central asia the caucasus

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Volume 14 Issue 1 2013

CENTRAL ASIA AND

THE CAUCASUS Journal of Social and Political Studies

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ED ITORIA CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Giuli ALASANIA Bülent ARAS

L B O A R D Volume 14 Issue 1 2013

Doctor of History, professor, Vice Rector of the International Black Sea University (Georgia) Doctor, Chair, Department of International Relations, Fatih University (Turkey)

Mariam ARUNOVA

Doctor of Political Science, leading research associate, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS (Russian Federation)

Garnik ASATRIAN

Doctor of Philology, professor, head of the Department of Iranian Studies, Erevan State University (Armenia)

Bakyt BESHIMOV

Doctor of History, professor, Vice President, American University-Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan)

Ariel COHEN William FIERMAN Paul GOBLE Sergey GRETSKY

Doctor, leading analyst, The Heritage Foundation, U.S.A. (U.S.A.) Doctor of Political Science, Professor of Indiana University (U.S.A.) Senior Advisor, Voice of America (U.S.A.) Doctor, Chair of Central Asian Studies, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State (U.S.A.)

Xing GUANGCHENG

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Alexander IGNATENKO

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Ashurboi IMOMOV

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Lena JONSON

Doctor, senior researcher, Swedish Institute of International Affairs (Sweden)

Klara KHAFIZOVA

Doctor of History, Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies, professor at the International Relations and Foreign Policy Department, Kainar University (Kazakhstan)

Jacob M. LANDAU

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S. Neil MACFARLANE

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Alexei MALASHENKO

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Abbas MALEKI Akira MATSUNAGA Roger N. McDERMOTT Vitaly NAUMKIN Yerengaip OMAROV Vladimer PAPAVA

S. Frederick STARR

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CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Journal of Social and Political Studies Volume 14 Issue 1 2013 IN THIS ISSUE:

ETHNIC RELATIONS Rakhmatullo ETHNOPOLITICAL PROCESSES Abdulloev. IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER 2001...................................................... 7 Cholpon ETHNIC TENSION IN KYRGYZSTAN Chotaeva. IN THE POST-CONFLICT PERIOD: ETHNOSOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY RESULTS.............................. 15

GEOPOLITICS AND SECURITY Jannatkhan POWERS AND Eyvazov. REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS: PARAMETERS AND TYPES OF INVOLVEMENT (POST-SOVIET SPACE CASE STUDY)......................................... 36 Ashot Egiazarian.

IRAN, TURKEY, AND RUSSIA: SEMI-PERIPHERAL STRATEGIES IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS...................................................... 57

Thrassy N. Marketos.

EAST MEDITERRANEAN GEOPOLITICAL ENERGY ELBOWING WITH AN AMERICAN, RUSSIAN, ................................. ISRAELI, TURKISH, AND IRANIAN PREFIX: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ACTORS...................................................................... 71 4



ELECTIONS AND REGIME CHANGE Hrant Mikaelian. ARMENIA: YEAR OF ELECTIONS................................................ 78 Konstantin Syroezhkin.

THE 18TH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA: INCONCLUSIVE RESULTS, URGENT TASKS, SHAKY COMPROMISES............................................................. 102

NATION-BUILDING Shokir Khakimov.

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN TAJIKISTAN: TOWARD DEMOCRACY OR GREATER AUTHORITARIANISM?.............................................. 122

Kadyrjan Smagulov.

PERSONNEL SHIFTS IN KAZAKHSTAN: TRADITIONAL ROTATION OR A NEW POLITICAL COURSE?..................................................... 137

MASS MEDIA Eric Freedman.

PRESS RIGHTS AND CONSTRAINTS IN KYRGYZSTAN: THE FIRST YEAR OF PRESIDENT ATAMBAEV............................................................. 144

REGIONAL ECONOMIES Murat INFLUENCE OF THE SHADOW ECONOMY Laumulin. ON THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF KAZAKHSTAN.............................................................................. 157 Rakhmatillo PROBLEMS RELATING Zoirov. TO TAJIKISTAN’S ACCESSION TO THE CUSTOMS UNION......................................................... 167 Mavzuna MAKING EFFECTIVE STRUCTURAL CHANGES Karimova. IN TAJIK INDUSTRY.................................................................... 177 5



FOR YOUR INFORMATION The Special Feature section in the next three issues will discuss:  Central Eurasia: Politics Today  Afghanistan-2014: Development Prospects for the Country and the Region  The Ferghana Valley: Conflict Potential and Development Prospects

Contributors please use the following guidelines: — begin articles with a brief abstract of 300-500 words and keywords; — articles should be no less than 3,000 and no more than 6,000 words, including footnotes; — footnotes should be placed at the bottom of each page; if there are references to Internet resources, please give the author’s name, the name of the document, the website address, and the date it was made available, for example, available 2007-04-19; — quotations, names of authors and other information from English-language sources should be duplicated in brackets in the original language, that is, in English; — the article should be divided into sections, including an introduction and conclusion; — the author should include the following personal information: first name, last name, academic degree, place of work, position, city, country. All articles accepted are published in Russian and English, in the Russian-language and English-language versions of the journal, respectively. The editorial board takes responsibility for translation of the articles.

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ETHNIC RELATIONS

ETHNOPOLITICAL PROCESSES IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER 2001 Rakhmatullo ABDULLOEV Research Fellow, Institute of Language, Literature, Oriental Studies, and Written Heritage, Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan (Dushanbe, Tajikistan)

T

ABSTRACT

hroughout the 20th century, domestic policy in Afghanistan unfolded under the influence of the ethnic factor. In 1929, the mainly Tajik Habibullah Kalakani movement ended the rule of Amanullah Khan; the National Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which split along ethnic lines, was another factor that brought about his downfall. In 1992, the mujahideen came to power; this ignited ethnic confrontation and the country’s de facto division into ethnically ho-

mogenous parts. The Islamist Taliban movement, which relied on the Pashtoon majority, established an unprecedentedly cruel regime and made the country the world center of terrorism and extremism. In 2001, the International Conference on Afghanistan held in Bonn could not ignore the role of the ethnic factor; it figured prominently while the Constitution was discussed and later adopted, as well as during the parliamentary and presidential elections.

KEYWORDS: Afghanistan; ethnic groups, political system; election campaigns, representation of ethnic groups, unity of the state. 7



Introduction Throughout its history, Afghanistan has been and remains a multinational state; today, it unites over 30 ethnic groups, the largest of them being the Pashtoons, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Balochi, Nuristanis, and Pashayi. The history of Afghanistan is a history of wars of independence; a history of the struggle of national minorities for their rights and freedoms; a history of tribal feuds, ethnic separatism, and never-ending confrontation between the Pashtoons and other peoples. In the 20th century, these trends became even more vehement. The following factors were behind the emergence and regular eruptions of ethnic contradictions broiling for a long time within Afghanistan’s borders: 

Ethnic contradictions: in 1747 Ahmad Shah Durrani founded the Afghan state and triggered the process of its centralization, which ended in the late 19th century. This meant that for a one-and-a-half centuries, the Afghan rulers remained bogged down in brutal wars for territorial expansion; they conquered vast areas in Northern and Western Afghanistan, Badakhshan, Hazarajad, Nuristan, etc. with ethnically alien populations.



The Durand Line: this was the cause of the political disagreements between independent Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 1893, Emir of Afghanistan Abdur Rahman Khan, who came to power with British assistance, had to sign an unequal or even humiliating peace treaty on the borders with British India. The Line cut across the Pashtoon tribal territories, vast areas were joined to British India and later, in 1947, became part of Pakistan.

 The

“divided peoples” issue: Pashtoons, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens, and the Balochi of Afghanistan are all “divided peoples”; they constitute ethnic majorities/minorities beyond Afghanistan’s borders—in Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.



The “religious minorities” issue: they include the Hazaras, who are Shi‘a Muslims mostly from the Ja‘farite and some from the Ismaili sects persecuted for ethnic and religious reasons.

The New “Old” Problem The downfall of the Taliban, which opened a new stage in the country’s history, did nothing to alleviate ethnic contradictions and their influence on domestic policy. They became even sharper, adding greater tension to local politics. The International Conference on Afghanistan in Bonn attended by representatives of the main ethnic groups was not free from the rivalry among them for places in the Interim Administration coalition and the post of head of the Afghan Interim Authority (head of state until the Loya Jirga scheduled for May 2002). Each of the ethnic groups was prepared to push forward its own candidate: the Pashtoons came up with Hamid Karzai and Seyyid Ahmad Gilani; the Mojadadis promoted head of their clan Sigbatulla Mojadadi; and the Uzbeks put forward Abdusattar Sirat. The Western delegations joined in the race, albeit in their informal capacities. The large states, the U.S. and U.K. in particular, placed their stakes on the Pashtoons as the largest ethnic group that dominated in the past and continued to call the tune in Afghan politics. Hamid Karzai was leader of the influential Pashtoon Popalzai tribe of the Durrani tribal confederation. The academic community basically agrees that more or less full ethnic representation in the newly established government would have been desirable but not obligatory. Viktor Korgun, promi8



nent authority on Afghanistan, objected: “This would have brought the Pashtoons, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and others into a purely formal unity; each of them would have been fighting for the interests of their own national group.”1 Amid the raging civil war, the increased rivalry for and ethnic squabbles over posts would have most likely overshadowed the urgent national problems. During the parliamentary elections, ethnic contradictions acquired an even sharper edge. In June 2002, the Emergency Loya Jirga met in Kabul to elect an Interim Government headed by Hamid Karzai with 12 Pashtoons, 10 Tajiks, 5 Hazaras, 4 Uzbeks, 1 Turkmen, and 1 Nuristani as its members. Deputy chairmen represented the largest ethnic groups: Tajiks (Mohammad Fahim); Hazara (Mohammad Karim Halili); Uzbeks (Negmatulla Shahroni); and the Pashtoons (Hidayat Amin Arsala). The Pashtoons acquired the key posts: they became ministers of finance, internal affairs, and communications, Chairman of the Supreme Court, and Head of the Central Bank. Tajiks had to be satisfied with the posts of ministers of defense, foreign affairs, information and culture, education, etc. This was the first time in the country’s history that the idea of a multiethnic government was supported by parties and political groups. In the past, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Nuristani, and others were included in the government together with the Pashtoons by royal decrees or by decisions of the ruling party (the National Democratic Party of Afghanistan, to be more exact). In December 2003-January 2004, 502 deputies of the Loya Jirga met in Kabul; on 4 January, they approved the country’s new Constitution which brought together democratic ideas and traditional Islamic values: it declared the supremacy of law and stressed that the laws should not contradict the norms and principles of Islam. According to Iranian academic M. Mazahiri, the ethnic factor strongly affected the Jirga’s decisions on the future parliamentary vs. presidential form of government: “The non-Pashtoon peoples preferred the parliamentary form, while the Pashtoons insisted on the presidential form of government.”2 The non-Pashtoon peoples feared that under a president with broad constitutional powers, the Pashtoons would dominate, very much as before, over the country’s political system. The Constitution, however, did not impose any ethnic or confessional stipulations on potential presidents. The deputies found it hard to agree on the powers of the executive bodies: the non-Pashtoon groups were opposed to strong presidential power. Former President Rabbani, supported by a large group of deputies who regarded him as their leader, objected to the constitutional provisions related to the president and his powers; he even tried to boycott voting. The delegates disagreed on the state language and the text of the anthem. The Loya Jirga approved Pashto and Dari as the two official languages; some of the deputies insisted on the same status for the Uzbek language. After prolonged and heated debates, the Constitution was amended: Uzbek and Balochi were recognized as the official languages in regions where the corresponding peoples lived in compact groups. While the 2004 Constitution was being discussed and finally adopted, academics and the leaders of the political parties suggested that the administrative-territorial division of the country be geared toward the historic, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural specifics of its peoples. Today, Afghanistan is divided into 34 administrative units (provinces) with multinational populations, the Bamyan and Nuristan provinces being the only exceptions. On the other hand, many peoples are divided by administrative borders: the central mountainous region of Hazarajat, home of the Hazara people, was divided for a long time among the provinces of Bamyan, Sar-e Pol, Samangan, Baghlan, Urozgan, and Ghazni. Nezavisimaia gazeta, 8 December, 2001. M.M. Mazohiri, “Payam-ha wa umidho-e Konuni asasi-e Afghanistan dar marhila-e amali”, Wizhagi-e Afgoniston pas az Tolibon, Ikra’, Kabul, s.a., p. 98. 1 2

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The country inherited the present administrative division from its monarchic past: the kings divided ethnic groups to slow down the development of ethnic awareness among the non-Afghan peoples and keep them divided into smaller ethnic groups with their own languages, cultures, etc. This explains why the issue of administrative-territorial division surfaced during the discussions of the constitution draft. Dr. I. Shahroni, for example, at first suggested that Afghanistan be divided into seven territorial-administrative units (states); later he came up with another option: smaller administrative units, since, he argued: “States should be fairly large units.”3 According to the decisions of the Bonn conference, as soon as the new Constitution was adopted, the country started moving toward a presidential election, first scheduled for July 2004 and later postponed until September because voter registration was dragging on far too long. In the last twenty years, Afghanistan has remained divided ethnically and politically; this means that the candidates supported by ethnic groups and respected religious leaders and warlords stand a much better chance at presidential elections. Peasant votes could strongly affect the results: political preferences in the countryside and those of the urban population are worlds apart. The urban people are better educated and are more politically aware; they are responsive to all sorts of influences and ideas. The rural population is much more devoted to the traditional Islamic values; the urban people are divided into supporters of different political parties, while the rural people have strong ethnic preferences. By mid-2004, all 18 presidential candidates, who represented different ethnic groups and regions, had been registered. With the Pashtoon and the world community, particularly the U.S., behind him, Hamid Karzai, leader of the Pashtoon Popalzai tribe, the native tribe of practically all Afghan emirs and kings, had the best chance. He also had vast financial resources, the state-controlled media, and political support from prominent political leaders on his side. Karzai selected the right election tactics: he ran with M.K. Halili, prominent leader of the Hazaras and first vice premier of the interim cabinet, as his vice president and Tajik Ahmad Zia Massoud (younger brother of Ahmad Shah Massoud), Ambassador of Afghanistan to Russia, as first vicepresident. Mohammad Mohaqiq, prominent Hazara leader and head of the Hezbe Wahdat (Unity) Party, also ran for president; under the Taliban, he had been its irreconcilable enemy and vehement opponent. This meant that he could hardly count on the electorate of the Pashtoon-populated eastern and southern provinces; political disunity among the Hazaras was another negative factor. An “old” player, leader of the Afghan Uzbeks and the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan General Abdul Rashid Dostum, joined the race. According to Russian academic Roman Streshnev, “the majority of the voters still prefer candidates of closer national or ethnic affiliation”4; even though the central government was working hard to unite the country into a single whole. On election day, Karzai received 55.4% of the votes; his closest rival Yunus Qanuni gained 16.3%; and General Dostum won 10%. According to the results, it became clear that the Uzbeks and Hazaras had cast their votes for members of their own ethnic groups. According to Russian expert Alexander Reutov, “there is not much sense in presidential elections in Afghanistan. It would have been enough to ascribe the voters of each tribe to each of the corresponding candidates.” 5 3 I. Shahroni, “Nizam-e ayandae Afganistan,” available at [http://www/ariaye.com/dari/qanooniasasi/shahrani/html], 9 November, 2007. 4 R. Streshnev, “Afghantsy vybiraiut prezidenta”, Krasnaia zvezda, 9 October, 2004, available at [http://old.redstar. ru/2004/10/09_10/4_03.html]. 5 A. Reutov, “Hamid Karzai kontroliruet menee 10% territorii Afghanistana,” available at [http://www.afghanistan.ru/ doc/2951.html], 4 December, 2007.

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In September 2005, Afghanistan elected a new parliament; by that time there were over 80 registered political parties and movements, which could be conventionally described as traditionalists, moderates, and secularists. The country elected 249 deputies, who represented different parties: the Islamic Society of Afghanistan (B. Rabbani) received 22 seats; the Unity Party and other Shi’a parties 30 seats; New Afghanistan (Y. Qanuni) 25 seats; the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan gained 20 seats; the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan 10 seats; and Afghan mellat 7 seats. The rest went to conservative fundamentalists, moderate traditionalists, and leftist liberals; independent deputies won over 90 seats.6 The ethnic composition of the lower chamber (Wulusi Jirga) was also highly varied: according to unofficial information there were 118 (47.4%) Pashtoons among the deputies; 53 (21.3%) Tajiks; 30 (12%) Hazaras; 20 (8%) Uzbeks; 11 (4.4%) non-Hazara Shi‘a; 5 (2%) Turkmens; 5 (2%) Arabs; 3 (1.2%) Ismailis; 2 (0.8%) Pashayis; one Balochi (0.4%); and one Nuristani (0.4%). 7 Viktor Korgun treats the non-Hazara Shi‘a and Ismaili deputies as one group. In Afghanistan, Tajiks and Pashtoons also belong to the Shi‘a branch; some of the Hazaras and Tajiks from Badakhshan profess Ismaili Shi‘a. This means that the religious affiliation of these deputies needed specification. It seems that the non-Hazara Shi‘a deputies represented the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan founded by Ayatollah Asif Mohsini Qandahari (with Pashtoon, Tajik, and Aymak membership), while Ismailis belonged to the National Solidarity Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Paiwand Milli Afgoniston) of Sayed Mansur Naderi. When writing about the impact of ethnic affiliation on the parliament and its decisions, Viktor Korgun says: “Since none of the ethnic groups have a majority of over 50% in the parliament, all attempts to push through purely nationalist programs will be checked.”8 There is a fairly widespread opinion that the parliament will ultimately be divided into ethnic groups on the strength of the fact that the discussions about native language, which went on in the Loya Jirga between 14 December, 2003 and 4 January, 2004 (when the Constitution was adopted), divided the deputies into Pashtoons and non-Pashtoons. The influential military-political groups that represent national minorities reject the idea of a united Afghan state with the Pashtoons as a dominant political force. In the past, the ethnic minorities (lumped together, they constitute over half of the country’s population) living to the north of Hindu Kush were tired of the Pashtoon political domination. These sentiments, very much alive today, are fanned by the Tajik and Uzbek bourgeoisie, which wants a much greater share of political power and which, due to certain historical conditions, has developed into the country’s decisive economic and financial power. Geo-economic factors also contribute to the anti-Pashtoon and separatist sentiments: over 60% of the country’s grain- and vegetable-growing areas, 46% of the fruit-growing areas, and over 80% of the areas on which industrial crops are grown are found in the country’s north.9 Over 70% of the total herd of small cattle and nearly the entire herd of karakul sheep (5-6 million) are raised in the north. In the last 10 years, these sentiments have intensified; indeed, the civil war unfolded mainly between the Pashtoons and non-Pashtoons; the defeat of the Pashtoon Taliban convinced the ethnic minorities of their military power and moral superiority and made them determined to insist on broad autonomy. See: V.G. Korgun, “Sostav afghanskogo parlamenta,” available at [http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2005/30-12-05.htm]. See: Ibidem. 8 Ibidem. 9 See: M.F. Slinkin, “Afghanistan: problemy voyny, mira i bezopasnosti v strane i regione,” available at [http://www. nbuv.gov.ua], 25 December, 2012. 6 7

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“External Factor” at Play With the Taliban out of the way, the civil war in Afghanistan became extremely complicated and unpredictable; after a short “respite,” it resumed in a qualitatively new dimension. Russian academic Mikhail Slinkin has pointed out: “…at first, starting in the mid-1970s, the civil war unfolded as an ideological and political confrontation; later, with the collapse in 1992 of the leftist regime, it developed into ethnic and confessional bloodshed. Today, the ethnic and confessional conflict is rapidly developing into a national-liberation movement against the foreign military presence.”10 In April 2007, a new political structure—the National Front of Afghanistan (NFA)—was set up with Burhanuddin Rabbani as its leader and popular politicians, warlords, and even royals among its members. Some analysts think that, to a certain extent, it resembled the former Northern Alliance because of the great number of Ahmad Shah Massoud’s former supporters among its members: Tajiks B. Rabbani, Ahmad Zia Massoud, Yu. Qanuni, Ismail Han, and M. Fahim (the Islamic Society of Afghanistan); leader of the Uzbeks A.R. Dostum (NIMA), as well as Hazaras Mustafa Kazemi (the Islamic Society of Afghanistan), Sayed Mansoor Naderi, and Muhammad Akbari (the People’s Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan); Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoy, former leader of the Afghan Communists and Minister of Internal Affairs (1980-1989), General Noorul-haq Ulumi, a prominent military leader, and Mustafa Zahir, grandson of Zahir Shah. As a new political force, the NFA formulated three major tasks: a parliamentary rather than presidential republic; elections of provincial governors; and voting by party lists. Elected governors were a striking novelty, even if the governors (wali) had been elected under Zahir Shah. According to the widely shared expert opinion, a federative state (suggested by the NFA) harmonized with the idea of a parliamentary republic and elections of governors. Waheed Mujda, for example, writes that there is nothing new in the idea of a federative state, “yet it has preserved its urgency. The recent events have shown that the dependence of 34 provinces on a weak Center does nothing good for the country’s development.”11 He pointed out that a federative state might make the non-Afghan peoples independent of the Pashtoon rulers. The new political force was set up to stand opposed to the Taliban, which although ousted, was still popular in the country’s east and south and among the Pashtoon tribes on the other side of the Durand Line. The political elite, however, headed by President Karzai and supported by the U.S., NATO, and the U.N. wants to include moderate members of the Taliban in the government. This cannot but cause deep concern among the leaders of the former Northern Alliance who represent the non-Pashto ethnic groups. We should bear in mind that Russia, Iran, and Uzbekistan supported the NFA. Before the new bloc appeared, Russia supported Rabbani and his allies, as well as Gulabzoy and Ulumi, former NDPA members; Iran backed Hazara leaders Kazemi, Naderi, and Akbari, while Uzbekistan was on Dostum’s side. This meant that if President Karzai weakened its grip on power, the United States would lose much of its impact, while Russia, Iran, and Uzbekistan would strengthen their positions. The National Front of Afghanistan clarified the balance of power inside the country: if it continues to gain in strength this could have a negative effect on the country’s further existence as an independent state. 10 11

M.F. Slinkin, op. cit. Asia-Plus, 25 April, 2007.

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The Pashtoon and pro-Pashtoon ruling circles will never support the ideas of federalism—this much is absolutely clear. R. Momun of Afghanistan wrote that “if a Pashtoon ruler accepts the idea of federalism it will signify that he has accepted the Durand Line and agreed to the end of Pashtoon rule in Afghanistan.”12 Mikhail Slinkin asserts that the separatist sentiments among the Turkic-speaking peoples of Afghanistan are not only home-grown, they are also initiated outside the country. He had in mind certain Turkic-speaking countries and their cherished dream—the Great Turan stretching from the Mediterranean and the Black Sea to Eastern Turkestan.13 Iran has his own far-reaching plans: it is seeking greater influence in Afghanistan on a pan-Islamist and ethnic basis. A. Boguslavskiy, a Russian researcher, believes that Tehran has in view several objective and subjective factors in its Afghan policy: “First, for the sake of national security and in the dangerous context of the use of force by the United States, Iran prefers, if not a friendly, at least a neutral and loyal neighbor with no political, economic, or border claims against Iran. Second, the country’s geographic location makes it a potentially advantageous trade and economic partner of Tehran, as well as a very much needed intermediary in transporting hydrocarbon resources (oil, natural gas, etc.) and all sorts of other cargoes along the North-South and East-West lines. Third, common historical roots, close languages, religion, culture, and customs create favorable conditions in which Iran can promote its national interests in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.”14 The Hazaras, who live in the central part of Afghanistan (according to certain sources they comprise about 19% of the country’s total population) and follow Shi‘a Islam, could always count on Tehran’s understanding, compassion, and support in their confrontation with the country’s Sunni majority. Iran is very popular with the Tajiks and Uzbeks living in the central and northern parts of Afghanistan; likewise, Iran’s influence is very strong in the Herat Province as a whole. Not long ago Iran had certain claims on the region. This means that the idea of maximum autonomy of some of the ethnic groups for the sake of continued political stability in the country’s north meets the geopolitical interests of the western and northern neighbors of Afghanistan, including Russia. The political preferences of the Pashtoon population of Afghanistan are strongly affected by Pakistan, where the Pashtoons are the second largest ethnic group (over 15% of the total population or about 15 million)15; they live in the northwestern part of Balochistan and the Sindh province and are in the majority in the North Western Frontier Province of Pakistan and the tribal zone. Traditionally, the Pashtoons figure prominently among the middle- and top-level commanders of the Pakistan army. Since the 1950s, the influential military circles of Pakistan have been toying with the idea of an Afghan-Pakistani confederation as the best possible method of settling interstate contradictions. At the same time, the rulers of Pakistan are ready to accept the idea of a single Afghan state if the idea of Pashtunistan is not placed on the agenda of their bilateral relations. In fact, Pakistan would rather see a united Afghanistan for the simple reason that otherwise the Pakistani Pashtoons might start thinking about an independent state. The political sentiments of the Afghan Balochi (over 0.2 million) are strongly affected by the Balochi of Pakistan and Iran. In Pakistan, the Balochi constitute about 3% of the total population Ibidem. See: M.F. Slinkin, “Etnicheskaia problema v Afghanistane (istoriko-politichesky analiz),” available at [http://www. nbuv.gov.ua/Articles/Kultnar/knp66/knp66_46-60.pdf], 6 February, 2013. 14 A.Ya. Boguslavskiy, “Irano-afganskie otnoshenia na sovremennom etape,” 8 August, 2009, available at [http://www. iimes.ru/rus/stat], 5 February, 2013. 15 See: “Natsional’no-etnicheskiy sostav naseleniia Pakistana,” available at [http://kraff.narod.ru/samudai/pak/ pakpeople.htm], 5 February, 2013. 12 13

13



(about 3.5 million); they are scattered across Balochistan (nearly 70%), Punjab, and Sindh. Over one million Balochi live in Iran. Some of the trends of the Balochi national movement are waging a guerilla war under the slogans of a united or Greater Balochistan. The main political parties, which side with the national interests of the Balochi of Pakistan and Afghanistan, demand broad autonomy for Balochistan. The position of the United States and its NATO allies should be taken into account for a correct assessment of the situation inside and around Afghanistan. Since early 2009, the United States has been implementing its new plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan; Washington is determined to liquidate terrorist networks by strengthening the regional security forces, building up democratic efforts, and promoting international cooperation. Barack Obama revealed certain details: “Today, I’m announcing a comprehensive, new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan… A campaign against extremism will not succeed with bullets or bombs alone.”16 The president went on to say that the U.S. would rely on agricultural specialists, doctors, and engineers not only to set up an environment in which people would realize that they were more interested in cooperating with the United States and international community than in supporting extremist ideologies. The American president firmly stated: “This is just one part of a comprehensive strategy to prevent Afghanistan from becoming the al-Qa‘eda safe haven.” Today American politicians and analysts are fond of saying that ethnic imbalance in the Kabul corridors of power cost Washington its strategy. After the Taliban was defeated by the coalition forces in 2001, the Northern Alliance commanders, who represented ethnic minorities, acquired a lot of power; Tajik commanders who belonged to the so-called Panjshir group that controlled the defense and security structures had even more power than other ethnic groups. The Americans decided that since the majority of the Pashtoon tribal leaders who had been ruling the country for centuries had been removed from power, Washington should revise its policies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to Michael Whitney, “the Pentagon has settled on a new counterinsurgency doctrine (COIN) which it intends to implement in Afghanistan. The program will integrate psyops, special forces, NGOs, psychologists, media, anthropologists, humanitarian agencies, public relations, reconstruction, and conventional forces to rout the Taliban, assert control over the South and the tribal areas, and to quash any indigenous resistance. Clandestine activity and unmanned drone attacks will increase, while a ‘civilian surge’ will be launched to try to win hearts and minds in the densely populated areas. Militarily, the goal is to pit one ethnicity against the other, to incite civil war, and to split the country in smaller units that can be controlled by warlords working with Washington.” 17

Conclusion The Afghan crisis, which has been going on for decades and which NATO interference has failed to stop, has far-reaching social-economic, ideological, ethnic, and national roots. The developments in Afghanistan of the last third of the 20th century show that neither military force nor foreign interference alone can bring peace. On the other hand, discussion and adoption of the new Constitution and the parliamentary elections showed that popular sentiments and the political climate in Afghanistan are still strongly af16 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-andPakistan]. 17 [https://deeppoliticsforum.com/forums/showthread.php?2738-The-Audacity-of-Ethnic-Cleansing-Obama-s-planfor-Afghanistan].

14



fected by ethnic contradictions: the text of the national anthem was approved only in Pashto, despite the frantic efforts of deputies of other ethnic groups to approve the Dari text as well. Moreover, during the presidential election of 2004 some of the demands and provisions of the election law were attenuated, without legal reasons, for certain categories of voters in eastern and southern provinces, that is, the tribal zone. The following events can be described as evidence of another bout of South-North confrontation: (1) removal of Mohammed Mohaqiq, one of the leaders of the People’s Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan, from his post. (2) Attempted assassination of former governor of Herat Province Ismail Khan and murder of his son Mirwais Sadiq. (3) Allegations against leader of the Uzbek community General Dostum. (4) Assassination of former president and prominent leader of the Tajiks B. Rabbani. (5) Attempts of the authorities to kindle confrontation between the military-political groups and their leaders. (6) The increased tension in the northern and western regions and in Hazarajad. The contradictions in Afghanistan cannot be resolved in favor of one ethnic group alone. The multinational state, which in the past assumed the name of Afghanistan, is the homeland of the Pashtoons, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Balochi, Nuristani, and other ethnic groups. They share a history, varied culture, and common religion. If this reality is ignored much longer, negative consequences and a threat to the state’s unity cannot be excluded.

ETHNIC TENSION IN KYRGYZSTAN IN THE POST-CONFLICT PERIOD: ETHNOSOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY RESULTS Cholpon CHOTAEVA D.Sc. (Hist.), Professor, Head of the Anthropology Program, American University in Central Asia (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan)

T

ABSTRACT

he author analyzes the ethnocultural and psychological factors contribut ing to the continued ethnic tension in

Kyrgyzstan in the post-conflict period. These factors figured prominently in the flare-ups of ethnic tension and continued ethnic strain. 15


CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS The sociological survey also included questions designed to identify the respondents’ civic identity, which directly depends on the degree to which the republic’s ethnic groups are integrated and which, on the other hand, is slowed down by ethnic and regional specifics. The continued ethnic tension has intensified an awareness of ethnic identity; however the sociological survey demonstrated that a common civic identity still prevails over ethnic identity. The absolute majority of the respondents consider themselves to be citizens of Kyrgyzstan and are not contemplating emigration.

Dr. Chotaeva proceeds from the results of an ethnosociological survey carried out in five regions of Kyrgyzstan. The ethnocultural factors are related to various aspects of ethnic identity—the extent to which the family and close relatives affect ethnic self-identity and the degree to which the survey respondents were familiar with their ethnic history and follow ethnic traditions and customs in everyday life. The psychological factors were determined by the degree of trust the members of one ethnic group feel toward another.

KEYWORDS: Kyrgyzstan, ethnic tension, ethnic relations, ethnic situation, ethnocultural factors, psychological factors, common civic identity, ethnosociological survey.

Introduction According to the 2009 population census, Kyrgyz constituted 71% of the country’s population; Uzbeks 14.3%; Russians 7.8%; and people of other nationalities 7%. Kyrgyz live throughout the republic and in its capital, Bishkek; Uzbeks are concentrated mainly in the south: the Osh, Jalalabad, and Batken regions; while Russians live mainly in the north: the Chu and Issyk Kul regions and in Bishkek. There are other fairly large ethnic groups: Dungans (1.1%); Uighurs (0.9%); Tajiks (0.9%); Turks (0.7%); Kazakhs (0.6%); Tatars (0.6%); Ukrainians (0.4%); Koreans (0.3%); Azeris (0.3%); Kurds (0.3%); and Germans (0.2%). Negative social, economic, political, cultural, psychological, and other factors have done nothing to improve ethnic relations in Kyrgyzstan. This holds true for both the end of the Soviet period and continues to be the case during the country’s independent development. Whereas in 1990, the ethnic conflict in the Osh Region was triggered by political factors—centrifugal trends, mounting national self-awareness, Kyrgyz as the only state language, etc.—the ethnic conflict of 2010 in the republic’s south was rooted in social and economic problems, such as the deepening economic crisis, inflation, unemployment, and plummeting standard of living. However, ethnocultural and psychological factors come to the fore every time ethnic relations become tense. While social, economic, and political factors set the ball rolling and help to feed the further development of ethnic conflicts, ethnocultural and psychological factors add fuel to the fire. The author analyzes the ethnocultural and psychological factors that have contributed to the ethnic troubles and continued tension in Kyrgyzstan a year after the 2010 ethnic conflict in the republic’s south based on information gleaned from an ethnosociological survey carried out in 2011. 16



How the Ethnosociological Survey was Conducted The author carried out this ethnosociological survey in 2011 within the framework of a UNESCO project called Encouragement of Ethnic Tolerance among the Youth of Kyrgyzstan to reveal the state of ethnic relations in Kyrgyzstan after the 2010 ethnic conflict and identify the factors conducive to ethnic stabilization and harmonization. The survey covered four regions (Chu, Issyk Kul, Osh, and Jalalabad) and the city of Bishkek. The regions were selected based on ethnic criteria: they are the areas of the country with the greatest ethnic diversity on a national scale and the greatest share of non-titular peoples. A total of 1,000 people aged 16 and over participated in the survey: 200 people in each of the covered areas. The sample was representative and proportional in terms of three main categories: nationality, age, and gender. As representatives of the three largest ethnic groups, Kyrgyz comprised 58.9%, Russians 16.3%, and Uzbeks 15.3% of the survey sample. Representatives of other nationalities (9.5%) were classified together in the “Others” category. The survey was carried out using questionnaires consisting of three parts with a total of 38 questions.  The

first part included questions about the respondent’s native language, how proficient they were in Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Russian, and their language preferences. The same part contained questions about various aspects of ethnic identity; the degree to which the family affected ethnic self-identity; the degree to which the respondent was familiar with the ethnic history, customs, and traditions of his or her ethnic group; and religious affiliation and the extent to which the respondent followed religious rites.

 The

second part dealt with the problem of ethnic relations in Kyrgyzstan; in particular, the environment in which the respondent lived, studied, and worked; the causes of ethnic discrimination and the measures needed to eliminate it; the level of ethnic tension in the given region; and the prospects for ethnic relations in the country.

 The third part dealt with civic identity; in particular it asked the respondents to identify their

predominant identity, assess the extent of ethnic integration and the factors that could promote integration of ethnic groups, and specify whether they would prefer to continue living in the country or emigrate.

In the course of the sociological survey, two hypotheses were formulated: 1. There is ethnic tension caused by numerous social, economic, political, and cultural problems; 2. Continued ethnic tension contributes to actualization of ethnic identity and its domination over civic identity.

The Level and Factors of Ethnic Tension We all know that ethnic tension is a special state of ethnic relations characterized by inflated enmity among ethnic groups; its level depends on the content and form of ethnic relations, and ethnocultural and psychological factors play an important role in fanning ethnic tension. 17



Ethnic tension continues to linger a year after the tragic events of 2010 in the south of Kyrgyzstan. When assessing the level of ethnic tension in the republic, most of the respondents (46% of the Kyrgyz; 49% of the Uzbeks; 38.7% of the Russians, and 34.7% of the “Others”) described it as “average” (see Table 1). At the same time, 44.2% of the “Others,” 31.9% of the Russians, 29.2% of the Kyrgyz, and 24.2% of the Uzbeks described it as “low”; 11.8% of the Uzbeks, 11.7% of the Russians, 10.5% of the Kyrgyz, and the same share of the “Others” spoke of it as “high.” Table 1 Answers to the Question “How Do You Assess the Level of Ethnic Tension in Your Region?” (% by nationality) Nationality Kyrgyz

Russians

Uzbeks

Others

Low

29.2

31.9

24.2

44.2

Average

48.6

38.7

49.0

34.7

High

10.5

11.7

11.8

10.5

Undecided

11.2

17.8

15.0

10.5

No tension

0.5

0

0

0

The largest share (17.6%) of those who described ethnic tension as “high” live in the Osh region (see Table 2). The largest share (57.5%) of those who described ethnic tension in their region as “average” live in the Jalalabad Region, while in the Issyk Kul Region 45.7% assessed ethnic tension as low (the largest share among the five regions). Table 2 Answers to the Question “How Do You Assess the Level of Ethnic Tension in Your Region?” (% by region) Region Bishkek

Chu

Issyk Kul

Osh

Jalalabad

Low

32.2

30.0

45.7

25.1

18.5

Average

46.7

37.9

38.2

48.2

57.5

9.5

13.3

4.0

17.6

10.0

Undecided

10.6

18.7

12.1

8.5

14.0

No tension

1.0

0

0

0.5

0

High

It was established that social, economic, political, historical, cultural, and psychological factors were thought to have a negative effect on the republic’s ethnic environment. 18



The social and economic factors (unemployment, poverty, poor living conditions, etc.) were described as the main causes of worsening ethnic relations by 49.7% of the “Others”; 41.3% of the Kyrgyz; 35.9% of the Uzbeks; and 41.7% of the Russians (see Table 3). Table 3 Answers to the Question “What are the Causes of Ethnic (National) Discrimination?” (% by nationality) Nationality Kyrgyz

Russians

Uzbeks

Others

Social-economic problems: economic crisis; unemployment; poverty; housing and land problems

41.3

41.7

35.9

49.5

Political problems: absence of political rights for ethnic minorities; inadequate representation of ethnic minorities in the power structures

10.2

19.0

10.5

17.9

Historical-cultural problems: the language problem; few or no schools and universities that teach in the native language; shortage of objects of culture; absence of cultural rights

16.8

6.1

14.4

2.1

Psychological problems: predomination of negative stereotypes about different ethnic groups (nationalities); rumors about discrimination against different ethnic groups

16.6

17.2

18.3

12.6

Undecided

14.3

16.0

20.9

16.8

0.8

0

0

1.1

Other

Political factors came second for 19% of the Russians; 17.9% of the “Others”; 10.5% of the Uzbeks; and 10.2% of the Kyrgyz. They pointed to the fact that ethnic minorities had no political rights and, therefore, had almost no representation in the power structures, etc. Cultural, historical, and psychological factors comprised the third group; 16.8% of the Kyrgyz; 14.4% of the Uzbeks; 6.1% of the Russians; and 2.1% of the “Others” pointed to cultural and historical problems: the language issue; few or no schools and universities that teach in the native language; inadequate number of cultural objects; and the absence of cultural rights. Psychological problems—negative stereotypes about ethnic groups and negative rumors about ethnic discrimination across the country—troubled 18.3% of the Uzbeks; 17.2% of the Russians; 16.6% of the Kyrgyz, and 12.6% of the “Others.” 19



It should be said that the largest share of those who pointed to social and economic problems lived in the north (the Chu Region and Bishkek—51.2% and 43.7%, respectively) (see Table 4). Much smaller shares of respondents concerned with these problems were found in the south (the Osh and Jalalabad regions—37.2% and 33%, respectively). Table 4 Answers to the Question “What are the Causes of Ethnic (National) Discrimination?” (% by region) Region Bishkek

Chu

Issyk Kul

Osh

Jalalabad

Social-economic problems: economic crisis; unemployment; poverty; housing and land problems

43.7

51.2

41.2

37.2

33.0

Political problems: absence of political rights for ethnic minorities; inadequate representation of ethnic minorities in power structures

14.1

7.9

12.6

17.6

10.0

Historical-cultural problems: the language problem; few or no schools and universities that teach in the native language; shortage of objects of culture; absence of cultural rights

6.5

10.8

17.6

18.1

13.5

Psychological problems: predomination of negative stereotypes about different ethnic groups (nationalities); rumors about discrimination against different ethnic groups

21.1

15.8

13.1

14.6

15.8

Undecided

14.1

13.3

14.6

12.6

24.5

0.5

1.0

1

0

0.5

Other

The largest share of respondents concerned with political and historical-cultural problems lived in the Osh Region (17.6% and 18.1%, respectively). The share of those concerned with psychological problems is not small either: 14.6% and 15.8%, respectively. The largest share of respondents concerned with psychological problems live in Bishkek (21.2%). Social and economic factors affect the ethnic context to a much greater extent than the other factors, yet they proved to be less prominent in the country’s south, the scene of the 2010 ethnic disturbances, than historical, cultural, and psychological problems. They figured much more prominently in the development of ethnic relations there, which explains the larger number of respondents 20



in the southern regions than elsewhere who pointed to political, historical, cultural, and psychological problems. When asked about the measures conducive to regulating ethnic relations, the respondents primarily pointed to social and economic measures, such as more jobs to ease unemployment, more better quality housing and successful solution of the land problem, subsidies for poor and needy families, and economic reforms. These measures were recommended by 34.6% of the Uzbeks; 46.2% of the Kyrgyz; 47.2% of the Russians, and 49.5% of the “Others” (see Table 5). Table 5 Answers to the Question “Which Measures Would Help to Remove Ethnic (National) Discrimination?” (% by nationality) Nationality Kyrgyz

Russians

Uzbeks

Others

Socio-economic measures: more jobs; more better quality housing and successful solution of the land problem; subsidies for poor and needy families; economic reforms

46.2

47.2

34.6

49.5

Political measures: political rights for the minorities and their greater representation in the top state and power structures

8.8

16.0

13.7

14.7

Cultural measures: schools teaching in the native language; events devoted to culture and history of different ethnicities (nationalities); addressing the problem of the absence of cultural rights

9.0

6.7

7.8

2.1

Educational measures: school and university courses in ethnic tolerance; wide propaganda of ethnic tolerance in the media (TV and radio)

21.9

16.6

22.2

23.2

Undecided

13.2

12.9

21.6

10.5

0.8

0.6

0

0

Other

Education comes second as an important instrument: special courses in ethnic tolerance at schools and universities; wider propaganda of ethnic tolerance in the media (TV and radio): 16.6% of the Russians, 21.9% of the Kyrgyz, 22.2% of the Uzbeks, and 23.2% of the “Others” pinned their hopes on education. Political measures (broader political rights for ethnic minorities and their broader representation in the corridors of power) were favored by 8.8% of the Kyrgyz; 13.7% of the Uzbeks, 14.7% of the “Others,” and 16% of the Russians. 21



The smallest share of respondents (2.1% of the “Others”, 6.7% of the Russians, 7.8% of the Uzbeks, and 9% of the Kyrgyz) complained about the lack of cultural rights and believed that the cultural problems could be resolved by having a greater number of schools that teach in the native language and holding events devoted to the culture and history of particular ethnicities (nationalities). The largest share of respondents who pointed to social and economic measures (54.2%) lived in the Chu Region (see Table 6), while a fairly large share in the Osh Region spoke about political and educational measures (16.6% and 25.1%, respectively). In the Issyk Kul and Jalalabad regions, 9.5% said that cultural measures were needed. Table 6 Answers to the Question “Which Measures Would Help to Remove Ethnic (National) Discrimination?” (% by region) Region Bishkek

Chu

Issyk Kul

Osh

Jalalabad

Socio-economic measures: more jobs; more better quality housing and successful solution of the land problem; subsidies for poor and needy families; economic reforms

44.7

54.2

48.2

38.7

38.5

Political measures: political rights for the minorities and their greater representation in the top state and power structures

9.5

10.3

5.1

16.6

14.5

Cultural measures: schools teaching in the native language; events devoted to culture and history of different ethnicities (nationalities); addressing the problem of the absence of cultural rights

4.0

7.9

9.5

8.0

9.5

Educational measures: school and university courses in ethnic tolerance; wide propaganda of ethnic tolerance in the media (TV and radio)

21.6

19.2

21.1

25.1

19.0

Undecided

18.1

7.9

15.1

11.6

18.5

2.0

0.5

0.5

0

0

Other

22



Ethnocultural Factors By ethnocultural factors we mean all sorts of aspects responsible for an individual’s ethnic identity, in particular, influence of the family and relatives on ethnic self-identification; familiarity of the respondents with their ethnic history; and observance of traditions and customs in everyday life. The absolute majority of the respondents were born into mono-ethnic families in which both the mother and the father belonged to the same nationality (see Tables 7 and 8). Table 7 Answers to the Question “What was Your Father’s Nationality?” (% by nationality) Nationality Kyrgyz

Russians

Uzbeks

Others

Kyrgyz

99.7

1.2

0

1.1

Russian

0.3

96.3

1.3

0

Uzbek

0

0

98.7

0

Other

0

2.5

0

98.9

Table 8 Answers to the Question ”What was Your Mother’s Nationality?” (% by nationality) Nationality Kyrgyz

Russians

Uzbeks

Others

Kyrgyz

97.8

3.1

4.6

11.6

Russian

0.7

93.9

3.3

9.5

Uzbek

0

1.2

88.2

6.3

Other

1.5

1.8

3.9

72.6

Parents and the family were the most prominent factors in shaping the respondents’ ethnic awareness: 90.0% of the Uzbeks; 83.4% of the Russians; 72.7% of the Kyrgyz, and 85.3% of the “Others” pointed to the family as the most important factor shaping their ethnic self-awareness (see Table 9). When asked to point to specific individuals, 55.6% to 73.6% of the respondents pointed to their mother and father as the two people who shaped their ethnic self-awareness to the greatest extent; 34% to 52.6% pointed to their grandmother and grandfather; and 4.6% to 16% to their friends, colleagues, and fellow students (see Table 10). Loyalty to cultural traditions and customs is another factor that has a significant influence on shaping ethnic identity. The respondents who grew up in families that observed ethnic traditions, 23


CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Table 9

Answers to the Question “What is the Strongest Factor Shaping Your Self-Awareness?” (% by nationality) Nationality Kyrgyz

Russians

Uzbeks

Others

The family

72.7

83.4

90.2

85.3

State policy and ideology

14.1

8.6

5.9

7.4

Books, literature

37.7

17.8

20.9

24.2

8.3

25.8

5.9

11.6

10.7

12.3

6.5

21.1

Religious rites and rituals

4.2

6.1

2.0

16.8

Other

0.5

0.6

0

1.1

Music, songs National holidays and important dates

Table 10 Answers to the Question “Who has Shaped Your Ethnic Self-Awareness to the Greatest Extent?” (% by nationality) Nationality Kyrgyz

Russians

Uzbeks

Others

Grandfather, grandmother

35.8

42.9

34.0

52.6

Mother

67.6

73.6

64.7

61.1

Father

65.5

58.3

55.6

55.8

Husband/Wife

4.6

4.9

4.6

2.1

Children

0.3

1.8

1.3

0

Other relatives

3.4

2.5

1.3

7.4

Friends, fellow students, colleagues

8.3

16.0

4.6

8.4

Other

2.6

1.2

1.4

1.1

rites, and holidays knew much more about them than others: 65.4% of the Uzbeks, 56.8% of the “Others,” 56.4% of the Kyrgyz, and 38.7% of the Russians grew up in the families that observed ethnic rights, traditions, and holidays (see Table 11). 24


Volume 14 Issue 1 2013 Table 11

Answers to the Question “To Which Extent did the Family in Which You Grew Up Observe Ethnic Traditions, Rites, and Holidays?” (% by nationality) Nationality Kyrgyz

Russians

Uzbeks

Others

Observed to a great extent

56.4

38.7

65.4

56.8

Observed, but not to a great extent

36.3

47.9

25.5

34.7

Practically never observed

3.6

8.6

2.6

6.3

Undecided

3.7

4.9

6.5

2.1

A home atmosphere permeated with ethnic traditions and culture affects the choice of nationality of a future spouse. Nearly all of the Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Russian respondents were married to spouses of the same nationality (see Table 12). Table 12 Answers to the Question “What Nationality is Your Spouse?” (% by nationality) Nationality Kyrgyz

Russians

Kyrgyz

53.5

3.1

2.6

9.5

Russian

0.8

52.8

2.0

10.5

0

0

63.4

2.1

45.0

41.1

27.5

37.9

0.7

3.1

4.6

40.0

Uzbek Not married Other

Uzbeks

Others

Over 48.6% of the Kyrgyz, 24.8% of the Uzbeks, 24.8% of the Russians, and 16.8% of the “Others” responded negatively to their children marrying a man or woman of another nationality (see Table 13). This means that the immediate social environment, namely, family and relatives, plays an important role in shaping the respondents’ ethnic identity. Loyalty to ethnic traditions and customs in the family determines the individual’s ethnic identity. This is especially important for young people who follow in the footsteps of their parents when starting their families; they observe ethnic traditions and rites to the same degree as they were practiced in the families of their relatives. 25



Answers to the Question “How Would You Respond to Your Child Marrying a Man (Woman) of Another Nationality?” (% by nationality) Nationality Kyrgyz

Russians

Uzbeks

Others

Positively

31.1

41.7

30.1

60.0

Negatively

48.6

26.4

24.8

16.8

Indifferent

5.8

16.0

13.7

6.3

Undecided

14.1

15.3

31.4

16.8

Positively to a Muslim

0.5

0.6

0

0

Psychological Factors The negative or positive nature of psychological factors depends on the degree of trust of the members of one ethnic group toward another; it, in turn, depends on personal experience with discrimination. Our respondents not only were the victims of discrimination, they also infringed, either involuntarily or intentionally, on the rights of members of other ethnic groups. Under pressure of the worsening ethnic relations and the resultant ethnic tension, ethnic groups are gradually losing their mutual trust. Most of the respondents gave negative answers to the question “Do you trust members of other ethnicities (nationalities)?” At the same time, 46.3% of the “Others” trust most members of other ethnic groups; the same can be said about 35.9% of the Uzbeks, 35.6% of the Russians, and 20.2% of the Kyrgyz (see Table 14). Some members of other nationalities are trusted by 49.7% of the Russians, 46% of the Kyrgyz, 38.9% of the “Others,” and 34.4% of the Uzbeks; 19% of the Uzbeks, 10.9% of the Kyrgyz, 7.4% of the “Others,” and 3.1% of the Russians do not trust some of the members of other nationalities, while 22.8% of the Kyrgyz, 11.7% of the Russians, 11.1% of the Uzbeks, and 7.4% of the “Others” do not trust anyone. The largest share of the respondents (38.9%) who trust most other ethnic groups live in the Chu Region (see Table 15). The largest number of those who do not trust some members of other nationalities live in the Osh and Jalalabad regions—12.6% and 12.5%, respectively, while the largest share of those who do not trust anyone (34%) live in the Jalalabad Region. Trust in the members of other ethnic groups frequently depends on whether the particular individual has had personal experience with ethnic discrimination. Most of the respondents (42.5%65.5%) had no such experience (see Table 16). At the same time, 49.1% of the Russians, 45.3% of the “Others,” 45.1% of the Uzbeks, and 28.7% of the Kyrgyz were sometimes exposed to ethnic discrimination; 2.9% of the Kyrgyz, 6.3% of the “Others,” 6.7% of the Russians, and 7.8% of the Uzbeks frequently suffered from discrimination, while 0.6% of the Russians, 2.1% of the “Others,” 2.9% of the Kyrgyz, and 4.6% of the Uzbeks were constantly discriminated against. 26



Answers to the Question “Do You Trust Members of Other Ethnicities (Nationalities)?” (% by nationality) Nationality Kyrgyz

Russians

Uzbeks

Others

Yes, most

20.2

35.6

35.9

46.3

Yes, some

46.0

49.7

34.4

38.9

No, not all

10.9

3.1

19.0

7.4

No, I do not trust any

22.8

11.7

11.1

7.4

0.2

0

0

0

Other

Table 15 Answers to the Question “Do You Trust Members of Other Ethnicities (Nationalities)?” (% by region) Region Bishkek

Chu

Issyk Kul

Osh

Jalalabad

Yes, most

28.1

38.9

27.6

26.1

17.0

Yes, some

42.2

42.4

50.8

48.7

36.5

No, not all

6.5

9.4

11.6

12.6

12.5

23.1

8.9

10.1

12.6

34.0

0

0.5

0

0

0

No, I do not trust any Other

Table 16 Answers to the Question “Have You Been Exposed to Ethnic (National) Discrimination?” (% by nationality) Nationality Kyrgyz

Russians

Constantly

2.9

0.6

4.6

2.1

Frequently

2.9

6.7

7.8

6.3

Sometimes

28.7

49.1

45.1

45.3

Never

65.5

43.6

42.5

46.3

27

Uzbeks

Others



The largest share of respondents constantly discriminated against for ethnic reasons (4.4%) lived in the Chu Region (see Table 17). The Osh Region is the place where the largest number of those who are frequently and sometimes exposed to ethnic discrimination live (6.5% and 45.7%, respectively). Table 17 Answers to the Question “Have You Been Exposed to Ethnic (National) Discrimination?” (% by region) Region Bishkek

Chu

Issyk Kul

Osh

Jalalabad

Constantly

1.5

4.4

3.0

2.0

2.5

Frequently

5.5

4.9

2.5

6.5

3.5

Sometimes

35.2

36.5

30.7

45.7

32.5

Never

57.8

54.2

63.8

45.7

61.5

Among those who have experienced ethnic discrimination at one time or another, most (15.3%22.2%) were exposed to insults against their nationality, 11.0%-15.8% were exposed to indifference Table 18 Answers to the Question “In What Form Have You, If Ever, Been Exposed to Ethnic (National) Discrimination?” (% by nationality) Nationality Kyrgyz

Russians

Uzbeks

Others

10.4

11.0

12.4

15.8

In the form of violation and infringement on my rights to services, information, etc.

6.5

8.6

10.5

8.4

In the form of rudeness

5.8

19.6

11.8

13.7

16.5

15.3

22.2

14.7

0.7

1.8

4.6

0

60.3

43.6

38.6

47.7

In the form of indifference to my problems

In the form of insulting comments about my nationality In the form of physical violence Never experienced

28



to their problems, while the rest (5.8%-19.6%) to rudeness, and 6.5%-10.5% to infringement on their rights. Between 0.7% and 4.6% of the respondents had experienced physical violence. The largest number of respondents exposed to insults and infringement on their rights are found among the Uzbeks (22.2% and 10.5%, respectively); the Uzbeks also suffered from physical violence more than other ethnic groups (4.6%). The Russians were exposed to rudeness more than the other nationalities (19.6%); the group of “Others” experienced indifference to their problems more than any other group (15.8%) (see Table 18). The largest number of those who ran up against a wall of indifference and inattention to their problems live in the Osh Region (15.1%) (see Table 19). The largest number of those who (or whose nationality) were exposed to insults live in the Jalalabad Region (24%). The largest number of those exposed to physical violence live in the Osh and Jalalabad regions (2.5% in each of them). Table 19 Answers to the Question “In What Form Have You, If Ever, Been Exposed to Ethnic (National) Discrimination?” (% by region) Nationality Bishkek

Chu

Issyk Kul

Osh

Jalalabad

13.6

11.3

7.0

15.1

9.5

6.0

10.3

8.0

9.5

4.0

In the form of rudeness in my address

11.6

14.3

5.0

12.6

5.0

In the form of insulting comments about my nationality

11.1

11.8

16.1

22.1

24.0

1.5

0.5

0

2.5

2.5

56.3

51.7

63.8

38.2

55.0

In the form of indifference to my problems In the form of violation and infringement on my rights to services, information, etc.

In the form of physical violence Never experienced

At the same time, the respondents were not only objects, but also subjects of ethnic discrimination: 26% of the Russians, 23% of the Kyrgyz, 16.9% of the “Others,” and 11% of the Uzbeks were subjects of ethnic discrimination either by chance, or were forced into this or did this without any obvious reasons (see Table 20). The largest share of such respondents (35%) live in the Osh Region (see Table 21). The majority of the respondents never infringed upon the rights of other nationalities. 29



Answers to the Question “Have You Ever Infringed Upon the Rights of Other Ethnicities (Nationalities)?” (% by nationality) Nationality Kyrgyz

Russians

Uzbeks

Others

Never

73.0

67.5

83.0

80.0

Sometimes by chance

10.0

14.7

6.5

10.5

Sometimes unwillingly

6.6

6.7

2.6

3.2

Yes

6.5

4.9

2.0

3.2

Undecided

3.9

6.1

5.9

3.2

Table 21 Answers to the Question “Have You Ever Infringed Upon the Rights of Other Ethnicities (Nationalities)?” (% by region) Region Bishkek

Chu

Issyk Kul

Osh

Never

69.3

77.3

83.4

65.3

76.0

Sometimes by chance

12.1

9.4

7.0

14.1

9.0

Sometimes unwillingly

4.0

3.0

3.0

11.6

7.0

10.1

3.9

3.0

4.5

5.6

4.5

6.4

3.5

4.5

3.5

Yes Undecided

Jalalabad

Possible Development of Ethnic Relations Despite the continued ethnic tension, 50.6% of the Kyrgyz, 43.8% of the Uzbeks (see Table 22), 25.3% of the “Others,” and 15.3% of the Russians believe that ethnic relations will improve. At the same time, 46.3% of the “Others,” 39.3% of the Russians, 22.6% of the Kyrgyz, and 19.6% of the Uzbeks do not expect any changes for the better. There is even more pessimism among 24.5% of the Russians, 17.9% of the “Others,” 15.0% of the Uzbeks, and 11.0% of the Kyrgyz, who are convinced that relations will become even worse. Many people found it hard to offer any forecasts on that score. 30



Answers to the Question “What are the Prospects for Ethnic Relations in Your Region?” (% by nationality) Nationality Kyrgyz

Russians

Uzbeks

Others

Improving

50.6

15.3

43.8

25.3

Everything will remain the same

22.6

39.3

19.6

46.3

Worsening

11.0

24.5

15.0

17.9

Undecided

15.8

20.9

21.6

10.5

Respondents in the Issyk Kul and Osh regions (57.3% and 50.3%, respectively) proved to be more optimistic; 20.6% in Bishkek were the most pessimistic among the respondents (see Table 23). The largest share of those who believed that nothing would change (35.7%) also live in Bishkek. Table 23 Answers to the Question “What are the Prospects for Ethnic Relations in Your Region?” (% by region) Region Bishkek

Chu

Issyk Kul

Osh

Jalalabad

Improving

29.6

35.5

57.3

50.3

34.5

Everything will remain the same

35.7

29.6

20.1

18.1

32.0

Worsening

20.6

15.8

9.0

15.6

11.5

Undecided

14.1

19.2

13.6

16.1

22.0

Civic Identity This section contained control questions of the ethnosociological survey and was intended to find out the respondents’ civic identity, which directly depends on the degree of integration of the ethnic groups of Kyrgyzstan and which, on the other hand, is slowed down by ethnic, regional, and tribal identity. The absolute majority of Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Russians primarily regard themselves as citizens of Kyrgyzstan; this is true of 78.4% of the Uzbeks, 68.3% of the Kyrgyz, 59.5% of the Russians, and 58.9% of the “Others” (see Table 24). 31



Answer to the Question “What is Your Prevailing Identity?” (% by nationality) Nationality Kyrgyz

Russians

Uzbeks

Others

Member of my tribe and clan

13.8

6.7

6.5

9.5

Representative of my region

3.2

1.8

4.6

6.3

Member of my ethnic group

11.9

21.5

6.5

17.9

Citizen of Kyrgyzstan

68.3

59.5

78.4

58.9

2.9

8.0

3.3

6.3

0

2.5

0

0

Citizen of the world Stateless person

Among the Kyrgyz, 13.8% regard themselves as members of their tribe and clan, while 11.9% see themselves as members of their ethnic group. This means that tribal identity prevails over ethnic identity among the Kyrgyz. Among the Russians, 21.5% regard themselves as representatives of their ethnic group; the share among the Uzbeks is 6.5%. Over 70% of the respondents, members of all ethnicities of Kyrgyzstan, regard the country in which they were born (Kyrgyzstan) (see Table 25) as their motherland. Much fewer respondents regard their historical homeland as their motherland: 20.9% of the Kyrgyz; 14.7% of the Russians, 11.6% of the “Others,” and 3.3% of the Uzbeks. Table 25 Answers to the Question “Which Country Do You Call Your Motherland?” (% by nationality) Nationality

Country of birth Country of residence Where life is better Historical homeland

Kyrgyz

Russians

Uzbeks

Others

72.2

71.8

76.5

74.7

7.0

13.5

19.6

12.6

0

0

0.7

1.1

20.9

14.7

3.3

11.6

Over half of the respondents answered that they are not contemplating emigration (see Table 26); 24.5% of the Russians, 22.1% of the “Others,” 16.1% of the Kyrgyz, and 15.7% of the Uzbeks want to, but cannot, leave the country; 21.1% of the “Others” and 14.7% of the Russians are determined to leave the country. This means that migration sentiments are most pronounced among the Russians and “other” ethnicities; practically none of those who want to leave intend to come back. 32



Answers to the Question “Would You Like to Leave Kyrgyzstan?” (% by nationality) Nationality Kyrgyz Yes, by all means

Russians

Uzbeks

Others

6.5

14.7

7.2

21.1

I would like to leave but cannot

16.1

24.5

15.7

22.1

No, I have no plans as yet

59.3

59.5

54.9

55.8

0.8

0

0

0

16.0

1.2

22.2

0

To study

0.8

0

0

0

As a tourist

0.5

0

0

1.1

I want to leave but will definitely come back No

A large share of those who want to leave Kyrgyzstan point to economic reasons (see Table 27): 17.2% of the Russians, 11.6% of the “Others,” 11.2% of the Kyrgyz, and 5.2% of the Uzbeks want to leave in search of permanent employment and adequate wages; 14.7% of “Others,” 8% of the Russians, 6.5% of the Uzbeks, and 5.8% of the Kyrgyz want to leave because of the low standard of living; 13.7% of “Others,” 11% of the Russians; 6.5% of the Uzbeks, and 5.6% of the Kyrgyz want to leave because of political instability. Table 27 Answers to the Question “What is the Reason for Your Intention to Emigrate, If Any?” (% by nationality) Nationality Kyrgyz Lack of permanent employment and adequate wages

Russians

Uzbeks

Others

11.2

17.2

5.2

11.6

Low living standards

5.8

8.0

6.5

14.7

Political instability

5.6

11.0

6.5

13.7

Ethnic (national) discrimination

0.5

1.8

2.0

2.1

Crime and corruption

1.0

1.8

2.6

1.1

To study abroad

0.8

0

0

0

74.0

60.1

77.1

55.8

1.0

0

0

1.1

Do not plan emigration To spend holidays

33



The results speak of a certain degree of integration of all the ethnic groups; among all the ethnicities, most of respondents describe the desire to unite as average (see Table 28). This is the opinion of about half of the Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Russian respondents. Table 28 Answers to the Question “How Do You Assess the Degree to Which Different Ethnic Groups Want Unity in Kyrgyzstan?” (% by nationality) Nationality Kyrgyz

Russians

Uzbeks

Others

Considerable

29.2

18.4

9.8

28.4

Average

46.2

44.2

49.7

37.9

Insignificant

15.4

17.8

11.8

15.8

9.2

19.6

28.8

17.9

Undecided

The respondents pointed to the following unifying factors: a strong state and the rule of law: 58.4% of the Kyrgyz, 48.4% of the “Others,” 46.6% of the Russians, and 43.1% of the Uzbeks; political stability: 33.7% of the Russians, 33.7% of the “Others,” 26.1% of the Uzbeks, and 22.9% of the Kyrgyz; economic reforms and fighting corruption and unemployment: 31.3% of the Russians; 29.5% of the “Others,” 20.4% of the Kyrgyz, and 17% of the Uzbeks; ethnic stability: 27.4% of the “Others,” 23.9% of the Uzbeks, and 13.8% of the Kyrgyz; and social security: 26.4% of Russians; 24.2% of the “Others,” 14.4% of the Uzbeks, and 10.4% of the Kyrgyz (see Table 29). Table 29 Answers to the Question “Which Factors Can Unite Ethnic Groups (Nationalities) in Kyrgyzstan?” (% by nationality) Nationality Kyrgyz

Russians

Uzbeks

Others

Strong state and the rule of law

58.4

46.6

43.1

48.4

Political stability

22.9

33.7

26.1

33.7

Economic reforms and struggle with unemployment and corruption

20.4

31.3

17.0

29.5

Social security

10.4

26.4

14.4

24.2

Ethnic stability

13.8

23.9

21.6

27.4

1.7

1.8

4.0

1.1

Other

34



The above suggests that today the situation regarding emerging civic identity can be described as encouraging; civic identity predominates over ethnic identity, even if the share of the latter is fairly large. Those who want to leave the country are driven by economic problems. Those who want to leave for ethnic reasons describe the absence of a stronger state and the rule of law, political instability and unemployment as the main obstacles to unification of the country’s ethnic groups.

Conclusion The sociological survey produced the following results. Ethnic tension continues in the post-conflict period; it is caused mainly by the still nagging social and economic problems, while political, ethnocultural, and psychological factors continue to figure prominently in ethnic tension. Ethnocultural and psychological factors contribute to the unfolding and continued ethnic tension. While social, economic, and political factors trigger ethnic conflicts, ethnocultural and psychological factors add fuel to the fire; these factors are responsible for the continued ethnic tension at the post-conflict stage. This means that our ethnosociological survey confirmed Hypothesis 1. Continued ethnic tension emphasizes ethnic identity. In Kyrgyzstan, however, civic identity still dominates over ethnic identity: the absolute majority of the respondents identify themselves as citizens of Kyrgyzstan and do not plan to emigrate. This means that Hypothesis 2 was only partly confirmed. The results refuted its second part, which said that ethnic identity prevails over civic.

35



GEOPOLITICS AND SECURITY

POWERS AND REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS: PARAMETERS AND TYPES OF INVOLVEMENT (POST-SOVIET SPACE CASE STUDY) Jannatkhan EYVAZOV Ph.D. (Political Science), Deputy Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Central Asia and the Caucasus (Baku, Azerbaijan)

I

ABSTRACT

t is hardly possible to correctly and fully assess the functioning and development of a regional security system without presenting a complete account of the entire range of ties and relations among the actors involved and the degree of influence of all the powers concerned.

Based on a case study of the post-Soviet space, the author studies the involvement of powers in regional security systems; his analysis of the key parameters of this involvement makes it possible for him to identify and describe two types of involvement: full and partial.

KEYWORDS: regional security system, political environment of a regional system, powers, involvement, post-Soviet space, Central Eurasia, post-Soviet security macrocomplex, Russia, Turkey, Iran, China, EU, the U.S. 36



Introduction A Regional Security System (RSS) can include all types of actors: they can be ordinary states and those that can consistently project their influence beyond their territories and are usually called powers. The powers’ involvement determines the system’s development. The type of involvement of a power in an RSS varies according to its underlying interests; the same parameter determines whether this actor should be regarded as part of the system or within the political environment of an RSS. The former presupposes that the power is involved in a web of security interdependencies in all the segments of the system up to and including corresponding ties with all of the system’s states. The interests that create the main ties are securitized as existential, which presupposes that extraordinary measures must be taken to realize them. The political environment of an RSS looks like a softer type of involvement: either the interdependence between the power and the system is not examined in the context of the fundamental security interests, or these interests only relate to certain segments of an RSS—states or geographically localized groups of states (subsystems). I intend to discuss the specifics of the involvement of powers in regional security systems based on a case study of the post-Soviet space. In my previous articles,1 I assessed the security interests and policy of power centers that should be primarily discussed in the context of the development of the RSS in the post-Soviet space (Russia, Turkey, Iran, China, the United States, and the European Union). The article addresses the common specifics of the involvement of powers in regional security systems based, in particular, on the empirics already discussed in my previous works. I rely on the Theory of Regional Security Complexes (TRSC) as the theoretical and methodological foundation of my study.

System, Elements, Subsystems What is the regional security system in the post-Soviet space? What are its structural and spatial specifics? I will start by trying to find answers to these questions. Using the TRSC apparatus, I regard the post-Soviet space as a regional security complex (RSC), and assessing its type I adhere to Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s idea of the “centered great power regional security complex.”2 Early in the 1990s, the once hierarchically arranged political system of the U.S.S.R. shifted to the anarchically arranged RSC, i.e. the regional system of 15 former Union 1 See: J. Eyvazov, “Russia in Central Eurasia: Security Interests and Geopolitical Activity,” The Caucasus & Globalization, Vol. 3, Issue 1, 2009, pp. 11-22; idem, “Iran’s Security Interests and Geopolitical Activity in Central Eurasia,” The Caucasus & Globalization, Vol. 3, Issue 4, 2009, pp. 19-30; idem, “China in Central Eurasia: Security Interests and Geopolitical Activity,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 2010, pp. 8-19; idem, “Central Eurasia through the Prism of Turkey’s Security Interests,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 11, Issue 3, 2010, pp. 77-85; idem, “The West and PostSoviet Central Eurasia: Certain Aspects of American and EU Security Strategy in the Region,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 2011, pp. 7-21. 2 The TRSC offers various types and forms of regional complexes; the most general typology distinguishes between a standard and a centered RSC. According to Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, in a centered RSC, the dynamics of security relations are determined by one power found in its center. The authors go on to identify three forms (depending on the specifics of “the central actor”) of this type: centered on a great power—Russia in the post-Soviet space; centered on a superpower—the United States in North America; and, finally, centered on an institution (institutional RSC)—the European Union (see: B. Buzan, O. Wæver, Regions and Powers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, pp. 55-61).

37



republics, the newly independent states (NIS) along with Russia as the system’s only power pole. In some of my previous contributions I used the term Post-Soviet Security Macrocomplex (PSM) to account for the structural changes that occurred in this RSC in the 2000s.3 As distinct from the early development of the RSS in the post-Soviet space, an assessment of its current conditions demands that the structural changes caused by unification of the three former Soviet Baltic republics (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) with the institutional RSC in Europe (the EU) be taken into account.4 I leave aside the discussion on the causes of these changes and the stable/transitional nature of the PSM as a whole, and suppose that its present political structure should be regarded as the sum-total of twelve elements: Russia + the other 11 post-Soviet NIS. Eleven newly independent states, which can geographically be described as the Central Eurasian5 segment of the post-Soviet space, form, in turn, local RSCs: Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova in Central Europe; Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia in the Central Caucasus; and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in Central Asia. Despite the fact that the newly formed regional subsystems have remained relatively autonomous, Russia continues functioning as the center that ties them together in a web of security interdependence of a PSM.

Powers and their Ties with the PSM Russia is the only actor in the PSM structure that can consistently project its influence region-wide, being the key security factor for the NIS in the subsystems. This means that the development of local complexes, the dynamics of security relations among the member states, and their ties with external powers in particular, depend, along with endogenous factors, on Russia’s activity. There are few doubts, at least today, about Russia’s involvement in the post-Soviet RSC. If revealed, the specifics of the involvement of the other powers concerned can suggest interesting conclusions related both to particular issues of the case and to the applicability and development of the TRSC apparatus. Turkey, Iran, China, EU, and the United States form the platform of the political environment of the PSM. All of them, with the exception of the United States, border on the PSM (its Central Eurasian segments) and have certain interdependence of their security with the member states of the corresponding local RSCs. Geography. Only the Russian Federation of the powers enumerated above has land borders with all of the Central Eurasian subsystems of the PSM: with Ukraine (1,576 km) and Belarus (959 km) 3 For more details, see: J. Eyvazov, “Some Aspects of the Theory of Regional Security Complexes as Applied to Studies of the Political System in the Post-Soviet Space,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 12, Issue 2, 2011, pp. 17-24; idem, “Central Eurasia through the Prism of Security: A Regional System or a Sub-System?” The Caucasus & Globalization, Vol. 5, Issue 1-2, 2011, pp. 6-15. 4 In 2004, these three former Soviet republics joined the EU and NATO, which reflects, at least, their involvement in the institutional RSC in Europe. 5 Here I am referring to the concept of Central Eurasia, Central Europe, and the Central Caucasus suggested by Eldar Ismailov, who regarded three post-Soviet regions as part of Central Eurasia: Central Europe—Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine; the Central Caucasus—Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia; Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (for more details, see: E.M. Ismailov, “Central Eurasia: Its Geopolitical Function in the 21st Century,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 2 (50), 2008, pp. 7-29.

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in Central Europe; with Azerbaijan (284 km) and Georgia (723 km) in the Central Caucasus; and with Kazakhstan (6,846 km) in Central Asia. The land contacts of the other powers are fairly limited. Iran has common borders with Azerbaijan (611 km) and Armenia (35 km) in the Central Caucasus and with Turkmenistan (992 km) in Central Asia. The land contacts of the others (apart from the United States, which has no common land borders with the PSM) are limited to one region: the EU with Central Europe (Ukraine, 1,159 km; Belarus, 1,456 km; and Moldova, 450 km); Turkey with the Central Caucasus (Georgia, 252 km; Armenia, 268 km; and Azerbaijan, 9 km); and China with Central Asia (Kazakhstan, 1,533 km; Kyrgyzstan, 858 km; and Tajikistan, 414 km).6 The Black and Caspian seas offer maritime contacts among the powers themselves, as well as between the powers and some of the states of the local RSCs: EU-Turkey-Russia-Ukraine-Georgia across the Black Sea; Russia-Iran-Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan across the Caspian. Ethnic and confessional ties. Direct land contact is responsible for other common elements, particularly ethnic and confessional ties. Today, there are no cases where political borders repeat the outlines of the ethnoconfessional dividing lines. In almost all cases, there are ethnic and confessional minorities in one state whose compatriots constitute a majority in the neighboring state. In the course of history, political borders change. Their dynamics, as a rule, outstrip the natural changes of the region’s ethnic and confessional map. When applied to powers, the situation looks much more complicated: borders are changed by the use of force, while migration policies change their ethnic and confessional makeup. This fully applies to geopolitical rivalry among powers. Wars for control over strategically important spaces are accompanied by changed state borders and migration. In the past, powers repeatedly used force to conquer the geopolitically attractive space Halford Mackinder described as “the Heartland”. Their “comings” and “withdrawals” can be still traced on the ethnoconfessional map of Central Eurasia. Today, the region’s ethnoconfessional structure figures prominently in shaping the key vectors of security interdependence among the post-Soviet NIS and between them and the powers involved. Russia is the last of the powers that controlled Central Eurasia. Its withdrawal in the early 1990s did not signify total loss of the region’s ethnoconfessional structure, which was to a considerable degree a product of Russia’s long domination. All three Central Eurasian regions preserved fairly large Russian diasporas, the security of which cannot be removed from the scope of Russia’s interests. On the whole, the Soviet Union’s disintegration left about 25 million Russians outside Russia’s borders.7 Irrespective of their citizenship, they constitute one of the most important factors of Russia’s relations with the other post-Soviet states.8 Iran’s most securitized ethnic tie is found in the Central Caucasus; here I have in mind the Azeris, the second largest ethnic group of the IRI living mainly in the country’s north close to the border with the Azerbaijan Republic. Iran’s ethnocultural ties with Central Asia are associated with the fairly large Turkmen community living in its northeastern part bordering directly on Turkmenistan. Special relations with Tajikistan form another vector of Iran’s ties with Central Asia. Despite the absence of direct land contacts across a common border, the two countries share ethnic and cultural roots. 9 The figures are taken from CIA World Factbook, 2013. See: Ch. King, N.J. Melvin, “Diaspora Politics. Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy and Security in Eurasia,” International Security, Winter 1999-2000, Vol. 24, Issue 3, p. 118. 8 Today, there are Russian diasporas in all countries of the Central European, Central Caucasian, and Central Asian regions; the largest of them are found in Ukraine (17.3% of total population), Kazakhstan (23.7%), Kyrgyzstan (12.5%), Belarus (8.3%), Uzbekistan (5.5%), Azerbaijan (1.8%), and Georgia (1.5%) (see: CIA World Factbook, 2013). 9 Tajikistan is the only Central Asian post-Soviet state that speaks an Iranian language. 6 7

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As an Islamic state, Iran relies on confessional affinity when dealing with the Muslim NIS of Central Eurasia, even though the Sunni/Shi‘a contradictions remain a stumbling block: the Muslim NIS (with the exception of Azerbaijan with its predominantly Shi‘a population10) profess Sunni Islam. The advantages of confessional affinity between Shi‘a Iran and Shi‘a Azerbaijan were offset by ethnic and political problems, some of them inherited from the past: Tehran’s fear of Baku’s possible encouragement of irredentist sentiments among the Iranian Azeris, cooperation between Iran and Armenia and between Azerbaijan and Israel, etc. Despite the fact that land contacts between Turkey and the PSM are limited to the Central Caucasus, its ethnoconfessional ties with the macroregion should be analyzed in a much wider context. The idea of Turkey’s leadership in the Turkic and Muslim world goes back into the past; after the Cold War it became even more popular among the Turks.11 Today, this is still one of the components of Turkey’s security ties, not only with the Caucasus, but also with the Central Asian region. In postSoviet times, Turkey largely based its relations with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, that is, the Turkic-speaking NIS, on ethnic and linguistic affinity. The Muslims of Georgia (Ajaria) and the Northern Caucasus have also been and remain an important factor of Ankara’s regional policy. Besides, the vast Caucasian diaspora in Turkey has its say in the process.12 China’s ethnoconfessional ties with the Central Eurasian regions of the PSM are geographically limited only to Central Asia, though it is fairly strongly securitized. The so-called Uighur Issue is the pivotal point in security interdependence between China and the Central Asian states. This threat is existential in terms of China’s security, since the matter concerns an independent Uighur state, Eastern Turkestan, which might spring up in China’s northwest, now called the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The XUAR’s ethnic, linguistic, and confessional ties with Central Asia are much older and much closer than those with China.13 Besides, there are zones of compact settlement of Kazakhs14 and Kyrgyz15 among the ten million Uighurs. The NIS that appeared in post-Soviet Central Asia added urgency to the old problem; on top of this, the Uighur diasporas of Kazakhstan (about 180 thousand-strong), Kyrgyzstan (50 thousand), and Uzbekistan (30 thousand) 16 have stepped up their activities. The XUAR with its predominantly Turkic-Muslim population remains a zone of greatest instability and centrifugal trends in the People’s Republic of China. The ethnoconfessional ties between the EU and PSM are also essential. They include: a PolishUkrainian and Polish-Belarusian border zone (so-called Western Ukraine and Western Belarus), the question of ethnic affinity between the Rumanians and Moldavians, and the equally important issue About 80% of Azerbaijan’s Muslim population is Shi‘a Muslims. See, for example: R. Burnashev, “Regional Security in Central Asia: Military Aspects,” in: Central Asia. A Gathering Storm? ed. by B. Rumer, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2002, p. 132. 12 According to certain sources, there are about 7 million people with Caucasian roots among Turkish citizens (mainly Circassians, Abkhazes, Lazez, Georgians, and Azeris) (see: G. Winrow, Turkey and the Caucasus: Domestic Interests and Security Concerns, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2000, p. 32). 13 For more details, see: K. Khafizova, “Separatism in China’s Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region: Dynamics and Potential Impact on Central Asia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1 (19), 2003, р. 7; Zhao Huasheng, “China, Russia and the U.S.: Their Interests, Postures, and Interrelations in Central Asia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5 (29), 2004, р. 117. 14 According to the 2010 population census, about 1.46 million Kazakhs live in China. 15 According to the 2010 population census, about 187 thousand Kyrgyz live in China. 16 See, for example: K. Shamshidov, “China’s Approach to Multilateralism with an Emphasis on its Influence in Central Asia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 13, Issue 4, 2012, p. 33. 10 11

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of the Russian population of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia,17 which figures prominently in RussiaEU relations. Threats associated with the region. Ethnicities and territories bordering on the Central Eurasian regions of the PSM form an important, but not the only, vector of security interdependence between the powers and the regions. I have already written that all the powers, with the exception of the United States, have direct geographical contacts and ethnoconfessional ties with this space. One cannot say that these contacts are all securitized enough to stimulate extraordinary regional activity of the powers, so I have described the most important of them above. In any case, most of the threats associated with this space are shaped, in different forms, by the latter’s specific geography, the securitization of which, from the viewpoint of certain powers’ military threats and vulnerabilities, is enhanced by the long history of their confrontation based on the threat of using force or wars in the region. This is especially true of how Russia, Turkey, and Iran perceive the region. Russia’s hegemony in Central Eurasia, which lasted for over two centuries, along with social and economic ties, contributed to a certain social-perceptual construct of “Russia’s special interests and its role in the post-Soviet space”. This was reflected in the foreign policy concept of the Near Abroad formulated in President Yeltsin’s decree of 14 September, 1995 On Approving the Russian Federation’s Strategic Course in Relations with CIS Member Countries. Considering Russia’s interests in the former Soviet space Dmitry Trenin has put it as follows: “The Russian presence is common to all the new geopolitical constellations. European Russia, naturally, is part of the new Eastern Europe. Central Asia, which includes Kazakhstan, contains a significant Eastern Slav element. Transcaucasia is inseparably linked with the Northern Caucasus, which is an integral part of the Russian Federation. Thus, if there is any one country which can still view the other fourteen ex-republics as its periphery (albeit not a homogeneous one), it is Russia.”18 The periods of Russia’s domination in these regions fortified its international position and its Great Power status. This served as a sort of pattern, from which sprang a corresponding tradition. The Near Abroad concept is one of its foreign policy reflections. It is not surprising that throughout its post-Soviet history Russia has actively tried to remain in control in this space; everything other powers were doing to integrate this space or even compete with Russia in some of its parts looked like a threat to its interests. In historical terms, this can be explained by Russia’s traditionally firm grip on Central Eurasian regions and stability/instability of its domination there, and also by its military-political relations with other powers. This is true, in particular, of Central Europe and the Central Caucasus. At all times, the Russian state was apprehensive of the threats coming from these regions: their geopolitical specifics made them unstable peripheries of the Russian Empire, even when its domination there was absolute and unchallenged. During periods of weakness, the Caucasus and Central Europe were the main centers of the centrifugal trends. In 1917, when the empire fell apart, these areas put up stiff resistance to the reintegration attempts; at some point independent states emerged there. Central Asia was relatively much more compliant. In the 17th-20th centuries, the three Central Eurasian regions, to different extents, were theaters of Russia’s military-strategic rivalry with other powers: with France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary in Central Europe; with Turkey, Iran, and Great Britain in the Central Caucasus; and with Iran and 17 For example, in 2009, ethnic Russians in Estonia accounted for about 26% of its total population. In 1989, on the eve of the Soviet Union’s collapse, there were about 30% of them. In Latvia, the share was about 30% in 2009 and 34% in 1989; the figures for Lithuania are 6% and 9.4%, respectively. 18 D. Trenin, “Russia’s Security Interests and Policies in the Caucasus Region,” in: Contested Borders in the Caucasus, ed. by B. Coppieters, Vubpress, Brussels, 1996, p. 91.

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Great Britain in Central Asia. The former two constituted the main corridors of military invasion against the Russian state. Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812 and that of Hitler’s Germany in 1941 left the strongest imprint on the historical memory of the Russians. In the south, the threat was traditionally associated with Iran and, especially, the Ottoman Empire.19 “Russians have always perceived its southwest tier … as a possible invasion route to Russia. Given their traditional fear of encirclement, the Russians have always been acutely aware that the Black Sea and the Caucasus are critical strategic approaches to their homeland and to their important industrial areas and energy resources.”20 The Caucasus is one of the few peripheries where Russia’s domestic weakness immediately ignited riots, undermined its control, and stirred the rivaling powers into hectic activity. This history explains, to a considerable degree, Russia’s current fears concerned with the regions, especially, the Kremlin’s approaches to NATO’s eastward expansion, and to Turkey’s attempts to play a more important role in the Black Sea-Caucasus-Central Asia space. In the past, Turkey and Iran were also active in Central Eurasia and cherished the Great Power ambitions in the region. From time to time, they warred with each other, or with Russia to gain (or preserve) control over certain parts of the region. Hence, relations within the Russia-Turkey-Iran triad have the fairly strong traditions of enmity. However, today for each of these powers the threats emanating from the region have their specifics. Turkey competed with Russia mainly in the Black Sea and in the Caucasus, which means Ankara looks at these regions as the most vulnerable to possible military threats from the North. Disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and emergence of Kemalist Turkey was accompanied by a fundamental revision of the previous regime’s foreign policy priorities; the Great Power ambitions and idea of leadership in the Turkic and Islamic world (typical of the Ottoman period of its history) were moved aside to make way for ideas of integration with Western civilization. The republic normalized its relations with Soviet Russia, but Turkey’s membership in NATO adjusted their relations to fit the bipolar confrontational logic of the Cold War. Disintegration of the Soviet Union tipped the military balance in the Black Sea in favor of Turkey. At the same time, emerging several actors (Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia) instead of one (the U.S.S.R.) did not contribute fundamentally to decreasing Turkey’s vulnerability from the North. In the mid-1994, Head of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces Doğan Güreş said: “Russia, because of its policies in the Caucasus and Crimea, posed a greater threat to Turkey than at any time in the Cold War.”21 In the 2000s, economic cooperation between the two powers, their relatively close positions on the Middle Eastern issues, and their criticism of what the West was doing in the Middle East somewhat eased the military-political tension in the Black Sea theater. However, domestic politics of both powers are characterized by trends capable of intensifying rivalry in their relations. Under President Putin, Russia has been working hard to restore its Great Power status. This is amply confirmed by implacable centralization of power, anti-Western rhetoric, strengthening the armed forces and demonstration of their potential (the 2008 August war with Georgia), and the active use of economic and energy instruments to achieve geopolitical aims. Russia’s relations with other powers (and with Turkey, its historical rival) will depend on whether it follows this road consistently and actively. On the other hand, Turkey remains undecided. It is vacillating between the Kemalist 19 Starting in the 17th century, over the span of 240 years Russia and Turkey fought over ten wars, mainly in the Caucasus (for more details, see: A.B. Shirokorad, Russko-turetskie voyny 1676-1918, AST Publishers, Moscow; Harvest, Minsk, 2000). 20 See: A.L. Karaosmanoğlu, “The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1, Fall 2000, pp. 203-204. 21 Quoted from: G. Winrow, op. cit., p. 23.

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course (which makes it part of the West) and its historical roots—an independent power with special interests in the Islamic and Turkish world. This means that the future of the current thaw between Turkey and Russia remains vague. Turkey’s relations with Armenia22 and the Kurdish Issue23 are the two most securitized aspects of Turkey’s ties with the Caucasus. In both cases, Turkey’s territorial integrity is threatened. Moreover in the past, both the Armenian and the Kurdish issues were exploited by rivaling powers to weaken Turkey. Iran’s geographic and ethnic specifics make the state especially sensitive to the ethnopolitical processes unfolding close to its borders. According to different sources, ethnic minorities constitute nearly half of Iran’s population; geographically they live in compact groups on both sides of the borders dividing single ethnic spaces. I have in mind the Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Balochi, and Turkmens. B. Shaffer has offered the following comment: “Iran’s ethnic groups are particularly susceptible to external manipulation and considerably subject to influence from events taking place outside its borders, since most of the non-Persians are concentrated in the frontier areas and have ties to coethnics in adjoining states…”24 This means that the domino effect started by an ethnopolitical conflict might be fraught with grave repercussions for the Iranian state. For certain reasons, the Azeri Issue is one of the most securitized for Iran.25 The Iranian authorities are apprehensive of a possible increase in irredentism among the Iranian Azeris and of the possible influence of external forces. They not only fear that the neighboring state will support these sentiments, but also that other rivaling powers might capitalize on Iran’s “soft spot.” This means that the fairly complicated ethnopolitical structure and the Azeri Issue, in particular, should be placed within the wider framework of Iranian security. In view of the irreconcilable conflict between Iran and the United States, which from time to time goes as far as deliberations about using force against the IRI, Tehran is very concerned about its security in the neighboring regions, as well as throughout Central Eurasia as a whole. Iran’s security can only be guaranteed if this space is prevented from being turned into a military-political foothold for the United States and its allies (including Israel and Turkey) to be used against the IRI in the form of direct military aggression, containment, or other actions designed to weaken its political system. 22 Turkey was among the first to recognize Armenia’s independence in the early 1990s. However, they have no diplomatic relations, while the borders remain sealed off. Escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Armenian occupation of part of Azerbaijan’s territory exacerbated the problems between the two states inherited from the past. Ankara insists that Armenia abandon its demand that Turkey recognize the fact of Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire in 1915, and that Erevan abandon its claims to Turkish territory (the territory of the Ottoman Empire populated by Armenians that covers the contemporary vilayets of Erzurum, Van, Ağri, Hakkari, Muş, Bitlis, Siirt, Diyarbekir, Erzincan, Bingöl, Malatya, Sivas, Amasya, Tokat, and part of Giresum [see: Istoria Osmanskogo gosudarstva, obshchestva i tsivilizatsii, ed. by E. Ihsanoglu, Transl. from Turkish, Vol. 1, Vostochnaia literatura Publishers, Moscow, 2006, p. 87]) and withdraw from the occupied Azeri territories. 23 Radical Kurdish organizations are determined to create an independent Kurdish state in the territories on which their ancestors lived in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. A large number of ethnic Kurds live in Turkey’s eastern part. From time to time, Turkey uses the army to suppress the terrorist activities of the Kurdish separatists who, back in the late 1970s, united into the Kurdistan Workers’ Party responsible for over 30 thousand deaths. 24 B. Shaffer, “The Formation of Azerbaijani Collective Identity in Iran,” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2000, p. 449. 25 The number of the ethnic Azeris in Iran in particular: according to CIA World Factbook, in 2012, they comprised about 16% of the 78.8 million-strong population. At the same time, there are reasons to believe that their share is higher. Historically, the Iranian Azeris are the most politically active population group. Starting in the 16th century, two Azeri dynasties—Safavids (1501-1722) and Qajars (1795-1925)—replaced one another on the throne. Under the Persian Pahlavi dynasty (1925-1979) and after the Islamic revolution, the Azeri provinces of Iran remained the most unstable part of the state, which Tehran can hardly control.

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To a certain extent, China and Iran share a similar conceptualization of the regions of postSoviet Central Eurasia. Very much like Iran, China badly needs a stable strategic rear in the northern and northwestern areas directly beyond its borders in order to concentrate on the key problems. 26 In the present conditions, neither Iran nor China regards the southern part of the post-Soviet space (despite the functional ethnoterritorial interdependencies) as the main theater of geopolitical rivalry and a source of direct military threats. Iran regards the Gulf as such; China, East Asia, or, rather, the part of the Pacific adjacent to it with U.S. regional outposts—Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Beijing fears an armed conflict with the United States in these theaters as the most serious security threat. The still pending territorial problem, the so-called Taiwan Issue is another, and fairly strong, impetus in the worsening relations with the United States up to and including an armed conflict between them in East Asia. Unlike Iran, China is determined to acquire a superpower status. The Taiwan Issue looks like a greater obstacle and the most sensitive issue for Beijing on this road. It seems that unless Taiwan, the most developed of the breakaway Chinese territories, is integrated into continental China, this status will remain unattainable. Fully aware of the issue, Washington is in no hurry to share its world leadership with China. For this reason, America will go on protecting Taiwan’s de facto independence as long as possible. This will add tension to the already tense relations between the two powers in East Asia in particular and will force China to maintain stability in Central Asia, its strategic rear. The Uighur Issue creates difficulties both for China and Central Asia. The separatist sentiments in the XUAR threaten China’s territorial integrity. This makes the country strategically vulnerable, to the advantage of those forces that prefer to deal with a weaker China. Moreover, the Chinese leaders realize that Uighur separatism is supported, both ideologically and financially, by extremist religious organizations. From the very beginning, the XUAR independence movement demonstrated strong religious undertones. Later, religious issues were rapidly politicized in the post-Soviet space to gather new undertones after 9/11, which allowed Beijing to hold forth about the ties between Uighur separatism and the extremist religious movements operating in Central Asia—al Qa‘eda, the Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and Hizb ut-Tahrir—which rely on terrorist methods to promote their ideas. In 2003, Beijing published the first list of terrorist organizations of Eastern Turkestan, which included the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, the East Turkestan Liberation Organization, the World Uighur Youth Congress, and the East Turkestan Information Center. 27 Accordingly, China’s securitization of Central Asia is based not only on perception of the region as a space of transborder activities of Uighur separatists. Beijing is fully aware that the region might become an extremist and terrorist foothold to be used by groups and associations connected with the Uighur movement for penetrating into China.28 Likewise, European and American security interests are also concentrated in the post-Soviet space. Despite what is being said in the post-Cold War period about minimization of the threat of a large-scale military conflict between Russia and NATO, no unified security community has appeared in Eurasia and the Euro-Atlantic space. The Western bias of the first years of Yeltsin’s presidency in Russia was very soon exhausted to be replaced with ideas of restoring Russia’s Great Power role in the world. NATO’s eastward expansion and its bombings of Serbia, uncompromising centralization of power under Putin seen in the West as a retreat from democratization, Russia’s support of radical See: Zhao Huasheng, op. cit., pp. 118-119. See: Ibid., p. 117. 28 See: Ibid., p. 118; M.T. Laumulin, The Geopolitics of XXI Century in Central Asia, KazISS, Almaty, 2007, p. 121. 26 27

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anti-Western regimes (in Venezuela, Iran, and Syria) and military-technical cooperation with them, the U.S. Iraqi war, Russia’s energy policy towards the EU and post-Soviet NIS, the 2008 August war in Georgia, the ABM contradictions between Moscow and Washington, the way the West looks at the state of human rights in the RF and the so-called Magnitsky List—this is a far from complete list of the factors responsible for the strained relations between Russia and the West. From the purely geographical point of view, one could consider only the EU as related to the RSS in the post-Soviet space, while the United States should have been regarded as the only globally involved superpower. The EU expansion allowed the European Union to acquire direct geographic contacts with Central Eurasia. In 2004 and 2007, when Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Rumania acceded to the European Union, it moved right up to the states of the region’s European part (Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine) forming a border over 3 thousand km in length. First, this placed the entire set of ethnoterritorial issues between the new EU members and these NIS on the all-European agenda. Second, this destroyed the buffer zone that separated Europe from political instability and conflicts in the post-Soviet space and the related, including transnational, threats (international organized crime, international terrorism, illegal migration, drug trafficking, etc.) that had affected the new EU members. Third, this changed the geopolitical configuration of the ties between the EU and Russia, the main power pole in the post-Soviet space. In two consecutive expansion waves (in 2004 and 2007), the European Union moved directly into the sphere of Russia’s vital interests, and in some places, the Baltics and Poland, directly toward the RF borders. Aware of the EU’s possible further expansion into the post-Soviet space (the possibility being confirmed by the ardent desire of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and some other NIS to become part of United Europe), Moscow had to retaliate against both the NIS enumerated and the EU itself. Upgraded security interdependence in the EU-Central Eurasian NIS-RF vector was best confirmed by the so-called gas issue when Moscow tried to use energy resources as a political instrument across the post-Soviet space and in its relations with the European Union. Suspension of gas supplies to EU countries in 2006 and 2009, Moscow’s intention to monopolize the oil and gas sphere in the post-Soviet space, and Gazprom’s attempts to establish control over the gas-distribution system of Europe have contributed to securitizing in the EU the problem of its energy dependence on Russia and forced the Europeans to diversify their oil and gas sources, including building energy transportation lines in the post-Soviet space bypassing Russia. The United States had no geographic contacts with the PSM. However, throughout the postSoviet period its presence was no weaker than that of the EU, and it remains quite prominent today. America’s global involvement caused by the needs unconstrained by geographical limits and its capability of projecting its might worldwide means that its role in the development of the regions of post-Soviet Central Eurasia should be taken into account. This also means that the interests of two actors of Western civilization—United Europe and the United States—are relatively identical, even though the latter plays the first fiddle in many respects, including in determining these interests. From time to time, this arrangement crops up as excessive geopoliticization of even the seemingly common transnational problems that the Western tandem wants to resolve. So far it is fairly hard to identify the direct security threats to the U.S. emanating from the regions of post-Soviet Central Eurasia, however, these regions border on areas that are extremely important for Washington’s security agenda: Afghanistan and the counterterrorist campaign in general, the Iranian Nuclear File and WMD non-proliferation regime, as well as relations with Russia, which are steadily going from bad to worse, and with China, which is steadily moving toward the pedestal of the only superpower. 45



Powers’ Involvement in Regional Security Systems: Key Parameters Using the PSM concept, one has to accept that Russia is the only power involved in the structure of RSS functioning in the post-Soviet space. This means that Russia’s key security interests extend to all its subsystems at the level of active stimulation of its corresponding (including extraordinary) behavior and relations with the states involved. At the same time, this should not be taken to mean that other powers are not involved and that their interests there are not as important as Russia’s. Let me remind you that the TRSC uses three concepts to describe the degrees of a power’s involvement in the RSC: direct involvement in the structure, “penetration,” and “overlay.” 29 In the case of the RSC, which has open, non-suppressed dynamics of security relations, we should use the first and second of them. The TRSC offers an explanation of the actor’s direct involvement in the structure on the basis of two parameters: its involvement in “the web of security interdependence” and geographic proximity.30 As for penetration, Buzan and Wæver describe it as a mechanism that connects the poles of the global system with the regional dynamics of an RSC: “Penetration occurs when outside powers make security alignments with states within an RSC.” Consequently, in compliance with the TRSC, the penetration does not imply the actor’s involvement in the web of security interdependence of an RSC. A closer look at the direct involvement of an actor in an RSC reveals that the above parameters are closely interconnected and cannot be discussed separately. Or, rather, one leads to the other: the actor’s involvement in the web of security interdependence of an RSC stems from its geographic proximity. The theory explains why geographic proximity plays an important role in determining the borders of an RSC emphasizing “the linkage between the intensity of military and political threats, and the shortness of the range over which they are perceived.”31 In the case of powers, the factor of geographic proximity should be assessed from the viewpoint of the powers’ main specifics—their ability to consistently project their influence beyond their territories. This means that in this case their involvement in an RSC is explained, first, by concentration of their key security interests in a region and, second, their ability to project their influence within the region. This stimulates security interdependence of this power with the other actors of the same RSC. Furthermore, the presence of key security interests in the region should be stable, that is, it should stem from stable and prolonged securitization of the region by a power. In fact, the power’s stable assessment of its security interests in the region based on historical memory and relations makes it possible to talk about the power’s involvement in the web of security interdependence of an RSS. When talking about the RSS in the post-Soviet space, one may wonder why Russia’s activity should be regarded as a result of its involvement in the structure, while Turkey’s or Iran’s activities in the Central Caucasus (or China’s in Central Asia) are described as a result of their “penetration?” B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., p. 49. B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. Second Edition, Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, Colorado, 1991, p. 191. 31 See: Ibidem. 29 30

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The prolonged and stable presence of their key security interests and geographic proximity, as well as the fact that they can project their influence in the region make the involvement of Russia, Turkey, and Iran in the Central Caucasian RSC identical. Even if we lower our assessment to the level of purely geographic proximity, this identity still counts and becomes even more obvious. The three countries have direct borders with the RSC even though the lengths are different: Russia has 1,007 km of common border; Turkey has 529 km, and Iran has 646 km. Differences in these figures cannot considerably affect the strengthening/weakening of their involvement, particularly they cannot be a sufficient basis for concluding whether these powers belong to the RSC or not. When talking about the RSC in the Central Caucasus, we should recognize the fact that Russia is not the only power with locally concentrated key security interests. I have already written above that Turkey and Iran have their own security interests in the region, or, rather, there is an interdependence between them and the Central Caucasian states which, in certain respects, ties their key, existential, security interests to the region. For example, this fully applies to the interdependence between Armenia and Turkey caused by the former’s territorial claims against the latter and the perceptions of historical insults associated with the 1915 events in the Ottoman Empire that the Armenians call “genocide.” This fully applies to the fundamental connection between Iran and Azerbaijan created by millions of ethnic Azeris living in the IRI in the territory historically called “Southern Azerbaijan.” 32 Both cases are related to territories and population, that is, to the components of physical base of the states which, for obvious reasons, belong to their key security interests. There are similar complexities in two other Central Eurasian RSCs. In Central Europe the problem comes from ethnoterritorial ties between three states (Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine) and their geographic neighbors, the EU new members (Poland and Rumania). One cannot ignore the ethnic proximity between Moldova and Rumania and the related interdependence between them. Likewise, one cannot ignore the Western Ukraine and Western Belarus issues and their Catholic Slavic populations when looking at the web of interdependence of Ukraine and Belarus, on the one hand, and Poland, on the other. Thus, if we recognize the aforementioned facts of security interdependence between the members of the PSM and the external actors, we should accept that not only Russia, but also Turkey and Iran (the Caucasian segment) belong to it; the same applies to, at least, Poland and Rumania in the European segment. For the same reasons we should count Iran (with its Turkmen ethnic community living in compact groups in the country’s north and the unregulated Caspian problems) and China (with its Uighur factor) as belonging to the Central Asian subcomplex. But this will contradict the TRSC, which rejects “overlapping membership”33 by saying that one and the same state can belong only to one RSC; this means that Turkey and Iran as members of the Middle Eastern RSC, Rumania and Poland as members of the European institutional RSC, and China as belonging to Northeastern Asia cannot be involved in any other RSC. Post-Soviet empirics do not confirm this TRSC thesis, which means that it can and should be somewhat readjusted. When talking about the possibility/impossibility of “overlapping membership,” one should pay attention to the state/power status of the member involved. In this respect, David Lake’s assertion has certain consistency, according to which a Great Power can belong to more than one RSC.34 The post-Soviet empirics discussed above confirm that not only Great Powers, but also powers with less international significance and a less ability to project their influence can be involved in more than one RSC. 32 Under the 1828 Treaty of Turkmanchay the Russian Empire and Persia divided the Azeri territories into Northern and Southern Azerbaijan. 33 B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., p. 48. 34 See: D.A. Lake, “Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach,” in: Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, ed. by D.A. Lake, P.M. Morgan, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, p. 64.

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Powers can be involved in more than one RSC, but the extent of their involvements can be very different, which affects their activity in the regions. Why can a power belong to several RSC? This is explained by the securitization specifics or, to be more exact, by the impact of geopolitical factors on it. The securitization process is very different in states and powers. It is much more geopolitically biased in powers, irrespective of their progress toward post-industrial societies. Securitization is an autonomous and relative process35; this thesis of the TRSC can be fully accepted. At the same time, because of its main role in shaping the actors’ behavior and the development of RSS,36 we must admit that, in contrast to the initial TRSC version, functioning of a regional complex is less associated with structural-political factors and much more closely related to other factors, including those related to the regions’ social specifics. This means that securitization as a process of conceptualization by state/society of its security depends on a much larger number of factors, including historical assessments. What does the society of a larger state-power with a corresponding political status, transborder military and economic potential, and historical memory of “glorious victories,” its domination in different parts of the world, and also of its former “imperial might” and worldwide impact think about itself? Is it similar to what societies in smaller states think about themselves? The questions are too obvious to require long answers. The Great Power traditions inherited from the past are actively involved in shaping political ideologies in many powers, especially in those which have not entered post modernity.37 These historical traditions are present in the ideologies not only of secular Russia, Turkey, and Communist China, but also of Islamic Iran. All of them are former empires that controlled vast stretches of Eurasia; all of them cannot but cherish and cultivate the historical memory of their glorious past. These traditions contribute to the political ideologies of these powers, which makes them indispensable securitization values. Consistency/inconsistency of a political ideology, in turn, directly affects the level of security, at least in the political and social sectors and, indirectly, the quality of the military sector. This means that devaluation of these values is dangerous to these security sectors. The Great Power values, being a product of conceptualization by society of the history of its spatial influence, directly depend on the geopolitical factor. Each power that exists within its recognized borders is virtually present in those historical limits with which its Great Power status is connected. Socially perceived, its domination within the historical limits is not only natural but, frequently, an indispensable condition of its consistency as a state. This means that the efforts of other actors to gain control over the same space are seen as threats to the power’s security. Even if this association with the space of its historical domination is mainly perceptional, it can be actualized by material components—an ethnically/confessionally close population left behind.38 35 Within the TRSC, securitization is represented as relative and autonomous, that is, as a process that totally depends on the actor: “…different actors securitize differently: different political and cultural situations enable securitization in different sectors and they have different dynamics…)” (B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., p. 87). 36 B.Buzan and O.Wæver have the following to say about the RSC seen from the prism of securitization: “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another)” (B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., p. 44). 37 B. Buzan and O. Weaver distinguish three types of sociopolitical development of contemporary states: premodern states (with a very low level of inner sociopolitical cohesion and state organization, weak governmental control over territory and population); modern states (with strong governmental control of society, limited openness, sanctity of sovereignty and independence complete with their attributes (including territory and borders), placing stakes on selfsufficiency, self-assistance, and national identity); and postmodern states (with a moderate attitude toward sovereignty, independence, and national identity, economic, political, and cultural openness when dealing with the outside world) (for more details, see: B. Buzan, O. Weaver, op. cit., pp. 23-24). 38 For example, the ethnic Russians who remained in the Soviet successor-states, or the Muslims who remained in the Balkans when Ottoman Turkey withdrew from the region.

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These perceived ties between the power and its former periphery may be strengthened by historical support (obligations) assumed by the former in relation to certain people(s) living in this territory39; sometimes society may interpret failure to live up to these obligations as defeat. 40 The fact that, first, several powers might claim a region (or regions) as their “natural responsibility zone” and, second, powers mostly preserve their ability to project, with varied degrees of efficiency, their influence on earlier controlled spaces, makes the situation even more complicated. This creates a web of security interdependence among powers and their interdependence with the newly independent states in the formerly controlled territory. In Eurasia, imperial systems stretched over vast territories, therefore their descendants (nowadays reduced to powers) may still nurse Great Power traditions in relation to several regions and, accordingly, be involved in these territories with more or less equal concentration of their security interests. At the same time, one should agree that the degree of concentration of the power’s security interests in regional systems will be different. This does not allow us, however, to speak, in one case, of the power as being included in the RSS (where its interests are highly concentrated) and to speak of its “penetration” in other cases. 

First, the very presence of key security interests (by definition vitally important for their holders) in the region(s) can be described as a sufficient motivation for its regional activity and its relations with others. It is not so important whether there are one, two, or three interests; the existential importance of each of them can be regarded as minimally necessary for any given power to be involved in regional security relations.

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Second, if we accept that securitization at the national level is autonomous and relative, we should also accept the relative nature of the vectors of its regional concentration. In this context, it is unwise to look at structural ties between actors as something static and not prone to changing, or rather to strengthening/weakening. One cannot exclude the possibility that the interdependence between states A and B as members of the same RSS will remain stronger for an indefinite period than interdependence between them and C as an external actor.

For example, can one insist and be sure that the key security interests of Iran in the Middle East associated with its relations with neighboring Iraq are much more important for Tehran than its key security interests linked with its relations with Azerbaijan in the Central Caucasus associated, in particular, with the multimillion compactly living Azeri community of Iran? Moreover, considering the Eurasian regions, one should also take into account the dynamic processes going on there and the impact of the related military-strategic and economic changes on the way the Eurasian powers perceive threats to their security. For example, how will America’s wider/ narrower military presence in Eurasia affect these perceptions? How will the region respond to Russia’s economic and military-technical strengthening/weakening against the background of higher/ lower world fuel prices or stronger/weaker tension between Russia and the West? These are not easy 39 Here is an example: Russia protected the Slavic peoples of the Balkans and Armenians and Ossets in the Caucasus, which in the 19th and 20th centuries involved it, together with other factors, in wars with Ottoman Turkey. In 2008, Russia, which started a war against Georgia, argued that it had to defend the Ossets of Georgia. Before moving troops inside Georgia, President Medvedev made a fairly important statement: “Historically Russia has been, and will continue to be, a guarantor of security for peoples of the Caucasus” (quoted from [http://ncafp.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/ImplementationReview-Russia-and-Georgia-Aug20111.pdf]). The same applies to the historical ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan and the Muslims of Georgia and the Northern Caucasus. 40 Russia’s inability to protect the Serbs and prevent the NATO bombings in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 and in Serbia in 1999 and effectively protect the rights of ethnic Russians in the Baltics is seen in Russia as its tangible defeat.

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questions; likewise, it is not easy to predict strengthening/weakening security interdependence in Eurasian regions caused by an autonomous and conventional securitization process. There is another, purely material, factor which complements the set of distinctions between a power and a state; this factor should also be taken into account while considering the “overlapping membership” issue. Powers are large states, while large states have large needs, which, conceptualized as national interests, must be realized. As distinct from small and medium states, powers frequently cannot realize their needs within narrow geographic limits; this forces them to go beyond the borders of one region. Depending on the nature of pivotal needs, interests may be existential for the given power. As distinct from the state, the power can consistently project its influence beyond its territory; it does not need geographic proximity to realize its interests. International terrorism and other forms of transborder criminal activity, WMD proliferation, as well as energy security are developing into fundamental motives behind powers’ involvement in important regions often located far away from those areas which should be the potential hubs of their existential interests. The way Washington treats South Asia (Afghanistan) and the Middle East (Iraq)—here I have in mind the use of force—serves as a pertinent example.

Types of Regional Involvement of Powers Admitting that powers can be involved in more than one RSS, one must establish the cases and forms in which this is possible. First, the power’s involvement in the RSS may be full, when it is present in the web of security interdependencies of the system at the level of key security interests in all the subsystems, up to and including corresponding ties with all the states, and partial, when such security interdependence between the power and the RSS develops at the level of the system’s individual subsystems. It is important to distinguish between these types of involvement and penetration. In the latter case, the power’s activity is unrelated to its consistently long presence in the web of interdependence of the key security interests either at the level of system, or its subsystems. In this case, the power may have relations with (or obligations in relation to) some of the system’s states. But these relations and obligations are not securitized as key interests, the violation of which creates existential security threats for the power. Being an element of an RSS, the power is fully involved in it, while examining the power within the system’s political environment does not necessarily presuppose its partial involvement. The system’s political environment does not exclude the presence of powers with no key security interests concentrated in it: they penetrate it for their own reasons, but their ties to the system are not based on their existential interests. In some cases, the political environment might overlap the “zone of indifference” and include “insulator states.”41 Partial involvement, in turn, presupposes that the power’s security is intertwined with that of the RSS at the level of the system’s individual subsystems. From this it follows that a power can be part of a system when it is fully involved and part of political environment when it has penetrated it. Partial involvement presupposes an intermediary level of ties and influences between the system and its political environment. Second, geographic proximity, being not crucially important for powers that can consistently project their force, including its military component, far and wide, remains still important as one of the parameters of involvement in the system. Indeed, irrespective of the actor’s power potential, its security in the first place are related to its physical components—territory and population. Any pow41

The TRSC uses these categories to identify the borders between regional complexes.

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er even having strategic weapons and mechanisms of containment of an aggressor concentrates primarily on neutralizing the threats coming from adjacent areas, the range of which is much broader than that of traditional threats: it includes ethnoterritorial conflicts, religious extremism, and terrorist activities. Indeed, Russia is coping with chronic problems of this sort in the Northern Caucasus, Iran has difficulties with the Azeri-populated areas, while Turkey is dealing with problems in the Kurdish provinces adjacent to the Central Caucasus. Moreover, common geography imparts stable nature to the power’s security assessment of the region that is also important for the power’s presence in the system’s security interdependence web. Different RSS are differently securitized by a power. A power may be fully involved in only one RSS, while the number of partial involvements depends on its geography (i.e. its nearest neighbors), historical memory (the regions related to it by Great Power traditions), material components (kindred ethnicities and confessions) and, finally, the current world status and corresponding ability to project its influence. The structure of involvement of the Eurasian powers is presented in the following table. Table Regional Involvement of the Eurasian Powers Type of Involvement Full

Partial

Power Russia

Post-Soviet space

Northeastern Asia (Japan, Korean Peninsula)

South Europe (the Balkans, western Black Sea area)

Northern Europe (the Baltics)

Turkey

The Middle East

Post-Soviet space (Northern Black Sea area, the Central Caucasus)

South Europe (the Balkans, western Black Sea area)

Iran

The Middle East

Post-Soviet space (the Central Caucasus, Central Asia)

South Asia (Pakistan, Afghanistan)

China

Northeastern Asia

Southeast Asia (Indochina)

Post-Soviet space (Central Asia)

South Asia (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan)

Specifics of the EU and U.S. Regional Involvement The specifics of the European Union’s and the United States’ regional involvement, which are somewhat different from the standard ideas about the ties between an RSS and the neighboring powers, deserve special attention. 51



At the very beginning of the present article, I identified both actors within the PSM political environment. This suggests several questions, the first of which deals with the nature of the EU as a political actor: can we talk about the EU as a power? When looking at Europe’s involvement in the PSM in an effort to assess the functionality of its security relations with other actors, we are confronted with the issue of the EU’s competency as a single holder of interests and related policy. No matter how far European integration has progressed, the EU can be hardly described as a single state, let alone a power. Within the TRSC, one can talk about the possible evolution of the EU from an “institutional” RSC42 to a more amalgamated political actor.43 Today, however, this is a long-term rather than short-term prospect accompanied by a multitude of questions, three of which have been formulated by Buzan and Wæver: “…is the EU able to take care of its own security without dependence on external powers? What are the interregional security dynamics between EU-Europe and its neighboring complexes? And to what extent and in what ways does the EU appear at the global level as a power of sorts?”44 As a source of strong economic impact, the EU is still working to form a unified course in the sphere of foreign and security policy. Its inner dynamics are still based on relations among sovereign states that can independently establish relations with neighboring regions. The EU’s influence is based mainly on its economic potential; in military matters the EU still depends on the United States. This means that despite a certain degree of consolidation within the EU (common interests in relation to neighboring regions), it should be regarded as the U.S.’s partner when it comes to military activities. The EU today is a target of external impact, that is, it is an RSS, and an actor with certain external interests and the ability to realize them when dealing with neighboring regions. The qualities of the former are obvious, while those of the latter still look dubious and unstable. The United States, on the other hand, is the mightiest power of the post-bipolar world; it is the “only superpower” with global interests and the corresponding capability to project its influence. This makes it much harder to identify its real involvement in various RSS. Within the TRSC, the United States belongs to the North American RSC. At the same time, the empirics of the post-bipolar world have demonstrated that its main, and sometimes extraordinary, activity is concentrated far beyond the limits of North America. The U.S. is involved in protracted military conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia. Should this be taken to mean that the U.S. is involved in the RSS in these parts of the world? While postulating the impossibility of “overlapping membership,” the TRSC admits that superpowers possess certain specifics: “Superpowers by definition largely transcend the logic of geography and adjacency in their security relations.”45 Buzan and Wæver tend to explain this through the mechanism of penetration. Irrespective of theoretical deliberations, America’s real involvement in these geographic regions far removed from its territory stems from security interests; more than that—they are securitized as key interests. When talking about the RSC through the prism of securitization (see footnote 36), one can easily discover that the “major processes of securitization” in the United States link it with the states of these regions (Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and North Korea) to a no lesser extent than the “securitization processes” that form the North American RSC. Moreover, these “major processes of securitization” are mutual. American perception of the Iranian or North KoB. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., p. 62. See: B. Buzan, op. cit., pp. 218-219; B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. De Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis, Rienner Publishers Boulder, London, 1998, p. 12. 44 B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., p. 373. 45 Idid., p. 46. 42 43

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rean threat is functional to the same degree as perception by Iranians or North Koreans of the American threat. As sovereign states under Saddam Hussein and the Taliban, Iraq and Afghanistan regarded the United States as an immediate threat; America reciprocated in kind. This means that we are dealing with partial involvement of the U.S. in these distant regions rather than with penetration. America is a special case that does not fit the standard mechanisms of contacts between powers and different RSS. In the previous chapters I touched the problems of powers’ special needs and projection of influence. In the case of the United States, we are dealing with global needs (at least perceived as such in America) and the unprecedentedly extensive potential of projecting influence (up to and including military force—the Navy, military bases, and SOA), which outstrip the potential of all other powers. In classical powers, Great Power traditions serve as a factor of regional involvement. In the case of the United States, we are dealing with a superpower, “the sole and, indeed, the first truly global superpower,” as Zbigniew Brzezinski put it,46 with a corresponding stable selfperception. It seems that the specifics of the regional involvement of superpowers should be further studied. And the present empirics do not suggest that the U.S.’s involvement should be limited to the North American RSS. To be more exact, in view of the fact that the United States is fully involved in the North American regional system, one should also designate its partial involvement in some other RSS, in particular in the Middle East, the post-Soviet space, and Northeastern, Southeastern, and Southern Asia.

Powers’ Regional Activity The question of what a power is doing to realize its interests in an RSS falls well within the context of the problem discussed. Indeed, the degree of a region’s securitization depends on what a power is determined to do to promote its interests in this region. Is this activity limited to standard everyday diplomatic mechanisms, or does it include extraordinary measures, up to and including the use of force? The answer to this question, among other things, clarifies the extent to which a power is involved in an RSS. The empirics of the development of the RSS in the post-Soviet space clearly points to Russia as the region’s most active power. This is obvious at the level of declaration of its interests and at the level of the range of mechanisms employed. All the three Russian presidents insisted that the post-Soviet space was a zone of Russia’s special interests. This was said in plain terms in President Yeltsin’s Decree on Approving the Russian Federation’s Strategic Course in Relations with CIS Member Countries, in President Medvedev’s Five Principles of Russia’s foreign policy formulated in the wake of the Russian-Georgian crisis of 2008, and in the Decree on Measures for Implementation of the Foreign Policy Course of the Russian Federation of 7 May, 2012, which outlined the foreign policy priorities of current Putin’s administration. In the final analysis, they are different stages of the development of the Near Abroad concept, in which the pivotal point is the region’s primary importance for the Russian Federation. Russia has been strongly opposed to trends fraught with the danger of removing the post-Soviet NIS from its orbit and, in particular, to the efforts of other countries to fortify their positions there. 46 Zb. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, New York, 1997, p. xiii.

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The range of instruments employed is fairly wide: standard diplomatic activity complemented with extraordinary measures—manipulation with ethnopolitical conflicts in some of the states, support of separatism47; economic instruments (the liberal empire tactics)48; energy domination; and, finally, the use of military force against Georgia in August 2008. Other powers are less active. All of them used certain means and methods (ranging from the economy, political support, and military-technical cooperation with the local NIS to elements of “soft power”) to build up their influence in the regions with the greatest concentration of their interests. Today, there are clear signs that none of them is ready to use harsh methods, up to and including the use of military force, to promote their interests, even though something similar did happen in the past: the situation in Georgia during its military conflict with Russia can serve as a pertinent example. The response of Turkey, the EU, and especially the United States to Russia’s use of military force against a newly independent state in which their interests were concentrated differed greatly from the previous empirics. The United States sent their warships to the Georgian Black Sea coast; together with accented diplomatic activity of the EU and Turkey this contained Russia. Surely, the August 2008 case demonstrated that Russia was ready to resort to extraordinary measures in the region. But it also can be helpful in explaining why other powers with security interests in Georgia demonstrated moderation and restraint. 

First, the extraordinary activities of a political actor under the pressure of securitized interests do not always presuppose a war; this is less likely in the case of powers’ relations and even less likely in the case of powers possessing strategic weapons. In August 2008, the response of Turkey, the EU and the U.S. to the fact that Russia moved its troops into Georgia was fairly strong and, in fact was among the main factors halting Russia’s movement within Georgian territory. It seems that it was thanks to their concerted efforts that Russia signed a truce and withdrew its troops from Georgia’s main territory.

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Second, even though Russia’s response to Tbilisi’s attempt to restore the state’s territorial integrity was harsh, the Kremlin clearly outlined the principles for which it was prepared to fight. Georgia’s defeat was a negative factor for the United States, Turkey, and the European Union, but Russia never crossed the line beyond which their key interests lay. If Russia had used military force to liquidate Georgia’s independence, remove the West-oriented Saakashvili administration, or destroy the fuel transportation system which brought Caspian energy resources to Turkey across Georgia, the response of the three actors would have been different.

47 Here I have in mind Russia’s unofficial support of separatist movements in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova— Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria (see, for example: B. Coppieters, “The Politicisation and Securitisation of Ethnicity: The Case of the Southern Caucasus,” Civil Wars, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2001, pp. 74-75; A. Malashenko, “Postsovetskie gosudarstva Yuga i interesy Moskvy,” Pro et Contra, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2000, pp. 42-43; S.E. Cornell, R.N. McDermott, W.D. O’Malley, V. Socor, F.S. Starr, Regional Security in the South Caucasus: The Role of NATO, Central AsiaCaucasus Institute, Washington D.C., 2004, p. 16; S.E. Cornell, “Undeclared War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Reconsidered,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XX, No. 4, Summer 1997, p. 12; A.I. Utkin, Mirovoy poriadok XXI veka, EKSMO Publishers, Moscow, 2002, pp. 400-401; A. Mörike, “The Military as a Political Actor in Russia: The Cases of Moldova and Georgia,” The International Spectator, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3, July-September 1998, available at [http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/iai/iai_98moa01.html], 13 December, 2007). 48 In this context, the “liberal empire” concept deserves special mention, according to which Russia should restore its influence in the NIS through economic expansion (see: A. Chubays, “Missia Rossii v XXI veke”, Nezavisimaia gazeta, 1 October, 2003). It was realized when Russia bought economic facilities in Armenia in exchange for debts; it also tried to apply the same pattern to Georgian and Ukrainian energy infrastructure facilities, etc.

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Involvement presupposes accentuated activity, up to and including its extraordinary measures. At the same time, the absence of the highest forms of such measures (use of military force) should not be taken to mean that the power is not involved. The Russian-Georgian war stimulated active interaction between the interested powers at the bilateral level—Russia-the U.S.; RussiaTurkey; Russia-EU—and at the U.N. level—extraordinary meetings of the U.N. SC on the Georgian developments, at which the U.S. and Georgia, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, failed to arrive at a concerted opinion about what had happened and to agree on a common resolution. There are other examples of accentuated activity of powers in post-Soviet Central Eurasia which, from time to time, went beyond the limits of standard diplomacy. Here are some pertinent examples: Turkey and Iran in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; Iran during the civil war in Tajikistan; Turkey during the North Caucasian instability in the 1990s; the U.S. in Georgia and Ukraine during the so-called velvet revolutions; America’s policy in the Central Asian NIS during the Afghan campaign, etc. One can hardly say that Russia has been the only power actively involved in an RSS in the postSoviet space, even in the context of the very short and empirically poor post-Soviet history and the small number of extreme situations similar to that of August 2008. On the other hand, the level of regional activity of a power depends on the degree of its involvement in a RSS. Full involvement presupposes more pronounced activity and, hence, a bias toward extreme types of activity. The Russian-Georgian war and the powers’ different behavior patterns can serve as an example.

Conclusion An efficient assessment of any political space from the point of view of the regional security system presupposes that the entire range of ties and relations among its elements and between them and external actors is taken into account. The RSS polarity and the impact of external powers are especially important in this respect. The RSS in the post-Soviet space is very illustrative: it clearly reveals a particular power’s ties with the system and the specifics of its involvement in the system. Based on its study presented in this article, I have concluded that there are two types—full and partial—of this involvement. In the first case, the power is present in the web of the system’s interdependence at the level of the key security interests in all of its subsystems, up to and including corresponding ties with all its states. In the second case, security interdependence of this kind is formed at the level of the RSS’s individual subsystems. Partial involvement makes it hard to identify the borders between an RSS and its political environment. A fully involved power is part of the system and determines its polarity. As part of the political environment of the system, a power can be related to it through the mechanism of penetration. Partial involvement presupposes an intermediary level of ties and impact between the RSS and its political environment. Both types of involvement are rooted in the interdependence of the power and the RSS at the level of the key security interests. Accordingly, for this power securitization of regionally-related threats and vulnerabilities may encourage extreme forms of its activity in an effort to neutralize them. Because of its more pronounced and more concentrated existential interests, a fully involved power is more inclined toward such forms of activity. Russia, Turkey, Iran, China, the EU, and the United States are all power centers involved in the RSS in the post-Soviet space. So far, however, Russia is the only power fully involved in this re55



gional system, while the others, as partially involved, serve as its political environment. Accordingly, one can determine the polarity of this RSS: here we can speak about the unipolar RSC, or to use a TRSC term, about the RSC “centered on a great power.” The present structure of the Post-Soviet Security Macrocomplex consists of 12 elements, namely, one power (Russia) and the other eleven NIS in its three subcomplexes—Central European (Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine); Central Caucasian (Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia); Central Asian (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Twenty years of post-Soviet development have demonstrated that the PSM is structurally unstable, which widens the range of opportunities to consider it as a transitive system. This and the soft form of its unipolarity are related to the specifics of its political environment. The large number of partially involved powers contributes to the system’s decentralization and plays the role of a containment factor for its only pole. The crucial parameter of an actor’s involvement in an RSS is the key security interests it has concentrated there. In the case of an ordinary state, these parameters are still closely related to its geographic proximity; in the case of a power, geography is not indispensable for the concentration of its security interests. Geographic proximity, however, is indispensable for the power’s full involvement; in the case of partial involvement, the geographic factor is important, but taking into account the specifics of the U.S. as a power and of its regional involvement it cannot be described as indispensable. The key security ties of Turkey, Iran, China, and the EU with the PSM in its different subsystems are based on geographic proximity. On the other hand, the fact that the Eurasian regions (the Middle East, the post-Soviet space, and Northeastern, Southeastern, and Southern Asia) are far removed from the territory of the United States does not devalue their importance from the viewpoint of America’s security interests. The nature of these interests suggests that the “only superpower” is partially involved in the RSS functioning in these regions. The United States is the only exception; the security ties of all other powers with the PSM are rooted in geographic proximity and, therefore, have ethnoterritorial dimensions. Hence it cannot be removed from the scope of their key interests. Moreover, the Central Eurasian regions of the PSM form a space of security interdependence between the involved powers and, by the same token, a sphere of their geopolitical interaction. The amity/enmity in their relations is projected to the region and motivates their regional activity. Oil and gas in the post-Soviet space are other factors of strong motivation of the powers involved. Some of them—the EU, the U.S., Turkey, and China—regard the region’s energy potential as a chance to upgrade their energy security; others—Russia and partly Iran—as a tool to be used to gain political advantages and upgrade their power status in the world. This space is a source of non-traditional threats, which also stimulates the involvement of powers in the regional NIS. These interests have already caused military interference of the United States and its European allies in Afghanistan and the use, for this purpose, of the territories of adjacent Central Eurasian states.

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IRAN, TURKEY, AND RUSSIA: SEMI-PERIPHERAL STRATEGIES IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS Ashot EGIAZARIAN Ph.D. (Econ.), Assistant Professor, Armenian State University of Economics (Erevan, Armenia)

T

ABSTRACT

he author discusses the semi-periph eral strategies of Iran, Turkey, and Russia in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus, as well as their trade expansion; he establishes that the semi-periphery countries, Russia and China in particular, dominate the region’s imports. He looks at all sides of Iran’s “struggle against exploitation” strategy, analyzes its

impact on individual economies, and reveals the semi-peripheral function of neo-Ottomanism from the world-systems perspective. The author’s analysis of Russia’s strategy allows him to conclude that after switching from mercantilism to integration with the leaders of the capitalist world-system, Russia can increase its semi-peripheral role and strengthen its position in the region.

KEYWORDS: Iran, Turkey, Russia, Central Asia, semi-periphery, the Southern Caucasus, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, trade expansion of the semi-periphery.

Introduction Immanuel Wallerstein, who looks at the world-systems theory as consisting of the core (the developed countries of the West) and the periphery (Third World countries) put the term “semi-periphery” into academic circulation. The world-system cannot function in conditions of strained relations between these two elements; it needs another structure (the semi-periphery) to ensure that the exploited periphery does not revolt against the exploiting core. There are no economic reasons behind the semi-periphery, however without it the world-system would be too polarized to retain its political stability. In other words, to quote Wallerstein, “the semiperiphery is needed to make the capitalist world-economy run smoothly.”1 This means that the economic role of the semi-periphery, which changed together with the world-system, is unimportant; what is important is its political role. 1 I. Wallerstein, “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 16, Issue 4, September 1974, p. 403.

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According to Wallerstein, there are over twenty semi-periphery countries, including Turkey, Iran, China, and Russia, all of them are major economic and political actors in Central Asia and the Caucasus. China is a semi-periphery country for economic reasons, however its place in the capitalist worldeconomy is somewhere between the core and the semi-periphery: its huge economic potential is steadily growing together with its political significance. In fact, this country is posing a challenge to the present configuration of the capitalist world-economy; here I will limit myself to its role in trade expansion. The other three countries (Iran, Turkey, and Russia) have very different economic and social structures and development dynamics; the same can be said about their political systems and cultural traditions; this explains their very different regional expansion strategies. Placed within the context of the world-systems analysis, the Iranian model of economic development can be described as “a struggle against exploitation,” which contradicts, to a certain extent, the liberal model of the West; its economic behavior outside its borders affects Washington’s policies in the Middle East. The United States is sparing no effort to keep Iran isolated at the global and regional levels; while Tehran, in turn, is sparing no effort to escape from this geopolitical and economic blockade. It should be said that its economic expansion earned Tehran a place in the regional oil and gas sector; it has established good relations with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Armenia. Its healthy GDP has moved Turkey to a good place in the world economy which is, however, greatly endangered by its negative trade balance and external debt—they make the country dependent on the core of the capitalist world-economy and, therefore, give it the appearance of a periphery country. Ankara has been exerting great efforts to move into the region, its success being especially impressive in the early 1990s. Later it was pushed back by the United States, the European Union, China, and Russia. Its economic interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus are limited to oil and gas, trade, investment, and construction. Post-Soviet Russia has found its place among the semi-periphery states of the capitalist worldeconomy; from the world-systems perspective it looks like a core in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Russian companies are spreading far and wide in many economic spheres, energy and trade in particular. The future of Russia’s economy is closely connected with guest workers from Central Asia and the Caucasus. Having switched from mercantilism to integration with the leaders of the capitalist world-economy, Russia can expand its semi-peripheral function and strengthen its regional position. This might not come true if new “power centers” appear in the region. Indeed, China’s stronger economic potential and international status will undermine Russia’s integration projects.

The Semi-Periphery: Trade Expansion In the context of world-systems analysis, the semi-periphery looks like a link that keeps the core and the periphery together. This is confirmed by its average economic indices as compared with the developed and underdeveloped states, as well as by its very specific place in the capitalist worldeconomy.2 On the one hand, it is trying to gain a place among the core countries; on the other, there is always the risk of sliding down to the periphery. 2

See: I. Wallerstein, op. cit.

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There are fairly large states among the semi-periphery countries with vast territories and considerable natural and human resources (about 70 to 100 million and more); they can rely on their capacious domestic market to develop relatively autonomous national economies and develop resources to modernize their industries and infrastructure. This adds vigor to national integration and state mechanisms. At the same time, the position of the semi-periphery is ambivalent not only because of instability, but also because of its two hypostases. Seen from the periphery, it is an exploiter and/or a military-political leader; seen from the core, it is a target of exploitation (a source of raw and other materials), that is, an outsider. The semi-periphery is doomed to remain an intermediary between the core and the peripheries of the capitalist world-economy: it depends on the core and on its own (mainly regional) periphery.3 The technologically more advanced and economically stronger core countries pursue a very aggressive investment policy in the periphery to establish their control over its strategic resources. The semi-periphery pursues an aggressive trade policy in its own periphery. As a periphery in relation to the core, a semi-periphery country can become the core for the neighboring periphery states; it can protect its domestic market against encroachments of the core, spread to the domestic markets of the weaker countries, and, in general, behave very much like the core. A semi-periphery state can develop and modernize itself independently, on its national basis, not only because of its economic potential, but also because of its political potential, primarily, according to Vladimir Khoros, because of its capacity as a nation-state.4 Their position in the capitalist world-economy makes the semi-periphery countries international players of “secondary importance” but with enough clout in neighboring periphery states. They cannot avoid trade expansion because of their economic structures: their mid-tech branches of the economy need horizontal expansion of consumer markets lest disproportions in the semiperipheral economies cause serious economic, social, and political upheavals at home and abroad. Expansion to new markets gives a semi-periphery country a chance to lower production costs and ensure economic growth and, hence, move forward to greater modernization and economic restructuring. In the 1990s, when Turkish and Iranian companies gained access to the Central Asian and Caucasian markets, they widened their markets and acquired more money. The share of private exportoriented businesses increased in both countries; this encouraged economic activity, created new jobs, and added to the profits of both semi-periphery countries. When moved to new periphery markets, the semi-periphery acts like a core because of its companies’ special position in the hierarchy of the world-economy. These companies are incorporated into the countries’ high-tech economic sectors. With shares in companies in semi-periphery countries, companies of the core countries receive at least part of the profits gained by exploiting the periphery. Turkey and China with their export-oriented companies are two pertinent examples. It should be said that these companies largely depend on companies of the developed countries for the latest technologies and corporate management. An analysis of the pertinent empirical data suggests that the core of the capitalist economy (the EU in this particular case) is the main consumer of the region’s raw materials. Forty-four percent, or 3 See: M.A. Molchanov, “Natsionalnye interesy v epokhu ‘globalnykh respublik’,” available at [http://www.polisportal. ru/index.php?page_id=79]. 4 See: V. Khoros, “Poluperiferia v kontekste globalizatsii,” Nezavisimy Almanakh “Lebed”, No. 329, 22 June, 2003, available at [http://www.lebed.com/2003/329.htm].

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$45 billion-worth (out of $102.3 billion), of the region’s aggregate export goes to the European Union (see Table 1). Table 1 Export of the Region’s Countries to the EU, 2010 Country

Export to the EU

Export, $m

Volume, $m

EU Share in Export, %

Armenia

1,011.4

501.3

49.5

Georgia

1,575.1

290.4

18.4

Azerbaijan

21,360.2

10,853.9

50.8

Kazakhstan

59,830.3

30,782.3

51.4

Uzbekistan

5,898.7

547.8

9.3

Kyrgyzstan

1,755.9

1,539.5

87.7

Tajikistan

1,195.0

42.8

3.6

Turkmenistan

9,700.0

483.1

5.0

102,326.6

45,041.1

44.0

Total

S o u r c e: Author’s calculations based on the figures of the national statistical services of the region’s countries and Eurostat.

Semi-peripheral Russia and China with 41.5% of the region’s total imports are the region’s leaders (see Table 2). Table 2 Ranking of Russia and China in the Imports of the Region’s Countries, 2010 Russia

China

Volume of Import, $m

Share, %

Score

Share, %

Score

Armenia

3,782.9

16.0

1

6.6

3

Georgia

5,156.3

5.6

5

6.5

4

Azerbaijan

6,600.6

17.3

1

8.9

4

Kazakhstan

30,839.3

39.1

1

12.9

2

Uzbekistan

3,525.9

54.0

1

33.6

2

Kyrgyzstan

3,222.8

33.6

1

20.7

2

Tajikistan

2,657.0

32.0

1

9.0

3

Turkmenistan

8,183.0

14.2

1

10.2

2

63,967.8

29.3

1

12.2

2

Country

Total

S o u r c e: Author’s calculations based on the figures of the national statistical services of the region’s countries and Eurostat.

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Iran: “Struggle against Exploitation” Iran opted for the statist Islamic economic model, which contradicted and still contradicts the liberal development model of the West; it does not allow the country to integrate into the capitalist world-economy. The religious, political, and economic elites of Iran insist that they intend to raise their country’s economic, scientific, and cultural level to acquire the status of the regional leader. Giovanni Arrighi, Italian economist, sociologist, and an authority in world-systems analysis, wrote that the “struggle against exclusionary tendencies” and the “struggle against exploitative tendencies” were two mutually exclusive behavioral patterns of the semi-periphery.5 Today, Iran is using the “struggle against exploitative tendencies” strategy to set up a division of labor system inside the country that will be relatively independent of the world-system. In other words, Iran is pursuing an autarchic strategy. Its geographic location, natural resources, and the predominantly young 80-million-strong population can be counted among Iran’s advantages. The steady flow of petro-dollars into the country made it possible for it to achieve some success in pursuing a fairly independent policy. Today, it is developing its nuclear program. This explains why Washington is determined to isolate Iran. It does not hesitate to apply economic sanctions to keep the country away from rich markets and sources of innovations. This will cost Iran its accumulated advantages and will force it to join the capitalist world-economy. Iran responds with maximally pragmatic foreign policies: unwilling to become part of unequal exchange with the core, it is staying away from it. On the other hand, Tehran is establishing unequal exchange relations with the periphery and more or less equal exchange relations with the semi-periphery; it is pouring a lot of energy into its economic ties with the Gulf countries, Central Asia, and the Caucasus and is also building multilateral relations with the SCO member states. In the 1990s, the Iranian presence in the Central Asian and Caucasian markets was fairly limited against the background of Chinese or even Turkish involvement.6 In the next decade, Tehran stepped up its efforts and switched to a more balanced policy; today, however, it trails far behind Russia and China with respect to trade turnover volume. It is trying to achieve at least three main things in the oil and gas sphere: to become an energy transportation hub; to identify the best route for gas exports (to Europe across the Southern Caucasus as one of the options); and to organize sustainable Caspian oil imports to keep the oil refineries in the country’s north in business.7 So far, Iran and its advantageous geographic location (it offers the shortest export route for Caspian resources) remain outside the big export game. It was expected that the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran oil pipeline would move 1 billion barrels of Kazakh oil a day to Iran. Today, the project geared at Kashagan has been frozen. The Iranian route cannot function in the present political context, while Washington’s tighter position makes its future dim. 5 See: G. Arrighi, “The Developmentalist Illusion: A Reconceptualization of the Semiperiphery,” in: Semiperipheral States in the World-Economy, American Sociological Association, Greenwood Press, New York, 1990, pp. 11-44. 6 See: A. Kniazev, “Regionalnaia strategia Irana v Tsentralnoy Azii: evolutsia i prioritety,” available at [http://www. knyazev.org/stories/html/chang_200508.shtml]. 7 For more details, see: A. Zulkharneev, “Energiticheskie interesy Irana v Kaspiyskom regione,” Tsentr politicheskikh issledovaniy Rossii, available at [http://www.pircenter.org/index.php?id=1248&news=5829].

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Iran is second only to Russia in terms of natural gas deposits—they are estimated at 28 trillion cu m (16% of the world’s total), however as late as 2007 the production volume was as high as the domestic consumption volume (110.5 bcm).8 Political and economic isolation keeps Iran away from the Asian (the Iran-Pakistan-India project) and European (Armenia-Georgia-the Black Sea-Ukraine-Europe project) gas markets. The country did not join Nabucco, which was planned as a transportation project for Iranian gas. We should bear in mind that the European gas market is vitally important for Russia, which explains why Gazprom (which controls Armenia’s gas transportation system) blocked off Iran’s efforts to move its gas to Europe via the Southern Caucasus. Iran, however, managed to organize oil and gas deliveries from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to its northern provinces9; the country also buys gas from Turkmenistan10 to sell it in the Southern Caucasus.11 Iran sees closer contacts with the Central Asian and Caucasian states as one of its foreign policy priorities; it has close relations with Tajikistan: both belong to the same ethno-cultural community; it is contemplating a Union of Farsi-Speaking States (Tajikistan, Iran, and Afghanistan). Iran is currently involved in several projects in Tajikistan, including tunnels in the mountains and hydroelectric objects (the second phase of the Sangtuda Hydropower Station); there are plans to connect Tajikistan and Afghanistan with power lines and build a network of highways and railways (Kolkhozabad-Lower Panj-Kunduz-Mazar-e Sharif-Herat-Mashhad). In 2010, trade turnover between Iran and Tajikistan reached $201.7 million which means that Iran let not only Russia ($959.8 million), China (687.1 million) and Turkey ($438.6 million) ahead of it but also Kazakhstan (312.8 million). The country is seeking a more prominent place in the region’s hydropower projects (it sees the Rogun Hydropower Station, the region’s largest, as one of the possibilities); so far, numerous geopolitical subtleties beyond Tehran’s power keep the country away. Together with Russia and China, Iran is the largest investor in the Tajik economy. It is quite satisfied with Turkmenistan’s neutrality policy; in 2010, their trade turnover reached $3.9 billion; the larger part of it was gas imports from Turkmenistan along the Korpeje-Kurdkuy pipeline. Iran pushed Russia, previously Turkmenistan’s largest trade partner, into second place (according to the RF Ministry of Economic Development): in 2010, Russia’s share in Turkmenistan’s trade turnover was 18%; Iran accounted for 21.7%; Turkey for 16.3%; and China for 10.7%. In Turkmenistan, Iranian companies invest in telecommunications, the water industry, construction, modernization of highways, oil refineries, etc. Their cooperation is further strengthened by the fact that Turkmen constitute a large share of the population in the north of Iran. 8 See: “Iran. Energy Overview. Iran Energy Data,” IEA, available at [http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/ Background.html]. 9 Every year Kazakhstan exports 4 million tons of oil across Iran under the swap scheme; Kazakhstan’s share is not large, about 7%. Turkmenistan uses the swap system to move nearly 90% of its annual oil export (about 3.2 million tons), or 43% of the total volume of swap operations (see: “Oil Flows and Export Capacity in the Caspian Sea and Black Sea Regions,” Kazakhstan. Energy Information Administration, p. 12, available at [http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Kazakhstan/Oil. html]). 10 The combined designed annual capacity of two gas pipelines, Korpeje-Kurdkuy and Dovletabat-Serakhs-Khangeran, is 12.5 billion cu m. 11 The Iranian presence in the gas market of the Southern Caucasus is fairly limited. Azerbaijan sells gas to the northwestern provinces of Iran and receives Iranian gas for Nakhchivan. Iran supplies Armenia with 400 million cu m of natural gas in exchange for electric power in a ratio of 1:3.

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In 2010, trade turnover between Iran and Kazakhstan was $1,120.3 million, Kazakhstan exported products totaling $1,093.3 million.12 Iran buys grain and the products of oil refineries and metallurgical plants from Kazakhstan. Relations between Iran and Uzbekistan are complicated by the Tajik nationalism and Islamic ideas widespread in the latter. The two countries, however, are developing trade in agriculture, the oil and gas sector, pharmaceutics, construction, and banking. In 2010, their trade turnover reached $609 million.13 Iran sells construction materials, detergents, foodstuffs, tea, and fruit to Uzbekistan and buys cotton, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, fertilizers, chemical fiber, etc., from it. Transport infrastructure figures prominently in the relations between the two countries; in 1996, they commissioned the Tejen-Serakhs-Mashhad railway connecting the railway systems of Iran and Central Asia; and in 2006, they built the Bafk-Bandar-e ‘Abbas railway to give Uzbekistan an outlet to the Persian Gulf. The territory of Uzbekistan, in turn, provides Iran with access to the CIS countries. In 2010, Iranian trade turnover with the countries of the Southern Caucasus was $580 million; Armenia is Iran’s closest partner—they are working together on energy and transportation projects and plan to connect their railways.

Neo-Ottomanism: Semi-Peripheral Function Its GDP of $729 billion makes Turkey Europe’s 7th and the world’s 17th economy (2010 figures); it ranks 17th in the world in terms of population size (77.8 million). The above has not earned it a place among the core countries of the capitalist world-economy; Turkey is a semi-periphery state. Its economy is dominated by the textile industry, mechanical engineering of a mid-tech level, resource-intensive branches (metallurgy and the food industry), tourism, and building contracts. The nagging domestic problems and persisting negative trade balance and external debt make Turkey partly a periphery country. It depends on the United States for its militarypolitical status, while its economy depends on Europe.14 Ankara tried to capitalize on the downfall of the Soviet Union; it hastened to spread its economic presence to Central Asia and the Caucasus, its advance being cut short by the economic crisis of the 1990s. Turkey comes after the U.S., EU, China and Russia in terms of investments in the region and trade volume. It has established good economic ties with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, its relations with Uzbekistan being much cooler. The closed border with Armenia and the absence of diplomatic relations did not affect trade turnover between the two countries: in 2010 it amounted to $212.1 million,15 which made Turkey Armenia’s 7th largest trade partner. Turkey is Georgia’s main trade partner with a trade turnover of $1,105 million at year-end 2010. See: Kazakhstan v 2010 godu. Statisticheskiy ezhegodnik. See: UzDaily.uz, 9 February, 2011, available at [http://www.uzdaily.uz/articles-id-5622.htm]. 14 For more details, see: S. Taşhan, “Turkey’s International Relations after Iraq War,” Foreign Policy, Issue 12, 2003, available at [www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/documents/periodicals/vol30.pdf]. 15 See: “Social and Economic Situation of the Republic of Armenia in 2010; External Sector,” The National Statistical Service of Armenia, available at in Russian [http://www.armstat.am/file/article/sv_12_10r_411.pdf]. 12 13

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Turkey, with a volume of $771.4 million, is Azerbaijan’s second largest import partner after Russia. Turkey could not move to the fore on the regional political scene and dominate it for two reasons: first, most of the region’s natural riches are controlled by the core of the capitalist worldeconomy; second, it failed to overcome the tough competition with the other semi-periphery countries (Russia, with its traditionally strong position in the region; China, which is consistently gaining strength and can spend much more money than Turkey; and Iran, with its pragmatic economic policy and cultural and historical ties with the region). The current policies of the Turkish ruling elite testify that its political and economic ambitions are moving closer to those outlined by the doctrine of neo-Ottomanism, in this case a political component of the semi-periphery function. Recently, Ankara has shifted the emphasis to the Middle East, with which it largely shares a common cultural heritage and history. It has another enormous strategic advantage. I have in mind its huge fresh water reserves. Water shortage in the Middle East has already caused many wars; it seems that in the coming decades the problem will become even worse. Turkey is seeking a place in the oil and gas sector, trade, investments, and construction in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The Turkish economy greatly depends on imported energy resources; imported oil and gas account for half of the country’s trade deficit; in January-October 2011, it amounted to $90 billion.16 To lighten the burden, Ankara joined several of the energy projects as a junior partner17: it invested in Azeri and Kazakhstan oil and gas projects and is one of the most active lobbyists of the Trans-Caspian gas project. Turkey is trying to use its geographic location to become an energy bridge between Europe and Asia18; this makes it a rival of Russia.19 Some experts think that the Blue Stream (which brings Russian gas to Turkey) was Ankara’s strategic mistake because it increased the country’s dependence on Russian gas.20 Russia’s oil and gas deliveries to Turkey are large enough for Ankara to seek mutually acceptable compromises with Moscow on energy projects. Turkey is very interested in the pipeline projects reaching the Mid-Eastern, particularly Iranian, hydrocarbon sources. Profits and political dividends do not exhaust its interests—it seeks greater security as well. Russia deliberately promotes pipeline projects that exclude Turkey; Moscow cannot but be concerned about Turkey’s stronger position: there are fears that after strengthening its position in the Middle East, Ankara will turn to the Caucasus and Central Asia. In the last twenty years, the gap between the two countries’ economic potential narrowed: in 1990, the Turkish GDP was 29% of Russia’s; in 2010, it reached 48.6%. Turkey intends to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Turkish Republic in 2023 by joining the ten largest world economies. 16 See: “Turtsia namerena snizit zavisimost ot rossiiskogo gaza,” Armenia Today, 16 December, 2011, available at [http://www.armtoday.info/default.asp?Lang=_Ru&NewsID=57254&SectionID=0&RegionID=0&Date=12/16/2011&PageP osition=1]. 17 For more details, see: A. Egiazarian, Turtsia i Rossia vo vneshneekonomicheskikh otnosheniiakh Azerbaidzhana (1995-2006), Kavkaz Analytical Center, Regnum, Erevan-Moscow, 2007, 66 pp. 18 See: S. Laçiner, “Turkey’s Pipeline Politics,” Review of International Law and Politics (Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika), Issue 19, 2009. 19 For more details, see: N. Ulchenko, “Geostrategic Aspects of Gas Export from Russia and Turkmenistan to Turkey,” Foreign Policy (Dış Politika), Issue 34, 2002. 20 See: Segodnya, 2 September, 1997.

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Turkey invested $6 billion in Azerbaijan,21 about $2 billion in Kazakhstan,22 and $1.3 billion in Turkmenistan.23 Turkish money is concentrated in power production (85% of the total), the processing industry, telecommunications, culture, and tourism. Until 2006, about 98% of Turkish exported capital went to Central Asia and the Caucasus: Turkey was involved in the Caspian fuel projects (production and transportation); this indicates the region’s huge importance in the country’s energy security. 24 Although geographically close neighbors, the Central Asia and Caucasus region and Turkey have no direct transportation links. A railway crosses Armenia; there is another railway in the east, on the Iranian border (Karykoy). Karykoy’s Kurdish population and the railway’s limited transportation capacity make it hardly suitable.25 Turkish companies are doing their best to resolve the problem with the help of their investment and trade strategies and local infrastructures. Turkish businesses reach the Russian market via Azerbaijan; this is amply demonstrated by the structure of Azeri export to Russia. The Turks are investing their money in export-oriented industries in Azerbaijan to remain in the domestic markets and reach the neighboring markets, particularly Russia’s.26 Turkey joined forces with Georgia to build the Kars-Akhalkalaki railway. Construction is another sphere of Turkish interests; this is especially true of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Turkish companies are no rivals for European, American, Japanese, or Chinese companies, however the Turks are present in nearly 80 countries. Between 2000 and 2008, the overall value of the Turkish projects abroad increased from $750 million (596.71 million euro) to $23.6 billion; the government plans to bring it up to $50 billion by 2015. In 1999, Engineering News-Record, the leading journal in the construction industry, listed four Turkish companies among the world’s 225 best international contractors. Ten years later, there were 31of them; together they brought $14.05 billion in profit into their country, or 3.6% of the aggregate international income of the world’s best building contractors. All of this makes Turkey a global player in the construction business.27

Russia: From Mercantilism to Integration Immanuel Wallerstein has written that post-Soviet Russia became a semi-periphery country in the capitalist world-economy, a place it has occupied throughout its 300-year-long history. 28 In terms of international labor division, Russia looks like a periphery country, however it is too large and too strong to be counted as such. “Even a weakened country Russia is too dangerous an adversary to let it slide to the South.”29 21

html].

See: Vestnik Kavkaza, 12 November, 2011, available at [http://www.vestikavkaza.ru/news/ekonomika/gaz/46205.

[http://news.mail.ru/inworld/kazakhstan/politics/7593642/]. See: I. Svistunova: “Turtsia-Turkmenistan. ‘Dva gosudarstva—odin narod’,” 8 June, 2011, available at [http://www. centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1307512620]. 24 For more details, see: A. Egiazarian, Gruzia: Strukturnye problemy ekonomiki i turetskaia ekonomicheskaia ekspansiia (1994-2007), Kavkaz Analytical Center, Regnum, Erevan-Moscow, 2007, 85 pp. 25 See: Ibidem. 26 For more details, see: A. Egiazarian, Turtsia i Rossia vo vneshneekonomicheskikh otnosheniakh Azerbaidzhana (1995-2006). 27 See: “Turtsia stanovitsia globalnoy siloy v stroitelstve,” available at [http://antalyatoday.ru/articlerd/antalya-46.html]. 28 See: I. Wallerstein, “Rossia i kapitalisticheskaia mir-ekonomika,” Svobodnaia mysl, No. 5, 1996, pp. 37-38. 29 Ibid., p. 41. 22 23

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Wallerstein describes “the army and everything which is connected with it in Russia” as elements of the core.30 In all other respects—resource potential, the nuclear industry, space research, and its surviving science and education sphere—Russia belongs to the semi-periphery. It can be said that it is still holding onto the position it has been occupying for nearly 300 years. However, if the destructive tendencies of the last two decades continue, in some 10 to 15 years Russia will become a permanent member of the “periphery community.”31 Today, as part of the capitalist world-economy, Russia is positioned as a raw-material appendage of the post-industrial and industrial countries; indeed, mineral resources and metallurgical products account for 80% of its export. It is working hard to switch to a different export structure by extracting and processing its rich natural resources with the help of its still existing industrial potential (the Canadian development scenario). Russia will have to revise its policies (so far obviously mercantilist) and rhetoric. Since the 17th century, mercantilism has been and remains an instrument of semi-periphery countries seeking a core status. It remains to be seen whether it will help Russia in the same way it helped France, Germany, and other countries. In the last fifteen years Russia has remained devoted (at least externally) to the principles of mercantilism, which failed to encourage structural changes in its economy. It seems that Russia intends to use its newly acquired WTO membership to leave mercantilism behind and establish closer relations with the leaders of the capitalist world-economy. This means that Russia might expand its semi-periphery function and consolidate its position in the region: Iran remains isolated, while Turkey has turned to the Middle East. It is commonly believed in Russia that the region’s countries belong to the sphere of Russia’s exclusive influence, a conviction rooted in the surviving memories of the Soviet past. In fact, the periphery neighbors of a semi-periphery country are invariably included in the sphere of its interests, its security interests in particular. Indeed, Russia’s national security can be undermined by instability in Central Asia (Islamism, refugees, drug trafficking, lost control over pipelines and uranium mining, contracted trade volumes, etc.) or the Northern Caucasus (very much affected by instability in the Southern Caucasus). To preserve and consolidate its position in the region, Russia is actively using all the tools at its disposal, including the transportation and communication infrastructure inherited from the Soviet Union. Moscow spares no effort to retain its dominant position in the European market (today the EU receives 50% of imported gas and 30% of oil from Russia32) and to preserve its economic and political advantages; it tries to block off all alternative oil and gas pipeline projects in the Caspian.33 The configuration of the region’s gas pipeline system is of primary importance for Russia; so far, it dominates it; its position in the oil pipeline system is less impressive. In an effort to gain access to vitally important resources, the European countries prefer not to spoil relations with Russia. This explains why their companies sometimes play against each other and why Gazprom has entered fairly advantageous contracts with ENI of Italy, Gasunie of the Netherlands, BASF and E. ON Ruhrgas of Germany, and Gaz de France of France. See: Ibid., pp. 38-39. V. Khoros, op. cit. 32 See: “An External Policy to Serve Europe’s Energy Interests. European Commission and EU Secretary-General/High Representative,” June 2006, available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/ 90082.pdf]. 33 For more details, see: Z. Baran, “EU Energy Security: Time to End Russian Leverage,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2007. 30 31

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Late in the 1990s, Russia promptly responded to the plans to build a gas pipeline across the Caspian (from Turkmenistan to Turkey and Europe) by building the Blue Stream across the Black Sea to Turkey. In 2007, Gazprom and ENI of Italy announced that they intended to build South Stream (a gas pipeline designed to push Nabucco away). Simultaneously, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan signed a tri-partite contract to build the Caspian pipeline along the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea and expand and modernize the already functioning pipelines in the region. When implemented, this project was expected to give Gazprom control over at least some of the Central Asian gas exports. Gazprom has an agreement with Turkmenistan to increase gas purchases from 50 bcm to 90 bcm in 2008. Despite the higher prices established by the Central Asian countries, Gazprom is buying more and more gas.34 Other (already existing) joint projects—the Central AsiaCenter and Bukhara-Urals gas pipelines—are used to increase the flow of Uzbek and Turkmen gas to Russia.35 Central Asian gas plays an important part in Russia’s energy balance; today Gazprom needs it to cover its European contracts. According to expert assessments, in the next decade Russia will remain the world’s largest exporter of natural gas, and the EU its largest importer. The unimplemented Trans-Caspian and Trans-Afghan projects could have become alternatives to the Russian routes; this means that there are no western and southern gas transportation routes to compete with the Russian—something that the United States and the European Union like very much. Indeed, oil as a resource of strategic importance goes to the core, while gas, a less important resource, to the semi-periphery. In 2006, Gazprom bought three of the largest gas fields (Urga, Kuanysh, and Akchalak) from Uzbekistan; the deal also guaranteed Russia’s tolerance of the Uzbek regime. This made Gazprom practically a monopolist exporter of Uzbek gas. From the world-systems perspective, semi-peripheral Russia relieves the core-periphery tension. Russia, a semi-periphery country, plays the role of the core in relation to Uzbekistan as a periphery country; this should not be taken to mean that the core has slackened its grip on the semiperiphery. The United States and the European countries have commercial and technological tools at their disposal to be presented to Russia at the negotiation table: 

Western investments in the oil and gas sphere—something which Russia badly needs;



Transfer of Western oil and gas technologies to Russia;



Cooperation in nuclear power production;



Coordination of efforts to achieve more efficient use of energy in Russia and the EU;



Western technologies to be used to achieve higher efficiency of the Russian power sector.

Russia’s position in the gas sphere is strong, but it has no transit monopoly: export no longer depends solely on it. Turkmenistan sells its gas directly to Iran and China; the latter also buy gas from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Compared with the other international players, Russia’s investments in the Central Asian fuel sector look modest. In 2007, it invested from $4 to $5.2 billion. The larger part—from 80 to 85% (between $3.4 and $4.1 billion)—went to Kazakhstan; Uzbekistan received from $0.5 to $1 bilIran and especially China are prepared to pay even more for Central Asian gas, which explains the higher prices. See: V. Paramonov, A. Strokov, “Russian Oil and Gas Projects and Investments in Central Asia,” Central Asia Series, Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham, 2008. 34 35

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lion; and the other countries (Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan) acquired up to $50 million.36 Russia is involved in many of the oil and gas projects in Kazakhstan on a much smaller scale than the West; it should be said that the BTC and BTE pipelines deprived Russia of some of its impact on Azerbaijan and Georgia. Gazprom operates in many countries; it is involved in geological prospecting in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan and in gas supplies and gas distribution in Armenia. ITERA of Russia is engaged in Turkmenistan in expanding the pipeline system and its modernization, a relatively less capital-consuming sphere. The offshore gas fields require much more money; their development is never smooth because of certain technological and geopolitical factors. Russia has to compete with Kazakhstan in the gas sector of Kyrgyzstan and Georgia; Kazakhstan intends to start geological prospecting for oil in Turkmenistan. The Kazakh companies might establish their control over the national hydrocarbon resources, which will endanger the Russian projects in this country. Russia is seeking greater involvement (but not domination) in hydropower production. Inter RAO EES of Russia built the Sangtuda-1 Hydropower Station in Tajikistan with a design capacity of 670 megawatt (today the company owns 75% of the shares). Russia supplies Kambarata-2 in Kyrgyzstan with power generators and controls the Inguri Hydropower Station in Georgia (its storage pool is located in Georgia, while the station itself is in Abkhazia, now under Russia’s control). The hydroelectric power projects in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are hard to implement because of the region’s water shortages: about 80% of the Central Asian water resources formed in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are used in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan, which has the region’s largest population, two-thirds of which work in agriculture, feels the shortage more than its neighbors. It depends on the water coming from the mountains of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. It is commonly believed in Uzbekistan that hydropower stations in these countries will disrupt the region’s water balance and trigger unpredictable social, political, and ecological repercussions. Russia’s involvement in hydropower projects draws it into the intricacies of the geopolitical game; this might undermine its influence in the region and damage its relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan, two potential buyers of the region’s power. It seems that, unwilling to risk its position in the region, Russia withdrew from the project of the Rogun Hydropower Station in Tajikistan. Turkey, Iran, and even China cannot resolve the region’s water supply and power production problems. Russia’s economy largely depends on trade with Central Asia and the Caucasus; it primarily concentrates on power production. As distinct from the West, which consumes energy resources, Russia trades in them. The raw materials from the region are processed at Russian enterprises, albeit on a much smaller scale than before. Russia sells spare parts to the region’s countries, extends technical assistance, and sells some other types of finished products (today, very much like in Soviet times, these countries have no industrial infrastructure to speak of). Russian companies cannot compete with their Western colleagues in Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan; in the oil-poor countries (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia), their position looks fairly strong. China in Kyrgyzstan, Iran in Tajikistan, and Turkey in Georgia confront Russia with fairly stiff competition. 36 See: V. Paramonov, A. Strokov, Rossiiskie neftegazovye proekty i investitsii v Tsentralnoy Azii, Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Central Asian Series, Great Britain, 2008. 19 pp.

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Russian companies are also interested in uranium mining, power production, the petroleum products market, construction, telecommunications, goods traffic, railways, banks, the military-industrial complex, some of the agricultural branches, etc. In November 2008, the Government of the Russian Federation adopted the Concept of LongTerm Social and Economic Development of the Russian Federation up to the Year 2020, which formulated the efficiency criteria and identified the landmarks leading to sustainable economic growth and stronger national security. By 2020, Russia intends to join the top five world countries; by 2020, per capita GDP should be doubled (against 2007); it should increase the share of high-tech and innovation enterprises; spend more on R&D; export more, etc. If realized, these plans will create a workforce shortage inside the country (in the next decade the country will lose 1% of its able-bodied population every year) and will need over 12 million migrants. So far, none of the developed countries has been able to implement the best possible scenario of economic growth in similar conditions.37 The high growth rates of the last decade in some sectors have made Russia even more dependent on migrant workers. According to certain assessments, the total number of labor migrants from Uzbekistan (both legal and illegal) is over 1 million; in Russia, nine out of ten migrants are illegal.38 Russia comes second after the U.S. in terms of number of migrants; they come from Central Asia and the Caucasus (today, Russia is the main host country for the region’s labor migrants). Russia’s population is growing older, which means that labor migration will develop into a key factor of its economic development; Russia will obviously work hard to consolidate its position in the region. So far it is losing its grip there: China with its huge economic and political resources is rapidly increasing its presence in the oil and gas industry, as well as in the trade and investment spheres. India, Iran, and Turkey are not strong enough to squeeze Russia out of the region. The rivalry between Russia and China in the region will most likely dampen their relations. China, which is strengthening and expanding its trade and economic contacts in Central Asia, is building transportation routes to connect the region with its own territory and oil and gas pipelines, which deprive Russia of its levers of influence. This is fraught with great problems for Russia in the long-term perspective.39 The Final Report of a group of experts on the urgent problems of Russia’s social and economic strategy until 2020 pointed out that China is gradually moving into a leading position in the commodity markets of the region’s countries (including the countries of Russia’s traditional domination). The document went on to say that “despite the slower (8.5%) average annual growth rates in 2011-2012 compared with 10.0% of the previous period (2010-2011), China remains one of the most dynamic economies because of the greater domestic demands and higher incomes of its population”. The authors deemed it necessary to point out: “In the next 10 years China will fortify its global position thanks to its growing economic might, more positive attitude of the West, and its financial expansion in the world markets (loans, buying-up distressed promissory notes, direct investments in other countries, etc.).” 37 See: M. Dmitriev, “Long-Term Economic Consequences of the Aging Population in Russia,” Information Supplement to the Report on Social Development for 2009, Center for Strategic Research. 38 See: S. Ryazantsev, L. Rybakovsky, “International Migration in the Russian Federation,” The document was presented at a meeting of U.N. experts in international migration and development, available at [http://www.un.org/esa/population/ meetings/ittmigdev2005/P11_Rybakovsky&Ryazantsev.pdf]. 39 See: M. Laruelle, S. Peyrouse, China as a Neighbor: Central Asian Perspectives and Strategies. Silk Road Monograph, Central Asia and Caucasus Institute, Washington, D.C., April 2009.

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The experts concluded that Russia might be confronted with risks and challenges; they do not exclude the possibility that by 2020 the yuan could become a global currency. They also presumed that “if a more radical scenario is implemented, which will make China the issuer of a regional (or even world) reserve currency, it might shatter the international monetary system, limit the sphere of the Russian ruble in international clearing operations, and cause currency war.” They believe that this will challenge the world community, not to mention Russia. China’s stronger position in Central Asia may keep the region away from Russia’s integration projects; they could add an edge to the rivalry over Central Asian energy resources and slacken customs control on the border between Kazakhstan and China (the southern border of the Customs Union), which in turn could thwart the plans to enlarge this Customs Union. The authors deemed it necessary to stress that the interests of third countries, Russia among them, might be damaged by China’s more active negotiation and interventionist activities in the “club of the world leaders;” its stronger position in the WTO and IMF, and the much stronger position of the G2 (the U.S. and China) in governing the global economic processes.40 Those who say that under certain conditions, vulnerable Russia will present a grave danger in the context of the interests of the capitalist world-economy now challenged by rapidly strengthening China could well be right. This means that in the short-term perspective, Russia will try even harder to build up its influence in the region.

Conclusion Wallerstein has written that the period of peaceful development of the capitalist world-economy has ended. Further widening of political rights and redistribution of material wealth will endanger the system of capitalist accumulation. It appears that this contradiction has cropped up in the form of a fiercer struggle for influence and distribution of regional resources among the core and semi-periphery countries. Turkey, Iran, and China tried to gain domination in the neighboring Central Asia and Caucasus region as soon as the Soviet Union ceased to exist; their companies have been actively pouring money into regional infrastructural and raw material assets and gradually penetrating the local markets. In the 2000s, Russia, which regained its strength thanks to high fuel prices, demonstrated its intention to draw the region into its foreign policy orbit; the core and the semi-periphery became involved in political and economic rivalry, which not infrequently developed into an open confrontation between them and among semi-periphery countries. They became much bolder when it came to decisions on many of the current issues; sometimes they formulated initiatives of an anti-systemic nature. The multivectoral policy of the periphery countries seeking more varied sources of money and more markets exacerbated this rivalry. Today, the United States and its policy of isolation are keeping Iran away from the region. Turkish expansion is fairly limited not only because it has few resources and possibilities (much fewer than those of China and Russia), but also because of the prominent Middle Eastern vector of Ankara’s foreign policy. Russia, which is determined to make the region part of its Eurasian integration project, regards its stronger position in the region as one of its foreign policy priorities. China is one of the main obstacles; this means that the relations between the two rivals might deteriorate. 40 See: Itogovy doklad o rezultatakh ekspertnoy raboty po aktualnym problemam sotsialno-ekonomicheskoy strategii Rossii na period do 2020 goda, pp. 806-807, available at [http://www.youngscience.ru/files/news-150312-strateg2020.pdf].

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The fight for uranium resources will add new hues to the contradictions between the main players and might ultimately “Balkanize” the region. Today, oil and gas are two of the main economic advantages, but on the world scale their volume looks fairly modest. The uranium deposits place the region on a par with Australia and Canada, two leading uranium-mining countries. The region’s oil resources have already largely been distributed, which means that the turn of uranium deposits has come. The West, Russia, China, and, according to certain assessments, Iran, which is interested in Tajikistan’s uranium resources, have already joined the fracas.

EAST MEDITERRANEAN GEOPOLITICAL ENERGY ELBOWING WITH AN AMERICAN, RUSSIAN, ISRAELI, TURKISH, AND IRANIAN PREFIX: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ACTORS Thrassy N. MARKETOS Ph.D. (Political Science), Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Athens, Hellas, Greece)

T

ABSTRACT asked the U.N. to recognize its right to drill in its territorial waters, Hezbollah being the most vocal in this regard. Turkey presented Syrian President Bashar al-Assad with the project of a QatarSaudi Arabia-Iraq-Syria-Turkey gas pipeline, via which natural gas could have been exported to Europe too, to the detriment of the Russian Federation, however the Syrian President refused, implementing Iran’s natural gas pipeline project instead.

he Leviathan gas deposit discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean Israe li Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in 2010 by the U.S. Noble Energy Company is in fact Syria’s stake in “democratization.” The drilling of natural gas has given birth to a new conflict in the region: Israel, Syria and the Gaza Strip claiming drilling rights as well. Cyprus (an EU member country) has not given up either, nor has Lebanon, which 1

1 This analysis and the facts, names, and figures included in it have no relation whatsoever to my work in the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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Construction of the natural gas pipeline started immediately. Spurred on by the U.S., Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia began directly supporting the Muslim Brotherhood as a destabilizing element for the “traitorous” regimes that were negotiating the Leviathan’s potential with Iran, Russia, China, and India. Turkish warships are engaged in all kinds of conflicts with American, Israeli, and Cypriot prospecting vessels in the Mediterranean Sea. Turkey imports 60 per cent of

its natural gas needs from Russia and cannot allow its “historical enemy” to manage the Leviathan deposit too. It is hoped that the advantage will be reversed once the Muslim Brotherhood comes to power. This analysis, based on the neo-realist school of thought in geopolitics, aspires to shed light on the geopolitical game being played astride the media coverage of the Syrian civil war and Eastern Mediterranean gas deposit potential.

KEYWORDS: energy security, Middle East, energy deposits, East Mediterranean, the U.S., EU, Russia, Iran, Turkey, civil war in Syria, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Kurds.

Introduction The estimates that have been circulating for several decades now regarding huge deposits of natural gas resources on the crisis-driven southeastern shore of the Mediterranean and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Republic of Cyprus turned out to be true when, in December 2011, official research studies confirmed what used to be rumors. In 2009, in cooperation with Noble Energy (Texas, U.S.), Israel discovered an offshore natural gas deposit in the Levantine basin, just 80 km west of the harbor of Haifa, containing some 238 bcm, which was named Tamar. It was the most significant natural gas discovery of the year and news of paramount importance for Israel, which, unlike most of its Arab neighbors, was deprived of energy efficiency. A year later, a 450 bcm offshore deposit, 5 km below sea level, was discovered slightly to the west but still in Israel’s EEZ, which was named Leviathan after the Bible sea monster. The geopolitical equation is completed by a 2-3 tcm natural gas deposit presumed to be hidden in Herodotus basin, under the jurisdiction of the Hellenic Republic.1 It came as no surprise that the 3,400 bcm of natural gas and 1.7 billion barrels of oil ready to be extracted from the depths of the Eastern Mediterranean sea—including the underwater deposits of the Nile delta in Egypt—once again became international spotlights in this troubled region and in the states surrounding it. Even before Tamar becomes productive (estimated for the 1st quarter of 2013), just the prospect of natural gas exploration in a region so close to the “energy thirsty” European Union market reversed the geopolitical map and prompted the Union’s reconsideration of the region. This geo-economic reconfiguration on the Eastern Mediterranean shores, arising in the context of a three-year worsening of relations between Turkey and Israel and the use of aggressive wording by Turkish officials against the Republic of Cyprus, evidently brought Israel and Cyprus, and not surprisingly Greece as well, closer together. This realignment made the geostrategic Cyprus-CretePeloponnese-Ionian Sea-Italy corridor probably the most efficient export route for Israel’s energy resources to the European market. 1

See:[http://www.science.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers/bdd/res/2619/quel-avenir-pour-le-gaz-naturel], 11 No-vember, 2012.

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Keeping in mind that the EU is currently importing some 83% of its oil and 57% of its natural gas requirements, the deposits in Israel, Cyprus, and Greece will be enough to meet the needs of the 27-member EU for around twenty years. Equally, taking into account that natural gas consumption in the EU reached 471 Gm3 in 2007 and is increasing at a rate of 3% every year, as well as the fact that Europe is aiming to reduce carbon-dioxide contamination by 2020 (by abandoning coal burning), the geostrategic significance of the Eastern Mediterranean energy resources is obvious. This significance is highlighted by the extremely sensitive political and geostrategic transition happening in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and, of course, Iran, and the highly competitive nature of relations between the Russian Federation and the Washington-London axis. Israel, which has been struggling recently to assure it is supplied with enough natural gas from the international market, while its own deposits are dwindling, is also very aware of this significance. At a moment, when the so-called Arab Spring has been ravaging the Libyan and Egypt regimes (Tel Aviv is receiving 40% of its natural gas imports from Egypt), a member of the Islamic Muslim Brotherhood party has become president in Cairo, and the U.S.-backed Lebanese Hezbollah is claiming part of the Tamar deposit, the prospect of quick exploitation of underwater resources has given the Hebrew state a powerful boost and optimism.

The Russian Factor The EU market seems ideal for advancing the East Mediterranean hydrocarbons of the Israel-Cyprus-Greece energy triangular, which naturally functions with American blessings. In any case, the Anglo-Saxons (U.S.-UK) have always associated Cyprus’ geopolitical significance with energy efficiency. It is enough to remember that the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the construction of which was actively backed by Washington and London, ends opposite Apostle Andrew Cape on the Karpassia Peninsula occupied since 1974 by Turkey. In other words, Cyprus is a strategically crucial point for the pipeline and control of energy resources in the region called the Greater Middle East. However, the economic hardships of Greece and Cyprus and the very good relations both states have with Moscow might prompt Athens and Nicosia to turn to Russia, which has always been interested in the region’s development, in search of an alternative. It is worth saying that both Soviet and post-communist Russian foreign policy has been engaged in a Realpolitik strategy and economic penetration into Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey, aiming to weaken those countries’ links with the West and extending Russian influence to the south. The 2.5-billion Russian loan to the troubled Cypriot economy has assured the importance of Russian investments, on the one hand, and has reaffirmed the stable political and economic ties with Nicosia, on the other. It stands to reason that Moscow declared it would not accept the objections Ankara had to Cyprus signing a deal with America’s Noble Energy Company aimed at developing its energy resources. The climate changes are creating an exit channel around the Arctic Circle necessary for facilitating the transportation of Russian trade goods. The Kremlin has been eagerly seeking such an exit channel in the Mediterranean Sea, the Baltic Sea, and even through Afghanistan in the Indian Ocean for three hundred years, but has always been ostensibly denied by Britain. Indeed, Russia is entering the second decade of the 21st century free of the “Rimland” burden, in other words, the strip of coastal land that, according to American geographer Nicholas John Spykman’s theory, encircled Eurasia and obstructed Russia’s free access to the Mediterranean Sea and, consequently, gave the Ottoman Empire and nowadays Turkey a “special relationship” with the Anglo-Saxon countries of the West, and then also with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the second half of 73



the 20th century. Realizing this, Turkey has tried to find something unique in its geopolitical and geostrategic position on the map and invented the “New-Ottoman theory” to charm the Arab-Muslim and Persian-Muslim Shi‘a world in order to use it as a tool for being accepted as the new hegemonic power in the oil- and natural gas-producing region of the Middle East.2 As for Russia, it risks losing Syria, its long-time Cold-War ally, where it maintains a significant naval power base (Tartous), due to the ongoing civil war there. This is a delicate situation since there is the real possibility that the Kremlin will seek to alternatively station its naval power elsewhere in the region or even in Cyprus, a member state of the Euro zone, with which it has excellent relations. This will give Russia the right to become actively involved in the island’s energy resource development. Several Russian companies are already competing to acquire offshore resource exploitation permits from the Cypriot government, causing many people in the EU to worry about Moscow’s potentially strong position in the island’s natural gas sector. Of course, Moscow is maintaining equally good relations with Israel, which is less than happy about the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood-backed opposition forces in Syria waging a harsh battle against the Assad regime. Tel-Aviv, which enjoys the backing of Moscow, is considering building an underwater natural gas pipeline, stretching from its deposits in the Levantine basin across Cyprus territorial waters to the Greek mainland, with the aim of supplying the European market. As a matter of fact, this is the third trustworthy alternative hydrocarbon transportation route to the EU markets (the other two involving Russian and Azeri resources) that could ultimately provide Europe with the energy that the Nabucco project failed to offer.3 The European states would no doubt prefer to rely on the loyal, according to the International Law of the Sea, Cyprus EEZ demarcation with Israel than on analogous claims by Turkey, Lebanon, and Syria.4 In addition, the Cyprus Republic has signed a defense cooperation treaty with Israel to provide security for mutual natural gas deposits,5 and, while on an official visit to Tel-Aviv, the Greek Defense Minister discussed engaging the Hellenic navy forces to protect the energy installations.6 Given that security is a decisive question for investing money in the construction of energy installations, these decisions offer a good framework for advancing the cooperation scheme Israel is elaborating with Cyprus and Greece. Furthermore, due to the number of Israeli citizens and family members working at the storage terminal to be constructed using Israel funds close to Famagusta, Israel and Cyprus have agreed to the stationing of an Israeli force, the task of which will be to protect them and the installations. The pact includes a term that provides the Israeli forces with access to the Cypriot defense units.7 Obviously, Israel will be present in Cyprus for a long time and this is no doubt occurring with Washington’s consent. As a consequence, the Republic of Cyprus is becoming part of the Hebrew state’s strategic survival, security, and well-being. This is creating a security belt around the energy deposits of the Eastern Mediterranean thought to be strong enough to annihilate Turkey’s threats against Cyprus, as well as Ankara’s attempts to draw the limits of its EEZ with Egypt without reference to the lawful rights of the Greek island of Kastelorizo, another Turkish mechanism aiming to deprive Hellenic and Cypriot EEZ from sharing limits. 2 See: J. Mazis, The Israel-Cyprus-Greece Axis Secrets. The European Energy Reality. Action Taken by the U.S. and Russia. Turkish Planning for Kastelorizo Island, Foreign Affairs-The Hellenic Edition, March 2012, pp. 10-11 (in Greek). 3 See: A. Stergiou, “Russian Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and its Implications for the EU External Action,” available at [http://iss.europa.eu/publications/], 25 July, 2012. 4 See: Ibidem. 5 See: J. Kanter, “Race for Gas by Cypriot Rivals Adds to Tensions,” New York Times, 30 August, 2012. 6 See: M. Sukkarieh, “Eastern Mediterranean: Will Gazprom Advance Russia’s Influence in the Region?” Middle East Strategic Perspectives, 22 October, 2012. 7 See: J. Kanter, op. cit.

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The U.S. and the EU are against Russia’s intervention in the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas deposit exploration and production. But Israel, Cyprus, and Greece are favoring this in an attempt to boost their justification for eventually entering a conflict with Turkey, and in the case of Israel, with other enemy neighbors. It is quite interesting that having secured the right of passage through the Turkish EEZ in the Black Sea for the imminent construction of the South Stream natural gas pipeline (28 December, 2011), Gazprom, known for its connections with the Kremlin, is trying to purchase bonds of the Hellenic DEPA oil and natural gas state company. According to a statement by Leonid Zyuganov, Head of Gazprom’s Project Management Department, “the company’s interest in DEPA has no connection with the South Stream project and the decision that the scheduled pipeline will not cross Greek territory is solely related to the market, not to the owner of DEPA,” meaning the low natural gas demand in Greece and Southern Italy due to the debt crisis in the two southern European countries. Many analysts think that, despite the fact that today’s South Stream project is crippling Greece, “the officially declared Russian interest in the Greek energy market makes the country’s re-inclusion in South Stream planning quite possible. Some even argue that it is being used as a negotiation tool for DEPA’s purchase by Gazprom.”8 It is also interesting that Gazprom signed an agreement with Israel on the production and preliminary purchase of 2 to 3 million tons of liquefied natural gas during President Putin’s visit to the country (July 2012). Providing that it achieves DEPA’s acquisition, Gazprom is planning to buy more Israeli and Cypriot natural gas, transport it in liquefied form to the Greek mainland, and sell it though DEPA’s network to the European markets. In parallel, Washington, while providing a strong boost to Cyprus’ right to exploit its energy resources, has established the first of chain of “Energy Resource Bureaus” in the region in Nicosia.9

Geopolitical Binding of the Energy Resource Potential of the Eastern Mediterranean to the Evolution of the Civil Conflict in Syria: International and Regional Actors In July 2011, while the conflict in Syria was still a protest against the Basar Al-Assad regime, Iran, Syria, and Iraq signed a natural gas pipeline construction agreement totaling $10 billion, which, using the South Pars Iranian deposits in the Persian Gulf (the world’s largest deposit that partially lies in the territory of Qatar) and running across Iraq, would reach Damascus in three years’ time and from there go on to Lebanon coast, thus supplying the European market. This would be a Shi‘a natural gas pipeline that would transport resources from Shi‘a Iran though predominantly Shi‘a Iraq to the Shi‘afriendly President Assad Alawi regime of Syria. This strategic planning gained impetus thanks to the discovery by Syrian companies of a huge natural gas deposit in Qara—comparable to that of Qatar— near the Lebanese border and the Russian naval base in the port of Tartous (August 2011). 8

Greek). 9

L. Liagosa, “No Connection to South Stream Pipeline for Greece,” Newspaper I Kathimerini, 13 November, 2012 (in See: J. Mazis, op. cit.

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If this Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline scenario comes to fruition, Qatar—which hosts the U.S. Central Command headquarters—risks being cut off from the hydrocarbon transport routes controlled by the United States and Turkey. Therefore, it is cooperating with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel, the U.S., its NATO allies, and various facets of the Syrian opposition (only recently organized and having a single representative) against the Assad regime, aiming to avoid the delivery of Iranian and Syrian natural gas to the Mediterranean coast. There is no doubt that a Syrian government controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood would be in favor of building the Qatar pipeline, which could easily be extended to Turkey. In a different scenario, according to the Al-Akbar Lebanese newspaper and information leaked by a big Western oil company,10 the U.S. is encouraging Qatar to construct an overland natural gas pipeline, which would transport its own gas and that of Israel and Lebanon from the Leviathan and Tamar deposits through Syria (particularly the Homs city area, a site of ferocious civil conflict) to the European markets, the first branch passing through Turkey and the second through the ports of Tripoli (Lebanon) and Lattakia (Syria). Nevertheless, despite the obvious geostrategic advantages this scenario offers Ankara, Doha, and in particular Tel-Aviv (the latter acquiring an overland pipeline to transport its energy resources at minimum cost), the persistence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not offering the best guarantees of cooperation between the Hebrew state and Turkey. Even though it favors a policy toward international recognition of the loyalty of political Islam, Ankara does not wish to establish supranational state cooperation that could influence its policy in the Gulf, Lebanon, and Iran. Its activism appears very legitimate in light of Ankara’s political cooperation with Suni Qatar and Saudi Arabia. This is a major policy shift for Turkey, since by abandoning the “zero problem policy with neighbors,” it is evaluating state-society relations in a particular country in accordance with the level of protest or violence that the latter suffers from. So Turkey is turning against Syria, its old ally and a close ally of Russian President Putin, aiming to strike the Middle East policy of Russia and Iran. Russia, in turn, is worried that the regional balance of power established during the last two years in the Middle East with the advent of the Arab Spring movement may favor the development of transnational Islamism. Populated by around twenty million Muslims, considering itself a victim of Islamist activism since the 1990s, and facing the revival of the Islamists as lawful power mongers in many Arab countries, Russia does not want Saudi Arabia and Qatar to reinforce their positions to the detriment of Iran, with which the Kremlin is cooperating in a wide range of issues. In fact, by intensifying its ties with Iraq too, Moscow is increasingly isolating itself from Ankara in a way that is turning the two countries into permanent members of opposite regional alliances. It is worth mentioning that should the Kremlin fail to strategically ease the development of the newly discovered natural gas deposits of its old Cold War ally, Syria, it risks seeing Turkey as a transportation and distribution hub of Syrian and Iranian gas to the international markets. Also Turkey, one third of the population of which is comprised of various national and religious minorities, is in danger of “being burned” in the same nationalist “fire” it is lighting for Syria by supporting the opposing Sunis.

Conclusion Given that Syrian soil has become a battleground for the Iranian and Turkish secret services, the Israel-Cyprus-Greece axis is the only guarantee the West can count on in a region torn by the so10 See: N. Charara, “Syrie: Le trajet des gazoducs Quataris décide des zones de combat!” Al-Akbar, 15 November, 2012 [www.french.irib.ir/analyses].

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called Arab Spring. Turkey is trying to act as a defender of “international legitimacy and humanism” in the Middle East in order to control the flow of resources from the new hydrocarbon Syrian deposits, as well as from the Eastern Mediterranean, by gaining the trust and support of the Arab World and the West. Ankara is well aware that should the Israel-Cyprus-Greece energy transportation axis become functional, it will no longer be in a position to threaten the West by means of the ITGI (ItalyTurkey-Greece-Italy) natural gas pipeline, or the Trans-Anatolian pipeline (June 2012) project it has signed with Azerbaijan in order to retain the geostrategic significance of the almost financially defunct Nabucco project. It should be pointed out that the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean is shifting as a result of the Arab Spring movement’s cataclysmic effect in swiping away the Middle East regimes, as well as the energy alliance Israel has decided to form along with Cyprus and Greece. Moreover, given the strategic military pact that Tel-Aviv has signed with Athens, which is increasing Israel’s strategic significance and providing it with a vital political and energy connection to the West (September 2011), along with the strategic cooperation that Tel-Aviv has established with U.S.-supported Erbil (the capital of autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan)—the latter acting as a counterbalance to Iran, Syria and Turkey—it can be assumed that the development of an alternative framework for supplying energy resources to the EU will be strong enough to eliminate the possibility of growing TurkeyRussia energy cooperation.11 Keeping in mind that the potential of the energy axis connecting Israel along the Cyprus-CreteIonian Sea route with the EU could increase six-fold within the next eight years, the West will be happy to be free, at least partially, of Arab and Iranian hydrocarbons, which would lead to the abolishment of the energy routes Turkey wishes to control.12 This might eventually satisfy Washington, which is embittered by the position Ankara has chosen to take regarding the embargo the West imposed on Iran due to its nuclear program. It may also satisfy the EU since it will free it from its dependence on Turkey with respect to securing energy from Central Asia and the Caucasus. This alternative energy route has raised significant interest. There have even been proposals to build an underwater natural gas pipeline called the East-Med Pipeline, which, connecting Israel-Cyprus-Greece, would continue through the Epirus region of Greece to the underwater section of the ITGI pipeline that goes to the coast of Italy.13 This scenario is thought to be the best long-term alternative, provided that additional energy deposits are discovered in the EEZ of Israel, Cyprus, and Greece. 11 See: Th.Ν. Marketos, “The Energy Dimension of the ‘Kurdish Issue’ and the Geopolitical Binding of the ‘Wider Middle East’ with the Eastern Mediterranean: The Role of the U.S., Turkey and Iran,” Scientific Analysis Research Centre Journal, The Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Issue No. 83, April 2012 (in Greek). 12 See: J. Mazis, op. cit. 13 See: Interview of Harris Samaras, President of the “Pytheas” company, to Interfax News Agency, 20 October, 2012.

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ELECTIONS AND REGIME CHANGE

ARMENIA: YEAR OF ELECTIONS Hrant MIKAELIAN Master of Political Science, Researcher at the Institute of the Caucasus (Erevan, Armenia)

T

ABSTRACT

his article takes a look at the national and local elections held in Armenia in 2012-2013, examining in particular the opportunities they created for political competition, the validity of the election results, their consequences, and so on. The author prefaces his study by first examining the national elections held in Armenia in the 1990s and 2000s. Furthermore, he focuses

on the viewpoints that are still pertinent today and can enhance our understanding of the current election processes. Whenever possible, the author presents a detailed review of all the statistics currently available to characterize the election process and the development of the domestic political situation in Armenia several years after the 2008 presidential election.

KEYWORDS: Armenia’s domestic policy, Armenia’s local self-government system, 2012 parliamentary elections in Armenia, 2013 presidential elections in Armenia.

Introduction The post-election opposition of 2008, which took human lives, put the sustainability and consistency of Armenia’s political system to a serious test. In 2012-the beginning of 2013, another round 78



of parliamentary and presidential elections was held in the country. Local elections were also held in the interval between them. According to the minimalist conception, a country can call its government system democratic when it holds competitive elections. Joseph Schumpeter, one of the initiators of this conception, defined democracy as follows: “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”1 This conception saw the light in the 1930s; since then elections, even if only formal, began being held in almost every country of the world. So the above definition was upgraded and now presupposes the existence of an institutional environment, including free media, and so on. Even if the quality of the election process is not taken as a criterion of the existence or absence of democracy, nation-wide voting is still a good starting point for carrying out a case-study of the political system in a particular country (especially if the concept “elections” covers the pre-election and post-election processes and not only the technical aspect of voting). Elections have been going on for around a year in Armenia (this year-long period began in February 2012 with the election for mayor of Hrazdan and ended in February 2013 with the national presidential election) and at the time this article was written, they had still not completely ended. In May 2012, elections were held to the National Assembly (Parliament) of Armenia, the preparations for which have been the main thrust of the country’s domestic policy for several years now. In September of the same year, elections were held to the local self-government bodies in most of the country’s communities. The upshot of this election marathon, which was an indicator of the development of the Armenian political system, can now be summed up and put in a nutshell. This article will examine how the elections were held and their political outcome, as well as their influence on the alignment of forces in the country.

Prehistory: Elections in Independent Armenia Since Armenia gained its independence, it has held parliamentary elections five times and presidential elections six times, but only one of these elections was not contested by society and the losing sides. This was the first presidential election held in 1991. Since then, the opposition, which has never gained a victory, has always challenged the election results. Russian expert Sergey Markedonov explains the show of protest by the fact that at all the subsequent elections, the “silver prizewinner” gathered enough votes to bring its voters out into the streets.2

Presidential Elections Presidential elections in Armenia have always been characterized by a high level of competition accompanied by an acute political standoff. However, this was frequently of a speculative rather than ideological nature, since the candidates essentially offered the voters the same thing. 1 J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Third Edition, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1950, Ch. II, “Another Theory of Democracy,” p. 269. 2 See: S. Markedonov, “Raffi Hovannisian: zaiavka na liderstvo,” Politkom, 27 February, 2013, available at [http:// www.politcom.ru/15397.html].

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Presidential elections in Armenia have always been held in an atmosphere of intense struggle and accompanied by accusations of vote-counting fraud. A protest electorate began forming in 1996; dissatisfied with the socioeconomic situation in the country, it always voted against the government. This electorate, localized primarily in Erevan and other cities of the country, comprises 30-40% of all the active voters and is willing to vote for practically any deputy who can offer an alternative to the pro-government party. Levon Ter-Petrosian won the presidential election held in Armenia in September 1996, gathering less than 52% of the votes. Second place went to Vazgen Manukian; he gathered 41.3% of the votes, but in so doing considered himself the winner. The mass protest demonstrations that followed the announcement of the election results did not lead to a change in power. Eighteen months later, Vazgen Manukian gathered only 12% of the votes at an early election and made a name for himself with respect to the speed at which his rating dropped. In 2003, he did not gather even one percent of the votes; the protest electorate does not like losers. The presidential elections of 1998 and 2003 took place in two rounds with Robert Kocharian winning both times. The results of these elections were contested both by his rivals and by most of the active part of society. In 2008, the opposition electorate was divided between Artur Bagdasarian and Levon TerPetrosian, who gathered 17.7% and 21.5% of the votes, respectively.3 Before the fall of 2007, no one expected Levon Ter-Petrosian to achieve such impressive success; it was practically inconceivable that he would even return to politics after his 10-year absence. This circumstance can be considered quite unique. The ease with which Ter-Petrosian received 350,000 votes shows that he was able to draw a large part of the protest electorate to his side. It is worth adding that trust in Armenia’s political system is still low to this day.

Parliamentary Elections Parliamentary elections in Armenia have their own history. The first (1995) were held in a noncompetitive atmosphere during prohibition of Dashnaktsutiun, the largest opposition party at that time, and arrests of its members.4 The Armenian National Movement (ANM), the ruling party, in an alliance with the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA), gathered the majority of votes (43%). Second place (17%) went to Shamiram (a women’s party) that was an appendage of the ruling party. The communists came third, while two other opposition parties acquired minimum representation in the parliament.5 Then the “hottest” elections to the National Assembly were held: in 1999 Armenia came right up to a change of power by constitutional means. After collecting 41.7% of the votes, the Unity bloc consisting of two groups—the RPA under the leadership of charismatic Defense Minister Vazgen Sargsian and the People’s Party headed by Karen Demirchian, which opposed President Kocharian— came first. Second place went to the communists, who gathered only 12% of the votes, while the former ruling party ANM gained the support of only 1.2% of the voters. The Unity bloc, which began taking steps to limit the power of Robert Kocharian and establish a parliamentary republic,6 had a good chance of success, but the terrorist act on 27 October, 1999 cut 3 See: Portal of the 2008 Armenian presidential election at Eurasianet, available at [http://www.eurasianet.org/ armenia08/index.shtml]. 4 See: V. Mitiaev, Vnutripoliticheskie protsessy v nezavisimoi Armenii. Armenia: problemy nezavisimogo razvitiia, Moscow, 1998, p. 95. 5 See: G. Kerian, “Evolution of a Multiparty System in Armenia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (10), 2001. 6 See: L. Panin, “Prezident Armenii proigral vybory parlamenta,” Kommersant, No. 092, 1 June, 1999.

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this short. This event generated a multitude of conspiracy theories, but despite the fact that the Unity bloc, which controlled the parliament and cabinet of ministers at the time, was engaged in the investigation, Robert Kocharian’s involvement in the terrorist act was not proven. The ANM’s essentially complete disappearance from Armenian politics in the second half of the 1990s shows the existence of a “pro-government electorate” (which votes for the government just because it is the government). In this case, such factors as respect for the government as such, support of stability (anxiety over the possibility of upheavals if the opposition won), and support of the current government policy could have played a role. By 2003, the country’s political field had broken down into a multitude of small parties, each of which had its own electorate; therefore the RPA, despite showing the most success, gathered only 23.7% of the votes. A total of 6 parties acquired seats in the parliament. So the RPA began turning into a pro-government party closely associated with the government structures and positioning itself as the president’s bastion. This was when the tradition of forming a government coalition ultimately formed in Armenia. At the parliamentary elections of 2007, the RPA gathered 34% of the votes, while second and third places went to the Prosperous Armenia Party (PAP) and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutiun (ARFD) that formed a government coalition and became part of the establishment.

Domestic Political Situation at the Beginning of 2012 Election of Mayor of the City of Hrazdan The election season opened in February 2012 in Hrazdan,7 which is an industrial center and the fifth largest city in terms of population in the country. However, more interesting is the fact that candidates from the RPA and Armenian National Congress (ANC)—the bloc of opposition parties headed by the first president of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosian—ran for mayor. This meant that representatives of the “old” and “new” authorities both of Armenia and of the city itself were contending for the seat of major. For example, the ANC was represented by former mayor of Hrazdan, veteran of the Karabakh war Sasun Mikaelian (who served a three-year prison term for participating in the events of 1 March, 2008), while the RPA was represented by the current city head, Aram Danielian. It should be noted that the political struggle in Hrazdan was regarded as a “test of strength” before the parliamentary elections scheduled for May. The ANC was actively involved in the election campaign; nearly all the leaders of the bloc came to support their partner, but this was not enough. Mikaelian, who gathered around 47% of the votes, was defeated by the current mayor, who was re-elected to a new term. The election aroused a great fervor: a large number of observers from Erevan, as well as dozens of journalists, came to the polling stations to keep tabs on the voting. The opposition talked about bribery before the election, but no vote-counting fraud was actually registered on election day.8 John Heffern, U.S. Ambassador 7 According to a report by Epress.am information agency, “never before has the election of a local mayor raised such a ruckus in Armenia” (“From Associate of Serzh Sargsian to Virulent Opponent,” Epress.am, 12 February, 2012, available in Russian at [http://www.epress.am/ru/2012/02/12/Небывалый-ажиотаж-в-50-км-от-Еревана-От-с.html]). 8 See: “Final Results: Incumbent Mayor Beats Opposition Candidate Sasun Mikaelyan in Hrazdan Elections,” Epress. am, 13 February, 2012, available at [http://www.epress.am/en/2012/02/13/final-results-incumbent-mayor-beats-oppositioncandidate-sasun-mikaelyan-in-hHrazdan-elections.html].

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to Armenia, who acted as an observer, also positively assessed the election.9 After the election of mayor of Hrazdan, there was a popular viewpoint among the opposition that the government had tried out a new falsification method based exclusively on buying off voters, but without coercion or direct fraud.

Lowering Opposition Activity By 2012, the demonstrations so ubiquitous in Armenia’s domestic political life since the mid1990s had practically dwindled to nothing. Levon Ter-Petrosian, who had been organizing acts of protest almost every week since the fall of 2007, was no longer able to gather large enough crowds. It was obvious that the protest electorate was gradually turning its back on the ANC. It is worth noting that demonstrations underwent their greatest decline in 2011 when the protestors were no longer stonewalled.10 In 2012, the number of participants in protest demonstrations was never more than 2,000 people, whereby they were usually held for non-political reasons (social, environmental, and so on). By 2012, the protest electorate had become disillusioned with the ideological opposition and partially joined the PAP, which had enormous organizational and financial resources. This party was founded in the mid-2000s by Gagik Tsarukian, one of Armenia’s most prominent businessmen with the support of the then president, Robert Kocharian, and its activity was regarded as an attempt by the latter to return to power. The “Kocharian factor” was an even more popular topic of discussion for the opposition media than the current participants in the political process, whereby Kocharian himself was hardly active at all.

Pre-Election Alignment of Forces A total of nine parties and blocs took part in the elections, as opposed to 23 in 2007; this shows that parties had already reached quite a high level of consolidation. There was no doubt that six parties would be doing their utmost to overcome the 5% barrier: the RPA, headed by President Serzh Sargsian, the PAP, the ANC, Heritage, headed by First Foreign Minister of Armenia Raffi Hovhannisian, the ARFD (a party without definite leaders), and the Rule of Law Party (RLP) headed by ex-speaker of the Armenian Parliament Artur Bagdasarian. So essentially no new faces appeared in Armenian politics. As for most of the contenders for seats in parliament, they were long-term political survivors who began gaining popularity among the Armenian population as early as the beginning of the 1990s. Moreover, this time the elections were held with clear domination of the RPA, which forced the opposition parties to unite: Heritage joined the Free Democrats, while the ANC formed a conglomerate of 10 parties. Let us take a look at the dynamics of the election campaign ratings. 9 See: N. Bulgadarian, “Posol SShA uvidel na vyborakh v Hrazdane ‘realnoe sopernichestvo,’” Armenian Service of Radio Freedom, 14 February, 2012, available at [http://rus.azatutyun.am/content/article/24483634.html]. 10 It should be noted that restricting the freedom to gather and of the media often becomes the catalyst of mass protest demonstrations. In 2001, pressure on the independent Rustavi-2 television company led to mass protest demonstrations in Georgia. In January 2011, demonstrations in Egypt correlated directly with disconnection of the Internet (see: N. Hassanpour, Media Disruption Exacerbates Revolutionary Unrest: Evidence from Mubarak’s Natural Experiment, Yale University, 2011, p. 33).

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Party Ratings in Armenia in February-April 2012 Compiled According to the Results of Sociological Polls11121314151617 Time Poll was Conducted

Poll Organizer

Results (in % of those who had made a choice)* RPA

PAP

RLP

Heritage

ARFD

ANC

Mid-February

Sociometer11

39

36

5.1

5.1

6.1

8.5

29 Feb-5 March

IPSC, EuFoA12

37

41

5

4

5

5

Mid-March

Sociometer13

40

35

5...6

5...6

6...7

8...9

4-10 April

ASA, Gallup Int.14

40

32

7

3.5

6

10

4-13 April

IPSC, VCIOM15

38

36

7

6

5

4

17-22 April

IPSC, EuFoA16

40.6

32.6

5.4

6.5

5.0

4.3

17-23 April

ASA, Gallup Int.17

39.2

29.9

6.0

6.3

5.5

12.2

* Undecided respondents, those who refused to answer, and those who did not intend participating in the elections were excluded from the calculation. In some polls, the total number of undecided respondents was higher than 40%.

Despite the 3.5% error for each of the above sociological polls, they show approximately the same correlation of forces and dynamics. Furthermore, some indices differ depending on the poll organizer. By the beginning of 2012, the contours of the government coalition in parliament had become eroded. The ARFD left it as early as 2009, while the intentions of the PAP were not clear at all. In February 2012, the question of signing a coalition memorandum among the PAP, RLP, and RPA was actively discussed, as well as their joint participation in the parliamentary elections. But the PAP refused to sign the memorandum and preferred to act independently.18 11 See: “Аharon Adibekian: Armenian Society has a Shorter Memory than a Chicken, and That is Good,” Armtoday. info, 22 February, 2012, available in Russian at [http://armtoday.info/default.asp?Lang=_Ru&NewsID=61056]. For the results, see: [http://www.tert.am/am/news/2012/03/26/aharon-adibekian/]. 12 See: “Poll: A Snapshot ahead of Armenia’s Presidential Elections. Main Findings,” European Friends of Armenia, TNS Opinion, IPSC, 22 March, 2012, p. 22, available at [http://www.eufoa.org/uploads/OpinionPoll_EN.pdf]. 13 See: Ահարոն Ադիբեկյանը չի հավատում “Հայաստանի եվրոպացի բարեկամներ”—ի սոցհարցմանը (Aharon Adibekian Does Not Trust the European Friends of Armenia Poll), Tert.am, 26 March, 2012. 14 See: “‘Gallup’ Predicts Victory for the Republican Party of Armenia,” News.am, 17 April, 2012, available in Russian at [http://news.am/rus/news/101624.html]. 15 See: “Sociopolitical Situation in Armenia on the Eve of the Parliamentary Elections,” Press-Issue, No. 2005, VCIOM, 20 April, 2012, available in Russian at [http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=268&uid=112722]. 16 See: “Poll: Last Assessment of Pre-Electoral Armenia,” European Friends of Armenia, TNS Opinion, IPSC, 28 April, 2012, p. 25, available at [http://www.eufoa.org/uploads/Poll_28.04.2012_EN.pdf]. 17 See: “‘Gallup International Association’-ը հրապարակեց, 17.04-23.04 ժամանակահատվածում անցկացված սոցիոլոգիական հարցումների արդյունքները (Results of Gallup International Association Poll carried out on 17.0423.04),” Novosti TV “Armenia,” 27 April, 2012, available at [http://news.armeniatv.com/post/id/88977/]. 18 See: “New Coalition Memorandum Not Signed: The RPA and PAP will Participate in the Elections on Separate Lists,” 7or.am, 13 February, 2012, available in Russian at [http://www.7or.am/ru/news/view/30624/].

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It was obvious that the PAP was getting stronger, and its competition with the RPA became the leitmotif of the elections to the National Assembly. As already noted, part of the protest electorate had gone over to the PAP, which predetermined a change in the paradigm of the rivalry at the elections; the ideological standoff turned into a contest of ways to attract voters. As a result of this, the elections were no longer perceived as a decisive battle between life and death; although the election campaign went quite normally, there was not a very high degree of opposition among its participants.

2012 Parliamentary Elections Campaign Programs It is typical that despite the differences in the ideological platforms of the parties contending in the race their campaign programs were largely similar. The ideologies declared by the parties bore significantly toward the right, but their promises were largely “leftist”; moreover, much was said about social justice, reforms, fighting corruption, and economic growth. Furthermore, the amounts of social assistance offered the population could be compared with the size of the Armenian budget.19 The ANC presented the most detailed election program; it envisaged carrying out quite an impressive set of reforms in agriculture, education, the economy, justice, and so on, which also required extremely large amounts of spending. As for the PRA, its program was minimalist and realistic and aimed only at continuing the current economic projects and reforms; the rest limited their promises to general declarations. The PAP, which promised to improve social conditions and support agriculture, occupied a very unique niche: it proposed paternalism, coveted by the Armenian electorate in the face of post-Soviet unemployment and the disorder reigning in small and medium population settlements. 20

Forming a Competitive Environment Despite the possibility of holding much freer elections than ever before, there was no automatic increase in voting competitiveness. The new election code gave the opposition much more room for maneuver in organizing elections; all of the parliamentary parties had the right to participate in election commissions and nominate their chairmen (under rotation terms). The second fact worth noting is the activity of the PAP, which ensured the ubiquitous presence of journalists, authorized persons, and observers. There was quite a large number of observers all told: around 30,000 local and 647 international (more than 250 of them were observers within the framework of the OSCE mission). 19 See: N. Iskandarian, T. Sargsian, H. Mikaelian, “Predvybornye obeshchaniia partii,” Institute of the Caucasus, May 2012, available at [http://www.c-i.am/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/brief-prefinal.pdf]. 20 According to the Caucasus Barometer poll carried out by CRRC in Armenia in October-November 2011, 73% of the polled thought that the government should be more like a parent, while 18% described it as a hired worker.

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The third innovation of these elections was balanced information broadcasting. Nearly all the television media used to be loyal to the government, while the only opposition television company, A1+, was deprived of its license.21 During the election campaign, broadcasting was much more balanced, while previously neutral television companies, such as Erkir media and Kentron (affiliated with the ARFD and PAP, respectively), became oppositional. Increasing criticism of the ruling party was heard on the main television channels, which allowed the voters to make an informed choice. This proved particularly important since in the spring of 2012, television media were the source of political information for 92% of the Armenian population, while Internet media constituted the main source of information for 31%, newspapers for 19%, and radio for 17%.22 It should be noted that whereas television and radio provided balanced broadcasting of the election campaign, the Internet media and printed press were extremely critical about the Armenian government. Table 2 Parties and Their Leaders on Armenian Television and Radio (8 April-4 May) 2324 Mentioning23 on Armenia’s Central Television Channels* Party

Of them (%):

Time Allotted (min24)**

Total Mentionings

Positive

Negative

Neutral

RPA

2,344

1.8

2.7

95.5

5,766

PAP

1,377

7.4

1.9

90.7

7,617

Heritage

1,038

1.1

0.1

98.8

7,841

ARFD

1,241

2.5

0.1

97.4

7,671

ANC

1,116

0.1

2.1

97.8

6,634

RLP

1,019

1.0

2.2

96.8

5,827

Other parties

1,356

0.0

0.0

100

8,535

9,491

2.1

1.4

96.5

49,891

Total radio.

* According to a poll carried out by the Erevan Press Club on central television channels and public

** According to a poll by the National Commission for Television and Radio (all Armenian television and radio stations); official statements by civil servants were excluded.

Furthermore, there is a surplus, rather than insufficient, number of minority parties, some of which have not even been able to prepare advertising clips and use free airtime to broadcast inter21 The A1+ Television Company was deprived of its license in 2002 and has since been trying to return to the air, after winning a case in the European Court, but in 2010, it was again refused renewal of its license. Since 2011, it has been broadcasting online, and since September 2012, it has been airing a television program on the Armnews TV channel. 22 See: “Poll: A Snapshot of Pre-Electoral Armenia,” p. 8. 23 See: “Report on Monitoring of Armenian Broadcast Media Coverage of 6 May, 2012 Elections to RA National Assembly,” Erevan Press Club, May 2012, p. 18, available at [http://ypc.am/upload/YPC%20Monitoring_Second%20Stage_ April%208-%20May%204,%202012_eng.pdf]. 24 Poll results available at [http://www.tvradio.am/uploads/0814.pdf], p. 9 (in Armenian).

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views with their leaders. This situation arose due to the government’s demands to provide equal airtime; but this state of affairs was subsequently perceived as the norm and nothing changed after the elections. Most of the parties had the opportunity to place street advertisements. In addition to the ANC, which was experiencing serious financial problems, all the large parties had billboards; the PAP had 164, the RPA—100; the RLP—64, Heritage—50; and the ARFD—38.25

Election Results From the technical standpoint, the elections were organized quite well and went very peacefully. In contrast to the last elections, far fewer serious violations were registered, while no instances of violence were seen at all (this was quite a sensation for Armenia). Nevertheless, cases of the use of the administrative resource, as well as bribing and direct falsifications were registered. Furthermore, voter turnout was sufficiently high and amounted to more than 60%. As a result of the parliamentary elections, all six major parties crossed the electoral threshold (5% for parties and 7% for blocs). In so doing, only two parties (the PAP and RPA) had an electoral margin of safety; all the others acquired only a few seats in the National Assembly. Table 3 Results of the Parliamentary Elections of 6 May, 2012 Votes Received

Distribution of Votes Received*

Mandates**

RPA

664,266

44.02

69 (+5)

PAP

454,671

30.12

37 (+19)

ANC

106,901

7.08

7 (+7)

Heritage

86,993

5.76

5 (–2)

ARFD

85,544

5.67

5 (–11)

RLP

83,123

5.51

6 (–3)

Other parties

24,419

2.02

0 (0)

Invalid bulletins

53,827

Parties

Independent deputies Turnout

2 (–15) 1,573,053

62.35

131

* The share of votes received in percentage of all valid bulletins. We will note that there was no place to vote “against all,” so bulletins that did not indicate a specific candidate were considered invalid. ** According to proportional and majority systems in total. Changes compared to number of seats in the past parliament are given in brackets.

25 See: N. Grigorian, “PPA i na etikh vyborakh potratitsia bolshe vsekh,” Aravot, 4 April, 2012, available at [http:// ru.aravot.am/2012/04/04/55675/].

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The RPA confirmed its dominance in Armenia’s political life, which, incidentally, had remained unchanged since 2008. However, the percentage distribution of the election results throughout the proportional system as a whole corresponded to the sociological polls conducted on the eve of the elections.

How Honest were the Elections? After election results are announced, the question of possible falsifications on the part of the government is always raised. The mission of observers from the CIS declared that the elections were held democratically. The OSCE observation mission largely gave a positive assessment, but noted that some violations were registered. According to the final report, violations were registered at 9.40% polling stations visited by the OSCE mission (the OSCE observers visited almost 2/3 of all the polling stations) that had an effect on the voting results, while procedural problems during vote tallying were noted in more than 20 cases.26 Nevertheless, the elections on 6 May, 2012 were described as the best ever held27 (we will note that the OSCE/ODIHR has been monitoring elections in Armenia since 1996). Local observers registered 1,107 violations; a little more than half of them were procedural in nature, while around 500 can be described as more serious violations.28 The prosecutor’s office received 213 reports on violations at the elections, but criminal cases were instigated regarding only 15 of them. The opposition insisted that “dead souls” had been included on the voters’ lists: a figure as high as 700,000 was named.29 The number of voters has indeed increased compared to past elections, even though migration has led to population reduction in recent years. However, Armenian emigrants are not giving up their citizenship and so remain on the lists for several years after their departure. The lists were published openly on the websites of the Central Election Committee and the police department; two weeks later only 0.1% of the voters had been removed from them. Furthermore, the opposition did not present one false passport; if they had actually existed, it would have been impossible to hide such a large number. The present author thinks that use of the administrative resource and bribing during the campaign are much more serious problems. He tries to reproduce a picture of the morning voting of the army he observed at one of the polling stations. Incidentally, its results were the same at all polling stations: the majority of army recruits voted for the RPA. Voting in prisons and refugee camps followed approximately the same scenario; this circumstance alone raised the RPA’s result by approximately 4%. The fact that public institutions were used to advertize the ruling party should also be considered use of the administrative resource; some voting headquarters of the RPA were housed in rural administration buildings. It is worth noting that the RPA’s final index differed from the results of sociological polls before the elections by approximately the same 4%. 26 See: OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, Final Report, OSCE, 26 June, 2012, pp. 21-22, available at [http:// www.osce.org/odihr/91643]. 27 See: “May 6 Elections Most Democratic and Transparent Vote Ever Held in Armenia,” News.am, 22 October, 2012, available at [http://news.am/eng/news/125727.html]. 28 According to the system of online registration of violations iDitord.org. [https://iditord.org/2012-parliamentaryelections/] (in Armenian). 29 See: “Levon Ter-Petrosian Complained to the French Ambassador that There were 700,000 Surplus Voters on the Voters’ Lists,” Panarmenian.net, 4 April, 2012, available in Russian at [http://www.panarmenian.net/rus/news/101744].

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The RPA also increased its representation in parliament by winning in single-mandate districts; majority deputies have 41 of the 131 seats in them. RPA representatives won in 29 of these districts, which helped the party to obtain the majority of seats in parliament. The thing is that it is enough to obtain a simple majority of votes to win in single-mandate districts. The competition among the opposition forces contributed to the fact that the republicans acquired less than 50% of the votes but subsequently won. Many of the one-mandate deputies used to be independent, but in the past few years, pursuing a policy to extend its own regional network, the RPA asked most of them, as well as their possible competitors from the representatives of local business elites, to join the party. The cancellation of single-mandate districts was one of the main demands of the opposition parties and the PAP before the parliamentary elections in 2012. Bribing voters along with use of the administrative resource is a traditional problem at elections in Armenia. Judging from indirect signs, in 2012, buying votes was resorted to much more frequently than ever before; this is explained by the apathy of many citizens toward the political struggle and the drop in the standard of living of Armenian households. In some cases, bribes amounted to only $30-50, but even these small amounts had an influence on voters’ choice, particularly in rural areas. However, it is difficult to determine precisely how widespread bribing was, since the voters themselves were not interested in revealing this information. The only polls on this topic were carried out in Erevan, Vanadzor, and Gumri: 16 voters admitted that they had been offered a bribe, while 9 refused to answer. In more than half of the cases, RPA representatives offered bribes, in a quarter of the cases, it was the PAP, in every fifth case it was the RLP, and in every seventieth, representatives of the ARFD.30 However, neither bribing the population, nor use of the administrative resource can be considered direct falsifications, since they put no pressure on the voters and each could vote as he or she saw fit. Moreover, there was no evidence of any widespread direct vote-counting fraud, ballot stuffing, or so-called merry-go-round voting (where groups of voters turned up to vote more than once at different polling stations) that might have changed the election results by even 1%. Nevertheless, the election results reflect not so much ideological preferences, as the ability to ensure the desirable result, which only the RPA and PAP were able to do.

Political Results of the Parliamentary Elections and Post-Election Processes The final election results registered a convincing victory for the state bureaucracy in the form of the RPA, which had never before gathered so many votes nor been criticized so little. The elections were followed by only one act of protest; it took place the day after the voting. It should be noted that it is a tradition in Armenia to organize a demonstration if not actually on election day, then the day after.31 As for the opposition, it received fewer votes than it expected; the ANC, Heritage, and ARFD hardly crossed the electoral threshold. As strange as it may seen, the Rule of Law Party also sur30 See: “Telephone Survey on 2012 Parliamentary Elections in Armenia,” Transparency—Armenia, pp. 4-5, available at [http://transparency.am/dbdata/Survey2012-eng.pdf]. 31 See: “Armenian Opposition Bloc Says Elections were Rigged,” 8 May, 2012, available at [http://news.am/eng/ news/104710.html].

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mounted the barrier, but it ultimately turned into a spoiler of the RPA and lost any independent value. The ANC and ARFD became perceptibly weaker and encountered several problems immediately after the elections. For example, the majority deputy left the ARFD, while the Republican Party and several regional structures broke away from the ANC. Despite the fact that the opposition parties criticized the election results in words, none of their representatives rejected their mandates (thus acknowledging the elections as fair). A little later, the Heritage faction split in two, leaving only two party members and one nonparty candidate (who passed on the party lists). Moreover, one of the PAP deputies left the faction. The failure of the ANC requires some additional explanation. The fact is that although the rhetoric of this bloc did not change right up to its entry into parliament and remained radical, most of the protest electorate turned away from it. The leaders of the bloc, who radicalized their statements to the limit (they called the country’s leaders outlaws and Mongol Tatars, and their voters slaves), were unable to tone them down at the proper time and some of the voters stopped taking them seriously. Moreover, the ANC was supported by a more radical electorate, many representatives of which left the country after the 2008 elections. In turn, the RPA’s stronger position made forming an alliance with the PAP absolutely unnecessary, so the latter was offered disadvantageous terms for joining the coalition. After the elections, the PAP essentially became a magnet for the opposition forces in the parliament; the large size of its faction played an important role in this, which, however, prevented it from becoming more radicalized. This resulted in four opposition and two coalition parties in the parliament (before the elections, there were two and three, respectively). Former government members (three former foreign ministers, two former prime ministers, and so on) received most of the parliamentary portfolios. So we are dealing with a new status-quo: the opposition, albeit not in the way it would have liked, was represented inside the parliament, which signaled the end of the “street politics” period typical of Armenia for many years. As paradoxical as it may seem, the failure of the opposition gave Armenian parliamentarianism a new lease on life (since it led to the formation of a stronger parliamentary opposition). Just like several years ago, the National Assembly of Armenia once again became a place for holding debates, but decisions were no longer made unanimously. For example, 75 people voted for the development program envisaged for the next five years presented by the government on 18 June, 2012; 47 were against, and 1 abstained.32 The turnout of parliamentarians also perceptibly grew: now sessions are held with a full auditorium (otherwise a result is not guaranteed). This is also related to the fact that businessmen (socalled oligarchs) have much more modest representation in the parliament today. According to the estimates of the ANC, 60 deputies of the parliament of the 2007 convocation owned their own business.33 Now several big businessmen are still represented in parliament, but their total number has perceptibly decreased. By mid-2012, there was talk in Armenia about the possibility of forming a two-party system in which the RPA and PAP would play the main roles. Despite its suspended state, the PAP retained enormous potential that fully correlated with the financial and organizational opportunities of the 32 See: “Armenian Parliament Approves Government’s Action Program,” Tert. Am, 21 June, 2012, available at [http:// www.tert.am/en/news/2012/06/21/karavarutian-tsragir/]. 33 See: “Parliamentary Elections in Armenia in 2012: Are Their Representatives being Replaced by Oligarchs?” IA Regnum, 30 November, 2011, available in Russian at [http://www.regnum.ru/news/1472984.html].

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RPA. On the eve of the elections, the RPA, trying to avoid a second round and possible subsequent upheavals, made every attempt to push the PAP out of the race for the presidential seat. But pressure on the PAP proved rather clumsy. From mid-June, audits were carried out at the Sivilitas Foundation, the co-founder of which is former head of the Foreign Ministry Vardan Oskanian (number two on the PAP list). He was accused of laundering money and evading taxes in rather large amounts and was soon deprived of his deputy immunity; in Armenia this case was regarded as political. By the end of 2012, Oskanian’s participation in public politics was reduced to zero, since he was unable to efficiently mobilize his supporters. Numerous non-political protest demonstrations on primarily social and environmental problems were held on this account. These demonstrations cannot be described as mass, but they produced a nucleus of active protestors mainly represented by young middle-class people.

Elections to Local Self-Government Bodies: Complete Domination of the RPA The local elections held on 9 and 23 September, 2012 essentially went unnoticed by the expert community and journalists (an exception was perhaps the election of mayor of Hrazdan). And they were indeed only of local significance, since almost no candidates from the opposition participated in them. As many as one thousand observers were registered at each of the two rounds of voting, who were mainly representatives of regional organizations. The only thing that attracted the attention of Erevan society was the fact that Vardan Ghukasian, from the RPA, was prohibited from rerunning for mayor of Gumri. Vardan Ghukasian, who actually mayor of Gumri at the time, was considered a person close to criminal circles and did not enjoy the broad support of the city’s population; but he hoped to receive the maximum number of votes by putting pressure on citizens. On 4 September, Serzh Sargsian openly supported the alternative candidate, a member of the PAP, Samvel Balasanian,34 who, in the absence of serious rivals, acquired 60% of the votes. The victory of the PAP at the parliamentary elections in Gumri squashed the intrigue about whether Ghukasian could win at the local election. Representative of the RPA, Darbinian, won in Vanadzor, which is the third largest city in Armenia, gathering 48% of the votes. In both cities, the turnout was below average: in Vanadzor, it reached 46%, while in Gumri it was only 37%. This is explained by the emigration of a large number of voters who were still on the lists. Similar indices of voter turnout are recorded regularly in these cities, which refutes the thesis that the votes of citizens who have left are used for ballot stuffing. On the whole, turnout proved quite high and in most communities it exceeded 50%.35 In some cities, there was serious competition at the elections, due to which the winner gathered less than half 34 See: “Armenian President Confirms Candidate for Gumri Mayor,” Tert.am, 4 September, 2012, available at [http:// tert.am/en/news/2012/09/04/serzh-sargsyan-interview/]. 35 Turnout indices for communities are available at [http://res.elections.am/images/doc/masnak09.09.12.pdf ] (for the elections held on 9 September, in Armenian); [http://res.elections.am/images/doc/masnak23.09.12.pdf] (for the elections held on 23 September, in Armenian).

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of all the votes. But according to current legislation, a relative majority is sufficient to become mayor of a community. The elections themselves were held in a peaceful atmosphere; in most communities, the government representative won. Suspicion is aroused by the fact that many candidates (at least 25%) withdrew their candidacies several days before the election. In approximately one third of the communities, there was no competition at all, since only one candidate participated in the election. The victory of the RPA helped it to gain a firmer foothold at the local level. Whereas several years ago, most mayors were non-party, subsequently (lagging a little behind the majority deputies) many of them, just like the representatives of other parties, joined the RPA. In September 2012, members of the RPA comprised the majority among the community heads in Armenia. The RPA mainly strives to enlarge its own base in the regions in order to mobilize the poor, loyal, or neutral electorate with the support of the rural elders and local structures. It should be noted that in some communities, two candidates from the RPA competed. The opposition parties, Heritage and the ANC, essentially removed themselves from the local elections, explaining this by their lack of confidence in the local self-government system and insufficient resources.36 Other parties, which were traditionally stronger at the local level (RLP, ARFD and PAP), also showed a low level of interest. Nevertheless, the higher level of electability of the candidates from the PRA compared with the ARFD, PAP, and RLP shows that they were in a more favorable position than the representatives of other parties. Table 4 Summarized Results of the Local Self-Government Elections in September 201237 Degree of Electability (Share of Those Elected among the Number of Candidates Nominated by a Particular Party), %

Number of Nominated Candidates

Number of Winners

Non-party

465 (37.6)

138 (21.6)

29.7

RPA

583 (47.1)

404 (63.3)

75.1

2 (0.2)

0 (0.0)

0

RLP

18 (1.5)

12 (1.9)

66.7

ARFD

41 (3.3)

26 (4.1)

63.4

117 (9.5)

55 (8.6)

47.0

Parties

Heritage

PAP

36 See: A. Harutyunian, “Armenian Opposition Opts Out of Local Polls,” IWPR, CRS Issue 657, 7 September, 2012, available at [http://iwpr.net/report-news/armenian-opposition-opts-out-local-polls]; I. Hovhannisian, “The ANC and Heritage are Not Being Active at the Local Elections,” Armenian edition of Radio Freedom,10 August, 2012, available in Russian at [http://rus.azatutyun.am/content/article/24672832.html]. 37 Collated election results are available at [http://res.elections.am/images/doc/statistics09.09.12m.pdf ] (elections held on 9 September, in Armenian); [http://res.elections.am/images/doc/statistics23.09.12m.pdf] (elections held on 23 September, in Armenian) (see also: “Կարեւորը մասնակցությունն է” (The Main Thing is Participation), Aikakan Zhamanak, No. 163 (3087), 25 September, 2012, available at [http://www.armtimes.com/36425]).

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Presidential Election: Election Campaign and Alignment of Forces Fall-2012: First Round of the Election Race In the fall of 2012, the unofficial presidential race began in Armenia. At first, PAP leader Gagik Tsarukian, who everyone recognized as a candidate capable of posing a real challenge to the government, took active part in it. After the parliamentary elections of 1 October in Georgia, at which oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili won, these moods intensified; Tsarukian has even been called the Armenian Ivanishvili.38 Judging by everything, this comparison clearly appealed to Tsarukian; he congratulated Ivanishvili much sooner than Serzh Sargsian. As for the RPA, it treated the change of power in Georgia very cautiously. According to the sociological poll carried out by the Sociometer Center at the end of September, 35.6% of the polled were willing to vote for Serzh Sargsian, while 31.8% supported Gagik Tsarukian. The leader of the Heritage Party, Raffi Hovhannisian, gathered 14.2% of the votes, Levon Ter-Petrosian 5.8%, and possible candidates from the ARFD—9.6% (total).39 In the second half of October, another poll was carried out, this time by Gallup International Association; it produced slightly different results. According to it, Serzh Sargsian could count on 39% of the votes, Gagik Tsarukian on 27%, Robert Kocharian on 15%, Raffi Hovhannisian on 6%, and Vardan Oskanian and Levon Ter-Petrosian on 4-5% each40 (in so doing, the number of undecided voters was not taken into account). Vardan Oskanian and Gagik Tsarukian were members of the same team, with which Kocharian was also often associated. It is quite obvious that Tsarukian became a serious threat to the authorities and could have quite easily caused the election to reach a second round, which could have led to unpredictable consequences. What is more, in October-November, the PAP cooperated quite actively with other opposition parties, demanding cancelation of the single-mandate districts and a transfer to a parliamentary republic, while Gagik Tsarukian held meetings in the regions, at which he criticized the government and the overall situation in the country. The government was also cranking up the pressure: on 2 October, Vardan Oskanian was deprived of his deputy immunity for presumably political reasons.41 This was also confirmed indirectly by the republicans themselves: the head of the parliamentary RPA faction called Oskanian the Armenian Ivanishvili. 42 At the same 38 See: “Gagik Tsarukian—armiansky Ivanishvili?” Armenia Today, 3 October, 2012, available at [http://armtoday.info/ default.asp?Lang=_Ru&NewsID=74707]. 39 See: “Dvumia osnovnymi kandidatami prezidentskikh vyborov iavliaiutsia Serzh Sargsian i Gagik Tsarukian: sotsiolog,” Pervy armiansky informatsionny, 9 October, 2012, available at [http://www.1in.am/rus/armenia_apolitics_22634.html]. 40 See: “Gallup International Association: Who Would Armenian Citizens Choose if the Election was Held Next Sunday?” Panarmenian.net, 2 November, 2012, available in Russian at [http://www.panarmenian.net/rus/news/130567]. 41 See: “Iskandarian: “Delo Oskaniana” imeet politicheskiy podtekst,” Aysor.am, 4 October, 2012, available at [http:// www.aysor.am/ru/news/2012/10/04/iskandarian/]; N. Melkumyan, “Armenian Opposition Leader Says He’s Being Framed,” IWPR, CRS Issue 662, 19 October, 2012, available at [http://iwpr.net/report-news/armenian-opposition-leader-says-hes-beingframed]. 42 See: “Rukivoditel fraktsii RPA: Armianskiy Ivanishvili ne Gagik Tsarukian, a Vardan Oskanian,” Panorama.am, 5 October, 2012, available at [http://www.panorama.am/ru/politics/2012/10/05/sahakian/].

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time, members of the RPA called on Tsarukian to support Serzh Sargsian at the presidential election; there might also have been some latent pressure or the threat of publishing compromising material. Corruption was the main topic on the agenda during the first round of the unofficial presidential race in Armenia. In September-October, Serzh Sargsian gave it his full attention: the Control Chamber exposed numerous corruption scandals, and investigations began regarding several high-ranking officials. Some of them were arrested, including the head of the Consular Department of the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the former head of the State Social Security Service. Arrests also continued of medium-ranking officials; their intensity dropped after mid-October and later stopped altogether. Public criticism of the prime minister and several other key officials voiced by the president at a government meeting held in mid-September made the above-mentioned events seem like part of the election campaign. It appeared suspicious that the Armenian president, who usually stayed out of the limelight, was so openly criticizing the ministers.43 In turn, Head of the PAP Gagik Tsarukian said while in Brussels that so far corrupted officials were leading the struggle against corruption in Armenia and that it would be impossible to beat them; this statement aroused irate comments from representatives of the ruling party.

Determination of Presidential Contenders However, Gagik Tsarukian dragged his heels and repeatedly postponed the date for announcing his decision regarding the format of his participation in the presidential election. On 8 December, he met unofficially with Serzh Sargsian and on 12 December publicly announced his refusal to participate in the election or support any of the presidential candidates. His decision bewildered the opposition and the government, since it was no longer clear who Serzh Sargsian’s main rival would be at the presidential election. Meanwhile, progress at the talks on Armenia’s associative membership in the EU and a deep and comprehensive free trade area depended on how well the election was held and whether there was a competitive environment. 44 It is extremely interesting that until December 2012, former Armenian president, Robert Kocharian, who left his post in 2008, was among the possible contenders for the head of state; at that time, the population did not take very kindly to his semi-authoritative style of rule. The ongoing crisis changed the attitude toward Kocharian; we will remind you that during the years of his presidency, the Armenian economy grew at high rates.45 Rooting for Robert Kocharian was engaged in on the 2rd.am website. On 13 November, Kocharian issued a statement in which he refuted any relation with the PAP and supported the demands of the opposition to transfer to the 100% proportional system. Furthermore, he added that “majority elections in Armenia feed the feudalization process.” This statement 43 See: H. Mikaelian, “Vnutrenniaia politika Armenii v sentiabre-oktiabre 2012,” Analitichesky biulleten—Armenia, RAS Institute of Europe, available at [http://ieras.ru/pub/bulleten/Am3.pdf]. 44 See: “Important for Reinforcement of Armenian-EU Relations, Barroso Says,” Tert.am, 1 December, 2012, available at [http://www.tert.am/en/news/2012/12/01/baroso-press-conferance/]. 45 During the second term of Robert Kocharian’s presidency (2003-2007), Armenian GDP increased by 85%, while during Serzh Sargsian’s first term (2008-2012), it grew by only 3%. Dynamics of the Armenian GDP are available on the website of the National Statistics Service at [http://armstat.am/ru/?nid=126&id=01001].

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only added fuel to the fire of the discussions about Kocharian’s possible participation in the election. But on 13 December, the next day after Tsarukian’s statement, Kocharian’s secretary officially announced that the former president was not intending and had never intended participating in the election.46 The other candidates also postponed making a final decision until the last minute. On 25 December, the day registration of the candidates began, Levon Ter-Petrosian announced that he would not be participating in the election, giving his age (he was 68) as the reason, which surprised many. The next day, the ARFD announced that it would not participate in the election, whereby adding that it would not support any of the candidates either. So, in December all the main contenders had left the election race. So the presidential election in Armenia was called technical, that is, deprived of any real competition.47 Heritage Leader Raffi Hovhannisian, whose party took only 6% of the votes at the parliamentary elections, was President Serzh Sargsian’s main rival. A few more candidates also announced their participation in the election. They included former prime minister Hrant Bagratian, who was not supported by a single party, Soviet dissident Paruir Airikian, who spent more than 17 years in prison camps, and a few less well-known candidates, for example, Vardan Sedrakian, a self-proclaimed “eposologist” (i.e. a researcher of epic folklore), Andreas Ghukasian, director of the Ai radio station, and Arman Melikian, former foreign minister of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Second Round of the Presidential Race At the beginning of 2013, the election campaign was essentially relaunched. The president’s rivals, who used to be minorities, were the main actors. However, the absence of the more prestigious opposition politicians particularly played into the hands of Raffi Hovhannisian. The thing was that for many years Hovhannisian’s personal attraction has been higher than his political rating. According to sociologists, this is due to his American background, image of a patriot, orientation toward the intelligentsia, as well as the fact that he smiles often, which no other leader of the Armenian political establishment, apart perhaps for Gagik Tsarukian (who also has a high personal rating), ever does. Raffi Hovhannisian, who quickly made himself at home on the abandoned opposition field, engaged in an energetic election campaign: his rating increased by several percentage points every week. There can be no doubt that the country’s authorities had their hand in this; 70% of the votes (if not more) won by the current president would have looked like an obvious reminder of the withdrawal of all the main rivals from the race. It should be noted that no ideological opposition was essentially seen in the election race; an exception was Raffi Hovhannisian’s proposal to declare the independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. But Serzh Sargsian criticized this statement, noting that “there can be no more risky undertakings at present.”48 46 See: “Robert Kocharian Won’t Take Part in Presidential Elections,” Slaq.am, 13 December, 2012, available in Russian at [http://www.slaq.am/eng/news/107184/]. 47 See: “A Political Scientist Calls the Upcoming Presidential Election in Armenia ‘Technical,’” Armenpress.am, 15 January, 2012, available in Russian at [http://armenpress.am/rus/news/705036]. 48 R. Stepanian, “Serzh Sargsian kritikuet Raffi Hovannisiana,” Armenian service of Radio Freedom, 12 February, 2013, available at [http://rus.azatutyun.am/content/article/24899360.html].

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Soon Raffi Hovhannisian was almost as well known as Serzh Sargsian, who hardly ever appeared on the TV screens.49 According to a poll carried out by European Friends of Armenia at the beginning of February 2013, Hovhannisian’s election campaign was the most convincing.50 There can be no doubt that he was lucky: due to the absence of rivals and the government’s passivity, he was able to draw a large part of the PAP electorate to his side.51 Table 5 Election Campaign Rating of Candidates, January-February 201352535455565758

Time of Poll

Organizer of Poll

Results (% of those who had made their choice)* Serzh Sargsian

Raffi Hovhannisian

Hrant Bagratian

Paruir Airikian

72

20

5

3

68.6

20.8

4.4

4.8

1.4

Others

12 Dec-13 Jan

Sociometer52

15-20 Jan

EuFoA53

15-23 Jan

Gallup Int.54

76

12

5

5

2

18-19 Jan

Sociometer

72

20

3.5

3.5

1

25-29 Jan

VCIOM56

61

27

4

5

3

25 Jan-2 Feb

Gallup Int.57

68

24

2

5

1

31 Jan-5 Feb

EuFoA

58

33

2.8

4.9

1.3

58

55

* Undecided respondents, those who refused to answer, and those who did not intend participating in the elections were excluded from the calculation. In some polls, the total number of undecided was higher than 25%.

49 According to a report by the Erevan press club on coverage of the election campaigns, Serzh Sargsian took third place in terms of air time allotted to the candidates for election agitation between 21 January and 16 February, yielding to Raffi Hovannisian and Paruir Airikian (see: “Report on Monitoring of Armenian Broadcast Media Coverage of Ra Presidential Elections in 2013,” YPC, p. 16, available at [http://ypc.am/upload/YPC%20Monitoring_RA%20Presidential%20Elections%20 2013_eng.pdf]). 50 Seventy-one percent of the polled called Hovannisian’s campaign the most convincing, while 64% opted for Sargsian’s campaign (see: “Poll: Armenia on the Eve of Presidential Elections,” European Friends of Armenia, TNS Opinion, IPSC, 9 February, 2012, p. 18, available at [http://www.eufoa.org/uploads/POLL20130209EN.pdf]). 51 At the beginning of February, 49% of PAP’s voters were ready to give their vote to Hovhannisian and 42% to Sargsian (see: “Poll: Armenia on the Eve of Presidential Elections,” p. 27). 52 See: A. Barsegian, “Ըստ Ադիբեկյանի՝ ընտրողների 72 տոկոսը կքվեարկի Սերժ Սարգսյանի օգտին” (According to Adibekian, 72% will Vote for Serzh Sargsian), Armenian public radio, 9 January, 2013 [http://www.armradio.am/ hy/2013/01/09/ըստ-ադիբեկյանի՝-ընտրողների-72-տոկոսը-կք/]). 53 See: “Poll: A Snapshot ahead of Armenia’s Presidential Elections. Main Findings,” p. 18. 54 See: “Gallup: President Sargsian ahead in Election Race,” News.am, 29 January, 2013, available at [http://news.am/ eng/news/137787.html]. 55 See: “Sociologists Predict that Sargsian will Gather from 68.8% to 72% of the Votes at the Presidential Election,” AMI “Novosti Armenia,” 25 January, 2013, available in Russian at [http://www.newsarmenia.ru/politics/20130125/42791202. html]. 56 See: “Presidential Election in Armenia: Two Weeks before the Voting,” VCIOM, press issue, No. 2223, 5 February, 2013, available in Russian at [http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=459&uid=113600]. 57 See: “Gallup Poll: Ghukasian’s Anti-Rating is Highest,” Aysor.am, 7 February, 2013, available in Russian at [http:// www.aysor.am/en/news/2013/02/07/gallup/]. 58 See: “Poll: Armenia on the Eve of Presidential Elections,” p. 23.

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As we see from the table, during the official election campaign, Serzh Sargsian’s rating tended to drop and fell by approximately 15%. Raffi Hovhannisian’s rating rose by almost the same amount and, judging from the election results, continued to increase after that. However, Hovhannisian’s personal popularity rose much faster than the rating of his Heritage Party.59 The election campaign was held in an atmosphere of the most favorable treatment of all the alternative candidates, but not all of them were able to take advantage of this opportunity. The election campaign was remembered for the desperate attempts of the minority candidates to attract the voters’ attention; it was the most eccentric of recent times. 60 For example, Paruir Airikian, Aram Arutiunian, and Andreas Ghukasian declared hunger strikes from time to time, whereby the latter kept his up for a whole month. On 1 February, some unidentified person fired at Paruir Airikian as he was returning home; people close to candidate Vardan Sedrakian were accused of organizing the attempt on his life.61 Nevertheless, wounded Airikian found the strength to enter political bargaining, reminding everyone of his right to postpone the election. In the end, he did not make use of this right, but lost almost all of his voters.

Results of the Presidential Election On 18 February, 2013, the presidential election was held in Armenia in a calm atmosphere. Any violations reported during the day mainly regarded overcrowded polling stations; there were very few more serious violations. For example, a total of 394 violations were registered on iDitord, that is, almost three times fewer than at the parliamentary elections.12 When presenting the results of the election monitoring, Artak Kirakosian, one of the heads of the observation mission of the Civil Society Institute, noted that in 2013, there were 7-8-fold fewer violations than at the presidential election in 2008. 62 According to the official data, 1.52 million people took part in the election (that is, a little less than in the parliamentary elections). Furthermore, Serzh Sargsian received 860,000 votes, Raffi Hovhannisian 540,000, Hrant Bagratian around 32,000, and Paruir Airikian 18,000. The other candidates gathered a total of 18,000 votes. The election results are presented in terms of region in the table below. This time, the OSCE observation mission gave the election in Armenia a very good assessment, noting the high level of its organization.63 Moreover, an interim report noted that violations that could 59 See: “Gallup: By Refusing to Nominate a Candidate for the Election, the Prosperous Armenia Party Lost the Support of Some of the Electorate,” Panorama.am, 9 February, 2013, available in Russian at [http://www.panorama.am/ru/ politics/2013/02/09/gallup2/]. 60 See: M. Grigorian, “Armenia: stanut li ‘tekhnicheskimi’ prezidentskie vybory,” BBC, 30 January, 2013, available at [http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/international/2013/01/130129_armenian_elections.shtml]. 61 See: “A Third Person, a Relative of Eposologist Vardan Serdakian, has been Arrested in the Case of Attempted Murder of Airikian,” 1in.am, 12 February, 2013, available in Russian at [http://www.1in.am/rus/armenia_apolitics_27174. html]. 62 See: “Artak Kirakosian: The Election of the Armenian President was Held in a Much More Ambient Atmosphere,” Panorama.am, 21 February, 2013, available in Russian at [http://www.panorama.am/ru/society/2013/02/21/a-kirakosian/]. 63 See: “Armenian Election Generally Well-Administered with Fundamental Freedoms Respected, but Some Key Concerns Remain, International Election Observers say,” OSCE/ODIHR, 18 February, 2013, available at [http://osce.org/ odihr/elections/99676].

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Election Results by Armenian Region64 Number of Invalid Bulletins*

Serzh Sargsian

Raffi Hovhannisian

Hrant Bagratian

446,005

54.05

23,380

49.30

42.83

4.36

72,768

63.62

1,459

66.00

30.78

1.45

Ararat

157,921

74.10

2,956

76.38

21.38

0.90

Armavir

128,635

57.26

4,351

54.20

42.55

1.20

Vayots dzor

29,697

62.70

1,644

63.66

32.26

1.81

Gegharkunik

128,881

69.09

2,347

79.69

17.96

0.93

Kotayk

138,257

59.43

4,174

61.97

33.50

1.97

Lori

143,337

60.35

3,967

55.79

39.72

1.51

Siunik

71,985

65.61

1,644

65.02

31.79

1.28

Tavush

71,278

65.70

1,874

54.08

40.68

2.05

Shirak

132,939

57.99

4,065

44.02

52.61

1.23

1,521,703

60.18

50,988

58.64

36.75

2.15

Erevan Aragatsotn

Total

Number of Participants, thous

Results in Terms of Candidates (%)

Turnout (%)

Region (marz)

* Since there was no place to vote “against all,” all the bulletins in which no specific candidate was selected were considered invalid.

have affected the outcome of the voting were noted at only five polling stations, whereby they were primarily procedural problems and not related to vote-counting fraud or ballot 64stuffing.65 The group of observers from the International Expert Center for Electoral Systems also recognized the election in Armenia as democratic.66 Soon the leaders of the EU, Council of Europe, NATO, Russia, the U.S., France, Germany, Ukraine, Georgia, and even Turkey were congratulating Serzh Sargsian.

The Opposition Does Not Recognize the Election Results However, the election was assessed critically within the country. Serzh Sargsian’s opponents interrupted the presentation of the ODIHR’s interim report on the Armenian election. Furthermore, the OSCE was accused of complying with its falsification, although this time there were fewer cases of use of the administrative resource than at the parliamentary elections in 2012. Author’s calculation based on the data published by the Central Election Commission. See: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, OSCE/ODIHR, 19 February, 2013, p. 11, available at [http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/99675]. 66 See: Election Report, ICES, 19 February, 2013, available in Russian at [http://www.elections-ices.org/files/ publications/16521.pdf]. 64

65

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Sargsian’s overwhelming advantage was confirmed at the polling stations where the army voted, whereas in many cities the opposition candidate won. The activity of the ruling party led to the fact that in the villages, known for their political passivity and where around one third of the population lives, Serzh Sargsian gathered the overwhelming majority of the votes. Let us try to understand why the opposition did not recognize the election results. Voting Map of Armenian Cities

Alaverdi Stepanavan Gumri

Ijevan

Vanadzor

Dilijan Hrazdan

Artik

Sevan

Charentsavan Ashtarak

Gavar

Abovian

Armavir

Erevan Vagharshapat (Etchmiadzin)

Masis Artashat Ararat Sisian

Serzh Sargsian

Goris

Raffi Hovhannisian

Kapan

Other candidates Invalid ballots

© Hrant Mikaelian

Before the election, few expected Raffi Hovhannisian to receive 540,000 votes, but it was this result that revived the intrigue that appeared to have long left the stage of Armenian politics. Raffi Hovhannisian refused to recognize the election results; on the contrary, he was calling himself the president of Armenia. Furthermore, the fact cannot be ignored that the administrative resource was used in favor of the current president. 98



Despite the fact that the losing candidate refused to recognize the election results, Armenia still made certain progress. It is enough to mention that after the election, the losing and winning candidates met and calmly discussed several issues. The fact that politics are no longer restricted to the center of Erevan can also be considered a good sign: Raffi Hovhannisian began holding protest demonstrations in essentially all the cities of the country. City residents rightly considered that the election did not reflect the result of nation-wide voting since in many cities Raffi Hovhannisian won (his campaign was aimed precisely at city residents); he was not understood and not accepted in the villages. Moreover, Hovhannisian did not have organizational resources in the small communities of Armenia; after visiting so many cities, he could hardly travel to 870 Armenian villages as well. If we rely on the available information about the small number of violations, we can find an unexpected explanation for the overall negative assessment the election process was given inside the country. Against the background of its improvement, some violations (serious and not very), such as use of the administrative resource, suddenly stood out in bold relief, although in the past they were taken for granted. In the second half of February, Hovhannisian’s rating was on the rise. Despite this, in those areas where he won or gathered a large number of votes, a low turnout and large number of invalid bulletins were seen, which shows the lack of trust in the electoral system of the country as a whole. The mentioned facts say that Raffi Hovhannisian, who just recently recommended himself as an opposition leader, still had the potential to attract the protest electorate. In other words, if Raffi Hovhannisian had been more active in the regions with a large number of city residents, he would have received a higher number of votes.

Post-Election Development of Events: BaRevolution The protest demonstrations organized by Hovhannisian were soon christened “BaRevolution” (Hello Revolution), implying the politician’s habit of walking around the streets and saying hello to the voters. Quite a large number of young people were involved in the demonstrations; they were peaceful and did not draw huge crowds (they usually drew between 5,000 and 15,000 participants in Erevan, and between 200 and 1,500 people in other cities). The fact that the so-called revolution was actively supported by many former supporters and associates of Ter-Petrosian (including those who had not participated in the election at all) confirms that the protest electorate has not lost its potential and is still geared toward carrying out a revolutionary change in power, that is, complete dismantling of the existing system of rule. This is precisely the reason for Hovhannisian’s rapid rise in popularity; however, he was unable to recommend himself as a successful political manager. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that Hovhannisian is extremely likeable and is not rejected by either the members of unofficial Orange organizations or by the older generation discontent with the socioeconomic situation. As for the protest demonstrations, their nucleus consisted of environmental activists who have succeeded in manifesting themselves over the past three years. Since the nucleus of the protest movement is comprised of middle-class members of unofficial organizations, the likelihood of it escalating into a revolution is not very high. As the experience of recent revolutions (successful and unsuccessful) has shown, the most aggressive charge comes from middle-aged disillusioned unemployed people or young people deprived of social perks. Furthermore, 99



we are dealing with people for whom protest is only a game (particularly young people). Despite the four-year history of the leftist movement in Armenia, it never did become mass and did not go beyond the center of Erevan and Gumri; so there is no point expecting street protests to bring about an overturn of power.67

Still, Was the Presidential Election Falsified? After the election results were announced, one of the main complaints was the correlation between the turnout and the number of votes Serzh Sargsian received; the data in Table 6 can serve as a graphic example. The author of this article calculated the Pearson Correlation Coefficient for the election, revealing that the share of votes Serzh Sargsian received is positively correlated with the turnout in Armenia’s regions; the coefficient amounted to 0.8265. In Raffi Hovhannisian’s case, this coefficient was equal to –0.7968. The opposition is using this fact as proof of mass ballot stuffing and falsifications. In turn, Russian and Armenian experts offered their own model for counting the election results, basing the turnout on normal or Gaussian distribution. Such calculations were carried out in Armenia too and produced a largely similar result: around 42 for Sargsian, and between 48 and 51 for Hovhannisian.68 Experts explain the positive relation between the turnout and number of votes Sargsian received and negative coefficient in the case of Hovhannisian as proof of ballot stuffing or vote-counting fraud. But it should be noted that the mathematical models used to calculate the above-mentioned coefficients have one special feature: they presuppose in general equal participation of voters throughout the country and homogenous voting at the national level. Keeping in mind the facts we already know, the conclusion can be drawn that this feature is the weak link in the study’s methodology. First, everyone knew even before the election that the turnout in the village (78%) was expected to be higher than in the cities (73%), not to mention in Erevan (66%).69 Taking into account the stable migration outflow observed in Armenian cities (apart from Erevan) and simultaneous high level of support for Hovhannisian, it could be presumed that this was where the official turnout would be much lower than expected since the survey was carried out among the de facto population. Furthermore, it is easy to explain the difference in turnout indices between Gumri, Vanadzor, and Kapan, which were caught in the emigration wave after Armenia gained its independence, and the economically prosperous cites of the Ararat region, which people leave much more rarely (here this index was of course higher). Moreover, we know that Raffi Hovhannisian’s election campaign was designed mainly for the cities. As a member of the observation mission, the present author of this article visited 8 polling stations in the city of Goris. In addition, he carried out an analysis of the election results at polling stations where categories of citizens vulnerable to administrative pressure voted. As a result, it was 67 See: I. Azar, “Poka, revoliutsia,” Lenta.ru, 25 February, 2013, available at [http://lenta.ru/articles/2013/02/25/ armenia/]. 68 See: “Policy Forum Armenia Publishes the Results of Its Preliminary Analysis on 18 February, 2013 Presidential Election in Armenia,” 22 February, 2013, available at [http://www.pf-armenia.org/sites/default/files/2013%20Election%20 Statement-3.pdf]; “‘Wizard’ in Armenian is ‘kahard,’” available in Russian at [http://romanik.livejournal.com/718556.html]; “Armenian Election in the Mirror of Official Statistics,” available in Russian at [http://abuzin.livejournal.com/114160.html]. 69 See: “Poll: Armenia on the Eve of Presidential Elections,” p. 21.

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possible to assess the influence of the administrative resource on the election results. For example, around 90% of army recruits voted for Serzh Sargsian; the same was seen in prisons and refugee camps. Keeping in mind the total number of army recruits, prisoners, and refugees, the conclusion can be drawn that Sargsian’s results were inflated by approximately two-fold. In addition, there was ballot stuffing (two cases of extensive stuffing are known), and in the Erevan administrative district of Malatia-Sebastia, a suspiciously large number of people voted according to absentee ballots (2,800 higher than the norm); these direct falsifications raised Sargsian’s results by another 0.2%. It is precisely these generally small direct falsifications that OSCE observers were referring to when they announced the high level of the election in Armenia. The present author also managed to count the anomalously high number of votes Sargsian received in the evening. This is explained by the members of his staff mobilizing those voters who had sold their vote but had not come independently to the polling stations; in Goris, for example, this kind of “distortion” amounted to around 9%. The number obtained by multiplying the votes of those who came to the polling stations during the day (if it can be said that they came independently) and the disproportionally high number of Sargsian’s supporters who appeared in the evening (if it can be said that they voted exclusively for money) is an indication of the influence of electoral bribes on the final voting results. In so doing, there is no reason to extrapolate this number (9%) as distortion of the results throughout the country: in some regions it could vary. Even if we take it as a basis, Sargsian would still have gathered more than 52% of the votes after deduction of the influence of the administrative resource. Moreover, there is no evidence that voters were coerced into buying votes, so this factor can be taken for granted at this stage.

Conclusion Armenia has passed the election exam at this stage; the degree of antagonism in terms of government vs. opposition has dropped somewhat, even though the latter did not recognize the results as legitimate. All the opposition parties acquired seats in parliament, while the former rival of the current president is happy to communicate with the government. However, active use of the administrative resource and the buying of votes that took place prevent the elections held in Armenia in 2012-2013 from being considered completely fair. Running ahead, an important step forward would be if administrative methods were rejected at the next election. The year 2012 demonstrated that a competitive struggle for electorate votes can be carried out by liberalizing the media space. There is also potential for gradually reducing the tension in the political system caused primarily by the government’s low level of legitimacy and the revolutionary moods in society. As for parties representing citizens’ group interests, hopefully they will appear in the future.

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THE 18TH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA: INCONCLUSIVE RESULTS, URGENT TASKS, SHAKY COMPROMISES Konstantin SYROEZHKIN D.Sc. (Political Science), Professor, Chief Scientific Associate of the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

T

ABSTRACT

he struggle at the very top of China’s political establishment reached its peak on the eve of the 18th Communist Party Congress; this largely predetermined the balance of political forces in the upper echelons of the Communist Party and the decisions of its congress. The compromise about the top figures makes the party’s political future very dim indeed. Although the retreating Hu-Wen Tandem managed to hold its ground, it is too early to say that the “reformers” have scored a final victory: in many respects the 18th Congress proved to be “transitional.” The final balance of power

will become clear in five years’ time after the next, 19th CPC Congress. It will probably clarify the course of the “fifth generation” of the country’s leaders. It seems that the next five years can be best described as time of compromises. One has to admit that the criticized Hu-Wen Tandem left the country in fairly good shape; it compiled a reasonable “roadmap” with no alternative on the horizon. It remains to be seen whether the new party and country leaders will manage in the next five years to avert social upheavals and fulfill the tasks formulated by the 18th Congress while following the roadmap.

KEYWORDS: China, Communist Party of China, 18th Congress, the State Council, Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping.

Introduction The 18th Congress of the CPC convened on 8-14 November, 2012 in Beijing took place amid foreign policy and domestic complexities and contradictions. This probably explains why it was convened a month later than scheduled and why its results are best described as contradictory. Under pressure of the Arab Spring, the Syrian crisis, and the changed rules of the game on the world arena, the CPC leaders had to revise certain aspects of their foreign policies: it seems that China will be more resolute while still relying on “soft power.” The number of bureaucrats guilty of corruption is steadily growing. The Bo Xilai File has demonstrated that there is not only no agreement about the methods of governance at the very top, but 102



also that the country’s leaders have clashed in an open political struggle. Aware of the plummeting confidence in the country’s leaders, lower morals, and lost faith in socialist ideals and the CPC’s ability to rule effectively, the people at the helm had to revise the larger part of their domestic policy course. Personnel shifts leap to the eye. The Congress merely legitimized the advent of a new generation of Chinese leaders. It is too early to assess them; it is too early to say whether they will prove deft enough to emulate the previous generation of rulers who dampened the rising social and ethnic conflicts in China and, most importantly, avoided a political crisis; it is too early to predict the country’s course. It is clear, however, that in the near future its social, economic, and political course will change and that the world will witness many interesting developments.

On the Eve The dynamically developing economy of the PRC, which has moved higher up the world’s “table of ranks,” and the determination with which social problems were addressed made the year 2012 a fairly challenging one for the Hu-Wen (Wen Jiabao, Prime Minister of the State Council of China) Tandem. The first signs of the coming crisis became evident in October 2011 when the Wukan villagers (Guangdong)1 rose in protest against land grabbing. Peasants and fishermen set up a committee to protect their rights, they drove away the local administrators and representatives of the CPC and elected their own administration. Beijing had to choose between appeasement and intimidation. In the context of the rising wave of social protests,2 intimidation looked preferable. This might have been nothing out of the ordinary had the Wukan events not shown that the Communist Party was losing its authority and its grip on the domestic developments and that corruption and arbitrariness among the bureaucrats were spreading like wildfire. In an article that appeared in the Qushi journal published by the Communist Party, Wen Jiabao had to admit that “corruption constituted the greatest threat to the party’s ability to rule the country.” 3 The March scandal predetermined both the specifics of the political process in the country on the eve of the 18th party congress and its decisions. Several events revealed to the public that there were serious disagreements inside the political class of China.4 Bo Xilai, one of the likely candidates for a post in the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CC CPC of the 18th convocation, was removed from all his posts and lost his seat in the National People’s Congress (NPC) and his party card. He was brought to court; his wife Bo-Gu 1 For more details, see: J. Anderlini, “Wukan Villagers Agree Peace Deal,” Financial Times, 21 December, 2011; R. Jacob, “Chinese Villagers Step Up Pressure,” Financial Times, 15 December, 2011; idem, “Communist Party Tested by Village Protests,” Financial Times, 18 December, 2011; idem, “Wukan Offers Democratic Model for China,” Financial Times, 30 January, 2012; idem, “Wukan Challenges Party Line on Democracy,” Financial Times, 10 February, 2012; idem, “Zhou Ping. Intimidation Backfires in Wukan Poll,” Financial Times, 5 March, 2012; D. Pilling, “Where Wukan has Led, Beijing will not Follow,” Financial Times, 8 February, 2012; I. Ivanov, “Kitayskie krestyane vygnali iz derevni partiynykh chinovnikov,” The Epoch Times Internet Portal, 15 December, 2011, available at [http://www.epochtimes.ru/], 20 December, 2011; V. Skosyrev, “V kitayskoy derevne vspykhnul bunt,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 16 December, 2011. 2 According to the Western press, there were 120 thousand protests in 2010; according to incomplete data for 2011, there were 180 thousand actions (see: V. Skosyrev, “Demonstranty blokirovali shosse v Kitae,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 23 August, 2011; idem, “V dereniakh Kitaia ne prekrashchaiutsia bunty,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 29 September, 2011). 3 See: Wen Jiabao, “Rang qiuanli zai yangguang xia yunxing” (Let Power Move in Sunshine), Qushi, No. 8, 2012. 4 On the Bo Xilai file, see: K. Syroezhkin, “Politicheskiy perepolokh v Podnebesnoy,” Tsentr Azii, No. 21-24, November/ December 2012, pp. 83-108.

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Kailai was accused of committing murder and sentenced to death, and Wang Lijun, his close associate, was sent to prison for 15 years. Criminal proceedings were started against a large group of other regional officials associated with him. The people at the top cannot agree on the country’s social, economic, or political future. 5 The conservative Jiang Zemin clan (to which Bo Xilai and his ally Zhou Yongkang, Secretary of the Central Political and Legislative Committee, who is also accused of an attempted coup, belong) is confronted by the Hu Jintao clan, the members of which are known as reformers. In fact, this confrontation, the inability to achieve a consensus, and the unwillingness to move to an open split cost the CPC its position. The Communist leaders delayed political changes in an effort to bribe the public with economic achievements in order to iron out the mounting problems. Today, this tactic has been exhausted. Irrespective of the true reasons for Bo Xilai’s downfall, much of what happened to him was caused by the squabbles at the very top of the communist pyramid. An “open secret” became even more open: it turned out that practically all officials, up to and including the top people in the CPC and People’s Republic of China, were involved in corruption, while the harsh measures applied by the CC CPC and the State Council were designed not so much to fight corruption as to remove political rivals. The CC CPC had to admit the ugly truth: the ruling class was more concerned about its material interests than anything else, while party discipline and a crackdown on corruption could change nothing. The phenomenon of “naked officials”6 (their numbers multiplying by day) was the logical response. According to China Economic Weekly, between 2000 and 2011, 18,487 people were detained while trying to flee abroad with illegally acquired assets. In 2011, the People’s Bank of China reported that since the mid-1990s between 16 and 18 thousand officials have fled the country with about 800 billion yuan ($128 billion) and could not be brought to account. There is another, even more eloquent figure: according to the Global Financial Integrity report published in October 2011, between 2000 and 2011, China lost $3.79 trillion in assets illegally exported from the country.7 There is another problem: the Center is losing control over the local power structures, as well as over the heads of the grass-roots party organizations and village party committees. The CPC leaders have become quite open about it. According to He Guoqiang, Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, this “was the result of worsening relations between the central and provincial party committees which ended in a crisis that might affect the implementation of the party’s political and ideological course.”8 5 According to prominent Chinese sociologist Sun Liping, there are people who would like to return to the past; they argue that the reforms of the 1990s infringed on the rights of workers of state enterprises and other working people who had to pay for their housing and medical services. They insist that it was bureaucrats and rich people who profited from the market. There are liberals who want to go on with the reforms without social orientation. Another group favors sociallyoriented reforms (quoted from: V. Skosyrev, “Politicheskaia drama v KNR stala detektivom,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 12 April, 2012). 6 The “naked official” (luo guan), an official with no property inside the country who has moved his family, relatives, and money abroad and has property outside China. 7 See: I. Ivanov, “Iz Kitaia massovo utekaiut dengi i uezzhaiut zazhitochnye liudi,” The Epoch Times Internet Portal, 17 December, 2012; Lin Jane, “Bogatstva natsii gotoviat k vyvozu,” The Epoch Times Internet Portal, 17 December, 2012; Liu Xiaozhen, “China Economic Weekly publikuet otchet o chinovnikah, sbegaiushchikh za granitsu,” The Epoch Times Internet Portal, 20 June, 2012, available at [http://www.epochtimes.ru/], 25 June, 2012. 8 See: Lin Feng, “Hu Jintao: Partiia nakhoditsia v kriticheskom polozhenii,” The Epoch Times Internet Portal, 1 July, 2012, available at [http://www.epochtimes.ru/], 10 June, 2012.

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According to public opinion polls (the results of which were published on 12 July, 2012), corruption (80.35%), inadequate democratization (53.4%), and social injustice (51.65%) were the three worst problems. The majority pointed to oligarchs as the source of these problems; it is commonly believed that they slowed down the country’s progress.9 This is a serious challenge, especially to the “fifth generation” of the Communist leaders; the crisis of confidence in the people in power is growing more and more obvious (“the people in power are corrupt and refuse to listen to the ordinary people; they work mainly to enrich themselves and express the interests of the ruling class”); the Communist Party has lost its authority and ability to effectively rule the country.10 The leaders of the CPC and the People’s Republic of China admitted that political reform was overdue. In March 2012, at a press conference held after the 5th Session of the National People’s Congress of the 11th convocation, Wen Jiabao deemed it necessary to point out: “Now reforms in China have come to a critical stage. Without successful political reform, it is impossible for China to fully institute economic reform and the gains we have made in these areas may be lost, and new problems that popped up in the Chinese society will not be fundamentally resolved, and such historical tragedies as the Cultural Revolution may happen again in China.” 11 On 14 May, Renmin Ribao carried a long article about the political reforms and their problems. It said, in particular, that the party and the country want to go ahead with political reform actively and reasonably, that the party should trim its power to become more viable, that rights should be protected while “popular enthusiasm,” which presupposes that the ordinary people should become “masters,” should be encouraged. The article outlined a scheme of “self-administration realized at the grass-roots level” through three elected committees: a committee to supervise what is going on in the village; a village party committee; and a village committee.12 As it left the political stage, the “fourth generation” came up with the idea that political reform should be a “re-branding” of sorts of the CPC’s power to make it easier for Xi Jinping and other members of the “fifth generation” to address many structural problems, of which corruption was one. The “fourth generation” went even further—it removed the neo-Maoists from among the group of the “new left” (who might start “rocking the boat”) from Chinese political life. Bo Xilai proved to be the first, but not the last, on the list. Today, a fierce mudslinging campaign is going on between the Shanghai Faction, which joined forces with the Crown Prince Party (otherwise known as “princelings”—children of prominent revolutionaries and Chinese leaders of the “first generation”), on the one side, and a group of the Communist Youth League (CYL), on the other. The latter are mostly market-oriented, while the princelings and the Shanghai Faction are mainly egalitarians. 9 See: I. Ivanov, “Neobychnye rezultaty sotsoprosa: kitaytsy ne liubiat diktaturu i kommunisticheskh liderov,” The Epoch Times Internet Portal, 16 July, 2012, available at [http://www.epochtimes.ru/], 20 July, 2012. 10 According to Dongxiang, a journal published in Hong Kong, on 26 October the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CC CPC met in Beijing for a closed meeting, at which Xi Jinping was scathingly critical; he pointed to “several whys:” Why is there tension between the people and the party and the government? Why is the level of popular confidence in the party low? Why is the level of satisfaction of the people with the local governments and personal moral qualities of the local officials low? Why do people give low marks to the party, government, state offices, and their personnel? Why is the level of popular support of the party’s course and politics low? The future secretary general said that it must be admitted that there were burning problems and the legality of certain methods of government was doubtful; he added that the “bell was tolling” for the legitimacy of the Communist government (quoted from: I. Ivanov, “Xi Jinping priznal krizis zakonnosti pravleniia kompartii v Kitae,” The Epoch Times Internet Portal, 29 October, 2012, available at [http://www.epochtimes.ru/], 30 October, 2012). 11 [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-03/14/c_131466552.htm]. 12 See: “Zhengzhi tizhi gaige wengbu tuijin (Carrying out Political Reforms with Confidence),” Renmin Ribao, 14 May, 2012.

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In view of the obviously successful social and economic reforms and China’s place in the world table of ranks, the Hu-Wen Tandem was immune to attacks on its social, economic, and political record. The Shanghai Faction launched an information war against Xi Jinping, as the CPC’s future leader, and Wen Jiabao, who carried out economic reform and initiated political reform. They insisted on bringing Bo Xilai to court and issuing a harsh sentence. Bo was accused of corruption, persecution of the followers of Falun Gong, one of the qigong schools, the cruelty of which shocked the world, and an aborted coup d’êtat. In June, Internet users learned that, according to Bloomberg, the interests of the brothers, sisters, and other members of Xi Jinping’s extended family “include investments in companies with total assets of $376 million; an 18 percent indirect stake in a rare-earths company with $1.73 billion in assets; and a $20.2 million holding in a publicly traded technology company,” as well as a villa and other real estate in Hong Kong.13 Careful investigation revealed that “Bloomberg was unable to trace any assets to Mr. Xi himself, or to his military singer wife, Peng Liyuan, or daughter, Xi Mingze, who studies at Harvard” and that “there is no evidence that Mr. Xi intervened to help his relatives’ businesses or of any wrongdoing by Mr. Xi or his extended family. People familiar with the family say Mr. Xi has ordered his siblings to ‘behave themselves’ and get out of business on a number of occasions in recent years.” 14 Although everyone knows that the Chinese elite converted its political capital into cash, doubts about the “clean hands” of the future leader of the party and country were planted. Xi Jinping panicked.15 The Hu team frantically sought a compromise with the Shanghai Faction; early in August 2012, the Politburo of the CC CPC met in Beidaihe to draw up a list of future party and country leaders. It was decided that the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CC CPC to be elected by the congress should consist of seven members: Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Zhang Dejiang, Li Yuanchao, Wang Qishan, and Wang Yang. An agreement on Xi Jinping had been reached back in 2010; three of the newly agreed candidates belonged to the Shanghai Faction; the other three to the Communist Youth League group. It seems that the trial of Gu Kailai, Bo Xilai’s wife, late in August in Hefei, the Anhui Province, was also part of the compromise. The judges who relied on the testimony of Gu Kailai, who said that murdered Briton Neil Heywood had threatened her son Bo Guagua, ruled that the murder had been committed by a woman in a “state of mental breakdown” driven by maternal instinct. Nothing was said about the crimes of corruption committed by Bo and his family; nothing was said about the part he had played in persecutions of the Falun Gong movement; the proven facts of the husband and wife’s illegal business activities and large sums transferred abroad were suppressed. The name of Bo Xilai was not mentioned. In mid-September, the Hu-Wen Tandem tried to recapture its lost position at a secret trial of Wang Lijun, which started on 17 September. Wang, Head of the Public Security Bureau (PSB) of Chongqing, was involved in Bo’s criminal activities. He was the first to reveal the compromising facts and his involvement in the coup against Xi Jinping. Official reports about the Wang Lijun case left much unsaid16; what was said proved to be enough to open a case against his former chief Bo Xilai. On 24 September, Wang was sentenced to [http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-29/xi-jinping-millionaire-relations-reveal-fortunes-of-elite.html]. [http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/103a9a4e-c1f5-11e1-8e7c-00144feabdc0.html]. 15 Early in September he disappeared from sight for two weeks, officially to nurse his injured spine. Later, it became known that late in August he had handed in a request not to appoint him the party and country leader (see: Lin Fen, “Pochemu Bo Xilai rukhnul, a Xi Jinping propal na vremia?” Part 2, The Epoch Times Internet Portal, 17 October, 2012, available at [http://www.epochtimes.ru/], 20 October, 2012. 16 See: “Wang Lijun anting shen ji anqing shiwei: dui Bo-Gu Kailai mimi luyin (The Trial of Wang Lijun and the Court Materials from Beginning to End: Secret Notes Related to Bo-Gu Kailai),” Xinhua wang, 20 September, 2012, available at [http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/], 25 September, 2012. 13 14

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15 years in prison for an aggregate of crimes and divested of his political rights for a year. His willingness to witness against Bo Xilai, help investigate “the Heywood case,” “clarify the worst crimes and violations committed by other people,” and “contribute to the protection of law and order” was repaid with a relatively light sentence. “The Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee decided at a meeting on 28 September to deprive Bo of CPC membership and expel him from public service for severe disciplinary violations;” the CPC’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) transferred his case to the judicial bodies. On 26 October, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress announced that the Standing Committee of the Chongqing Municipal People’s Congress had taken back Bo’s deputy mandate, thus ending his immunity from criminal liability.17 On 26 October, The New York Times carried a big article by David Barboza,18 in which he asserted that the “many relatives of Wen Jiabao, including his [mother], son, daughter, younger brother, and brother-in-law, have become extraordinarily wealthy during his leadership… A review of corporate and regulatory records indicates that the prime minister’s relatives have controlled assets worth at least $2.7 billion… The review of the corporate and regulatory records … found no holdings in Mr. Wen’s name. And it was not possible to determine from the documents whether he recused himself from any decisions that might have affected his relatives’ holdings, or whether they received preferential treatment on investments.” The family advocates rejected the accusations as unjustified; Wen Jiabao initiated verification of what was written in The New York Times; on 5 November, the SC of the Politburo of the CC CPC sanctioned official investigation.19 The outcome is hard to guess, however the compromising materials affected the course of the 18th Party Congress and the decisions related to the top appointments.

The Congress: Key Policy Outcomes I have already written above that the 18th Congress was expected to legitimize the generation shift. The “fourth generation” with the Tandem at its head moved away to give space to the next generation of Chinese Communist leaders. In any case, those who had were 70 or older by the beginning of the congress stood no chance of being elected to the CC, Politburo, or Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. The CPC not merely followed the tradition of rotation at the top started by Deng Xiaoping, the Hu-Wen Tandem obviously completely trusted its successors and was less critical of the situation inside the country than certain foreign (especially Western) media. Moreover, those who predicted that Hu would remain in power for another couple of years as Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission (CMC) proved wrong—the post went to Xi Jinping. It remains to be seen what the “fifth generation” will do with what they acquired from their predecessors, which social groups will become their point of reference, and what they plan to do in17 [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-12/29/c_132071302.htm]; [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/ china/2012-11/04/c_131950261.htm]. 18 See: D. Barboza, “Billions in Hidden Riches for Family of Chinese Leader,” The New York Times (U.S.), 26 October, 2012. 19 See: A. Odinets, “Na s’ezd KPK vynesli vazhny vbros,” Kommersant, 29 October, 2012; S. Petrova, “Obvinenie Wen Jiabao v korrutsii—prodolzhenie borby fraktsiy v Kitae,” The Epoch Times Internet portal, 29 October, 2012, available at [http://www.epochtimes.ru/], 5 November, 2012.

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side and outside the country. This will become clear in about twelve months when power is finally transferred to the new Chinese leaders. China’s fast economic growth created a myth about its power; however the Chinese, the CPC leaders in particular, are much more skeptical. Whatever the case, the new generation is facing a lot of problems.  The

first and worst of them is the legitimacy crisis aggravated by the squabbles inside the Communist Party. Everyone knows that and no one is prepared to “rock the boat.” The new leaders (very much like the old ones) must work hard to restore public confidence in the party and its ability to rule. Some of the urgent tasks and main ideas found their way into the new Constitution of the CPC: “the Scientific Outlook on Development that puts people first,” “decisions of the party obligatory for all;” “exercising governance for the people,” “governance based on the law,” etc. To be realized, the Chinese must slash corruption, force the bureaucrats to obey the law, and work in the interests of all rather than for their private gain.

 Second,

the new leaders must carry on what has been started: they must change the model of economic growth. Much has been done, but much more remains to be done. The current development model is basically a wasteful, “cost-based”, one, relying on extended formula of industrial production. The country must concentrate on high tech and innovations; it must work for the domestic rather than foreign market and pour more money into the little developed central and western regions.

 Third,

the real economy should be strengthened, while its virtual sector trimmed. In recent years China has been suffering from an ailment common to the global economy caused by the expanding virtual sector of the economy; because of lower profitability of the real sector, industrial enterprises have started funding virtual economic branches; this has affected the real economy, which shrank; the cost of production increased and put small and medium enterprises in a quandary.

 Fourth, the country has to expand domestic demand; the shortest road lies through light tax

burden in the real sector and higher income for the ordinary people. This cannot be done at low cost; there is also the danger of parasitical sentiments spreading.

 Fifth,

there is no alternative to the current policies in the Chinese countryside. The recent events in the south opened the people’s eyes to the fact that the 700 million-strong rural population is a highly explosive social factor. The 12th Five-Year Plan contains a complete list of measures to be implemented.

 Sixth,

the “fifth generation” is aware of the fact that the social sphere is no less explosive; the conflict between the strategy of “not destabilizing inequality” and the rapidly mounting social differentiation or even segregation (many population groups are deprived of access to means of social mobility) is becoming more and more obvious by the day.

 Seventh, China’s population is rapidly growing older, which negatively affects the structure

of manpower resources: a shortage of skilled manpower will hit the country despite its huge population. This will not happen during the rule of the “fifth generation,” however the problem is too real to be ignored.

 Eighth,

the new leaders will have to pay attention to a critically important issue: China is gradually losing its competitive advantages (cheap and relatively skilled labor; a favorable investment climate; accessibility of foreign markets and resources); this process is unfolding together with the mounting social and demographic problems. 108

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS 


Ninth, the younger generation is indifferent both to socialist ideas and the political struggle—it concentrates on personal wellbeing, which allows the people at the top to rein in the political reforms; on the other hand, this might devalue the idea of restoring China and the Chinese nation to their former glory—until recently, this idea has been advancing the Chinese model.

 Tenth,

the new leaders will have to cope with the rising wave of Han nationalism, a serious problem in a country where the national regions are hit by numerous social problems. China’s great and increasing ambitions and the mounting pressure of the West related to the human rights issue do nothing to alleviate the urgency of these problems. It has become clear that mass protest rallies might develop into large-scale disturbances fed by ethnic separatism (in Tibet and Xinjiang) or by social problems (in the poorest regions with a predominantly peasant population). The old leaders used the old time-tested methods: huge sums of money from the state coffers to pay for services and preferences. Some members of the “fifth generation” have already voiced their disagreement with the old practice. It is useful as an emergency measure, but it breeds excessive social expectations; the regions look to the center for help, but the regional elites prefer to be less dependent on the central authorities.

 It

remains to be seen whether the new people will manage to stand opposed to Han nationalism rather than be tempted to side with it. Thanks to the Internet, nationalist ideas in China are highly popular.

 Finally, the new leaders will have to slacken their grip and allow a certain amount of political

liberalization. This should not be taken to mean that nothing has been done so far to reform the political system. Much has been done—but the radicals want to see faster and deeper changes. The course of the Hu-Wen Tandem realized the majority of the ideas found in Charter 2008 published on the Internet by Chinese intellectuals and human rights activists.20

The rising number of protests testifies that the Tandem’s efforts were not enough; the new leaders will have to keep in mind what Alexis de Tocqueville said at one time: “Revolutions come not when masses are downtrodden, but when there lot is improving.” Hu Jintao concentrated on these problems at the Congress; some of the novelties were included in the Constitution of the Communist Party of China as a guide to action.

Hu Jintao’s Report: Accents He started his report by saying: “At present, as the global, national and our Party’s conditions continue to undergo profound changes, we are faced with unprecedented opportunities for development as well as risks and challenges unknown before.”21 After a short outline of what had been done between the congresses and after summing up the results of the previous decade he, according to his own tradition, concentrated on the problems. The problems in the economy were caused by unequal, unharmonious and unsustainable development, the limited innovation potential of science and technology, the irrational structure of production, the weak foundations of Chinese agriculture, the increasingly acutely felt limited resources, and 20 See: “China’s Charter 08,” available at [http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/jan/15/chinas-charter-08/]. For the Russian text of the charter and commentaries, see: Yu.M. Galenovich, Kitayskie siuzhety. Chem dovolen i chem nedovolen Kitay, Vostochnaia kniga, Moscow, 2010, pp. 198-243. 21 [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_131981259_3.htm].

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the environmental problems. Hu went on to say that the economic model should be changed; reforms should go deeper while the country should become more open. In the social sphere there was a wide and widening gap between the city and the village, between the economic indices of the regions, and in the way incomes were distributed. The spheres of education, employment, social security, medicine, housing, environment, food and medication safety, occupational safety, public order, the judicial system, and law and order are plagued by numerous problems. The wave of social contradictions is rising fast. State governance is not free from numerous problems: slack morals, dishonesty, the low skills of some of those who supervise scientific development, and lack of discipline among the grass-roots party officials, while some of the party leaders are unsure of their ideals and their mission. He also mentioned formalism, bureaucracy, greediness, squandering, moral degradation, and other negative phenomena. He deemed it necessary to stress the ideological inheritance of the new generation—the Scientific Outlook on Development being one of the five theoretical pillars of the CPC. 22 Hu Jintao has pointed out: “The most important achievement in our endeavors in the past ten years is that we have formed the Scientific Outlook on Development and put it into practice by following the guidance of Marxism-Leninism” and went on to say: “As we advance toward the future, thoroughly applying the Scientific Outlook on Development is of major immediate significance and farreaching historical significance for upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics. We must apply it throughout the course of modernization and to every aspect of Party building.” The second section of the report also dealt with theoretical issues. Hu pointed out that it was important to preserve the “Chinese characteristics” of socialism and assessed what had been done by his predecessors. 1. Mao Zedong carried out socialist transformation and established the basic system of socialism, “thereby accomplishing the most profound and the greatest social transformation in China’s history… In the course of socialist development, the Party developed distinctively creative theories and made tremendous successes despite serious setbacks it went through, thus providing invaluable experience as well as the theoretical and material basis for launching the great initiative of building socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new historical period.” 2. Deng Xiaoping “made the historic decision to shift the focus of the Party and country’s work to economic development and to pursue the policy of reform and opening up... They [the Party’s second generation] gained a keen appreciation of the underlying goal of socialism and established the Party’s basic line for the primary stage of socialism. They called for taking our own road and building socialism with Chinese characteristics.” 3. Jiang Zemin stood “the severe tests posed by complex domestic and international developments and major setbacks in world socialism; they [the Party’s third generation] upheld socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Based on China’s new realities, Jiang Zemin “reaffirmed the Party’s basic program and its basic experience, set the goal of reform and developed a basic framework for achieving this goal, namely, developing a socialist market economy … reaffirmed the basic economic system and the system of income distribution in the primary stage of socialism.” In the course of building a xiaokang (moderately prosperous) society, the new members of CC CPC went on with their practical, theoretical, and institutional changes; they invariably regarded man 22 The four others are: Marxism-Leninism, the idea of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping’s theory, and Jiang Zemin’s important thoughts relating to the Three Represents.

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as the main element and worked toward all-sided, harmonious, and sustainable development of society. It was pointed out that China needed a harmonious socialist society, faster eco-civilizational construction, and a general “scheme” of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Hu Jintao deemed it necessary to stress: “In building socialism with Chinese characteristics, we base ourselves on the basic reality that China is in the primary stage of socialism. Our overall approach is to promote economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological progress, and our general task is to achieve socialist modernization and the great renewal of the Chinese nation.” He further pointed out: “To achieve new victory for socialism with Chinese characteristics under new historical conditions, we must have a firm grasp of the following basic requirements and make them shared convictions of the whole Party and the people of all ethnic groups in China:  “We

must maintain the people’s principal position in the country;

 “We

must continue to release and develop the productive forces. This is the fundamental task of socialism with Chinese characteristics;

 “We must persevere in reform and opening up. Reform and opening up are crucial to adher-

ing to and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics;

 “We

must safeguard social fairness and justice. Fairness and justice are inherent requirements of socialism with Chinese characteristics;

 “We must strive for common prosperity. This is the fundamental principle of socialism with

Chinese characteristics;

 “We

must promote social harmony. Social harmony is an inherent attribute of socialism with Chinese characteristics;

 “We must pursue peaceful development. Peaceful development is the sure choice of social-

ism with Chinese characteristics;

 “We

must uphold the leadership of the Party. The Communist Party of China is the leadership core of the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”

He once more returned to the fact that the country was at the initial stage of socialist construction and would long remain so, that a gap between the steadily growing demands of the people and backward public production persisted in the country with the status of the world’s largest developing economy. Hu Jintao returned to the goals outlined by the CPC Constitution: build “a moderately prosperous society in all respects when the Communist Party of China celebrates its centenary and turn China into a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious when the People’s Republic of China marks its centennial.” He went on to list the tasks for the near future. “1. Complete the building of a xiaokang society by 2020:  “The

economy should maintain sustained and sound development. Major progress should be made in changing the growth model. On the basis of making China’s development much more balanced, coordinated and sustainable, we should double its 2010 GDP and per capita income for both urban and rural residents. The contribution of scientific and technological progress to economic growth should increase considerably and China should become an innovative country;

 “People’s

democracy should be expanded. The institutions of democracy should be improved and its forms enriched. People’s enthusiasm, initiative and creativity should be fully leveraged; 111



 “The

country’s cultural soft power should be improved significantly. Core socialist values should take root among the people, and both the level of civility of citizens and the moral and ethical standards of the whole society should be significantly raised;

 “Living

standards should be fully raised. Equal access to basic public services should be generally achieved. The educational level of the entire population should be significantly raised and training of innovative professionals markedly improved. China should have a large pool of competent professionals and be rich in human resources, and it should basically modernize its education. There should be more employment opportunities. Income gaps should be narrowed, middle-income groups should keep growing, and the number of people living below the poverty line should drop by a large margin;

 “Major

progress should be made in building a resource-conserving and environmentally friendly society.”

2. Speeding up a new growth model based on:  Ensuring  Firing

that development is based on improved quality and performance;

new motive forces which will pursue innovation-driven development;

 Establishing  Relying

a new system for developing modern industries;

on the invigorating role of domestic demand, especially consumer demand;

 Mobilizing

a modern service industry and strategic emerging industries;

 Invigorating

scientific and technological progress.

Hu Jintao stressed that the real sector of Chinese economy, as well as small and medium businesses should be developed, while the policy of favorable treatment of the Chinese village should be continued: “We should continue to encourage industry to support agriculture in return for agriculture’s earlier contribution to its development and encourage cities to support rural areas. We should give more to farmers, take less from them and lift restrictions over their economic activities… We should increase policy support to boost agriculture, benefit farmers and increase rural prosperity, and encourage the rural population to participate in modernization on an equal footing and share in its fruits.” He further suggested that “we should reform the land expropriation system and increase the share of gain in land value to farmers” to prevent social conflicts. 3. Deepening and expanding political reform. This was the first time since the 13th Congress of CPC in 1987 that this issue was discussed in detail. Hu Jintao stressed: “The reform of the political structure is an important part of China’s overall reform. We must continue to make both active and prudent efforts to carry out reform of the political structure, and make people’s democracy more extensive, fuller in scope and sounder in practice.” He outlined several tasks:  “We must ensure the unity of the leadership of the Party, the position of the people as mas-

ters of the country and law-based governance;

 “We

should place greater emphasis on improving the way the Party exercises leadership and governance to ensure that it leads the people in effectively governing the country;

 “We should attach greater importance to improving the system of democracy and diversify-

ing the forms of democracy to ensure that the people conduct democratic elections, decision-making, administration and oversight in accordance with the law;

 “We

should give greater scope to the important role the rule of law plays in the country’s governance and in social management, uphold the unity, sanctity and authority of the coun112



try’s legal system and ensure that the people enjoy extensive rights and freedoms as prescribed by law.  “We

should place high importance on systemic building, give full play to the strength of the socialist political system and draw on the political achievements of other societies. However, we will never copy a Western political system.”

The following was formulated as specific trends of political reform:  “Support and ensure the exercise of state power by the people through people’s congresses;  “Improve

the system of socialist consultative democracy;

 “Improve

community-level democracy;

 “Promote

law-based governance of the country in an all-around way.” Hu Jintao went on to say: “As the Constitution and laws are adopted by the Party and the people under its leadership, the Party must act within the scope prescribed by the Constitution and laws. No organization or individual has the privilege of overstepping the Constitution and laws, and no one in a position of power is allowed in any way to take one’s own words as the law, place one’s own authority above the law or abuse the law;

 “Deepen

reform of the administrative system;

 “Improve

the mechanism for conducting checks and oversight over the exercise of power;

 “Consolidate

and develop the broadest possible patriotic united front.”

Hu Jintao formulated five more tasks equally important for the country’s future: continued construction of the socialist cultural power; more emphasis on social development and raising the standard of living; ecocultural development; accelerating the modernization of national defense and the Armed Forces; realization of the “one state—two systems” principle; and movement toward reunification of the Motherland. He further pointed out that it was much harder to revive trust in the Communist Party, increase control over the party functionaries, and upgrade the CPC governance skills: “Under the new conditions, the Party faces complicated and severe long-term tests in exercising governance, carrying out reform and opening up and developing the market economy as well as tests from the external environment. And the whole Party is confronted with increasingly grave dangers of lacking in drive, incompetence, being out of touch with the people, corruption and other misconduct.” The “fourth generation,” which is leaving the stage, clearly indicated how these tasks could be carried out: “1. Be firm in our ideals and convictions and remain true to the faith of the Communists. “2. Put the people first, exercise governance for the people and always maintain close ties with them. “Serving the people is the fundamental purpose of the Party, and putting people first and exercising governance for the people is the ultimate yardstick for judging all the Party’s performance in this regard. “3. Vigorously promote intra-Party democracy and enhance the Party’s creative vitality. “4. Deepen reform of the system for the management of officials and personnel and build a contingent of competent key officials for governance. “5. Adhere to the principle of the Party exercising leadership over personnel management and attract outstanding individuals from all over for the cause of the Party and country. “6. Promote community-level Party building in an innovative way and consolidate the organizational foundation for the exercise of governance by the Party. 113



“7. Unswervingly combat corruption and preserve Communists’ political character of integrity.” Hu Jintao deemed it necessary to warn: “Combating corruption and promoting political integrity, which is a major political issue of great concern to the people, is a clear-cut and long-term political commitment of the Party. If we fail to handle this issue well, it could prove fatal to the Party, and even cause the collapse of the Party and the fall of the state.” “8. Strictly enforce Party discipline and willingly uphold centralized leadership of the Party.” The Communist leader offered no novelties in China’s foreign policy. He merely repeated: “The world today is undergoing profound and complex changes, but peace and development remain the underlying trends of our times. The global trends toward multipolarity and economic globalization are deepening. Cultural diversity is increasing, and an information society is fast emerging. World economic growth is overshadowed by growing factors of instability and uncertainty, and imbalance in global development has widened. There are signs of increasing hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism, and local turmoil keeps cropping up. Global issues such as food security, energy and resource security and cyber security are becoming more acute.” For the first time Hu Jintao presented in great detail the basic foreign policy principles of the People’s Republic of China which the “fifth generation” of political leaders was expected to follow. It seems that the fifth generation will arm itself with the experience of their predecessors.

A Compromise I have already written that the people selected to rule the Communist Party of China were a result of the compromise between two rivaling elite groups: the united group of the “princelings” and the Shanghai Faction, on the one hand, and the Communist Youth League group, on the other. This compromise is best illustrated by Jiang Zemin’s presence in the Congress presidium and by Hu Jintao’s demonstratively respectful treatment of him. This should not be taken to mean that the Hu-Wen Tandem retreated from its position in the face of the Shanghai Faction.  First, the 18th Congress is seen as a transition to the final balance of power to be determined at the next, 19th Congress in 2017. By that time, ten members of the 18th Politburo of the CC CPC out of 25 will be over seventy; the same is true of four out of the seven members of the SC of the Politburo of the CC CPC (see Tables 1-2).23  Second, among the members and candidate members of the CC CPC the majority owe their

careers to the Tandem. Out of 205 permanent members of the 18th CC CPC, 89 were members of the previous CC CPC; 58 were candidate members of the 17th CC CPC; 17 were members of the CCDI of the 17th CC CPC; and only 41were newcomers mainly recommended by Hu Jintao.24

 Third, Hu Jintao drew the army to his side or to the side of those who would come after him

by replacing, six months before the Congress, practically the entire top crust of the PLA; on 24 November, he appointed people who would side with him at the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Communist Party of China and, later, at the CMC of the People’s Republic of China (the two structures are full of the same people).

23 See: A. Gabuev, “Masti kitayskoy vlasti,” Kommersant Vlast, Nos. 42-45, 2012; [http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/ default/files/Research/USCC_Staff_Report_Rising_Leadersinthe_CCP_(March%202012).pdf]. 24 The member and candidate lists for the CC CPC is available at [http://www.russian.xinhuanet.com/], 20 November, 2012.

114



Members of the Politburo of the CC CPC Name

Date of Birth

Post in the Party and Other Hierarchies

Membership in a Faction

Reelected Xi Jinping

1953

General Secretary of the CPC Chairman of the CMC CPC

“princelings”

Wang Qishan

1948

Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, vice premier

“princelings”

Liu Yunshan

1947

Member, Central Secretariat of the CC CPC, Director of Propaganda Department of the CC CPC

CYL

1945

Member of the PRC State Council, in 2002-2003 head of the United Front Department of the CC CPC

CYL

Liu Qibao

1953

Member of the Secretariat of the CC CPC; Secretary of the CPC Committee and Chairman of the SC of the Sichuan Provincial People’s Congress; on 20 November appointed head of the Propaganda Department of the CC CPC

Li Keqiang

1955

Vice premier of the State Council

CYL

Li Yuanchao

1950

Member of the Secretariat of the CC CPC; head of the CPC Central Organization Department; possible future vice premier

CYL

Wang Yang

1955

Secretary of the CPC Committee of Guangdong Province

CYL

Liu Yandong (female)

Zhang Gaoli

Zhang Dejiang

Yu Zhengsheng

1946

Secretary of the CPC Committee of Tianjin

1946

Vice premier of the State Council; Secretary of the CPC Committee of Chongqing; removed from this post on 20 November

1945

Secretary of the CPC Committee of Shanghai

CYL

Shanghai Faction Shanghai Faction “princelings”

New Members Member of the State Council; Secretary of the Working Committee of Bodies Directly under the State Council; President of the Chinese Academy of Governance

Ma Kai

1946

Wang Huning

1955

Xu Qiliang

1950

Deputy chairman of the CMC CPC; member of the CMC PRC

1950

Secretary of the CPC Committee and Chairperson of the SC of the Fujian Provincial People’s Congress; on 20 November appointed Secretary of the CPC Committee in Tainjin

Sun Chunlan (female)

Director of Policy Research Office of the CC CPC

115

n/a

Shanghai Faction “princelings” CYL


CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Table 1 (continued)

Date of Birth

Name

Post in the Party and Other Hierarchies


Sun Zhengcai

1963

Secretary of the CPC Committee and Chairman of the SC of the People’s Congress of Jilin (Jiyelin) Province; on 20 November appointed Secretary of the CPC Committee of Chongqing

Li Jianguo

1946

Since 2009 deputy chairman of the SC of the National People’s Congress

n/a

Zhang Chunxian

1953

Secretary of the CPC Committee of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region

CYL

Fan Changlong

1947

Vice Chairman of the CMC CPC, commander of the Qingan Region

Shanghai Faction

1947

Member of the PRC State Council; deputy secretary of the Central Policy and Law Commission, CC CPC; minister of public security; on 20 November appointed Secretary of the Central Policy and Law Commission, CC CPC

Shanghai Faction

Zhao Leji

1957

Secretary of the CPC Committee and Chairman of the SC of the Shaanxi Provincial People’s Congress; on 20 November appointed head of the CPC Organization Department

CYL

Hu Chunhua

1963

Secretary of the CPC Committee and Chairman of the SC of the People’s Congress of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region

CYL

Li Zhanshu

1950

Chief of the General Office of the CC CPC; member of the Secretariat of the CC CPC

CYL

Guo Jinlung

1947

Secretary of the CPC Committee, Beijing

CYL

Han Zheng

1954

Deputy Secretary of the CPC Committee and mayor of Shanghai; on 20 November appointed Secretary of the CPC Committee of Shanghai

Meng Jianzhu

CYL

Shanghai Faction

Table 2 Members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CC CPC Name

Date of Birth

Post in Party and Other Hierarchies


Reelected

Xi Jinping

1953

General Secretary of the CPC, Chairman of the CPC CMC; member of the CMC PRC; deputy Chairman of the PRC; in March 2013 will become Chairman of the PRC

Li Keqiang

1955

Deputy Prime Minister of the State Council; in March 2013 he will be appointed Premier of the State Council of the PRC

116

“princelings”

CYL


Volume 14 Issue 1 2013 Table 2 (continued)

Name

Date of Birth



New Members Wang Qishan

1948

Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, vice premier

Liu Yunshan

1947

Member of the Central Secretariat of the CC CPC; Director of the Propaganda Department of the CC CPC

1946

Secretary of the CPC Committee of Tianjin; probable candidate for the post of first vice premier of the State Council

Shanghai Faction

1946

Vice premier of the State Council; Secretary of the CPC Committee of Chongqing; removed from this post on 20 November; probable candidate for the post of chairman of the National People’s Congress

Shanghai Faction

1945

Secretary of the CPC Committee of Shanghai; probable candidate for the post of Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference

“princelings”

Zhang Gaoli

Zhang Dejiang

Yu Zhengsheng

“princelings”

CYL

The newly appointed top figures were elected to the CPC Central Military Commission (see Table 3).25 This means that the four old-timers—Admiral Wu Shengli (Commander of the PLA Navy); Generals Chang Wanquan and Xu Qiliang, as well as Xi Jinping as the new Chairman of the CMC CPC—do not tip the balance. In the past the three of them once more vowed allegiance to Hu Jintao. It should be said that the division into “princelings,” Shanghai Faction, and CYL is fairly conventional: the greater number of new Communist leaders can be associated with several groups on the strength of their place of birth and work and their patrons from among the top Communist figures. This is best illustrated by those who were elected to the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CC CPC and the 18th Politburo of the CC CPC. Xi Jinping, the new General Secretary and future chairman of the PRC, started life as a “princeling”; he filled the post of the CPC Committee of Shanghai and was actively involved in deposing Chen Liangyu, head of the Shanghai Faction. In fact, he is an active supporter of the course outlined by the Hu-Wen Tandem. The same fully applies to Wang Qishan, a newly elected SC member. Born to common parents, he married into the family of Yao Yilin, former vice premier and member of the SC of the Politburo of the CC CPC; he is close to Wen Jiabao and the Tandem’s financial “guru.” Li Keqiang, future premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, is a protégé of Hu Jintao. Zhang Gaoli, Zhang Dejiang, and Yu Zhengsheng belong to the Shanghai Faction; in 2017 they will have to retire. It seems that they will be replaced with Wang Yang, Secretary of the CPC 25 See: K. Hille, China’s “‘Princeling’ Generals Hit by Bo Purge,” Financial Times, 7 May, 2012; A. Gabuev, “Molodye drakony,” Kommersant Vlast, No. 44, 2012; [http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC_Staff_Report_ Rising_Leadersinthe_CCP_(March%202012).pdf].

117



Members of the Central Military Commission of the CPC Name

Date of Birth



Reelected Xi Jinping

1953

General Secretary of the CPC; Chairman of the CMC CPC; deputy chairman of the CMC PRC

“princelings”

Xu Qiliang

1950

Deputy Chairman of the CMC CPC; member of the CMC PRC

“princelings”

Chang Wanquan

1949

Former Director of the General Armament Department; member of the 17th CMC; member of the CMC CPC, member of the CMC PRC

Shanghai Faction

Wu Shengli

1945

Commander of the PLA Navy; member of the CMC CPC; member of the CMC PRC

“princelings”

New Members 1947

Deputy Chairman of the CMC CPC; commander of the Jinan Military District

1951

Former commander of the Beijing Military District; on 24 October appointed director of the General Staff Department; member of the CMC CPC

CYL

1951

Former political commissar of the Guangzhou Military District; on 24 October appointed Director of the General Political Department; member of the CMC CPC

CYL

Zhao Keshi

1947

Former commander of the Nanjing Military District; on 24 October appointed head of the PLA General Logistics Department; member of the CMC CPC

CYL

Ma Xiaotian

1949

Former Deputy Chief-of-Staff; on 24 October, appointed Commander of the PLA Air Force; member of the CMC CPC

“princelings”

Zhang Youxia

1950

Former commander of the Shenyang Military District; on 24 October, appointed to the PLA General Armaments Department

“princelings”

1954

Former deputy Chief-of-Staff, in 2006-2010 — Commander of the Second Artillery Corps Organization; on 24 October, appointed commander of the 2nd Artillery Corps, member of the CMC CPC; on 23 November, Xi Jinping conferred him with the rank of colonel general

Fan Changlong

Fang Fenghui

Zhang Yang

Wei Fenghe

Shanghai Faction

CYL

Committee of the Guangdong Province, and Li Yuanchao, Head of the CPC Central Organization Department. 118



The same applies to the Politburo of the CC CPC: ten out of 25 members are either “princelings” or belong to the Shanghai Faction; in 2017 five out of ten will be over 70. There are 13 CYL among the Politburo members; three will have to retire in 2017. Two members of the Politburo—Ma Kai and Li Jianguo (with the prospect of being appointed head of the National People’s Congress)—do not belong to any of the three groups. In 2017 they will be 70 and will have to retire. The above suggests that a compromise was successfully negotiated; it remains to be seen how long it will survive. As a much more united group than the “princelings” and the Shanghai Faction, the CYL stands a much better chance of sustaining a final victory soon; this will become clear at the 19th CPC Congress. In any case, the course suggested and partly implemented by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao worshipped by CYL members will be continued. The fierce disagreements in the CPC over the future of China are more or less irrelevant: there is no alternative to the course launched and partly implemented by the Hu-Wen Tandem.

Conclusion The decisions of the 18th CPC Congress and Chinese reality suggest several preliminary conclusions. An analysis of what the world media wrote about the preparations for the Congress and its results shows that the country is feared. The world is not so much apprehensive of China’s might as it is of its possible inability to cope with it. A strong China is a challenge, while a weak and disintegrating China is a threat that cannot be overestimated. Despite the squabble at the top, the generation transfer was peaceful, however the ad hoc consensus might be overturned at the next congress where the CYL will triumph. They will outline their own course, which will probably not be very different from that of the Tandem. Today China and its new leaders are confronted with a huge number of problems, the worst of them being:  The

still unregulated economic structure;

 The

half-baked model of economic growth based on domestic consumption;

 The

impossibly wide gap between the rich and the poor;

 The

still unresolved housing problem;

 The

far from perfect and too limited social insurance system;

 The

still unreformed institution of registration at place of residence and public services, which must be upgraded;

 The

ageing population;

 Environmental  Excessive

administration of the educational system;

 Inadequate  Low

pollution;

high-tech development;

public morals;

 Perpetuated  Growing

social stratification;

disagreements between the bureaucrats and the people; 119



 The

persisting low level of social services and the people’s inability to carry out self-administration;

 Inadequate

quality of the middle class and its inadequate size.

These problems should be immediately addressed and resolved—this much is clear from what the Chinese leaders say in public and from the documents of the 18th Congress. The fifth generation will probably have to concentrate on political reform, however rapid liberalization is hardly around the corner. It will be gradually realized within the roadmap drawn up by Hu Jintao. The new leaders will concentrate on strengthening the party’s positive image and fighting corruption and moral disintegration in party ranks. This was what Xi Jinping said during his first meeting with journalists as General Secretary of the CPC. He stressed: “Under the new conditions, our Party faces many severe challenges, and there are also many pressing problems within the Party that need to be resolved, particularly corruption, being divorced from the people, going through formalities and bureaucratism caused by some Party officials, We must make every effort to solve these problems. The whole Party must stay on full alert.”26 The social aspects of the planned reforms have received more attention since there is no other way to regain the trust of the ordinary people. The General Secretary elect pointed out: “Our people have an ardent love for life. They wish to have better education, more stable jobs, more income, greater social security, better medical and health care, improved housing conditions, and a better environment. They want their children to have sound growth, have good jobs and lead a more enjoyable life. To meet their desire for a happy life is our mission. It is only hard work that creates all happiness in the world.” Significantly, Xi Jinping used common words; it was obvious he was speaking to the people rather than to a small group of apparatchiks. He used the words “the Chinese nation” about ten times and only once referred to “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”27 This means that traditional values, nationalism included, will probably predominate in the new political course. China has arrived at the need to reassess its humanitarian impact on the world. Its leaders have realized that it is not enough to export commodities and investments: China must also export its ideas and cultural values. Due to the traditional self-sufficiency of the Chinese civilization, China’s isolation during the Middle Ages and in the New Times, and the persisting misunderstanding and misinterpretation of Chinese values in the West, this is easier said than done. Hence Xi Jinping’s formula: China “needs to learn more about the world, so does the world need to learn more about China.” Recently, Chinese society has developed an awareness that its country must pursue a more active foreign policy; the Chinese need leaders able to talk more boldly to the world community. There are active national-patriotic groups and movements among the Chinese youth ready to respond to any calls of the party and the government. This has been confirmed by a conflict with Japan over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands. China’s foreign policy principle and the national defense concept are changing. The public is especially irritated with the following foreign policy prescription: “hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”28 [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/15/c_131976383.htm]. Ibidem. 28 Early in the 1990s, Deng Xiaoping, who had left his party and state posts but retained a lot of authority with the country’s leaders, formulated a foreign policy and security strategy that later became known as the 24 Character Strategy: 26 27

120



Some Chinese experts think that China is ready to move out of the shadows (in certain respects it has already done this); it can offer the world its initiatives; it can even push the United States off the stage and claim world leadership. The military are especially enthusiastic; many of the Chinese military experts are ready to act; they dismiss the course of avoiding conflicts and maneuvering as “obsolete.” They call on the leaders not to avoid conflicts but to demonstrate determination and aggressiveness: the country is ready to rebuff any enemy. These sentiments were indirectly supported by the party congress. Hu Jintao minced no words when talking about the country’s defenses: “We should attach great importance to maritime, space and cyberspace security. We should make active planning for the use of military forces in peacetime, expand and intensify military preparedness, and enhance the capability to accomplish a wide range of military tasks, the most important of which is to win local war in an information age.” 29 This means that China’s foreign policy will become much tougher even though “soft power” will prevail; rearmament of the PLA will continue with the emphasis on the naval component. The country’s leaders formulated ambitious tasks: complete modernization and informational support of the PLA by 2020. (lengjing guancha; zhanwen jiaogen; chenzhe yingfu; taoguang yanghui; shanyu shouzhuo; jiuebu dangtou) “observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.” Later four more characters (yousuo zuowei) were added: “to be able to accomplish something.” 29 [http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27137540_9.htm].

121



NATION-BUILDING

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN TAJIKISTAN: TOWARD DEMOCRACY OR GREATER AUTHORITARIANISM? Shokir KHAKIMOV D.Sc. (Law), Deputy Chairman of Tajik Law Consortium (Dushanbe, Tajikistan)

T

ABSTRACT

his article examines how constitution alism is taking shape in present-day Tajikistan and analyzes its main development stages in 1994 (the drawing up and adoption of the first RT Constitution), 1999 (the constitutional reform), and 2003 (the introduction of amendments and additions to the current RT Constitution). This study defines the general features of constitutionalism of the transition period, which include the following: 1. The broad reception of foreign law, as well as implementation of the international legal provisions of human rights, the democratic foundations of statehood, the separation of

powers, and the rule of law while retaining the regulations passed down from Soviet times. 2. The general contradictoriness and inconsistency of the constitutional rulemaking. 3. The transformation of certain provisions of the Constitution into a declaration of intentions, relating to their lack of correspondence to the real political and socioeconomic situation in the country. It reveals the lack of correspondence between the content of the Constitution and the old legislation largely inherited from the

122


Soviet past and presents the content of the constitutional reform carried out in 1999 within the framework of executing “The General Agreement on Establishing Peace and National Consent in Tajikistan.” The author analyzes the amendments and additions to the Constitution, the adoption of which was brought up at the 1999 referendum. The article presents an appraisal of the constitutional reform of 2003


and examines the problems of carrying it out, during which favorable conditions were created for the emergence of authoritarianism in the country. It also notes that Tajikistan’s sociopolitical reality creates prerequisites for differences between the de jure and de facto constitution. This usually leads in practice to a certain shift from democracy to authoritarian methods of executing state power.

KEYWORDS: Tajikistan, constitutionalism, the Constitution, the Parliament (Majlisi Oli), form of rule, referendum.

Introduction Authors who write about constitutionalism in post-Soviet countries believe that it began with the policy of perestroika and glasnost pursued in the last days of the Soviet Union’s existence. This was when values of the transition period relating to West European and American liberalism that found their juridical expression in the principles of the law-based state, democracy, and the separation of powers began to filter into the public consciousness. Constitutional commissions responsible for enforcing the foundations of a new political and legal system and model of state power organization that differ from the previous have been forming in the Soviet republics since the summer of 1990. Constitutionalism during the transition period is distinguished by recognition of the universal standards that presume a democratic way of drawing up and adopting the constitution, constitutional control, stability of constitutional provisions, and recognition of universal human values. However, each of the new sovereign states took a different approach to drawing up its constitution; numerous social factors and national traditions had an effect on it. So, despite their common past and simultaneous start to building real constitutionalism, the republics of the former Soviet Union are distinguished by distinct specifics. Constitutionalism is being established in states that are becoming increasingly authoritarian and, consequently, bear the stamp of this form of rule. This article aspires to present an analysis of how constitutionalism has been emerging and developing during the transition period using Tajikistan as an example.

The First Constitution of Independent Tajikistan (1994) As we know, constitutionalism in Tajikistan is directly related to the place the country once held in a larger state (first the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union). Constitution-building in the 123



republic during Soviet times had its own special features. First, this was a process manipulated from above, that is, by the Union Center. Second, Tajikistan did not have its own traditions of constitutionalism. And, third, the Tajik S.S.R. can be described as an insert in the larger structure of the Soviet Union and under the political supervision of the C.P.S.U.; so until the beginning of perestroika it was Soviet-style constitutionalism that reigned there, the parameters of which were determined by the Union constitutions in effect at the particular time. When it acquired its independence, Tajikistan was faced with the need to draw up its own Basic Law for the first time. The adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan (hereafter, the RT Constitution) on 6 November, 1994 became a milestone event for RT constitutionalism. It became the first Constitution of independent Tajikistan that enforced essentially new (differing from the Soviet) foundations of the social and state system envisaged by the provisions included in it. In this case, it is important that the new stage in the development of RT constitutionalism began immediately from the time the Constitution was adopted, and not from the drawing up of the relevant theoretical doctrine, as was the case at one time in the West and Central European countries, as well as the U.S. This “rearrangement of components” was in no way explained by the fact that the new Constitution was adopted along the lines of the old, that is, Soviet constitutionalism. It was primarily explained by the emergency situation that had developed in the republic after the collapse of the Soviet Union, during which a civil war broke out. This greatly slowed drawing up a new Basic Law in the country, which was in dire need of constitutional and legal regulation of its statehood and public relations. The situation in which Tajikistan found itself required broad reception of the constitutional legislation of today’s developed countries.1 In so doing, it should not be forgotten that in pre-Soviet times Tajikistan did not have its own constitutional tradition. The 1994 RT Constitution became a kind of a bridge between the Soviet and new real constitutionalism based on borrowing regulations and principles from the legislations of the inveterate developed democracies. This circumstance initially predetermined its profound internal contradictoriness, which could not help but be manifested at a systemic level (since the constitution is the main regulatory legal act enforcing the systemic projection of society). The matter concerns not so much the text of the Constitution as the insufficient compliance between the elements of the legal and political systems of society (the content of the Constitution, on the one hand, and the nature of sociopolitical and legal consciousness and the practical implementation of constitutional provisions, on the other). We will try to reveal this contradiction through the prism of the systemic approach. The sufficiently high level of legal technicality of the Tajikistan Constitution is explained by the fact that it is based on the broad reception of foreign law (including international legal human rights regulations). Many of the provisions contained in it are clichés typical of the constitutions of developed countries, as well as of international legal acts on human rights; the same can also be said of its structure. The RT Constitution consists of a Preamble and 100 articles divided into ten chapters. 2 The first chapter is devoted to the fundamental principles of the constitutional system, the second to human and citizen rights, freedoms, and basic obligations. The next three chapters contain provisions about the formation, structure, and competence of the higher bodies of state power and administration—the Parliament (Majlisi Oli), President, and Government. The sixth chapter is devoted to local power, the seventh to the status of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region; the eighth and ninth discuss the organization and main principles of the activity of courts and public prosecutor’s office, respectively. 1 See: Kh. Khamidov, “Nekotorye voprosy gosudarstvenno-pravovogo razvitiia Respubliki Tadzhikistan,” Vestnik mezhparlamentskoi assamblei (St. Petersburg), No. 1, 1993, pp. 55-56. 2 See: RT Constitution, Dushanbe, 2003, 86 pp. (in Tajik, Russian, and English).

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Of course, resolution of the problems relating to execution of the Constitution largely depends on the further development of national law. In this sphere, it is important to primarily reinforce the guarantee of unhindered realization of citizen rights and freedoms, elaborate efficient mechanisms for preventing and eliminating violations, and prevent the possibility of past procedures being restored. As we noted above the parameters of the RT Constitution do not entirely correspond to the country’s cultural and historical reality. It can be called the matrix of a new political and legal culture, which, as in other CIS countries, is imposed from above and has certain contradictions. One of them is that the people who compose the state apparatus are called upon to be bearers of this new culture, but they are not distinguished by a high capacity for assimilating it. So, after being refracted in their minds, the European principles, institutions, and provisions enforced in the Basic Law sometimes acquire a local interpretation that reflects the poor development and traditional organization of civil society, as well as the existence of authoritative trends (inevitable in these conditions) in power execution. This results in a certain gap emerging between the meaning of several important terms and the content they acquire when executing the RT Constitution; this kind of difference can be found in the provisions of many of its chapters. For example, Tajikistan is described as a social state (Part 2 of Art) and each person in it has the right to employment (Art 35); but this provision is carried over from the Soviet Constitution and does not correspond to the socioeconomic changes that have occurred in the country since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Recognition of the equality of different forms of property (including private) reflects the state’s course toward creating a market economy, of which crises of reproduction and unemployment are characteristic. However, the extremely low initial level of the country’s economic development is forcing Tajik citizens to leave the country in order to realize their constitutional right to employment (there are more than one million citizens in this category today). Nor are those articles of the Constitution that envisage citizens’ socioeconomic rights in full effect; the matter concerns Art 38 (on the right to health care ensured through free medical assistance in governmental health care institutions), Art 39 (on the right to social assistance in old age, in the case of illness, disability, or loss of ability to work), and Art 41 (on the right to education, which should be free in governmental educational institutions). Art 30 of the 1994 RT Constitution reads: “Each person is guaranteed the freedoms of speech and the press, as well as the right to use information media.” But this article does not sufficiently define the right of citizens to receive information. Consequently, it can be said that citizen rights are not fully observed. So the right of each person to receive information and guaranteed access to it should be enforced in the Constitution. Furthermore, this means real access to all types of information without exception, including visual, printed, and electronic. The information provision system can play an important role in this. This problem has two levels; on the one hand, daily receipt of information through the available means and methods, and on the other, the drawing up and introduction of a real mechanism of access to its global sources. The 1994 Constitution does not contain provisions about the election system, not to mention defining its basic sources and mechanisms (in particular, realization of election rights). It does not envisage the creation of a professional and permanent Parliament, although it is the constitution that should regulate issues concerning its formation and forms of activity. The fact that Soviet constitutional institutions still hold sway is shown by the provisions on the formation of the institution of the Presidium of the Majlisi Oli with broad regulatory-legal and monitoring-administrative powers (Art 50) in the structure of the Tajik Majlisi Oli and the definition 125



of the constitutional status of the Chairman of the Majlisi Oli. These provisions were in effect until 26 September, 1999, that is, until amendments and additions were made to the 1994 Constitution and a new two-house Parliament was instituted with a permanent professional lower house—the Majlisi namoiandagon. The significance of any constitution (including the 1994 RT Constitution) is primarily defined by its place in the national legal system. Possessing supreme legal force, it is the summit and at the same time foundation of the entire system of legal sources. In this sense, the principles and regulations of the Constitution act as the fulcrum holding up the structure of national law. Reading the 1994 RT Constitution creates the impression that its authors were very well aware of this. For example, Art 10 reads: “The Constitution of Tajikistan possesses supreme legal power, and its norms have direct application. Laws and other legal acts that are contrary to the Constitution do not have legal force. …International legal acts recognized by Tajikistan are a constituent part of the legal system of the republic. In the case of a discrepancy between the laws of the republic and recognized international legal acts, the norms of the international legal acts are applied.” However, there are many factors hindering the execution of this provision. Let us begin with the fact that a new legal system essentially began to emerge in Tajikistan when the Constitution was adopted. As mentioned above, this is precisely what explained the lack of correspondence between its content and the old legislation carried over from the Soviet past (it should be noted that the same thing was also seen in post-Soviet Russia). In this context, we should also remind you of the contradiction existing between the regulations ensuring citizens’ social rights (for example, the right to free education and health care) and the real level of Tajikistan’s development that prevents them from being realized. Moreover, as noted at the beginning of the article, some ideas of West European and American liberalism expressed in the Constitution (for example, regarding political and ideological pluralism) do not coincide with the cultural regulations and ideas of Tajik society. As we know, the differences between a de jure and de facto constitution lead to a certain shift toward authoritarianism. The authors of the RT Constitution, as though foreseeing this development of events, repeatedly place it on a level with current legislation (thus violating the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution). For example, according to Part 3 of Art 35 of the RT Constitution, no one may be subjected to forced labor, except in cases anticipated by law. So the law makes an exception from the constitutional provision. Furthermore, the Constitution does not set forth either the content of the law or the nature of these exceptions. Similar legal technicalities are also used when defining the powers of the Majlisi namoiandagon. For example, Art 54, which lists the powers of the Majlisi namoiandagon, ends with a provision, according to which the country’s Parliament exercises other powers determined by the Constitution and laws (Para. 8). This same formulation is also found in Art 69 regarding the powers of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan (Para. 26). I would like to note that this practice of placing the Constitution on the same level as the regulations of current legislation is not always obvious. For example, according to Part 2 of Art 14, limitations of the rights and freedoms of citizens are only allowed for the purposes of ensuring the rights and freedoms of other citizens, ensuring social order, and protecting the constitutional system and territorial integrity of the republic. In this list of reasons for limiting rights and freedoms of citizens, the provision about ensuring social order appears insufficiently clear and legally vulnerable, mainly because this article does not refer to Art 46, which envisages the procedure for declaring a state of emergency. In so doing, the rendition of this provision leaves free rein for the subjective assessments of law-makers. In addition, this kind of rendition presumes the limitation of citizen rights and freedoms based on a special act for 126



ensuring social order, which also erases the boundary between the Constitution with its supreme legal force and current legislation. In compliance with Para. 2 of Art 49 of the RT Constitution, the Majlisi Oli has the power of “interpreting the Constitution and laws.” This provision gives rise to objections regarding a whole series of positions. First, it contradicts the principle of separation of powers, since responsibility for interpreting the laws is placed on the body that adopts them. Nor does the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Tajikistan have the right to interpret the Constitution or laws; endowing it with such powers could be an important restraining mechanism ensuring control over legislative power (since provisions of the law deemed unconstitutional are no longer applied). On the other hand, this regulation contradicts Part 1 of Art 98 of the Constitution, according to which amendments and additions to the Constitution are introduced through general referenda. Meanwhile, official interpretation of the regulations of the Constitution endowed the supreme legislative body in practice turns into a masked form of introducing amendments and additions to it. Official interpretation of the law by the supreme legislative body (which logically also adopted these acts) will also be a hidden form of law-making (since the act of official interpretation will essentially have the force of law); Professor G. Shershenevich spoke out against this practice.3 The Constitution declaring Tajikistan a republic did not clarify the question of form of rule. Elements of building a presidential republic can be found in the constitutional provisions, but it is impossible to clearly define the form of rule of the Tajik state. For example, according to Art 64, the President of the Republic of Tajikistan is the head of state and of the executive power (Government). The President is the guarantor of the Constitution and laws. However, the interrelations among the supreme bodies of Tajik state power (the Parliament, Government, and head of state) do not correspond to the classical presidential model of rule. For example, according to Art 73 of the Constitution, the Government is responsible to the President and also under the control of the Majlisi Oli with respect to the execution of the law. However, the last provision is carried out extremely inconsistently. For example, although the Majlisi Oli approves the country’s budget presented by the Government, it does not have the authority to supervise its execution. On the one hand, the Government is responsible to the President (as is customary in a presidential republic), while on the other hand, the Government and any of its members may present its resignation to the President, which is not typical of a presidential republic. Nor is it clear to what extent the supreme executive body of state power (the Government) is responsible for what goes on in the republic, what the boundaries of its power are, and in what cases it may raise the question of no-confidence in the Government. The post of prime minister, the powers of whom are not envisaged in the Constitution, shows the “non-standard” form of rule in Tajikistan; this essentially turns him into a nominal figure. According to Arts 71 and 72 of the Constitution, the Majlisi Oli may bring up the question of terminating the President’s power (in the event of his incapacity or committing state treason, and so on). However the President does not have the authority to disband the Majlisi Oli. In the context of the separation of powers, the independence of the courts acquires the greatest significance. Only independent courts can execute real control with respect to the executive power. In this respect, the provision of Art 87, which says that judges are independent and subordinate only to the Constitution and law, and interference in their work is forbidden, seems entirely logical. But this provision loses its significance somewhat due to the provision in Art 84, according to which, judges have terms of five years, and after the amendments and additions to the RT Constitution of 22 June, 2003, ten years (Part 3, Art 84). So judges become dependent on those power structures that compile the list of candidates to court posts for a specific time. 3

See: G. Shershenevich, Obshchaia teoriia prava, Issue 4, Moscow, 1912, p. 726.

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Until 26 September, 1999, this function was performed by the Ministry of Justice, which was also responsible for material and technical provision of the courts. Judges of the Military Court, the court of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, and regional, Dushanbe city, city, and district courts were appointed and dismissed by the President on the petition of the Minister of Justice (Art 86). At present, these powers have been transferred to the newly formed Justice Council, which, from the viewpoint of control over the activity of the executive power, has greatly weakened the courts and limited their functions. This is mainly happening because the current judges are trying to find favor with the powers that be in the hope of acquiring a new appointment. The 1994 Constitution left a large part of Tajik society dissatisfied; the matter primarily concerns the status of languages and ambiguous approaches to regulating citizenship matters. It has also “essentially closed off the way to gradual differential development in Tajikistan of the right to private ownership of land and the drawing up and adoption of the law on mortgages.” 4

Constitutional Reform of 1999 As already noted, between 1992 and 1997, a civil war was going on in Tajikistan. A General Agreement on Establishing Peace and National Consent in Tajikistan was signed on 27 June, 1997 in Moscow between the Government of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) with the assistance of the U.N. Security Council and the guarantor states.5 In order to monitor and implement the terms of this Agreement, a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) was created, in which representatives of the Government and UTO were equal members. Chairman of the NRC was UTO leader Said Nuri. If necessary, the decisions adopted on the basis of a consensus in the NRC were presented to Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov. In compliance with his constitutional powers, he issued decrees, presented drafts of resolutions at Government sittings for making fundamental decisions, and submitted law drafts to the country’s Parliament. A decision on the need to carry out constitutional and legal reforms was made within the framework of implementing the peace process. The Tajik President came forward with this initiative at the 12th session of the Majlisi Oli on 30 June, 1999. In compliance with Art 99 of the Constitution, he submitted a draft of amendments and additions to the 1994 Constitution prepared by the National Reconciliation Commission for the Majlisi Oli’s perusal.6 Introducing amendments to the Constitution was motivated by the need to enhance democracy and ensure stability in Tajikistan. But both the content of the amendments and the procedure for introducing them into the Constitution largely contradicted the declared motivation. For example, according to the Constitution, proposals for its amendments and additions are published in the press three months before the referendum. This provision was violated since Resolution No. 816 of the Tajik Majlisi Oli of 30 June, 1999 “On Proposals of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan for Amendments and Additions to the RT Constitution”7 and Resolution No. 817 of the Tajik Majlisi Oli of 30 June, 1999 “On Holding a Referendum of the Republic of Tajikistan for In4 See: Sh. Gaiurov, “Novaia Konstitutsiia Respubliki Tadzhikistan i nekotorye voprosy sobstvennosti,” in: Konstitutsiia Respubliki Tadzhikistan i puti ee realizatsii, Dushanbe, 1995, pp. 48-49. 5 See: General Agreement on Establishing Peace and National Consent in Tajikistan. What Is It? Prepared by the U.N. Observer Mission in Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 1997. 6 See: Sadoi Mardum, 2 July, 1999. 7 See: Akhbori Majlisi Oli Respubliki Tadzhikistan, No. 6, 1999, Art 168.

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troducing Amendments and Additions to the RT Constitution”8 were published on 2 July, 1999, while the referendum was supposed to be held on 26 September, 1999. Moreover, Art 49 of the RT Constitution listed one of the powers of the Majlisi Oli as “introducing draft legislation and other important governmental and social issues for popular discussion.” There can be no doubt that these issues include introducing amendments and additions to the Constitution. But Resolution No. 816 of the Majlisi Oli prescribed publishing proposals of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan for amendments and additions to the Constitution within three days “for citizens to make their general acquaintance with them.” Nor was the technique for holding the referendum very democratic. For example, the draft of the amendments and additions consisted of 28 Paras: formation of the upper house of Parliament; extension of the President’s powers from 5 to 7 years; subsequent presidents being elected to one term, and so on.9 However, the citizens who were to participate in the referendum had to answer only one question: “Do you accept the amendments and additions to the RT Constitution?” It stands to reason that it was extremely difficult to give an unequivocal answer to this question, particularly since the proposed amendments and additions were largely contradictory. The amendment on parties can serve as a vivid example of this contradictoriness; according to the new version, Art 28 of the Constitution read: “…citizens have the right to create political parties, including those of a democratic, religious, and atheist nature…” The party headed by the president was considered democratic; first it was called National, and later renamed National Democratic. The Party of Islamic Revival was religious, while the Communist Party was atheist. Nevertheless, classification of the political parties only partially reflected the situation that had developed at the time in Tajikistan. The thing was that in addition to the above-mentioned, the country’s political system included several other parties, such as the Party of Political and Economic Renewal, the Agrarian Party, the Party of Justice and Development, and so on. A justified question arises in this respect, “To which of the different types should they be related?” Moreover, this classification clearly lacks logic: it implies that religious or atheist parties cannot be democratic. In this rendition, Art 28 contradicts Part 1 of Art 8, according to which “in Tajikistan, social life develops on the basis of political and ideological pluralism.” It also contradicts Part 2 of Art 17, in correspondence with which “the Government guarantees the rights and freedoms of every person regardless of … political beliefs.” The amendment that envisages the creation of a two-house Parliament also arouses serious objections. For example, in keeping with the amendments and additions (Art 49), the upper house is elected at joint meetings of deputies of the local representative bodies (the election procedure is directed at strengthening executive power). Meanwhile, at the local level, the principle of separation of powers is not observed: the same person, who may be a regional, city, or district chairman, also heads the representative and executive power branches. It is the chairmen of local power bodies who arrange the elections to the upper house, electing 75% of the members of the Majlisi milli suitable for executive power, while 25% are appointed by a decree of the Tajik President. Since all the chairmen are appointed by the president, these amendments give him an effective lever of influence on legislative power. What is more, the creation of the upper house requires additional material expenses, thus increasing nepotism, protectionism, and bureaucratism. According to the rendition of Art 56, brought up at the referendum, the upper house is responsible for electing, recalling, and making decisions regarding the immunity of the chairman, his depIbid., Art 169. See: Draft of Amendments and Additions to the RT Constitution, Sharki Ozod, Dushanbe, 1999, 29 pp. (in Tajik and Russian). 8 9

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uty, or judges of the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, and Higher Economic Court, as well as appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General and his deputies. It should be noted that Part 5 of Art 27 of the RT Constitution reads: “Elections and referenda are carried out on the basis of general, equal, and direct voting rights by secret ballot.” This provision is a general regulation and inviolable principle, and there may be nothing to the contrary. It follows from this that the amendments and additions to Part 2 of Art 49 contradict Art 27 of the RT Constitution, since they envisage elections to the upper house on different principles. Moreover, during elections every citizen may only have one vote. But in this case, it turns out that the deputies of the local Parliaments will have two votes each. Furthermore, the deputies of the local Parliaments are in no way an electoral college (if elections are considered to be indirect). The principles of voter equality and directness of elections are also violated. So extending the president’s term from 5 to 7 years and limiting his time in power to one term were unjustified. It should be noted that the initiators of these amendments aimed to extend the current president’s term in power. Moreover, the new rendition of Art 28 and the question of the upper house of the Majlisi Oli, as well as the amendments to Art 65, brought up at the referendum, were not really that necessary. The proposals for introducing amendments and additions to Part 3 of Art 61, which reads, “the Majlisi Oli may interpret the Constitution in the same way as constitutional laws are adopted,” deserves particular attention. Before introduction of the amendments, the Majlisi Oli, that is, the onehouse Parliament, had this right. The Parliament became a two-house structure after the amendments were adopted. In both cases, a procedure for interpreting the Constitution and laws was envisaged that was to be carried out within the framework of adopting constitutional laws. This idea of the referendum initiators was not only anti-constitutional, but also absurd. So the president limits the Parliament’s powers, as well as its opportunity to act effectively. In turn, the Parliament limits the powers of the judicial bodies, including by assuming judicial and regulating power. As a result, the President and Majlisi Oli violated the principle of separation of powers and essentially reduced the system of checks and balances that was just beginning to form in present-day Tajikistan to naught. Another gross violation of the Constitution and the principles of democracy on the part of the Majlisi Oli was appropriating the people’s powers of authority (in matters concerning constitutional law). The legal regulation of certain issues became problematic; for example, it was not clear who should execute constitutional powers before new constitutional bodies were elected and how. It is a well-known fact that when introducing amendments to the Constitution, the status of a particular body changes, and, as a result, the question arises of its legitimacy and the scheduling of new elections (regardless of when the body’s powers run out). So these matters are usually regulated by transitional or concluding provisions that are an integral part of the Constitution. The meaning of these provisions lies in the fact that they regulate matters relating to the implementation of the new regulations of the Constitution.10 It should be noted that by adopting resolutions No. 816 and 817 of 30 June, 1999, the Majlisi Oli usurped the people’s powers of authority. According to Para. 4 of Resolution No. 816 of the Majlisi Oli that came into force on the day it was published, “after amendments and additions come into force … the Majlisi Oli executes all powers endowed by the Majlisi milli and Majlisi namoiandagon 10 For more on this, see: I. Starostina, “Referendum v sisteme konstitutsionno-pravovoi otvetstvennosti,” in: Konstitutsionno-pravovaia otvetstvennost: problemy Rossii, opyt zarubezhnykh stran, ed. by Prof. S. Avakian, MGU Publishers, Moscow, 2001, pp. 461-469; Kh. Khamdov, “The Role and Place of Referendum in the Modern Constitution,” Gosudarstvo i pravo (Dushanbe), No. 2, 2001, pp. 1-10 (in Tajik); B. Gadoev, Problemnye voprosy instituta referenduma, Pravovye problemy instituta referenduma v Respublike Tadzhikistan, ed. by Associate Professor A. Imomov, Dushanbe, 2003, pp. 7-76.

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on its chairmen, members of the Majlisi milli, and deputies of the Majlisi namoiandagon…” In other words, the powers of the Majlisi milli and Majlisi namoiandagon envisaged in the draft of the amendments and additions to the Constitution were passed on to the current one-house Parliament without holding elections; such law-making does not stand up to scrutiny. In actual fact, according to the RT Constitution, the amendments and additions to it were introduced by holding a general referendum (Part 1 of Art 98). In this case, among other things, a proposal only to create a two-house Parliament was brought up at the referendum. The question of transferring the powers of the Parliament functioning at that moment (which doubtlessly had constitutional significance) was decided by deputies in a general act of Parliament, so to speak. In fact, it was an amendment to the Constitution adopted beyond the scope of the established procedure; by adopting this resolution, the Parliament deputies were in fact extending the term of powers of the Majlisi Oli, the President, and other state bodies. The nature of the amendments made to the Constitution show that transitional provisions relating to the need to create a new system of state bodies should also have been brought up at the referendum. But this was not done; as a result, the Parliament, having assumed constitutional powers, essentially became an illegitimate body after the referendum. Summing up the constitutional reform of 1999, the following conclusions should be drawn: 1. When holding the referendum, the Majlisi Oli of the Republic of Tajikistan permitted several gross violations of the Constitution. 2. Resolutions No. 816 and 817 of 30 June, 1999, adopted by the Majlisi Oli, contradicted Para. 6 of Art 49 and Art 99 of the Constitution, since the draft of the amendments and additions to the Basic Law of Tajikistan were published not for general discussion, but only for general acquaintance. 3. The Majlisi Oli violated the constitutional deadlines for holding the referendum. So in accordance with Art 10 of the RT Constitution, the provision of the Majlisi Oli on scheduling of referendum day was deemed invalid. 4. The content of the draft of the amendments and additions to the RT Constitution on the whole contradicted the foundations of the constitutional system of Tajikistan. 5. The Majlisi Oli appropriated the people’s powers of authority, particularly with respect to the execution of constitutional powers by state bodies after the referendum. These matters should have been included in transitional or concluding provisions of the Constitution and brought up at the referendum.

Reform of the Constitution of 2003 The last stage of constitutional and legal development of present-day Tajikistan began in 2003. Proposals of the Majlisi milli (upper house) and Majlisi namoiandagon (lower house) “On Introducing Amendments and Additions to the RT Constitution” were examined. On 5 March, 2003, the lower house of the Parliament adopted the resolution “On Forming a Coordinating Commission to Introduce Amendments and Additions to the RT Constitution.”11 11

See: Akhbori Majlisi Oli Respubliki Tadzhikistan, No. 3, 2003, Art 95.

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In accordance with the instructions of the Majlisi namoiandagon, the Coordinating Commission summarized and presented the proposals of members of the Majlisi milli and deputies of the Majlisi namoiandagon “On Introducing Amendments and Additions to the RT Constitution” to the Majlisi namoiandagon for examination, keeping in mind the opinions and conclusions of other entities having the right to initiate legislation.12 After examining these proposals, on 19 March 2003, the Majlisi Oli adopted the provision “On the Proposal of Members of the Majlisi milli and Deputies of the Majlisi namoiandagon of the Majlisi Oli of the Republic of Tajikistan On Amendments and Additions to the RT Constitution.” 13 It said in particular that “…for the purpose of further improvement of the country’s political and state system, strengthening democracy in society, improving the procedure for ensuring guarantees of human and citizen rights, guaranteeing the constitutional foundations for further development of a free economy and entrepreneurship, and keeping in mind the deep-cutting changes in socioeconomic and cultural-political life expressed in maintaining peace and stability in the republic, in accordance with Art 98 of the RT Constitution and Art 12 of the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Tajikistan ‘On Referendum of the Republic of Tajikistan,’ … we resolve: “1. To adopt the proposal of the members of the Majlisi milli and deputies of the Majlisi namoiandagon of the Majlisi Oli of the Republic of Tajikistan “On Amendments and Additions to the RT Constitution” (according to the appendix) and bring it up for discussion at a general referendum. “2. To publish the proposal “On Amendments and Additions to the RT Constitution” in the press within three days. “3. To ensure that this resolution comes into force from the day it is published.” The same day, the resolution of the Majlisi namoiandagon “On Holding a Referendum of the Republic of Tajikistan for Introducing Amendments and Additions to the RT Constitution” was adopted.14 In the resolution adopted it was noted that “in accordance with Para. 6 of Art 57 of the Constitution of the RT and based on Art 8 of the Constitutional Law of the RT “On Referenda in the Republic of Tajikistan,” the Majlisi namoiandagon of the Majlis Oli of the Republic of Tajikistan resolved: “1. To schedule a general referendum “On Amendments and Additions to the RT Constitution” on 22 June, 2003. “2. To bring up the following question at the general referendum: “Do you accept the amendments and additions to the RT Constitution?” This resolution appears to have been violated by a whole series of different constitutional provisions. For example, Part 1 of Art 6 of the Constitution reads: “In Tajikistan, the people are the possessors of sovereignty and are the only source of state power.” But the people (from whom all state powers proceed) did not authorize the Majlisi namoiandagon to determine the content of the amendments and additions to the Constitution. Moreover, the Majlisi namoiandagon did not have the right to act on behalf of all the people. This is confirmed by Art 6 of the Constitution and the proposed addition to Para. 3, which said that “general referenda and elections are the highest direct expression of the power of the people.” 12 See: “Report of Chairman of the Coordinating Commission A. Dostiev, ‘On Introducing Amendments and Additions to the RT Constitution,’” Sadoi Mardum, 20 March, 2003 (in Tajik). 13 See: Akhbori Majlisi Oli Respubliki Tadzhikistan, No. 3, 2003, Art 97. 14 See: Ibid., Art 98.

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I would also like to note that, in addition to everything else, the powers of the Majlisi namoiandagon include “bringing law drafts and other important state and social questions up for general discussion (Para. 2, Part 1, Art 57), as well as scheduling referenda. So, the Majlisi namoiandagon did not have the right to adopt the final text of the amendments and additions to the Constitution of the RT, or to schedule the day for holding the referendum without ensuring openness, transparency, and participation of the institutions of civil society, or without bringing these matters up for general discussion.15 Entities that put forward proposals for amendments and additions to the Constitution only have the right to endow them with legal form, but not to determine their content, which should be clarified only after a general discussion (in the procedure that is envisaged and adopted by the 1994 Constitution). Arts 98-99 of the RT Constitution specifically set forth only the procedure, entities, and legal form of submission, as well as the procedure for scheduling a referendum. Since bringing draft laws and other important state and social issues up for general discussion (Para. 2 of Art 57), as well as scheduling a referendum (Para. 6 of Art 57) are the exclusive powers of the Majlisi namoiandagon (that is, its rights and obligations), failure to exercise them without a good reason is a breach of law. In our opinion, in this case, by ignoring Para. 2 of Art 57 of the RT Constitution, the supreme legislative and representative body abused their rights and limited the power of the people. It should be noted that the resolution of the Majlisi namoiandagon of 19 March, 2003 primarily envisaged the forms of response to the proposed amendments and additions to the Constitution. The draft of the amendments and additions to the RT Constitution essentially applied to the following paragraphs: 

1-5 (Preamble and Fundamental Principles of the Constitutional System);



6-22 (Human and Citizen Rights, Freedoms and Obligations);



23-36 (the Majlisi Oli);



37-45 (the President and the Government);

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46-50 (the Local Power and Self-Government Bodies, including the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region);



51-54 (Judicial Power);



55-56 (Introducing Amendments to the Constitution and Transitional Provisions).

A total of 122 amendments and additions were brought up at the referendum (keeping in mind that the items brought up for voting sometimes included more than one question). Around 80% of the proposed amendments and additions were of a technical, clarifying, and stylistic nature. For example, certain articles of the Constitution were amended structurally; in some cases, the matter concerned the replacement of separate figures, words, phrases, or entire sentences. Moreover, two articles (55 and 63) were rewritten in full, as well as 20 parts or sentences in specific articles of the Constitution.16 This of course was difficult for even scientists and specialists to understand. Therefore, from the viewpoint of logic and common sense, it would be simply impossible to give an unequivocal “yes” or “no” answer to the set questions. 15 For more details on this, see: M. Fedotova, “Institut vsenarodnogo obsuzhdeniia i rol sredstv massovoi informatsii v ego realizatsii,” in: Osnovnye napravleniia razvitiia gosudarstvenno-pravovykh institutov na sovremennom etape, Moscow, 1986, pp. 201-204; I. Churina, “Dalneishee sovershenstvovanie protsedury provedeniia vsenarodnykh obsuzhdenii,” Vestnik MGU, Series 11, Pravo, No. 5, 1988, pp. 75-80; M. Pisotkin, “Politicheskie igry vokrug referenduma,” Narodny deputat (Moscow), No. 7, 1993, pp. 49-54; V. Kapitsyn, Iu. Roldugin, “Obshchechelovecheskaia demokratiia (sotsiologichesky aspeлt),” Vestnik MGU, Series 12, Sotsialno-politicheskie issledovaniia (Moscow), No. 72, 1992, pp. 39-45. 16 See: Draft of Amendments and Additions to the RT Constitution, TASFETO, Dushanbe, 2003, 30 pp. (in Tajik and Russian).

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Some of the proposed amendments of course deserve support. Worth mentioning in this respect are the additions to Part 1 of Art 5 on the supreme value of man, his rights and freedoms, to Part 2 of Art 6 about how the general referendum and elections are the highest direct expression of power of the people, and to Part 2 of Art 30 on prohibiting propaganda and agitation that incite social, racial, national, religious, and linguistic hostility and enmity. However, some the amendments brought up at the referendum deserve criticism. The new renditions of Parts 2 and 4 of Art 65 of the Constitution draw attention to themselves. They are clearly aimed at creating conditions for reelecting the current President. Whereas in the past, a candidate for the post of president should be no younger than 35 and no older than 65, now it is proposed that only the lower age limit be preserved. Moreover, Part 4 of Art 65 of the Constitution envisaged only one term in power for the President, whereas the new rendition reads that the same person shall not occupy this post for more than two terms in a row. Part 3 of Art 8 of the RT Constitution read: “Social associations are formed and operate within the framework of the Constitution and laws. The state provides them with equal possibilities in their operations.” It was proposed in this respect, to add “and political parties” after the words “social associations,” and to exclude the second sentence (“the state provides them with equal possibilities in their operations”) entirely from the text of the Constitution. This amendment is clearly aimed at creating privileged conditions for the ruling party and pro-government social associations (within the framework of the political system of the country’s society). It was proposed to render Part 2 of Art 8 as follows: “The ideology of not one party, social association, religious organization, movement, or group can be recognized as state.” It appears that a significant terminological imprecision is permitted here that is impermissible for a constitution. For example, on the one hand, parties, religious organizations, and movements are types of social associations. While on the other, the meaning of the word “group” is not clear (does it mean groups of people, social associations, or something else?). The amendments brought up for the referendum were not always logically consistent. For example, on the one hand, addition to Art 14 read that “human and citizen rights and freedoms are realized directly. They determine the goals, content, and application of laws, activity of the legislative, executive and local powers, and local self-government bodies, and are ensured by the judicial power body.” But the analysis we carried out of the other proposed amendments and additions (with respect to ensuring human and citizen rights and freedoms) shows that some of them worsened the position of people and citizens. For example, Part 2 of Art 45 said that “laws establishing new taxes or worsening the economic position of the citizen do not have retroactive force.” The draft of the amendments and additions to the RT Constitution envisaged the words “position of the taxpayer” instead of the “economic position of the citizen.” There can be no doubt that this kind of “correction” significantly diverges from the observation of citizen rights. First, the “economic position of the citizen” is a much broader concept than “taxpayer.” Second, the conjunction “or” means that the words “economic position of the citizen” apply not only to laws establishing new taxes, but also to any other laws (including customs, financial, civil, family, labor, pension, and other legislation). Part 1 of Art 42 of the Constitution read: “On the territory of Tajikistan, each person is obligated to comply with Tajikistan’s Constitution and laws, as well as to respect the rights, freedoms, honor, and dignity of other people.” It was proposed that “in Tajikistan” replace the words “on the territory of Tajikistan.” According to the new rendition, this means that embassies, representative offices, consulates, trains, and airplanes of Tajikistan located outside the country, but which are still considered its territory, do not have to observe (including foreign states and their citizens) the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Tajikistan. 134



The amendments introduced to Arts 38 and 41 of the Constitution have significantly lowered the level of social guarantees the state offers the country’s population. In the past, according to Art 38, each RT citizen had the right to health care through free medical assistance in governmental health care institutions. In accordance with the amendments, however, this right may only be enjoyed within the framework determined by the law. Before introduction of the amendments, Art 41 of the Constitution envisaged that general secondary education is obligatory. The Government guarantees free general secondary education in the state educational establishments. In the new rendition, the word “secondary” has been replaced with “basic,” which means 9-grade, that is, incomplete secondary education. Keeping in mind the abovementioned amendments, a justified question arises: “How can something of this kind even be possible in a social state?” The provisions applying to election law, local self-government bodies, rendering legal help to citizens, status of the public defender’s office, and so on also contained disputed aspects and contradictions. For example, it was proposed that Part 3 of Art 27 be rendered as follows: “Upon reaching the age of 18, a citizen has the right to participate in a referendum, vote, and be elected upon reaching the age set forth by the Constitution, constitutional laws, and laws.” So, to be elected, the only requirement made of a citizen is that he or she has reached a certain age. But when defining the conditions for election or appointment to Parliament, the amendments added a provision on the need for a candidate for Parliament deputy to have a higher education (Parts 1 and 5 of Art 49). This requirement contradicts not only the provisions of the Constitution itself, but also the international acts on human rights recognized by Tajikistan. In the current rendition of Para. 1, Part 3, Art 89 of the Constitution, one of the powers of the Constitutional Court was indicated as “determining whether laws and legal acts of the Majlisi Oli … are in accordance with the Constitution.” In the new rendition, it is proposed that the words “joint legal acts of the Majlisi milli and Majlisi namoiandagon” replace the words “legal acts of the Majlisi Oli.” This means that if either of the houses adopts acts contradicting the Constitution, the Constitutional Court cannot examine them for their constitutionality. The nature of the amendments brought up at the referendum shows the clear inconsistency of their authors with respect to the role of constitutional law in regulating state institutions. For example, on the one hand, according to the Constitution, the procedure for establishing, performing the activity, and executing the powers of the Government, local power bodies, courts of all levels, public prosecutor’s office, and public defender’s office is determined by constitutional law (Arts 74, 78, 83, 84, 92, 95). But the new rendition of Part 5 of Art 78 envisages that “the self-government body of a settlement and village is the jamoat, the procedure for establishing, executing the powers, and performing the activity of which is regulated by the law.” This approach seems to contradict logic, since local self-government, which is a direct expression of the grass-roots power of the people, is the basis for developing the state and civil society. So the results of the analysis we carried out make it possible to conclude that due to violation of the procedure for drawing up and bringing the proposed amendments and additions to the RT Constitution to a national vote, the legitimacy of the referendum held on 22 June, 2003 and its results are subject to doubt. Instead of being brought up for national discussion, a whole series of issues was resolved bureaucratically, hastily, and very contradictorily. In our opinion, the proposals for amendments and additions to the Constitution should be adopted in the first reading with submission for general discussion and only then the results summarized and the final text adopted. If this had been done, it could then be confirmed that the referendum was held with adherence to all the democratic regulations. 135



Conclusions So it can be stated that processes are going on (although slowly) in Tajikistan aimed at establishing constitutionalism. Furthermore, the clear insufficiency of the country’s own experience is made up for by borrowing from the constitutional legislation of countries with developed democracies. This has made it possible to reflect world experience of constitutional development in the RT Constitution and ensure a sufficiently high level of legal technicality. Many ideas (law-based state, rule of law, and so on) and the basic trends of world constitutional development have been set forth in the RT Constitution. Nevertheless, the reality of the transitional process turned several provisions of the 1994 RT Constitution into a declaration of intentions. After the end of the civil war and reconciliation of the conflicting sides, a Tajik state was formed that is increasingly acquiring the features of authoritarianism; the trends of its legislative execution have been developing against the background of inconsistency, contradictoriness, and incompleteness of the constitutional processes. Political will is required for constitutionalism in Tajikistan to become a reality. This is precisely what is needed to carry out constitutional reform. Despite the fact that amendments and additions have been introduced twice to the 1994 RT Constitution (in 1999 and 2003), it still requires further improvement. In our opinion, for successful advance of the democratic processes in the country, the following amendments and additions should be made to the RT Constitution: (1) The mechanism for implementing the separation of powers, as well as the system of checks and balances in executing state power should be reexamined. (2) The Constitutional Court should be endowed with the right to officially interpret the Constitution and laws. (3) The question of the permanent status of the Majlisi milli should be resolved or it should be eliminated. (4) The powers of the Government (including the powers of the Prime Minister) should be determined, as well as its place in the state power system. (5) The organizational and legal principles should be determined for the representative and executive local power bodies to operate on an independent basis. (6) The electability and independence of local self-government bodies should be ensured on the basis of decentralization principles. (7) The Majlisi namoiandagon should be endowed with the right of parliamentary control over the executive power branch as a whole, including with respect to executing the state budget. (8) The establishment of an institution of parliamentary Human Rights Ombudsman should be envisaged. (9) The fundamental principles and goals of the country’s socioeconomic development, including state support of private business, should be enforced. (10) A mechanism should be established for ensuring the direct effect of and principles for executing the Constitution, and so on. A system of RT law sources should also be enforced in the Constitution. Cooperation with Russia within the CIS is making it urgent to improve translation of the Constitution from Tajik into Russian. Today, around 150 terminological inaccuracies have been found in the current text of the RT Constitution during its translation into Russian. 136



Implementation of Part 4 of Art 10 of the Constitution, which says that “international legal acts recognized by Tajikistan enter into force after their official publication,” must be urgently resolved. The right of citizens to information is not enforced in the RT Constitution; it should be reflected in Art 30. The characteristics of the Tajik state (legal, democratic, social) and main principles of the constitutional system (rule of law, national sovereignty, separation of powers, recognition of different forms of property, and creation of equal conditions for them, etc.) envisaged in the Constitution are the content of the contemporary theory of constitutionalism. But the declared constitutional principles and provisions do not always correspond to Tajikistan’s present-day reality. Today, academic discussions are being held on a wide range of topics regarding the nature of the country’s constitutional development that encompass matters from reform of the Constitution to its complete revision. The most acceptable, in our opinion, are proposals for further enhancing the law within the framework of the current Constitution. As the most important regulator of social processes and the main legal system, the RT Constitution should keep in mind the political and legal reality and constitutional traditions of the country’s past. Only on this basis can values of domestic constitutionalism be formed. Furthermore, the accumulated experience should become the basis both for a critical analysis of the mistakes made and for further development.

PERSONNEL SHIFTS IN KAZAKHSTAN: TRADITIONAL ROTATION OR A NEW POLITICAL COURSE? Kadyrjan SMAGULOV Political Science Doctoral Candidate, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (Almaty, Republic of Kazakhstan)

T

ABSTRACT

he author analyzes the personnel shifts in 2012 and during the first month of 2013 in the Republic of Kazakhstan to point out that despite the scope (the government, local executive structures, and central state security services received new people), the country’s state administration bodies did not undergo any rejuvenation. Furthermore, the personnel shifts in the

defense and security structures (the police investigation departments in particular) show that the country’s leaders attach particular importance to the processes going on inside the country and want to keep them under control. Ten regions received new akims (heads of the administrative-territorial units) who, when appointed, were warned about

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the possible repercussions of embezzlement and misuse of budget money. New instruments of control over what the akims are doing in their regions have been created in the hopes of reducing the still fairly widespread nepotism to a minimum. There is another interesting side to the personnel shifts of 2012-2013: just as in Russia, the parliament of Kazakhstan is turning into a “waiting room” or “depot” of

sorts where deputies either await a new appointment or live out the remaining days of their political career. The 2012-2013 rotations are described as the first steps toward implementing a new program called the Kazakhstan-2050 Strategy. The political priorities and implementation methods, however, will never change: the president remains in charge of everything up to and including the choice of prime minister.

KEYWORDS: Kazakhstan, personnel policy, akims, defense and security structures, the Kazakhstan-2050 Strategy.

Introduction A series of personnel shifts in the central and local executive structures took place in Kazakhstan in early 2013. Furthermore, some of the top figures (in the defense and security structures among others) were moved to new posts. The country went through something similar a year earlier, in January 2012; these changes turned out to be but the first step toward much more impressive shifts in the upper echelons of power. In September 2012, for example, Serik Akhmetov was promoted from the first vice premier (a post he had filled since January 2012) to the prime minister. This means that it took almost an entire year for top officials to be shuffled, very like in a pack of cards, from one post to the next. What is behind the latest appointments in the central and local structures of power? How will they affect the country’s policies? I will try to answer these questions.

A Pack of Cards A pack of cards called the Political Olympus of Kazakhstan was presented to the public as the curtain fell on 2012. The pack contained 54 cards each bearing an embellished image of one of the republic’s political heavyweights.1 This presented a relatively accurate picture of the country’s political reality: for quite a long time personnel changes have remained limited to a fairly narrow circle of officials, who are moved from one post to another. Some people believe that by appointing new people with “fresh” approaches to the old problems, the president is attempting to add vigor to state policies. Others think the president is merely maintaining a balance among the elite groups. The latter looks more justified: so far, the newcomers have produced no positive shifts in the way the president’s instructions are carried out and the state programs implemented. The next period of rotation took twelve months to be completed. It ended in January 2013 when Karim Masimov’s premiership ran out. He had headed the government for over five years, so far, the 1 See: T. Baytukenov, “Karty reshaiut vse,” available at [http://www.time.kz/index.php?module=news&newsid=30699], 29 January, 2013.

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longest time in office. In fact, the long political season of 2003-2006 ended in 2007 when Prime Minister Danial Akhmetov and Speaker of the Senate Nurtai Abykaev lost their posts.2 During Masimov’s premiership, Rakhat Aliev was removed from his post; the country experienced rapid economic growth, lived through a financial and economic crisis, two parliamentary campaigns and a presidential election, and survived the riots in Zhanaozen, loud corruption scandals, mounting religious extremism, and outbursts of terror. This stage, however, came to an end without political storms: the current regime is obviously resolved to keep the elite and people at the helm in comfortable living conditions. The elite, which controls the economic and political levers and, therefore, the financial flows, is free to act as it sees fit, which negatively affects the country’s development. This explains why the never-ending reshuffling in the government, which is acquiring new departments, agencies, development institutions, and all sorts of funds, is not yielding the desired results. In less than 22 years of its independent existence, the republic has seen eight cabinets.3 Sociologists B. Bekturganova and G. Abdykasymova have written that the “irremovability coefficient” has been steadily growing from one cabinet to the next. For example, 21.8% of the members of the Tereshchenko Cabinet, which functioned from October 1991 to October 1994, came from the previous, Soviet, republican government. The Kazhegeldin Cabinet (October 1994-October 1997) acquired 35.6% of its members from the previous cabinet. More than half (53.6%) of the Balgimbaev Cabinet (October 1997-October 1999) came from the two previous cabinets. The next cabinet of K. Tokaev (October 1999-January 2002) employed 45.5% of those who worked in the previous cabinets; their share in the I. Tasmagambetov Cabinet (January 2002-June 2003) reached the critical point of 68.2%. Rotation of the cabinet members is nothing but an illusion created by restructuring of ministries and departments and purely formal redistribution of portfolios within a very narrow circle. 4 This means that the cabinet members come from a very small group of the chosen ones and that the process is anything but transparent. Top officials are sought for among those closely connected with the leaders of the elite groups; kinship plays an important role, together with personal loyalty to the president and the recruiting elite group. The strict screening criteria and the fact that the leaders of the elite groups do not trust newcomers and, on the whole, do not want to see new people at the top explains why there have been practically no new faces in the corridors of power in the last ten years. Earlier, before the oppositional Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan Movement was set up in 2001, the president appointed quite a few young economists and lawyers with Western diplomas to high posts. An open demonstration by the Young Turks (the non-official name of the opposition movement) increased mistrust toward the newcomers in state administration system. The author of this article has calculated that in the D. Akhmetov Cabinet (June 2003-January 2007), the irremovability coefficient reached a record 75%. In other words, two thirds of the ministerial positions went to those who had served in the Tasmagambetov Cabinet. The Masimov Cabinet, which started working on 10 January, 2007, employed 70.6% of those who came from the D. Akhmetov Cabinet. In the S. Akhmetov Cabinet, the coefficient reached its highest figure (80%); the president endorsed its composition in September 2012; there were 20 members and the prime minister; 16 out See: “Peregruppirovka sil,” available at [http://www.nomad.su/print.php?a=2-200702050233], 29 January, 2013. See: Official site of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan [URL: www.government.kz]. 4 See: B. Bekturganova, G. Abdykasymova, “Smena pravitelstva: lyubopytnaya statistika,” available at [URL: http:// www.zonakz.net/articles/3103], 29 January, 2013. 2 3

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of 20 (or 80%) had worked in the Masimov government. The shifts of January 2013 did nothing to reduce the number (16) of members from the previous cabinet in the S. Akhmetov government. We should bear in mind, however, that some of the ministers were appointed a year earlier, in January 2012 (the present prime minister being appointed at that time the first deputy chairman of the government). In January 2012, President Nazarbaev threatened to disband the government5; Masimov and his ministers, however, survived for another six months. Explanations can be found in the President’s Address to the Nation presented late in 2012, in which Nazarbaev outlined the country’s prospects until the year 2050. The Address, now known as the Kazakhstan-2050 Strategy, posed ambitious tasks: a place among the thirty most developed states of the world; a greater role for the parliament; administrative reform; and a fundamentally new system for managing natural resources.6 The ambitious plan was well-timed: the country expected “big oil” from Kashagan (the country’s largest oil and gas field) very soon; the country leaders were looking forward to a new stage of economic growth. This explains why the country needed a new prime minister who, having armed himself with the Strategy, would steer the country toward economic growth; furthermore, the new prime minister created the illusion of a new government. This brings to mind 10 October, 1997 and the President’s Address to the Nation “Strategy of Kazakhstan-2030,” which is also when a new prime minister, Nurlan Balgimbaev, was appointed to replace Akedzhan Kazhegeldin, who had fallen into disgrace. The new cabinet is a myth—the prime minister (S. Akhmetov) is new, but the ministers are the same. This means that the prime minister has nothing to do with appointments: the president has chosen loyal ministers. This explains why there are no younger people in the top ministerial posts; Bauyrjan Baybek, a young man moved from his previous position of deputy head of the presidential administration to the post of the first deputy chairman of the ruling Nur Otan Party, is the exception rather than the rule. The same people are merely shifted from one cabinet to another; economic reforms and changes in the law-enforcement structures, the social sphere, and elsewhere remain on paper: those who failed to carry them out remain in their posts. None of the previous governments was punished for its mistakes; frequent rotations do not allow ministers to acquire too much weight. They are moved from one post to another in disregard of their special skills and knowledge. This means that reshuffling and rotations are nothing more than the “imitation of activity.” According to D. Ashimbaev, a well-known expert on the elite, the state machine will go on with administrative reforms to keep tens of thousands of civil servants occupied. In December 2012, the president signed the Law on Amendments and Addenda to Certain Legal Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan Related to the Civil Service. It is designed to increase the efficiency of the state machine by introducing, in particular, a new mechanism of functioning and assessment of civil servants based on the principle of meritocracy to select and promote the best among them, add efficiency to the state machine, and make personnel appointments more objective and more transparent. Under the same law, Administrative Corps A was set up. The president pointed out that these measures would reduce the number of state servants eight-fold.7 It should be said that the “imitation of activi5 See: “N. Nazarbaev kritikuet pravitelstvo i grozit emu otstavkoy,” available at [http://www.kursiv.kz/ novosti/v-kazakhstane/1195219286-nnazarbaev-kritikuet-pravitelstvo-i-grozit-emu-otstavkoj.html], 29 January, 2013. 6 See: “Poslanie Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan—Lidera natsii Nursultana Nazarbaeva narodu Kazakhstana “Strategia Kazakhstan-2050: novy politicheskiy kurs sostoiavshegosia gosudarstva,” available at [http://www.akorda.kz/ru/page/page_ poslanie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazakhstan-lidera-natsii-nursultana-nazarbaeva-narodu-kazakhstana], 29 January, 2013. 7 See: “Nazarbaev podpisal popravki v zakon o gosudarstvennoy sluzhbe,” available at [http://tengrinews.kz/ kazakhstan_news/nazarbaev-podpisal-popravki-v-zakon-o-gosudarstvennoy-slujbe-225546], 29 January, 2013.

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ty,” which is typical of central and local executive structures, creates the illusion of their diligence and dedication. Andrey Riabov of the Moscow Carnegie Center believes that the ruling circles in the postSoviet countries want to stretch out the transition period8 as long as possible for the following reasons. 

First, the new political elites realize that new institutions of power offer the shortest road to self-assertion and promotion. They provide the opportunity to resolve, in the shortest time possible, the key task of the transition period, i.e. conversion of power and its attributes into property or, rather, offer a chance to preserve both.



Second, there is no long tradition of feeling responsible for the country they administer; the expert also pointed out that, very much like in Soviet times when top bureaucrats were deliberately made to feel the temporary and insecure nature of their exalted statuses, officials are still not sure of their positions, even in the new conditions where there is no need for such uncertainty.



Third, the risk of losing the status of a high-ranking administrator is inevitably accompanied by the threat of losing certain positions inside the elite.

The anti-communist revolution produced what are called transitional classes resolved to perpetuate the present transitional state of society: this will allow them to combine the inflexible hierarchy, inflexible structures, limited competitiveness, and practically non-existent vertical mobility of the communist system with the boons created by the market economy.9 In Kazakhstan, prime ministers are changed fairly frequently because of the political system in which prime ministers are appointed by the president and endorsed by the parliament. The ruling Nur Otan Party is in the absolute majority (80% of the seats), which means that endorsement presents no problems. Premiership in Kazakhstan is the pinnacle of a political career, after which downfall is inevitable. Once removed from power, all chairmen of the cabinet are pushed from the scene; their names disappear from the press. This happened to all the prime ministers of independent Kazakhstan: Tereshchenko, Kazhegeldin, Balgimbaev, Tokaev, Tasmagambetov, and D. Akhmetov; this is probably in store for Masimov.

Rotation among the Law-Enforcers There is another hidden aspect of the current personnel rotations in Kazakhstan. Under the law, the president has the right to appoint the ministers of defense, internal affairs, justice, and foreign affairs; he also appoints heads of the National Security Committee, Border Guard Service, Presidential Guard, External Intelligence “Syrbar,” Republican Guard, Constitutional Council, Presidential Administration, Security Council, Procurator General, heads of local executive structures (akims of the regions and cities with the republican status), the financial police, and the National Bank. These structures control all the key areas in state policy; this is especially true of the defense and security structures: in 2012-2013, the heads of nearly all them were changed. 8 See: A. Riabov, “Praviashchie klassy v postsovetskikh stranakh zainteresovany v sokhranenii perekhodnogo perioda. Vystuplenie na federalnom klasse Moscovskoy shkoly politicheskikh issledovaniy,” available at [URL: www.zonakz.net/ articles/26246], 29 January, 2013. 9 See: Ibidem.

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In 2012, Berik Imashev was appointed Minister of Justice and Erlan Idrisov became Foreign Minister. In September 2012, former prime minister Masimov became head of the Presidential Administration. In January 2012, Minister of Justice Rashid Tusupbekov was appointed Chairman of the Agency for Fighting Economic Crimes and Corruption (another name for the financial police) to replace Kayrat Kojamjarov (who had filled the post since 2008). On 23 January, Amangeldy Shabdarbaev was appointed Commander of the Republican Guard. In January 2013, Kayrat Kojamjarov was appointed presidential aide—Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan; more or less simultaneously, Nurlan Julamanov received the post of Deputy Chairman of the National Security Committee and Director of the Border Guard Service. In January 2013, the president issued a decree appointing Ruslan Jaksylykov as Chief Commander of the Internal Forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; by means of the same decree, Anuar Sadykulov received the post of Commander of Arystan (Special Forces within the National Security Committee). It should be said that the heads of all the other state structures appointed by the head of state do not have long records at these posts. Askhat Daulbaev, for example, was appointed Procurator General on 15 April, 2011; Nurtay Abykaev has been in his post since 23 August, 2010. Igor Rogov was re-appointed for his second term as Chairman of the Constitutional Council on 15 June, 2010. Amanjol Jankuliev, director of External Intelligence “Syrbar”, and Mukhtar Ayubaev, head of the Presidential Guard, are old-timers: they have filled their posts since 17 February, 2009 and March 2006, respectively. The above suggests that the heads of external intelligence retained their posts for four years, while the heads of internal intelligence were frequently changed. I have already written that the processes going on inside the country receive a lot of attention from the top people.

Rotation of the Heads of Regions There are 14 regions in Kazakhstan and two cities with a republican status: Astana, the country’s capital, and Almaty, the former capital and the country’s largest financial center. Two akims—Imangali Tasmagambetov (Astana) and Akhmetjan Esimov (Almaty)—have remained in their posts since April 2008; two akims (the Southern Kazakhstan and Eastern Kazakhstan regions) have filled their posts since March 2009; the akim of the Jambyl Region appointed in November 2009 is one of the old-timers. The akims of the Almaty and Aktobe regions were appointed to their posts in April and July 2011, respectively. In January 2012, four regions—Western Kazakhstan, Karaganda, Kostanay, and Pavlodar—received new akims. On 15 August, a new akim came to the Atyrau Region. In 2013, five newcomers replaced the old akims in the Akmola, Kyzylorda, Mangistau, Northern Kazakhstan, and Karaganda regions. In 2012-2013, ten out of 16 regions (over 50%) acquired new heads. On 25 January, 2013, the president held a meeting with the akims of the regions of Kazakhstan, at which he instructed them to keep unemployment in check or even create more jobs and raise the standard of living of the ordinary people. He also deemed it necessary to remind them that the country’s social and economic development should receive due attention. Whether deliberately or not, approval of the arrest of Bergey Ryskaliev, accused of grand larceny, was issued on the same day, probably as a warning to the newly appointed akims. 142



Starting in 2013, the republic’s leaders have been taking measures to minimize or root out corruption altogether: with this aim in view, the akims will be accessed according to a rating of 45 points; the results of the previous year cost 12 akims their posts.10 Rotation and promotions of the akims at all levels will be geared toward rating and assessments; the same applies to all civil servants; this is done to rule out or at least minimize nepotism. According to the Kazakhstan-2050 Strategy, akims of villages and auls will be elected11 to clearly delineate the responsibilities and powers between the center and the regions and increase public control over the local executive structures. This means that 2,533 akims (or 91.7% of the total number of regional heads at all levels) will be elected. Later, akims of a higher level will also be elected.

Conclusion The personnel rotations of 2012-2013 were intended to facilitate the implementation of the Kazakhstan-2050 Strategy; the very fact it was adopted means that the present regime is determined to survive until 2050. Frequent rotations at the top level are carried out with the single aim of keeping the elites under control, not to add fresh impulse to the country’s development. Indeed, 80% of the ministers retained their posts; the ruling classes want to prolong the transition period for as long as possible. Rotation of prime ministers creates the illusion of renovation, largely thanks to the efforts of the pro-government media. In fact, this illusion is needed because the country will soon be receiving oil from the gigantic Kashagan oil fields. The president appointed new/old people to top posts in the defense and security structures. Rotation brought new akims to ten regions; much is being done to minimize corruption in order to start using budget money more efficiently. I have already written that the parliament has become a “waiting room” of sorts for top officials. Nurgali Ashim, former Minister of the Environment, for example, was sent off to cool his heels in the parliament; the same happened to Onalsyn Jumabekov, former Chairman of the Supreme Court Council. Sergey Kulagin and Sergey Dyachenko (former akims of the Kostanay and Akmola regions, respectively) supply another pertinent example: the former was moved to the Senate, while the latter was elected vice speaker of the Majilis. Two more high-ranking officials—Serik Umbetov, former business manager in the Presidential Administration, and Omarkhan Oksikbaev, former head of the Auditing Committee—also ended up in the parliament. This means that the prime minister of Kazakhstan has never been an independent political figure. The ministers are either approved by the president or directly appointed by him; state policy and the way it is carried out remain as immutable as ever. 10 See: “V Kazakhstane osvobozhdeny ot dolzhnosti 12 akimov,” available at [http://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/vkazahstane-osvobojdenyi-ot-doljnostey-12-akimov—224790], 29 January, 2013. 11 See: “Poslanie Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan—Lidera natsii Nursultana Nazarbaeva.”

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MASS MEDIA

PRESS RIGHTS AND CONSTRAINTS IN KYRGYZSTAN: THE FIRST YEAR OF PRESIDENT ATAMBAEV Eric FREEDMAN Associate Professor of Journalism, Michigan State University (East Lansing, MI, U.S.)

T

ABSTRACT

he ouster of authoritarian President Kurmanbek Bakiev in April 2010 was heralded as opening the door to a new era of human, press, and political rights protections in Kyrgyzstan. However, the interim administration of President Roza Otunbaeva and the accession of her democratically elected successor, President Almazbek Atambaev, on 1 December, 2011, failed to produce the anticipated, significant commitment to restore and

safeguard press rights. Drawing on interviews with journalists and mass media experts in Bishkek and Osh, this article examines the press rights situation and restraints in the first year of the Atambaev administration. It concludes that achievement of a strong press rights record will be neither easy nor swift in light of Kyrgyzstan’s Soviet-era and post-independence history, economic constraints, and political fragility.

KEYWORDS: Kyrgyzstan; journalism; press freedom; ethnic conflict; post-revolution. 144



Introduction In April 2010, Kyrgyzstan experienced its second revolutionary change of regimes since independence nineteen years earlier. A popular uprising ousted the increasingly authoritarian president, Kurmanbek Bakiev, who was replaced by an interim president, Roza Otunbaeva. Kyrgyzstan experienced a second major upheaval in June 2010 when violence between ethnic Uzbeks and ethnic Kyrgyz erupted in the country’s South. The nongovernmental organization (NGO) International Crisis Group labeled that conflict a “pogrom” and reported that the “June events”—as local residents characterized it—left more than 420 people dead and displaced more than 400,000 others. 1 Both events quickly proved to have serious adverse impacts on a media environment that had come under tighter controls under Bakiev. Voters subsequently amended the constitution to sharply reduce the power of the president and to provide greater authority to Jogorku Kengesh (Supreme Council). Under the new structure, the popularly elected president serves as head of state and the Jogorku Kengesh, a unicameral parliament, chooses the prime minister, who serves as head government. Atambaev, a former prime minister, became president on 1 December, 2011. On that day, the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek released a congratulatory statement expressing U.S. support “to the people of the Kyrgyz Republic as they undertake the hard work of building upon the democratic gains of the past eighteen months and realizing a democratic, prosperous and just future for all citizens of the country.”2 Four of the five parties holding seats in the parliament formed a governing coalition.

Research Question Since independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan has had an inconsistent but usually weak record of protecting the rights of free speech and free press. That record has generated widespread concern among human rights and press rights NGOs such as Reporters sans Frontières (RSF), Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Freedom House, and International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX). Even so, its human rights record generally had been more favorable than the records of the four other former Soviet socialist republics in Central Asia; two of them—Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan—rank among the world’s most repressitarian regimes, those that are “both authoritarian in governance and repressive in human rights practices.”3 Scholars are increasingly studying the press system in Kyrgyzstan. The first comprehensive post-independence study reviewed the history and status of the mass media; in it, Svetlana Kulikova and Gulnara Ibraeva discussed restraints on press freedom, media economics, and relationships among state and private news outlets.4 In a later analysis of media discourse leading to the February 2005 parliamentary elections, K.A. Karagulova found that the Askar Akaev regime had “created a 1 See: Kyrgyzstan: Widening Ethnic Divisions in the South, Asia Report No. 222, International Crisis Group, p. 3, available at [http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/222-kyrgyzstan-widening-ethnic-divisionsin-the-south.aspx], 29 March, 2012. 2 See: Statement by U.S. Embassy Bishkek Congratulating President Atambaev on His Inauguration, 1 December, 2011, available at [http://bishkek.usembassy.gov/pr_embassyinauguration.html], 1 December, 2011. 3 E. Freedman, R. Shafer, S. Antonova, “Two Decades of Repression: The Persistence of Authoritarian Controls on the Mass Media in Central Asia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 11, Issue 4, 2010, p. 95. 4 See: S. Kulikova, G. Ibraeva, The Historical Development and Current Situation of the Mass Media in Kyrgyzstan, Occasional Papers 1, Cimera Foundation, Geneva, Switzerland, 2002.

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discourse of danger and instability” to mold public opinion and delegitimize political adversaries. 5 The present author found no major changes in university-level journalism education after the Tulip Revolution; academic programs still adhered to Soviet-style pedagogy with little emphasis on practical training.6 Irina Wolf content-analyzed how Vecherniy Bishkek covered an illegal Islamist organization linked to terrorist attacks in Central Asia.7 G. Pitts used survey research and interviews to assess professionalism among journalists in Kyrgyzstan.8 And S.V. Kulikova and D.D. Perlmutter examined the role of samizdat-style websites in disseminating oppositional information during the run-up to the Tulip Revolution.9 As happened with the advent of independence in 1991 and the Tulip Revolution in 2005,10 many people inside and outside Kyrgyzstan hoped that the April 2010 revolution would usher in a rapid movement toward transparent, participatory governance and strong respect for human rights, including press rights. However, both prior experiences failed to make such promises come true. After the 2010 revolution, initial experience also proved disheartening amid anti-press incidents and practices. In one positive sign during the interim administration, parliament decriminalized libel. Although lauded by human rights groups, the legislation was largely symbolic because no journalist had been criminally prosecuted for libel since independence; rather, plaintiffs who felt victimized by press coverage used civil suits to punish and, in some cases, bankrupt news organizations and journalists. It remains a crime to insult public officials.11 In the second half of 2010, doubts arose about the future of press freedom despite Otunbaeva’s promises to protect it. In May 2011, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of Media commended her government’s attempts to establish public service broadcasting and to decriminalize defamation but expressed concern about journalists’ safety.12 Meanwhile, CPJ chastised her failure to intervene in the criminal case of Azimjon Askarov, an imprisoned human rights activist and freelancer for the independent news website Voice of Freedom; his case is discussed later in this article. International press rights monitoring NGOs still give Kyrgyzstan low evaluations. Freedom House’s “Freedom of the Press” report rates its press system as “not free,” while the organization’s “Freedom on the Net” report places it 18th among 47 countries ranked.13 The 2012 IREX report on media sustainability in the region assesses its press system as barely in the “near sustainability” category in free speech, plurality of news sources, and supporting institutions factors, but as an “unsus5 See: K.A. Karagulova, “Danger Ahead: The Government Discourse on the Elections and Observation Before 24 March, 2005,” in: Observing or Participating in Regime Change? Kyrgyz Perspectives on the Role of International Election Observation Missions in 2005, ed. by S. Torjesen, I. Overland, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, 2006, pp. 25-43. 6 See: E. Freedman, “After the Tulip Revolution: Journalism Education in Kyrgyzstan,” Paper presented at the World Journalism Education Congress, Singapore, 2007. 7 See: I. Wolf, “Hizb ut-Tahrir in Kyrgyzstan as Presented in Vecherniy Bishkek: A Radical Islamist Organization through the Eyes of Kyrgyz Journalists,” in: After the Czars and Commissars: Journalism in Authoritarian Post-Soviet Central Asia, ed. by E. Freedman, R. Shafer, Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, Michigan, 2011, pp. 79-97. 8 See: G. Pitts, “Professionalism among Journalists in Kyrgyzstan,” in: After the Czars and Commissars: Journalism in Authoritarian Post-Soviet Central Asia, pp. 233-243. 9 See: S.V. Kulikova, D.D. Perlmutter, “Blogging Down the Dictator? The Kyrgyz Revolution and Samizdat Websites,” in: After the Czars and Commissars: Journalism in Authoritarian Post-Soviet Central Asia, pp. 263-286. 10 See: E. Freedman, “When a Democratic Revolution Isn’t Democratic or Revolutionary,” Journalism, Vol. 10, No. 6, 2009, pp. 843-861. 11 See: Freedom of the Press 2012-Kyrgyzstan, Freedom House, available at [http://www.freedomhouse.org]. 12 See: “OSCE Media Freedom Representative Praises Kyrgyzstan’s Media Freedom Progress, Urges Authorities to Ensure Safety of Journalists,” Press Release, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, available at [http://www. osce.org/fom/77788], 19 May, 2011. 13 See: Freedom of the Press 2012 and Freedom on the Net 2012, Freedom House, available at [http:www. freedomhouse.org].

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tainable mixed system” in professional journalism and business management factors.14 RSF places it tied at 108th among 179 countries.15 The disappointing overall failure of the interim administration to protect and expand press freedom may be attributed in part to the uncertainties of Kyrgyzstan’s immediate post-revolutionary environment, to the national trauma produced by the ethnic violence in the South and to a continuing legacy of authoritarianism. Whatever the reasons, it is reasonable to inquire into events and policies under what is presumed to be the more politically stable administration of the democratically elected Atambaev. Thus the research question: What was the state of press freedom in Kyrgyzstan during the first year of the Atambaev administration, from 1 December, 2011, to 30 November, 2012?

Methods This article is based in large part on eleven in-depth interviews of journalists, journalism educators, and mass media experts in Bishkek and Osh in May 2012. Those cities were chosen because one is the capital and the other, Kyrgyzstan’s second-largest city, was the center of inter-ethnic violence in June 2010, several months after the revolution. Interviewees were selected based on their experience with a wide array of print, broadcast, and online media, including state, independent, and opposition news organizations. Interviews took place in Russian with the assistance of a translator or in English. Most interviews lasted forty-five to ninety minutes. Participants were asked to sign an informed consent form approved by the author’s university and had the right to withhold their names from published studies and articles; two chose that option. A number of studies in Kyrgyzstan have used in-depth interviews as part of mass media research. As examples, see studies of the post-Tulip Revolution press situation after the Tulip Revolution16 and of environmental journalism in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.17 Irina Wolf’s dissertation about newspaper coverage of Hizb ut-Tahrir incorporated interviews with Vecherniy Bishkek reporters who covered the outlawed Islamist organization.18 In addition to formal one-on-one interviews, the author conducted a roundtable discussion in Osh with nine young radio journalists at the bilingual Yntymak Public Radio that was launched by the U.S.-based NGO Internews; its name means “accord” or “harmony” in Kyrgyz and Uzbek. A television station is planned as well, according to the Internews country director.19 This article also draws on reports and statements from international press rights and human rights advocacy NGOs, from other civil society groups, from contemporary accounts from news media in and out of Kyrgyzstan, and from informal conversations with other experts.20 14 See: Media Sustainability Index 2012: The Development of Sustainable Independent Media in Europe and Eurasia, International Research & Exchanges Board, 2012, p. 290. 15 Press Freedom Index 2011/2012, 2012, Reporters sans Frontières, available at [http://en.rsf.org/press-freedomindex-2011-2012,1043.html]. 16 See: E. Freedman, “When a Democratic Revolution Isn’t Democratic or Revolutionary.” 17 See: E. Freedman, “Environmental Journalism and Ecological Nongovernmental Organizations in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan: Too Rarely Shall the Twain Meet,” Central Eurasian Studies Society, October 2009. 18 See: I. Wolf, “Comparative Quantitative and Qualitative Content Analyses of Coverage of Hizb ut-Tahrir in German, British and Kyrgyz Quality Newspapers in 2002-2007,” Dissertation for a Ph.D. in Psychology, University of Constance, Germany, 2011, 362 pp. 19 Mark Walsh, interview, 22 November, 2012, Bishkek. 20 Media, multinational, and NGO sources included: the Committee to Protect Journalists; Institute for War & Peace Reporting; Ferghana News; EurasiaNet; Forum 18 News Service; International Crisis Group; International Research &

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The National Council for Eurasian and Eastern European Research and Michigan State University’s Muslim Studies Program and School of Journalism provided field research grants.

Anti-Press Events The situation of imprisoned journalist-activist Azimjan Askarov at the start and end of the first year of the Atambaev presidency can be viewed as emblematic of the broader media landscape during the study period. Askarov is a human rights advocate and journalist for Moscow-based Ferghana News, the Golos Svobody website, and other media outlets. He is now serving a life term on fabricated allegations of organizing riots, possession of extremist literature and ammunition, attempted kidnapping, and complicity in a police officer’s murder.21 Amnesty International named him a prisoner of conscience; he received human rights awards in absentia from the Moscow Helsinki Group and the Czech Republic-based NGO People in Need. In events that bookend the study year, press rights defenders vigorously advocated his release in the run-up to Atambaev’s assumption of office and continued to push the issue through the end of his first year. Calls for his freedom had begun earlier, however; among those efforts was a 14 June, 2011, letter from CPJ to interim President Otunbaeva urging his release. Shortly after Atambaev took office, CPJ criticized the Supreme Court’s 30 December decision upholding the conviction and sentence. Toward the end of the study period, on 12 November, 2012, the Open Society Justice Initiative and a Kyrgyzstani lawyer filed a complaint on his behalf with the United Nations Human Rights Committee. The complaint asserted that authorities targeted Askarov based on his status as a human rights defender and his minority Uzbek ethnicity, and that authorities subjected him to torture, illegal detention, and an unfair trial.22 And on 21 November, 2012, he received a CPJ International Press Freedom Award in absentia. After learning of the award from the Voice of America Uzbek Service, he wrote to CPJ to express appreciation for the recognition and to criticize what he called biased reporting “during the tragic days of June 2010.” His letter stated: “I was doing my work in Bazar-Korgon: documenting violence and helping to identify victims. Twenty-three civilians were shot dead, more than 50 were wounded, and 205 houses belonging to ethnic Uzbeks were burned to ashes. Yet, not a single one of these facts was publicized by the mainstream Kyrgyz media, and authorities continue to remain silent about the killings, the mass-scale looting, and the arson in Bazar-Korgon.” 23 Although the Askarov case drew international attention, violations of press rights during the study period went far beyond the plight of a single journalist. That was manifested in government activities on a number of fronts. For example, in February 2012, the country’s largest Internet provider, which serves as many as half of Kyrgyzstan’s Internet users, blocked domestic access to the Moscow-based independent website Ferghana News. The company acted on orders from Prime Minister Omurbek Babanov; news reports cited a parliamentary deputy’s justification that Ferghana News had published material that promotes religious and ethnic strife.24 In September 2012, a Bishkek court Exchanges Board; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; U.S. Department of State; Amnesty International; Reporters sans Frontières; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; IFEX; and Human Rights Watch. 21 See: M. Suleymanov, “Otunbayeva Must Put Words into Action in Askarov Case,” Committee to Protect Journalists, available at [http://cpj.org/blog/2011/03/otunbayeva-must-put-words-into-action-in-askarov-c.php], 11 March, 2011. 22 See: “Human Rights Azimjan Askarov Takes His Torture and Unfair Trial in Kyrgyzstan to Human Rights Committee,” Ferghana News, available at [http://enews.fergananews.com/articles/2792], 13 November, 2012. 23 See: “A Letter of Thanks from Askarov,” Committee to Protect Journalists, available at [www.cpj.org/awards/2012/ a-letter-of-thanks-from-askarov.php], 2012. 24 See: “Kyrgyz Government Blocks Access to News Website,” Committee to Protect Journalists, available at [http:// cpj.org/2012/02/kyrgyz-government-blocks-access-to-news-website.php], 23 February, 2012.

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prohibited showing of the film “I Am Gay and Muslim” at a human rights documentary film festival; the court acted at the behest of the State Committee on Religious Affairs.25

Findings: Major Problems Confronting the Press Overall, journalists differed on whether the country’s media environment had improved under Atambaev. Even those who stated that the situation in general is better also expressed concerns about critical weaknesses of the system, including official and extra-official constraints, political interference, and lack of media independence, absence of sustainability, and unwillingness to tackle controversial issues and investigative projects. There were geographic differences in perspective as well. Journalists in the South reported that the media situation in their region was more precarious and vulnerable than in the North as a result of the June 2010 ethnic violence. One piece of evidence they cited was self-censorship rooted in fear that the press would be blamed if violence again breaks out between ethnic Uzbeks and ethnic Kyrgyz. Such differences of opinion mirror findings by IREX in its most recent Media Sustainability Index (MSI) which covers the eleven months immediately before Atambaev’s ascension to office and the first month of his administration: “Overall, in 2011 Kyrgyzstan received very contradictory ratings in regard to the freedom of speech: some MSI panelists felt that in 20 years of independence freedom had never been greater, while others believed that there were plenty of episodes in 2011 where freedom was being throttled.”26 The press system was “in crisis before the revolution” but “generally improved” afterward. “It usually does in Kyrgyzstan,” according to the head of the Department of Journalism and Mass Communication at American University of Central Asia. “The government gives some room to write the truth,” and some journalists began “small-scale investigations and feel some freedom to challenge the government and parliament.” 27 A Radio Azattyk journalist in Bishkek said, “Before it was difficult to find information, and there was much more pressure. Before, [journalists] knew who was unhappy and from whom to expect a negative reaction and harassment.” Now, he continued, “it is more open but sometimes they still feel pressure.”28 Speaking from a media development donor’s perspective, the mass media support program director for Soros Foundation-Kyrgyzstan saw a change under the new government and a “transformation in ownership . . . for some short period of time,” but it was “very brief, as in 2005,” a reference to the Tulip Revolution. She opined that the “only advantage” of the new parliamentary system compared to the old presidential model was increased diversity of the media market, “especially if you consider Internet sources” that are not covered by the mass media law—“but the relationship between the media and those in power didn’t change much.” 29 And an Osh-based correspondent for an international news agency remarked: “Public relations and journalism are mixed in our country. The situation after the June [2010] events changes all the 25 See: D. Trilling, “Kyrgyzstan: Rights Activists Condemn Ban on Gay Muslim Documentary,” EurasiaNet, available at [http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65986], 1 October, 2012. 26 See: Media Sustainability Index 2012: The Development of Sustainable Independent Media in Europe and Eurasia, p. 289. 27 G. Toralieva, interview, 15 May, 2012, Bishkek. 28 Z. Kubonych, interview, 15 May, 2012, Bishkek. 29 E. Karakulova, interview, 14 May, 2012, Bishkek.

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time. Everything repeats and repeats. There is a political crisis … There are situations when journalists send articles to make sure someone is looking good. This is public relations, not journalism.” 30 What follows are observations by the interviewees on key elements of the mass media environment during the study period.

Legal and Extra-Legal Constraints Constraints on press freedom can come from multiple sources, including national, regional, and local public officials and bureaucrats; individual politicians; political parties; and businesses, NGOs, and other entities with actual or perceived power. Media owners also may limit what their staffs are allowed to print or broadcast for economic, political, or personal reasons. Constraints can be highly visible, such as statutes, libel suits, criminal charges, and physical attacks. They can be more subtle, such as harassment, tax audits, license denials, and pressure on advertisers. Self-censorship also represents a significant obstacle to independent reporting. Asked about the dangers that reporters and editors face in Kyrgyzstan, a leader of the Public Association “Journalists” replied, “In this field we got used to working in extreme situations.”31 A journalist for an international news organization said, “The mass media in our country is honorable and respectable but some people don’t obey the rules of the country and threaten me or beat me.” 32 Interviewees repeatedly pointed to three incidents in particular to illustrate the point. One is the government’s blocking of the Moscow-based Ferghana News website.33 A second is the conviction in absentia of the former owners of two Uzbek-language television stations in Osh on contrived charges of stirring up ethnic tensions. Dzhavlon Mirzakhodzhaev of Mezon TV and Khalil Khudaiberdiev of Osh TV chose self-exile rather than face long prison terms; the trial took place between the presidential election and Atambaev taking office.34 The third is the conviction of ethnic Russian journalist Vladimir Farafonov on charges of fueling racial hatred under a law that bans incitement of “national, racial, religious, or interregional enmity.”35 He was fined 50,000 som (about U.S. $1,100), but the court rejected a prosecution request for a prison term.36 The Farafonov case in particular tested the limits of government tolerance for unpopular and potentially volatile journalism. It is easy to understand the strong reaction generated among the majority population when he wrote in the newspaper Bely Parus “that only 20 percent of ethnic Kyrgyz are ‘modern humans,’ while 80 percent are ‘stupidly stuck in the Asian middle ages.’”37 As news story by an international news outlet put it, “While few disagree that Farafonov’s articles include Anonymous 2, interview, 18 May, 2012, Osh. B. Ibraimov, interview, 18 May, 202, Osh. 32 Anonymous 1, Interview, 16, May, 2012, Osh. 33 For background, see: “Kyrgyzstan: News Agency Sues Government Over ‘Illegal’ Ban,” EurasiaNet, available at [http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66292], 12 December, 2012. 34 For background, see: “Two Media Owners Sentenced in Absentia,” IFEX, available at [http://ifex.org/ kyrgyzstan/2011/11/16/media_owners_sentenced_absentia], 16 November 2011. 35 For background, see: D. Trilling “Kyrgyzstan: `Political Reporting is Not a Crime’—Watchdog,” EurasiaNet, available at [http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65067], 1 March, 2012. 36 See: A. Muratbekov, “Kyrgyzstan: Caught between Nationalists, Court Fines Journalist,” Global Voices Online, available at [http://globalvoicesonline.org/2012/07/10/kyrgyzstan-caught-between-nationalists-court-fines-journalist], 10 July, 2012. 37 Quoted from: C. Rickleton, “Kyrgyzstan: Prosecution of Russian Journalist Tests Ethnic Enmity Laws,” EurasiaNet, available at [http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65130], 14 March, 2012. 30 31

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distasteful and offensive anti-Kyrgyz slurs, the case offers a fairness test for Kyrgyzstan’s justice system: amid a rise in nationalist rhetoric since the ethnic violence between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in June 2010, no ethnic Kyrgyz have stood before a court on a charge comparable to that faced by Farafonov.”38 And a Western media analyst in Bishkek said, “Cases like that are tough. It’s a great way to provoke ethnic hate, but still you are prosecuting journalists.”39 Among additional incidents, there was a libel suit against the online news outlet 24.kg and unsuccessful pressure on a Vecherniy Bishkek editor to leave the country for writing about the conflict in the South. “The National Commission on the State Language under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic considered that this article offended [the] feelings of Kyrgyz people, saying that Dina [Maslova] had mentioned in the article that only people with a narrow mind don’t respect other nationalities... Members of the Commission contacted Dina and said that this is offensive. Then Dina published another article saying that Commission people collected signatures to declare Dina persona non grata to make her leave the country.”40 To illustrate the subtle pressure that influential policy-shapers can exert on the press, a Russian diplomat warned a radio journalist against pursuing a story about the U.S. military base in Kyrgyzstan, saying such coverage could damage relations between Russia and Kyrgyzstan. The journalist quoted the diplomat as saying, “This is a big game. You should keep out.” That remark was made “in a good way,” the journalist recollected, and the diplomat did not demand deletion of the story “but encouraged me to be more careful in the future. Of course it didn’t stop me. It irritated me the way they talked to me.”41

Lack of Access to Information and Officials Difficulty in obtaining information from government agencies and officials, as well as from nonofficial sources, remains a serious impediment to effective reporting. While the Atambaev administration has made efforts to improve transparency, “the government changes but they’re all the same players,” a media analyst says of ministry staffs. “All the same people are behind the windows. They still have a very strong obstructionist perspective ... [that is] adversarial to the press.” 42 Access to official information may be more difficult away from the capital than it is for journalists in Bishkek. A young reporter at Yntymak radio in Osh observed, “It’s really problematic for us to get information from government or officials,” depending on the “popularity of the news organization” and of the individual reporter.43 A newspaper journalist with Osh Shamy (Candle of Osh) said, “Society is not open for giving interviews about the problems we have... There is a mentality in Osh: They care about the opinions and ideas of other people—what they’ll say about him.” In addition, he said that bureaucratic procedures can be slow. For example, municipal officials solicited for interviews about HIV/AIDS must call the mayor and Bishkek for permission to speak to the press. “It’s a long process and takes a lot of time.”44 The coordinator of the Osh Media Resource Center complained that journalists have received a “porridge” or “mixture” of accurate and untrue information, especially after the June 2010 ethnic violence.45 Ibidem. F. Styers, interview, 14 May, 2012, Bishkek. 40 G. Toralieva, email to author, 26 February, 2013. 41 Z. Kubonych, interview, 15 May, 2012, Bishkek. 42 F. Styers, interview, 14 May, 2012, Bishkek. 43 Roundtable at Yntymak Radio, 17 May, 2012, Osh. 44 T. Aidakunov, interview, 18 May, 2012, Osh. 45 A. Pyatibratova, interview, Osh, 17 May, 2012. 38 39

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Opaque Ownership and Lack of Economic Sustainability As T. Hanitzch and R. Berganza observed, “Journalists do not operate in a vacuum but within highly organized contexts, most notably the newsroom, and media organization. Especially ownership has long been established as a major, if not the most important factor that shapes news production at the organizational level.”46 Thus the media ownership situation in Kyrgyzstan is particularly troubling as an obstacle to press independence. “Every parliamentarian, every party, every political organization has its own paper or a paper under their influence,” while ownership of media outlets is opaque because it is often masked under the names of joint stock companies. “Outright agendas are visible through the content,” a media analyst said.47 “Politicians, to express their political opinions and approaches, create a newspaper for two or three issues,” a press rights activist said.48 “Politicians have their own newspapers so it divides into the politician’s private theme,” meaning they reflect the owners’ political positions and interests. “Those journalists are also divided” because their own work, therefore, must reflect the same political positions and interests. “Journalists for those newspapers try to write good things for their chief.”49 A civil society NGO official said, “The issue of media ownership remains unresolved in the state and so-called ‘independent’ media but everyone knows who owns them.” She noted the absence of a rating system for television stations and the lack of transparent and verifiable circulation figures for newspapers. In her view, it will take time before advertising income proves sufficient to sustain media outlets; she predicted that within a decade, some newspapers will be owned by larger companies with investors and will survive on ad revenue.50 The lack of economic viability of news outlets is closely related to questions about ownership. The consensus is that nonstate media outlets in the country are not financially profitable—with the possible exception of Vecherniy Bishkek—but that owners profit in other ways, namely public relations value and political influence. Among independent newspapers, only Vecherniy Bishkek is currently sustainable, according to a media analyst, who cautions that such status will “evaporate … because it makes all its money from classified ads, and people are turning instead to the website Diesel.kg for online classified ads. The country has only about ten major advertisers, such as banks, beverage companies, and telecommunications companies,” he said, adding, “The ad market will take years to develop.”51

Journalism Skills and Ethics Many interviewees criticized the skill levels, ethics, or both of journalists. For example, an editor with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty cited “a lack of qualified journalists on the ground,” with the exception of those working for international news organizations such as RFE/RL and the British Broadcasting Corporation. “Even state TV channels, when they do report on these [controversial] issues have very loose reporting.”52 He attributed the frequency of bribes to low salaries, saying journalists at regional media outlets may earn only US $100-$150 a month and in Bishkek US $300-$500 a month, 46 See: T. Hanitzch, R. Berganza, “Explaining Journalists’ Trust in Public Institutions across 20 Countries: Media Freedom, Corruption, and Ownership Matter Most,” Journal of Communication, Vol. 62, No. 5, 2012, pp. 794-814. 47 F. Styers, interview, 14 May, 2012, Bishkek. 48 B. Ibraimov, interview, 18 May, 202, Osh. 49 Roundtable at Yntymak Radio, 17 May, 2012, Osh. 50 E. Karakulova, interview, 14 May, 2012, Bishkek. 51 F. Styers, interview, 14 May, 2012, Bishkek. 52 T. Umaraliev, interview, Bishkek, 14 May, 2012.

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“depending on professional level,” although international news organizations pay more. “Therefore,” he continued,” they easily accept bribes or material goods.”53 The director of the Osh Media Resource Center said journalism students do not get basic knowledge of how to organize stories, what the law and ethics require, the structure of government, or an understanding of the consequences of their stories. And when new journalists join a media organization, “the organization has no editing rules or specific policies to follow… Here they’re told where to go, who to meet, what to write, the results in advance.”54 In addition, the most talented university students are increasingly likely to seek jobs in public relations or with international NGOs rather than journalism because they are not satisfied with opportunities and salaries at local media outlets.55 One journalist put it bluntly, saying: “Young people don’t want it,” citing salaries that are too low to support a family and the possibility of physical assault or death.56 Yet a more optimistic young reporter at Yntymak Radio said, “Every journalist has to have a dream to be in a higher position, to grow in the job.”57

Decline of Uzbek-Language Media The ethnic violence of June 2010 in southern Kyrgyzstan remains one of the most destructive impediments to development of independent and reliable mass media. In addition to seizure of Osh’s two Uzbek-language television stations during the interim Otunbaeva administration, many ethnic Uzbek journalists have moved from the South to Bishkek or left Kyrgyzstan for other countries. Ethnic Kyrgyz also took over two Uzbek-language newspapers. “Uzbek-language media were completely wiped out of the media landscape, with only one 1,000-circulation newspaper left in the South, but it is state-funded and “on the brink of survival,” according to a civil society NGO official. “Television is even worse.”58 EurasiaNet reported that three municipalities in the South publish Uzbeklanguage weekly newspapers, all with low circulation.59 It also called Yntymak Radio “perhaps the brightest hope for an Uzbek-language revival in mass media.”60

Further Findings: Cumulative Effects on News Coverage Collectively, these factors play out in two visible, interrelated ways: avoidance of controversial topics in news coverage, such as ethnic conflict, and a dearth of investigative reporting. In a comprehensive overview of international media coverage of ethnic conflicts, Murad Esenov discusses both the essential role of such coverage and how partisan journalism may fuel the fires of violence, as some analysts say it did in Chechnia and in the June 2010 events in Kyrgyzstan. On the first point, he wrote, “By offering the broad public information on this subject, the media not only inform people, but also generate mass ideas and moods with respect to ethnic relations. This makes the way the media presents and interprets the ethnic life of different peoples extremely Ibidem. M. Aitieva, interview, Bishkek, 15 May, 2012. 55 G. Toralieva, interview, 15 May, 2012, Bishkek. 56 Anonymous 1, Interview, 16, May, 2012, Osh. 57 Roundtable at Yntymak Radio, 17 May, 2012, Osh. 58 E. Karakulova, interview, 14 May, 2012, Bishkek. 59 See: “Kyrgyzstan: Language and Media Still Sensitive Subjects in Southern Regions,” EurasiaNet, available at [http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66068], 18 October, 2012. 60 See: Ibidem. 53 54

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important.”61 On the second point, he cited an analysis by D. Atykanova of newspaper coverage during the 2010 ethnic conflict. “She comes to the conclusion that many articles on ethnic issues published during this period were of an outraged and accusatory nature with respect to a particular ethnicity and so promoted aggravation of the conflict.”62 In an interview after his conviction in absentia, the self-exiled former owner of Osh TV discussed the ethnic situation in terms of media professionalism. He said a growth in nationalism during the Bakiev regime escalated after the uprising, including “pogroms” against ethnic Kurds and Turks in villages near Bishkek in spring 2010. He continued: “It was during this time that rumors of interethnic strife started to disseminate in southern Kyrgyzstan where Bakiev initially fled after the coup. Osh TV journalists went to investigate those reports, and found that local small-scale conflicts happening at the time were about access to power, not ethnicity of the residents. But the post-coup tensions continued to stir rumors of ethnic violence. Realizing the role and influence news media had, we, the journalists, tried to defuse those rumors by calling the developments by their real names. And when we learned of a May 2010 protest rally in Jalal-Abad, led by Kadyrzhan Batyrov, an informal leader of the ethnic Uzbek community, and Bektur Asanov, regional governor and ethnic Kyrgyz, we immediately decided to broadcast it. We understood that cohosting of the rally by the leaders of two ethnic groups was good material for neutralizing those rumors, and we aired it. We continued our broadcasts—five news reports a day—until June 11, 2010, the day the conflict started, and the day when the Osh mayor, Melis Myrzakmatov, ordered us to cease broadcasting.”63 In fact, ethnic Uzbeks accounted for more than 80 percent of suspects arrested on violence-related charges in June 2010 although they made up more than 70 percent of the casualties.64 News organizations do not directly address the issue of ethnic tensions, perhaps from fear or because there is “no economic necessity to promote a multilingual society,” said a civil society NGO official. “It comes back to ownership: If the media depended on ratings, they would fight for each and every reader and each and every viewer.”65 The coordinator of the Osh Media Resource Center observed. “It’s not popular to write about issues covering nationalities.”66 On another controversial topic regarded as largely off-limits, the official of the Public Association “Journalists” said. “It’s really dangerous to cover corruption issues connected with politicians,” adding that “responsible journalists” need sources of balanced and accurate information—sources not easily available in Kyrgyzstan.67 That corruption remains a serious concern is not in doubt. The latest Transparency International report on perceptions of public corruption ranked Kyrgyzstan in the 13th percentile among 154 countries; it scored twenty-four of 100 possible points on scale where 0 means “perceived to be highly corrupt” and 100 means “perceived to be very clean.”68 In July 2012, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights identified corruption as an obstacle to the rule of law and human rights.69 Individual incidents reported during the first year of Atambaev’s administration illus61 See: M. Esenov, “The Role of the Media in Covering Ethnic Issues,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 13, Issue 2, 2012, p. 7. 62 See: Ibid., p. 8. 63 See: M. Suleymanov, “Q & A: Khudaiberdiyev on Kyrgyz Trial, Press Freedom,” Committee to Protect Journalists, available at [http://www.cpj.org/blog/2011/12/q-a-khudaiberdiyev-on-kyrgyzstan-trial-press-freed.php], 1 December, 2011. 64 See: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011: Kyrgyz Republic, U.S. Department of State, available at [http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186678.pdf]. 65 E. Karakulova, interview, 14 May, 2012, Bishkek. 66 A. Pyatibratova, interview, Osh, 17 May, 2012. 67 B. Ibraimov, interview, 18 May, 202, Osh. 68 See: “Corruption Perceptions Index 2012,” Transparency International, available at [http://www.transparency.org/ country#KGZ], 5 December, 2012. 69 See: S.U. Kim, “UN Rights Chief Urges Kyrgyzstan to Address Corruption, Discrimination,” Jurist, available at [http:// jurist.org/paperchase/2012/07/un-rights-chief-urges-kyrgyzstan-to-address-corruption-discrimination.php], 10 July, 2012.

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trate the continuation of corruption and reinforce the need for a vigilant, aggressive, and independent press to report about it. For example in June 2012, a parliamentary opposition deputy who had been mayor of Bishkek was arrested, and the next month, authorities charged the Minister of Social Development with trying to extort payments from an international adoption agency. 70 In November, a senior Energy Ministry official in Kyrgyzstan was arrested on charges of abusing her government position, forgery, and fraud for allegedly issuing a license to a shell company that bought energy at reduced prices and resold it at artificially inflated rates to consumers.71 As for investigative stories, a civil society NGO official said, “The media ownership system has to change… Ownership is an obstacle to investigative reporting. Journalists face policies and politics on the newsroom which are in line with the owners’” but not spoken aloud.72 In other words, close economic and political alliances between individual politicians and parties on the one side and media owners on the other erect barriers to independent reporting and presentation of news and analysis. That plays out in three principal ways: First, reporters and editors are discouraged or prohibited from pursuing possible stories that would embarrass their news outlets’ benefactors and sponsors or would jeopardize the financial support provided to the press organization. Second, reporters and editors are ordered to dig up dirt on their benefactors’ and sponsors’ opponents, including rumor and innuendo. Third, such evident lack of fairness and independence endangers public trust in the press as a civil society institution committed to transparency and accountability of government and other institutions of power and influence.

Conclusions The press rights situation in Kyrgyzstan should be placed in the context of wider abuses of individual and political rights during the same twelve months. Human rights violations reported during the study period fall into such categories as:  Religious

rights: Law enforcement and other government agencies failed “to stop or even appear sympathetic to violent attacks on people exercising freedom of religion or belief,” including arson attacks on a Jehovah’s Witness Kingdom Hall in Jalal-Abad region and attacks on Protestants in Naryn region.73



Prisoner rights: The human rights group Spravedlivost (Justice) reported that police beat detainees at a temporary detention facility in Jalal-Abad on 6 November. In some cases the police stripped and humiliated them while searching for mobile phones and other “contraband.”74



Disability rights: The government has not yet ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, preventing most special-needs children from greater educational opportunities.75

It is also essential to understand that press rights are not established merely to protect journalists and media companies. Instead, press rights are a cornerstone of transparent and responsive demo70 See: C. Rickleton, “Kyrgyzstan: Is Corruption Controversy and Sign of Political Trouble Ahead?” EurasiaNet, available at [http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65715], 26 July, 2012. 71 See: A. Sultankulova, “Kyrgyzstan Energy Official Faces Corruption Charges,” RIA Novosti, available at [http:// en.rian.ru/news/20121112/177388448.html], 12 November, 2012. 72 E. Karakulova, interview, 14 May, 2012, Bishkek. 73 See: M. Bayram, “Kyrgyzstan: We Need to Protect the Rights of the Majority,” Forum 18 News Service, available at [http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1712], 15 June, 2012. 74 See: “Kyrgyzstan: Investigate, Prosecute Police Abuse,” Statement, Human Rights Watch, available at [http://www. hrw.org/news/2012/11/14/kyrgyzstan-investigate-prosecute-police-abuse ], 14 November, 2012. 75 See: “Kyrgyzstan: Schools Wrestle with Equal Access Issue,” EurasiaNet.org, available at [http://www.eurasianet. org/node/66102], 24 October, 2012.

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cratic governance. Infringement on those rights impairs the ability of a country to empower its citizenry to make informed decisions about public policies and officials. It is easy to see how this study’s findings on impediments to access to information fit J.E. Relly’s observation about the interconnection between access to information and freedom of expression, a relationship that scholars consider “inseparable because of the press’ critical role in monitoring information about government activity… Democratic theory suggests that a free news media and access to public information are associated with an informed electorate in what ultimately constitutes a feedback loop to government…This model is based on the assumption that citizens will access government-held information on their own or through news media monitoring and ultimately hold government accountable through free and fair elections.”76 So what is the Atambaev government’s current commitment to press freedom? As the Public Association “Journalists” representative put it, “If the government was transparent without darkness, why are they afraid of sites like Ferghana.ru?”77 A media analyst observed that even good journalists “are always subservient to some editor who is answerable to someone else. There’s always a political agenda.” Even so, the analyst said that research shows that trust in the press remains “fairly strong,” and although “people may have lots of complaints, they want to see Kyrgyzstan framed well in the media.”78 Yet the director of the Osh Media Resource Center adds, “No one trusts media owned by the government.”79 Accounts by individual journalists and media experts confirm the analysis of press rights advocates that promises of press freedom were not fulfilled during Atambaev’s first year in office. They also support the assessment that progress toward that goal will be neither swift nor smooth although advocacy for change will continue. Questions remain about the willingness of the still-young presidential administration and the constitutionally more powerful Jogorku Kengesh to adopt legislation, policies, and governmental practices that respect and safeguard press rights. Even if the national government undertakes press protection initiatives as a priority, however, the willingness of local officials to follow remains in doubt. Uncertainty also continues about the degree of support for press rights among the citizens, the courage of media owners to challenge official and quasi-official restrictions, and the financial viability of independent press outlets that are not subservient or beholden to government, political parties, or individual politicians. It is important for researchers to go beyond official statements and reports to inquire of working journalists what the actual press freedom situation is and how it affects their ability to perform their professional duties. Negative effects such as self-censorship, bribe-taking, conflicts of interest, threats, and harassment impair the ability to build public trust in the ethics and credibility of the press and the ability of the press to serve as a foundational institution in a democratic society with effective avenues for citizen participation and protection of individual and political rights. In addition, the attitudes, perceptions, and practices of journalism educators also are important subjects of research inquiry because their students are the country’s future journalists and professional communicators. The final question then becomes: What is the prognosis for press freedom five years from now? “Events in Kyrgyzstan tell us not to plan the future. I can’t say anything about the future,” responds the coordinator of the Osh Media Resource Center.”80 76 See: J.E. Relly, “Do Journalists Have Information Access? Exploring News Media Freedom and Colonial Heritage in 42 Nations,” Paper presented to the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, 2010. 77 B. Ibraimov, interview, 18 May, 202, Osh. 78 F. Styers, interview, 14 May, 2012, Bishkek. 79 M. Aitieva, interview, Bishkek, 15 May, 2012. 80 A. Pyatibratova, interview, Osh, 17 May, 2012.

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REGIONAL ECONOMIES

INFLUENCE OF THE SHADOW ECONOMY ON THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF KAZAKHSTAN Murat LAUMULIN D.Sc. (Political Science), Research Fellow at the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

T

ABSTRACT

his article examines the phenomenon of the shadow (hidden) economy and its influence on Kazakhstan’s financial and economic development and security. The republic’s statistical bodies often use the term “non-observed economy,” which implies hidden, unaccounted, informal, and illegal economic activity. Non-observed economic activity includes the production of goods and services, as well as the illegal redistribution of revenue and as-

sets. Based on how widespread shadow and corruption processes are and on the current level of Kazakhstan’s economic development, it can be concluded that when pursuing a policy to combat the shadow economy, attention should be placed not so much on reducing its scope as on raising the efficiency of the entire governance system. Furthermore, the state should play a leading role in managing socioeconomic processes.

KEYWORDS: Kazakhstan, shadow economy, economic security, corruption, trade, markets. 157



Introduction The shadow economy is a widespread phenomenon today, affecting even developed countries, although states with a transition economy are more susceptible to the influence of this phenomenon. In some countries, the shadow economy is larger than the formal sector.1 The criminal sector is a segment of the shadow economy. So, in some cases, its existence can threaten not only normal functioning of the legal economy, but also the national security of the state. In this respect, an analysis and study of this phenomenon is extremely pertinent for Kazakhstan. The shadow economy can be defined in general as the sum-total of economic relations among the various entities of public production that run counter to legal regulations and formal rules of economic management; for one reason or another their results are not (or cannot be) calculated by official statistics and are not taxed. In other words, in order to obtain vast material wealth in a short time with minimum investment and effort, economic entities establish certain informal relations that are called shadow.

The Shadow Economy in Kazakhstan: Its Scope and How It Functions According to official statistics, in 2008, Kazakhstan’s shadow economy amounted to 3.13 trillion tenge or more than $20 billion. According to certain government estimates, the share of the shadow economy in Kazakhstan over the past ten years dropped from 30% to 20% of the GDP and amounted to 5 trillion tenge. According to other estimates, by 2012, the volume of the shadow sector of the republic’s economy amounted to between 40% and 70%.2 Such a significant difference in figures draws us to conclude that there are neither reliable statistics on the scope of the shadow economy and its structure, nor are there tools and methods for estimating them. According to official statistics, the size of the self-employed population among the total employed amounts to around 2.3 million people (according to other data—2.7 million people, or 32.8% of the economically active population). According to the data for 2008, trade, the restaurant business, catering, recruiting agencies, car, household appliance and personal item repairs, real estate transactions, as well as rental and rendering of services to consumers accounted for the largest share in the total volume of the non-observed economy, each segment amounting to 3.5%. Agriculture and forestry, fishing and fish breeding accounted for 3.2% each, while construction reached around 2.8% (including road building). It is known that large amounts of cash largely circulate in trade, real estate transactions, and different types of small and medium business services. Furthermore, a large amount of trade carried out at bazaars and city markets goes unaccounted.3 Today no one knows for sure how many people are employed in trade markets and their service sphere. According to official data, there are as many as 180,000 merchants working at these markets, 1 See, for example: A. Singh, S. Jain-Chandra, “Out of the Shadows,” Finance and Development, Vol. 49, No. 2, June 2012, available at [http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/06/singh.htm]. 2 For comparison, according to the World Bank, this figure in Russia was 41%-42%. 3 See: O deiatelnosti rynkov v Respublike Kazakhstan, RK Statistics Agency, Astana, 2012, pp. 1-10.

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while the unofficial figures say this number is several times higher. The problem is that it is impossible to draw up an efficient state policy in this sphere without real statistics.4 According to researchers from the World Bank, some data indicate that indirect employment is several times higher than direct. For example, different sources in Kazakhstan say that the total direct and indirect employment at the Flea Market in Almaty alone is around 250,000 people (estimates of 2006-2008), which is five times higher than the number of merchants operating the sales outlets and the administrative personnel of the bazaars. The economic reforms have given rise to a growing and contradictory labor market. Many restrictions existing in the planned economy have been removed (on unemployment, on holding more than one job, on additional part-time employment, and so on), which has made the employment sphere more flexible and dynamic. But this has led to an increase in such shadow phenomena as working without the corresponding registration, side jobs using the enterprise’s property, fictitious employment, and so on. This has led to informal employment, where neither labor nor civil law contracts are entered. Today the structure of the informal sector of the labor market is extremely diverse. In particular, skilled and sufficiently well-paid work (private lessons, medical services, car repair, construction, road repair work, recruiting, and so on) and unskilled work (shuttle trade, janitorial work, and so on) can be singled out. In order to regulate labor migration and the internal labor market, the government sets annual quotas for foreign workers. But practice shows that corruption and the absence of necessary control over migration flows is reducing the government’s efforts to zero. All of the above-mentioned factors together make it imperative to study the influence of the shadow economy on Kazakhstan’s economic development, particularly in light of the socioeconomic modernization policy declared by the state. An analysis of the essence, forms, content, and structure of the shadow economy in Kazakhstan will help to resolve the serious socioeconomic problems (corruption and economic inefficiency) and raise the republic to a new level of development. At present, the shadow economy in Kazakhstan consists of three levels.  The first level is occupied by self-employed people who have essentially dropped out of the

official social security system (including pension savings), which in the future could lead to serious problems for the state.

 The second level is occupied by small and medium business, which largely functions in the

so-called gray zone, on the border between the shadow and the legal economy.

The most dangerous is the third level, which is related to the shadow market of corruption services. The structure of goods in shadow trade should logically coincide with the overall inventory of products sold in retail trade (here individual deviations and specifics are possible); it is also influenced by the specialization of markets. The inefficiency and corrupt nature of Kazakhstan’s customs service encourage an increase in shadow trade. The unwieldy document registration system (official and unofficial) and laborious customs procedures prompt trade market agents to make use of gray systems or to engage directly in smuggling.5 4 See: Razvitie torgovli v RK: tendentsii i vliianie na makroekonomicheskie indikatory, Scientific-Research Institute of Economics and Information Technology of Transport and Telecommunications, Astana, 2011, 84 pp. 5 Results of Sociological Surveys Carried Out by the KACB/R between 2005 and November 2011, Kazakhstan Association of Customs Brokers, Almaty, 2012, pp. 1-7 (in Russian).

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So, according to the most cautious estimates, gray and smuggled goods total as much as $3 billion. At the same time, despite regular reform of the Kazakhstan Customs Committee (including the most recent), there are trends toward a drop in the republic’s legal goods turnover with such important trade partners as the PRC, Kyrgyzstan, and the Russian Federation. Small companies dispersed over large territories usually operate in the retail sphere and it is not easy to control them. It is difficult for the tax agencies to determine the income of these companies, since it comes directly from individual consumers. The high level of the informal economy is having a negative effect not only on the amount of taxes collected, but is also directly curbing the development of the social system. Furthermore, informal companies that do not pay taxes and violate legal regulations achieve a significant decrease in outlays. Losses related to the low productivity of labor and inadequate scope of production are covered by means of funds that are not tax-declared. This, in turn, distorts the competitive environment, since inefficient informal players remain in business and deprive more productive official companies of the opportunity to increase their share in the market. In the end, according to economists, the long-term negative effect of informal companies on economic growth and the rate at which new jobs are created prevails over any short-term gain (primarily job provision). At the regional level, Almaty ranks first in terms of trade volume, accounting for some 40% of Kazakhstan’s retail trade turnover.6 Almaty accounts for a large part of the illegal turnover of monetary resources, which form 25% of Kazakhstan’s GDP; furthermore, there are no large industrial or mining enterprises in the city.

Threats to Security of the Economy and Social Stability by the Shadow Economy In any country, an extremely large shadow sector is a direct threat to economic security. Despite the absence of special research studies, this problem is also urgent for Kazakhstan; according to official data, the size of the shadow economy in the country amounts to 20% to 30%, while according to unofficial data it reaches 40%-50%. There are no objective statistics relating to the labor market (for example, the presumed number of merchants fluctuates from between 180,000 and 2 million people) or to trade (both foreign and domestic) in Kazakhstan. This situation makes it impossible to give a precise definition of the social component of trade, small and medium business enterprises, or the volume and range of imported goods, as well as to carry out streamlined monitoring and price control of domestic- and foreignmanufactured goods. Measures are not being taken to fight customs corruption or the price excesses seen in wholesale and retail trade. This problem has several dangerous aspects for Kazakhstan. The extensive shadow economy indicates the existence of informal power centers in the form of organized crime, which often functions in cahoots with officials. The largest bazaars and wholesale markets either belong to representatives of various political groups or are patronized by them. The existence of alternative shadow centers of economic influence is fraught with the creation of tension zones in the political sphere too. These centers could either try to become political players 6 Retail and Wholesale Trade in the Republic of Kazakhstan. 2006-2010, Statistics Collection, Astana, 2011, pp. 1-12 (in Russian).

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or tools in the struggle for power. Keeping in mind that street trade produces enormous amounts of unaccounted-for cash, we can say that the country’s political stability is in danger. An example is the events that occurred in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. At that time, criminal authorities were actively in favor of a change in power; they supported one of the opposing sides, using not only their financial, but also human resources, including from the markets and bazaars. A large number of those employed in the shadow economy are self-employed people who have essentially dropped out of the official social security system (including the pension savings system). In the near future, this could lead to serious difficulties; the state will not only have to decide the future of people who at one time worked in the shadow economy, but also explain to citizens currently paying into the savings system why they have to pay the pensions of those who never made pension-related contributions. The shadow economy, strangely enough, has played the role of shock absorber and made it possible for many Kazakhstan citizens who lost their jobs at former Soviet state enterprises to keep their heads above water. However, as some specialists correctly note, although the shadow economy has helped people to survive, they have lost their former qualifications and, if markets are closed down, they will most likely find they are no longer in demand. Over the past 20 years, the population’s values have greatly changed in Kazakhstan; many believe that the shadow economy is normal for any society. And no matter what business or specific state structures do to bring the shadow economy out into the light, many will perceive this as a threat to their customary way of existence. Nor should we forget that the highest level of social vulnerability is seen precisely in trade, where more than 50% of the employed are self-employed and more than 70% are women and children. Consequently, the problem cannot be resolved by simply closing markets and bazaars to reduce the physical size of spontaneous and shadow trade. On the contrary, this might provoke new outbreaks of protest. Furthermore, as practice shows, it is easier for people to join together to protect their property rather than rally around amorphous political slogans. In addition to the existence of the shadow economy, the trends of recent years that point to the existence of two threatening negative processes are causing concern. First, the number of protest acts has increased in the country. Second, some protest groups have become more radical; their interests are being expressed by new political players who are not members of the traditional opposition. This all shows that both the government and Kazakhstan’s democratic opposition have competitors capable of influencing certain protest strata of the population. The paradox of the situation is that the government, while actively weakening the law-abiding opposition functioning inside the system, is essentially ignoring the resistance in the form of radical groups coming from outside the system. As a result, the government has a strategic initiative only with respect to law-abiding players. As for informal and shadow centers, they are actively taking the initiative upon themselves. The situation is complicated further by the fact that the presence of an extensive shadow sphere is helping to preserve the low level of political and legal culture (primarily among young people). In this context, we must draw attention to the growing trend in religiosity (and pseudo-religiosity) of the population. The matter primarily concerns the adherents of Islam who, incidentally, comprise an overwhelming number of market and bazaar owners, as well as those employed as merchants and service personnel. Furthermore, as practice shows, in recent years the Islamic factor has been playing a leading role in mobilizing radical groups. The increase in number of Kazakhstan citizens who genuinely and fervently confess radical Islam and their joining organizations that espouse violence as a way to achieve their goals means that ground is forming in the republic that could bring forth new opposition to the current regime. This opposition will have unlimited ability to expand its ranks and increase its influence on the population. 161



It must also be kept in mind that a large number of Kazakhstan citizens have suffered from the market reforms. This particularly applies to the rural areas where Islam is much more strongly entrenched than in the cities. Some socially unprotected residents of cities (particularly those without good prospects) looking for comfort in religion can be classified in this category. It is these social groups that comprise the bulk of market and bazaar workers (from among young people). Today it is evident that markets and bazaars not only present an opportunity (sometimes the only one) for young people from the villages to find jobs in the cities, they are also places for people to socialize and even live. The severe increase in the price of housing has made it essentially unaffordable for young people from the villages, particularly those from large families, the members of which are largely representatives of the titular ethnicity. Sooner or later this category of citizens will demand its place in the sun, raising the level of social protest far beyond its current bounds. The stability and systematic nature of the shadow activity existing in essentially all spheres of the economy shows that in recent years significant qualitative changes have occurred in its internal structure that cannot help but have an effect on public life. The shadow economy has essentially become institutionalized (shadow economic behavior has become enforced).

Structure of the Shadow Economy As mentioned above, the shadow economy in Kazakhstan is comprised of three levels. The third level consists of various gray economic schemes that prevent business from coming out of the shadows and constantly feed corruption in the power and administration bodies of Kazakhstan. The following circumstances promote an increase in the informal economy: (1) the government is unable to force companies to carry out their tax and other financial obligations; (2) it is too expensive for companies to function in the formal economy; (3) specific social regulations exist that “justify” deviation from participating in the formal economy; (4) certain officials of the power and administration bodies (particularly in the regions) are interested in preserving the shadow economy; (5) there are no precise and clear statistics relating to the labor market, foreign economic activity, and the functioning of city markets and bazaars; (6) legislation regulating wholesale and retail trade (both with respect to organizing markets and the status of employees, and with respect to tax collection from trade) leaves much to be desired and the government is exercising insufficient control over speculation. The government has essentially washed its hands of this problem, allowing the directors of markets and trade centers to resolve it instead. These circumstances are responsible for the shadow economy in Kazakhstan becoming not only an uncontrollable sector of public reproduction, but also a system of informal engagement with stable characteristics, among which are the following:  official  rules

entities play roles in the shadow economy;

of shadow behavior have developed;

 stable

types of shadow economic relations have formed between specific entities; 162



 new

types of organizations have appeared and are functioning within which and with the help of which entities carry out their shadow activities.

The existence of shadow institutions can be provisionally divided into two main groups. Institutions that have arisen within particular legal structures (political, legal, or economic) during the economic reforms belong to the first group; they include the following:  shadow

production of certain types of products;

 shadow

sales of products;

 untargeted

use of budget resources;

 conversion

into cash;

 shadow

revenue, including shadow wages;

 shadow

export-import operations;

 shadow

outflow of capital;

 shadow

investment;

 shadow

employment;

 shadow

payment of officials’ services, corruption, and so on.

All of these shadow institutions differ in terms of the functions they perform. This explains their multi-branch, multi-sectoral, and “penetrating” nature; in other words, they have wormed their way into all spheres of the economy and social system. Shadow institutions that have arisen spontaneously belong to the second group. They appeared outside any previously existing legal economic organizations, which is shown by the way they are described: “criminal protection racket,” “ganging up,” “kickback,” and so on. The main reason for the low efficiency of the measures taken by the country’s government to reduce the size of the shadow economy is the fact that it has acquired a system-forming nature.

Social-legal Aspects of the Problem As research shows, during the past 10 years, markets and bazaars have become a permanent job site for a large part of the population represented by different ethnic groups. In so doing, in spite of the rather difficult working conditions (particularly in the winter), a large number of merchants have no intention of changing their type of activity in the near future. Just as important is the fact that the number of young people working at the markets and bazaars has increased over the past 10 years. Research shows that the market (including wholesale), which has become home to many young people, is absorbing more than 50% of the merchants and approximately half of them are under the age of 25. Market merchants usually have large families. Almost all of their members are also employed at markets or provide services for their family members who work there. This increases the potential protest mass 3-5-fold, including by means of young people and pensioners. Just as important is that each in any way significant market or bazaar has high-ranking people behind it (employees of the akimats, court, prosecutor’s office, police, numerous auditors and representatives of licensing agencies) who also enjoy the same feeding trough. So closing markets down is in no way in the interests of high-ranking officials, although it is possible that a not entirely honest competitive struggle may be going on among them for a place in the sun. So a conflict of interests is inevitable however you look at it. 163



As the largest tax payers, bazaars not only essentially define the cost of basic goods and services, but are also considered a place where public opinion is formed. Suffice it to say that it is here that propaganda literature of the banned Islamic party Hizb ut-Tahrir can most frequently be found. There are problems that concern both industry associations and market players today. For example, the representatives of industry associations and market leaders draw attention to the following factors:  the vagueness of trade legislation (regulations are scattered throughout different legal acts);  the absence of contemporary terminology and classification of trade formats (supermarkets,

hypermarkets, discounters, A-, B-, C-class stores) and catering establishments in regulatory legal acts. Consequently, the absence of approved terminology gives rise to a low quality of statistical information, which is making it difficult to improve the trade legislation;

 interest

on the part of officials (particularly in the regions) in preserving gray schemes in trade, as well as lack of transparency in the functioning of city markets and bazaars;

 the

absence of established statistics on the sale of goods and services; not only do we not know what we are transporting and what we are producing, we do not know how much and at what price it is all being sold;

 insufficient

qualified specialists.7

As for commercial workers, their complaints boil down to the following:  high

rental fees that are raised according to the arbitrary decisions of market directors regardless of the state of the economy;

 control

over markets by organized crime groups related to market directors and officials in the power and administration bodies;

 unbearable  absence

working conditions for renters;

of the necessary services on the part of the market administration;

 problems

relating to servicing and registering individual cash registers, patents, declarations, and so on;

 the large number of thieves

and pickpockets at markets and bazaars, police quiescence and willingness to carry out investigations only with the participation of buddies from the organized crime group patronizing the particular market;

 difficulties  distant

goods;

in reaching the grounds adjacent to markets and the impossibility of parking;

location of storehouses, high price of customs clearance, and irregular receipt of

 the

presence of illegal workers (which may be to the benefit of the merchants themselves: cheaper workforce, on the one hand, its frequent turnover, on the other);

 lack

of interest by the market administration in creating optimal conditions for merchants and buyers.

According to the data of the research carried out, most merchants would like to work legally. However, hardly anyone believes in a radiant future and “will not believe in it until the government begins taking real steps aimed at improving working conditions and putting pressure on bazaar directors, until it begins making sure that tax assignations reach the country’s budget, however not in the 7

Staff problems in the trade sector are typical of most non-finance and non-raw material branches.

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way it is happening now, but in a dramatically new way that takes into account the interests of both sides and is mutual, and until there is a clear picture regarding the border and ways of delivering (both legally and illegally) freight.”8 The study showed that city markets and bazaars are essentially monopolized by their owners, while there is a permanent contingent of merchants working at them and agents servicing them. In order to overcome the above-mentioned problems, the government must form corresponding conditions, as well as have an adequate understanding of the processes taking place in the internal consumer market of Kazakhstan. Unfortunately, neither the first nor the second is occurring today. The state must change its system of relations and priorities in certain branches of the economy, re-examine the game rules in the market, create a reliable control system over price formation, and step up efforts to combat speculation. Furthermore, it must begin by drawing up a new economic policy, the main priority of which will not be developing trade and the service market, but organizing domestic goods production that fully satisfies internal demand (with respect to amount, diversity, quality, and affordable price of produced goods).

Conclusion World experience and development trends in trade in Kazakhstan show that if the economic situation deteriorates trade will move again from the stores to the markets (as well as from expensive and well-equipped markets to cheaper ones). Moreover, the level of bank lending and investment appeal of commercial real estate, which has not entirely recovered, could drop once more. It is possible that in trade, just as in the banking sector, the state will have to adopt the so-called counter-cyclical regulation principle. It presumes a weakening of state regulation in the event the economic situation deteriorates, while, on the contrary, when the economy begins to recover, regulation toughens up (new progressive demands are introduced with respect to modernization, and so on). (1) With respect to small business enterprises that have found a way to hide their income, the so-called motion and time study used by tax bodies with respect to different types of business, for example, beauty parlors, car washes, catering outlets, flower stands, and entertainment establishments, is rather interesting. This method boils down to the following: a tax committee employee comes to audit a facility with a pen and notebook and calculates the time in which and how many customers were served, determines whether a cash receipt was issued, how many people are on the staff, and so on. Based on these data, it is not difficult to calculate approximately how much revenue escaped taxation. It may make sense to adopt this method with respect to city markets and bazaars, particularly since merchants themselves are in favor of having an akimat representative at every market not only to carry out permanent monitoring of its activity and keep tabs on the situation, but also examine specific questions, requests, and proposals. (2) Another method for identifying companies and enterprises working in the shadows is cameral control, that is, an audit based on data presented by taxpayers themselves (in this case, if the indicated amounts do not coincide, this gives impetus to carry out a more thorough inspection). For example, in 2011, use of the cameral control method ensured that more than 2,000 taxpayers paid an additional 35 billion tenge into the budget. 8

Torgovye rynki Kazakhstana: sovremennaia situatsia i problemy modernizatsii, Almaty, 2012, p. 36.

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(3) Full-fledged statistical accounting and monitoring of market activity and the entire infrastructure accompanying it must be organized, beginning from the moment goods cross the customs border and ending in their sale. The main problem that prevents an adequate policy from being developed and implemented with respect to city markets is the absence of full-fledged statistics regarding the inventory and origin of the goods being traded, the difference between the prices declared at customs and those asked at wholesale markets and directly in the local stores, as well as regarding the social-psychological, gender-age, and other characteristics of the people employed in this sphere. (4) Legislation must be improved in retail trade (including with respect to regulating production and other relations between merchants and the market administration) and strict control must be exerted over the amount of rent, price formation, and quality of products being sold. Rent conditions and trade markup must also be legislatively regulated and speculation, as well as unjustified trade markup and fees imposed on merchants by the market administration, strictly intercepted (within the law). (5) The mechanism of state-private partnership must be put into wider practice. For example, the state could assume obligations for granting plots of land, ready market projects, and providing engineering infrastructure. As for expenses on building and supplying with trade equipment, they will be assumed by private companies or market owners themselves. (6) Investment preferences must be ensured for building large trade facilities with a total area of more than 2,000 sq. m. (7) Wholesale markets must be given the opportunity to receive loans at a subsidized compensation rate for replenishing current capital when circulating the products of agricultural consumer cooperatives. This will make it possible to integrate wholesale markets with consumer cooperatives. (8) Wholesale centers of agricultural products must be created (in correlation with trade logistic centers) in the regions of Kazakhstan. The policy of issuing privileged loans to agricultural producers should be continued. Furthermore, issuing loans should exclude the current practice of “kickback.” Emphasis should be placed on reducing the net cost of products manufactured with a simultaneous increase in their quality, increase in labor productivity and profitability of production, as well as the use of modern technology. (9) With respect to fighting shadow circulation, reformatting small wholesale markets looks extremely promising. In addition to the high quality of services and goods, modern formats ensure large amounts of purchases and stable prices. This will ultimately make it disadvantageous for middlemen who do not have guaranteed delivery channels, documents for the goods, and use gray taxation schemes to work with large trade networks. (10) Another effective measure for developing modern trade formats is state support of reconstruction projects of trade markets and their transformation into capital facilities with the corresponding service infrastructure. Local power bodies could issue market owners targeted interest-free or preferred loans. (11) It would be very worth while looking at the question of granting subsidies to cover interest on loans from second-tier banks when building stationary trade markets (capital facilities) and storehouses, and purchasing the necessary transportation. (12) It may make sense, in cooperation with the akimats, to examine the question of implementing a model market project. Development of the project for such a market and its 166



building should be carried out by the akimat, after which it could be put up for sale at an open tender. Implementation of the above-mentioned measures will make it possible to significantly lower the likelihood of negative socioeconomic scenarios developing when transforming city markets. The struggle with shadow circulation should begin with collecting VAT in retail trade; this will make it possible for the akimats to obtain data on the income of informal suppliers and related branches, and, consequently, increase and toughen control over the observation of the law. Taxes must also be simplified for small and medium business. This will make it possible for the state to decrease the share of the shadow business; in the future it may be possible to eliminate corporate income tax, which is difficult to calculate, and replace it with transaction tax. Only large transactions (starting at $100,000, for example) could be charged with such tax. Moreover, the problem of envelope wages, which is still a way to move money into the shadows, must also be resolved. Practice shows that at least 31% in tax should be deducted from a worker’s salary (10% individual income tax, 10% into the pension fund, and 11% social profits tax). This figure should also be minimized, without affecting pension assignations in so doing. Electronic trade should also be improved today. According to specialists, the primary task in this area is introducing electronic invoices for organizations selling services and goods through the Internet. The thing is that book-keeping regulations often greatly complicate business processes by requiring that invoices and other accompanying documents be signed after goods are sold or services rendered through the Internet. Another very important task is to ease tax requirements for electronic businessmen.

PROBLEMS RELATING TO TAJIKISTAN’S ACCESSION TO THE CUSTOMS UNION Rakhmatillo ZOIROV Ph.D. (Law), Associate Professor, Chairman of Tajik Law Consortium (Dushanbe, Tajikistan)

T

ABSTRACT

his article attempts to analyze the or ganizational, political, economic, and legal problems associated with the Tajikistan’s accession to the Customs Union, the establishment of which is objectively important with respect to its aims, functions, and potential for achieving the projected results. In so doing, it focuses

mainly on the Custom Union’s regulatory and legal framework. The article presents the results of an analysis of the prerequisites, consistent patterns, and consequences of Tajikistan’s accession to the Customs Union; they have been expressed in some of the theoretical conclusions and practical proposals. 167



KEYWORDS: Tajikistan, Eurasian Economic Community, accession to the Customs Union, Common Economic Space, integration, regulatory and legal framework, customs legislation, implementation, unification, reception, systemization, harmonization.

Introduction The first attempt to form a Customs Union (CU) in the CIS was made in 1993. On 6 January, 1995, the first international legal act—the Agreement on the Customs Union between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus—was entered.1 Although this experiment was not properly developed, several years later, after the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) was established, a more sober, well-considered, and sufficiently sophisticated approach to implementing this complex idea was formed, which is still pertinent today. Here we can agree with V. Likhachev, who said that in the 21st century, integration (in its different aspects) is one of the main trends in globalization, geopolitics, and geo-economics. Consequently, the international subjectness of states and intergovernmental organizations is “actively and creatively developing through the integration potential of practically every sovereign actor.” This can confidently be applied to all the CIS countries. The CU began functioning on 1 July, 2010; it has acquired its own appearance and identity and operates in keeping with the three Ps—positivity, pragmatism, and practicality. 2 At present, establishment of the CU is undergoing an upswing. Dozens of the world’s countries, including those a long way from Russia and Tajikistan such as New Zealand, Vietnam, Norway, and Sweden, see the benefits of greater integration in the Eurasian region. Thirty-five countries are already showing an interest in creating a free trade area with the CU of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Furthermore, the share of those wishing to cooperate with the CU in world trade amounts to 90%. 3 This is precisely why the main problems relating to the Tajikistan’s accession to the CU are extremely important; they include organizational, political-economic, and particularly legal aspects.

The Significance of Establishing the Customs Union The integration processes going on in the CIS countries show there is a very obvious objective need to intensify mutual economic cooperation, whereby not only in the bilateral, but also in the multilateral format. It stands to reason that there is not only a strictly economic or political need for this, but that a whole range of different factors influencing the countries’ strategic choice also comes into play. Such legal aspects as organizational-legal, political-legal, economic-legal, technical-legal, cultural-legal, and so on play an important (if not the most important) part in ensuring cooperation. From References to the regulatory and legal framework of the CU in the CU’s electronic resource will not be further given. See: V.N. Likhachev, in: Tamozhennyy soiuz i Tadzhikistan: novye perspektivy integratsii, Collection of Reports, Dushanbe, 2010, pp. 6-7. 3 See: Ibid., p. 3. 1 2

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this viewpoint, the significance of establishing the CU cannot be overestimated, but much more important is how its activity will be implemented in practice. It should be admitted that the decision to establish the CU with three member states was and still is largely political, although it is basically an economic organization. Nor is there any doubt that Russia’s part in forming the CU is defined by its long-term strategic economic, political, and legal interests. However, at this stage, the political aspect prevails. I would like to note that the Russian Federation incurs certain financial losses when implementing the main measures aimed at forming the CU. Nevertheless, achieving success in this far-from-easy task certainly meets the most important objectives of the Russian Federation’s national development. The purpose of creating both the CU and the Common Economic Space (CES) is to improve the quality of life in the member states and ensure their economic growth. Correspondingly, it is presumed that pursuing a coordinated policy will help to reach more perceptible achievements in increasing the accumulation of basic assets and mutual investments, as well as in raising the competitiveness of the respective economies. At the same time, it remains a fact that little attention was given at first to the legal aspects of the CES and CU. Since the 2007, the CU has acquired a more astute legal status. On 6 July, 2010, the CU Customs Code came into force in Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. This gave rise to an essentially new legal situation (both in the international legal sphere and domestic legislation and in the legal system as a whole) related to replacing national customs legislation with the contractual and legal framework of the CU. Meanwhile, the discussion about the significance of the CU, particularly of the CU customs legislation, as well as its virtues and shortcomings, is continuing unabated; in spite of this, it is undoubtedly the largest multilateral economic project in the post-Soviet expanse called upon to boost integration trends among the new sovereign states for the sake of a dramatic improvement in mutually advantageous economic trade cooperation and participation in the international division of labor.

The Prerequisites and Consistent Patterns of Tajikistan’s Accession to the CU Issues relating to Tajikistan’s accession to the CU have been becoming more urgent since 2005. Since that time, they have occupied a permanent place on the republic’s sociopolitical agenda. On 26 September, 2012, an international seminar was held in Dushanbe on the topic “The Customs Union and Tajikistan: New Prospects for Integration,” during which extremely fundamental answers were given to several of the key issues. All the participants unanimously agreed that the time had come to shift from general political declarations to a detailed study of further development scenarios and determining the entire range of prospects and advantages Tajikistan’s accession to the CU would give both the Union’s member countries and the republic itself. Reports by O. Gavruk,4 A. Kataev,5 N. Kaiumov,6 V. Likhachev,7 A. Pavlov,8 and others were devoted to this topic. See: O. Gavruk, in: Tamozhenny soiuz i Tadzhikistan, pp. 30-36. See: A. Kataev, in: Tamozhenny soiuz i Tadzhikistan, pp. 10-18. 6 See: N. Kaiumov, in: Tamozhenny soiuz i Tadzhikistan, pp. 84-88. 7 See: V. Likhachev, op. cit., pp. 6-9. 8 See: A. Pavlov, in: Tamozhenny soiuz i Tadzhikistan, pp. 19-22. 4 5

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Issues were also addressed regarding customs duty and non-duty regulation, coordination of technical regulations and other regulatory documents, as well as product manufacture and trade management procedures. Despite the technical nature of the existing problems, their resolution is an important vector in the CU’s activity. In addition, it was essentially unanimously agreed that technical and procedural details should not overshadow strategic issues, primarily building a common CU platform that would allow the member countries to occupy a consolidated position in the world market. The main factor motivating Tajikistan’s participation in the CU is the fact that, as a sufficiently important world and regional player and party to many international agreements and organizations, it has considerable potential in integration cooperation (the CIS, EurAsEC, CIS Economic Court, CIS Interparliamentary Assembly, CSTO, bilateral formats, and so on). In this respect, following the globalization trends, Tajikistan considers integration to be one of the important priorities of its foreign policy; this course is also supported by the country’s public. Such things as historical prerequisites, the memory code of labor distribution during Soviet times, international obligations making it possible to create integration communications (the Treaty between the RF and RT on alliance cooperation oriented toward the 21st century of 16 April, 1999), as well as trustworthy foreign policy and foreign trade practices (according to data of 1 July, 2012, Tajikistan maintains contacts with 91 countries of the world) are among the other factors motivating Tajikistan’s participation in integration processes. It should also be mentioned that there are conditions for special cooperation treatment between Tajikistan and the countries belonging to the CU.9 In this context, several legal aspects should also be mentioned.  First,

there is an effectual legal framework; Moscow and Dushanbe have signed more than 140 interstate, intergovernmental, and interdepartmental agreements, including in the economic sphere.

 Second,

all the CU countries are among Tajikistan’s most important economic and trade partners. For example, today Russia accounts for around 20% of Tajikistan’s foreign goods turnover. The import of goods from Russia amounts to 24.7% (of the total import volume) and to 15.5% from Kazakhstan. In addition to this, the republic has economic trade relations with 70 Russian regions. Russian business is relatively active in the region; by 1 April, 2012, the volume of accumulated direct investments from Russia reached $744 million. Russia has already announced the implementation of a new long-term project in Tajikistan (known as the Krupnov project), in accordance with which it intends to invest another $12 billion in the republic’s economy in the next twenty years.10 Moreover, on 5 October, 2012, another six agreements, including on fuels and lubricants, were signed in Dushanbe between the Russian Federation and Tajikistan.  Third, further development of the achievements and issues of bilateral cooperation requires

that Tajikistan join the efforts of the CU and step up its activity in the EurAsEC.

The experience (organizational and legal) acquired by Tajikistan is boosting (in the mid term) interest in the country participating in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and, in the future, in the Eurasian Union (EAU) and its structures (including in the future EAU Parliament). See: V. Likhachev, op. cit., pp. 7-8. For more on this, see: Azia-Plus, 20 September, 2012; Yu. Krupnov, “Proekty sovmestnogo razvitiia Tadzhikistana i Rossii kak ‘materialnaia’ baza uspeshnogo tamozhennogo soiuza,” in: Tamozhenny soiuz i Tadzhikistan, pp. 44-47. 9

10

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The Customs Union’s Regulatory and Legal Framework The formation of the CU’s contractual and legal framework within the EurAsEC or the CU customs legislation has been going on for 17 years now (that is, since 1995). A meeting of the Interstate Council of the EurAsEC at the level of the heads of state held on 6 October, 2007 was a key stage in its formation. A decision was adopted at the meeting “On the Formation of the CU’s Legal Framework within the EurAsEC,” which said: 1. Adopt the Agreement on the Customs Union Commission, the Agreement on Creating a Common Customs Territory and Forming the Customs Union, and the Protocol on the Procedure for Entry into Force of International Agreements Aimed at Forming the Contractual and Legal Framework of the Customs Union, Secession from It, and Accession to It. 2. Approve the List of International Agreements Comprising the Contractual and Legal Framework of the Customs Union. 3. Approve the Action Plan for Forming the Customs Union within the Framework of the Eurasian Economic Community. The list of international agreements comprising the contractual and legal framework of the Customs Union consisted of two parts. The first part incorporated international agreements in effect within the EurAsEC. The matter concerns ten international legal treaties (agreements and protocols) entered between 6 January, 1995 and 24 March, 2005. The second part includes international agreements aimed at completing formation of the contractual and legal framework of the CU. This is another 12 international legal treaties (agreements and protocols) signed in 2007 (most of them were to be adopted after 2007). At that time, the Action Plan for Forming the Customs Union within the Framework of the Eurasian Economic Community was approved by Decision No. 1 (6 October, 2007) of the Interstate Council of the EurAsEC (the supreme body of the CU); this action plan consisted of seven parts and was calculated for four years. The first part (or group) of measures envisaged by the plan was aimed at drawing up an international legal framework for the CU; the second at forming a Common Customs Tariff (CCT); the third at establishing an institutional CU structure (CU Commission, empowering the EurAsEC court to settle disputes within the CU and introduction of the EurAsEC court statute); the fourth at implementing the provisions of international treaties forming the legal framework of the CU (the first paragraph in it reads “bringing national legislations into harmony with the contractual and legal framework of the CU”); the fifth at harmonizing customs legislation (the first paragraph reads “unification of the customs administration procedure, including unified goods declaration rules, payment of customs tariffs regulations, and unified customs regimes,” and paragraph 5 envisages “introducing the Customs Code of the Customs Union”); the sixth at unifying trade regimes with respect to third countries (from identifying the differences in trade regimes and coordinating procedures to unify them to third countries recognizing the CU as an international community); and the seventh at creating a common customs territory. Implementation of this Action Plan, which was carried out from 2007 until the end of 2010, led to the adoption of about another 85 international legal acts. In so doing, more than 50 of them were signed in 2010 alone, while another 25 were entered in 2011 and the first half of 2012. On the whole, as of January 2013, the contractual and legal framework of the CU comprised more than 130 international regulatory and legal acts. The CU Customs Code should be considered the contractual and legal 171



framework of the CU, which is the result of systemization (albeit intermediate) of the international agreements and other acts in the regulation of customs relations. The general part of the CU Customs Code consists of three sections: I. Basic Provisions (chapters 1-8, articles 1-69). II. Customs Payments (chapters 9-14, articles 70-93). III. Customs Control (chapters 15-21, articles 94-149). The special part of the CU Customs Code consists of the following sections: IV. Customs operations preceding the submission of a customs declaration (chapters 22-25, articles 150-172). V. Customs operations relating to placing goods under a customs procedure (chapters 26-28, articles 173-201). VI. Customs procedures (chapters 29-43, articles 202-311). VII. The special features of movement across the customs border and carrying out customs operations with respect to separate categories of goods (chapters 44-49, articles 312-365). The CU Customs Code ends with section VIII, which contains transitional provisions; it is not divided into chapters and comprises articles 366-373. So, the CU Customs Code consists of two parts (general and special), 8 sections, and 50 chapters, and includes 373 articles.11 The CU’s and CES’s openness to accepting new members (as their economic interest comes to fruition) is the basis for extensive economic rapprochement in Eurasia in the future. The number of CU members could consistently grow as other participants in the EurAsEC and other interested CIS countries (as they mature) accede to it on the basis of the basic principles and mechanisms in effect within the framework of the troika.

The Main Achievements of the CU The CU’s achievements in 2007 were rather modest; they were more of an organizational-political and economic nature. The CU has been operating in full measure since 1 July, 2010, when Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia joined the common customs space. By that time, all the main steps had been taken for ensuring the establishment and functioning of the CU, forming its contractual and legal framework and institutional structure, and common foreign trade tariff, non-tariff, and customs regulation system, as well as pursuing a coordinated policy in technical regulation and the application of sanitary, veterinary, and phytosanitary measures. All the coordinated types of control have been moved to the outer boundaries of the CU, while on the internal borders of the CU member states customs, transport, sanitary, veterinary, and phytosanitary control has been removed. Institution of the CU Common Customs Tariff and on 1 January, 2010 affected the transfer of powers in the sphere of customs-tariff and non-tariff regulation of foreign economic activity to the CU Commission. When the CU Customs Code came into effect, a common customs regulation system began functioning. Unified rules for determining customs value and country of origin of the goods have been drawn up and put into use. An entire series of regulatory documents on customs administration has 11

For more details, see: Tamozhenny kodeks TS, Moscow, 2010.

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been adopted, including unified goods declaration rules, payment of customs dues regulations, and unified customs regimes.12 Import customs duties have been assigned and distributed. As of the beginning of 2012, the state, economic entities, and participants of foreign economic activity of the CU members and third countries can appeal to the EurAsEC Court. In November-December 2010, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed a set of agreements that form the contractual and legal framework of the CES, as well as basic principles which envisage the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. The terms of these agreements imply that a coordinated policy is carried out and activity conducted by economic agents of the three countries under general legal conditions. In July 2011, the sides ratified the indicated agreements. This made it possible to put the entire set of agreements forming the contractual and legal framework of the CES into effect on 1 January, 2012. All the agreements within the framework of the CES are based on international principles (including the norms and rules of the WTO and OECD). So a common market is being established with free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor, in which approximately 170 million consumers participate. A new supranational body—the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC)—was created on the basis of the Agreement signed on 18 November, 2011. In accordance with the CES agreements, more than 90 functions and powers in different spheres of the economy have been transferred to the supranational regulation level. Since 1 February, 2012, the EEC, which inherited the powers of the CU Commission, began functioning; its main task is to ensure conditions for the functioning and development of the CU and CES, as well as draw up proposals within their framework for economic integration. 13 So, on the whole it can be noted that between 2009 and 2012, the CU began tackling the following series of tasks: (a) overcoming the risks of the world crisis; (b) restoring cooperative (food, technological, investment, and so on) relations and sources; (c) forming the CES; (d) removing border barriers to integration and production specialization; (e) improving the development infrastructure; (f) overcoming monopolization and protectionism; (g) raising the competitiveness of the national economies and expanding the sales markets; (h) building a common economic space, common energy market, common transportation space, common currency market, ensuring mutual access to the market of financial, banking, insurance services, and so on.

The Main Problems Relating to Tajikistan’s Accession to the CU Primarily it should be noted that apart from the above-listed problems relating both to organizational-political, economic, and other factors and to the republic’s accession to the CU itself, this 12 13

See: S.A. Baliev, in: Tamozhenny soiuz i Tadzhikistan, p. 76. See: Ibid., pp. 76-77.

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part of the article focuses attention on those relating to legislation and law-adopting activity. We will also take a closer look at the implementation, reception, and harmonization of Tajikistan’s legislation after its accession to the CU (leaving aside the actual accession procedure). In this respect, let us turn to the report by Tajik parliamentary deputy A. Kataev. It noted that the parliament of Tajikistan “while drafting new laws and other regulatory acts and projects in terms of the country’s national legislation, the provisions and regulations of model regulatory and legal acts are effectively and systematically used that were drawn up within the framework of the EurAsEC Interparliamentary Assembly and regulate relations in the economy and its spheres.” He emphasized in particular that more than 70 model laws of the EurAsEC Interparliamentary Assembly are used in this sphere, as well as some 60 recommendations in the sphere of innovations, economic activity, the banking system, and so on.14 But it should be noted that although the parliament of Tajikistan also uses experience, model laws, and recommendations in its law-making activity, these are mainly acts of the CIS, not of the EurAsEC, Interparliamentary Assembly. This is why Tajikistan has its work cut out in this area. I would also like to clarify several terminological issues. As A. Pavlov justifiably notes, we often hear the phrase “join the Customs Union,” but it is not entirely correct, since the CU and CES are not international organizations. From the legal viewpoint, the CU is more an aggregate of acts that form a regulatory and legal framework, within which the member states pass on some of their sovereign rights to a specially created body—the CU Commission, and as of the beginning of 2012—the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC).15 Furthermore, it is often said that this is a supranational body, but this sooner applies to its form than to its content. The very fact that the CU Commission drew up and adopted decisions shows that it was an intergovernmental body. Since 2012, the EEC has acquired certain features of a supranational body; this occurred after an EEC Collegium was formed in its structure with the power to make binding decisions. At the same time, the EEC Council and the Higher Eurasian Economic Council make the most important decisions at the level of heads of state and government. Nevertheless, both are sooner intergovernmental and interstate bodies. It should be noted that the EEC is also primarily an intergovernmental body; this can be claimed from the way it draws up and coordinates decisions. This status of the EEC can partly be explained by the fact that since the set of corresponding agreements (2012) came into effect, the CES, in contrast to the CU, began acquiring features of an international integration association (whereby it is not registered as an international organization). In the legal sense, the EurAsEC is an international organization and Tajikistan is its fullfledged member. As we know, one of the aims of establishing the EurAsEC was to form the CU and CES. However, not all of the members of the EurAsEC were equally prepared for full-fledged integration, which led to a certain conflict. It consisted of the fact that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as members of the EurAsEC and, consequently, sharing this organization’s goals, did not join the agreements on the establishment of the CU for different reasons and took almost no part in drawing up its regulatory and legal framework. This led to a unique situation manifested in the different levels of integration within the EurAsEC and the formation of separate regulating bodies for the CU and the CES. From this it follows that, despite the striving of most of its members for the designated goals, the EurAsEC and its structures are unable to transform today. Nor are they able to merge with the regulation and administration bodies of the CU and CES, since some of the EurAsEC member states have not joined their regulatory and legal framework. Moreover, there is little legal possibility of the 14 15

See: A. Kataev, op. cit., p. 17. See: A. Pavlov, op. cit., p. 19.

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EurAsEC transferring to the EEC in its current composition after 2015, which has additional nuances in the situation being examined.16 It seems important to define the CU customs legislation; see Art 3 of the CU Customs Code. In keeping with it, the CU customs legislation consists of the following parts: (1) this Code; (2) international agreements of the CU member states regulating legal customs relations in the CU; (3) decisions of the CU Commission regulating legal customs relations in the CU and adopted in compliance with this Code and the international agreements of member states. All the above-listed 130 international legal acts are part of the CU customs legislation. If Tajikistan accedes to the CU, it will have to carry out all the preparatory work with respect to implementation, or to be more precise, reception of the CU customs legislation, which will be extremely difficult. The thing is that Tajikistan, even as a member of the EurAsEC, has essentially not participated at all in the drawing up and adoption of these international legal acts. Moreover, the republic has essentially no experts on international law, never mind those who specialize in customs legislation. Further it should be noted that the Tajikistan Customs Code was adopted in November 2004. At present, 60% of this code, which is in effect in the rendition of Tajik Law No. 169 of 3 March, 2006 and consists of a preamble, 7 sections, 62 chapters, and 508 articles, does not correspond to the CU Customs Code. Moreover, if Tajikistan accedes to the CU, it will not only have to deem the Tajikistan Customs Code null and void (based on the need to replace national legislation with international legal acts of the CU), but also revise the legal mechanism for regulating customs relations in the country. It stands to reason that certain gaps could arise in regulation, and it will be impossible to work the bugs out of all the customs relations, particularly new ones, straightaway. For this reason, Tajikistan must adopt several laws (or, for example, following Russia’s example, a special law “On Customs Regulation”) in order to regulate customs relations with its own customs legislation (with respect to those not regulated by the CU customs legislation). This simply requires implementing the measures listed below: (1) carrying out a special analysis of the entire contractual and legal framework of the CU; (2) finding ways and means to most efficiently transform the legislative framework of Tajikistan in customs affairs; (3) identifying all the customs relations unregulated by the CU customs legislation; (4) compiling a register of special provisions for those contractual norms that are unacceptable for Tajikistan, and so on. Otherwise, there will be no effective customs legislation in Tajikistan. Some difficulties that might arise as a result of Tajikistan’s accession to the CU and CES are related to the country’s geographical location and the unclear position of Kyrgyzstan. Nevertheless, joining a common customs territory does not necessarily presume that the country has a common border with this territory, although it entails additional administration efforts. The special feature of the CU and CES legal instruments is that they must be applied to the fullest extent; agreements must not be examined and ratified individually or decisions on separate matters bargained over and prolonged. After a corresponding decision has been made all the international agreements forming the contractual and legal framework of the CU and CES must be joined and the CU CCT introduced at home. 16

See: Ibid., pp. 19-20.

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Moreover, for countries that decide to join the CU and CES, all the decisions of the CU Commission, EEC Collegium and Council, EurAsEC Interstate Council, and Higher Economic Council in effect since 2012 will become binding. National legislation must be brought into harmony with the regulatory documents of the CU and CES; this is rather an onerous task and must be prepared for in advance. It should also be noted that the legal possibilities for discussing the waiving of certain commodity items are limited. As the experience of Kazakhstan showed (which at the first stage had a long list of goods charged at rates different from the CU Common Customs Tariff), it is very difficult to ensure reliable control over the non-movement of certain goods into the territory of other CU members when there is no customs border; therefore, the list of items waived was reduced to a minimum. It is probably not expedient for Tajikistan to orient itself toward any kind of special treatment, since any waiver from the general regime will cause many administrative difficulties. With respect to improving customs administration, reliable control must be established (customs, sanitary, veterinary, and phytosanitary) at check points, which should be equipped in keeping with the CU requirements. It should also be kept in mind that the CES is an intermediary stage in accession to the EEU; rather extensive powers are transferred to the supranational level, and there is the prospect of reaching the next, higher level of integration. Different rates of integration within the CES (this is precisely what happened in the EurAsEC) is entirely inadmissible; before momentous decisions are made an agreement must be reached and an adamant stance drawn up on all issues. In addition, as V. Likhachev noted, recognizing the political and applied expediency of Tajikistan’s accession to the CU and keeping in mind the problems along the way, it is important to draw up and adopt a kind of road map that “should rely on the country’s Constitution, the general principles of international law, acts instituting the CU, and the Procedure for Entry into Force of International Agreements Aimed at Forming the Contractual and Legal Framework of the Customs Union, Secession from It, and Accession to It of 6 October, 2007. Such pertinent issues for Tajikistan as harmonization and rapprochement of legislations, orientation toward CU technical standards, priorities of integration development of the legal system of states, implementation of Tajikistan’s international obligations, taking into account the experience of the WTO, EU, Union State, and others should be marked on the map. Special attention should be given to the trend toward supranationalism and the correlations between sovereign powers and the competency of the supranational CU bodies.”17 It is thought that this type of work at the state (Tajikistan) and international (bilateral and multilateral diplomacy) levels has the right to exist; it fits well into the regulations and boundaries of Tajikistan’s international subjectness, as well as the practice of its relations with the CU member states.

Conclusion So, it should be emphasized that when forming the CU there is absolutely no need to rush or jump over stages; here we are dealing with a long process. During 2010-2012, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan gradually honed their efforts within the framework of the emerging CU customs legislation. As the three-year experience shows, further development of this process will be slow, arduous, and difficult, particularly if the CU enlarges due to accession of Kyrgyzstan, and then Tajikistan. 17

See: V. Likhachev, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

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The main thing is to ensure that Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s accession is not simply a political decision, but the result of thorough preparation work (including purely legal), the process of which must be examined from at least the following angles: (1) the organizational-legal aspects and problems of Tajikistan’s joining the contractual and legal framework of the CU; (2) the legal problems of transformation (integration) of Tajikistan’s customs legislation within the CU per se; (3) the legal problems of unifying and systemizing the customs legislation of the CU member states, which will begin at the same time as transformation (integration) and, naturally, will have their own negative and positive features. Moreover, the countries will have to think about further unifying and systemizing both their own customs legislation and that of the CU. It should be noted that over time it will become increasingly necessary to create a common, coordinated, and stable customs system, capable of overcoming the inconformity and contradictions that might emerge in the future. And finally, I think that accession to the WTO first of Russia (24 August, 2012) and then of Tajikistan (10 December, 2012) will add its specific features to restructuring of the CU customs legislation; the international community is also interested in this, which is oriented toward achieving political, economic, and legal security, as well as building a legal and fair integration space of global and transregional dimensions. Harmonization of the customs legislation of the CU and the WTO will help to strengthen Tajikistan’s authority as an actor in contemporary world policy and strengthen the CU’s image within the EurAsEC, and consequently the EAC. In the near future, we will be able to talk about the emergence of an organization, the activity of which is aimed at resolving the problems of ensuring a world legal order and developing an anticrisis international legal structure.

MAKING EFFECTIVE STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN TAJIK INDUSTRY Mavzuna KARIMOVA Ph.D. (Econ.), Head of the International and Regional Economy Department, Institute of Economics and Demography, Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan (Dushanbe, Tajikistan)

B

ABSTRACT

ased on an analysis of the changes going on in the sectoral structure of

Tajik industry, this article justifies the need to carry out its regular restructuring.

177



KEYWORDS: industry, restructuring, structural changes, structural effect, strategy of structural changes.

Introduction Today, the economy of Tajik industry is an open, non-linear, dynamic and self-developing system distinguished by targeted, spontaneous, local, and systemic changes. In recent years, uncontrollable spontaneous large-scale structural changes have been going on in the country’s industry and new forms of ownership (as well as new owners) are continuing to take shape and develop. Changes in the comparative economic efficiency of different sectors of industry are promoting a flow of capital and labor from some production works to others, as well as the appearance of new organizational and managerial structures. However, they are not engaged in forming an efficient territorial and sectoral structure of the region’s industry. The spontaneous changes that have been going on in the republic’s industry for decades have led to destructive consequences indicating a large-scale structural crisis that is manifested in the following:  the wasted overheads incurred from the reforms carried out in 1990-1998 during transfer of

the national economy to market conditions;

 the

dramatic transformation of the sectoral structure of industry, as a result of which the share of market infrastructure institutions and the fuel and energy complex in GDP has significantly grown, while that of such sectors as the machine-building, chemical, and petrochemical industries has greatly declined. Inflation and free price formation caused value redistribution in favor of circulation and management, as well as of the fuel and energy complex, and a decrease in demand as a result of the drop in personal income and devaluation of the circulating funds of enterprises. There were not enough financial resources to ensure the simple reproduction of basic assets, the value of which abruptly dropped;

 the

technological degradation of industry related to the attrition of science-intensive production (particularly in machine-building), the severe reduction in spending on science and education, as well as the drop in the share of high-tech sectors. This is mainly caused by underestimating the need for an innovative approach to restructuring the economy, primary orientation toward the export of raw materials and primary processing products, and directing the main financial resources into the circulation sphere isolated from the real sector;

 changes

in property structure. They have led to the share of state and private property becoming almost equal. Moreover, as a result of privatization, corporate property has appeared. For example, whereas in 1995 the share of state property in industry amounted to 97.7%, by 2010, it was equal to 56.3%. In so doing, the share of joint ventures in state property amounted to 7.2%, and corporate property to 7.3%. But these changes did not lead to an increase in the efficiency of industrial production;

 transformation

of the structure of foreign economic ties, increase in foreign trade turnover due to the increase in amount of import, increase in the external debt and its service charges, and dramatic increase in the import of consumer goods into the country. 178



Structural Problems of Tajik Industry A sufficient number of both objective and subjective problems have accumulated in the country’s industry that are making it impossible to achieve sustainable economic growth or even the 1990 level. The significant structural changes that occurred in the country’s industry as a result of the reforms carried out were caused not by the rapid development of the sectors, but by the abrupt drop in production in some of them. A comparison of the changes in sectoral structure observed in 1980 with the structural changes that occurred in 2010 show that the share of the fuel and energy complex, which was equal to 5.7%, increased to 14.9%. Considerable changes occurred in the sectors that put out technical industrial products; moreover, there has been an abrupt increase in the share of nonferrous metallurgy from 4.4% in 1980 to 35.7% in 2010. At the same time, there has been a drop in production in machine-building and metal processing (from 10.2% to 2.6%), as well as in the chemical and petrochemical industry (from 3.3% to 0.5%). Dramatic changes are also seen in the sectors operating in the consumer market; whereas in 1980 the share of the light industry reached 44.7%, in 2010 it amounted to 13.2%. Transition of the economy to world prices had a considerable influence on the structure of industry, which had a particular impact on the basic sectors (the prices of their products proved much lower than the world level). As for electric power, its share in the sectoral structure of the country’s industry as whole increased considerably. Tajikistan is rich in energy resources, but, in our opinion, their export is only justified if high value-added products are manufactured; but unfortunately this is not happening so far. The production growth rates in certain sectors are also having an effect on changes in the structure of the country’s industry. In this respect, classifying sectors according to the elasticity coefficient (Cel), which we calculated as the ratio of production volume growth rate in the sector to the industrial production growth rate throughout the country as a whole, proves quite interesting. The results of the calculations we made show that elasticity coefficients in different sectors of industry differ considerably from each other (see Table 1). Cel shows the contribution each sector makes to the overall increase in industry. Its magnitude makes it possible to judge which sectors are the most “sensitive.” The calculation results show that on the whole during the entire period under examination the elasticity coefficient in such sectors of industry as the power sector and nonferrous metallurgy fluctuates between zero to one. In other words, they are among those sectors with a low growth elasticity and their contribution to the overall increase in industrial production is extremely insignificant. The chemical, petrochemical, glass, porcelain and pottery industries are among those sectors with a negative elasticity coefficient. The other sectors are characterized by high growth elasticity, which is proof of abrupt structural changes. However, it should be noted that the changes going on in the structure of industry are uncontrollable; they are largely spontaneous and depend on world prices, the dynamics of foreign trade turnover, and the migration situation in the country. Tajikistan is experiencing a structural crisis that is hindering development of the country’s economy. One of its main characteristics is an increase in moral and physical depreciation of basic assets. This in turn has led to burdening the structure of the national economy both with old production units and with the manufacture of low-quality products that cannot compete with imported analogues. During the period under examination, the decrease in production volume in different sectors of the national economy was very uneven, which shows the increase in structural disproportions. 179



Elasticity of Production Growth in Terms of Tajik Industrial Sectors for 2000-2010 Elasticity Coefficient

Sector of Industry

2000-2005

2005-2010

2000-2010

All industries = 1 Electric power

0.296

0.441

0.334

Fuel

2.587

9.605

4.403

Chemical and petrochemical

1.319

–5.426

–0.427

Nonferrous

0.651

0.0469

0.494

Machine-building and metalworking

5.663

24.879

10.637

Timber, woodworking, cellulose and paper

4.160

27.168

10.115

Industrial building materials

4.070

11.770

6.063

Glass, porcelain, pottery

0.995

–3.763

–0.237

Light

1.356

–0.496

0.877

Food

1.921

4.340

2.547

Flour and cereal products and fodder

0.995

4.152

1.812

When studying the reasons for the structural crisis, it can be noted that the state of industry today results from both the influence of external macroeconomic factors and of the abysmal situation at the enterprises themselves; this is particularly manifested in the growing degradation of resource potential, poor adaptation to a competitive environment, and predomination of regions with unattractive types of production in the sectoral structure. Many enterprises cannot reach the necessary competitive level due to their limited access to investment resources. Despite the fact that the volume of manufactured goods rose at several production enterprises, it was not accompanied by an increase in resource quality or level of enterprise adaptation to the competitive environment. Positive national economy development rates in no way indicate that positive changes are going on in its structure. A prevalent part of economic growth is associated with a quantitative increase in the production of primary resources and primary processing products. The insufficient dynamism of the progressive structural changes in the economy has led to the appearance of disproportions between production and society’s needs. The structure of industry that has developed in Tajikistan carries the stamp of the collapse of the Soviet Union, civil war, and special features of the country’s historical development. As a result of this, it lags almost two centuries behind the leading countries of the world in its technical and economic development. Another reason for the low efficiency of Tajik industry is its relative isolation from the world centers of scientific-technical and economic development. In 2000, the import quota amounted to 22.8%, in 2009 to 45.9%, and in 2010 to 47.1%. Furthermore, the goods structure of export has been degenerating: Tajikistan has turned into a raw material appendage of the highly developed countries. 180



The deep deformations in the industrial structure and low level of quality and competitiveness of a large part of the range of Tajikistan’s industrial products are largely related to the country’s raw material orientation and the self-contained national economic development it underwent for so many decades.

Tajikistan and the WTO On 10 December, 2012, Tajikistan acceded to the WTO, which could entail considerable losses for the country’s industrial enterprises. Therefore, several measures must be carried out aimed at restructuring the country’s industrial complex. After its accession to the WTO, Tajikistan is going to encounter problems related to integration into and globalization of the world economy. Nor can the influence of transnational companies be ignored; according to different expert assessments, 500 of the largest of them account more than a quarter of world production of goods and services, a third of world export of the manufacturing industry, around 70% of trade in raw material products, and more than 80% of trade in new technologies. Moreover, Tajikistan, being outside the epicenters of scientific and technical development of high technology in the real sector of the economy, is greatly under their influence. This is manifested in the country’s strong dependence on the import of end products of the manufacturing industry, as well as on the delivery of new technology, production lines, knowhow, and so on. So we need to draw up efficient approaches to defining a strategy for restructuring Tajikistan’s industry. During the years of independence, it has been essentially impossible to restructure the country’s industry. This was due to the breakdown in the “enterprise-power body” management mechanism, the state’s withdrawal from industrial regulation, and the privatization and denationalization processes. Loss of control and the impossibility of adapting to the contemporary demands of competitiveness brought industry to a crisis. We carried out an assessment of the influence restructuring is having on the overall dynamics of economic development on the basis of the structure effect coefficient (see Table 2). If the value of the coefficient is greater than one, this means that the development dynamics of the particular sector are ahead of the economic growth rate as a whole. If the value of the coefficient fluctuates between zero and one, this shows the positive contribution of the particular sector to overall economic growth. But this also identifies a lag behind the overall economic development rates. If, however, the coefficient is less than zero, this shows the negative contribution of the particular sector, that is, it causes a drop in the main macroeconomic indices of economic development. As a result of calculating the structure effect coefficient for different sectors, we revealed that the influence of the industrial sector on GDP growth as a whole throughout the country differed from year to year. However, in 2008-2009, many sectors operated inefficiently and the changes in sectoral structure and industrial production growth rates had a negative effect on economic growth as a whole throughout the country; the reason for this was the consequences of the world financial and energy crisis. Only the building material industry has continued to demonstrate economic growth, although it is insignificant. During 2010-2011, Tajik industry had a positive influence on GDP growth; whereby the structure effect coefficient amounted to +0.27. 181



Dynamics of the Structure Effect Coefficient Sector

2002-2003

2006-2007

2008-2009

Industry, total

+0.91

+1.27

–0.49

Electric power

+0.60

+0.72

–0.14

Fuel

+0.59

+4.24

–0.01

Nonferrous

+0.37

+0.17

–0.58

Chemical and petrochemical

+4.97

–0.25

–0.12

Machine-building and metalworking

+4.29

+5.91

–2.63

Industrial building materials

+4.77

+4.25

+0.16

Light

+1.62

+1.96

–0.69

Food

+0.26

+2.77

–0.42

As for the influence of restructuring on economic growth in the country’s regions (see Table 3), as our calculations show, in each of the periods examined, the leading role in the increase of the gross regional product (GRP) shifted from one to another. For example, between 2007 and 2009, districts of republican subordination largely showed considerable growth in GDP and GRP rates. In 2010, the picture changed and the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region took the lead, followed by Dushanbe in 2011. It should be noted that in each region there are industrial sectors that define the overall GRP growth. Table 3 Structure Effect Coefficient by Region 2007-2008

2008-2009

2009-2010

2010-2011

Dushanbe

+0.45

–1.05

+0.47

+4.79

Sughd Region

+0.12

+0.46

+3.21

+0.8

Khatlon Region

+0.47

+2.49

+1.29

+0.20

Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region

+0.35

+0.76

+3.66

+0.27

Districts of republican subordination

+1.29

+4.51

+1.74

–2.58

Structural problems are also characteristic of the participants in the innovation process (from the viewpoint of correlating the industrial enterprises of small, medium, and large innovative business). Despite the certain amount of economic growth over the past few years, there have not been any positive structural changes in the country’s industry. 182



Compared to most countries of the world, Tajikistan’s economy lies in the complete lack of development of production for the consumer market and there is an insistent need for its accelerated outfitting. Based on this, we believe that such priority sectors as the light and food industries should receive maximum support. From this point of view, investments in small and medium enterprises of the light industry that ensure rapid payoff are preferable. In the current conditions, a possible way to restructure Tajik industry could be to start gradual structural renewal using the maximum multiplier by means of targeted consistent siphoning of funds into relatively self-contained economic systems (from local to more global). In this respect, a policy of small and medium industrial business support could play a significant role.

Strategy for Restructuring Industry Tajikistan has the responsible task of carrying out restructuring of industry and ensuring its sustainable development in the near future. This will help to incorporate Tajikistan into the world trade system not only as an exporter of agricultural products, but also as a country that puts out competitive industrial products. Achieving a high level of competitiveness of industrial products is a large-scale national strategic task. It can only be solved by pursuing an active and dynamic structural policy that cannot be carried out within the framework of short- and medium-term industrial development programs of the country and its regions. The current conditions are making new demands on the strategy for restructuring industry and ways to implement it. Implementing the priority restructuring tasks in industry should rely on the following fundamental principles:  purely

administrative, financial, technological, and market resources (in addition to industrial policy tools);

 a

cluster approach to building a structural policy as a powerful innovative instrument of regional development;

 development

of state-private partnership not only at the state level, but also at the level of individual regions;

 creation

of favorable conditions for forming mechanisms of economic self-development, raising the significance of scientific and technological progress, and using its achievements in production. This approach will promote the formation of technological, sectoral, and institutional industrial structures equivalent to those that exist in developed countries; this will allow Tajikistan to occupy a certain niche in the world economic system.

Both external and internal sources of industrial production development need to be activated in order to implement the above-listed tasks. Conditions must be created that are capable of transferring the industrial complex of the country and its regions to a regime of socioeconomic, structural-functional, and organizational-financial stability. In current conditions, control needs to be maintained over sustainable development of industry. So restructuring of the country’s industrial complex should be aimed at forming a competitive market environment. As for a structural policy, it should be viewed as a factor promoting the development of competition and demonopolization of the industrial sectors. 183



The problems and disproportions we revealed during our research confirm that the need has arisen in Tajikistan for drawing up a long-term strategy of industrial restructuring using the achievements of scientific and technological progress.

Conclusion World experience in studying the trends and legitimate patterns of industrial development show the need to form new mechanisms of management aimed at carrying out targeted structural changes, as well as raising the competitiveness of products and share of high value-added goods. The main qualitative vector of the structural changes in Tajikistan’s industrial complex should be their innovation; this requires using the scientific and technical capacities that are available in the country and the world. The main aim of restructuring is to ensure a balanced economy and maintain proportionality in which dynamic, balanced, and non-crisis development of industry in the country and its regions will help to integrate Tajikistan into the global economic system. The state needs to exert efforts to resolve the multitude of problems related to industrial restructuring. This restructuring should be aimed at overcoming structural deformations, eliminating inefficient production units, restructuring current industrial enterprises, as well as forming a new structure capable of appreciating the new innovations, realizing competitive advantages, and creating new high-tech companies.

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