Beyond Disasters - Worldwatch Institute

W O R L D WAT C H R E P O R T

Beyond Disasters

Creating Opportunities for Peace michael renner and zoë chafe


Beyond Disasters Creating Opportunities for Peace

michael renner and zoë chafe l i s a m a s t n y, e d i t o r

w o r l d wat c h i n s t i t u t e , wa s h i n g t o n , d c

© Worldwatch Institute, 2007 ISBN 1-878071-80-7 Library of Congress Control Number: 2007928232

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The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Worldwatch Institute; of its directors, officers, or staff; or of its funding organizations.

On the cover: Indonesian workers construct a house in a refugee camp in Kaye Jato village, Aceh Besar, June 2005. Photograph © REUTERS/Tarmizy Harva

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Table of Contents Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 “Unnatural” Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 The March Toward Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Understanding Factors of Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Storm Clouds and Silver Linings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Case Study—Aceh: Peacemaking After the Tsunami . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Case Study—Sri Lanka: A “Double Blow” to Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Case Study—Kashmir: Physical Tremor, but No Political Earthquake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Creating Future Opportunities for Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Figures, Tables, and Sidebars Figure 1. Number of Disasters Worldwide, 1987–2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Figure 2. People Affected and Killed by Natural Disasters, 1987–2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Figure 3. Fair Market Rent for a One-Bedroom Unit in New Orleans, 2000–2006 . . . . . . 17 Figure 4. Aceh and Its Location in Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Figure 5. Incidents of Conflict Between GAM and Indonesian Government Forces (GoI) and Local-Level Conflicts, January 2005–February 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Figure 6. Sri Lanka: Tsunami-Displaced Persons by Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Figure 7. Deaths in Sri Lanka’s Civil War, 2000–2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Figure 8. Kashmir: Political Division and Earthquake Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Figure 9. Deaths from Violence in Jammu and Kashmir, 1989–2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Table 1. The Impact of Selected Major Disasters, 2004–2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Table 2. Attempts at Bilateral Post-Disaster Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Table 3. Impacts of Civil War and the 2004 Tsunami on Aceh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Table 4. Selected Provisions of the Aceh Peace Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Table 5. Aceh’s Peace Accord versus the Governing Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Table 6. Impacts of Civil War and the 2004 Tsunami on Sri Lanka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Table of Contents Table 7. Assistance to Conflict- and Tsunami-Affected Sri Lankans, as of April 2006 . . . . 31 Table 8. Impacts of the Kashmir Conflict and the October 2005 Earthquake . . . . . . . . . . 34 Sidebar 1. After Hurricane Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Sidebar 2. Drought and Conflict in Darfur, Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Sidebar 3. Disaster Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Sidebar 4. Principles of the “Do No Harm” Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Sidebar 5. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Acknowledgments The authors are indebted to the Ford Foundation for its generous support of this project. This paper was strengthened greatly by the detailed feedback provided by Philippe Hoyois (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, Brussels), analysts Nireka Weeratunge and Sunil Bastian (Colombo, Sri Lanka), Ilan Kelman (DisasterDiplomacy.org, Boulder), Dayna Brown (Listening Project), and Worldwatch Board member Larry Minear. Field trips to Aceh and Sri Lanka in 2005 and 2006 provided us with valuable insights into this topic. We thank Jessica Rucell and Elizabeth Wong for organizing and leading a small Global Exchange delegation to Aceh. We are similarly grateful to Rixt Bode (Oxfam Novib), Amal Kumar Pramanik (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee), Devanand Ramiah and Niel Kusumsiri (UNDP), and Natasha Udugama (Sarvodaya) for facilitating visits to post-tsunami micro-credit and reconstruction projects in southern Sri Lanka. In Aceh, the following individuals generously shared their views: Linda North and Kerry Ross (Yayasan Lamjabat); Fuad Mardadital (Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Commission, BRR); Lilianne Fan (Oxfam); Peter Woetmann and Nicholas Alexandre Bonvin (Aceh Monitoring Mission); and Bakhtiar Abdallah (GAM). In addition, staff members of the Aceh Civil Society Task Force, Aceh Recovery Forum, Women Volunteers for Humanitarian Action, Yasindo (Community Rural Development Foundation), and the International Organization for Migration granted interviews. In Sri Lanka, the authors benefited from conversations with: Madhavi Ariyabandu; Nikki Burns and Priyanka Samarakoon (CARE); Iveta Ouvry (MercyCorps); Mahinda de Silva (Sewalanka Foundation); Nanditha Hettitantra (Oxfam America); and Johannah Boestel (Asian Development Bank). Meeri-Maria Jaarva (Crisis Management Initiative, Helsinki) and Tore Hattrem, Sondre Bjotveit, Erik Ivo Nürnberg, and Tom Knappskog (Norwegian Foreign Ministry) also took time out of busy schedules to discuss the challenges of peacemaking efforts in Aceh and Sri Lanka. Last, but certainly not least, several Worldwatch colleagues played crucial roles in shepherding this report from manuscript to polished final product, and ensuring its visibility: Senior Editor Lisa Mastny, Art Director Lyle Rosbotham, Communications Manager Darcey Rakestraw, and Marketing Director Patricia Shyne.

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Summary

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wo recent tragedies, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, gave rise to hopes that three longstanding Asian conflicts could finally be brought to an end: the separatist uprising in Indonesia’s Aceh Province, the civil war in Sri Lanka, and the territorial dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Amid terrible loss of life, these disasters presented residents and policymakers alike with a host of new challenges, but also with unique opportunities to address their ongoing troubles. Earthquakes, floods, droughts, and other natural disasters exact a heavy human and economic toll. On average, 231 million people were affected by natural disasters each year over the past decade—equivalent to every person in Indonesia, the fourth most populous country in the world. As climate change and ecosystem destruction intensify, the stage is being set for more frequent, more powerful, and more destructive disaster events. Communities that are already disempowered as a result of economic and ecological marginalization are exceptionally vulnerable to disasters, which exacerbate problems of poverty, indebtedness, and food insecurity. Many of the world’s poorest residents are forced to live on unstable hillsides or in areas prone to drought or flooding. Women, children, and the elderly are among those most affected by disasters. Disasters can trigger conflicts by straining the social and economic fabric of affected communities. Recriminations may occur over such post-disaster realities as unequal relief efforts, inadequate compensation, contentious


aid distribution, unwelcome resettlement, or lack of consultation with those who are most affected. In extreme cases, the seeds of violent conflict may be sown. Areas of recent or current armed conflict are particularly at risk. But when disasters occur in conflict zones, they can produce an unexpected silver lining: the opportunity for peace. By jolting the political landscape, disasters hold the potential to quickly transform conflict dynamics and generate opportunities to bring long-running disputes to an end. Hardship that cuts across existing divides can prompt acts of goodwill and create common relief needs. Joint emergency aid efforts and rebuilding activities can be a catalyst for building mutual trust among adversaries. In some cases, the destruction wrought by a disaster may be so great that reconstruction in conflictafflicted regions is able to proceed only with a ceasefire or peace agreement. Aceh, Sri Lanka, and Kashmir have each taken dramatically different paths in the aftermath of disaster. In Aceh, the tsunami served as a catalyzing shock that decisively shifted the political dynamics of the region and cemented a collective interest in peace. Sri Lanka had a ceasefire in place, but struggles over control of reconstruction aid reinforced the island’s divides and contributed to renewed warfare. And in Kashmir, despite substantial post-disaster goodwill, India and Pakistan ultimately missed a unique opportunity to reinvigorate the stalled reconciliation process. The differing experiences of these three disaster- and conflict-affected regions offer important lessons: • Compassion alone is unlikely to carry warB E Y O N D

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Summary ring factions through the complexities of a peace process. It must lead to political change that addresses the root causes of the conflict. • Solutions must be indigenous, supported by the affected forces and communities rather than engineered by outside actors. • The international community has an important role to play in facilitating fledgling peace processes, reinforcing shared interests, and creating maneuvering space for civil society. This includes donor governments, United Nations agencies, private aid groups, and others. • Environmental protection and restoration measures are important for reducing future disaster vulnerability as well as the potential for associated hardship and conflict. These measures are especially critical as post-disaster reconstruction puts enormous pressure on natural resources and the environment. How can we identify and harness unique opportunities for peacemaking in post-disaster

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situations? Policymakers must exhibit courage and use skilled leadership. The intersection of disaster, conflict, and peacemaking requires creative interdisciplinary responses from governments, international donors, and civil society. Relief groups, development agencies, economists, environmentalists, human rights advocates, and conflict mediators must work together more proactively, building on one another’s expertise. Because aid is inevitably political, relief and development groups need to integrate conflictsensitive strategies into their work. Aid is not an easy lever for peace, and unless carefully designed, aid policies can exacerbate conflicts. Sincere consultations with communities and civil society leaders, which ensure that local needs and interests are taken into account, are a critical prerequisite for successful aid projects. Great care must be taken to avoid inequities in assistance to disaster- and conflict-affected populations.


“Unnatural” Disasters

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n late December 2004, the earth shook violently. Deep beneath the Indian Ocean, an enormous tectonic plate lurched sideways, shifting more than 15 meters in a matter of seconds.* Pushing the adjoining plate upward, the movement set off a massive earthquake that measured 9.0 on the Richter scale, triggering one of the deadliest tsunamis in modern history. Although it took many weeks to tally the gruesome toll, within hours more than 200,000 people had lost their lives in over a dozen countries along the Indian Ocean’s rim.1† For the two countries hit hardest by the waves—Indonesia and Sri Lanka—widespread death and suffering are unfortunately not new experiences. Both nations were, at the time of the tsunami, home to festering civil conflicts, and their experiences in the disaster’s aftermath had an important bearing on how these conflicts would unfold. Worldwide, as the impacts of earthquakes and other disasters worsen over time, and as civil or international conflicts arise and persist, a better understanding of the connections between these two types of tragedies will be critical. Whether under the sea or on land, earthquakes—along with floods, droughts, hurricanes, and other weather extremes—are often seen as the cause of natural disasters, the forces of nature unleashed in unpredictable ways. But these occurrences might be better characterized as “unnatural” at times. There is growing recognition that disaster is itself often *Units of measure throughout this report are metric unless common usage dictates otherwise. †Endnotes are grouped by section and begin on page 43.


the product of human impacts on the natural environment, as well as shortsighted and inappropriate development patterns, settlements in increasingly vulnerable areas, and socioeconomic divides and inequities. Disasters present complex challenges, beyond the obvious tasks of improving early warning systems or mobilizing quick relief. They are connected in important ways to a range of social, environmental, and ultimately political challenges faced by humanity, including: • Environmental degradation: Human-induced changes in ecological systems and cycles make certain types of disasters more likely and increase their destructive power. Deforestation heightens the danger of flooding and landslides; inappropriate land use contributes to droughts and desertification; and the destruction of coral reefs, mangroves, and wetlands increases coastal areas’ exposure to storms. • Climate change: The release of massive amounts of carbon into the atmosphere from fossil fuel burning and deforestation further aggravates many of these problems. River deltas and other low-lying areas will be forced to contend with the specter of sea-level rise. Populations already living in areas prone to drought or extreme weather patterns—many of them with limited capacity to adapt and cope—will face even greater challenges. • Population and housing: Population growth translates into larger numbers of people potentially living in harm’s way, particularly in areas where houses are poorly built (and thus less likely to withstand natural forces). Many people settle, by choice or necesB E Y O N D

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“Unnatural” Disasters sity, in disaster-prone places. With more frequent natural hazards, certain areas are likely to become less habitable or economically viable. This is expected to contribute to more involuntary population movements. • Poverty and inequality: Poorer residents often have little choice about where to live and work. Marginalized by economic and political structures that cater to the more powerful, they may settle in the most vulnerable places—on steep hillsides or at low elevations likely to be hit by landslides, floods, or other disasters. After a disaster happens, the poor are often unable to purchase clean food or water. They will also suffer when money for social programs is diverted for disaster relief and recovery efforts. Disaster can derail progress on international targets for well-being, such as the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals.

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• Human security and peacemaking: The heavy economic toll and sudden stress imposed by disasters can easily reinforce existing inequalities and may even trigger disputes. On the other hand, when disasters strike in conflict zones, the shared suffering offers an unprecedented opportunity for “humanitarian peacemaking”: a chance to overcome the divisive issues at the heart of long-lasting conflicts. In the days after the 2004 tsunami struck, there was hope among residents of conflicttorn Sri Lanka and in Indonesia’s Aceh province that the fateful shift of tectonic plates might translate into a political realignment conducive to making peace. But this is just one of many possible outcomes when disaster and conflict overlap. Ultimately, the thoughts and actions of the individuals and groups involved in coordinating relief and recovery efforts have a profound effect on the way forward.


The March Toward Disaster

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*The following hazards are included under the umbrella term “natural disaster”: drought, earthquake, extreme temperature, flood, slides, volcano, wave/surge, wildfire, and windstorm.


Figure 1. Number of Disasters Worldwide, 1987–2006 2000 Source: EM-DAT

Number

1500

1000

500

1987–1991

1992–1996

1997–2001

2002–2006

fatalities down over time, a single major event like the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami can 1500 this trend. It is notable that there were obscure Source: EM-DAT just as many deaths from other disasters during the 2002–06 period as were suffered during Deathsthe 1200 tsunami, though this event attracted more global Affected attention than any single other occurrence. 2004 Meanwhile, the number of people affected Tsunami 900 by disasters—injured, left homeless, or otherwise requiring immediate assistance—has increased 600 more than 10 percent over the past two decades, from an average of 209 million a year between 1987 and 1996 to an average of 300 a year between 1997 and 2006.4 231 million Widespread hazards account for a large share of those affected: over the past decade, 82 2.3 billion people affected1997–2001 or percent0of the 1987–1991 1992–1996 2002–2006 injured by a natural hazard were survivors of a flood (1.2 billion) or drought (736 million).5 Disasters are often portrayed as unavoidable B E Y O N D

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9

1500

1200

900

600

300

0

Millions Affected

0

Thousand Deaths

n recent years, the world’s attention has been pulled rapidly from one disaster event to the next. With an average of nearly one natural disaster per day—348 recorded each year over the past decade—it is no wonder that governments, aid agencies, local organizations, businesses, and citizens are hard-pressed to keep up with these calamities.1* (See Figure 1.) To qualify as a disaster, as defined by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, a natural hazard must kill 10 or more people, affect 100 or more people, or necessitate a declaration of emergency or call for international assistance.2 Some disasters are never reported. In other cases, they capture media attention only momentarily, when the scope of suffering and pain seems overwhelming. The recovery period, which can appear slow and distant, gets less support than is needed to help us understand the long-term challenges facing survivors. As quickly as they enter the spotlight, the epicenters of disaster can fade out, leaving residents and responding agencies to cope with the necessary rebuilding and recovery efforts. The rising frequency of disasters and constant flow of competing news stories reinforce this tendency to focus only briefly on individual events. Over the past 20 years, the human toll from natural disasters has changed markedly.3 (See Figure 2, page 10.) While advances in earlywarning systems have pushed the number of

2000 Source: EM-DAT


Number

1500

1000

500

0

1987–1991

events. But in reality, they are the product of several factors: natural hazards (such as windstorms, earthquakes, or floods), vulnerabilities (such as lack of access to information, poor food security, deforestation, or inadequate city planning), and failed risk-management tactics (such as implementing building codes, improving sanitation, and conducting emergency drills).6 While humans have little ability to1992–1996 control natural1997–2001 hazards, much more can be 2002–2006

Figure 2. People Affected and Killed by Natural Disasters, 1987–2006 1500

1500 Source: EM-DAT Deaths Affected

1200

2004 Tsunami 900

900

600

600

300

300

0

1987–1991

1992–1996

1997–2001

Millions Affected

Thousand Deaths

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0 2002–2006

done to understand vulnerability and use risk-management tactics to prevent future devastation. Natural hazards often expose existing vulnerabilities. But human-related factors ultimately influence the severity of the devastation. These include population growth and urbanization, environmental destruction, and climate change: • Population growth and urbanization: As the human population rises past 6.5 billion, putting greater pressure on the availability and cost of land, more people are being forced to live in riskier places and in higher concentrations.7 By 2030, an additional 1.7 billion people will live on our planet, bringing the total population to an estimated 8.2 billion.8 Because disasters are defined in part by their human toll, having more people in harm’s way 10

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will likely bring an associated rise in disaster impacts. In 2008, for the first time ever, more people will live in cities than rural areas; by 2030, this urban share is projected to reach 60 percent, or some 5 billion people.9 Cities have been home to some of the most lethal and costly disasters in recent years. A 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan, killed an estimated 6,400 people and caused damages totaling $128 billion (in 2005 dollars).10 * Ten years later, Hurricane Katrina engulfed the U.S. city of New Orleans, killing 1,800 residents and having a similar economic effect.11 In 2006, an earthquake in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, killed more than 5,700 people and affected 2.3 million others.12 Many cities are located in risky areas— along coasts, near known fault lines, or in low-lying regions susceptible to flooding. In some cases, this siting is a vestige of advantageous sea trading routes. In other cases, sprawl has left residents no choice but to move to less-desirable areas outside the city center. Whatever the historical reason, as urbanization intensifies, cities often lose their natural defenses. • Environmental destruction: When the 2004 tsunami came ashore on the southeastern coast of India, one village— Naluvedapathy in Tamil Nadu state—was largely spared. Two years earlier, villagers had planted more than 80,000 trees, resulting in a kilometer-wide forest barrier between the village and the ocean.13 Although the massive waves still caused widespread flooding, the trees broke the waves’ impact, resulting in few deaths among residents. Neighboring areas were not so lucky. Across wide swaths of tsunami-affected coastline, the deforestation of mangroves and the degradation of offshore coral reefs left villages vulnerable. One study in Sri Lanka revealed that damage to the coast was far greater in places where mangrove forests had been disturbed. In areas with more-intact forests, the trees remained in place even as they bore the brunt *All dollar amounts are expressed in U.S. dollars unless indicated otherwise.


The March Toward Disaster of the waves.14 This pattern of environmental degradation leading to worse disasters has been observed time and again. New Orleans, devastated by the flooding and storm surge that followed Hurricane Katrina, is losing coastal wetlands to rising seas at a rate of 1.5 football fields (8,026 square meters) an hour; the state of Louisiana has lost a quarter of its wetlands since the 1930s, mostly due to levees blocking the natural flow of sediments down the Mississippi River.15 Mumbai, India, which was inundated by massive flooding in 2005, has lost much of its natural flood defense—mangrove forests—to development.16 And many countries in Central and South America experience devastating landslides each hurricane season due to deforestation. • Climate change: As scientists develop a better picture of our climatic situation, global awareness of climate change has reached a tipping point. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the Earth’s average surface temperature has increased measurably over the past 100 years.17 The U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration reports that the five warmest years since the late 1880s all fell within the last decade.18 And in 2005, meteorologists announced they had observed an 80 percent increase over 35 years in the most powerful types of tropical cyclones—storms fueled by warm ocean water.19 As drought, flooding, erratic weather, and extreme temperatures are on the rise, so are the disasters that often follow these phenomena. In 2006, long-term drought on the Greater Horn of Africa, including the worst drought in Somalia in a decade, led to food shortages that affected at least 11 million people.20 That same area experienced its most severe flooding in 50 years.21 The UK-based humanitarian organization Christian Aid reported that one third of pastoralists in Kenya have had to abandon their traditional lifestyle because of adverse conditions related to drought.22 This is just one example of the many ways extreme weather can produce either rapid-onset, high-profile disasters or slow-onset, relatively inconspicuw w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g

ous disasters. A 2007 report from the IPCC reinforces the fact that climate change will hit poor countries the hardest.23 Climate change will intensify coastal and weather-related hazards threatening these vulnerable communities.24 This rising level of risk will require additional attention from the international donor community.25 Aid organizations are already struggling to keep up with the rising disaster toll. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which inspired an outpouring of international support, was the best-funded relief effort ever recorded, with a

Table 1. The Impact of Selected Major Disasters, 2004–2006

Year

Event

Deaths

Total People Affected

(Number)

2006 2005 2005 2004

Yogyakarta Earthquake Kashmir Earthquake Hurricane Katrina Indian Ocean Tsunami

5,778 74,648 1,833 226,408

Total People Deaths Affected (Percent of all disasters during year)

2,340,745 3,026,265 500,000 2,431,807

27.1 84.4 2.1 93.3

Source: See Endnote 28 for this section.

staggering $1,241 donated per beneficiary when only an estimated $261 was required.26 The total pledge amount came to $8.5 billion—second only to the $9 billion pledged after Hurricane Mitch hit Central America in 1998—with individual giving comprising $5.5 billion of this.27 But disasters of the type and magnitude of the tsunami or the October 2005 earthquake in Kashmir are relatively rare. While they are typically characterized by high numbers of deaths, they touch a far smaller percentage of the total population affected by disasters over the course of a year.28 (See Table 1.) Heightened attention to certain high-profile events obscures the fact that persistent, localized disasters occur each and every day, most of which generate little or no response. When Hurricane Stan hit Guatemala roughly a month after Hurricane Katrina, it resulted in a similar number of fatalities but generated B E Y O N D

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1.7 2.1 0.3 1.4


UNHCR camp for earthquake survivors at Muzaffarabad, Kashmir. © Fründt/teamwork-press

only a fraction of the media coverage and subsequent aid response.29 Worldwide, flooding in some low-lying areas makes people homeless on an annual basis, heavy rains produce landslides that engulf entire communi-

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ties, and windstorms destroy power lines or other costly infrastructure. These smaller disasters are often deadly and demand ongoing attention from aid agencies.


Understanding Factors of Vulnerability

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isasters provoked by storms, floods, droughts, earthquakes, and other hazards often compromise human security, exacting a heavy economic toll and undermining livelihoods. These effects can be temporary, but in many cases disaster also impairs the long-term habitability or economic viability of the affected area. While the severity of disaster is an important factor, the timeliness and adequacy of relief and rebuilding programs, and the resilience of affected communities and societies, will ultimately shape the future of the area. In poorer countries, disasters easily exacerbate problems of poverty and indebtedness by sucking away scarce financial resources from social programs and contributing to food insecurity. In 1998, Hurricane Mitch caused economic damage equivalent to 60–65 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of Honduras and Nicaragua.1 In contrast, the $128 billion in damage caused by the massive 1995 earthquake in Kobe equaled just 2 percent of Japan’s GDP.2 In urban areas, poor residents are often forced to live in the most undesirable neighborhoods, in environmentally precarious places (such as on unstable hillsides or floodplains), or on contaminated land. Similarly, in rural areas, inequitable land distribution or economic marginalization may mean that small farmers are forced onto steep grades or areas prone to drought or flooding. Hurricane Mitch revealed such vulnerabilities with brute force, killing some 30,000 people and displacing 1.5 million in Honduras and Nicaragua.3 Economic and ecological marginalization leaves poor and disempowered communities


exceptionally vulnerable to disasters. The United Nations Development Programme notes that countries with a low human development score—a measure of life expectancy, education, and standard of living—account for 53 percent of recorded deaths from disasters, even though these countries are home to only 11 percent of the people exposed to natural hazards worldwide.4 When a natural hazard strikes, certain segments of the population are often at higher risk for injury or death. Women in particular are disproportionately affected by disasters, given their economic situations and roles in the home, as are children and the elderly. Taking the special vulnerabilities and capacities of these groups into consideration when designing disaster response plans can minimize the physical, social, and economic consequences. After Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans in 2005, race and economic class were often cited as factors to explain the demographic divide in impacts, as well as the poor U.S. federal response. Few sources mentioned gender, though women in the New Orleans area are more likely than men to live in poverty and to head single-parent families.5 In the aftermath of the disaster, many women faced the daunting challenges of ensuring their own safety and attending to their children’s health, finding housing for themselves and their families, and organizing schooling while searching for jobs—all while wading through the attendant bureaucracy to receive the financial benefits to which they were entitled.6 Hurricane Katrina is not an isolated example of gender’s role in disaster vulnerability. Surveys in the Ampara district of eastern Sri B E Y O N D

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Understanding Factors of Vulnerability Lanka indicate that 66 percent of those killed by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami were women, many of whom were preparing breakfast in their homes or tending to their children when the waves hit.7 Initial estimates from Aceh in Indonesia found that more than 70 percent of the fatalities were female, in part because women waiting on the shore for fishing boats to return were more severely affected than the fishermen out at sea.8 And an earthquake that leveled buildings in Maharashtra, India, in 1993 crushed more women than men (who were likely to be working or sleeping outdoors).9 The insecurity and unusual circumstances that arise post-disaster place women at higher risk as well. In temporary camps, insufficient lighting and a breakdown in social accountability can result in embarrassment, sexual harassment, and abuse, as was observed anecdotally in Sri Lanka after the tsunami.10 Lack of employment and general depression can lead to domestic violence.11 And basic issues such as inadequate sanitation facilities and supplies can add significantly to women’s burdens. Mothers and pregnant women face particular health and safety challenges in environments where food supplies and medical care are often scarce. Economic vulnerability is another significant concern for women. When land titles are lost or the titleholder dies, women may have little sway in retaining family property. If a husband was killed during the Kashmir earthquake in 2005, his land often went to the eldest son, even if the surviving wife occupied and used it.12 In Sri Lanka, women owned as much as 75 percent of the affected land prior to the tsunami, but afterwards, most donor-given houses were deeded in a man’s name.13 And in India, tsunami relief money was disbursed to men, leaving female-headed families without support.14 But women should not be seen as helpless victims. In fact, they are crucial players in successful disaster management planning and recovery efforts. In San Alfonso, El Salvador, women who had been affected by Hurricane Mitch in 1998, as well as two earthquakes in 2001, successfully evacuated before Hurricane 14

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Stan hit their community in 2005, though many houses were destroyed. Female survivors have since constructed a risk map that integrates health and environmental information and set up a monitoring system to watch the nearby river.15 In situations where prior planning was not effective, women can forge crucial links to stave off worsening crises. Just before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, six women who worked as telephone dispatchers in Lower Plaquemines Parish were instructed to stay at their desks while their superiors evacuated.16 They had not been alerted to any emergency plans, so they used their knowledge of the local area, as well as their personal connections with the residents, to devise phone trees and evacuation plans before phone lines and electricity were cut.17 Their efforts probably saved several hundred lives.18 Children and the elderly are two other demographic groups at potentially higher risk during disasters. They may need assistance to evacuate safely and effectively according to disaster plans (if these exist), as well as special attention to ensure they receive warnings in enough time to act on them. The 2005 Kashmir earthquake proved deadly for children, killing more than 16,000 in schools that collapsed during the quake.19 The elderly, who may depend on family members to help them access food and health services, suffered as well: of 11,540 elderly people in camps after the earthquake, some 1,564 were without any adult support.20 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the tsunami killed a disproportionately high number of both groups as well.21 In many cases, children may survive but their parents do not, leaving them to fend for themselves in a chaotic post-disaster situation. In Sri Lanka alone, at least 1,500 children were orphaned by the tsunami, and in Indonesia another 2,000 were separated from their parents or orphaned.22 Some 2,430 children were separated from their parents by Hurricane Katrina.23 As with women, the risks for children do not disappear once a disaster has hit. Their ability to go back to life as they knew it may be w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g

Understanding Factors of Vulnerability seriously compromised by factors beyond their control. Schools may be closed for prolonged periods of time if they were damaged or if teachers are unable to return to work. Alternatively, families may be unable to afford school fees if wage earners have lost their jobs or must redirect their earnings toward rebuilding or medical fees. In some areas of Sri Lanka, 25 percent of children were still not back in school two years posttsunami, even where attendance was very high before the disaster.24 And safety risks may dissuade families from allowing children, especially girls, from returning to school.25 Disasters can leave children at risk of becoming child laborers or being trafficked to other regions or countries. If a child is orphaned, he or she will often have to find food, clothing, and shelter or earn money to purchase these things. In many cases, new orphans—or those temporarily separated from their parents—are at increased risk for economic exploitation.26 Some governments are taking proactive measures to reduce this risk. After the Kashmir earthquake, Pakistan restricted child relocation to prevent trafficking, collaborated with nongovernmental organizations to reunite families, and built temporary schools.27 In Indonesia, a post-tsunami project funded by


Precariously placed housing in Kandy, Sri Lanka, clings to a hillside after heavy flooding. © Zoë Chafe

the U.S. Department of Labor and implemented by Save the Children targeted 10,530 children at risk of working in hazardous or exploitative positions by reactivating community learning centers and working with staff to raise awareness of the problem.28

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eyond livelihood and human security impacts, sudden stresses caused by disaster may strain the social and economic structures of a community, deepening existing inequalities and triggering conflicts. Not only are disasters, as a 2005 Oxfam International report put it, “profoundly discriminatory in their impact on people” (with factors like gender, age, and income determining who will be most affected), but human reactions often reinforce their unequal impacts.1 How well a government responds has important political implications. Competent disaster management can improve an agency’s image and efficacy, while an inept or indifferent attitude toward disaster will likely erode citizens’ trust. Potential political and economic repercussions in the aftermath of disasters include: • Aid as a political tool: Disagreements over the allocation of disaster aid among affected groups may erupt, especially if politicians wield aid as a tool for dispensing favors to their supporters, as happened in Peru in 1998 following an El Niño-triggered disaster.2 • Aid distorts the economy: High-profile disasters (such as the 2004 tsunami or the Ethiopian famines of the mid-1980s) can mobilize massive amounts of international aid, creating “an economic branch of its own,” in the words of a 2005 German study.3 But the quick receipt of such money may deepen inequality, benefiting residents who rent houses or offer services to emergency aid groups while hurting those who face rising prices from aid-induced inflation. After Hurricane Katrina, for example, rents rose substantially in New Orleans, pricing out some long-term residents.4 (See Sidebar 1.)

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• Competition for jobs and services: Disasterdisplaced populations may not be welcome elsewhere if they are seen as competitors for scarce land, water, jobs, and social services. This was the plight of flood-displaced Bangladeshis in India’s Assam region, and of drought-displaced Hawaweer pastoralists in northern Sudan, in the early 1980s.5 • Unequal compensation: Disputes may erupt over inadequate compensation for property losses, particularly if land titles and other forms of documentation are lost (or did not exist to begin with). Or, as happened in the 2004 tsunami, the physical landscape may be so fundamentally altered that it becomes nearly impossible to adjudicate property disputes. • Conflict over resettlement: If resettlement and reconstruction proceed without properly consulting affected communities and respecting their rights, conflict can ensue. When survivors of the 2005 Kashmir earthquake protested their eviction from a makeshift refugee camp in Muzaffarabad, police broke up the march, injuring and arresting several demonstrators.6 • War weakens resilience: Areas of recent or ongoing armed conflict are especially at risk. Warfare depletes a country’s economic resources, rends its social fabric, and damages its natural environment—affecting the resilience needed to recover from a disaster. Somalia, for example, routinely contends with severe flooding and drought, but war-damaged roads and bridges hinder aid delivery.7 In extreme cases, governments that fail to adequately and fairly manage disasters could sow the seeds of violent conflict. In November 1970, after a cyclone claimed an estimated w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g

Storm Clouds and Silver Linings course. But not all types of disasters necessarily lend themselves to conflict resolution: droughts may lead to mounting rivalries over access to scarce land and water among different comSidebar 1. After Hurricane Katrina When Hurricane Katrina hit the southern coast of the United States in 2005, causing widespread damage in several states, it exposed the stark divides between the distinct geographic communities living in the city. Areas built earlier in the city’s history and on higher ground, such as the French Quarter, were largely unaffected by the storm surge. Newer neighborhoods such as the Ninth Ward, built on less-desirable land in the mid-1900s, suffered the worst impacts. Most of all, the storm and its aftermath served as a devastating testimonial to the lack of evacuation and recovery options faced by America’s urban poor. Before Katrina, New Orleans was a vibrant city, home to 454,863 residents. Of these, 67 percent were African-American. Just over a year after the event, the city’s demographics had changed drastically: the city had shrunk to less than half of its former population, with an estimated 187,525 residents in October 2006. Only 46 percent were African-American. In the wake of the storm, rents rose significantly as damaged rental units were razed, dramatically restricting the socioeconomic makeup of people able to remain in, or move back to, the city. (See Figure 3.) Infrastructure regeneration also varied considerably. In wealthier Jefferson and St. Tammany Parishes, 100 percent of public schools were re-opened as of November 2005. In Orleans Parish, only 44 percent of schools had reopened by January 2007, nearly a year and a half after the storm; the record was even worse in hard-hit St. Bernard Parish, where only one in five schools had opened. Source: See Endnote 4 for this section.

Figure 3. Fair Market Rent for a One-Bedroom Unit in New Orleans, 2000–2006 1000 Source: Brookings

Monthly Rent (2006 Dollars)

300,000–500,000 lives in the eastern province of Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh), many residents accused the government in distant Islamabad of being indifferent to their suffering or even intentionally delaying aid shipments. The disaster fueled demands for political autonomy, and Pakistan’s military government responded with increased repression, provoking a war that cost some 3 million lives but led to Bangladesh’s independence in December 1971.8 That same month, a devastating earthquake hit Nicaragua’s capital, Managua. After the country’s dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle embezzled international reconstruction aid, support from the business community crumbled, weakening his regime. Amid deteriorating economic conditions, the Sandinista National Liberation Front grew rapidly and by 1979 overthrew the Somoza regime.9 The negative repercussions of disasters may be seen as new storm clouds—a cascade of suffering and misery. But when disasters occur in conflict zones, they can also bring an unexpected silver lining: the opportunity for peace. By jolting the political landscape, disasters can dramatically transform conflict dynamics and generate opportunities to bring long-running disputes to an end. Disasters may inflict suffering that cuts across existing divides, temporarily triggering acts of goodwill or mutual solidarity and creating common relief needs. Joint emergency aid efforts and rebuilding activities among adversaries can be a catalyst for building mutual trust. The destruction wrought by a disaster may be of such a scale that reconstruction can proceed only with a ceasefire or peace agreement. But post-disaster opportunities are brief, lasting for perhaps no more than a fleeting moment along the timeline of the conflict. Whether the chance for peacemaking is seized—and whether it ultimately succeeds— depends on a range of factors and circumstances: the scale of disaster, the type of conflict, political leadership, and the role of the military, international donors, and civil society.10 After a disaster of great magnitude (relative to the suffering inflicted by conflict), leaders and the public may be receptive to a changed

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Storm Clouds and Silver Linings munities, creating rifts rather than common interests, as has occurred in Darfur, Sudan.11 (See Sidebar 2.) And slow-onset or smallerscale disasters that elude the media or donor spotlight often fail to prompt international engagement and pressure for peace. Disasters have the potential to unite people from opposing sides around a common goal. But the range of dynamics that may unfold is

Sidebar 2. Drought and Conflict in Darfur, Sudan In Sudan’s Darfur region, years of creeping desertification and severe droughts have led to sporadic famine. These environmental challenges might have spurred cooperation between the area’s farming and nomadic communities—two populations with a history of competing for scarce water and fertile land, but also a record of economic interdependence and a tradition of seeking negotiated solutions. Instead, increasing scarcity has led to rising tribal antagonism over the past 20 years. Darfur has also experienced increased banditry and lawlessness, and it has played involuntary host to insurgent groups from neighboring Chad. In February 2003, war broke out in Darfur, the result of many decades of economic and political marginalization by the central government in Khartoum. When Darfur rebels, primarily black Africans, formed armed groups to attack government installations, the Sudanese government, which is predominately Arab, responded by playing up ethnic distinctions and arming the so-called Janjaweed nomadic militias. Working in concert with government army attacks, the Janjaweed have killed at least 200,000 Darfuris, burned 90 percent of farming villages, raped countless women and forced 2.5 million residents out of their homes. At least 2 million displaced Darfuris are now living in refugee camps, where the constant need for water and firewood force women to make long and dangerous treks out of the camps in search of these basic resources. Source: See Endnote 11 for this section.

wide, depending on whether a disaster affects people on both sides of a conflict or strikes primarily one side. Suffering on both sides is likely to prompt a certain commonality of interests, at least in the short run. Though a “one-sided” calamity is likely to elicit acts of compassion, it may ultimately fail to overcome distrust. Even when an opportunity for peacemaking arises, it may wither if one side feels strong enough to prevail with military force or fears that entering negotiations will be seen as an act of weakness. Or, the conflict parties may see a humanitarian ceasefire not as a prelude to peace but as an opportunity to regroup and re18

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arm.12 While post-disaster meetings about aid and recovery efforts can be a “door-opener” that allows parties to meet and build the trust necessary to discuss grievances and political issues, there is no guarantee that such contact will lead to political engagement.13 A key factor to the success of such peacemaking efforts is the commitment of political leaders to initiate meetings or respond constructively to such overtures by opponents. This is particularly the case when intense internal rivalries divide ethnic groups or warlords, and where the relationship between states is marked by ideological rigidity or conflicting interests.14 (See Table 2.) To succeed, peacemaking efforts need to take into account the interests and motivations of political rivals, public pressure, media and other opinion shapers, or outside powers. If opposition parties or other important segments of society are left out or intentionally sidelined, they may well see a political benefit to opposing peace. Others may be tempted to undermine any conflictresolution efforts because they derive enormous profit from maintaining a war economy through arms deals, smuggling, extortion, and other illicit activities. Disaster relief efforts sometimes rely heavily on armed forces, due to militaries’ substantial personnel and logistical capacities. This can be positive or negative, depending on the type of existing conflict. With interstate conflict, mutual trust could be built if the armed forces of both sides engage in collaborative relief work. In civil war situations, the military plays a contradictory role: a force that may have been seen as an oppressor by the affected population is suddenly meant to be received as a first-aid provider. After a disaster, there is often an influx of civilian aid workers. Especially if accompanied by intense (though typically short-lived) global media interest, their presence turns the spotlight on war-torn areas that may previously have been ignored or even off-limits to outsiders, as was the case in Aceh, Indonesia, after the 2004 tsunami. Such circumstances present an unprecedented opportunity to enhance transparency and end human rights abuses. w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g

Storm Clouds and Silver Linings Table 2. Attempts at Bilateral Post-Disaster Diplomacy Ethiopia–Eritrea • 1999–2000 drought and famine • 2002 drought

During a 1998–2000 border war, Eritrea agreed to deliver food aid to landlocked Ethiopia through a humanitarian corridor from its port of Assab. Ethiopia dismissed this as a “gimmick.” In November 2002, Ethiopia again rejected a similar offer.

Taiwan–China • Sept. 1999 Chi-Chi Earthquake

At a time of high political tension, China offered post-disaster assistance to Taiwan. The Taiwanese saw this as a patronizing move by China, which claims sovereignty over the island.

India–Pakistan • Jan. 2001 Gujarat Earthquake

India’s acceptance of Pakistani earthquake aid was impetus for a summit in July 2001. The meeting failed to meet expectations, and relations later dramatically worsened.

Greece–Turkey • 1999 Earthquakes in both countries

Post-disaster mutual assistance and goodwill led towards improving bilateral relations, but did not bring a resolution to the long-standing Cyprus conflict.

Cuba–United States • Nov. 2001 Hurricane Michelle • July 2005 Hurricane Dennis • Oct. 2005 Hurricane Wilma

Cuba declined aid offers after Hurricanes Michelle and Dennis (suggesting instead that the United States normalize bilateral trade relations). After Wilma, Cuba agreed to receive a U.S. disaster assessment team; but when it insisted on discussing disaster response coordination, the United States withdrew the offer.

Iran–United States • Dec. 2003 Bam Earthquake

The United States sent medical personnel and supplies to Iran, but the gesture of goodwill failed to thaw icy relations between the two countries.

United States–Others The United States did not accept aid offers from Cuba (1,500 doctors and • Aug./Sept. 2005 medical supplies), Venezuela (food, oil, water, and aid workers), or Iran (20 Hurricane Katrina million barrels of crude oil, predicated on end of U.S. sanctions). Source: See Endnote 14 for this section.

International aid workers, donors, and mediators who appear on the scene after a disaster may need to play an assertive role in encouraging warring parties to resolve their conflict or at least adopt a ceasefire. International donors will likely insist that the parties undertake concrete steps toward that end, so that emergency aid can be delivered and reconstruction efforts are not ultimately in vain. But foreign workers may also be seen as unwelcome meddlers, or their impartiality may be questioned. Where conflicts are already ripe for resolution and no military solution is imminent,


post-disaster goodwill can provide a muchneeded spark for peacemaking. The 2004 tsunami and the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, for example, gave rise to hopes that three longstanding Asian conflicts, with diverse histories and different possibilities for peace, could finally be brought to an end: civil wars in Indonesia’s Aceh province and in Sri Lanka, and a cross-border dispute between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. Building on the tools for understanding disaster and conflict discussed in the preceding sections, the following case studies detail the very different post-disaster trajectories that each conflict has followed.

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Case Study

Aceh: Peacemaking After the Tsunami

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n December 26, 2004, fighters with the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM) looked on helplessly from mountain redoubts as tsunami waves washed over their coastal village below, killing nearly every inhabitant. Although the tsunami that devastated much of Aceh—a province of Indonesia embroiled in conflict for almost 30 years—did not end fighting right away, it helped kick-start successful peace negotiations. Aceh, located at the northern tip of Sumatra Island, became part of the newly established

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Figure 4. Aceh and Its Location in Indonesia

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Aceh incorporated into North Sumatra province.

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Aceh becomes part of newly sovereign Indonesia.

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Aceh Timeline

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INDIAN OCEAN

Acehnese support Darul Islam rebellion.

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To pacify Aceh, 1950 incorporation is reversed.

Aceh granted “special territory” status, an empty promise.

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ACEH Regencies and selected towns

KOTA SABANG KOTA BANDA ACEH

Republic of Indonesia in 1949. But excessive political centralization and broken promises of autonomy provoked deep misgivings among the Acehnese. Local resentment was further fueled by the unjust exploitation of the area’s vast natural resources. Revenues from oil, natural gas, and logging ventures primarily benefited multinational companies and cronies of long-reigning dictator Suharto in Indonesia’s capital city, Jakarta.1 Aceh today remains one of Indonesia’s poorest provinces.2 GAM was founded in 1976 with the express goal of seceding from Indonesia.3 (See Timeline, below.) The group’s initial uprising was quickly suppressed by the Indonesian army, but membership surged in reaction to severe human rights violations by the government army.4 As the dominant institution in Indonesia for decades, the military was increasingly involved in a broad range of legal and illegal business deals. Profits from ventures in Aceh and other parts of the country supplemented the official defense budget and enriched individual commanders.5 One of the military’s most lucrative sources of income in Aceh has been illegal logging. Some elements of the military have also been involved in marijuana production and trafficking, prostitution, and extortion. For this reason, among others, the military was resolutely opposed to a negotiated solution to the Aceh conflict; some units actively worked to undermine peace efforts

General Suharto establishes dictatorship.




GAM fighters return to Aceh and renew uprising.

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Aceh declared a Military Operations Area; mass killings ensue.

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GAM fighters receive extensive military training in Libya.

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GAM’s initial uprising crushed by Indonesian military.

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GAM (Free Aceh Movement) founded.

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Natural gas discovered in Aceh; land seized without compensation.

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*Legally, martial law gave way to a state of civil emergency in May 2004, but this made little practical difference.

catalyzing shock; it produced a focus on common goals of relief, recovery and reconstruction; and it brought increased international attention.” 14 Several donors, including the governments of Germany and Japan, made it clear that they expected progress on settling the conflict so that reconstruction could proceed unimpeded, though they stopped short of conditioning aid directly on resolving the conflict.15 With the eyes of the world trained on Aceh, both the government and the Table 3. Impacts of Civil War and the rebels were anxious to seize 2004 Tsunami on Aceh the moral high ground. Number of People Impacts or Housing Affected Just four months before the tsunami struck, PresiCivil War dent Susilo Bambang YudKilled 13,000–50,000 hoyono had been elected Displaced in 1992–2002 1.4 million on a platform that included Displaced in 2003–04 120,000–150,000 settling the Aceh conflict. Tsunami After the disaster, his govKilled or missing 167,540 ernment saw an opportuDisplaced or homeless 500,000 nity to repair Indonesia’s Damaged and destroyed houses 116,880 international credibility, sullied by endemic corrup- Source: See Endnote 9 for this section. tion and the military’s reputation for brutality, and to push ahead with the difficult task of further democratizing Indonesia’s political culture.16 Meanwhile, GAM had endured significant military setbacks during the period of martial law. It suffered from combat fatigue, disruptions of supply lines and communications, and reduced strength in urban areas.17 Aware of the lack of international support for Aceh’s independence, its leaders had come to realize, shortly before the tsunami, that negotiations were their only way to maintain legitimacy.18 In January 2005, peace talks began in Helsinki, mediated by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari. By August, eight months after the tsunami, a peace agreement had been signed.19 While it may be tempting to believe that

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between 2000 and 2003.6 Since the fall of the Suharto dictatorship in 1998, political reformers have worked to loosen the military’s grip on Indonesian society.7 A 2004 law requires the military to end its lucrative business ventures within five years, and the practice of reserving a number of seats in parliament for representatives of the armed forces was abandoned. These reforms are essential both for peace in Aceh and for Indonesia’s overall evolution toward more democratic governance.8 The humanitarian catastrophe triggered by the tsunami provided a critical opportunity for change in Aceh.9 (See Table 3.) When the disaster happened, the province had been suffering under martial law since peace talks failed in May 2003. The sudden attention generated by Aceh’s post-disaster plight pried the area open to international scrutiny—which in turn helped end human rights violations, created political space, and offered an avenue for halting the conflict with GAM.* The need for massive international assistance was irrefutable, though government hardliners attempted to bar foreign relief personnel from Aceh.10 Eleven countries deployed some 4,500 soldiers to provide emergency aid.11 As many as 180 international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) registered in the provincial capital, Banda Aceh, and perhaps an even larger number swept in for short periods of time.12 Indonesians themselves collected huge amounts of food and clothing for tsunami survivors, and a flood of volunteers from all over the country poured into Aceh.13 The enormous scope of the tsunami’s destruction shifted the political dynamic quite decisively, as Richard Baker of the East-West Center explains: “It provided a powerful and

Second GAM rebellion largely suppressed.


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“Humanitarian Pause for Aceh” agreed but sabotaged by military.

Special autonomy legislation for Aceh signed.

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November: GAM resumes activities.

Parliament rejects demand for Aceh independence referendum.

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August: Martial law in Aceh lifted.

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Severe financial crisis; popular uprising ends Suharto reign.

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1997–98

© Michael Renner

Affairs Yusuf Kalla asked his deputy Farid Husain to explore options for ending the conflict.20 Following the presidential election in 2004, Kalla became vice president. Two months prior to the tsunami, his intermediaries secretly signed nine “Points of Agreement” with representatives of GAM military commander Muzakkir Manaf—providing amnesty and economic concessions in exchange for an end to GAM’s armed struggle. When word of the agreement leaked out, other GAM field commanders and GAM’s exiled leaders in Sweden rejected it as economic bribery devoid of needed political change.21 Meanwhile, Juha Christensen, a Finnish philologist and businessman intimately familiar with Indonesia, embarked on determined citizen diplomacy in 2002 to bring government representatives and the exiled GAM leaders

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One year after the tsunami, the coastal areas of Aceh’s capital Banda Aceh were still a scene of devastation.

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together. By late 2004 they had gained enough trust to commence negotiations. Just when former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, who agreed to act as facilitator, was ready to invite the two sides to Helsinki, the tsunami struck.22 It is by no means clear whether negotiations would have succeeded in the absence of the tsunami and the international spotlight that followed it to Aceh. Given the history of failed peace efforts, there were tremendous challenges to establishing sufficient trust, formulating an acceptable political formula, and overcoming the opposition to a negotiated peace agreement. Even after the tsunami, several Indonesian ministers were initially opposed to the resumption of peace talks.23 GAM military leaders in East Aceh were reluctant to abandon the goal of independence, and those in West Aceh seemed satisfied with the material benefits they gained from the war economy. But they did not mount a challenge to the negotiations.24 President Yudhoyono’s and Vice President Kalla’s strong personal commitment to peace proved essential. Yudhoyono’s military background enabled him to identify and neutralize hard-line government army officers. Kalla, who heads Golkar, Indonesia’s largest political party, dealt with critics among politicians and parliamentarians.25 Despite sincere commitment from GAM and government representatives, international pressure, and tremendous expectations in Aceh, the Helsinki negotiations proved thorny. The government did not reciprocate a unilateral ceasefire by GAM, and army violence against civilians continued. “The breaking point was often close,” writes Finnish journalist Katri Merikallio in her insider account of that period.26 In the end, a peace agreement—the so-called Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)—was struck in July and signed on August 15, 2005.27 (See Table 4.)

Indonesia’s experience with the tsunami led directly to successful peace negotiations, there are several other factors to consider. For instance, secret peace efforts had begun prior to the tsunami. In 2003, Minister for Social

February: New peace talks start.


Aceh: Peacemaking After the Tsunami Table 4. Selected Provisions of the Aceh Peace Agreement Issue

Provision

Disarmament and GAM to demobilize its 3,000 fighters and relinquish 840 weapons. Government Demobilization forces in Aceh reduced to 14,700 soldiers and 9,100 policemen. Amnesty

GAM members to receive amnesty; political prisoners to be released.

Human Rights

A Human Rights Court and a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation to be established.

Reintegration

Former combatants, pardoned prisoners, and affected civilians to receive farmland, jobs, and other compensation.

Political Participation

Free and fair elections: Aceh governor (2006), Aceh legislature (2009). Government to facilitate the establishment of local political parties (by amending the national election law) by January 2007.

Economy

Aceh entitled to retain 70 percent of its natural resource revenues.



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December: Tsunami devastates Aceh.

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October: Yudhoyono becomes president; pledges peace in Aceh.

2004

May: Tokyo peace talks fail; martial law.

and another quarter by the tsunami. Six months after the peace agreement, almost 75 percent of GAM members were unemployed.31 The situation has not changed significantly since.32 Political disputes, bureaucratic delays, and corruption have slowed distribution of reintegration assistance.33 And the number of people needing such aid far exceeds the 3,000 combatants mentioned in the peace agreement.34 In February 2006, the Badan Reintegrasi Aceh (BRA, Aceh Reintegration Agency) agreed to expand the ranks of those eligible for reintegration assistance to more than 20,000 (including unarmed GAM members and supporters, former political prisoners, anti-GAM militias, and others).35 Violence between GAM and the Indonesian army has come to an end. But as former combatants grow frustrated and disillusioned with their compensation, there has been a rise in armed robberies and extortion.36 And local conflicts over aid and electoral politics have

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March/April: Anti-GAM militias attack CoHA offices.

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December: Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) signed.

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The implementation of the peace agreement was closely supervised by the European Unionled Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) from September 2005 to December 2006. During the first three months, some 1,800 prisoners were released, 3,000 GAM fighters disarmed and demobilized, and close to 32,000 government soldiers and policemen withdrawn.28 Compared with earlier failed peace efforts, AMM had considerable political weight behind its mission, and the EU supported the peace and reconstruction effort with 300 million Euros ($400 million) in 2005 and 2006.29 As AMM head Pieter Feith put it, once the EU decided to get involved, failure was not an option.30 Successful reintegration of former GAM fighters remains a crucial factor in determining whether peace will be stable. Those fighters who own land have fared reasonably well. But many others still require land, capital, skills training, and jobs. Half of the GAM ex-combatants surveyed by the World Bank had their houses damaged or destroyed by the conflict,

May: Aceh and Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Board established.

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2006. Despite splits within GAM, one of the group’s leaders, Yusuf Irwandi, emerged as the winner and was inaugurated as governor in early February 2007. In guiding Aceh forward, he faces a range of tough challenges. A key question is whether he will be able to shape the implementation of the governing law to satisfy Acehnese expectations. Reconstruction and economic revival are also crucial for cementing peace.41 The tsunami triggered one of the most generous humanitarian aid responses ever, with pledges in the billions of dollars pouring in from all over the world. However, despite a sixfold increase in provincial revenues and aid flows since 1999, more people in Aceh live in poverty now.42 The conflict drove the poverty rate up from about 10 percent in 1996 to 20 percent in 1999 and 28.5 percent in 2004. After the tsunami, more than 35 percent lived in poverty.43 And a March 2006 poll revealed that 76 percent of Acehnese felt inflation and unemployment had actually made life harder since the peace agreement.44 The reconstruction effort has run into a number of problems, including unresolved land and property disputes. Two years after the tsunami, about 57,000 houses—roughly half the number needed—had been built. Many people remain in temporary barracks or tents, with overcrowding, little privacy, and often a lack of basic sanitation services such as toilets and running water.45 In March 2006, some 10,000 of the new houses were judged to be so poorly built that they require major repair. Corruption has also plagued the rebuilding effort.46 The plethora of aid groups present in Aceh is impressive evidence of a worldwide desire to assist the Acehnese in their hour of extreme need. But their redundant efforts have translated into high overhead costs, duplication of projects, and a greater risk of inappropriate

flared up since the peace agreement, and tensions between local communities and military forces have increased.37 (See Figure 5.) Despite a recent upswing in violence, the vast majority of these local disputes are non-violent. Although key provisions of the MOU were to be incorporated into a new governing law for Aceh, the law submitted by the government to the Indonesian parliament and the version 2001

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Figure 5. Incidents of Conflict Between GAM and Indonesian Government Forces (GoI) and Local-Level Conflicts, January 2005–February 2007 120 Source: Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update 100 GAM–Gol Local-level conflicts

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2005

eventually approved are much weaker.38 GAM and many Acehnese NGOs charge that it falls short of the autonomy provisions in the peace accord in several instances.39 (See Table 5.) Aceh was paralyzed by protests and a one-day general strike when the law finally passed in July 2006. The government says it can be amended in a year or two.40 But given Jakarta’s long track record of broken promises, that is not reassuring to the Acehnese. The delay in passing the law meant that Aceh elections had to be postponed repeatedly, from an initial target of April, to December

December: GAM leader Irwandi Yusuf wins gubernatorial elections.

2007

Monthly Rent (2006 Dollars)

Source: Brookings

February: Irwandi inaugurated as Aceh governor.


Aceh: Peacemaking After the Tsunami Table 5. Aceh’s Peace Accord versus the Governing Law 2005 Peace Accord

2006 Governing Law

Decisions with regard to Aceh require Central Government consultation with, and consent of, Acehnese authorities. (Section 1.1.2.)

Refers only to a consultation process, weakening Aceh’s autonomy. (Article 8)

Human Rights

Establish a Human Rights Court. (Sect. 2.2.)

Establish ad-hoc tribunal that will not hear cases retroactively. (Art. 215)

Indonesian Military

Responsible for external defense only. (Sect. 4.1.1.)

Responsible for state security; could be read as an internal function. (Art. 193)

Natural Resources

Aceh is entitled to retain 70 percent of revenues from its natural resources. (Sect. 1.3.4.)

Law mentions 15–55 percent entitlement. (Art. 181) Joint resource management by provincial and central government. (Art. 160)


aid.47 Intense turf wars among some aid groups resulted in certain towns and villages receiving superfluous services, while more remote ones were overlooked. A desire to demonstrate quick results to Western donors (and thus burnish credentials seen as necessary to secure future funding) sidelined longerterm needs.48 Acehnese resentment rose because of the lack of consultation and the severe mismatch between aid groups’ promises and actual delivery of benefits.49 The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition warns in its 2006 assessment that local capacities—of both government and civil society—are in danger of being undermined rather than strengthened.50 Indonesia’s post-tsunami experience highlights the risk of disbursing aid benefits unevenly and creating wider economic disparities between population groups. The 120,000 Acehnese who lost their homes due to the conflict, but who have received little support compared with tsunami-affected communities, are increasingly dissatisfied.51 Tsunami survivors typically receive $5,000–6,000 for house reconstruction, whereas conflict survivors receive only about $3,500.52 Some efforts are now under way to address this imbalance—via the Kecamatan Development Program, for instance, for which BRA is providing $60 million


over two years. By March 2007, 30 percent of conflict-affected villages had received funds.53 Aceh and Indonesia have, thus far, successfully grasped the peacemaking opportunity afforded by the tsunami. The country’s desire for peace appears to remain strong, but it could be endangered by inequities in aid provisions and distributions. It will take several years for Aceh’s economic and political challenges to be fully resolved, and reinvigorating Aceh’s economy beyond reconstruction will be important to give people a strong stake in peace.

B E Y O N D

D I S A S T E R S

To prevent others from taking their land, tsunami survivors encamp near their gutted house in Banda Aceh’s Meuraxa neighborhood. © Michael Renner

25

Case Study

Sri Lanka: A “Double Blow” to Development

O

n the morning after Christmas Day, 2004, several families in the Sri Lankan capital of Colombo were on their way to a festive brunch at a hotel overlooking the Indian Ocean. On their way, they heard an emergency broadcast over the car radio, reporting that large waves had hit the eastern and southern coasts. They watched as a strange haziness

100,000–290,000 50,000–100,000 25,000–50,000 1,000–25,000 1–1,000

Jaffna

SRI LANKA

Colombo

26

IN D IA

50 miles

0

B E Y O N D

Sinhala Only Language Act marginalizes Tamil speakers.

D I S A S T E R S

Sinhala youth uprising in south brutally crushed by army.

19 7 2

Sri Lanka gets independence from Britain.

50 km

0

19 7 1

Matara

19 5 6

Sri Lanka Timeline

19 4 8

Figure 6. Sri Lanka: Tsunami-Displaced Persons by Province

New university admission rules discriminate against northern Tamils.

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) founded.

19 7 7

Number of Displaced Persons

19 7 6

Source: UNHCR

developed on the horizon and ocean undulations left boats damaged in the nearby harbor.1 Even though it took two hours for the tsunami waves to travel from the quake’s epicenter to Sri Lankan shores, disaster came to the country quite unexpectedly. Sri Lanka is no stranger to suffering and death; its residents have lived with civil war and related violence since 1983.2 (See Timeline, below.) But the intersection of disaster and violence has tested the limits of the national government and citizens’ resilience since the tsunami struck. Unlike Aceh, Sri Lanka’s story does not give much cause for hope. Rather, it is an ongoing calamity in which the poor and politically isolated are inevitably the losers. Sri Lanka’s civil violence has deep roots that can be traced back to colonial days. Historically, the country has been home to people of diverse ethnicities and religions who lived in relative harmony. Significant groups include the majority Sinhalese, most of whom are Buddhist and live in the central and southern parts of the country, and the less-populous Tamil (mostly Hindu) and Muslim communities, who live primarily in the north and east. There are also so-called “Up-Country Tamils” in the south-central highlands, who were brought to the island from India by British tea plantation owners in the 19th and early 20th centuries.3 Under British rule, British and American missionaries who had established schools in the

Rising anti-Tamil violence in Sinhala south.




B E Y O N D

Indian Peace Keeping Force deployed in northeast. IPKFLTTE fighting.

D I S A S T E R S

27

1987–90

LTTE emerges as dominant force in Tamil politics.

19 8 7

Rise in extra-judicial killings and “disappearances” of Tamils.

19 8 6

Start of Sinhala-Tamil civil war.

Wickremasinghe’s efforts Table 6. Impacts of Civil War and the to negotiate an “Interim 2004 Tsunami on Sri Lanka Self-Governing Authority” for the northeast, Number of People Impacts or Housing Affected based on highly controversial LTTE proposals.11 Civil War Another key problem was Killed or missing* 86,000 that the ceasefire focused Displaced, at peak 800,000 narrowly on the two main Displaced, March 2007† 465,000 actors: the governing Damaged and destroyed houses 326,000 party and the LTTE. It Tsunami ignored divisions within Killed or missing 35,322 the different ethnic comDisplaced 516,150 munities, sidelined the Still displaced, Fall 2006 325,000 Muslim population, Damaged and destroyed houses 105,000 downplayed human rights issues, and therefore failed *About 60,000 killed and more than 21,000 missto gain strong support ing prior to 2002 ceasefire; close to 5,000 killed between 2005 and early 2007. from a variety of con† Includes people originally displaced before the stituencies. Significant 2002 ceasefire, plus 223,000 newly displaced by portions of society saw increasing ceasefire violations in 2006 and 2007. Some 128,000 Sri Lankans have sought refuge in the ceasefire as contrary neighboring India. to their interests.12 The government’s free-market Source: See Endnote 14 for this section. policies, which were urged by international donors, became another obstacle to peace as poorer sections of society experienced economic hardship under the ceasefire. All in all, “the peace process acted as a ‘lightening rod’ for wider political and societal tensions,” as a report published by the Asia Foundation has described.13 By the time the tsunami hit Sri Lanka in late 2004, several rounds of peace talks had ended in shambles. The LTTE had pulled out over a political snub, with fear that peace might loosen its grip over Tamil society. Meanwhile, Wickremasinghe’s government was defeated at the polls by hard-line candidate Mahinda Rajapakse, and the breakaway Karuna faction challenged the LTTE in a shadow war in the east. On the day of disaster, the tsunami hit all ethnic communities badly, killing half as many

19 8 4

Sinhala anti-Tamil riots.

19 8 3

Prevention of Terrorism Act passed; state of emergency in north.

19 8 1

19 7 9

north provided education to the Tamil population, enabling many to join the English-speaking administrative ranks. This preferential treatment set up inequities that would fuel tensions after Sri Lanka—then called Ceylon— regained independence in 1948.4 Subsequent majority governments, inevitably dominated by Sinhalese, instituted language, educational, and religious policies that discriminated against Tamils and other minorities (by declaring Sinhala the national language, for example).5 Initially, Tamils demanded autonomy within Sri Lanka. But as successive governments reneged on agreements with the minority’s leaders, Tamil society became increasingly radicalized and there were calls for a separate state. By the late 1980s, the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had risen to prominence under its leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran.6 The LTTE waged war against the government, using bomb attacks to single out military installations, religious shrines, and government events in a campaign that killed thousands and displaced many more.7 The new millennium began with a particularly brazen attack that disabled the country’s sole international airport. When Ranil Wickremasinghe was elected prime minister in late 2001, the first glimmer of peace in more than a decade appeared. Having secretly begun negotiations with the LTTE prior to his election, Wickremasinghe quickly orchestrated a ceasefire agreement in February 2002, with Norway playing a key role as mediator.8 But the ceasefire was driven more by the pressures of a severe economic crisis than by a readiness to produce a political settlement.9 And a range of politicians, paramilitary groups, and businesses had vested interests in continued conflict, profiting materially or politically from it.10 President Chandrika Kumaratunge—who was sidelined in the negotiations—blocked

Sinhala insurrection against “Indian expansionism” suppressed.


28

B E Y O N D

D I S A S T E R S

LTTE bomb attack in Colombo kills hundreds.

LTTE bombs important Buddhist Temple in Kandy.

LTTE attacks Colombo airport; tourism, foreign investment fall.

2002

Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, but peace talks collapse.

1998

IPKF withdraws; LTTE takes control of northeast, breaks ceasefire.

19 9 6

GovernmentLTTE ceasefire.

19 9 0

19 8 9

© Michael Renner

pouring of generosity—factories in Colombo, for instance, closed so their employees could ferry emergency supplies down the worse-hit south coast. Momentary solidarity among the conflict’s adversaries triggered hope that postdisaster cooperation would lead to reconciliation. Some Sri Lankans reminisce about the three-week period immediately after the tsunami as a time when there were no divisions.16 But the cards were stacked against continued cooperation. The spontaneous acts of grassroots solidarity that had brought so much hope were not reinforced by politicians, who proved unresponsive to public opinion polls indicating a strong preference for peaceful con-

19 9 5

In Devinuwara, a microloan enabled this family to purchase a coir-spinning wheel. Coir rope is made from the fiber of a coconut’s outer shell.

2 0 01

flict resolution.17 In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, President Kumaratunge prevented then-United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan from visiting LTTE-held areas—a highly symbolic rebuff that began to solidify old divisions once again.18 Before long, rifts emerged over the vast sums of international aid that had begun to pour into Sri Lanka. The LTTE directed outside funds and private donations through its Tamil Rehabilitation Organization, a non-transparent but reportedly efficient aid mechanism.19 Control over aid distribution is an intensely political issue, closely interwoven with the question of how Sri Lanka should be governed. Even before the tsunami, two efforts in 2002 and 2004 to set up joint mechanisms to distribute conflict reconstruction aid had failed.20 Prompted by international donors, the government and LTTE did negotiate an aid-sharing agreement (the so-called Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure, or P-TOMS), signed in June 2005.21 For the LTTE, a formal role in the distribution of international reconstruction funds promised much-desired legitimacy. Sinhala nationalists denounced the deal, perceiving it as a tool for the LTTE to carve out a separate state.22 After just one month, Sri Lanka’s Supreme Court suspended the agreement, pending a constitutional review.23 After Prime Minister Rajapakse won presidential elections in November 2005 with hardliners’ support (many Tamils, who would have likely voted for his opponent Wickremasinghe, abstained), P-TOMS was effectively abandoned.24 Rajapakse has taken a notoriously hard-line approach to dealing with the LTTE. Encouraged that several countries, including the United States, India, Canada, and the European Union, blacklisted the LTTE as a terrorist organization, the government has increasingly gone on the offensive—doggedly capturing key parts of formerly LTTE-controlled territory.25

people in one day as had been killed in 20 years of civil war.14 (See Figure 6, page 26, and Table 6, page 27.) When the tremors ended, Sri Lanka was confronted with an unprecedented opportunity to use relief and recovery efforts as a means to overcome its self-immolating civil war.15 The tsunami elicited an incredible out-

Government and LTTE sign ceasefire, brokered by Norway.


Sri Lanka: A “Double Blow” to Development The backlash against foreigners and civil society groups serves as a cautionary tale about what outsiders can hope to accomplish in the area of conflict resolution. The limits have been apparent for some time. At a Tokyo conference in June 2003, international donors pledged $4.5 billion in reconstruction and development aid to Sri Lanka.33 Although the Figure 7. Deaths in Sri Lanka’s Civil War, 2000–2007 4500 4000

Source: SATP * Data for 2007 are January through March.

3500 Tamil Tigers Government troops Civilians

Number

3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 2000


2003

2004

2005

2006

2007*

0

March: “Karuna faction” breaks away from LTTE.

B E Y O N D

1998

2001

2004

April: New hard-line government elected, rejects ISGA proposal.

D I S A S T E R S

29

2004

1995

2004

October: LTTE proposes Interim SelfGoverning Authority (ISGA).

1992

2004

2003

2003

2003

2002

April: LTTE pulls out of peace talks.

June: Donors pledge $4.5 billion for post-conflict reconstruction.

2002

money was ostensibly tied to progress in the peace negotiations, this was little more than an 4000 afterthought, and no compliance mechanisms Source: Swami, SATP were adopted. Individual have not * Data for 2007 aredonors January t0 March 25.fol3500 lowed a joint strategy, but appear to have had an exaggerated view of the leverage of their aid 3000 vis-à-vis the strategic calculus of the government2500 and the LTTE. The massive inflows of aid in the aftermath of the tsunami ended any misconceptions.34 such 2000 The statistical story of tsunami reconstruc1500 tion in Sri Lanka is not a simple one. Some 51 percent 1000 of the required houses have been rebuilt, but this obscures important geographic 500 35 In the north, escalating conflict differences. has prevented rebuilding, such that less than 15 1989

Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) deployed.

2001

Number

Although the 2002 ceasefire agreement remains in place on paper, Sri Lanka has begun a steady slide back into the pattern of violence and human rights violations that the country unfortunately knows so well. During 2006 alone, more than 4,000 people were killed on the island.26 (See Figure 7.) This trend has continued unabated in 2007, with several highprofile bomb attacks targeting civilians, an unprecedented air strike on an air force base adjacent to Colombo’s international airport, and an attempted attack on Colombo’s harbor.27 When asked how the conflict could be ended, by early 2007 only 46 percent of the Sinhala public favored peace talks, compared with 95 percent of Up-Country Tamils and 88 percent of Muslims. Some 35 percent of Sinhalese preferred a military defeat of the LTTE, and another 11 percent a mix of talks and fighting.28 The escalating conflict has led to a humanitarian crisis and curtailed the political space within which civil society can operate.29 On a visit to Colombo in early 2007, a sense of tension and heightened security pervaded the city, which sits far from the main centers of daily violence to the north and east of the country.30 Police and military checkpoints, some reinforced with sandbags and covered by camouflage tents, dominated major and minor roads. By this time, relations with international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating within Sri Lanka had become tense as well, due primarily to a breakdown in trust between these organizations and the Sri Lankan government. The government accused the Dutch organization ZOA-Refugee Care of aiding the LTTE and threatened to expel it— or any other NGOs proven to be collaborating with the Tigers.31 Colombo newspapers now regularly carry inflammatory articles warning against sinister motives of certain foreign governments, the United Nations, or NGOs.32

2007*

December: Tsunami hits Sri Lanka.


30

B E Y O N D

D I S A S T E R S

May: EU declares LTTE a terrorist organization.

August: Fighting in east and north escalates sharply.

2006

December: Tensions with LTTE rise and violence breaks out.

2006

November: Prime Minister Rajapakse wins Presidential elections.

2005

July: Supreme Court rules P-TOMS partially unconstitutional.

2005

2005

2005

June: Government and LTTE agree to share tsunami aid (P-TOMS).

2006

but the resumed conflict has meant that the northeast, already saddled with weak public services and poor infrastructure, is increasingly difficult to access.42 While 150,000 Sri Lankan families lost their livelihoods after the tsunami, about 75 percent have regained their main source of income.43 However, renewed violence in the north and east has hindered this regeneration of livelihoods there. One specific example cited by several organizations includes the fact that both reconstruction materials and products made by small entrepreneurs are double or triple taxed when they are transported out of the north or east, as they enter or exit governmentcontrolled areas, LTTE-controlled territory, or land now claimed by the breakaway Karuna faction. This inflates transportation prices to such a degree that it seriously hinders the shipment of goods necessary for local producers to earn livelihoods.44 In the south, several microfinance programs have been successful in helping families regain their financial foothold. The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), an aid organization working closely with Oxfam, has given thousands of small loans of around $100 to tsunami survivors and their neighbors. Projects in and near the southern coastal city of Matara have had a nearly 100-percent repayment rate, with any missing payments attributed to resettlement or migration.45 These small loans support a variety of businesses, mostly related to coir (coconut fiber) processing, handicrafts, food items, and retail. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) administers another effective initiative. With the acronym “Strong Places,” it focuses on supporting community-based organizations at a time when most international aid tends to flow through a select group of large national NGOs.46 With the conviction that local grassroots organizations can play key

percent of the needed housing had been constructed as of December 2006.36 On the east coast, this figure is also low, at 25 percent, according to the Sri Lankan government.37 In tsunami-affected areas, perceptions of reconstruction aid are often marked by allegations of bias. Even though the south has fared comparatively well, residents nonetheless charge that the international community has unduly focused on the plight of Tamil civilians isolated by ongoing warfare. Those living to the north and east, where construction has been haltingly slow due to logistical difficulties and serious security concerns, reportedly feel that the south has received more than its fair share of aid, in part because many tourists made private donations to southern communities they had previously visited.38 A lack of communication across geographic divides often fuels this type of animosity. The Sri Lankan NGO Sarvodaya, which works in 10,000 villages across the country, has implemented an exchange program called “Villageto-Village, Heart-to-Heart” that seeks to overcome ethnic and linguistic boundaries. In paired villages, residents travel to help each other with manual tasks while gaining an understanding of the common interests and needs that they share.39 The Sewalanka Foundation, another NGO, has a staff that is part Sinhalese, part Tamil. By emphasizing transparency, it has managed to avoid a politicization of its aid work.40 Despite efforts to the contrary, significant inequities did materialize in the amount and quality of aid provided. Among tsunamiaffected communities, the Sinhala-majority south and west fared better than the north and east of the country. Also, tsunami-affected areas generally fared better than conflictaffected communities.41 (See Table 7.) Not only do the south and west have far stronger political representation and influence in Colombo,

October: Geneva talks end without progress.


Sri Lanka: A “Double Blow” to Development Table 7. Assistance to Conflict- and Tsunami-Affected Sri Lankans, as of April 2006* Conflict-Affected

Tsunami-Affected

Food (Estimated nutritional value)

1,000 kilocalories per person per day

1,881 kilocalories per person per day

Transitional Shelter (Estimated value)

$50–200 per shelter; for 60 percent of 17,852 families remaining in shelters

$300–600 per shelter; for all 60,000 families in need

Permanent Housing (Estimated cost)

$2,500 per house; for 47,000 families, or 14 percent of all in need†

$3,000–11,000 per house; for all 105,000 families in need

Cash Grants/ Allowances

$250 resettlement grant per family; for 105,000 families, or one third of all families in need

$100–200, plus $50 emergency resettlement allowance per family; for all 405,000 families in need

* Inadequate information precludes a comparison with regard to compensation payments, non-food related items, and livelihood restoration support. † Government pledged support to 105,000 families (those with access to land and incomes of less than $250 per month) in 2003, but resources were committed for only 47,000. In government “High Security Zones,” people are not permitted access to their land; no alternative land has been provided. Source: See Endnote 41 for this section.

January: Government captures Vakarai, LTTE stronghold on east coast.

2007

2007

roles in recovery and future disaster prevention, UNDP provides seed funding to build capacity at this level. Around Matara, three such organizations funded through the Strong Places project provide an inspiring glimpse of the opportunities associated with local organizing.47 The organizations are composed solely of women from clustered villages. They utilize UNDP funds to buy raw materials needed to kick-start small businesses—support that is critical in sustaining poor families. The women hope to eventually own coir-processing mills or build community meeting spaces. The tenacity with

which they describe their decision-making process makes it clear that a strong bond and sense of accountability exists between the members of each group.48 Initiatives such as these provide bright spots in an otherwise bleak picture of Sri Lanka. Rather than becoming an opportunity for a breakthrough in favor of peace, the tsunami amplified Sri Lanka’s conflict dynamics. With little hope for peace talks to resume, and continued suspicion over rebuilding efforts, the divided country must confront many serious issues if it is to indeed succeed at the goal of “building back better.” 49

January: Donors give $4.5 billion in aid for 2007–09; call for end to violence.


B E Y O N D

D I S A S T E R S

31

Case Study

Kashmir: Physical Tremor, but No Political Earthquake

W

Source: Center of Excellence DMHA

TAJIKISTAN

C

H NORTHERN AREAS Occupied by Pakistan, claimed by India

I

Northwest Frontier Province

LINE O F CO

K

EPICENTER

Kabul

NT

Peshawar

Islamabad

a

L

s

h

m

i

r

J A M M U A N D KA SH MI R Occupied by India, claimed by Pakistan

A

Srinagar

RO

N

AFGHANISTAN

Jammu

P A K I S T A N

I N D I A

Lahore IND IA

32

B E Y O N D

D I S A S T E R S

Ceasefire leaves Kashmir divided.

1962–63

Referendum on Kashmir agreed, never carried out.

19 4 9

Newly independent India and Pakistan go to war over Kashmir.

19 4 8

19 4 7

Kashmir Timeline

Quake-affected area

India-Pakistan talks over Kashmir; no agreement reached.

India-Pakistan war over Kashmir.

19 6 5

Figure 8. Kashmir: Political Division and Earthquake Zone

19 6 5

Since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the two nations have repeatedly skirmished over Kashmir.2 (See Timeline, below.) And since 1989, a separatist insurgency in India’s state of Jammu and Kashmir—in which some supporters favor independence and others prefer to join Pakistan—has led to tens of thousands of deaths.3 (See Figure 9.) Initially nationalistic and secular in orientation, the movement was later dominated by Islamic groups and aided by Pakistan’s powerful intelligence service. Although violence has decreased substantially since 2002, the Kashmir conflict remains at the heart of the political antagonism between New Delhi and Islamabad.4 Both countries are armed with nuclear weapons and have hundreds of thousands of soldiers arrayed against each other. After armed Kashmiri militants attacked the Indian parliament in New Delhi in December 2001— abetted by Pakistan, India suspected—the two rivals nearly came to blows during a tense sixmonth standoff.5 Wary of another conflagration, the two governments began to step back from the precipice of war in April 2003. They restored full diplomatic relations, adopted a ceasefire along the LoC in November 2003, agreed to pre-notify each other of ballisticmissile tests, and in February 2004 initiated a “composite dialogue” on a range of disputes, including Kashmir.6 Two years later, when this process was in

hen a massive earthquake struck Kashmir on October 8, 2005, families sprawled across this mountainous territory naturally wanted to make sure that relatives living in nearby towns and villages had survived. But many of them could not reach their kin—and impassable roads were only part of the problem. The quake’s epicenter was near the “Line of Control” (LoC), the ceasefire line that demarcates India and Pakistan’s claims on Kashmir and separates many Kashmiri families.1 (See Figure 8.)

Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) Liberation Front seeks secession.


4000

* Data for 2007 are January through March.

3500 Tamil Tigers Government troops Civilians

3000 Number

Kashmir: Physical Tremor, but No2500 Political Earthquake


2005

2006

2007*

Figure 9. Deaths from Violence in Jammu and Kashmir, 1989–2007 4000 3500

Source: Swami, SATP * Data for 2007 are January t0 March 25.

3000

Number

2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 1989

1992

1995

1998

2001

2004

2007*

Insurgency in J&K’s Kashmir Valley; India deploys troops.

B E Y O N D

All Party Huriyat Conference (APHC) founded by secessionists.

D I S A S T E R S

33

19 9 8

Violent protests against electoral fraud in J&K.

19 9 3

nightly cross-LoC “peace bus” between the Kashmiri cities of Srinagar and Muzaffarabad was inaugurated with considerable fanfare in April 2005. But Kashmiris were not consulted during its setup.15 Stifling bureaucracy and stringent security measures on both sides meant that only 3,600 Kashmiris out of 17,000 applicants were able to travel, in either direction, during the first two years of the link.16 Some passengers had to wait a year or longer for a travel permit.17 Although a second bus service connecting the cities of Rawalakot and Poonch was launched in June 2006, it operates under similarly tight restrictions.18 Tensions have been reduced and bilateral trade has increased more than sixfold. But

19 8 9

First free and fair elections in J&K.

2000

of extremists) limited the flow of visitors, and by the1500 end of 2006 only about 1,700 people had crossed the LoC. 14 What could have been 1000 an historic breakthrough became, instead, a 500 tightly circumscribed exercise. timid and In general, people-to-people contact has 0 2000promise 2001 than 2002 2003 2004 remained more reality. A fort-

19 8 7

Simla agreement: Line of Control (LoC) established.

19 7 7

India-Pakistan war; some fighting in Kashmir.

19 7 2

19 7 1

danger of failing, energetic diplomacy inspired by earthquake relief offered a fresh opportunity to defuse the Kashmir conflict. Immediately after the quake, many observers, including Indian and Pakistani newspapers, watched to see if pragmatic cooperation around relief and rebuilding, and expanded cross-border civil society contacts, would cement a new peace.7 Subsequent developments, however, fell short of these high hopes. More people perished in one day due to the earthquake than in two decades of conflict.8 (See Table 8, p. 34.) Immediately after the October 8 tremor, goodwill prevailed between India and Pakistan. Within two weeks, India had delivered close to 300 tons of food, medicine, and tents to its neighbor; consented to let Pakistani helicopters operate in a no-fly zone along the LoC; temporarily re-established cross-border phone links severed 16 years earlier; and pledged an additional $25 million worth of relief aid.9 Because landslides and damaged roads cut off rescuers’ access to some of the affected areas, helicopters became a critical asset.10 India offered to have its army helicopters join search-and-rescue missions. But distrust between the two nations sabotaged that proposal. Pakistan, referring to “military sensitivities,” refused to let Indian pilots fly the aircraft. India, in turn, insisted on using its own crews, and no agreement was ever reached.11 On the ground, the governments agreed to open five crossing points along the LoC to facilitate cross-border relief and allow separated families to meet. Despite a terrorist attack in New Delhi, believed to have been perpetrated by Kashmiri extremists, an agreement was signed.12 But mutual suspicions delayed its implementation, so it was not until November 17 that the first civilians were finally allowed passage.13 Rigid security measures on both sides (due to fears of cross-border infiltration

India and Pakistan conduct nuclear weapons tests.


Internally displaced persons

In Kashmir Valley: 350,000–450,000† Along Line of Control: 30,000 ‡

Impact of the Earthquake Deaths Injuries Displaced/homeless people

Pakistan

India

73,000** 79,000 3.3 million

1,300 6,600 150,000

* Aggregate number from Figure 9; estimates vary. † Estimated range as of February 2005. ‡ Down from 150,000–175,000 in 2002.

**Official estimate; unofficial figures are higher (88,000 in November 2005). Source: See Endnote 8 for this section.

34

B E Y O N D

D I S A S T E R S

India and Pakistan test nuclear-capable missiles.

2003

India and Pakistan at brink of war after attack on Indian parliament.

2002

July: India and Pakistan leaders meet, do not resolve Kashmir issue.

2001

India-Pakistan clashes at Kargil kill more than 1,000 people.

2001

19 9 9

there is not enough willingness to resolve the most contentious issues, specifically the status of Kashmir.19 Indian columnist C. Raja Mohan commented in late 2005: “In any creative endeavour, it is when you decide to play safe that you start raising the odds of failure.”20 The relationship between India and Pakistan remains vulnerable to the political effects of terrorist acts, such as the commuter train bombings in Mumbai that killed more than 180 people in July 2006.21 India charged that the bombings were “instigated, inspired and supported by elements across the border.”22 Bilateral talks did take place again in November 2006 but failed to make any gains, hobbled by continued discord over responsibility for the Mumbai attacks.23 Military spending in both countries remains high. India almost doubled its expenditures, even after factoring in inflation, from $11 billion in 1996 to $20.4 billion in 2005. Pakistan’s military budget rose until 2003, but has since declined somewhat to about $3.2 billion.24 The huge cost of relief and rebuilding following the

May: India and Pakistan restore diplomatic ties.

July: DelhiLahore bus service resumes after 18 months.

2003

Impact of the Conflict (since 1990) Deaths In Jammu & Kashmir: 42,000+*

2003

Kashmir quake—estimated at $5.2 billion—is straining Pakistan’s financial resources. Under growing pressure from civil society organizations, in early November 2005 President Pervez Musharraf temporarily postponed the planned $4.5 billion purchase of 75 to 80 F-16 fighter jets from the United States.25 Although India had severely criticized the planned deal because the jets can carry nuclear weapons, by April 2006 Musharraf decided to go forward with the purchase of a smaller package of U.S. jets.26 To realize peace in Kashmir, India and Pakistan must go beyond normalizing their bilateral relationship and change their heavyhanded policies toward the region. Unfortunately, if anything concrete can be said about post-earthquake measures, it is that they alienated rather than endeared Kashmiris. The Indian and Pakistani armies aggressively took charge of relief efforts, yet proved ineffective and, by some accounts, even discriminatory in distributing supplies.27 Pakistan has long lacked an effective civilian disaster management policy. After the quake, the government put army generals in charge of the newly established Federal Relief Commission (responsible for rescue and relief operations) and the Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Authority (tasked with rebuilding). Widespread demands for transparency and accountability were largely ignored.28 Asserting control over relief operations and reconstruction planning, the Pakistani military sidelined Parliament and civilian agencies and failed to consult with affected communities. A quarter-million troops were in the region, but the military’s relief effort was ill planned and poorly executed.29 The International Crisis Group commented that “troops…reacted as if they were in a state of war, not faced with a natural disaster.” Opposition parties in Kashmir complained that their supporters were

Table 8. Impact of the Kashmir Conflict and the October 2005 Earthquake

November: Ceasefire along LoC.




September: Second meeting between Indian government and APHC.

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The main road into Muzaffarabad, half its width collapsed by the earthquake. © Sheikh Danish Ejaz

October: Earthquake in Kashmir and northern Pakistan.

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April: Cross-LoC bus service established.

2005

Kashmir was largely a missed opportunity for a peacemaking breakthrough. The leaders of both India and Pakistan showed that they were not prepared to break decisively with deeply ingrained patterns of mutual distrust. As one analyst put it, “even genuine attempts to reach across the divide are always analyzed in terms of propaganda value and diplomatic oneupmanship.” 39 Had these leaders taken some calculated risks—directing their armies to cooperate in relief efforts, throwing open the LoC, and welcoming greater civil society crossborder contacts—a dramatically different dynamic may have unfolded. It is an open question whether local and international aid agencies could have played a

2005

February: India and Pakistan launch “composite dialogue.”

groups. 37 There has been little tangible change to date. However, in the face of decreasing militant violence, India indicated in April 2007 that it might finally make good on promises to reduce its troop presence in the Kashmir valley—a key demand of Kashmiri activists and an essential step to resolving the underlying conflict.38 In all, the post-earthquake situation in

2005

January: First meeting between India and APHC moderates.

2004

December: India and Pakistan resume rail and air links.

2004

2003

denied assistance.30 The Pakistani government allowed front groups for banned anti-India extremist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaishe Mohammed, to play a major role in providing humanitarian aid to earthquake survivors.31 Although popular support for these groups appears limited, their presence nevertheless gave them fresh legitimacy and the potential to recruit new members. This presents new risks to confidence-building efforts with India.32 In the disaster’s aftermath, Pakistani civil society initiated a massive mobilization in support of earthquake victims. Some observers, like veteran journalist Ahmed Rashid, think this may ultimately translate into growing pressure for democratization.33 It appears that true peace on the subcontinent will come not solely as a result of high politics, but only as stable constituencies for peace and a growing crossborder dialogue involving civil society emerge. In Indian-controlled Kashmir, too, it was the military that carried out the bulk of relief and rehabilitation efforts. As was the case on the Pakistani side, there were protests against the perceived slow and biased distribution of relief supplies, with claims that victims with government connections received priority. Alienation among Kashmiris grew as the army handled the rescue and relief operations in the manner of an occupying force.34 Battling the insurgency, India expanded its military presence in Kashmir from 36,000 troops in 1989 to some 600,000 as of early 2007.35 But human rights abuses committed with impunity by these forces have fueled proindependence sentiments among many Kashmiris. Human rights protections and greater accountability are key ingredients to resolving the long-running conflict.36 In an encouraging move, India has opened a dialogue with the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, an umbrella alliance of nearly two dozen political separatist

35

October: Bombs in New Delhi kill more than 60 people.


A young boy sells bananas from the rubble of his school, destroyed by the 2005 earthquake. © Fründt/teamwork-press

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December: Pakistan tests short-range nuclear missile.

2007

September: India and Pakistan resolve to resume talks.

international aid presence has been lopsided— Pakistan requested outside help while India tightly restricted any foreign presence—it is not clear whether a more active role by aid agencies would have had sufficient impact on both sides.40

2006

July: Bombs strike commuter train in Mumbai; Pakistan fingered.

2006

June: Second cross-LoC bus service launched.

2006

November: India and Pakistan open five LoC crossings for civilians.

2006

2005

more active role toward peacemaking. They did not push such an agenda. At any rate, their position—similar to that of local civil society organizations—was circumscribed by the armed forces’ assertive role in what remains a highly militarized zone. And because the

February: Bomb on DelhiLahore train. Kashmir extremists suspected.


Creating Future Opportunities for Peace

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ceh, Sri Lanka, and Kashmir have all experienced conflict and then disaster. Their starkly different post-disaster trajectories offer critical lessons for conflict resolution, exemplifying the diversity of roles that the government, military, disaster relief, and conflict resolution communities can play when opportunities for peace arise. These examples also provide insight into the complex post-disaster dynamics and unique local contexts that can make or break fleeting opportunities for peace. While local sensitivities can be overpowering, some larger lessons hold true for most cases: for instance, compassion alone is unlikely to carry warring factions through the complexities of a peace process.1 (See Sidebar 3.) Only when all sides have decided they are ready to address the root causes of the conflict—grievances, inequities, and discordant goals—will a political formula for peace be possible. The following is a comparison of the three case studies in several critical areas: Committing to a Political Solution • In Aceh, the Indonesian government and GAM concluded they could not win militarily and committed to resolving core conflict causes. • In Sri Lanka, although a ceasefire was already in place, the tense situation was marked by confrontational posturing. Military success became the sought-after outcome, with efforts to find a political solution left behind. • In Kashmir, despite efforts to build trust between Indian and Pakistani officials, there was no substantial change in military deployments to Kashmir. Confronting Those Against Peace • In Aceh, Indonesia’s top leaders worked hard


Sidebar 3. Disaster Diplomacy Ilan Kelman, a researcher at the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder, Colorado, is a leading proponent of the view that “disasterrelated activities can catalyze diplomacy but are unlikely to create diplomacy.” His Web site, www.disasterdiplomacy.org, provides a clearinghouse of resources on the intersections between disaster and conflict. The site directs readers to publications, current debates, and more than two dozen relevant case studies. Kelman challenges readers to investigate key examples and offer their own opinions. He recommends the need for further research to identify the influence—if any—that disasters may have on foreign affairs or diplomacy, as well as how to confront political border issues in the wake of disaster. Source: See Endnote 1 for this section.

to confront or neutralize opponents of a negotiated peace among military officers and parliamentarians. • In Sri Lanka, hard-line Sinhala parties adeptly manipulated public opinion and wielded considerable influence over government policy. On the Tamil side, the LTTE feared that peace would endanger its grip on Tamil society. • In Kashmir, the Pakistani government permitted militant anti-India groups to play a major role in assisting earthquake survivors, despite the danger that extremists would gain fresh legitimacy and support. Controlling Disaster Aid • In Aceh, tsunami relief flowed freely, both because there were no fixed lines of territorial control between the combatants and because GAM did not object to government aid distribution. • In Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers demanded control over relief aid in their own zone, a move viewed by many Sinhalese as a stepping stone toward secession. A protracted squabble over B E Y O N D

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In Banda Aceh, GAM members surrender their weapons to representatives of the Aceh Monitoring Mission. © Michael Renner

aid distribution sharpened tensions. • In Kashmir, coordinated Indian-Pakistani relief efforts were curtailed by sovereignty and security concerns. Facilitating and Monitoring Peace • In Aceh, the strong-willed facilitator kept negotiations on track and the European Union put its prestige and funding behind the resulting accord. • In Sri Lanka, facilitator Norway has been the target of recriminations from both sides. International ceasefire monitors have struggled under a weak mandate and little international backing. Outside powers like the United States and the European Union forfeited their ability to act as neutral mediators by declaring the LTTE a terrorist organization. • In Kashmir, there has been no comparable outside-mediated peace process. Conflict solutions must be indigenous— developed and supported by those involved in or affected by the fighting. Still, donor governments, United Nations agencies, private aid groups, and other foreigners play an important political and financial role in facilitating fledg38

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ling peace processes. They can make these more effective by: improving conflict mediation capacities; undertaking a more systematic assessment of the connections between disaster, conflict, and peacemaking; and examining lessons learned from such experiences. The U.N. Development Programme’s Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery is currently undertaking such an effort, an important step toward sharing disparate knowledge and standardizing the way that peace processes are approached in post-disaster scenarios. In each of the three cases discussed, examples of post-disaster solidarity belied the chasms cut by years of conflict: parts of the population clearly desired an end to the longstanding conflicts. (These sentiments were expressed most strongly in Aceh, where ubiquitous roadside signs and banners proclaimed “Kami sangat rindu kedamaian”—“We really desire peace.”)2 Whether these hopes translated into changed policies depended in part on the nature of the national political systems and political cultures. This is not a simple question of nominally democratic forms of governance. Rather, at issue is whether minority needs and w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g

Creating Future Opportunities for Peace human rights were addressed and whether popular wishes were reflected adequately at the political level. The broader struggle for more inclusive and transparent governance, civilian control over the military and (in multiethnic societies) decentralization is crucial to the outcome. Civil society has an important role to play in bridging the gap between public interests and political decisions. Strengthening local civil society is also important with regard to transparency and accountability in how postdisaster and post-conflict programs are carried out. The central goals of the international community in countries emerging from the twin challenges of disaster and conflict must be to create maneuvering space for civil society, reinforce shared interests, and thus strengthen support for peace. Leveraging Aid Toward Peace In both Aceh and Sri Lanka, donors urged that conflicts be settled so relief and reconstruction could proceed unimpeded, but stopped short of making conflict termination a formal condition for aid.3 However, in the Sri Lankan case, economic incentives have not trumped the core political objectives of the parties involved in the conflict. This does not mean that aid cannot be a tool for peacemaking—rather, that it should be regarded as an intensely political tool. As long as the political dispute at the heart of a conflict remains unresolved, aid-related decision-making will be colored by political posturing. In the absence of a deal to end Sri Lanka’s conflict, for example, the P-TOMS agreement between the government and the Tamil Tigers became a lightning rod because it was seen as an avenue for the LTTE to cement its claim to a separate state. There is also a danger of mismatching the promise and reality of aid. Disaster-affected populations in conflict zones will expect relief and reconstruction assistance to bring about a noticeable improvement in their economic fortunes following the deprivations suffered due to conflict. (Indeed, the post-tsunami slogan was “building back better.”) But if the actual w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g

experience is at variance with expectations, new frictions may result and possibly undermine peacemaking. Donor governments and aid agencies must ensure that aid does not reopen old grievances or create new divisions, such as amplified social and economic inequalities. The influx of aid personnel is also a doubleedged sword. On the one hand, a substantial international humanitarian presence can serve to highlight and perhaps stop human rights abuses; this is what happened in Aceh. However, aid agencies may introduce fresh problems if they do not understand the local context or fail to consult with affected communities. Another problem is that large, well-funded international agencies can easily overwhelm local groups and outbid them for skilled staff. They are de facto gatekeepers: by virtue of privileged contacts to major donor governments and access to the media, they command access to funds, decision-makers, and opinionshapers. Local NGOs typically work with them in a subsidiary fashion.4 International agencies need to exercise great care to avoid fueling local divisions and resentment.5 Otherwise, the net result may be the opposite of the capacity building intended.6 Aid groups that have a long track record in a given country, focusing not just on humanitarian assistance but also on longer-term development, are likely to be more sensitive to local needs, norms, and dynamics than those that come into a country purely on an emergency basis—“parachuting in” with preconceived notions of what is needed and what will work, only to move on before gaining an adequate understanding of the local situation.7 Political Acuity and Conflict Sensitivity Many humanitarian groups, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, say their expertise is strictly in providing aid to relieve suffering, and that their mandate could be thus categorized as well. Entering the tricky realm of conflict resolution is, as David Petrasek of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva explains, seen as straying into “fundamentally political questions, which will inevitably compromise the ability to mitigate B E Y O N D

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In Kalutara, Sri Lanka, a Sarvodaya eco-village provides resettled tsunami survivors with homes equipped with rainwater harvesting barrels and solar panels. © Zoë Chafe

suffering.” 8 There is a fear that a broader stance will imperil impartiality and endanger staff on the ground. Although aid agencies have an oftenuncomfortable relationship with military forces, these two groups are increasingly working in close proximity. Aid and military action have become blurred in many disaster and conflict situations. This blurring is thought to have contributed to the 408 reported acts of major violence against aid workers that killed 434 of them between 1997 and 2005.9 Being aware of political contexts is not equal to taking sides. Some humanitarian groups have come to “accept that their work may have political impacts,” writes Petrasek, and “endeavor to ‘do no harm’ through their interventions.”10 (See Sidebar 4.) But disaster aid and conflict resolution work are often seen as separate realms. For instance, the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition produced a highly detailed assessment of the international response to the 2004 tsunami, yet by its own admission did not address “the question of how the tsunami and the aid influenced the conflicts in Sri Lanka and Aceh.”11 While hardly new, the “Do No Harm” prin40

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ciples are not uniformly applied. Aid is inevitably political, and relief organizations would be wise to prioritize their conflict sensitivity by better understanding the politics that inevitably shape aid and recovery work; tracking the ways in which aid groups’ actions either exacerbate or decrease conflicts; and seeking out opportunities for post-disaster peacebuilding.12 Environmental Restoration Environmentalists have an important role to play in post-disaster rebuilding and peacemaking. In order to reduce future disaster vulnerability—and the potential for hardship and conflict that is often associated with disasters—environmental protection and restoration is crucial. In coastal areas, mangroves, coral reefs, and wetlands are important buffers; in mountainous areas, forests anchor the soil and help prevent devastating landslides.13 But, like aid groups, environmentalists need to be conscious of socioeconomic and political factors. The poor often have no choice but to settle in vulnerable areas. Sri Lankan fishermen, for example, will seek to live close to the ocean even though establishing a coastal buffer zone may be an environmentally astute move. w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g

Creating Future Opportunities for Peace Post-disaster reconstruction puts enormous pressure on natural resources and the environment. The need for speedy rebuilding to give disaster-displaced people a firm roof over their heads can be at odds with the goal of environmental restoration, leaving disasterprone areas more vulnerable to subsequent natural disasters. Prior to the Kashmir earthquake, deforestation degraded the region’s steep slopes and heightened the region’s vulnerability to landslides. Post-disaster, the earthquake intensified the pressure on natural resources, as displaced residents removed vegetation for use in construction, cooking, and heating.14 Sustainable forest stewardship, watershed vulnerability mapping, and slope stabilization—including reforestation—are all critical recovery tasks. In April 2005, the government of Indonesia adopted Green Reconstruction Policy Guidelines for Aceh, a framework document developed by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF).15 These guidelines address where to get reconstruction materials, what types of environmental restoration techniques are most effective, and the importance of building legitimate local institutions. But the peace deal also opened up areas to loggers that were once too dangerous, and Aceh’s massive reconstruction needs fueled already-rampant illegal logging.16 In response, the province’s new governor Irwandi Yusuf said in March 2007 that he would impose a moratorium on all logging.17 Environmental restoration is a core ingredient of disaster prevention and mitigation strategies. It also presents an unparalleled opportunity to promote cooperation among adversaries. A 2004 U.N. Development Programme report mentions that, “in Colombia, violently opposed local communities in the Department of Meta have worked together to mitigate the impact of floods as a means not only of protecting livelihoods, but also of building trust and reconciliation.” But there is still much room for innovative policymaking. UNDP concludes that on a global scale, “little or no attention has been paid to the potential of disaster management as a tool for conflict prevention initiatives.”18 w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g

While cooperation around environmental restoration may bring opportunities for peace, it is far preferable to base cooperation on disaster prevention and environmental protection. A growing array of “environmental peacemaking” initiatives—including peace parks, shared river basin management plans, regional seas agreements, and joint environmental monitoring programs—are built on the Sidebar 4. Principles of the “Do No Harm” Approach The “Do No Harm” approach was first championed in 1994 by Mary B. Anderson, author of the 1999 book Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—Or War. The approach includes seven basic findings: 1. Assistance is not neutral; rather, it becomes a part of the conflict context. 2. Any conflict situation contains two realities: dividers, those factors that people are fighting about or cause tension, and connectors, those factors that bring people together and/or tend to reduce tension. 3. Assistance has an impact on both dividers and connectors and can increase or reduce either. 4. Resource transfers—what aid agencies bring in and how they distribute it—are one mechanism through which assistance produces impacts. 5. Implicit ethical messages—what is communicated by how agencies work—are the other mechanism of impact. 6. The details of assistance programs—what, why, who, by whom, when, where, and how—matter. 7. There are always options for changing assistance programs to eliminate negative impacts (increased conflict) or to improve positive contributions to peace. Source: See Endnote 10 for this section.

notion that shared concerns can facilitate cooperative behavior among otherwise opposed communities or countries.19 Similar notions foster cooperation around the concept of disaster prevention. Complex Challenges, Disparate Agendas After a disaster, aid and relief groups are understandably focused on immediate relief challenges, just as development assistance groups concentrate on economic goals, environmentalists tackle sustainability challenges, and conflict mediators tame political grievances. Among the suite of international assistance agencies responding on the ground, creative and imaginative collaboration is critical to avoiding fresh disputes and grasping peacemaking opportunities in the wake of a B E Y O N D

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Creating Future Opportunities for Peace Sidebar 5. Recommendations For donor governments and disaster relief agencies: • Integrate conflict-sensitive strategies into disaster relief plans, and implement the lessons of the Do No Harm Project. • Promote ongoing collaboration among aid organizations to avoid “turf wars” and duplication of effort. • Minimize relief inequities between disaster- and conflict-affected communities, and ensure that both are adequately represented in all decision-making. • Conduct assessments of the opportunities and problems associated with using aid to encourage peacemaking. For conflict resolution groups: • Use post-disaster relief as an opportunity for conflict resolution; analyze and learn from previous cases. • Raise awareness among diplomats of unconventional factors that can trigger or worsen conflicts, such as livelihood loss, environmental degradation, and climate change. • Ensure strong international support for mediation and monitoring efforts, and create multi-disciplinary training programs. For environmental organizations: • Conduct proactive assessments of natural disaster risk in conflict zones. • Integrate environmental protection and restoration into disaster-mitigation efforts. • Work with governments to plan sustainable reconstruction efforts (including laws mandating careful use of natural resources during reconstruction). For concerned citizens: • Encourage elected officials to quickly and fully fund disaster and conflict relief efforts. • Get to know the types of projects supported by the organizations you donate to. • Press government leaders to make themselves available as international mediators.

disaster. When the list of responders includes those tackling reconstruction, disaster prevention, environmental protection, economic development, conflict mediation, and postconflict disarmament efforts, better coordination is desperately needed. Too often, agencies and organizations with similar goals operate in parallel spheres, absent communication or coordination. With disparate agendas, constituencies, operational cultures, and time horizons—and given the typical paucity of funding for peace-related ventures— they often compete for influence and visibility. The 2004 UNDP report laments that “the divisions between those working on natural disaster risk reduction and complex political emergencies and development have hindered the search for ways to address such situations.” 20 The multitude of actors responding to natural disasters should seek to integrate their diverse perspectives and draw on their unique strengths. (See Sidebar 5.) To reconcile the short- and long-term needs of different constituencies and the agendas of various stakeholders, professionals from diverse fields need to be brought together in dialogue. With such interdisciplinary attention toward conflict resolution in a post-disaster context, future scenarios may hopefully follow the successful path traced thus far by Aceh after the tsunami.

Opportunities for collaboration: • Undertake a comprehensive study of lessons emerging from disasterconflict interfaces; generate recommendations for all actors concerned (akin to the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition reports). • Establish a forum where these recommendations and their implementation can be discussed, bringing together the perspectives and expertise of various fields (including disaster mitigation, development, environment, and conflict resolution). • Create plans for aid-sharing scenarios in advance of disaster.

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Endnotes “Unnatural” Disasters

(Munich: 29 December 2005).

1. Worldwatch calculation based on Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), “EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database,” at www.em-dat.net, viewed 6 March 2006.

12. CRED, “EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database,” op. cit. note 1, viewed 4 March 2007.


14. Farid Dahdouh-Guebas et al., “How Effective Were Mangroves as a Defence Against the Recent Tsunami?” Current Biology, vol. 15, no. 12 (2005), pp. 443–47.

1. Figure 1 data are a Worldwatch calculation based on Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), “EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database,” at www.em-dat.net, viewed 6 March 2006. Due to a change in disaster recording methods in 2003, recent figures on the number of disasters may appear artificially inflated compared with historical figures; see CRED, “EM-DAT Data Entry Procedures,” at www.em-dat.net/guidelin.htm. 2. CRED, “EM-DAT Criteria and Definition,” at www.em-dat.net/criteria.htm, viewed 6 March 2006. 3. Figure 2 data are a Worldwatch calculation based on CRED, “EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database,” op. cit. note 1. 4. Ibid. 5. Worldwatch calculation based on ibid. 6. Zoë Chafe, “Reducing Natural Disaster Risk in Cities,” in Worldwatch Institute, State of the World 2007 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), pp. 114–15. 7. United Nations Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects 2005 (New York: 2006), also available online at esa.un.org/unup. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Munich Re, Megacities—Megarisks: Trends and Challenges for Insurance and Risk Management (Munich: 2004), p. 21. Economic losses expressed in 2005 dollars using deflator obtained from Robert Sahr, Oregon State University, “Consumer Price Index Conversion Factors 1800 to Estimated 2016 to Convert to Dollars of 2005,” at oregonstate.edu/cla/polisci/faculty/sahr/sahr.htm, revised 11 April 2006. 11. Deaths from Gary Younge, “Gone with the Wind,” The Guardian (London), 26 July 2006; economic losses from Munich Re, “Two Natural Events Play a Prominent Role in the 2005 Catastrophe Figures,” press release


13. Sunil Raman, “Tsunami Villagers Give Thanks to Trees,” BBC News Online, 16 February 2005.

15. New Orleans from John Young, “Black Water Rising,” World Watch, September/October 2006, p. 26. Louisiana from Cornelia Dean, “Time to Move the Mississippi, Experts Say,” New York Times, 19 September 2006. 16. Somini Sengupta, “Torrential Rain Reveals Booming Mumbai’s Frailties,” New York Times, 3 August 2005. 17. United Nations Environment Programme and World Meteorological Organization (WMO), “The Evidence for Human-Caused Global Warming is Now ‘Unequivocal,’ Says IPCC,” press release (Paris: 2 February 2007). The temperature increase spans the years 1906–2005. 18. U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “2006 Was Earth’s Fifth Warmest Year,” press release (Greenbelt, MD: 8 February 2007). 19. Richard Kerr, “Is Katrina a Harbinger of Still More Powerful Hurricanes?” Science, 16 September 2005, p. 1807. 20. WMO, “WMO Statement on the Status of the Global Climate in 2006,” press release (Geneva: 14 December 2006). 21. Ibid. 22. Christian Aid, Life on the Edge of Climate Change: The Plight of Pastoralists in Northern Kenya (London: 2006), p. 2. 23. Andrew Revkin, “U.N. Draft Cites Humans in Effects of Climate Shift,” New York Times, 5 April 2007. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), “World Disasters Report: Living and Dying in the Shadows,” press release (Geneva: 14 December 2006). 27. Total donated from IFRC, World Disasters Report 2006 (Geneva: 2006), p. 168.

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Endnotes 28. Table 1 based on CRED, “EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database,” op. cit. note 1, viewed 4 March 2007. “Total affected” refers to all those injured, affected, or left homeless by a disaster. Estimates of the number affected by the 2004 tsunami vary greatly, with the United Nations tsunami appeal stating 5 million people, and the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition and World Bank estimating 2 million people, per IFRC, op. cit. note 27, p. 178. 29. IFRC, op. cit. note 27.

Understanding Factors of Vulnerability 1. Vicki Gass, Democratizing Development: Lessons from Hurricane Mitch Reconstruction (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, July 2002), p. 4. 2. Japan from Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), German Committee for Disaster Reduction, and University of Bayreuth, Linking Poverty Reduction and Disaster Risk Management (Eschborn, Germany: 2005), p. 24. 3. “The Politics of Hurricane Mitch,” CounterPunch, 1999, at www.counterpunch.org/mitch.html; Gass, op. cit. note 1, p. 1. 4. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge for Development (New York: 2004), p. 1. 5. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), World Disasters Report 2006 (Geneva: 2006), p. 141. 6. Juliette Terzieff, “Michelle Castillo Evacuated; Now Faces Unknown,” Women’s eNews, 2 October 2005, at www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2474; Juliette Terzieff, “Katrina Survivor Hangs On; Help Has Yet to Arrive,” Women’s eNews, 27 August 2006, at www.wo mensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2866/context/archive. 7. Post-Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction, Joint Report of the Government of Sri Lanka and Development Partners (Colombo: December 2006), p. 5. 8. Oxfam International, “The Tsunami's Impact on Women,” Briefing Note (Oxford: March 2005), p. 2. 9. IFRC, op. cit. note 5, p. 144. 10. Post-Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction, op. cit. note 7, p. 5. IFRC, op. cit. note 5, p. 155. 11. Post-Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction, op. cit. note 7, p. 5. 12. IFRC, op. cit. note 5, p. 144. 13. Post-Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction, op. cit. note 7, p. 5. 14. Shannon Lacy, “What Can Women Do? Rebuilding Lives Post-Tsunami,” undated, at www.disasterwatch.net/ resources%20links/rebuilding_lives_post_tsunami.pdf. 15. IFRC, op. cit. note 5, p. 158. 16. Ibid., p. 142.

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19. Office of the UN Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery, “Helping Reduce Children’s Vulnerability to Disaster: ISDR and UNESCO Launch ‘Disaster Risk Reduction Begins at School’ Campaign,” press release (New York: 16 June 2006). 20. Population Council, “Council Study Clarifies States of Vulnerable Populations After Pakistan Earthquake,” Population Briefs, September 2006. 21. Post-Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction, op. cit. note 7, p. 6. 22. Sri Lanka from ibid.; Indonesia from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 2005 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor (Washington, DC: 29 August 2006), p. xxi. 23. IFRC, op. cit. note 5, p. 144. 24. Post-Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction, op. cit. note 7, p. 5. 25. Ibid. 26. U.S. Department of Labor, op. cit. note 22. 27. Ibid., p. xxii. 28. Ibid.

Storm Clouds and Silver Linings 1. Oxfam International, “Targeting Poor People: Rebuilding Lives after the Tsunami,” Briefing Note (Oxford: 25 June 2005), p. 1. 2. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), German Committee for Disaster Reduction, and University of Bayreuth, Linking Poverty Reduction and Disaster Risk Management (Eschborn, Germany: September 2005), p. 27. 3. Ibid. 4. Sidebar 1 from Adam Nossiter, “New Orleans Population is Reduced Nearly 60 Percent,” New York Times, 7 October 2006, and from The Brookings Institution, “The Katrina Index: Tracking Recovery of New Orleans and the Metro Area” (Washington, DC: 15 February 2007), pp. 20, 29. Figure 3 from idem, p. 24. Fair Market Rent is a gross rent estimate that includes the shelter rent plus the cost of all utilities, except telephones. The margin of error for this survey is +/- 12 percent. 5 . GTZ, German Committee for Disaster Reduction, and University of Bayreuth, op. cit. note 2, pp. 23–24. 6. Duryog Nivaran and Practical Action South Asia Programme, South Asia Disaster Report 2005: Tackling the Tides and Tremors (Islamabad: June 2006), p. 57. 7. “Drought, Floods and Conflict—Triple Emergency in Somalia,” ReliefWeb, 20 December 2006, at www.reliefweb .int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EKOI-6WP5KM?OpenDoc ument; Emily Wax, “Dying for Water in Somalia’s Drought,” Washington Post, 14 April 2006. 8. Michael Renner and Zoë Chafe, “Turning Disasters into Peacemaking Opportunities,” in Worldwatch Institute, State of the World 2006 (New York: W.W. Norton

17. Ibid.

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18. Ibid.

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Endnotes & Company, 2006), pp. 115–16. 9. Ibid. 10. For a more detailed discussion, see Michael Renner, “Post-Disaster Peacemaking: Conceptual Issues,” at www.worldwatch.org/node/4829. 11. Sidebar 2 based on the following sources: Dan Connell, “The Politics of Slaughter in Sudan,” Middle East Report Online, 18 October 2004; Peter Verney, “Darfur’s Manmade Disaster,” Middle East Report Online, 22 July 2004; Stephan Faris, “The Real Roots of Darfur,” The Atlantic, April 2007, pp. 67–69; Helen Young and Abdal Monim Osman, Challenges to Peace and Recovery in Darfur, Feinstein International Center Briefing Paper (Medford, MA: Tufts University, December 2006); Zoë Chafe, “A Promise, Tested Again,” World Watch, July/August 2006, p. 2; village destruction from Glenys Kinnock, “The Rape of Darfur,” The Guardian (UK), 18 January 2006; deaths and displacement from “Q&A: Sudan’s Darfur Conflict,” BBC News Online, 27 February 2007. 12. Philippe Le Billon and Arno Waizenegger, “Peace in the Wake of Disasters? Secessionist Conflicts and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, forthcoming, 2007. 13. David Petrasek “Vive la Différence? Humanitarian and Political Approaches to Engaging Armed Groups,” in Accord (Conciliation Resources), no. 16 (2005), available at www.c-r.org. 14. Table 2 based on the following sources: cases discussed on the DisasterDiplomacy.org Web site; Kemal Kirisci, “The ‘Enduring Rivalry’ Between Greece and Turkey: Can ‘Democratic Peace’ Break It?” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Spring 2002; Anthony Boadle, “Cuban Doctors Say Politics Block Katrina Offer,” Yahoo News, 9 September 2005; Frances Harrison, “Iran Offers US Katrina Oil Relief,” BBC News Online, 6 September 2005.

5. International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Natural Resources and Law Enforcement, Asia Report No. 29 (Jakarta and Brussels: 2001), pp. 10–12. 6. McCulloch, op. cit. note 1, pp. 12–17; Down to Earth, Aceh: Logging a Conflict Zone (London: 2004). 7. Bill Guerin, “Aceh Rises Above the Waves,” Asia Times Online, 19 July 2005. 8. Abigail Abrash Walton and Bama Athreya, “US Ties and Challenges to Peace in Aceh,” Asia Times Online, 21 January 2005; “Indonesia Bans Army Business Ties,” BBC News Online, 12 April 2005; C.S. Kuppuswamy, Indonesia: Armed Forces and their Diminishing Political Role, Paper No. 528 (Noida, India: South Analysis Group, 2002). 9. Table 3 from the following sources: Global IDP Project, “Indonesia: Post-Tsunami Assistance Risks Neglecting Reintegration Needs of Conflict-Induced IDPs” (Geneva: Norwegian Refugee Council, 26 May 2005), pp. 1, 3; Global IDP Project, “Prior to Tsunami, at least 125,000 People Had Been Displaced Since May 2003 by the Conflict” (Geneva: Norwegian Refugee Council, December 2004); UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 2004 Global Refugee Trends (Geneva: 2005); Indonesia Relief, “Post-Tsunami Aceh Population Census to Start in August,” press release (Jakarta: 6 July 2005). Range of conflict deaths from Katri Merikallio, Making Peace. Ahtisaari and Aceh (Porvoo, Finland: WS Bookwell Oy, 2006), p. 224. 10. Jane Perlez, “Indonesia Orders Foreign Troops Providing Aid to Leave by March 26,” New York Times, 13 January 2005. 11. Kirsten E. Schulze, Between Conflict and Peace: Tsunami Aid and Reconstruction in Aceh (London School of Economics and Political Science, undated), p. 7. 12. John Telford, John Cosgrave, and Rachel Houghton, Joint Evaluation of the International Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami: Synthesis Report (London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, July 2006), pp. 55–56.

Case Study—Aceh: Peacemaking After the Tsunami

13. Schulze, op. cit. note 11, p. 9; Merikallio, op. cit. note 9, p. 14.

1. Lesley McCulloch, Aceh: Then and Now (London: Minority Rights Group International, May 2005); Kirsten E. Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization, Policy Studies No. 2 (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2004).

14. Richard W. Baker, “Asian Insurgencies—Two Conflicts, Two Stories,” East–West Wire (East-West Center), 19 July 2005.

2. Rizal Sukma, Security Operations in Aceh: Goals, Consequences and Lessons, Policy Studies No. 3 (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2004), p. 3. 3. Timeline based on the following sources: McCulloch, op. cit. note 1; Sukma, op. cit. note 2; Schulze, op. cit. note 1; Sejarah Indonesia, “An Online Timeline of Indonesian History,” at www.gimonca.com/sejarah/mapmain.shtml; Peter Kreuzer, “Aceh: Nach der Flutwelle Neue Hoffnung auf Frieden?” in Ulrich Ratsch et al., eds., Friedensgutachten 2005 (Münster, Germany: Lit Verlag, 2005), pp. 115–24; “Acheh in History,” Acheh Times, at www.acheh times.com/timeline. 4. Schulze, op. cit. note 1, pp. 14–17.


15. Rachel Harvey, “Aceh Looks for a New Political Future,” BBC News Online, 21 March 2005; Merikallio, op. cit. note 9, p. 37. 16. “Aceh Key to Indonesia’s Rehabilitation,” Asia International Political and Strategic Review, May 2005; Evelyn Rusli, “After Big Step Toward Aceh, Still Many Hurdles to Overcome,” International Herald Tribune, 19 July 2005. 17. International Crisis Group, Aceh: A New Chance for Peace, Asia Briefing No. 40 (Jakarta and Brussels: 15 August 2005), pp. 4–5. 18. Ian Fisher, “Rebels Express Thanks for Aid to Indonesians,” New York Times, 17 January 2005; Merikallio, op. cit. note 9, p. 99. 19. Merikallio, op. cit. note 9, pp. 15–26, 128–31.

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Endnotes 20. Ibid., p. 29. 21. International Crisis Group, op. cit. note 17, pp. 1–3; Schulze, op. cit. note 11, pp. 26–27. 22. Merikallio, op. cit. note 9, pp. 29–37. 23. Schulze, op. cit. note 11, p. 29. 24. Merikallio, op. cit. note 9, pp. 166, 184. 25. Michael Morfit, “A Happy, Peaceful Anniversary in Aceh,” Asia Times Online, 15 August 2006. 26. Merikallio, op. cit. note 9, p. 136. 27. Table 4 from “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement,” 15 August 2005, available at Crisis Management Initiative, www.cmi.fi/?content =aceh_project. 28. Merikallio, op. cit. note 9, pp. 152–200; Pieter Feith, “The Aceh Monitoring Mission Experience,” paper presented at “Beyond the Tsunami from Recovery to Peace” seminar, Jakarta, Indonesia, 3 May 2006. 29. European Commission, External Relations, “European Commission Assistance to Aceh— Overview” (Brussels: December 2006), at ec.europa.eu/comm/external _relations/indonesia/assistance_to_aceh/index.htm. 30. Merikallio, op. cit. note 9, p. 99. 31. World Bank/Decentralization Support Facility (WB/DSF), GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment: Enhancing Peace through Community-Level Development Planning (Banda Aceh/Jakarta: March 2006). 32. World Bank, “Brief—The Aceh Peace Agreement: How Far Have We Come?” (Washington, DC: December 2006), at web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/INDONESIAEXT N/0,,contentMDK:21150070~pagePK:141137~piPK:1411 27~theSitePK:226309,00.html. 33. International Crisis Group, Aceh’s Local Elections: The Role of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), Asia Briefing No. 57 (Jakarta and Brussels: 29 November 2006); World Bank, op. cit. note 32. 34. Michael Renner, interview with GAM spokesman Bakhtiar Abdullah, Banda Aceh, Indonesia, 21 December 2005. 35. Christine Beeck, “Nach den Gouverneurswahlen in Aceh,” BICC Focus 3 (Germany: Bonn International Center for Conversion, January 2007), p. 4. 36. WB/DSF, “Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update” (Jakarta: November 2006 and January 2007 editions). 37. WB/DSF, “Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update” (Jakarta: March 2007 edition). Figure 5 from “WB/DSF Aceh Conflict Monitoring Dataset,” as transmitted in email communication with Blair Palmer, World Bank Conflict and Development Team, Jakarta, 2 March 2007. 38. Michael Renner, interview at Aceh Recovery Forum, Banda Aceh, Indonesia, 17 December 2005. 39. Jane Perlez, “Aceh Says Indonesia Law Falls Far Short on Autonomy,” International Herald Tribune, 12 July 2006.

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Table 5 based on “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement,” op. cit. note 27 and on Parliament of the Republic of Indonesia, Pemerintahan Aceh (Jakarta: July 2006), at www.parlemen.net. 40. Nani Afrida, “General Strike Mars Aceh Law’s Enactment,” Jakarta Post, 12 July 2006; “GAM Wants Aceh Governance Law Revised to Meet Peace Deal,” Jakarta Post, 4 August 2006. 41. International Crisis Group, Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh, Asia Briefing No. 61(Jakarta and Brussels: 22 March 2007); Lucy Williamson, “Aceh Votes for Major Change,” BBC News Online, 12 December 2006; “Ex-Rebel Becomes Aceh Governor,” BBC News Online, 8 February 2007. 42. World Bank, “Aceh Public Expenditure Analysis. Spending for Reconstruction and Poverty Reduction” (Washington, DC: September 2006), at siteresources .worldbank.org/INTINDONESIA/Resources/Publication/ 280016-1152870963030/APEA.pdf. 43. Ibid.; Sukma, op. cit. note 2, pp. 3, 30. 44. H. Diani, “Acehnese Unsure Peace Will Last: Poll.” Jakarta Post, 31 March 2006. 45. Seth Mydans, “Tsunami-Tossed City’s Survivors Struggle to Carry On,” New York Times, 26 December 2006. 46. “Aceh Aid Homes Unfit,” The Age (Australia), 30 March 2006. 47. Telford, Cosgrave, and Houghton, op. cit. note 12. 48. Michael Renner, interviews with local NGOs in Aceh, Indonesia, December 2005. 49. Eye on Aceh and Aid Watch, A People’s Agenda? PostTsunami Aid in Aceh (Erskineville, New South Wales: February 2006), at www.aidwatch.org.au/index.php?cur rent=1&display=aw00878&display_item=2. 50. Telford, Cosgrave, and Houghton, op. cit. note 12, pp. 18–19. 51. Eva-Lotta E. Hedman, “The Right to Return: IDPs in Aceh,” Forced Migration Review, May 2006, p. 70. 52. WB/DSF, “Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update” (Jakarta: November 2006 and March 2007 editions). 53. World Bank, op. cit. note 32.

Case Study—Sri Lanka: A “Double Blow” to Development 1. Authors’ interview with residents of Colombo, Sri Lanka, January 2007. 2. Timeline based on the following sources: Jeremy Armon and Liz Philipson, eds., Accord Issue 4: Demanding Sacrifice: War and Negotiation in Sri Lanka (London: Conciliation Resources, August 1998); Alan Keenan, “No Peace, No War,” Boston Review, Summer 2005; International Crisis Group, Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process, Asia Report No. 124 (Colombo and Brussels: 28 November 2006); “Timeline: Sri Lanka,” BBC News Online,


Endnotes at news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1166237.stm, viewed 20 March 2007; Jonathan Goodhand and Bart Klem, with Dilrukshi Fonseka, S.I. Keethaponcalan, and Shonali Sardesai, Aid, Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka, 2000–2005 (Colombo: Asia Foundation, August 2005); Jayadeva Uyangoda, “Transition from Civil War to Peace: Challenges of Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka,” Working Paper (Colombo: Social Scientists’ Association, November 2005). 3. K.M. de Silva, Reaping the Whirlwind. Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 1998). 4. Ibid. 5. International Crisis Group, op. cit. note 2, p. 3. 6. Ibid., p. 5. 7. Ibid. 8. International Crisis Group, op. cit. note 2, p. 5. 9. Authors’ interview with Sunil Bastian, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 15 January 2007. 10. Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake, “Dysfunctional Democracy and the Dirty War in Sri Lanka,” Asia Pacific Issues, No. 52 (Honolulu: East-West Center, May 2001), pp. 1, 6. 11. Keenan, op. cit. note 2; Uyangoda, op. cit. note 2, pp. 9–10, 19. Text of the Interim Self-Governing Authority proposal at “Full Text: Tamil Tiger Proposals,” BBC News Online, 1 November 2003. 12. Goodhand and Klem with Fonseka, Keethaponcalan, and Sardesai, op. cit. note 2. 13. Ibid., p. 8. 14. Figure 6 from UNHCR GIS Unit Sri Lanka, “Displacement Caused by Tsunamis by District, as at 02 January 2005, 15:45 hrs.” Table 6 based on the following sources: Mandeep Kaur Grewal, Approaches to Equity in Post-Tsunami Assistance. Sri Lanka: A Case Study, commissioned by the Office of the UN Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery (New York: November 2006), Table 1; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Escalation of Conflict Leaves Tens of Thousands of IDPs Without Protection and Assistance” (Geneva: November 2006), available at www.internal-displacement.org; South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Casualties of Terrorist Violence in Sri Lanka since March 2000,” www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/database/annual_casualties.htm, viewed 30 March 2007; “U.N. Envoy Visits Sri Lanka Amid Deteriorating Humanitarian Situation,” International Herald Tribune, 8 September 2006; “More Than 40,000 Civilians Flee Latest Fighting In Eastern Sri Lanka,” UNHCR News, 13 March 2007.

16 September 2006, at www.colombopage.com/archive/ September16135927SL.html. 18. “UN Chief Restricted from Tiger Areas,” BBC News Online, 8 January 2005. 19. International Crisis Group, op. cit. note 2, p. 9. 20. In 2002, a “Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North and East” (SIHRN) was proposed, and in 2004, a North East Reconstruction Fund. See Grewal, op. cit. note 14, p. 17. 21. Jo Johnson, “Sri Lanka’s Faltering Peace Process Gets Boost,” Financial Times, 24 June 2005. “Memorandum of Understanding for the Establishment of a PostTsunami Operational Management Structure,” available at www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/document/ papers/P-TOMS.htm. 22. Dumeetha Luthra, “Sri Lanka’s Controversial Tsunami Deal,” BBC News Online, 24 June 2005. 23. “Sri Lanka Suspends Tsunami Deal,” BBC News Online, 15 July 2005. 24. Grewal, op. cit. note 14, p. 18. 25. “Sri Lanka Troops ‘Take Key Town,’” BBC News Online, 19 January 2007. 26. Figure 7 from South Asia Terrorism Portal, op. cit. note 14. Data are from March 2000 to March 2007. 27. “Bomb Hits Second Sri Lankan Bus,” BBC News Online, 6 January 2007; “Rebel Boats Sunk, Says Sri Lanka,” BBC News Online, 27 January 2007; “Sri Lanka Blast ‘Kills Civilians,’” BBC News Online, 2 April 2007. 28. Centre for Policy Alternatives, Peace Confidence Index (Colombo: February 2007). Tamils in the northeast were not polled. 29. Centre for Policy Alternatives, War, Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka: Overview and Trends 2006 (Colombo: 2007). 30. The authors visited Colombo and parts of Sri Lanka’s south coast during a research trip in January 2007. 31. Simon Gardner, “Sri Lanka Investigates Aid Groups Over Rebel Links,” Reuters, 11 January 2007. The group’s full name in Dutch is Zuid-Oost Azië Vluchtelingenzorg (South-East Asia Refugee Care).

15. David Rohde, “In Sri Lanka’s Time of Agony, a Moment of Peace,” New York Times, 4 January 2005.

32. See, for example: Janaka Perera, “European Double Game to ‘Tame’ Sri Lanka,” Sunday Observer, 14 January 2007; Walter Jayawardhana, “UN Diplomat Allegedly Involved with Terrorism,” Sunday Observer, 21 January 2007; Lucien Rajakarunanayake, “INGO, NGO What Are You?” Daily News, 20 January 2007. Save the Children felt compelled to take out a newspaper ad to defend itself against scurrilous charges, per “Save the Children in Sri Lanka Clarifies,” Sunday Observer, 21 January 2007.

16. Authors’ interviews in Colombo, Sri Lanka, January 2007.

33. Goodhand and Klem with Fonseka, Keethaponcalan, and Sardesai, op. cit. note 2, p. 11.

17. Ibid. A public opinion survey conducted in June and July 2006 showed that 79 percent of respondents preferred a peaceful resolution of the country’s conflict, per “Sri Lankans Need Peace, a Survey Says,” ColomboPage,

34. Ibid., p. 87; Uyangoda, op. cit. note 2, p. 17; authors’ interviews, op. cit. note 16.


35. Post-Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction, Joint Report of the Government of Sri Lanka and Development B E Y O N D

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Endnotes Partners (Colombo: December 2006), p. 6. 36. Ibid., p. ix. 37. Ibid. 38. Authors’ interviews, op. cit. note 16. 39. Authors’ interview with staff at Sarvodaya headquarters, Moratuwa, Sri Lanka, 16 January 2007. 40. Authors’ interview with Mahinda de Silva, Sewalanka Foundation, Boralesgamuwa, Sri Lanka, 17 January 2007. 41. Table 7 adapted from Grewal, op. cit. note 14, Table 2. 42. Ibid. 43. Post-Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction, op. cit. note 35, p. 6. 44. Authors’ interviews, op. cit. note 16. 45. Authors’ interview with Amal Kumar Pramanik, BRAC officer, Matara, Sri Lanka, 20 January 2006. The authors are grateful to Rixt Bode of Oxfam Novib for assisting with the organization of this field visit, and to Amal Kumar Pramanik for sharing his knowledge and time. 46. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “Sustaining Tsunami Recovery by Organisations Networking at the Grassroots level through Promoting Local Accountability and Capacity Enhancement Systems (STRONG PLACES),” undated, at mdg-guide.undp.org/ files/Module%203.4/STRONG_PLACE_Project_Sri_Lan ka.doc. 47. Observations based on authors’ field visit to projects, Matara, Sri Lanka, 20 January 2007. The authors are grateful to Devanand Ramiah, UNDP, for organizing the visit and to Niel Kusumsiri for sharing precious time and expertise. 48. Authors’ conversations with community groups, Matara, Sri Lanka, 20 January 2007. 49. Post-Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction, op. cit. note 35, p. 8.

Case Study—Kashmir: Physical Tremor, but No Political Earthquake 1. “South Asia Quake: In Depth,” BBC News Online, 4 October 2006. Figure 8 based on map generated by the Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (DMHA), Tripler AMC, Hawaii. 2. Timeline based on the following sources: “Timeline of the Kashmir Conflict,” Wikipedia, en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Timeline_of_the_Kashmir_conflict; Justin Podur, “Kashmir Timeline,” 10 January 2002, at www.zmag.org/ southasia/kashtime.htm; “Timeline: Steps to Peace in South Asia,” BBC News Online, 15 April 2005, at news .bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3825917.stm; South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Jammu and Kashmir Timeline—Years: 1931–1999,” at www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/ states/jandk/timeline/year1931_1999.htm. 3. Figure 9 based on Praveen Swami, Quickstep or Kadam Taal? The Elusive Search for Peace in Jammu and Kashmir, Special Report 133 (Washington, DC: U.S. 48

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Institute of Peace, March 2005), and on South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Annual Fatalities in Terrorist Violence 1988–2007,” www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/ states/jank/data_sheets/annual_casualties.htm. 4. For a brief summary of the origins of the Kashmir conflict, see “Kashmir Flashpoint,” BBC News Online, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/south_asia/2002/kashmir _flashpoint, and Emma Batha, “Crisis Profile: What is the Conflict in Kashmir About?” Reuters AlertNet, 19 October 2005, www.alertnet.org/thefacts/reliefsources/11297138 2078.htm. 5. International Crisis Group, India, Pakistan and Kashmir: Stabilising a Cold Peace, Asia Briefing No. 51 (Islamabad and Brussels: 15 June 2006). 6. Ibid. 7. See, for example: “Press Hopes Quake May Ease Ties,” BBC News Online, 9 October 2005; Scott Baldauf and Laura Winter, “Quake Relief Fights Tough Terrain,” Christian Science Monitor, 11 October 2005; Tim Sullivan, “Kashmiris Believe Quake Can Bring Peace,” Boston Globe, 17 October 2005. 8. Table 8 based on the following sources: Duryog Nivaran and Practical Action South Asia Programme, South Asia Disaster Report 2005: Tackling the Tides and Tremors (Islamabad: June 2006), p. 47; Center of Excellence DMHA, “South Asia Earthquake Update,” 13 April 2006 and 8 November 2005 at www.coe-dmha .org/Pakistan/SAEU110805.htm and www.coe-dmha.org/ Pakistan/SAEU041306.htm; International Crisis Group, Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake, Asia Briefing No. 46 (Islamabad and Brussels: 15 March 2006); Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre Web site, www.internaldisplacement.org. 9. “India Offers Pakistan $25m in Aid,” BBC News Online, 27 October 2005. 10. Duryog Nivaran and Practical Action South Asia Programme, op. cit. note 8, pp. 55–56. 11. Tariq Ali, “A Tale of Two Tragedies,” The Nation (New York), 14 November 2005, p. 5. 12. Ravi Prasad, “Militancy and Natural Disaster in Kashmir,” ISN Security Watch, 4 November 2005, at www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=13386. 13. Amit Baruah, “LoC Crossing to Be Made Easier,” The Hindu, 13 November 2005; “Kashmiris Reunite in Grief Across LoC,” expressindia, 17 November 2005, at www.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=58471. 14. “1407 People from India and PoK Have Crossed LOC,” The Hindu, 16 December 2006. 15. International Crisis Group, op. cit. note 5. 16. “LoC Bus Completes Two Years Amid Less Enthusiasm,” Greater Kashmir, 11 April 2007, at www.greaterkash mir.com/Home/Newsdetails.asp?newsid=6134&Issueid=2 10&Arch=. 17. Sheikh Mushtaq, “Peace Bus Carries Few Passengers, Flickering Hope,” Reuters, 16 April 2006. 18. Scott Baldauf, “‘Confidence’ Measures Falter in Kash-


Endnotes mir,” Christian Science Monitor, 25 July 2006; “Kashmiri Grief Crosses India-Pakistan Divide,” Reuters India, 4 October 2006.

“South Asia Earthquake Update” (Tripler AMC, HI: 8 November 2005), at www.coe-dmha.org/Pakistan/SAEU 110805.htm.

19. “Kashmiri Grief Crosses India-Pakistan Divide,” op. cit. note 18.


20. C. Raja Mohan, “Losing the Peace Plot,” Indian Express, November 15, 2005.

1. Sidebar 3 from Ilan Kelman, “Disaster Diplomacy: Current View,” at www.disasterdiplomacy.org/index.html #currentview.

21. Somini Sengupta, “Peace Talks in Peril, India Warns Pakistan,” International Herald Tribune, 15 July 2006. 22. Graham Usher, “Mumbai’s Casualties,” The Nation (New York), 14 August 2006. 23. Somini Sengupta, “Talks by India and Pakistan Make No Gains on Train Blasts,” New York Times, 16 November 2006. 24. Military expenditures, expressed in constant 2003 prices and exchange rates, from Petter Stålenheim et al., “Military Expenditure,” in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2006: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 340. 25. “Musharraf Sees Quake as a Chance for Kashmir Solution,” Daily Times (Pakistan), 17 November 2005. 26. “Pakistan to Buy American F-16s, Chinese FC-10 Fighter Jets—Minister,” Forbes, 13 April 2006; “US Plans to Supply Pakistan with Fighter Jets,” Mail & Guardian Online (South Africa), 4 July 2006. 27. Prasad, op. cit. note 12. 28. Duryog Nivaran and Practical Action South Asia Programme, op. cit. note 8, pp. 52–53. 29. Jan McGirk, “Kashmir: The Politics of an Earthquake,” openDemocracy.net, 19 October 2005. 30. International Crisis Group, op. cit. note 8. 31. Ibid.; International Crisis Group, op. cit. note 5.

2. Aceh signs and banners observed by Michael Renner during a visit to Aceh, Indonesia, 15–23 December 2005. 3. Rachel Harvey, “Aceh Looks for a New Political Future,” BBC News Online, 21 March 2005; Zoë Chafe, “Sri Lanka Donors Wary of Increasing Conflict,” at www.worldwatch.org/node/4893. 4. Ian Smillie and Larry Minear, The Charity of Nations. Humanitarian Action in a Calculating World (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2004), pp. 183–202. 5. Authors’ interview with Nireka Weeratunge, independent consultant, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 14 March 2007. 6. John Telford, John Cosgrave, and Rachel Houghton, Joint Evaluation of the International Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami: Synthesis Report (London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, July 2006), pp. 18–19, 43. 7. In Aceh, a member of a local NGO spoke disparagingly of those who hop from one crisis or disaster spot to another, recounting how one expatriate greeted a colleague with the words “Hi Bob, haven’t seen you since we did Somalia…” Michael Renner interview, Banda Aceh, Indonesia, 16 December 2005. Similar problems were evident in Sri Lanka, per authors’ interviews in Colombo, January 2007. 8. David Petrasek “Vive la Différence? Humanitarian and Political Approaches to Engaging Armed Groups,” in Accord (Conciliation Resources), no. 16 (2005), available at www.c-r.org.

33. Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan Quake Revives Civic Power,” BBC News Online, 15 November 2005.

9. Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer, and Katherine Haver, Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and Operations, Humanitarian Policy Group Report 23 (London: Overseas Development Institute, September 2006), p. 11.

34. Center of Excellence DMHA, “South Asia Earthquake Update” (Tripler AMC, HI: 28 October 2005), at www.coe-dmha.org/Pakistan/SAEU102805.htm; Prasad, op. cit. note 12.

10. Petrasek, op. cit. note 8; Sidebar 4 from Collaborative for Development Action, Inc., “The Seven Lessons,” www.cdainc.com/dnh/the_seven_lessons.php, viewed 20 March 2007.

35. Anuj Chopra, “India Weighs Troop Reduction in Quieter Kashmir,” Christian Science Monitor, 2 April 2007.

11. Telford, Cosgrave, and Houghton, op. cit. note 6, p. 28.

32. Kamran Haider, “Quake-Hit Pakistani Kashmiris Shun Islamist Parties,” Washington Post, 12 July 2006.

36. Human Rights Watch, Everyone Lives in Fear. Patterns of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir (New York: September 2006). 37. Palash Kumar, “Indian PM, Kashmir Group Agree on Peace Talks System,” Reuters AlertNet, 3 May 2006, www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/DEL91854.htm. 38. Chopra, op. cit. note 35. 39. Muzamil Jaleel, “Kashmir’s Tragic Opportunity,” openDemocracy.net, 4 November 2005. 40. Indian restriction from Center of Excellence DMHA, w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g

12. Need to incorporate political analysis from Sunil Bastian, Colombo, Sri Lanka, interview with authors, 14 March 2007. 13. Farid Dahdouh-Guebas et al., “How Effective Were Mangroves as a Defence against the Recent Tsunami?” Current Biology, vol. 15, no. 12 (2005), pp. 443–47. 14. Duryog Nivaran and Practical Action South Asia Programme, South Asia Disaster Report 2005: Tackling the Tides and Tremors (Islamabad: June 2006), pp. 61–62. 15. World Wide Fund for Nature–Indonesia, Green Reconstruction Policy Guidelines for Aceh (Jakarta: April 2005).

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Endnotes 16. Fachruddin M. Mangunjaya, “Illegal Logging: Warning Light for Aceh Forests,” Tempo Magazine (Indonesia), 22 January 2007, available at www.acheh-eye.org; “Tsunami Reconstruction Drives Illegal Logging in Indonesia,” mongabay.com, 6 August 2006, at news.mongabay.com/ 2006/0806-ap.html. 17. “Aceh to Implement Logging Moratorium,” Jakarta Post, 17 March 2007.

Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge for Development (New York: 2004), p. 73. 19. Ken Conca, Alexander Carius, and Geoffrey D. Dabelko, “Building Peace Through Environmental Cooperation,” in Worldwatch Institute, State of the World 2005 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), pp. 144–57. 20. UNDP, op. cit. note 18, p. 73.

18. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),

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Index A Aceh (Indonesia) gender of tsunami victims, 14 global attention on, 18 peacemaking, 5, 20–25, 37–39 Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), 23 Ahtisaari, Martti, 21–22 aid, see also reconstruction Aceh (Indonesia), 21, 24–25, 37 coordination, 42 Do No Harm approach, 41 Kashmir, 33, 35–36, 38 military delivery of, 18, 33, 35–36 pledges vs. media response, 11–12 political and economic effects, 6, 16, 37–40 recommendations, 42 Sri Lanka, 5, 27–31, 37–38 All Parties Hurriyat Conference, 35 Anderson, Mary B., 41 Annan, Kofi, 28 Asia Foundation, 27

B Badan Reintegrasi Aceh (BRA), 23 Baker, Richard, 21 Bam Earthquake (Iran), 19 Bangladesh, 17 Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), 30 Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 38

C Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, 9 Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 39 Chi-Chi Earthquake (Taiwan), 19 children, 13–15 China, 19 Christensen, Juha, 22 Christian Aid, 11 climate change, 7, 11–12 collaboration, 42 Colombia, 41 Colombo (Sri Lanka), 26, 28–29


conflict, sparked by disaster management, 16–18 coral reef destruction, 10 Cuba, 19

D Darfur (Sudan), 18 Debayle, Anastasio Somoza, 17 deforestation, 7, 10–11, 41 desertification, 7, 18 diplomacy, 37 disaster aid, see aid disasters, see also specific disasters and disaster areas defined, 9 human causes, 7–8, 10–12 statistics, 5, 9–11, 13, 27, 34 vulnerabilities to, 10, 13–15 displaced populations, 16 Do No Harm approach, 40–42 droughts, 7 conflict caused by, 17–18 Ethiopia, 19 Somalia, 11 Sudan, 18 survivors, 9

E Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Authority (Pakistan), 34 earthquakes El Salvador (2001), 14 Greece (1999), 19 India (1993), 14 India (2001), 19 Indian Ocean (2004), 7 Iran (2003), 19 Japan (1995), 10, 13 Kashmir (2005), 14, 32 Taiwan (1999), 19 Turkey (1999), 19 East-West Center, 21 El Salvador, 14 elderly, 13–14 environmental degradation, 7, 10–11, 42 environmental restoration, 6, 40–42

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Index Eritrea, 19 Ethiopia, 19 European Union, 23, 38

International Committee of the Red Cross, 39 Iran, 19 Irwandi, Yusuf, 24

F

J

Federal Relief Commission (Pakistan), 34 Feith, Pieter, 23 flood survivors, 9 food shortages, 11 Free Aceh Movement (GAM), 20, 21–24, 37

Jaishe Mohammed, 35 Jammu (India), 32, 33 Japan, 21 jobs competition, 16

G

Kalla, Yusuf, 22 Karuna faction, 27, 30 Kashmir deforestation, 41 earthquake (2005), 32–33 factors inhibiting peace, 37–38 India-Pakistan reconciliation opportunity, 5, 32–36 land title loss, 14 resettlement conflict, 16 Kecamatan Development Program, 25 Kelman, Ilan, 37 Kenya, 11 Kobe (Japan), 10, 13 Kumaratunge, Chandrika, 27, 28

GAM (Free Aceh Movement), 20, 21–24, 37 gender, 13–14 Germany, 21 Golkar, 22 Greece, 19 Green Reconstruction Policy Guidelines for Aceh, 41 Guatemala, 11

H Honduras, 13 housing, 24, 29–30, 31 Hurricane Dennis, 19 Hurricane Katrina aid offers rejected, 19 evacuation, 14 fatalities and costs, 10 gender of victims, 13 poverty, 17 Hurricane Michelle, 19 Hurricane Mitch, 11, 13, 14 Hurricane Stan, 11, 14 Hurricane Wilma, 19 hurricanes and climate change, 11 Husain, Farid, 22

52

K

L land title loss, 14 land use, 7 landslides, 41 Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, 35 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 27–29, 37–39 Line of Control, 32, 33 Louisiana, 11, see also Hurricane Katrina LTTE, see Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

I

M

India, see also Kashmir flood defense loss, 11 gender inequities, 14 jobs and services competition, 16 Kashmir earthquake response, 32–36 Pakistani assistance to, 19 separatist insurgency, 32 tsunami barrier, 10 Indian Ocean tsunami (2004) Aceh (Indonesia), 20–21 aid pledges, 11 children as victims, 15 gender of victims, 13–14 India, 10 Sri Lanka, 26–28, 30–31 statistics, 7, 21 Indonesia, 10, see also Aceh (Indonesia) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 11

Maharashtra (India), 14 Manaf, Muzakkir, 22 mangroves, 7, 10–11, 40 Matara (Sri Lanka), 30, 31 media attention, 9, 11–12 mediation/facilitation, 38, 42 Merikallio, Katri, 22 microfinance, 30 military Aceh (Indonesia), 20–22, 25 aid delivery, 18, 33–35, 36, 40 Kashmir, 34–35, 37 Sri Lanka, 37 Millennium Development Goals, 8 Mohan, C. Raja, 34 Mumbai (India), 11 Musharraf, Pervez, 34

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Index

N

S

Naluvedapathy (India), 10 New Orleans, 11, see also Hurricane Katrina NGOs, see nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) Nicaragua, 13, 17 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), see also aid Aceh (Indonesia), 21 Kashmir, 35 local vs. international, 39 Sri Lanka, 29, 30 Norway, 27

Sandinista National Liberation Front, 17 Sarvodaya, 30, 40 Save the Children, 15 services competition, 16 Sewalanka Foundation, 30 Sinhalese, 26–27, 29, 30 Somalia, 11 Sri Lanka, 5 civil war, 26–31 factors inhibiting peace, 37–39 gender inequities among disaster survivors, 13–15 mangrove destruction, 10–11 tsunami, 7, 26–28 Strong Places project, 30, 31 Sudan, 16, 18 Suharto, 20, 21

O Oxfam, 30

P Pakistan, 19, 34, see also Kashmir peacemaking, 8 Aceh (Indonesia), 20–25 environmental restoration, 40–41 Kashmir opportunity, 32–36 leveraging aid, 39 recommendations, 40 Sri Lanka, 27–29 success factors, 17–19, 37–38 Peru, 16 Petrasek, David, 39, 40 population growth, 7–8, 10 Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS), 28, 39 poverty/poor, 8, 13, 24, 40 Prabhakaran, Vellupillai, 27 property loss compensation, 16

T Taiwan, 19 Tamil, 26–30 Tamil Rehabilitation Organization, 28 Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, 25, 40, 42 tsunamis, see Indian Ocean tsunami (2004) Turkey, 19

U U.S. Department of Labor, 15 United Nations, 8 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 13, 30, 38, 41, 42 United States, 19, 38 urbanization, 10

R

V

Rajapakse, Mahinda, 27, 28 Rashid, Ahmed, 35 reconstruction, see also aid Aceh (Indonesia), 21, 23–24 environmental restoration, 6, 40–42 Kashmir, 34 need for ceasefire, 17, 21 need to consult affected communities, 16 Sri Lanka, 29–31 refugee camps, 14, 18 relief, see aid resettlement, 16, 31 risk-management tactics, 10

Venezuela, 19

W Wickremasinghe, Ranil, 27 women, 13–14 World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 41

Y Yokyakarta (Indonesia), 10 Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, 21, 22, 23 Yusuf, Irwandi, 41

Z ZOA-Refugee Care, 29


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Disasters & Peacemaking Web Portal Regular updates to the authors’ articles, links, and resources… Check out the Disasters and Peacemaking portal on Worldwatch’s website at: www.worldwatch.org/features/disasters

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Peacemaking

Other Worldwatch Reports Worldwatch Reports provide in-depth, quantitative, and qualitative analysis of the major issues affecting prospects for a sustainable society. The Reports are written by members of the Worldwatch Institute research staff or outside specialists and are reviewed by experts unaffiliated with Worldwatch. They are used as concise and authoritative references by governments, nongovernmental organizations, and educational institutions worldwide. On Climate Change, Energy, and Materials 169: Mainstreaming Renewable Energy in the 21st Century, 2004 160: Reading the Weathervane: Climate Policy From Rio to Johannesburg, 2002 157: Hydrogen Futures: Toward a Sustainable Energy System, 2001 151: Micropower: The Next Electrical Era, 2000 149: Paper Cuts: Recovering the Paper Landscape, 1999 144: Mind Over Matter: Recasting the Role of Materials in Our Lives, 1998 138: Rising Sun, Gathering Winds: Policies To Stabilize the Climate and Strengthen Economies, 1997

On Ecological and Human Health 165: Winged Messengers: The Decline of Birds, 2003 153: Why Poison Ourselves: A Precautionary Approach to Synthetic Chemicals, 2000 148: Nature’s Cornucopia: Our Stakes in Plant Diversity, 1999 145: Safeguarding the Health of Oceans, 1999 142: Rocking the Boat: Conserving Fisheries and Protecting Jobs, 1998 141: Losing Strands in the Web of Life: Vertebrate Declines and the Conservation of Biological Diversity, 1998 140: Taking a Stand: Cultivating a New Relationship With the World’s Forests, 1998

On Economics, Institutions, and Security 168: Venture Capitalism for a Tropical Forest: Cocoa in the Mata Atlântica, 2003 167: Sustainable Development for the Second World: Ukraine and the Nations in Transition, 2003 166: Purchasing Power: Harnessing Institutional Procurement for People and the Planet, 2003 164: Invoking the Spirit: Religion and Spirituality in the Quest for a Sustainable World, 2002 162: The Anatomy of Resource Wars, 2002 159: Traveling Light: New Paths for International Tourism, 2001 158: Unnatural Disasters, 2001

On Food, Water, Population, and Urbanization 171: Happer Meals: Rethinking the Global Meat Industry, 2005 170: Liquid Assets: The Critical Need to Safeguard Freshwater Ecosytems, 2005 163: Home Grown: The Case for Local Food in a Global Market, 2002 161: Correcting Gender Myopia: Gender Equity, Women’s Welfare, and the Environment, 2002 156: City Limits: Putting the Brakes on Sprawl, 2001 154: Deep Trouble: The Hidden Threat of Groundwater Pollution, 2000 150: Underfed and Overfed: The Global Epidemic of Malnutrition, 2000 147: Reinventing Cities for People and the Planet, 1999

To see our complete list of Reports, visit www.worldwatch.org/taxonomy/term/40 w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g

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About Worldwatch The Worldwatch Institute is an independent research organization that works for an environmentally sustainable and socially just society, in which the needs of all people are met without threatening the health of the natural environment or the well-being of future generations. By providing compelling, accessible, and fact-based analysis of critical global issues, Worldwatch informs people around the world about the complex interactions among people, nature, and economies. Worldwatch focuses on the underlying causes of and practical solutions to the world’s problems, in order to inspire people to demand new policies, investment patterns, and lifestyle choices. Financial support for the Institute is provided by the Blue Moon Fund, the Chicago Community Trust, the Energy Future Coalition/Better World Fund, The Ford Foundation, the German Government, the David B. Gold Foundation, The Goldman Environmental Prize/Richard & Rhoda Goldman Fund, the W. K. Kellogg Foundation, the Steven C. Leuthold Family Foundation, the Marianists of the USA, the Noble Venture Fund/Community Foundation Serving Boulder County, the Norwegian Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the V. Kann Rasmussen Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, The Shared Earth Foundation, The Shenandoah Foundation, the Taupo Community Fund of the Tides Foundation, the United Nations Population Fund, the Wallace Genetic Foundation, Inc., the Johanette Wallerstein Institute, and the Winslow Foundation. The Institute also receives financial support from many individual donors who share our commitment to a more sustainable society.

About the Authors Michael Renner joined the Worldwatch Institute in 1987 and is a senior researcher. His work focuses on new concepts of security and the ways in which environmental degradation and competition over resources can generate conflict and human insecurity. Michael co-directed the Institute’s State of the World 2005 report, focused on “Redefining Global Security,” and currently directs the Global Security Project. Michael has traveled and spoken extensively on environment and security issues and is involved in efforts to translate his research findings into new policies. He has chaired discussions on an environmental security strategy with policymakers and parliamentarians at both the European Parliament and the Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe (OSCE). In 2006, he wrote the foreword to the Inventory of Environment and Security Policies and Practices, published by the Institute for Environmental Security. A native of Germany, Michael lives on Long Island, New York, with his wife and two children. Zoë Chafe is a Research Associate at the Worldwatch Institute. Since joining the Institute in 2003, she has been a frequent contributor to Worldwatch publications, including State of the World, Vital Signs, and World Watch magazine. Her writing has also been featured in such publications as Worldchanging: A Users Guide to the 21st Century and the Pan-Arab environmental magazine AlBia Wal-Tanmia. Her recent work focuses on natural disaster trends, urbanization, and strategies for confronting climate change. Zoë coordinates Worldwatch University, the Institute’s youth outreach initiative, and has served on the steering committee of SustainUS, the U.S. Youth Network for Sustainable Development. She previously worked at the Center on Ecotourism and Sustainable Development in Washington, D.C., the Centre for Science and Environment in New Delhi, the U.S. Forest Service, and the Rocky Mountain Biological Laboratory. Originally from California, she currently lives in Washington, D.C.

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Beyond Disasters Creating Opportunities for Peace The Indian Ocean tsunami, the Kashmir earthquake, Hurricane Katrina— these disasters affected millions of people and captured the world’s attention, eliciting some of the most generous humanitarian responses ever. Unfortunately, we now face a future in which disasters will become more common, more powerful, and—in many cases—more deadly. With increasing populations, climate change, and environmental destruction, our communities may be at greater risk than ever before. When disasters occur in conflict zones, the devastation is compounded. If aid is not distributed fairly among disaster and conflict survivors, new rifts can emerge. Relief groups must be prepared to tread a fine line as they work alongside armed militaries and rebel factions. But there can be an unexpected silver lining: although disasters harm people and communities in conflict areas, the cooperation and goodwill following these events may jolt the political landscape, bringing renewed opportunities for peace. Relief and reconstruction efforts can build trust among combatants, ultimately even bringing conflicts to an end. This report examines three unique situations in conflict-affected areas following disasters, focusing on Indonesia’s Aceh province and Sri Lanka, both affected by the 2004 tsunami, and on the long-contested region of Kashmir, devastated by the 2005 earthquake. The experiences of these regions yield important lessons that clarify the connections between disasters, conflict, development, and peacemaking.

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