated a left turn to increase separation. On departure, the aircraft was cleared to climb to 5,500 ft but the pilot subsequently reported maintaining 6,500 ft without a clearance. Early in the cruise, the alternator failed. The pilot decided to return to Alice Springs and the aircraft landed without further incident. After the crew calculated the take‐off data based on the applicable IFR departure plate, ATC changed the clearance to a visual departure. After takeoff, the crew realised that the take‐off data had not been checked or amended. An unidentified aircraft departing from runway 12 struck a small bird. As the aircraft taxied to the apron from the runway, the pilot observed a fire in the right engine. The pilot shut down the engine and evacuated the aircraft. During the approach, the crew observed a hydraulic low quantity warning. The crew actioned the non‐normal checklist and advised ATC of the problem. The crew completed a flypast for a landing gear inspection and ATC confirmed that the landing gear appeared to be down. The aircraft landed safely. An engineering inspection revealed that the hydraulic transmitter plug was dirty and this was confirmed to cause the fluctuating indication. During an inflight weather diversion, the aircraft's amended track was not coordinated between air traffic agencies. During the take‐off run, the aircraft struck a bird that impacted the nose area. The pilot applied moderate braking and rejected the takeoff. The brake overheat warning light illuminated and the flight was delayed for approximately two and a half hours. During the approach the pilot received an unsafe landing gear indication. The pilot conducted a flypast of the tower for an inspection and ATC informed the pilot that the nose gear was only half extended. The pilot completed the emergency procedures and manually extended the gears. After receiving three green lights, the aircraft was landed safely. During the preflight check, the pilot had noticed a puddle of hydraulic fluid under the right flipper door. During cruise, the pilot requested to return to Sydney due to a trim problem. When the landing gear was selected up on a maintenance test flight, it did not fully retract. The pilot successfully lowered the landing gear and returned for a landing without further incident. The aircraft was assigned 10,000 ft inbound on the 359 radial due to preceding traffic inbound on the 145 radial at 9,000 ft. With the first call to Tower, the pilot reported inbound at 9,000 ft. During the cruise, the crew observed both the " Bleed Air L Fail " annunciator and the " Bleed Air L Temp Low " annunciator illuminate and elected to divert to Alice Springs. While on approach, the pilot was instructed to join right base for runway 12. The ADC subsequently observed the aircraft tracking beyond the aircraft boundary, parallel to runway 17 and possibly lined up with a road. The pilot was instructed to go around and the aircraft subsequently returned for a landing on runway 12.

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Page 44 of 47


Occurrence Date




Model

200801543

7/03/2008

Airspace


Verbal instruction

Unknown

CTA

C

200801804

18/03/2008

Operational

Warning device


PA‐32R‐300

CTR

D

200802091

27/03/2008

Operational

Miscellaneous

Other

737‐838

CTR

D

200802131

31/03/2008

Mechanical

Airframe

Landing gear

210N

CTR

D

200802327

7/04/2008

Mechanical

Airframe

Landing gear

58

CTR

D

200802480

19/04/2008

Airspace



M20M

CTR

D


200802591

29/04/2008

Airspace


Verbal instruction

A320‐232

CTA

C

200802645 200802647

22/04/2008 22/04/2008

Operational Operational

Bird / animal strike Bird / animal strike

Birdstrike Birdstrike

717‐200 717‐200

CTR CTR

D D

200802714

22/04/2008

Operational


Birdstrike

737‐838

CTAF (R)

G

200803055

7/05/2008

Operational

Communications

Air‐ground‐air

210N

CTAF (R)

G

200803105

18/05/2008

Airspace


Verbal instruction

BD‐700‐1A10

CTA

A

200803162

10/05/2008

Operational

Significant event

Crew incapacitation

CTA

A

200803332

15/05/2008

Airspace


747‐438 717‐200 ‐‐‐‐‐ 737‐838

CTR

D

200803642

1/06/2008

Operational

Warning device


210N

CTR

D

200803707

4/06/2008

Airspace



R44 II

CTR

D

200803838

8/06/2008

Airspace


Verbal instruction

J230B

CTA

D

200803920

7/06/2008

Operational

Collision

Controlled flight into terrain

PA‐34‐200

CTAF (R)

G

200804211

25/06/2008

Operational

Communications

Air‐ground‐air

500‐S

CTAF (R)

G

200804280

2/07/2008

Airspace

Aircraft separation

Breakdown of separation

PC‐12/47 ‐‐‐‐‐ 328‐100

CTA

C

200804281

2/07/2008

Airspace


Verbal instruction

328‐100

CTA

C


ATSB Summary While inbound to Alice Springs on the 313 radial, the aircraft was cleared on a visual approach. The pilot subsequently diverted off track and established the aircraft on final approach without a clearance. When the landing gear was selected down, the pilot received an unsafe landing gear indication that was subsequently determined to be false. The aircraft landed safely. A spill of volatile liquid was discovered in the aft cargo hold. It appeared as though the spill had occurred during the flight to Alice Springs. During the initial climb, the aircraft's landing gear could not be retracted. The pilot returned the aircraft safely to Alice Springs where emergency services were on standby. While on final approach to runway 12, the pilot commenced a go‐around due to a landing gear malfunction. The landing gear was manually lowered and the aircraft returned for a landing without further incident. The aircraft was not equipped with HF radio for a stage that placed the aircraft outside VHF coverage and the aircraft was not in normal communications with ATC for 85 NM. The aircraft did not track in accordance with the cleared route. During the take‐off run, the aircraft struck a bird. During the landing roll, the aircraft struck four small birds. During the flare, the aircraft struck a bird that impacted the right main landing gear. On departure, the crew did not broadcast on the CTAF ( R ) frequency. During the cruise, the aircraft was assigned a block level of FL430 to FL450, but the crew reported a block level of FL430 to FL470. During the cruise, a cabin crewmember became medically incapacitated. Incorrect coordination details, for two separate aircraft, were coordinated by the Alice Springs Tower controller to the ASC controller. On both occasions the ASC controller corrected the error. During the initial climb, the landing gear failed to retract. The pilot returned the aircraft to Alice Springs. The helicopter became airborne and departed without a clearance. After ATC instructed the pilot to join left base, the aircraft was observed joining left downwind without a clearance. During the approach, the pilot was unable to see the runway lights due to heavy fog. The pilot circled the aerodrome and shortly after, reported that the aircraft had collided with trees. ATC declared an INCERFA and emergency services were activated. The aircraft landed safely. An inspection revealed the aircraft had struck foliage within the vicinity of the aerodrome. The aircraft sustained minor damage. It was reported that the pilot of the arriving aircraft did not make the mandatory CTAF radio broadcasts as per the published procedures. On departure, the Dornier 328 was cleared to 6,000 ft. The pilot subsequently reported to have climbed to 6,200 ft and the Dornier conflicted with an opposite direction Pilatus PC12 maintaining 7,000 ft. Separation standards were infringed. During the climb, the aircraft diverted right of track without a clearance.

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Page 45 of 47


Occurrence Date




Model

200804894

26/07/2008

Operational

Warning device


58


CTR

D

200804968

31/07/2008

Airspace


Verbal instruction

500‐S

CTA

D

200805002

31/07/2008

Airspace

Airspace incursion

PRD

172R

PRD

PRD

200805030

1/08/2008

Operational

Warning device


210L

CTR

D

200805122

8/08/2008

Airspace


Verbal instruction

717‐200

CTR

D

200805141

4/08/2008

Mechanical

Systems

Avionics

210L

OCTA

G

200805362

16/08/2008

Operational

Aircraft loading

Weight and balance

717‐200

CTR

D

200805489

21/08/2008

Operational


Birdstrike

Unknown

CTR

D

200805500

24/08/2008

Operational

Significant event

Fumes

717‐200

CTA

C

200805598

25/08/2008

Operational

Significant event

Fumes

A320‐232

CTA

A

200805630

27/08/2008

Operational


Birdstrike

737‐838

CTAF (R)

G

200805752

3/09/2008

Operational

Warning device


210M

CTA

D

200805908

18/09/2008

Operational

Warning device

Other

717‐200

CTR

D

200806196

24/09/2008

Operational

Warning device


95‐B55

CTR

D

200806503

7/10/2008

Operational

Warning device


58

CTR

D

200806565

9/10/2008

Airspace

Airspace incursion

Controlled airspace

A36

CTA

C

200806911

21/10/2008

Operational

Ground operations

Ground handling

PC‐12/45

CTR

C

200806929

2/11/2008

Airspace


Verbal instruction

172N

CTR

D

200807099

30/10/2008

Operational

Aircraft control

Other

PA‐31‐350

CTR

D

200808092

29/12/2008

Mechanical

Airframe

Rotors / tail rotor

R22 BETA

OCTA

G

200808246

19/12/2008

Operational

Weather / environment

Turbulence

737‐838

CTA

A

200808260

31/12/2008

Operational


Birdstrike

777‐26KER

CTAF (R)

G


ATSB Summary When the landing gear was selected down, the pilot received an unsafe landing gear indication. The pilot conducted a go‐around and subsequently advised of a safe landing gear indication. The aircraft was cleared to join left downwind for runway 30, but was subsequently observed to have joined right downwind. The aircraft was observed to have entered P229 without a clearance. The pilot commenced a go‐around on final approach due to an unsafe nose landing gear indication. The crew did not comply with the issued taxi instructions and the aircraft subsequently entered runway 12 without a clearance. During the cruise, the aircraft commenced an uncommanded roll and steep climb. The pilot regained control of the aircraft by reducing power, selecting flap and applying full forward pressure on the control column. The subsequent engineering inspection revealed that the autopilot malfunctioned. A large number of children were unreported on the loading sheet resulting in the an incorrect payload weight. A bird carcass was retrieved from runway 12. While on descent, the crew detected abnormal fumes coming from the cockpit air‐ conditioning. During the cruise, the cabin crew noticed fumes when the ovens were opened. During post flight inspection, the engineer reported a birdstrike. It could not be established when the strike occurred. During the approach, the pilot reported that the aircraft had an intermittent unsafe landing gear indication. A flypast for inspection confirmed that the landing gear appeared to be down and locked. During the approach, the crew received two stickshaker warnings. The investigation is continuing. While on approach, the pilot advised of an unsafe landing gear indication. The unsafe indication was subsequently rectified. The pilot conducted a go‐around from final approach to runway 12 due to an unsafe landing gear indication. A blown bulb was subsequently identified. When the pilot requested an airways clearance, the aircraft was observed by ATC to have already entered controlled airspace without a clearance. During ground handling in preparation for flight, the towbar was not correctly attached to the tug. During a turn, the towbar came free and the aircraft rolled forward striking the tug. While the aircraft was on downwind, the pilot conducted an orbit without a clearance. Due to communication problems and failure of the horizontal situation indicator, the pilot did not retract the landing gear after takeoff until the aircraft's reduced climb performance was noticed. During a survey flight, the pilot noticed a vibration in the cyclic. The pilot carried out a precautionary landing and discovered that one of the main rotor blades had delaminated and peeled back approximately 2 cms and 10 cms from the blade tip. The investigation is continuing. During the cruise at FL370, the aircraft encountered moderate to severe turbulence, thought to be wake turbulence from a crossing heavy aircraft at FL380. The aircraft was diverted to Alice Springs due to a medical emergency. During the landing roll on runway 30, the aircraft struck a black kite (bird).

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Page 46 of 47

Annex H – BITRE Data

TOTAL AIRCRAFT Movements Annual Growth 7,597 9,093 19.7% 10,001 10.0% 9,591 -4.1% 6,038 -37.0% 9,923 64.3% 10,417 5.0% 11,320 8.7% 12,617 11.5% 13,928 10.4% 13,116 -5.8% 13,210 0.7% 13,249 0.3% 12,697 -4.2% 12,741 0.3% 11,254 -11.7% 7,856 -30.2% 7,647 -2.7% 7,900 3.3% 7,421 -6.1% 7,076 -4.6% 6,298 -11.0% 6,352 0.9% 6,657 4.8%

Average annual growth: 5 years 2003-04 to 2008-09: 10 years 1998-99 to 2008-09: 20 years 1988-89 to 2008-09:

ALICE SPRINGS - TOTAL AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS - Financial Years 16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 0

19 85 ‐8 19 6 86 ‐8 19 7 87 ‐8 19 8 88 ‐8 19 9 89 ‐9 19 0 90 ‐9 19 1 91 ‐9 19 2 92 ‐9 19 3 93 ‐9 19 4 94 ‐9 19 5 95 ‐9 19 6 96 ‐9 19 7 97 ‐9 19 8 98 ‐9 19 9 99 ‐0 20 0 00 ‐0 20 1 01 ‐0 20 2 02 ‐0 20 3 03 ‐0 20 4 04 ‐0 20 5 05 ‐0 20 6 06 ‐0 20 7 07 ‐0 20 8 08 ‐0 9

Financial Year 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09

-3.4% -6.3% -1.8%


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Annex H – BITRE Data (continued)

TOTAL PASSENGER Movements Annual Growth 557,364 621,004 11.4% 717,218 15.5% 720,526 0.5% 457,388 -36.5% 715,559 56.4% 717,762 0.3% 790,695 10.2% 893,095 13.0% 953,602 6.8% 853,274 -10.5% 798,751 -6.4% 781,207 -2.2% 802,704 2.8% 780,825 -2.7% 715,632 -8.3% 561,509 -21.5% 571,804 1.8% 607,751 6.3% 602,905 -0.8% 605,073 0.4% 624,326 3.2% 627,425 0.5% 674,215 7.5%

Average annual growth: 5 years 2003-04 to 2008-09: 10 years 1998-99 to 2008-09: 20 years 1988-89 to 2008-09:

ALICE SPRINGS - TOTAL PASSENGER MOVEMENTS - Financial Years 1,200,000

1,000,000

800,000

600,000

400,000

200,000

0 19 85 ‐8 19 6 86 ‐8 19 7 87 ‐8 19 8 88 ‐8 19 9 89 ‐9 19 0 90 ‐9 19 1 91 ‐9 19 2 92 ‐9 19 3 93 ‐9 19 4 94 ‐9 19 5 95 ‐9 19 6 96 ‐9 19 7 97 ‐9 19 8 98 ‐9 19 9 99 ‐0 20 0 00 ‐0 20 1 01 ‐0 20 2 02 ‐0 20 3 03 ‐0 20 4 04 ‐0 20 5 05 ‐0 20 6 06 ‐0 20 7 07 ‐0 20 8 08 ‐0 9

Financial Year 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09

2.1% -1.7% -0.3%


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