Applied Ethics and Philosophy

Philosophy in Context, V o l . 18, © 1988

Applied Ethics and Philosophy Mark D. Stohs

Are philosophers engaged in applied ethics doing philosophy? In his article, " A p p l i e d Ethics: Some Platonic Quesdons," David L . Roochnik argues quite vehemently that applied ethics is not philosophy. He states that he w i l l "argue for an extreme thesis: that applied ethics is not a genuine philosophical discipline."' Despite this strict denial, Roochnik apparendy concedes that "to the extent that [applied ethics] uses contemporary conflicts in order to force students to reflect on higher principles, it is philosophical."^ Unfortunately, Roochnik fails to consider the degree to which applied ethics courses are designed to lift students sights to higher principles. In his reply, R . M . Fox challenges Roochnik's stringent denial that applied ethics is philosophy, primarily by strengthening the case that insofar as applied ethics teaches "us something about the adequacy or inadequacy of ethical theories [principles]," it qualifies as philosophy.^ Fox suggests several means whereby this aim can be satisfied, and adds that even the process or activity of approaching lofty principles should be classified as philosophy.^ One interpretation of this debate is that Roochnik allows that some instances of engaging in applied ethics qualify as philosophy, but very few such instances exist; while Fox argues that a broader range of such instances exists. To resolve such questions, an empirical investigation would have to be undertaken. Presumably the questionnaire would elicit whether an applied philosophy course is "designed to stimulate the student to further philosophical discussion, or is it designed to return the student to the "real w o r l d " after having injected her with a small dose of ethical sensitivity."^ But this suggestion diverts attention from the key issue. Discovering whether applied ethics classes stimulate students to think philosophically is a pedagogical invesdgation. Even the purported " p u r e " philosophy can be taught nonphilosophically. The issue turns on whether applied ethics as such exemplifies the characterisdcs which make it philosophy. The problem is that the various relationships that may hold between the central pursuit of a discipline and the so-called " a p p l i e d " pursuits of the same discipline have not been considered. Many academic disciplines have well-established "pure/ applied" distincdons. Applied art, applied math, and even applied business (insofar as M B A schools distinguish between the theoretical and practical programs) are conspicuous examples. Reflection about the disdnctions in these other fields may shed some light on the problem of differentiadng applied ethics/philosophy within the broader discipline of philosophy. Indeed, even sentiments that some philosophers have towards applied ethics/

46

M A R K D . STOHS

philosophy parallel the sentiments of fine artists toward applied ardsts. A s Fox notes, " a large number of philosophers would agree with [Roochnik] in holding that it is not the business of philosophy to address popular issues, or to pander to the masses."^ Similarly, some rock musicians have argued that those who perform for T V commercials are "selling-out," are not pursuing the true goal of being a musician. A n d certainly many commercial ardsts initially regret not being able to pursue fine art.

1. The Pure/Applied Distinction in Other Disciplines^ In this section, I w i l l briefly suggest how the pure/applied distinction is conceived in a variety of disciplines. One of the most interesdng fields for consideradon is art. The simple distincdon between pure and applied art is well entrenched; especially when 'applied art' is taken to refer to occupational pursuits such as commercial art. But the disdnction becomes more complex when the " c r a f t s " and architecture are included. Craftspeople in ceramics, silversmithing, and weaving have long attempted to gain recognition as artists; and there is litde doubt that in the long-run. architecture qualifies as art. Note that some of the greatest periods in art have been defined at least partially by changes in architectural style (classical, renaissance/gothic). To the uninformed observer, the relatively sharp distinctions between fine and all of the applied art fields may appear arbitrary. From the fine artist's perspective, what lies at the heart of the distinction? Presumably it is that the applied art objects have primanly functional uses, whereas the pure art objects are made for the sake of art itself. Ceramic pots and buildings serve ordinary human needs, while fine art satisfies higher level aesthetic needs. This distinction may be cast in a additional terms, e.g., as intrinsic vs. instrumental art. It may be tempting to make this distincdon turn on whether the art object is intended to be sold (to make a living) or is intended simply to be art for art's sake (whether or not it is sold). But this distincdon would not hold up well in the "real w o r l d , " where recognized fine artists rely on sales and commissions. A n d it would be difficult to make the analogy hold within philosophy, where most philosophy is currently authored by those who are gainfully employed as philosophy faculty. U l dmately however, the objection to this view is that two virtually idendcal objects of fine art may have been created with different intentions on the part of the artist, and yet one would have to be classified as art and the other as non-(pure) art. The distinction in business programs between theoretical and practical may provide a slight variadon. The theoretical programs not only teach the underlying theories within business, but expect the student to master and even begin to make contributions towards extending those theories. Practical programs, in contrast, proclaim that they examine business as it actually occurs, and expect the student to " a p p l y " whatever principles or theories they may read about in the texts. The distincdon apparendy reduces to that between reflecting upon principles and making actual business decisions (at least simulated). The distinction between pure and applied math is perhaps most obvious when comparing those mathematicians who are engaged in exploring mathematical thee ' with those who are actuarials. Similar contrasts and/or tensions hold between scientists and engineers, experimental and counseling psychologists, and political sciendsts and pollsters. The central question is whether any common thread concerning the pure/applied distinction runs throughout the wide variety of disciplines. A brief review of the above examples shows that the intrinsic vs. funcdonal distinction in art holds in

A P P L I E D ETHICS A N D PHILOSOPHY

47

several of the fields. From the perspective of philosophy, this may best be put in terms which disdnguish the reflection of principles and the use of (accepted) principles for practical pursuits. Indeed, this kind of distincdon presumably underlies the practice of awarding a doctorate in philosophy to those who have examined the boundaries of their fields. In sum, a good deal of evidence tends to support the common ground Roochnik and Fox share, that reflection about principles is the disdnctive mark of philosophy (and of " p u r e " fields in all disciplines). But this hard and fast disdnction overlooks significant pursuits about which there can be serious debate. The most notable, outside of philosophy, would be the non-fine arts, including architecture and the crafts. One can hold fast to the posidon that an architect is not an artist. But the works of Frank L l o y d Wright alone virtually prove this position false. In other words, while the pure/funcdonal distinction appears operative throughout a large variety of disciplines, it fails to provide a complete account of disdncdons within the disciplines. Even within philosophy we now have an extremely narrow vision about what constitutes philosophy, when one realizes that psychology, the natural sciences, etc., were not well disdnguished from philosophy itself just a few centuries ago. Certainly, narrow specialization, when it is not accompanied with the natural extension into directly related fields, has harmed philosophical activity, and merely reinforces the view that only reflecdon about pure principles qualifies as philosophy. A broad variety of acdvides which are, as such, applicadons of rules or principles within a field, serve to extend the boundaries of that pure field, and these activities must be included as part of the discipline itself. It may be the case that only retrospectively are we aware of the contribution. But it is difficult to argue that it only becomes art (for instance) when it is recognized to be so. Rather, the view should be that it is art when created, but is not recognized to be so until later.^ Analogously, some applied ethics aim to and do have an impact on philosophical principles. It would be injudicious to claim that philosophers who conduct their research in applied ethics fail to have this as one of their aims (without careful examination of at least a statistically representative sample of articles, books, etc.). Hence I seem to be confirming Roochnik's initial posidon that an activity qualifies as philosophy if and only if it is or leads to reflection about ultimate principles. But notice that this definition is m.uch too broad, for virtually any activity may lead to reflection about ultimate principles. The dilemma is that if the appeal to principles is abandoned as a criterion of philosophy (for example), then very litde distinguishes experimental science from philosophy, and if the appeal to principles is maintained, then philosophy remains an extremely narrow pursuit. In the remaining sections, I w i l l attempt to arrive at a more reasonable conception of applied philosophy/ethics. The present aim will not be to set forth necessary and sufficient condidons, but to make progress towards that end.

2. Art, Architecture, and AppUed Ethics The debate between what counts as art (including music) endures. One simple point not always considered is that some purported art is "so poor" that it cannot be called art, despite any other characteristics the object or artist may exemplify. The "paintings" on velvet one occasionally sees conclusively support this claim! In other words, some people call such objects art, without their being genuine ait. It is so bad that the label 'art' is misused. For a child playing the piano, merely connecting notes does not constitute music.

48

M A R K D. STOHS

Hence the first feature that discriminates between good and bad appHed ethics is that some applied ethics is so poor, it falls outside the domain of philosophy altogether. This allows that some poorly done applied ethics remains philosophy. The "metaphysical" component of this distinction merely purports that it exists. The "epistemological" component concerns how we know which side of this distinction a particular work may fall. It may be that a significant proportion of works in applied ethics falls on the side of non-philosophy; and this may be Roochnik's real apprehension about the whole project. For most cases, what disdnguishes non-applied ethics from ethics w i l l be the same as what distinguishes philosophy from non-philosophy (i.e., purported philosophy written so poorly as to be non-philosophy). Hence no special reason compels us to articulate what makes a purported work of applied ethics non-philosophical. Only insofar as disdncdve features of applied ethics arise will this distinction require further "epistemological" elaboration. The second feature to observe when considering architecture relates to the mixture of art and technical skills required to produce a building which may eventually be a work of art. A building without outstanding artistic qualities w i l l not be art, but neither w i l l a building without structural soundness. Both are necessary, and are probably sufficient, for a building to be art (at least in the long run). The technical requirements place limits on the "art" involved, in that the building must be constructed according to minimum standards; while technical advances achieved artistically add to the stature of a building. The architect, somewhat unlike the pure artist, cannot fabricate in the realm of fantasy or imagination. The analogy with philosophy proves enlightening. Some philosophers maintain that metaphysics, for instance, endures as exempt from empirical constraints; the main, i f not the only, constraint is logical consistency. Whether or not this is true, other branches of philosophy, including even epistemology, face increasingly tighter empirical constraints. Crucial components within epistemology, for example, rely on the fact that human beings have senses and reason. A n d the philosophies of science, law, etc. must make appeals to the known facts in those disciplines. A s Fox notes, philosophy tries to uncover principles which are "(purportedly) the principles something or other ~ such as ethics or science."^ Principles which go beyond or ignore the facts fail as viable components of theories. Applied ethics may be regarded as the branch of ethics which includes the attempt to combine the theoretical and the factual, analogously to the manner in which architecture combines art and technology. Implied in this claim is the view that applied ethics must examine and understand the relevant facts. It may be theory which demarcates the relevant facts, but any ethical theory (or theory within applied ethics) which goes beyond or ignores the facts is unsadsfactory. Indeed, the claim may be even stronger. A n architect who ignores technical standards w i l l build a building that is unsafe, and is hence irresponsible. A philosopher who creates an ethical theory without regard to the relevant facts misleads others, and insofar as people act in accord with the theory, the philosopher is irresponsible. O f course the relevant facts are of varying levels of generality, so that a higher level theory may not require the examination of detailed facts. But a lower level, applied theory, such as one about the moral status of corporations, would require increasingly detailed and complete factual information. This claim does not depend upon the existence of "brute" facts, but merely upon the contrast between theory and fact, which should be acceptable even i f the posidon that no fact exists independendy of a theory is correct. The main difficulty

A P P L I E D ETHICS A N D PHILOSOPHY

49

in developing sound theories in applied ethics will be the proper selection of factual information (empirical theories). Indeed, this is at least one place where this (second) feature of applied ethics relates to the first (i.e., that some purported applied ethics is so poor that it is not philosophy at all). That is, some of the applied work which fails to qualify as philosophy runs into trouble because of problems in addressing or selecting the appropriate facts.

3. An Illustration Plant closings have drawn much attention in recent years, to the extent that a bill has passed in Congress which requires 90-day notice in specified circumstances. The proponents of such legislation believe that the worker will benefit, while the opponents claim that this is just one more intrusion into the workings of the freemarket. The present aim is not to debate the merits of this or other resoludons, but to explore the relationships among the philosophical, economic, and empirical facets of this issue. The philosophical perspective concerns the moral jusdfication of an economic system. The debate is among those who hold that the efficiency of the free-market system benefits all, those who defend socialism as guaranteeing a fair distribudon of goods within society, and those who take a compromise posidon, in which a freemarket with strong controls is satisfactory or preferable. The economic approach includes the articulation of the principles inherent in each of the distinct types of economy. The empirical elements include the results observed from the operation of a particular economy that conforms to the basic principles. The inter-reladon among these three levels is complex, and serious debates remain virtually unresolved as a result. For instance, interpreting the facts surrounding the question about whether the Reagan years have benefitted or harmed the poor persists as particularly difficult. But appealing to and interpreting the facts cannot and should not be ignored. With respect to plant closings, one of the decisive factors is how they affect the workers (and their cities) who lose their jobs. If an economy is actually efficient and resilient, then a lost job is replaced quickly. Further, if requiring advance notification of a plant closing does exacerbate existing problems, then advance notificadon may not be the best resolution. The philosopher who defends one of these economic systems on moral grounds must attend to these kinds of relevant details. A defense of capitalism that ignores how an actual economy affects people is incomplete. A n d the empirical detail may vary from situation to situadon. The early years of the 1980's in Detroit would presumably differ dramatically from the late 1980's in the booming high-tech suburban corridors throughout the country. To see this more clearly, consider some of the statistics presented in my paper, "Individual Rights and Plant Closings," wherein some of the events in Detroit from 1979-84 are chronicled.'^ From 1980-84, Wayne County saw a decrease in populadon of 6.5%, and the state of Michigan lost almost 17% of its total jobs, enough to support a city of over one-million people. Further, "the number of employees in Detroit decreased by 103,439 people from 1980 to 1984, . . . of which 69% were in manufacturing . . . " " With this "reverse multiplier" in effect, it is certainly too much to expect each of those individuals to regain employment within months. A collapsing economy offers decreasing numbers of opportunides.

50

M A R K D . STOHS

The general point is that a sound and complete defense of any one of the underlying philosophical (moral) theories related to the diverse economic systems requires attention to such detail, and examining/interpreting relevant empirical data is part of the philosopher's responsibility. Other pertinent issues would include the time typically needed to find new jobs and the amount of lost compensation suffered by those who lose their jobs. Social policies and background theories fail when the appropriate facts are ignored. A n d a sizable percentage of work in applied ethics relates to the evaluation or development of such policies and theories. It w i l l be objected that the attention ;;o empirical data remains the task of the social scientist. Psychologists, economists, sociologists and others are prepared to gather, sift, and present data in meaningful formats. Philosophers, in contrast, lack the relevant skills (as philosophers), and should not attempt to do the tasks of the social sciendst. Hence, the philosopher's proper role is that of reflecdng upon abstract principles. The facts are relevant, but only secondarily, as vague, general background constraints. This objecdon warrants consideradon. for it is unreasonable to suggest or argue that a philosopher, in performing the tasks of the social sciendst, is doing philosophy. However, the broad thesis, that the philosopher must take account of empirical data, is not thereby false. The critical question is, what distinctive approach does the philosopher use when examining empirical data? What, for instance, would make the examination of employment data from Detroit philosophical, rather than sociological? The question just posed cannot be answered in full presendy. Note first that nothing prevents the sociologist from taking a philosophical approach to the data. Indeed, one might presume that some of the important sociological work generated has been informed by philosophical principles and concerns. When the organizing principle of some empirical research is the moral justifiability of an economic system or policy, then surely there is a philosophical tenor to the research. In the same manner, philosophers can approach data philosophically by utilizing philosophical principles to provide the structure for organizing, selecting and interpredng the data, and by subsequendy evaluadng the impact upon the philosophical principle (theory) by the data. Again, this leaves the door open for researchers in other disciplines to engage in philosophical acdvity; which may be " o f f e n s i v e " to some philosophers. But a cursory examination of some of the products of other fields would show that some either is philosophical or has direct philosophical import. Philosophy certainly is not the exclusive domain of ("professional") philosophers. In sum, applied ethics should be considered as analogous to architecture, as a mixture of the pure and merely functional elements of a discipline; especially insofar as the applied philosopher and architect are compelled to account for the facts and technical detail. It may be the case that all conscientious philosophy shares this quality, but presumably reflecdng on ultimate principles sets philosophy off from other disciplines. The general contention is that the relationships among the subsets v/ithin other disciplines should be examined in order to enlighten the debate about the status of applied ethics within philosophy. Architecture provides merely one example, and has been examined only cursorily above. Future invesdgation may yield a more precise and complete analysis.

4. Conclusion Some quesdons may remain. It can be argued that addressing the central topic

APPLIED ETHICS A N D PHILOSOPHY

51

without first clarifying the nature of philosophy is misguided. A n d one could plausibly argue that since philosophers rarely agree about what philosophy is, it is useless to address subsidiary questions like the one just posed. It is true that basic positions about philosophy must be assumed in any such inquiry, but these requirements are only logical. For any given attempt at addressing the above question, these assumptions may remain implicit. Indeed, by exploring such issues, the assumptions may become more explicit and hence more capable of being evaluated. The inidal question also implies that applied ethics (or, more broadly, applied philosophy) consdtutes a unified field of research, which is false. Philosophers engaged in applied ethics undertake a wide variety of projects, some of which are probably more "philosophical" than others. It is not obvious, for instance, that being paid to compose a code of ethics for a company constitutes a philosophical task, especially if the particular code is drafted from a set of commonly accepted guidelines. In contrast, examining the moral status of corporations qualifies as philosophy, given that asking whether animals or children are morally responsible are clearly philosophical quesdons. Finally, the boundaries of applied ethics/philosophy appear far from exact. For example, business and medical ethics are the fields most typically included. But how do these differ from philosophy of science or the philosophy of educadon? The general theory being suggested is that applied ethics/philosophy should not be examined in isoladon, as the "black sheep" of the family. A broader understanding of its place within philosophy should enable us to make sound distincdons among the various projects undertaken within all of the specializations within and "around" philosophy.

NOTES 1. Roochnik, David L . , " A p p l i e d Ethics: Some Platonic Quesdons," Philosophy in Context, V o l . 17, 1987, p. 40. He also comments that "applied ethics is insuldng to both of the domains it hopes to span: the philosophical and the social" (p. 45) Throughout the discussion which follows, 'applied ethics' will be taken to refer loosely to applied philosophy as well. 2. Roochnik, ibid., p. 45. 3. Fox, R . M . , " C a n the Philosopher Return to the C a v e ? " Philosophy V o l . 17, 1987, p. 50; see also p. 48.

in

Context,

4. Fox, ibid., p. 51. 5. Roochnik, ibid., p. 45. 6. Fox, ibid., p. 47. 7. The points made in this section are intended to be exploratory, representadve, and suggestive, rather than complete and definidve; far more extensive detail about the distinctions in other disciplines is required to formulate a sound position. 8. I recognize that I am treading upon central issues in aesthetics here, and that the problems are much more complex. But the general point of this paper remains unaffected — namely, that debates in other areas/disciplines should have an impact on the debate about philosophy/applied ethics.

52

M A R K D . STOHS

9. Fox, ibid., p. 48. 10. Stohs, Mark D . , "Individual Rights and Plant Closings," Proceedings of the Council on Employee Responsibilities and Rights, October 13, 1988; originally presented at the Annual Conference on Business Ethics, Wheaton College, A p r i l 1987. 11. Ibid., Stohs, p. 4.

THE PERSONALIST

The P E R S O N A L I S T F O R U M is a biannual journal devoted to publishing scholarly work that addresses issues o f being persons in this world. Each issue will include articles and a review of philosophical works relevant to a particular theme. Projected future themes are Personalism: New Direcdons (Spring 1989), Humanism (Fall 1989), Educadng Persons (Spring 1990), Personalism and Pragmatism (Fall 1990), Thinking about G o d (Spring 1991), Evil (Fall 1991). Annual subscripdon rates are $8 f o r individuals, $10 f o r institudons. Individual copies are $4. Write Thomas O . B u f o r d , Editor, T H E P E R S O N A L I S T F O R U M , Department o f Philosophy, Furman University, South Carolina 2 9 6 1 3 .