into 'bads'; societal abundance versus inequality of access; abundance of ... The crisis â it is everywhere, and it is still said again and again that it is the most ... reference system (the US) as means to overcome the weaknesses of the other systems. ..... 'development economics, to a greater extent than traditional neoclassical.
Background Paper
Peter Herrmanni
Growth and Development – Complement or Contradiction? Challenges for a Global Agenda Abstract For a long time, the Rostowian model, indentifying development with economic growth, was not fundamentally questioned. Even its critiques were more concerned with asking to leave choices of ways of development to countries, without contesting the objectives and the character of capitalist growth as such. Taking this paradigm as general reference point, the discussion today needs to be refocused, developing a specific perspective by asking if the supposed identification of development and growth is justifiable. Instead of taking up on the crucially important debate on Capabilities, Human Development and Social Quality, the focus is at present on the question if and in which way the mode of production itself changed, allowing the emergence of a new understanding of development. The focus is on five tensions, each of them also proposing new potentials. Namely it is about the overproduction of goods and the turn of goods into ‘bads’; societal abundance versus inequality of access; abundance of knowledge and its misdirection towards skills; the individualisation of problems and their emergence as societal threat and the complexity of government and the limited scope of governance.1 Introduction The crisis – it is everywhere, and it is still said again and again that it is the most severe crisis after 1929, the time when the ‘Black Tuesday’ left a sign in history. Though there is surely some justification of taking such comparative perspective, doubts have to be raised:
1
See also Herrmann, Peter, 2015; Crisis and no end? Re-‐embedding Economy into life and nature; in: Environment and Social Psychology (2015)–Volume 1, Issue 1: 1-‐11; http://esp.whioce.com/index.php/ESP/article/download/01003/pdf_3; 16/01/16
1
•
Most importantly, the geopolitical dimension changed fundamentally – instead of fighting back capitalism it is now solely about the inner distribution of powers within the hegemonic power-‐block
•
Though every crisis concerns antroponomic issues, the current crisis is centrally around redefining the parameters of the entire system, most likely more than others before
•
Thus it is closely linked to massive technological changes, challenging the socio-‐economic contract instead of only adapting the small print of the existing agreement
•
With all this we find as well a new constellation of problems and resources for change.
Accordingly, analysing the current situation against this background should take a fresh approach. Up to now, we usually take the perspective of the status quo as unchangeably given system of reference, searching for solutions of crises by extending the parameters. This was for instance the underlying approach of the Rostowian proposal. He suggested the expansion of the successes of the reference system (the US) as means to overcome the weaknesses of the other systems. However, this approach had been flawed by ignoring that such progress would systematically undermine the conditions on which it is established. Instead of following such path, we have to look at the current contradictions as points of reference for change. Traps and Openings In short, the challenges are the following: •
Universally – in terms of space and time o growth – and the supposed lack of it o integrity – and the search for criteria that are suitable for highly differentiated societies
•
Specifically the definition of well-‐being and good life o depending on the concrete conditions
2
o and
defined
by
the
trajectory
of
independence
and
interdependencies. One major step made in the debate of this challenge is made by the capability approach. In my understanding its main innovative perspective does not come from emphasising the potentials of immaterial needs and resources, and their reference to given conditions. The real issue is freedom, i.e. the meaning of any resource for enhancing our ability to achieve what we value. However, there is some one-‐sidedness in its conceptualisation: the social dimension refers to the conditions under which individuals live, and their ability to defined their own pace. However, it is limited when it comes to analysing and discussing the capabilities of the social, i.e. understanding the social itself as fundamentally formable and changeable. In this perspective one can discuss if a society actually wants to adapt to any model – a topic often approached in discussions on modernisation (theories), and thus, of course, criticising the Rostowian manifest. Such discussions, without denying their justification, overlook an important aspect, namely that the overall structural setting is fundamentally changing – even if globalisation is taken as central point of reference, most of the considerations remain within the framework of methodological nationalism. In order to overcome such limitation, the following extensions are suggested. First, there is a proportional relationship between the expansion of certain challenges – we can speak of an internalisation trap. This means that matters, previously externalised, are now requiring a solution within the system of reference itself. Second, this does not only mean relocation but also a qualitative change – former solutions become now problems. Though also closed systems are surely not completely and automatically sustainably integrated (‘integer’), they demonstrate at least for some relevant time certain stability – we can refer to
3
Michel Aglietta’s definition of accumulation regimes.2 This stability depends not least on a very specific balance at the external borders. Any change of these borders will in consequence require a re-‐definition of the parameters that define the qualitative character of integrity. Sociologically we may speak of an AGIL-‐ity trap, of course referring to Talcott Parsons’ scheme (adaptation, goal attainment, integration, latency), but also to agility in the understanding of the capacity to act. Third, at the same time we find new openings as matter of defining capabilities and providing new points of reference. In recent times the term ‘bubbles’ found entry into the debates of economic development, in particular linked to the analysis of the crisis after 2007/2008 ff. . However, the issue at stake is well known from history of capitalism. In fact, overproduction and over-‐accumulation can be seen as permanent companion of capitalism, characterising the market and being part of the immanent quest to growth and the tendency of decoupling growth from real productive and consumptive needs. Instead, capacities are based on striving for gain. Its sources are •
commodification, understood as tendency of exchange value obtaining meaning relative independent of use value
•
the devaluation of work/labour o expressed in the tendency of the profit rate to fall o expressed also in the tendency of the purchasing power to fall ( a closely linked though non-‐identical process)
•
and resulting in what is now known as financialisation.
It has to be emphasised that we face a distributional problem, however importantly one that is located in the sphere of production itself. This can be seen as overproduction opening. Fourth, to the extent to which spaces face pressure towards commodification, we find paradoxically also an increasing need for re-‐embedding. Though this is in some way a simple act of defiance, more important is the fact that the overall perspective of societal integrity requires for the sake of continued existence 2
Though it is here proposed to understand accumulation as general process of valorisation.
4
mechanisms that function as ‘glue’ – and all formations have to find their specific way. To the extent to which globalisation becomes real, i.e. to the extent to which the bias in methodological nationalism is overcome, previous strategies do not work anymore. Turned positively, this opens the way for traditional patterns to enter the AGIL-‐pattern in a new way. We may speak of re-‐AGIL-‐isation. The mechanism is relatively simple as we are concerned with the recontextualisation of traditional patterns – it is the process of the duality of dialectics, i.e. sublation and supersession. Current debates and policies by, with and for indigenous people in Latin America are a particularly interesting field for further consideration. Looking at the development as complex issue, though •
maintaining the emphasis of GDP as measurement of economic activities
•
seeing economic activity as overall social (re)production
•
linking it analytically into the complex setting of o accumulation regime o mode of regulation o living regime o mode of life o utilisation regime and o mode of appropriation we arrive at a framework that allows us to understand the challenges for a sustainable socio-‐economic perspective – emphasising its needs and the potentials for realisation. – In the following some theses will set a framework for further consideration.
Developmental Freedom versus Growth Anxiety Thesis 1: Globally, the productive forces and means of production are developed to such an extent, that even a generous living standard for all can be easily secured. However, this is not solely and simply about redistribution of existing resources and wealth. Equally important is the change of the direction of the production from exchange value – the re-‐establishment of the integrity of production and
5
consumption. We may also refer to aspects as shifting from finance industries to real industriousness. This is linked to paying with Giovanni Arrighi attention to the distinction between two different kinds of market-based economic development. One kind occurs within a given social framework; it exploits the hidden potential of that framework for economic growth, but it does not alter the framework itself in any fundamental way. Fundamental changes in the social framework capable of increasing or reducing the potential for economic growth may occur. But they originate in processes and actions of a noneconomic nature rather than from within the process of economic growth. … The second kind of market-based economic development, in contrast, is one that tends to destroy the social framework within which it occurs and to create the conditions (not necessarily realized) for the emergence of new social frameworks with a different growth potential. …, changes originating in processes and actions of a non-economic nature are secondary or subordinated to the changes that originate from within the economic process. (Arrighi, Giovanni, 2007: Adam smith in Beijing. Lineages of the twenty-first century; London/New York: Verso: 41) It is necessary to remain open towards the different conceptualisations of the re-‐ embedding of the economy into society. Thesis 2: Such living standard is not about ‘awarding’. Instead, it is about an activation approach in the sense of developing by providing social space for people’s self-‐ realisation and self-‐determination. – Providing social space essentially means that this can only happen in collective action, emphasising not least the creation of common pool resources and public goods/spaces.
6
Thesis 3: Part of the challenge is to fully recognise that the problem is not primarily the inequality of access to private goods. Instead, the problem is the privatisation itself. I am – at least here and now – not talking about private property as legal title; I am – at least here and now – also not talking about private means of production. Instead, of interest is in the present context ownership in the understanding of what we may call ‘social responsibility of products’ and ‘social responsibility of the use of products’.3 Thesis 4: From here there are severe consequences not only for market activities. As we are in fact facing an antroponomic or convivialist crisis, we have to consider also the repercussions in the living regime: as much as finances are today separated from the representation of real value, we see as well that skills are separated from knowledge. In some way we may perceive this as paradox as apparently many outstanding personalities in the IT-‐sector have an educational background ‘outside the box’. Nevertheless, on the user-‐side of IT we find a further push towards an instrumentalist understanding of the living regime. Thesis 5: This can also be seen in the sphere of government and governance, following the principle of increasing possibilities and possibilities to act and participate for an increasing number of people. However, this goes hand in hand with a decrease of actual power, as the scope of action is decreasing. – Of course, this is a problematic issue because scope has to be seen in its contradictory character. If not taken in strict mathematical terms, we can speak of a reversed proportionality of quantitative and qualitative reach: more issues can be influenced, but the interaction between them is out of reach. Governance, in tendency replacing government, is only a misleading movement, opening spaces for participation by separation and segregation. – Still, we have to be careful: in some respect and some areas we find a countermovement: some forms of 3
‘social’ understood in the widest sense, including environmental issues and the like.
7
artificial intelligence, using complex algorithms, are the most commonly used forms – and they are well able to suggest connections. The problem, however, is that these are functional, leaving the setting of objectives outside of the equation. Thesis 6: We may summarise that the different aspects are in actual fact a matter of increasing and ‘stabilised’ gaps, emerging from individualist socialisation – and as such they are surely in their very nature destabilising. With this we overcome the tension which Margaret Archer has in mind when she problematises analytical dualism. It means that the economic structure is pushing towards a process of increasing internal tensions with every step away from externalisation, at least to some extent a logical connection. The Way Forward – Development Issues In some instances, simple adjustment and rebalancing may be sufficient. This translates for instance into following a conservative development strategy, aiming on GDP-‐growth. In other instances, and with this I want to come to the more practical and political questions of a developmental perspective for the BRICS-‐alliance and LA, we need fundamentally changed orientations. Background is that we have to arrive at understanding globalisation as reaching a qualitatively new stage. I. In short, this stage is characterised by the new geopolitical pattern, not only challenging the position of countries but more importantly challenging the centre-‐periphery-‐pattern. Multi-‐polar, cross-‐polar and non-‐polar perspectives are equally on the way. II. Though this means on the one hand an increased interdependency, it requires on the other hand overcoming the commonly applied analytical polarisation – ‘connectivity’ and ‘connectedness’ are new terminologies that are increasingly gaining ground, emphasising the need to see ‘division of labour’ not as
8
segmentation, and look instead at the societal, i.e. relational and processual dimensions of division of labour. Though in actual fact underdeveloped, still subordinated under the perspective of comparative advantage, the perspective now is about cooperative advantage. III. One of the additional turning points is the need to turn away from the traditional mainstream of ‘growth, jobs and stability’ – this is the sequence proposed for instance by the Italian ministry of Economy and Finance in recent proposal for ‘A shared European Policy Strategy’ (Italian government/Governo Italiano Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri: A Shared European Policy Strategy for Growth,
Jobs,
and
Stability;
http://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/ASharedPolicyStrategy_20160222.pd f; Una strategia europea condivisa per crescita, lavoro e stabilità; http://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/una_strategia_europea_condivisa.pdf ;
http://www.governo.it/articolo/il-‐documento-‐italiano-‐l-‐europa/4187;
24/05/16). Any kind of expansion is fundamentally flawed by the structurally built-‐in dependency. Priority can only be seen in stability and sustainability – from here jobs are defined, not from the perspective of growth. A major implication is the change of the overall structure, allowing to move from a zero-‐ sum-‐constellation to a constellation of advanced cooperation. The problematique and challenge is obvious when we look at the recent developments, proving the divergence of growth and employment – though the phenomenon is by no means new (see e.g. Onaran, Özlem, 2016: Secular stagnation and progressive economic policy alternatives; Post Keynesian Economics Study Group. Working Paper 1609; Greenwich, London: Greenwich Political
Economy
Research
Centre,
University
of
Greenwich;
http://www.postkeynesian.net/downloads/working-‐papers/PKWP1609.pdf; 24/05/16) IV. This implies that quality of jobs is put at the centre stage of considerations. Their quality is defined by using a triple perspective:
9
•
in the traditional perspective of a decent income for decent work
•
in the understanding of social usefulness, including the value of private use value and also matters as cohesion and inclusion
•
in an understanding of sustainability which includes a sufficient degree of independence. In this light the more recent shifts towards domestic development strategies are hugely important – and they show as well that there is no reason to shy away from decreasing growth rates.
V. On the contrary, a development strategy that starts from the demand side (not necessarily in the Keynesian understanding) allows overcoming the limitations of individualised needs and wants. ‘Full accounting’ is only one, and actually not the most important factor. Crucial is to develop a fundamentally different approach, above this had been briefly mentioned as matter of ‘social responsibility of products’ and ‘social responsibility of the use of products’. Conceptualising this further can be well seen as link to current discussion in Latin America, where reference to ‘Pachamama’ regains meaning and redefines the role and position of human agency. VI. This includes revisiting legal systems. The Western legal systems are systematically based in individualism and personalisation, i.e. only persons can be legal entities and social entities are redefined as persons so that they are legally responsible – be it as reference of active or passive action. ‘Pachamama’ questions such perspective structurally and requires a new understand of both, environment, the social and responsibility. VII. Here the issue of debt is gaining relevance. Though temporarily necessary, it is getting clearer that the fundamental mechanism of indebting is not rooted in securing supply, but in the creation of demand – economic terms suggest that we are facing a reversal of the supply-‐demand-‐orientation, or we may suggest: a mechanism that suggests to use Keynes instead of Say. The result is dependency of the consumer – the increased purchasing power turning as instrument against the power of the purchaser. From economics we know the basic fact that the
10
money is always with the buyer. This had been throughout history frequently used as instrument to establish dependency – one of the most recent cases is Greece. Of course, it is the dependency defined by the need to repay debt. However, the really problematic matter is more complicated, consisting at least of the following two layers: •
the commodification on the side of the debtor – thus a mechanism of establishing a long-‐term dependency
•
the establishment of a leeway for financialisation – the low and still falling profit rate requires the search for new investment spheres.
This means for the current situation simply that the goal of decreasing debt/obligations is essential. However, this cannot be based in deleveraging but has to be based in measures that allow establishing a correspondence between debt and domestic values. Conclusion This allows to return to the points mentioned in the beginning, namely •
the internalisation trap
•
the AGIL-‐ity trap
•
the overproduction opening
•
the re-‐AGIL-‐isation.
Looking at the overall picture of economic development, one of the outstanding issues is technological development. The importance of this factor is not denied. However, instead of seeing it in isolation as factor solely changing the technical conditions of production, we have to look at the way in which it is affecting the interaction of different forms of capital. Crucial is the change of the overall structure of societal reproduction. Surely, global competition still plays a major role. And equally certain is that new technologies play a role, intensifying competition by ‘flattening the world’ (Friedman) – though we have to emphasise that this suggested flattening is surely far from equalising opportunities and a move to any leisure or affluent society (Veblen/John K. Galbraith). Leaving the
11
many important aspects of the current global crisis aside, one crucial point is the structural change of the process of capitalisation. The following Overview 1 highlights the relevant dimensions that are in need of further consideration – not least empirical research has to be undertaken to avail of a clear framework.
Microlevel; Mesolevel; Macrolevel
production Department II: consumables Department III: finances Department IV: services
Production/
Accumulation
manufacturing
Regime
Consumption
Distribution
Exchange
Mode of Regulation Living Regime Mode of Life
Mode of appropriation
means of
Utilisation regime
Department I:
Overview 1: Fundamental Economic Structure
One of the difficulties is that the shifts are taking place globally and within regions and nations. And although we can speak in some ways and in many areas about a process of sophistication of the overall production, the old patterns still persist and are essential as foundation on which the processes of sophistication can be established (see for some aspects of this debate: Roberts, Michael, October 2014: De-‐industrialisation and socialism; in: Michael Roberts Blog. Blogging from a marxist
economist;
https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2014/10/21/de-‐
industrialisation-‐and-‐socialism/; 30/03/16). Politics of development – in economic and societal terms – are exactly at this point challenged. Sophistication means in some ways an increasing detachment of the advanced spheres. It was the detachment of countries and regions and/or the detachment of markets – the most extreme and fatal recently the quasi-‐fall of the financial system and the housing crisis. We can now see that alienation is not about a psychological
12
separation; we are facing a process that finds its ground in the detachment of production from its own foundation, namely the generation and consumption of use value. Indeed the increasing employment of new technologies plays some role in the overall development. But here we have to return to what had been said earlier. Any meaningful growth has to be concerned with freedom, i.e. the meaning of any resource for enhancing our ability to achieve what we value – and as said as well: such valuation can only be social valuation as further development comes otherwise to an absolute halt. This includes that dealing with the individualising effect of some of the new technologies has to be countered with some suspicion from an economic perspective: Commonly developmental success is seen in close conjunction with institutions, connectivity and culture. If we summarise the literature on the different topics and bring them together, the overall receipt for success is connectivity in conjunction with reliability of this connectivity and its democratic control. However, •
connectivity on its own can easily be anti-‐developmental due to the fact of being prone to corruption (‘nepotism’), not allowing any ‘political control’ (‘despotism’);
•
reliability on its own can easily be anti-‐developmental due to the fact of lacking compatibility with real connections (‘the iron cage’), boiling decisions down to technicalities seemingly without political dimension (‘self-‐constraint by supposed practical necessities’);
•
democracy on its own can easily be anti-‐developmental due to the fact of being left without criteria about what should be matter of the decisions (‘voluntarism’) and by establishing a tendency towards opportunism (‘populism’).
Of course, in all these cases we have to be clear about the actual concepts of connectivity, reliability and democracy we refer to. But actually such clarification is part of development itself. Can we develop against this background some concrete requirements that link the three corners of the triangle that is presented in the following Graph 1?
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Graph 1: Points of Reference
Looking for answers will follow implicitly the four topics, i.e. the internalisation trap, the AGIL-‐ity trap, the overproduction opening and the re-‐AGIL-‐isation. 1) First we can look at the question of embeddedness: •
Though the traditions are different, both, China and the ‘New Latin America’ have particular social resources easily translating into sociability and a major pool of natural resources. Leaving the serious issues of pollution and one-‐sided dependence on raw material based mono-‐structures aside, we find also a well-‐founded tradition of respect towards social integrity and nature as value in itself. In my interpretation this is avoiding the fundamental dichotomisation that is underlying European traditions.
•
One of the main challenges is internal and external connectedness: in many cases the challenge is about dealing with the hyper-‐urbanisation on the one hand and huge national and regional discrepancies.
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Simple strategies, that are primarily oriented on growth, increase on the one hand the tendencies of limiting the potentials mentioned first and lead to dangerous agglomerations that actually threaten growth. 2) If we return to the old and somewhat odd quarrel in economics, we should not forget that the founding idea of classical thinking was very much about the wealth of the nations, strictly understood as common wealth. So far it is clear that the push failed due to its inherent individualist bias. This bias had been translated much later into the so-‐called Washington Consensus.4 The fundamental reason that caused the consensus to fail can be seen especially in two facts: •
The failure of institutions was due to the increased push towards privatisation: investment, instead of being geared to maintaining common pool resources, common goods and the establishment of a sound infrastructure, was geared towards the increase of private wealth. Arvind Subramanian highlighted the failure of two strategies – he presented his ideas in article in the Business Standard, writing: The crisis served as a useful natural experiment to test two extreme models of globalisation that countries had adopted going into the crisis. These models of globalisation reflected choices about openness to foreign capital and to exports. The first can be
4
Fiscal policy discipline, with avoidance of large fiscal deficits relative to GDP; Redirection of public spending from subsidies ("especially indiscriminate subsidies") toward broad-‐based provision of key pro-‐growth, pro-‐poor services like primary education, primary health care and infrastructure investment; • Tax reform, broadening the tax base and adopting moderate marginal tax rates; • Interest rates that are market determined and positive (but moderate) in real terms; • Competitive exchange rates; • Trade liberalization: liberalization of imports, with particular emphasis on elimination of quantitative restrictions (licensing, etc.); any trade protection to be provided by low and relatively uniform tariffs; • Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment; • Privatization of state enterprises; • Deregulation: abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental and consumer protection grounds, and prudential oversight of financial institutions; • Legal security for property rights. (Washington Consensus. (2016, May 14). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 06:20, May 25, 2016, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Washington_Consensus&oldid=720243912) • •
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described as the ‘foreign finance fetish’ model which relied on importing a lot of foreign capital, especially financial capital… . The second model can be described as the ‘export fetish’ or the mercantilist model, which entailed a reliance on exports as development strategy assisted by government intervention, for example through an undervalued exchange rate, and combined with a curtailment of some forms of foreign financial capital. … . (Subramanian, Arving, 2010: What Globalisation Strategy?; http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/arvindsubramanian-what-globalisation-strategy-110012700076_1.html; 25/05/16) •
This also means that any social orientation remained annexed, not being a genuine part of the overall societal setting. Turned around, this means as well that bureaucratic structuration gained a dominant role, in tendency independent of societal and even individual use value.
3) We face a paradox as on the one hand we see the lack of employment opportunities. On the other hand there seems to be a lack of investment opportunities, leading to the financialisation. As such we are apparently facing a paradox – and indeed if we look only at this constellation we see the two patterns: The increasing inequality due to financialisation as highlighted by James Galbraith (passim); and the increasing decoupling of economic activities (expressed in GDP) and emerging employment opportunities (see above, page 9). However, we need to take a wider perspective. Together with Marica Frangakis, I pointed out that the problem has to be located in a different way. The discrepancy has to be seen in the falling apart of social relationships, of which the division of labour and the technological developments are genuine part. In this light we emphasised particularly the following moves today, of course requiring strong political intervention:
16
•
incentivising production away from over-accumulation (e.g. tax and subsidies)
•
shorter working hours/longer holidays/work over the life cycle/ lowering retirement age/ income in kind (e.g. crèches, other benefits otherwise offered by the market)/ training as part of one’s working life (cf flexicurity regime and life-long learning)
•
recognition of “societal work”, for instance as in the French debate on “sécurité d’emploi ou de formation”[.],
•
launching a policy of fiscal stimulus as European strategy that fosters investment,
•
de-centralisation and development of local and regional potentials,
•
fostering a policy of sustainable global equity rather than competitive growth.
(Herrmann, Peter, Frangakis, Marica, 2014: The need for a radical ‘growth policy’ agenda for Europe at a time of crisis; in: Dymarski, Wlodzimierz/Marica Frangakis/Leaman, Jeremy: The Deepening Crisis of the European Union: The Case for Radical Change; Poznań: Poznań University of Economics Press: 179-194; here: 184 f.) 4) As justified as it is to be sceptical about current initiatives and movements, we should not underestimate the potentials that are given. Of course, it is necessary to criticise the lack of the sharing aspect of the suggested sharing economy (see Eckhardt, Giana M./Bardhi, Fleura, 2015: The Sharing Economy Isn’t About Sharing at All; in: Harvard Business Review, January 28th, 2015; https://hbr.org/2015/01/the-‐sharing-‐economy-‐isnt-‐about-‐sharing-‐at-‐all; 01/04/16); of course the discussion about endogenous growth and green deal remains fundamentally flawed, not changing the fundamental parameters of growth; of course, referring to an access economy, as the relevance of the control over data is increasing if related to the role of energy (Herrmann, Peter, 2016:
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From 5 giant evils to 5 giant tensions – the current crisis of capitalism as seedbed for
its
overturn
–
or:
How
Many
Gigabyte
has
a
Horse?;
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301815015_From_5_giant_evils_to_5_g iant_tensions_-‐_the_current_crisis_of_capitalism_as_seedbed_for_its_overturn_-‐ _or_How_Many_Gigabyte_has_a_Horse; 26/05/16), highlights one trend, making us easily forget the fact that the traditional production is globally still following the traditional requirements and patterns of industrialism; and of course, we have to be alert in political terms, including the new ‘measurement-‐initiatives’ as those by the OECD, aiming on measuring well-‐being. Nevertheless, the variety of calls for change and the variety of the sources of such calls, reaching to people who had been in power positions without calling for any change, may also be seen in the light of diffuse, but objective pushes towards change. They are not emerging from changed insight but from changed pressures and opportunities. This can also be interpreted as the explosive pressure that comes from two sides, namely the fundamental questioning of the law of value at the bottom and the top. It is interesting that we apparently have to ‘reverse’. In a standard textbook on development economics we find the presentation of a move from traditional economics, over political economy to development economics, presented as an extension of scope, and it is contended that ‘development economics, to a greater extent than traditional neoclassical economics of even political economy, must be concerned with the economic, cultural, and political requirements of effecting rapid structural and institutional transformations of entire societies in a manner that will most efficiently bring the fruits of economic progress to the broadest segments of their populations. It must focus on the mechanisms that keep families, regions, and even entire nations in poverty traps, in which past poverty causes future poverty, and on the most effective strategies for breaking out of these traps.’ (Todaro, Michael P./Smith, Stephen C., 201211: Economic Development; Boston et altera: Addison-‐ Wesley: 8) Looking at this sequence we see a reversal of the constitution of society in economic development teaching: society is seen as framework, not as condition of economic development. A major challenge we all face – and this is in particular true for countries that are still or again willing to discuss development
18
beyond growth in a truly global perspective – is to secure not the control of the functioning of the market, but the embeddedness of the market into societal relationships. This challenge – and admittedly its ambiguity – is making sure that the ends and means are set into place as complements: A Shared Society is one where every resident feels at home and able to play a full part in the society. Empowerment enhances the potential for participation and public engagement. A shared and empowered society is more sustainable, both in the sense that it is likely to be more stable and prosperous but also because it is more likely to be environmentally sensitive as its members are aware of the impact of their actions on their local environment and resist efforts to exploit the environment for short-term gain. Of course, that depends on the community being aware of the impact of its actions and willing to act responsibly. But public involvement adds extra levels of checks and balances, and in a Shared Society, where everyone is encouraged to engage and take responsibility, it is easier to raise awareness of important issues. (McCartney, Clem, 2015: The Post-2015 World – Implications for Social Development; in: ICSW, October 2015: Global Cooperation Newsletter; New York; 1-7; here: 5f. ) As laudable as initiatives as for instance the orientation on Shared Societies by the Club of Madrid (e.g. http://www.clubmadrid.org) are, the danger is obvious too: the thinking remains fundamentally caught in defining sharing and the issues it relates to the Shared Societies (empowerment, participation …) as annex, looking at them as contributing to the economic success. So, there are huge challenges but also potentials – and it is essential that we start not from a wish list but from the objective requirements and possibilities. i Dr. [philosophy] (Bremen, Germany) habil [sociology] (Debrecen, Hungary). Studies in Sociology (Bielefeld, Germany), Economics (Hamburg, Germany), Political Science (Leipzig, Germany) and Social Policy and Philosophy (Bremen, Germany). Currently he lives in Rome, Italy and works as social philosopher in various contexts within the EU and globally. He is also adjunct professor at the University of Eastern Finland (UEF), Department of Social Sciences (Kuopio, Finland), honorary associate professor at Corvinus University in Budapest, Faculty of Economics, Department of World Economy.
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He had been teaching at several Third Level Institutions across the EU; currently correspondent to the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Social Law (Munich, Germany). He holds position as for instance that of a senior advisor to the European Foundation on Social Quality (The Hague, Netherlands), member of the Advisory Board of EURISPES – Istituto di Studi Politici, Economici e Sociali, Rome, member of the Scientific Board and its coordination committee of ATTAC – Association pour la taxation des transactions financières pour l’aide aux citoyens, Associate Member of the Eurasian Center for Big History and System Forecasting, Lomonosow Moscow State University, Russia. He is also full member of the European Academy of Social Science and Arts. He held various positions as visiting professor at different universities within ad outside of the EU. He also had been research fellow at National Taiwan University, Taipei; The Cairns Institute, James Cook University, Australia; Visiting Scholar at Orta Dogu Teknik Üniversitesi (ODTU), Ankara, Turkey; Visiting Scholar at the Max-‐Planck-‐Institute für Sozialrecht und Sozialpolitik, Munich, Germany; Visiting professor at Zhejiang University, HangZhou, PRC; Founding Professor at Bangor College CSUFT, ChangSha, PRC. His areas of teaching comprise economics, political science, sociology and law. He started his work in researching European Social Policy and in particular the role of NGOs. His main interest shifted over the last years towards developing the Social Quality Approach further, looking in particular into the meaning of economic questions and questions of law. He linked this with questions on the development of state analysis and the question of social services. Since recently his interest shifted towards political economy, globalisation and formational change. I this context he is in particular interested in questions around change of labour/work (‘precarity as seedbed of a new political-‐economic formations’, sustainable socio-‐economic growth, socio-‐economic sustainability …). He published widely on the various topics. Contact: EURISPES – Istituto di Studi Politici, Economici e Sociali Prof. Dr. Peter Herrmann Via Cagliari 14 00198 Roma ITALIA skype: peteresosc QQ: 2738027550 currently Bangor College CSUFT Address: 498 Shaoshan Rd(S),Tianxin District, Changsha, Hunan, 410004, China skype: peteresosc QQ: 2738027550 -‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐ NEWS, THOUGHTS AND PROVOCATIONS http://williamthompsonucc.wordpress.com https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Herrmann_(social_philosopher) https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Peter_Herrmann https://www.youtube.com/user/esosceu/videos
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