an assessment of ceo oversight of natural disaster preparedness

AN ASSESSMENT OF CEO OVERSIGHT OF NATURAL DISASTER PREPAREDNESS James L. Morrison University of Delaware Ganiyu Titi Oladunjouye Deborah Dembry Albany State University ABSTRACT This study focuses attention on CEO effectiveness in overseeing natural disaster preparedness in organizations in the manufacturing sector. Based upon an online survey of those in mid-management positions in organizations within the manufacturing sector, there is the perception that the CEO is somewhat disconnected from natural disaster planning. In this regard, the findings of the study support the conclusion that the CEO in particular is not attending to disaster preparedness to the degree that managers would like. Ironically, the CEO is perceived as being effective in compiling current data on an organization’s natural disaster risks but ineffective when overseeing the establishment of a preventive framework. Keywords: Natural Disaster Preparedness, Business Continuity, Business Resilience

INTRODUCTION The economic costs of natural disasters in 2011 carried a price tag of approximately $380 billion, resulting from not only earthquakes in Japan and New Zealand, but from tornadoes, hurricanes and flooding around the world. (Wahlstrom, 2012). This figure is about two-thirds higher than that recorded in 2005, indicating that the natural disasters are becoming a major issue. Natural disasters caused by landslides, earthquakes, hurricanes, wildfires, avalanches, floods, wind and ice storms can occur in any part of the world, and thus North America is not immune. According to Wahlstrom (2012), in April 2012 alone, 32 tornadoes were reported in Kansas, Colorado and Texas, while four major blizzards and winter storms impacted the midAtlantic and Eastern United States earlier in the same year. Just last November, a 6.6 magnitude earthquake rocked British Columbia. Also in 2011, Ontario made headlines with 18 registered tornadoes in the span of one month. Wahlstrom (2012) goes on and states that the increasing number of natural disasters each year is likely resulting from climate change, poor land use, and disruptive atmospheric imbalances, resulting in severe drought in some areas as well as widespread flooding in others. Therefore, for this research, a natural disaster is a sudden calamitous event that is the result of atmospheric and other geological imbalances that threatens the viability of the organization and is characterized by creating chaos, disruption of operations, confusion, and even death of employees. Most companies in the United States are not immune from the destruction that may result from a natural disaster, no matter if they are located in coastal states or in the central part of the country. The question that begs to be answered is how well are American companies prepared to react to a natural disaster, if one suddenly occurs. This study is focused on the senior leadership of companies for determining to what degree is attention being given to natural International Journal of Business and Public Administration, Volume 11, Number 2, Summer 2014

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disaster preparedness; and in particular, how effective has the CEO been in overseeing planning strategies to ready workers to anticipate tasks that will be helpful for surviving an ordeal of significant magnitude. Natural disasters present issues that test the ability of organizations to effectively protect their employees as well as their infrastructure, resulting in reducing both human and property loss. BACKGROUND OF STUDY Dimensions to Natural Disaster Preparedness Drabak (2001) defines natural disaster preparedness planning as a process of generating strategies to be followed in readying an organization for sudden organizational emergency. Preparedness consists of pre-event planning to address complications that are likely outcomes of a natural disaster: such as: (1) loss of key personnel; (2) conflict over authority and decisionmaking; (3) need to sustain operational capacity of organization; and (4) responsibility of assuring safety and rescue needs of employees. Bankoff (2004) points out that natural disasters affect organizations in the private sector, often resulting in severe consequences to the livelihood of employees working at an impacted site. Moreover, those in leadership positions are not only vulnerable to what has occurred but also to what may lie ahead such as financial loss, displacement, and anxiety. Unfortunately, employees in organizations typically have little time to respond appropriately to such a catastrophic event, unless prior plans have been put into effect. (Quarantelli, 1988). Identified here are some of the natural disasters that propose a challenge for organizational preparedness: avalanches, blizzards, earthquakes, cyclones, floods, landsides, severe storms, tornadoes, tsunami, wildfires, forest fires, and hurricanes, etc. Organizational Preparedness Wooten and James (2008) of the University of Michigan Ross School of Business and Erika Hayes James (2008) of the University of Virginia Darden Business School suggest that most executives are generally aware of the negative consequences associated with an organizational crisis, but they typically have a personal laissez faire attitude toward planning for an unlikely possibility of a natural disaster impacting them directly. Consequently, to them employees perceive leaders as being generally underprepared for guiding their organizations through turbulent times. Accordingly, Kunreuther and Useem (2010) argue for organizations to have leadership in place which may avert a tragedy resulting from an organizational crisis, whether man-made or natural variety. To them, the best time to establish a state of readiness is well before the actual event. Hutchins, Heather and Gaudet (2008) point out that natural disaster crisis planning generally has been an overlooked researched area in the organizational leadership literature. Often overlooked areas of leadership responsibility for organizational preparedness include predetermined policies and procedures (1) to rescue employees from harm; (2) to secure technological systems and infrastructure; and (3) to establish an organizational culture that is confident in dealing with a natural disaster. In their study of crisis planning conducted by the research team seven months after Hurricane Katrina, results indicated that organizations generally did increase efforts in disaster planning somewhat during the post-Katrina period.

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However, they also point out that natural disaster preparedness still needs to be enhanced in terms of attention to and resources allocated by the senior leadership. Carney and Jorden (1993) state that managers generally believe that senior leadership should provide the proactive planning required to avoid the unnecessary destruction of both facilities and human life resulting from an unpredictable event. The research of Herman, Oliver and Barton (2002) reveal that the better prepared a company is, the more likely it is to survive a crisis. Similarly, Mitroff and Alpasian (2003) report that there is growing evidence that crisis prepared companies fare better financially and stay in business longer. Moreover, Stocker (1997) states that crisis preparation helps organizations anticipate ramifications of a disaster, enabling organization to devise tactics to modify the impact of such events. Hesselbein (2002) of the Drucker Foundation points out that crisis preparedness is a test of character of leadership. Interestingly, Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) report that most research on crisis management effectiveness has focused on after-the-event analysis. Based on their research, they also state that those in senior leadership positions appear to rely considerably on the public sector (e.g., Federal, and State emergency services) and community non-profit agencies to assist in providing aid to affected employees and their families. While leaders do realize that a crisis has the potential to disrupt operations of an entire organization (Coombs, 1999), they tend to ignore serious pre-event planning. Even though natural disasters can be “show-stopping, peoplestopping, reputational defining” (Lukaszewski, 2003), the prevailing sense existing among senior leaders of organizations is that it cannot happen to them. Accordingly, a 2003 study published in the Harvard Business Review indicated that only between 5 and 25 percent of Fortune 500 companies were prepared to cope with a crisis, leaving approximately 75 percent not prepared (Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2004). Finally, Runyan (2006), based on his study of organizational responses as an outcome of Hurricane Katrina, found that there was a lack of planning by small business; vulnerability to cash flow interruption; lack of access to capital for recovery; problems caused by federal assistance; and serious infrastructure problems impeding recovery. Schoenberg (2010), after a more current review of the research on crisis preparation and planning, reported that there remains a scarcity of research performed on pre-event natural disaster planning. Therefore, an intriguing question here remains: ‘Has the senior leadership in today’s organizations been ignoring natural disaster impacts over the last decade, or are they personally paying more attention to pre-event planning? RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS Tufekci and Wallace (1998) suggest that natural disaster preparedness efforts consist of two stages; pre-event and post-event. Pre-event tasks include predicting and analyzing potential dangers and developing necessary action plans for mitigation. Post-event response depicts those tasks undertaken immediately after the disaster has actually occurred. Since the review of the literature indicates that previously published data on pre-event natural disaster planning is rather scarce, the research question investigated is how effective is the CEO currently in exhibiting leadership in organizational preparedness. This study relies upon collecting data from those most affected by the occurrence of a natural disaster; in this case, managers who have responsibility over daily operations. What is unique here is the use of a research design that gathers data on natural disaster preparedness from a multi-dimensional perspective, comparing managers with varying degrees of education and work experience, as well as those located in different parts of the country and situated in varying


68

size of organizations. Thus, for analyzing organizational preparedness in more depth than in the past, the following null hypothesis was tested. H0 : the perceptions of those in mid-management positions in terms of the effectiveness of the CEO in overseeing organizational preparedness in regards to natural disasters will not vary by region of the country, size of the organization, length of employment, and education level. METHODOLOGY Instrument The survey instrument used for gathering data was designed through the University of Delaware Qualtrics Access protocol. An online data gathering instrument was utilized to gather data on delineating CEO involvement in mitigating and readying an organization to protect the safety of employees, as well as to preserve property. The original survey form was given to nine managers from the Delaware-Pennsylvania-New Jersey Regions. After getting feedback from this consulting group, several items were deleted from the original instrument and several other items were revised. As the result of this process, the instrument has content validity. The survey consisted of seven items related to CEO oversight to natural disaster preparedness. A 5-point rating scale using strongly agree to strongly disagree was adopted for recording responses of those in the sample. The instrument was delivered online during a two-week span in January 2012. Research Sample Using the American Business National Data Base (2012) of 50,000 managers, a random sample of 1000 managers was selected. The sample consisted of managers employed in positions in organizations in the manufacturing sector within the United States. Manufacturing was identified as a significant sector where CEOs generally have a substantial financial investment in facilities (e.g., plant, equipment, technology, etc.) The sample for the study was 120, representing 12 percent return. Those in the sample were sent two online reminders to complete the survey. Statistical Measures Using a 5-point rating nominal scale to collect data, the Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric independent samples test was performed on the four variables identified for study: region of the country, size of organization, length of employment, and educational level of manager. Due to the fact that there were few responses in the strongly agree and strongly disagree categories, responses to the 5-point scale were regrouped to +1 to signify agree or strongly agree; 0, for no opinion; and -1, for disagree or strongly disagree. By grouping responses into three categories, a sufficient number of responses was generated for statistical measures to be calculated. In addition, a Cronbach Reliability Test (1951) was performed in which a coefficient of .87 was calculated, which is well above the.70 generally required for determining survey reliablity.


69

FINDINGS Descriptive Analysis The sample for the study consisted of 120 managers, with 101 being male and 19, female. In terms of the region of the country, the sample was well distributed throughout the country with 54 managers from coastal states (those bordering either the Atlantic or Pacific Ocean or the Gulf of Mexico); 24, from North Central States (those in northern ½ of country); and 34, from South Central States (those in southern ½ of country). In terms of educational level, 47 had a bachelor’s degree, and 57, an advanced degree, with both degrees representing 85 percent of the sample. However, about 15 percent of the sample possessed either a secondary school diploma or had some college education. In terms of length of employment, 72 managers had 11 or more years of employment service with their company and 48 had 10 years or less. Finally, only 17 in the sample were employed in companies having over 1000 employees whereas 103 were situated in either medium to small companies. Overall Perceptions of Managers of CEO Oversight of Natural Disaster Preparedness Based upon the overall mean scores of perceptions of managers as to the effectiveness of their CEO in overseeing natural disaster preparedness planning, there appears to be general disagreement that their senior leadership has been effective in this regard. (Table 1) Using a rating scale where +1 indicated agreement, -1, disagreement; and 0, no opinion, the overall calculated means indicated that the managers mostly disagreed that they had a qualified natural disaster team in place (m=-.45), a well-qualified chief risk officer in place (m=-.41), a proactive CEO (m=-.34) , effective rescue procedures in place (m=-.36), a regular review of disaster preparedness (m=-.34) or a clearly identifiable chain of command in place for handing a natural disaster (m=-.08). However, there was a perception that their CEO had compiled up-to-date information about their organization’s natural disaster risks (m = .32). (Table 1) Table 1 Overall Frequency Distribution of Perceptions of Managers of the Effectiveness of Their CEO Overseeing Natural Disaster Preparedness (N=120) Rating Scalea Survey Items -1 0 +1 Mean Qualified Nat. Disaster Team in Place 77 20 23 -.45 Qualified Nat. Disaster Risk Officer in Place 82 7 32 -.41 CEO Proactive in Nat. Disaster Planning 78 5 37 -.34 Effective Rescue Procedures in Place 78 7 35 -.36 Up-To-Date Data on Organizational Risks Compiled 39 4 77 +.32 Regularly Review of Disaster Preparedness 70 21 29 -.34 Chain of Command for Nat. Disaster in Place 54 21 45 -.08

Var. .636 .781 .849 .820 .874 .714 .826

Note: a: -1 = disagree; 0 = no opinion; +1= agree

Region of Country. In analyzing responses of managers by region of country, there were generally, with one exception, no significant differences in perceptions. Using the KruskallWallis Test for independent samples for comparing responses of 50 managers situated in coastal states, 24 in north-central states, and 46 in south-central states (Table 2), there was only one item where there was a significant statistical difference; that being, the perception of having a well-


70

qualified chief natural disaster risk officer in place. There was a significantly greater degree of disagreement with this perception of those situated in organizations in a coastal state than the other two regions of the country (p = .026). Table 2 Comparative Analysis of Perceptions of Managers of Their CEO Oversight of Natural Disaster Preparedness by Region of Country (N=120)

Ob. Ex. 0

Ob. Ex. +1

Meand

T-Statb

df

Signif.

Qualified Team in Place

Ob. Ex -1

1a

35 (32.1)

9 (8.3)

6 (9.6)

-.58

1.907

2

.385

2

14 (15.4)

4 (4.0)

6 (4.6)

-.33

3

28 (29.5)

7 (7.7)

11 (8.8)

-.37

1

40 (33.8)

3 (2.9)

7 (13.3)

-.66

7.337

2

.026*

2

15 (16.2)

3 (1.4)

6 (6.4)

-.38

3

26 (31.1)

1 (2.7)

19 (12.3)

-.15

1

36 (32.5)

2 (2.1)

12 (15.4)

-.48

1.919

2

.383

2

14 (15.6)

2 (1.0)

8 (7.4)

-.25

3

28 (29.9)

1 (1.9)

17 (14.2)

-.24

1

37 (32.5)

2 (2.9)

11 (14.6)

-.52

2.899

2

.235

2

14 (15.6)

1 (1.4)

9 (7.0)

-.21

3

27 (29.9)

4 (2.7)

15 (13.4)`

-.26

21 (16.3)

2 (1.7)

27 (32.1)

.12

4.649

2

.098

2

7 (7.8)

2 (1.8)

15 (15.4)

.33

3

11 (15.0)

0(1.5)

35 (29.5)

.52

1

32 (29.2)

11 (8.8)

7 (12.1)

-.50

2.598

2

.273

2

14 (14.0)

3 (4.2)

7 (5.8)

-.29

3

24 (26.8)

7 (8.1)

15 (11.1)

-.20

1

29 (22.5)

5 (8.8)

16 (18.8)

-.26

3.748

2

.154

2

10 (10.8)

3 (4.2)

11 (9.0)

.04

3

15 (20.7)

13 (8.1)

18 (17.3)

.07

Item

Risk Officer in Place

CEO Proactive

Rescue Proc. In Place

Up-to-date Risk Data 1

Reg. Review of Prep.

Chain of Command

Note:

abcd•

1 = 50 Coastal States; 2= 24 North-Central States; 3= 46 South-Central States Kruskal-Wallis Independent Samples Statistical Measure ob = observed; ex – expected -1 = disagree; 0 = no opinion; +1 = agree (Rating Scale) significance at the .05 level


71

Size of Organization. In terms of size of the company, there were systematic significant differences in their perceptions of their CEO oversight of natural disaster preparedness. The findings indicate that those managers in mid-size operations demonstrated considerably lesser degree of disagreement that their CEO was ineffective in natural disaster oversight than those in other size organizations. (Table 3) In terms of having a qualified natural disaster team and risk Table 3 Comparative Analysis of Perceptions of Managers of Their CEO Oversight of Natural Disaster Preparedness by Size of Company (N=120)

Ob. Ex. 0

Ob. Ex. +1

Meand

T-Statb

df

Signif.


Ob. Exc -1

1a

37 (34.0)

1 (8.8)

4 (10.2)

-.62

6.526

2

.038*

2

27 (32.1)

6 (8.3)

17 (9.6)

-.20

3

13 (10.9)

2 (2.8)

2 (3.3)

-.65

1

41 (35.8)

5 (3.1)

7 (14.1)

-.64

8.481

2

.014*

2

27 (33.8)

2 (2.9)

21 (13.3)

-.12

3

13 (11.5)

0 (1.0)

4 (4.5)

-.53

1

40 (34.4)

3 (2.2)

10 (16.3)

-.57

8.292

2

.000*

2

26 (32.5)

0 (2.1)

24 (15.4)

-.04

3

12 (11.0)

2 (1.7)

3 (5.2)

-.53

1

39 (34.4)

7 (3.1)

7 (15.5)

-.60

15.260

2

.000*

2

24 (32.5)

0 (2.9)

26 (14.6)

-.04

3

15 (11.0)

0 (1.0)

2 (5.0)

-.76

1

24 (17.2)

3 (1.8)

26 (34.0)

-.04

10.183

2

.006*

2

14 (16.3)

1 (1.7)

36 (32.1)

.46

3

2 (5.5)

0 (0.6)

15 (10.9)

.76

1

33 (30.9)

10 (9.3)

10 (12.8)

-.43

11.226

2

.004*

2

22 (29.2)

10 (8.8)

18 (12.1)

-.08

3

15 (9.9)

1 (3.0)

1 (4.1)

-.82

1

36 (23.8)

7 (9/3)

10 (19.9)

-.49

23.086

2

.000*

2

16 (22.5)

11 (8.8)

23 (18.8)

.14

3

2 (7.7)

3 (3.0)

12 (6.4)

Item


CEO Proactive


Up-To-Date Risk Data


Chain of Command

Note:

abcd•

1 = 53 (0 - 250 Employees); 2= 50 (251 – 1000 employees); Kruskal-Wallis Independent Samples Statistical Measure ob = observed; ex – expected -1 = disagree; 0 = no opinion; +1 = agree (Rating Scale) significance at the .05 level

.59 3= 17 (1000+ employees)


72

officer in place, a CEO being proactive in natural disaster planning, and having regular reviews of disaster preparedness, the managers in both smaller and larger organizations indicate significantly greater disagreement as to their CEO effectiveness (Table 3). However, in regard to compiling up-to-date information on a company’s natural disaster risks, those managers in larger organizations (m=+.76) were in significantly greater agreement that their CEO was effective than either those in a medium size company (m=+.46) or small size (m = -.04). Similarly, a statistical difference was computed in regard to a company having a clearly identifiable chain of command in place to cope with an actual natural disaster if one should suddenly occur. In this instance, managers in larger organizations were in great agreement (m =+.59) than those in medium size (=+.14) and in smaller organizations (m = -.49) (Table 3) Educational Level. Based upon the educational level of the manager, there were significant statistical differences in the degree of disagreement among their perceptions as to the ineffectiveness of their CEO in natural disaster oversight for six of the seven items on the online survey. Only for the perception that there was a well-qualified natural disaster risk officer in place was there no statistical difference (p.=.095). Generally, those managers holding either a 4-year baccalaureate degree or having completed post-Master’s work held similar perceptions as to the effectiveness of their CEO in natural disaster preparedness. However, perceptions were significantly different from those managers holding a secondary school diploma or a Master’s. In regards to having a qualified natural disaster team in place, a chief risk officer in place, a proactive CEO and effective rescue procedure in place, and having a regular review of disaster preparedness, these two groups of managers held very similar levels of disagreement (Table 4) as demonstrated via similar negative mean scores (m=-.57; m=-.65). Moreover, the mean scores of perceptions of those managers with either a secondary school diploma or Master’s degree indicated a lesser degree of disagreement (m=-.11; m=-.21). Of particular interest is that all managers with the exception of those who have earned a Master’s degree (m = -.05) agreed that their CEO was effective in compiling data about their organization’s natural disaster risks. However, in terms of having a clearly identifiable chain of command in effect, those with post-Master’s educational experience (m =-.76) had significantly different perceptions that those in the other educational categories (m=.21, .04,and -05) (Table 4) Length of Employment. In terms of length of employment, there was a significant statistical difference among the perceptions of managers as to the ineffectiveness of their CEO oversight in natural disaster preparedness for all seven items on the online survey questionnaire (Table 5). Specifically, for their perceptions regarding the placement of a qualified natural disaster team, the appointment of a qualified risk officer, their CEO being proactive, having effective rescue procedures in place, having a regular review of disaster preparedness, and having a clearly identifiable chain of command in place, those managers with a longer length of service with 16+ or more years were significantly at a higher degree of disagreement that their CEO was effective than those with fewer years of employment in their organization. (Table 5). Finally, those managers relatively new to an organization were in greater agreement (m=1.00) that their CEO had compiled up-to-date data on organizational natural disaster risks than their counterparts (m = -.48, .71, .24).


73

Table 4 Comparative Analysis of Perceptions of Managers of Their CEO Oversight of Natural Disaster Preparedness by Educational Level (n=120) Item

Ob. Exc

Ob. Ex.

Ob. Ex.

Meand

T-Statb

df

Signif.

19.166

3

.000*

6.377

3

.095


-1

0

+1

1a

3 (12.2)

16 (3.2)

0 (3.7)

-.16

2

38 (30.2)

3 (7.8)

6 (9.0)

-.68

3

21 (23.7)

1 (6.2)

15 (7.1)

-.16

4

15 (10.9)

0 (2.8)

2 (3.3)

-.76

1

9 (12.8)

3 (1.1)

7 (5.2)

-.11

2

36 (31.7)

2 (2.7)

9 (12.5)

-.57

3

23 (25.0)

0 (2/2)

14 (9.9)

-.24

4

13 (11.5)

2 (1.0)

2 (4.5)

-.65

Ob. Ex. 0 3 (1.8)

Ob. Ex +1. 6 (5.8)

Meand

T-Statb

df

Signif.

1

Ob. Ex -1 10 (12.4)

-.21

8.253

3

.041*

2

36 (30.6)

2 (2.0)

9 (14.5)

-.57

3

19 (24.1)

0 (1.5)

18 (11.4)

-.03

4

13 ( 11.0)

0 (0.7)

4 (5.2)

-.53

1

4 (12.4)

7 (1.1)

8 (5.6)

.21

22.612

3

.000*

2

39 (30.6)

0 (0.2)

8 (13.7)

-.66

3

20 (24.1)

0 (2.2)

17 (10.8)

-.08

4

15 (11.0)

0 (1.0)

2 (5/0)

-.76

1

2 (6.2)

1 (0.6)

16 (12,2)

.74

16.161

3

.001*

2

17 (15.3)

2 (1.6)

28 (30.2)

.23

3

19 (12.9)

1 (1.2)

17 (23.7)

-.05

4

1 (5.5)

0 (0.6)

16 (10.9)

.88

1

6 (11.1)

2 (3.3)

11 (4.6)

.26

20.335

3

.000*

2

37 (27.4)

6 (8.2)

4 (11.4)

-.70

3

17 (21.6)

7 (6.5)

13 (8.9)

-.11

4

10 (9.9)

6 (3.0)

1 (24.1)

-.53

1

6 (8.6)

3 (3.3)

10 (7.1)

.21

12.580

3

.006*

2

19 (21.2)

7 (8.2)

21 (17.6)

.04

3

15 (16.7)

9 (6.5)

13 (13.9)

-.05

4

14 (7.7)

2 (3.0)

1 (6.4)

-.76


CEO Proactive

c




Chain of Command

Note: a - 1 = 19 (Diploma/Some College); 2 = 47 ( 4-Yr. Baccalaureate); 3 = 37 (Masters) ; 4 = 17 (Post-Masters); b - Kruskal-Wallis Independent Samples Statistical Measure; c - ob = actual observations; ex = expected observations d - -1 = disagree; 0 = no opinion; +1 = agree (Rating Scale); * - Significance at the .05 level


74

Table 5 Comparative Analysis of Perceptions of Managers by Length of Service (n=120) Item

Ob. Exc

Ob. Ex.

Ob. Ex.

Meand

T-Statb

df

Signif.


-1

0

+1

0 (12.2)

15 (3.2)

4 (3.6)

.21

27.746

3

.000*

2

25 (18.6)

3

24 (21.8)

1 (4.8)

3 (5.6)

-.76

2 (5.7)

8 (6.5)

-.47

4

28 (24.4)

2 (6.3)

8 (7.3)

-.53

1

6 (2.8)

4 (1.1)

9 (5.1)

.16

17.015

3

.001*

2

26 (19.6)

1 (1.7)

2 (7.7)

-.83

3

21 (23.0)

1 (2.0)

12 (9.1)

-.26

4

28 (25.7)

1 (2.2)

9 (10.1)

-.50

1

7 (12.4)

2 (1.8)

10 (5.9)

.16

12.934

3

.005*

2

25 (18.9)

0 (1.2)

4 (8.9)

-.72

3

19 (22.1)

2 (1.4)

13 (10.5)

-.18

4

27 (24.7)

1 (1.6)

10 (11.7)

-.45

1

2 (12.4)

6 (1.1)

11 (5.5)

.45

24.890

3

.000*

2

25 (18.9)

0 (1.7)

4 (8.5)

-.72

3

24 (22.1)

0 (2.0)

10 (9.9)

-.41

4

27 (24.7)

1 (2.2)

10 (11.1)

-.45

1

0 (6.2)

0 (0.6)

19 (12.2)

1.00

38.875

3

.000*

2

20 (9.4)

3 (1.0)

6 (18/6)

-.48

3

5 (11.0)

0 (1.1)

29 (21.8)

.71

4

14 (12.4)

1 (1.3)

23 (24.4)

.24

1

2 (11.1)

4 (3.3)

13 (4.6)

.58

26.738

3

.000*

2

21 (16.9)

6 (5.1)

2 (7.0)

-.66

3

23 (19.8)

5 (6.0)

6 (8.2)

-.49

4

24 (22.2)

6 (6.7)

8 (9.2)

-.42

1

2 (8.5)

6 (3.3)

11 (7.1)

.47

37.513

3

.000*

2

22 (13.1)

2 (5.1)

5 (10.9)

-.59

3

5 (15.3)

7 (6.0)

7 (14.3)

.51

4

25 (17.1)

6 (6.7)

7 (14.3)

-.47

1

a


CEO Proactive




Chain of Command

Note:

a - 1 = 19 (0-5 years); 2 = 29 ( 6-10 years); 3 = 34 (11-15 years) ; 4 = 38 (16+ years) b c d *

-

Kruskal-Wallis Independent Samples Statistical Measure ob = actual observations; ex = expected observations -1 = disagree; 0 = no opinion; +1 = agree (Rating Scale) Significance at the .05 level


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RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH Since this study focused attention on CEO effectiveness in overseeing natural disaster preparedness in organizations in the manufacturing sector, it would be helpful to conduct a similar study using managers in other sectors, such as financial, retailing, and technology. Determining the state of current preparedness in the private sector would provide insight as to how resilient we actually will be if and when such a natural disaster occurs. Indications are that natural disasters are likely to be more frequent as documented by the recent number of tornadoes recorded with past year. CONCLUSION The findings of this study support the conclusion that the CEO in particular is not attending to disaster preparedness to the degree that managers would like; and this is in spite of recent tragic events (such as tornadoes, earthquakes, and flooding) over the past several years. Although the CEO is perceived as being effective in compiling current information on an organization’s natural disaster risks, he or she is perceived as being ineffective with oversight practices in general. In this regard, the significant differences among perceptions of managers due to the effects of location, size of the organization, length of employment and educational level were in the degree of disagreement to their CEO being effective in organizational preparedness generally and not in support of their CEO’s performance. This degree of ineffectiveness as perceived by managers appears to be consistent across the country. However, those managers in both smaller as well as larger organizations disagree to greater degree as to the ineffectiveness of their CEO than their counterparts in mid-size companies. Also, it may be concluded that those managers with longer employment records are more skeptical of their CEO’s effectiveness than those with shorter employment records. Therefore, the null hypothesis of the study that the perceptions of those in mid-management positions in terms of the effectiveness of the CEO in overseeing organizational preparedness in regards to natural disasters will not vary by length of employment, education level, and size of the organization is rejected . This study suggests that CEOs should reposition themselves with an increased personal effort to rally their staffs to enhance natural disaster preparedness. REFERENCES

American Business National Data Base (2012). 700 Larkspur Landing Circle, Larkspur, CA 94939 Bankoff, G. (2004). Time is of the essence. Disasters, vulnerability and history. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 22, No. 3, 23-42. Carney, A., & Jorden, A. (1993, August). Prepare for business-related crises. Public Relations Journal, 34 – 35. Coombs, T. W. (1999). Ongoing crisis communication. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.


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Coombs, Timothy W., Holladay, & Sherry J. (2001). An extended examination of the crisis situation: a fusion of the relational management and symbolic approaches. Journal of Public Relations Research, 321 – 340. Cronbach, L.J. (1951). Coefficient alpha and internal structure of tests. Psychometrika, 16, 297334. Drabek, T. (2001) .Disaster warning and evacuation responses by private business employees. Disasters, 25, (1), 76–94. Hesselbein, F. (2002, Fall). Crisis management: a leadership imperative. Leader to Leader (online). Retrieved on February 13, 2004, http://www.pfdf.org/leaderboos/L2L/fall2002/fh.html Herman, M. L. & Oliver, B. Management, 48 – 53.

(January 2002). A primer for crisis management. Risk

Hutchins, H. Annulis, H., & Gaudet, C. (2008). Crisis planning: Survey results from Hurricane Katrina and implications for performance improvement professionals http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/piq.20002/abstract (retrieved May 5, 2012) Kunreuther, Howard and Useem, Michael (2010). Learning from catastrophes: Strategies of reaction and response. University of Pennsylvania, Wharton Publishing. Lukaszewski, J. (August 18, 2003). Managing the boss and the bosses during crises. PR Reporter, 4-6. Mitroff, I., & Alpasian, M. (April 2003). Preparing for evil. Harvard Business Review, 109 – 115. Mitroff & Alpaslan.(2004) Preparing for Evil. http://www.visitmyphilippines.com/images/ads/aa7aeca3ce9ab73291f2337e6c4a072b.pdf National Association of Manufacturers (2009). http://www.nam.org/Statistics-AndData/Facts- About-Manufacturing/Landing.aspx (retrieved May 5, 2012) Pauchant,T.C., & Mitroff, I.I. (1992). Transforming the crisis-prone organization: Preventing individual, organizational and environmental tragedies. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers. Quarantelli, E. (1988). Disaster crisis management: A summary of research findings. Journal of Management Studies, 25, 373-385. Runyan, Rodney (2006). Small business in the face of crisis: Identifying barriers to recovery from a natural disaster. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5973.2006.00477.x, 14, (1), 12–26.


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Schoenberg, Allan. (2005) Do crisis plans matter? A new perspective on leading during a crisis. Public Relations Quarterly, H. J. Ventures International, 1-6. http://www.webpages.uidaho.edu/css594/secure/lessons/05/schoenberg%20crisis%20pla nn%20leadrshp.pdf (retrieved May 7, 2012) Stocker, K. P., (1997). A strategic approach to crisis management. In Caywood, C.L. (Ed). The handbook of strategic public relations and integrated communications. New York: McGraw Hill, 189 – 203. Tufekci, S., & Wallace, W.A. (1998). The emerging area of emergency management and engineering. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 45 (2), 103–105 Wahlstrom, M. (2012). Natural disasters in 2011 make for costliest year ever. UN News Service, March 5, 2012 Wooten, L., & James, E. (2008). Linking crisis management and leadership competencies: The role of human resource development. Advances in Developing Human Resources, 10, (3), 352-379.

About the Authors: James L. Morrison is a professor of organizational and community leadership in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Delaware. His research focuses on assessing leadership effectiveness in enhancing innovation, diversity, and ethics in the workplace. He has published over 75 articles and presented over 100 papers at conferences around the world. His current research is assessing senior leadership effectiveness in natural disaster preparedness planning. Ganiyu T. Oladunjoye is a retired professor of Educational Leadership. He worked as a Fulbright Scholar in the Faculty of Education and Liberal Studies at the University of Technology, Jamaica at Kingston in 2002/2003 academic year. Prior to transferring to the College of Education in 2005, he was the chair of the Department of Accounting, Business Information Systems and Marketing at Albany State University, Albany. He is a welltraveled scholar having presented papers in five continents. Deborah E. Bembry is a professor of Education at Albany State University. Her certifications are in Early Childhood Education, Educational Leadership and Middle Grades Language Arts, Science and Social Studies. She currently serves as the chair of the Department of Counseling and Educational Leadership. She has taught in kindergarten, first grade and higher education. Her teaching career has taken her to Morehead State University, Morris Brown College, and Olivet Nazarene University.


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Appendix (Survey Instrument) Specific Leadership Actions of CEO For Reducing Vulnerability of Organization __________________________________________________________________________ Please Tell us About Yourself (Please Circle Only One Per Item) __________________________________________________________________________

Type of Organization:

Manufacturing

Service

Other _________________ (Please State)

No. of Years Employed at Company:

0–5

Job Title/Position:

Upper Management

(Job Title) ________________________

Middle Management

(Job Title)_________________________

Lower/Supervisory Mgmt.

(Job Title)_________________________

Gender:

Female

Male

6 – 10

11 – 15

over 15

Other

Overall Size of Company: 0 – 100 101 - 1000 1001 –5000 5001 + (No. of Employees in Co.) ____________________________________________________________________________ Directions: The purpose of this questionnaire is to assess the effectiveness of current planning to identify and promote strategies for the prevention, mitigation and management of natural disasters. Please indicate your perceptions of your CEO by responding to each of the following questions using a 5-point Likert rating scale where 1 = strongly disagree; 3 no opinion; and 5 strongly agree. _____________________________________________________________________________ Strongly Disagree 1

Strongly Agree

2 3 4

5

CEO attention to Natural Disaster Oversight Practices 1. The CEO has put into place a strong natural disaster oversight team.

2.

Our CEO has in place a well-qualified natural disaster chief risk office as part of the executive team

1 2 3

1

4

5

2 3 4 5


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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Our CEO has been proactive with our company’s Board of Directors in Natural Disaster Planning

1 2 3 4 5

The CEO has planned for implementing effective rescue operations for those employees directly affected.

1 2 3 4 5

The CEO has led effort to compile, evaluate, and keep up-to-date information about company natural disaster risks and preparedness.

1 2 3 4 5

The CEO regularly reviews preparedness plans so that all members of the company know in a natural disaster what to do.

1 2 3 4 5

The CEO has clearly identified a chain of command to be used During an natural disaster to our organization.

1 2 3 4 5


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