Chapter 2. Rural population

Team of authors: Agnieszka Baer-Nawrocka, Jerzy Bartkowski, Barbara Chmielewska, Barbara Fedyszak-Radziejowska, Izasław Frenkel, Jan Herbst, Iwona Nurzyńska, Walenty Poczta, Jerzy Wilkin, Józef Stanisław Zegar Original edition: Polska wieś 2018. Raport o stanie wsi, Wydawnictwo Nau kowe Scholar, Warszawa 2018 Reviewer: Prof. Andrzej P. Wiatrak Translated from Polish by Dorota Szmajda Cover design: Katarzyna Juras Cover photo: Przemysław Czaja ISBN 978-83-7383-963-2 doi: 10.7366/9788373839632 Copyright © by Foundation for the Development of Polish Agriculture (FDPA), Warsaw 2018 No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without written permission of the publisher. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the FDPA.

Foundation for the Development of Polish Agriculture ul. Gombrowicza 19, 01-682 Warszawa www.fdpa.org.pl; e-mail: [email protected] Published on behalf of FDPA by Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar Sp. z o.o. ul. Wiślana 8 00-317 Warszawa Poland www.scholar.com.pl; e-mail: [email protected]

Contents Preface.......................................................................................................... 9 Chapter 1. Rural Poland: The present and the past – an overview of the Report – Jerzy Wilkin..................................... 11 Introduction................................................................................................... 11 1.1. Population changes in Poland’s rural areas............................................ 11 1.2. What is the standard of living, income structure and scale of poverty in rural areas?........................................................................... 13 1.3. Changes in the rural social structures and civic activity of rural residents................................................................................................. 15 1.4. Changes in agriculture........................................................................... 18 1.5. What are the benefits of European integration for Polish rural areas and agriculture?..................................................................................... 20 1.6. Political preferences, views and elections of rural residents ................ 21 1.7. Rural areas in the long historical perspective........................................ 22

Chapter 2. Rural population – Izasław Frenkel ............................... 27 2.1. Trends of change in rural population numbers...................................... 27 2.2. Demographic factors of rural population change................................... 28 2.3. Changes in the administrative division into urban and rural areas........ 34 2.4. Structure of rural population by age and sex ........................................ 35 2.5. Employment........................................................................................... 37 2.6. Rural unemployment.............................................................................. 41 Concluding remarks...................................................................................... 44 Tables ......................................................................................................... 46

Chapter 3. Rural communities: Attitudes, values and socioeconomic determinants – Barbara Fedyszak-Radziejowska. ... 69 Introduction................................................................................................... 69 3.1. Peasants, members of the peasant movement, farmers in the Polish People’s Republic ................................................................................. 69 3.2. Attitudes, values and socio-economic situation of farmers and rural residents ....................................................................................... 74 3.3. Human and social capital of rural residents........................................... 79 3.4. Social capital.......................................................................................... 82 3.5. Some remarks on the religiousness of rural residents . ......................... 87

3.6. Rural residents and farmers about the European Union: A stable acceptance . ........................................................................................... 89 Concluding remarks...................................................................................... 90

Chapter 4. Polish agriculture – changes and regional differences – Agnieszka Baer-Nawrocka, Walenty Poczta......... 93 4.1. Polish agriculture in the national economy . ......................................... 93 4.2. Resources and inputs of factors of production and relations between them......................................................................................... 96 4.3. The area structure of farms ................................................................... 98 4.4. Structure of livestock farming............................................................. 100 4.5. Production output................................................................................. 101 4.6. Value of market production and purchasing........................................ 104 4.7. Productivity of production factors....................................................... 105 Concluding remarks.................................................................................... 108

Chapter 5. Convergence and divergence processes in rural areas and society at large with regard to income – Barbara Chmielewska, Józef Stanisław Zegar........................... 109 Introduction................................................................................................. 109 5.1. Income trends of rural and urban populations .................................... 110 5.2. Structure of sources of livelihood........................................................ 114 5.3. Poverty ................................................................................................ 117 5.4. Changes in the sources of livelihood of rural population by types of municipalities.................................................................................. 120 5.5. Incomes in the European Union member states . ................................ 124 Concluding remarks.................................................................................... 130

Chapter 6. Poland as a beneficiary of the Common Agricultural Policy – Iwona Nurzyńska..................................... 133 Introduction . .............................................................................................. 133 6.1. Participation in the Single European Market – an unappreciated benefit ................................................................................................. 134 6.2. Financial transfers from the EU budget to Poland in 2004–2017........ 137 6.3. The Common Agricultural Policy and jobs ........................................ 139 6.4. CAP support to farmers’ incomes........................................................ 142 6.5. CAP support to young farmers ........................................................... 148 6.6. Integrated financial support under CAP and EU’s Cohesion Policy... 151 Concluding remarks.................................................................................... 153

Chapter 7. The political map of Poland’s rural areas – Jerzy Bartkowski......................................................................................... 155 Introduction................................................................................................. 155 7.1. Perception of the government and the president . ............................... 157

7.2. Political participation. Willingness to take part in elections and voter preferences . ............................................................................... 166 7.3. Key political issues: European Union, supranational institutions, institutional system and democracy..................................................... 168 7.4. Evaluation of the PiS programme and the government’s activities..... 174 Concluding remarks.................................................................................... 177

Chapter 8. Undervalued, underappreciated. The scale of activity of social organisations in rural areas – Jan Herbst. .. 181 Introduction................................................................................................. 181 8.1. The forgotten actor: social organisations in Poland’s social development . ...................................................................................... 181 8.2. “Non-governmental organisations” in Poland’s rural landscape: definition traps..................................................................................... 184 8.3. The institutional potential of social organisations in rural areas – basic data............................................................................................. 185 8.4. Development of the non-profit sector – macrotrends.......................... 191 8.5. Scale of activity of rural organisations ............................................... 196 8.6. Activity of rural organisations and their role in service provision ..... 198 Concluding remarks.................................................................................... 203

Chapter 9. Evolution of rural areas and agriculture in Poland in 1918–2018 – Jerzy Wilkin.......................................................... 205 Introduction................................................................................................. 205 9.1. Waves of institutional and systemic reforms....................................... 206 9.2. “Joining rural areas to Poland” in the interwar period......................... 207 9.3. The difficult independence................................................................... 210 9.4. Agrarian reforms as institutionalisation of social and economic transformation of rural areas................................................................ 211 9.5. The fight of peasants and the fight for peasants.................................. 214 9.6. Rural areas and agriculture during the Polish People’s Republic........ 216 9.7. Attempts at collectivisation of agriculture........................................... 219 9.8. Post-socialist transformation of Polish agriculture (1989–2003)........ 220 9.9. Poland’s rural areas in the European Union......................................... 223 Concluding remarks.................................................................................... 225

Annex ....................................................................................................... 227

Preface It is with great pleasure that we present you with the latest edition of the Report on the State of Rural Areas, which is special being the tenth in the series that was started in 2000. The jubilee of the Report coincides with the thirtieth anniversary of the Foundation for the Development of Polish Agri culture (FDPA), which has sponsored and published all the Reports in this publishing series so far. This year, we also celebrate the centenary of Poland’s regaining independence in 1918. Our biannual reports on the development of agriculture and rural areas have made a lasting contribution to the dissemination of knowledge on complex processes taking place in Poland’s rural areas, which are essential components of Polish society, culture and economy. All the reports published to date have been interdisciplinary in character and based on the methodological approach that, in our view, is needed for understanding and describing those processes. Such a way of presenting various determinants of growth, trends, structural transformations and development effects visible in rural areas in Poland is the differentia specifica of our Report, when compared with other publications on agriculture and rural development. For us, the slogan “to understand rural areas” is a beacon in methodological and editorial terms. This is not an easy task since the subject matter that the authors of the Report deal with is extremely complicated. The authors of the Report are among Poland’s most eminent researchers of phenomena taking place in rural areas. Their expertise and findings from research conducted in several academic centres serve to discuss major demographic, economic, political and social developments. The Report, in its methodological and editorial approach, aims to present scientific knowledge in a way that is accessible to a wider audience. Our ambition is for the Report to be read not only by academic and political circles or the media, but also by ordinary readers – representatives of local communities, whether rural or municipal. We look at popularisation of knowledge on rural development as our principal task. Every time, both the authors and the editors are faced with the challenging task of selecting areas or topics for analysis concerning the functioning and development of Poland’s rural areas. We are not able to present a report that would capture all aspects of these complex issues – that would go beyond our financial, editorial and technical capabilities. Nevertheless, we aim to provide

preface

a broadly reliable picture that discusses phenomena of particular importance for rural areas and agriculture. Our readers appreciate such an approach, and therefore the Report has a relatively wide audience. The previous editions of the Report featured chapters which addressed crucial questions concerning the state of rural areas, their problems, changes and achievements. These included such issues as: changes of the demographic structure, sources of livelihood for the rural population, scale of poverty in rural areas, major social problems facing rural areas and how their social structures are changing, the “political map” of rural areas, main changes in Polish agriculture and their effects. Since 2004, we have specifically tried to describe and expound the process of European integration pertinent to rural areas and agriculture and its effects. These issues are also discussed in the present Report. Due to its special commemorative and historical context, the report Rural Poland 2018 has a separate chapter briefly summarising the evolution of agriculture and rural areas in Poland in the years 1918–2018. Some historical motifs can also be found in other chapters, especially Chapter 3, which discusses rural communities, and Chapter 8, devoted to non-governmental organisations operating in rural areas. We would like to extend our gratitude and thanks to all those who have helped us in making the Report happen: its authors, consultants, the Foundation for the Development of Polish Agriculture and Scholar Publishing House. Jerzy Wilkin and Iwona Nurzyńska Scientific Editors

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Jerzy Wilkin*

Chapter 1. Rural Poland: The present and the past – an overview of the Report Introduction Our Reports on the State of Rural Areas in Poland primarily aim to present the most current picture of rural areas and agriculture, as is the function of such studies. However, in order to offer a reliable view of the current situation, it should typically be compared with what the situation looked like in the earlier periods, as only such an approach may give a trustworthy overview of the scale and areas of change, progress or regression. In the previous Reports, we presented an account of the changes taking place in Poland’s rural areas from a perspective spanning at least two-year periods. On this occasion, due to the triple jubilee of this year’s Report on the State of Rural Areas: its 10th edition, the 30th anniversary of the FDPA and the 100th anniversary of Poland’s regaining independence in 1918, we make even more historical references. This is well visible in several chapters of the Report, particularly in its last chapter discussing long-term, centennial trends in the development of rural areas in Poland. Such a historical perspective helps to better understand the scope and outcomes of the changes discussed in the present Report.

1.1. Population changes in Poland’s rural areas This is the domain of analyses, given – as in all the previous Reports – by Poland’s most eminent expert on the demography of rural areas in Poland, Professor Izasław Frenkel. As in all the previous editions, his studies are among the main pillars of the Report. The demographic processes epitomise the quintessential changes taking place in any community. The effects of development, successes and failures, problems and pathologies, are most palpably reflected in individuals, their physical fitness and health, fertility/ reproduction, life expectancy, economic activity, spatial and professional * Prof. dr hab. Jerzy Wilkin, Institute of Rural and Agricultural Development, Polish Academy of Sciences.

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1. Rural Poland: the present and the past...

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mobility and similar processes. These phenomena are discussed in Chapter 2. As before, the chapter written by Professor Frenkel draws on extensive em pirical and statistical evidence. The many meticulously prepared tables not only illustrate the discussed phenomena and trends in valuable quantitative terms but also offer an empirical basis that can be used by other researchers. An increase in the number of rural population, indicated in the previous Reports, can be observed, a process which is accompanied by a decrease in the size of urban population. Rural areas have come to be regarded as attractive places to live. Nevertheless, these trends are not evenly distributed spatially, with an increase in the rural population visible in ten voivodeships, and a decrease in six. In the Śląskie Voivodeship, 23% of the population live in rural areas, as compared to nearly 59% in the Podkarpackie Voivodeship. Too few children are born both in rural areas and in the country at large to ensure a sufficient replacement rate. The fertility rate in Poland’s rural areas, which is slightly higher than that in cities, has nevertheless been higher than the average for the European Union. Life expectancy is up in Poland as a whole and in its rural areas. This is particularly well visible in the case of women: in Poland’s rural areas, the differences in life expectancy for men and women (8.7 years) are among the widest in the EU. The changes observable in the rural population are consequences of both internal (domestic) and international migration. According to estimates, rural residents account for one-third of migration abroad. The rate of permanent international migration from rural areas, which was negative in 2014 (3,800), turned out to be positive in 2016 (800). This was the effect of changes that took place on the European and Polish labour markets. The unemployment rate in Poland visibly dropped, unlike in most of the EU countries where it remained relatively high. Nearly 80% migrants stayed abroad for 12 months or longer. Therefore, such migration can be considered as relatively permanent, a process which involves not only taking up employment but also planning residence on a permanent basis. This phenomenon may largely be underpinned by Brexit and the EU’s decisions relating to migration into the United Kingdom. Even though the rural population in Poland is ageing, it still counts among the youngest in the European Union. The age level of the elderly population in Poland, including that in rural areas, is among the lowest in all the European Union countries and Iceland. The growing rate of economic activity in Poland’s rural areas can be viewed as a positive phenomenon. In 2014–2016, the overall employment rate in rural areas (people aged 15 or over) increased from 50.9% to 52.6%, and in the working age population – from 66.0% do 68.6%. Despite the considerable

rural Poland 2018. the Report on the state of rural areas

improvement observable in that regard in the recent years, the employment rate of the rural population in Poland still lags below the EU average and the average country values for most of the EU countries. This is particularly true with regard to women, youth aged 15-24 and older population aged 55-64. Disagrarianisation, coupled with a shrinking share of the population employed in agriculture and a decreasing role of income from agriculture, is a process that has been observable in the rural areas for many years now. As the authors point out elsewhere in the Report, it impacts on the nature of Poland’s rural areas in many different ways. The process of closing the development gaps between rural and urban areas also includes education. In this regard, the gap still remains considerable, although a distinct progress has been noted. Polish agriculture continues to absorb significant resources of labour, which are not put to an effective use owing to the prevalent farm structure. Those employed in Polish agriculture in 2016 accounted for nearly one-fifth of those working in the EU agricultural sector as a whole, which represented nearly the same share as in France, Spain and the United Kingdom taken together. Another positive phenomenon observable in rural areas and in the country at large is the falling unemployment rate. Ever since 1989, unemployment has been one of the most pressing socio-economic problems in rural areas. Currently, the unemployment rate in Poland is lower than the EU average. Nonetheless, the highest rate of unemployment is still recorded in the group of youth aged 18-24.

1.2. What is the standard of living, income structure and scale of poverty in rural areas? This question is tackled by the authors in Chapter 5 of the Report. A significant progress has taken place in that regard, mainly thanks to Poland’s membership of the EU and the access it offers to many Community programmes, notably the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which count both agricultural workers and other rural residents among their beneficiaries. A growing number of rural inhabitants find employment outside agriculture, where they earn higher incomes, whilst the social insurance and social assistance systems provide support to a numerous group of rural residents. Agriculture is the main source of income for close to 10% of the rural population. In 2016, income from gainful employment represented 48.5% of total incomes of rural households (compared to 54.8% in the case of urban households); 7.2% came from self-employed activity (9.0% urban households), and 9.3% – from individual farming activity (0.4% in urban households).

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The disparities between incomes from agriculture and those from other sectors of the economy are narrowing, a process which is accompanied by a relative improvement of the income and social situation of rural residents. In 2004–2016, the nominal per capita income of the rural population increased by 118%, and that of the urban population – by 94%. The standards of living of rural residents do not diverge considerably from the quality of life of residents of smaller cities (up to 20,000), which can be regarded as a developmental success of Poland’s rural areas. Due to a relatively high rate of growth, falling unemployment and positive effects of EU assistance, the scale of poverty has been shrinking in rural areas and in the country at large. In 2016, the percentage of individuals living in extreme poverty households (i.e. those with expenditure below the subsistence level) fell from 12.3% to 4.9%, and from 18.1% down to 11.0% in farmer’s households as compared to 2005. The income and social advancement of the population living in rural areas was observable both in Poland and across the EU; this issue is also tackled in the Report. The narrowing of income disparities between rural and urban residents can largely be explained by a significantly higher dynamic of income growth in rural than in urban areas. In 2016, as compared to 2005, the disposable income per an equivalent person increased in the EU-27 rural areas by 64%, compared to 28% in large cities and 21% in small cities (towns). This, however, should not overshadow the scale of development problems and disparities concerning the rural (and not only rural) population. According to Barbara Chmielewska and Józef Zegar, “in the European Union, despite a high level of socio-economic development, the risk of poverty and/or social exclusion occurs on a wide scale, with marked differences visible across countries, regions and social groups. In 2016, this was the situation of 117.5 million people.” The phenomenon of social exclusion and deprivation can be encountered not only in the new, less-developed EU member states but also in some better-developed countries such as Spain, Italy or the United Kingdom. The two authors state that: “in the period after the EU accession, the share of people threatened with poverty and/or social exclusion fell in almost all EU13 countries both in rural areas and in cities whereas Poland was the country where the social situation had improved the most.” Polish farmers and other rural residents are the two groups that benefited the most from European integration. The conclusion formulated by the authors in that regard is that “reducing the disparities in income from agriculture between Poland and the remaining EU member states was inter alia an effect of direct payments and other transfers, reduced unemployment in agriculture, improved area structure and economic strength of farms, and


increased specialisation of production. An analysis of the changes in the income relations from agriculture in the EU member states suggests that, for Poland, the period after the EU accession has been one of closing the distance with the EU-15.”

1.3. Changes in the rural social structures and civic activity of rural residents The anniversary of regaining independence by Poland in 1918 inspired some authors of the Report to engage in historical reflections. This is particularly well visible in the first part of Chapter 3, whose author, Barbara FedyszakRadziejowska, discusses the often underestimated or even outright ignored political and civic activity of the rural population. The consequence of such activities was that they contained the scale of collectivisation in Poland, and resistance against the Communist authorities was particularly strong among Polish farmers. Residents of rural areas, whose number has oscillated at a level of ca. 15 million since the 1940s, are generally satisfied with their place of residence, just as the inhabitants of largest cities. The percentage of inhabitants satisfied with their residence in rural areas was not only higher (85%) than average, but also higher than that of people satisfied with living in largest cities with a population over 500,000 (84%). In an era characterised by a free flow of information and high mobility of individuals, which makes it easy to compare one’s place of residence with that of other people, such a high degree of satisfaction with living in rural areas can be viewed as proof of their considerable civilisational advancement. This process has largely been driven by EU programmes and funds available for Polish farmers and rural residents. As Fedyszak-Radziejowska wrote, “most farmers believe that they live ‘in average conditions’ (56%), and nearly one in five (18%), that they live ‘in good or very good conditions’. This indicates that the situation in that regard has improved and the social inequalities between farmers and other vocational groups have been reduced.” This positive trend is also emphasised by other authors of the Report. It should be borne in mind, however, that the level of income in rural areas still remains lower than in cities, and the scale of poverty is greater. The key development gaps between rural and urban areas are de creasing; this includes both ‘hard’ factors such as infrastructure, household appliances or income, and those related to human capital. The educational gap and the scale of digital divide are also narrowing. In 2017, Internet access at home was declared by 75% of rural residents, compared to 55% in 2015. Not only opportunities for online access are growing, but

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also the ability to use the Internet for information, education and economic purposes. Farmers and residents of rural areas less frequently participate in culture than urban inhabitants; this is also true about reading and going to the theatre, cinema or museums. Similarly, rural residents less frequently travel abroad for holidays or tourism, a phenomenon which is easy to explain. On the other hand, the share of rural residents in short-term economic migration has increased; currently, one-fourth of farmers and a similar percentage of workers declare such activity. This form of mobility affects not only the level of income but also the quality of human capital in rural areas. Our Reports devote a lot of attention to the development of social capital in rural areas. Contrary to some stereotypes and media reports, the situation in that regard is not unfavourable, and certainly not worse than in cities. Chap ter 3 of the Report offers the following conclusion: ‘today, empirical material offers many arguments that there are no fundamental differences between social capital and self-organisation level of urban and rural communities.’ Farmers and rural residents are willing to engage in activities for their communities and participate in the operation of civic organisations even more frequently than urban residents. Local government is that aspect of the political sphere that attracts the most interest and involvement on the part of rural residents; it enjoys the greatest trust, and its election mobilises rural communities, as evidenced by a high turnout in the local elections. Poland’s rural areas are more religious than the country at large, which is a well-known phenomenon. Fedyszak-Radziejowska summarises it as follows: “faith, religious practices and attachment to the Catholic moral principles all have a much stronger presence among farmers and rural residents than in other socio-professional groups.” Rural residents and farmers alike declare their strong support to Po land’s EU membership (80–85%); Polish rural areas have widely bene fited from the EU accession and appreciate it. This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. The discussion of social life in rural areas is complemented by an ana lysis of the activities of civic organisations, provided in Chapter 8 by Jan Herbst, which also offers historical reflections, some of them concerning the period before the Partitions (i.e. before 1773). The author demonstrates how the civic and social organisation of rural areas was underestimated in the last century and earlier, and concludes that “in the partitioned Poland, civic organisations acted as repositories of national identity and independence traditions. In the interwar period, they were often leading providers of basic social services, from fire protection to mutual in-


surance, business cooperation, education, combatting poverty or culture promotion.” The diversity of civic organisations operating in rural areas, particularly in the interwar period, raises considerable difficulties in their interpretation or definition. This issue is extensively analysed by Herbst, who concludes that “in describing the condition and social role of rural organisations, one should use the broadest possible definition of such activity, and refer not to the institutional spectrum typically associated with the term ‘non-governmental organisations’, but rather to a broader notion of the ‘third sector’ or ‘social economy’.” Herbst demonstrates that a large part of organised activity in rural areas is delivered through non-formal structures. At the same time, many formal (registered) organisations do not pursue any activity. According to GUS (Central Statistical Office), in 2016 the number of civic and social organisations (foundations, associations and other entities) in Poland was estimated at nearly 100,000. More than one-third of them were active in rural areas. The scope and significance of civic and social organisations operating in rural areas is not adequately recognised, respected or appreciated. It was so in the period between the World Wars and it is so today. In that regard, such organisations as voluntary fire brigades (OSP), rural homemakers’ clubs (KGW), sports associations and other organisations, with membership running in thousands play a special role in the rural space. In the Second Republic of Poland (1918–1939), cooperatives represented a sizeable and important group of civic organisations. Herbst counts parish communities, especially those run by the Catholic Church, among actors undertaking collective activities. In his opinion, there are over 40,000 of such entities. The last decade witnessed a rapid increase in the number of foundations and associations across Poland: “in rural or rural-urban municipalities, every year an average of 2100 associations and nearly 400 foundations were added to REGON (the national official business register). The increase in the number of associations year to year was even higher in rural areas than in cities.” Activities which were earlier carried out by state entities are now increasingly provided by non-governmental associations. The state’s relinquishment of the provision of many public services mobilised the local communities in such spheres as for example education and upbringing, sports, culture and social assistance. Worth noting is the growing diversification of forms of social activity and its intensity in various parts of the country, e.g. a considerable popularity of foundations and associations in the north and west of Poland, and parish communities in the south.

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1.4. Changes in agriculture

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In the present Report on the State of Rural Areas the authors analysing changes in agriculture focused on regional differences observable in agriculture and development trends viewed from a spatial perspective. One characteristic feature of Polish agriculture is that it absorbs relatively considerable labour resources, the forms and scope of which not only vary but are also difficult to appraise in detail. In parallel, the criteria governing formal farm classification and their employment used by GUS are also subject to modifications, which additionally makes it difficult for researchers to precisely determine the analysed values and their changes in time. Depending on methodology, the volume of labour resources involved in farming activity is estimated at 10–16% of the pool of labour in Poland. This is a very high value considering that the agricultural sector currently generates a mere 2.4% of the GDP. The highest rate of labour absorption can be observed in the southern regions of Poland, characterised by a prevalence of low farms. Use of labour in such farms is only partial and not very efficient. What is surprising is the increase in 2007–2016 in the number of employed in agriculture in regions where farms are small and the number of employed per 100 ha of farmland is high, i.e. in the voivodeships of Małopolskie, Podkarpackie, Lubelskie and Śląskie. In Zachodniopomorskie, the number of people employed in agriculture per 100 ha of farmland is about eight times as small as in Małopolskie. The volume of capital expenditure in agriculture varies from region to region. Such investments account for only ca. 2% of total investments in Po land, and are concentrated mainly in those regions where the farm structure ensures that they can be put to a highly productive use. Investment outlays per one person employed in the Zachodniopomorskie Voivodeship are twoand-a-half times higher than in the country at large and nearly eight times higher than in Podkarpackie. Generally speaking, the level of investments in agriculture can be regarded as unsatisfactory. The level of fixed asset depreciation in agriculture, estimated on average at 77% in 2016, is on the increase. Modernisation of food-processing plants, distribution networks and marketoriented farms, coupled with the influx of inward capital to the agri-business sector and EU support earmarked especially for agriculture, fostered the fast growth of production of agri-food products, also those for export. According to Agnieszka Baer-Nawrocka and Walenty Poczta, the authors of Chapter 3, “in 2007–2016 the value of exported agricultural produce and food products increased nearly threefold, i.e. from PLN 38,277.0 million to PLN 105,781.4


million, which meant a 3.3 percentage point increase in the share of these products in total exports, up to 13.2%.” The farm area structure is improving, although at a relatively slow pace. Nearly half of all farmland in Poland is operated by smallholdings with an area of 1-20 ha. Nonetheless, the number of smallest farms is falling, and there are more and more relatively large farms having an area between 50 and 100 ha. There are still wide regional differences in the farm structure, with the smallest farms prevalent in the southern voivodeships (Małopolskie, Podkarpackie) and the largest ones – in the northern and western regions. Farmland once owned by state-owned farms is now an asset that offers possibilities for the development of the sector of big private largescale commercial farms. The authors of Chapter 3 conclude that: “it means that, in many Polish regions, the farm area structure is unfavourable and the bulk of land is used by small farms. In those regions, the concentration process is negatively affected by many historic, economic and socio-cultural factors, intrinsic in agriculture as such and in its environment.” Withdrawal from animal production of many largest farms established from former state-owned farms (PGRs), which are converting to strictly plant production, can be regarded as an unfavourable phenomenon. In 2007–2016, the pig population decreased the most, by as much as 40%. The cow population also decreased in all regions except Podlaskie, which has turned into the country’s ‘dairy basin’. In 2000–2016, the relation between the prices of products sold by farmers and the prices of products bought for agricultural production (so-called price scissors) was as a rule not favourable for farmers. Farms’ competitiveness and the level of farmers’ incomes mainly depend on labour productivity in agriculture, which remains relatively low in Poland and shows wide differences across regions. Baer-Nawrocka and Poczta look at this situation as follows: “the Kujawsko-Pomorskie and Wielkopolskie Voivodeships, alongside Zachodniopomorskie, Warmińsko-Mazurskie and Pomorskie, are regions with the highest labour productivity in agriculture, which ranges from PLN 90,500 in Zachodniopomorskie to PLN 71,400 in Kujawsko-Pomorskie. Extremely low labour productivity, at 20-30% of the national average, was recorded in the Podkarpackie (PLN 9,535) and Małopolskie Voivodeships (PLN 13,754); what is more, labour productivity fell in these regions in the period under analysis.” Spatial disparities in the development of Polish agriculture are widening, which suggests that more attention should be paid to regional agriculture development strategies and the opportunities offered by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and national agricultural policies in reducing such disparities, predominantly by

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encouraging a better use of the production potential in those regions where such opportunities exist but are insufficiently tapped.

1.5. What are the benefits of European integration for Polish rural areas and agriculture?

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The changes and effects, especially the successes in the development of Polish agriculture and rural areas in the last decade or so cannot be sufficiently appreciated without giving justice to the role of European integration in that process. Its role cannot be simply reduced to huge transfers of funds from the EU budget for direct payments for Polish farmers nor to the EU co-financing of rural development programmes. There are enormous benefits offered by the possibility to operate on the European Single Market (trade benefits), by the stability and predictability of agricultural policy, by the Cohesion Policy, an EU programme of great significance for Poland, and by the institutional framework that guarantee various freedoms for EU citizens (civil liberties, free flow of capital, people, etc.). The opportunities and outcomes of Poland’s EU membership should be viewed from a broad perspective, and this is what we have attempted to do in the previous Reports on the State of Rural Areas. In the present Report, this issue is discussed in Chapter 6. The author emphasises what is not always acknowledged or appreciated: that benefits from EU policies and their budgets earmarked for specific countries, e.g. Polish agriculture, bring positive effects also for other countries (in the form of development synergies and multiplier effects), with the greatest shared benefits being associated with the operation of the European Single Market. Following Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004, Polish agriculture received financial support on a scale unknown before, which comprised funds both from the EU and the national budgets. Such assistance was complemented by other EU policies, first and foremost the Cohesion Policy, with their positive effects being felt by farmers and other rural residents. One accumulated effect of these policies was the phenomenon indicated in the past editions of the Report and in the present one, which we metaphorically termed “joining the rural areas to Poland”, and which refers to reducing the scale of exclusion and closing the development gap between urban and rural areas. The issue is tackled by several authors. The key examples of benefits derived from European integration and EU policies, discussed in Chapter 6, include: • FDI influx to Poland: PLN 778 billion in 2004–2016; • rapid growth of exports, incl. exports of agricultural produce and foodstuffs, with the balance of trade in these products in excess of EUR 7 billion in plus;


• Poland has become the leading beneficiary of financial settlements with the EU: the net balance in 2014–2016 reached EUR 10 billion; • in 2004–2017, agricultural producers in Poland received EUR 28 billion of direct payments from the EU budget; • over 80% Polish farmers receive direct payments, even though nearly half of them do not produce for the market; • direct payments in Poland account for ca. 50% of farmers’ incomes; • in 2004–2015, over 40,000 projects aimed to create jobs outside agriculture in rural areas were completed thanks to EU support; • the EU designed a widely accessible programme to support small farms; • the EU also launched a mechanism whereby young farmers can receive support under CAP’s first and second pillar; • many efforts were made to better integrate EU policies, particularly CAP and the Cohesion Policy. On the eve of a new programming and financing period in the development of the European Union (post 2020), there appeared a real threat that the EU funds earmarked for these two policies will be curbed due e.g. to Brexit and new development priorities and needs identified within the EU.

1.6. Political preferences, views and elections of rural residents Rural Poland is the stronghold of the currently ruling Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – PiS). As Jerzy Bartkowski, author of the chapter on political preferences in rural areas, wrote: “PiS has been the party enjoying the strongest support in rural areas and among farmers since the 2001 election. Such strong support was also visible in both rounds of the presidential election (10 May and 24 May 2015) and in the parliamentary election (25 October 2015). In the latter, the higher turnout of rural voters, including farmers, was a major factor that helped to tip the scales of power in Poland.” We pointed out in the previous Reports that rural voters play a decisive role in the election results in Poland. The party that wins in rural areas usually wins the national election. In the opinion polls carried out by the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS) in 2015–2018, the share of PiS government supporters among rural residents was high albeit variable (40-50%), and even higher among farmers (50-60%), which can be found puzzling if not surprising. In the last days of Beata Szydło’s cabinet, its activities (since the day it was appointed) were viewed positively by as many as 81% farmers and 68% rural residents. The president’s activities had similarly positive rankings, and the views about

21


the future of the country were generally optimistic. In February 2018, the majority of farmers were of the opinion that Poland was heading in the right direction, and a mere 29% held an opposite view. Ever since 1990, no party has won such a staggeringly high support among farmers as PiS. If juxtaposed with all that has taken place in rural areas over that period, with the effects of policies and activities of the previous governments, and particularly with the effects of European integration for rural development described by us, the attitude shown by farmers to the PiS government can be found quite surprising. The PiS government has not introduced any new institutional or financial arrangements that would be beneficial for farmers; has passed an act on the agricultural system (on the market for land) that is not popular with farmers, and has pursued an internal and foreign policy that jeopardises Poland’s, and Polish farmers’ access to EU funds, which have so far been so widely and profitably used by rural areas and agriculture. Rural residents more widely than urban inhabitants were lured by the so-called ‘dignity and historical policy’ of PiS, appealing to traditional values, improving the social conditions of families (the so-called “Family 500+ programme” for families with children), lowering the retirement age, and a tangible improvement of the labour market situation. In the opinion of rural residents, their economic (existential) safety has been improved under the PiS government. In early 2018, farmers declared a high turnout in the future parliamentary election (74%), similarly to rural residents, who however declared a slightly lower turnout (66%). These social groups may still have a substantial if not decisive influence on the result of the next parliamentary election. The same can be said about the forthcoming local government election, the type of election which is the most popular with rural voters. In rural areas, the support for Poland’s EU membership remains high, at over 80%. Similarly, both rural residents and farmers have a positive view of the democratic system in comparison to other forms of government (62-68% of approvals), although at the same time relatively considerable dissatisfaction with how democracy works in Poland (4348%) can be observed.

1.7. Rural areas in the long historical perspective

22

Chapter 9 summarises the evolution of agriculture and rural areas in Poland since the abolition of serfdom in 1864, and more broadly since the regaining of independence by Poland in 1918. During that period, socio-economic and political systems had changed, so as the country’s borders, international con-


ditions, agrarian structure and many other significant determinants of growth. It should be borne in mind that, over that period, Poland went through two wars: the Polish-Soviet War (1920–1921) and World War II (1939–1945). In Poland, the socio-economic and political systems changed rapidly and completely; the country has undergone four sweeping institutional and systemic transformations. Rural areas and agriculture played a major part in these changes and in the processes of socio-economic development taking place in such a volatile and turbulent historical conditions. In the period between two World Wars, over 70% of the country’s population lived in rural areas. At the time, rural residents and agricultural workers included mainly peasants working small farms, and peasants represented 51-52% of the country’s total population and about 70% of the rural population. The Second Republic of Poland (1918–1939) implemented several stages of agrarian reform aimed to open access to land, the basic factor of production, to landless peasants and smallholders. Another important goal of the reform was to alleviate a sense of deprivation and humiliation of the peasant estate. It was also intended to strengthen a sense of empowerment of peasants and rural residents in the system of government of the reborn Polish state. These goals were only partially achieved. In the interwar period, 2,650,000 ha of land was expropriated, divided into plots and sold to landless peasants and smallholders; in effect, an agrarian structure evolved in which very small farms prevailed. The structure proved to be rather long-lasting as it continued into the People’s Republic of Poland (1945–1989) and the Third Republic of Poland (post 1989). In the interwar period, there was a need to remedy the damages caused by the war, unite the country and lay the institutional foundations necessary for the existence of a modern state. Half through that period, the most severe economic crisis of the century had broken out, which led to a 30% slump in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and set the country’s economic development back by several years. Throughout the period of the Second Republic of Poland, especially in the first years following the regaining of independence in 1918, and then in the mid-1930s, a group of genuine and influential peasant leaders emerged, some of whom occupied high-ranking positions in the country’s political structures. The most eminent of all was undoubtedly Wincenty Witos, who served three times as prime minister. Characteristically, both in the interwar period and after World War II, the newly formed authorities wanted to gain political support among peasants, the most numerous social group, by promising, and partly implementing, agrarian reforms, which in effect increased the land holdings

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24

of smaller farms and landless peasants. These processes, however, would come to a halt after the new authorities had consolidated their power. The agrarian reform in the wake of World War II started with the decree passed by the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) in July 1944. During the reform of 1944–1948, more than 6 million hectares were divided into landholdings, with 1,068,000 allotted farms and the average area of apportioned land being 5.7 ha per farm. Some attempts at collectivisation were made as early as the late 1940s, but produced rather limited results; most of the cooperatives which were established under political pressure were liquidated in the mid-1950s. The building of socialism in Poland’s rural areas (1949–1989) met with more resistance and led to fewer successes than in other significant sectors of the economy and society or in other countries of the socialist bloc. Polish peasants left a more visible mark on the Polish version of socialism than any other social group. The years after the end of World War II were characterised by a stable population living in Poland’s rural areas, at a level of ca. 15 million, although the share of the rural population in the country’s overall population fell from 60% directly after the war to less than 40% at present. The agrarian structure which evolved after the abolition of serfdom and in the Second Republic of Poland, based on the prevalence of small family farms, was the backbone of the peasant culture and economy. The enormous significance of the peasant estate in Poland’s economic and social structure is a hallmark distinguishing Poland from other countries of contemporary Europe. The initial years after the commencement of the post-socialist trans formation in 1989 proved very challenging for Polish farmers. Post 1990, the price relations between the products sold and bought by farmers were unfavourable (so-called price scissors), farmers’ incomes fell, the level of unemployment was high both in cities and in rural areas, and public funds earmarked for agricultural policies were severely curtailed. Particularly difficult was the situation of workers of former state-owned farms. The restructuring processes, together with the privatisation of land and production assets formerly held by state-owned farms (PGRs) and taken over by the State Treasury, released assets which led to the development of the sector of large, private farms owned by both individuals and companies. In the years 1991–2003, the balance of trade in agricultural produce and foodstuffs remained negative, and a sizeable portion of the production potential of Polish agriculture was not tapped. What brought a truly sweeping change in the development conditions of Polish agriculture, in the agricultural policy, economic standing of farms


and living conditions of the rural population, was Poland’s accession to the European Union in 2004. Making the EU’s direct payments accessible to nearly 90% farmers in Poland had a positive impact on the level of agricultural incomes and opened up opportunities for farm modernisation and expansion. The share of EU transfers in the farms’ incomes reached 50%. The stable and predictable agricultural policy and the accompanying finan cial measures and instruments, as a rule implemented in seven-year periods, also fostered the development of agriculture post 2004. During Poland’s EU membership, the agri-food complex has been thoroughly modernised, as a result of which exports of foodstuffs have soared, particularly to the European markets. The positive trade balance in this category of goods has been on the increase since 2003 and now stands at ca. EUR 7 billion. In 2004–2018, the relations between farmers’ incomes and the country’s average greatly improved (the so-called income parity for agriculture), so as the opportunities of farms for expansion and the living conditions in rural areas. Rural areas are increasingly considered attractive places to live, and the balance of rural-urban migration is favourable for rural areas. Unquestionably, the years following Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004 have been the most prosperous period for farmers and rural residents throughout the history of Poland’s rural areas and Polish agriculture.

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Pagina

26


Izasław Frenkel*

Chapter 2. Rural population This chapter briefly describes the basic changes in the status, demographic structure and economic activity of the rural population during the last two or three years in comparison to the previous trends. Similarly to Rural Poland 2016, the trends that can be observed in Poland’s rural areas are compared to the changes that have taken place in Polish cities and other European Union countries. This Report draws mainly on the current demographic and economic activity statistics published by the Central Statistical Office (GUS) and on Eurostat data. It also incorporates some findings from the Population and Housing Census 2002 (NSP 2002) and the National Census of Population and Housing 2011 (NSP 2011) .

2.1. Trends of change in rural population numbers The overall dynamics of change in the number of Poland’s population in 2014–2016 closely resembled that from the years 2012–2014: both these periods were characterised by a decreasing trend, on a very similar scale, of approximately –0.1%. Moreover, the differences in the dynamics of urban and rural population, visible for over a decade, were continued in both these periods: just as before, also in 2014–2016 the number of urban residents fell (by –0.4%), and that of rural residents – increased (by 0.3%). The scale of change was slightly smaller in these two populations than in the years 2012–2014 when it was, respectively, –0.5% and 0.4%. * Izasław Frenkel, Institute of Rural and Agricultural Development, Polish Academy of Sciences. In this Report, “rural areas” are understood as areas situated outside the administrative boundaries of urban areas (cities). The terms “rural areas” and “villages” are treated as equivalents. Unless otherwise specified, the data presented here refer to the population actually living in a given administrative unit. This category includes the population with permanent residence (that is, registered as permanent residents or residing permanently without being registered) in a given territorial unit, and the population with temporary residence (registered as temporary residents) for longer than three months (cf. Rocznik Demograficzny 2017, uwagi do działu Stan i struktura ludności). The criterion of registration used in the definition means that the category of the actually living population (also referred to as the actual population) also includes persons permanently living in Poland, but temporarily residing abroad (regardless of the period of their absence). Unless otherwise stated, all data concerning population numbers and their changes since 2010 come from the current demographic statistics in the version which incorporates the findings from the NSP 2011.

27

2. Rural population

In 2014–2016, the size of the rural population increased in ten voivode ships: from 0.1% in Łódzkie and Zachodniopomorskie to 2.5% in Pomorskie, and fell in the remaining six: from –0.2% in Warmińsko-Mazurskie to –5.2% in Lubuskie; nowhere except Lubuskie that fall was by more than –1%. The increase and the decrease could generally be observed in the same voivodeships as in 2012–2014, except Lubuskie, which noted a slight increase, and Podkarpackie, where no change in the size of the rural population was observed. Similarly to the aggregate number of the rural population, in 2014–2016 its share in the number of the total population increased from 39.7% up to 39.8%. An increase was observed in all the voivodeships except Lubelskie, Lubuskie and Podlaskie, which recorded a fall, and Mazowieckie and Świętokrzyskie, where there was no change. In 2016, the share of the rural population ranged from 23.0% in Śląskie to 58.8% in Podkarpackie; it reached more than 50% also in Małopolskie (51.6%), Lubelskie (53.6%) and Świętokrzyskie (55.4%). The differences in the percentage of the rural population in 2016 were very similar to those observable in the several preceding years (Tab. 2.1).

2.2. Demographic factors of the rural population change In the demographic and population balance terms, changes in the size of the rural population are mainly caused by changes in the rate of natural increase, internal migration between urban and rural areas, permanent migration abroad and changes in the administrative division into rural and urban areas.

2.2.1. Natural increase

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In 2014–2016, just as in the previous years, the rate of natural increase of the rural population was positive (i.e. contributed to its growth) but dwindling: from 10,700 to 4,700 in absolute numbers, and from 0.7 to 0.3 persons per 1000 rural population (in cities, the rate of natural increase was negative, at 0.5‰ in both these years). In 2016, the positive rate of natural increase broken down by voivodeships was reported in eight voivodeships, and negative in the remaining eight: Dolnośląskie, Lubelskie, Lubuskie, Łódzkie, Opolskie, Podlaskie, Śląskie and Świętokrzyskie. Except Dolnośląskie, Lubuskie and Śląskie, these were the same voivodeships as in the previous years (Tab. 2.2).


2.2.2. Births and fertility The decreasing rate of natural increase of the rural population in 2014– 2016 was a consequence of changes in its constituent parts, i.e. the birth rate and the mortality rate, with the former going down from 10.3 to 10.2 per 1000 population, and the latter going up from 9.6‰ to 9.9‰. The decline in the birth rate was caused by changes in the total fertility rate, in the number of women in reproductive age (15-49 years) and in the share of women in the peak of fertility (20-34 years). In 2014–2016: • the birth rate in rural areas declined from 10.3 to 10.2 per 1000 population (in cities, it increased from 9.9‰ to 10.2‰); • the total fertility rate in rural areas remained at the same level of 1.39 per woman (and increased from 1.22 to 1.33 in cities), while the difference between rural and urban areas fell from 14.2% to 5.1%; a considerable decrease in that regard was reported in all voivodeships; • the number of women in reproductive age in rural areas was by 16,000 lower in 2016 than in 2014 (and by about 105,000 lower in cities), while the share of women in the peak fertility age decreased from 46.0% to 45.3% of all women in reproductive age (in cities – from 46.5% to 44.1%); • just as in 2014, in 2016 the highest rates of fertility were also recorded in the population of women aged 25-29, with 98.7 births per 1000 women of that age, followed by women aged 30-34, with 76.7‰, whereas women aged 20-24, with the highest fertility only a decade ago, were ranked third, with 53.0‰; • both in 2014 and in 2016 the total fertility rate in rural areas was about one-third lower than the replacement-level fertility, it was also below that level in all the voivodeships (in 2016, by about 25% in Pomorskie to about 43% in Opolskie) (Tables 2.3 and 2.4). According to the 2015 data, the fertility level in Poland’s rural areas was lower than the average total fertility rate in all the EU member states and lower in comparison to most countries of the region. The fertility rate even lower than in Poland was found only in Cyprus, Greece, Spain and Portugal. In all the EU member states, the fertility rate did not ensure generational replacement, although in some of them (France, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom) it was close to that level (see Tab. 2.13).

The average number of children who would be born per woman in the whole fertility period (assuming that in the individual stages of the fertility period she would give births with the intensity observable for the year under analysis). Approximately 2.1 births per woman.

29

2. Rural population

2.2.3. Mortality rate and life expectancy

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In 2014–2016, the following trends were observed in that regard: • the total mortality rate in rural areas increased from 9.6 to 9.9 per 1000 population, a process that was accompanied by a simultaneous decrease in partial mortality rates in many of the five-year age groups (in cities, the total mortality rate went up from 9.9 to 10.2‰, with a simultaneous decrease in partial rate values observed in most of the age groups). Infant mortality was still on the decrease, although it remained higher in rural than in urban areas (in 2016, 4.1 and 3.9 deaths, respectively, per 1000 live births); • the average life expectancy continued to rise, albeit at a much lower pace than in the previous years. For men living in rural areas, it increased from 73.1 years in 2014 to 73.2 years in 2016, that is by only a 0.1 year, while in 2012–2014 it increased by a whole year. The situation regarding women was similar: in 2014–2016, life expectancy rose from 81.7 to 81.9 years, i.e. by 0.2 years, compared to 0.7 years in 2012–2014. A similar slowdown in life expectancy increase was found in cities; • that the dynamic of average life expectancy increase in rural areas deteriorated is also demonstrated by the fact that, while in the previous years an increase was observed in all the voivodeships, in 2014–2016 this was the case only in some of them: seven for men and 11 for women. In 2016, the highest life expectancy values for men living in rural areas (74.7 years) were reported in Małopolskie and Podkarpackie, and the lowest (71.6 years) – in Warmińsko-Mazurskie (in cities, life expectancy was the highest in Podkarpackie [76.4 years], and the lowest in Łódzkie [72.1 years]). In the population of rural women, the highest life expectancy rate (83.0 years) was recorded in Podkarpackie, and the lowest (80.5 years) in Lubuskie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie (in cities, it was the highest in Podlaskie [82.8 years], and the lowest in Łódzkie [80.3]); • men living in rural areas have a shorter life expectancy than those living in cities and, until recently, that difference, unfavourable for rural areas, was increasing: in 2010 it reached 1.2 years compared to 0.9 and 0.6 years, respectively, in 2008 and 2006. In 2012, the difference fell to 1.0 year, but in 2014 and 2016 it rose again, to 1.1 and 1.2 years, respectively. Lower life expectancy values for men in rural areas than those in urban areas are found in all the voivodeships, although to varying extents, Śląskie being the sole exception: there, these values are more favourable for rural residents. Unlike men, life expectancy values for women living in rural areas are only slightly better than those for women living in cities (e.g. by 0.1 and 0.2 years in 2010 and 2014, respectively) or show no differences at all (e.g.


• •

• •

•

in 2012 and 2016). Broken down by voivodeships, these differences were often wider and/or reversely directed (Tab. 2.5). Compared to the EU-28 countries, in 2015 in Poland’s rural areas: the average life expectancy for men was 4.9 years lower than the average in all the EU member states, and 1.6 years lower for women; life expectancy in Poland’s rural areas was also shorter than the average in most EU member states; for the population of men, the widest differences (about seven to eight years) were found in comparison to Cyprus, Spain, Iceland and Italy, and for the population of women (about three to four years) – compared to Finland, France, Hungary and Italy; lower life expectancy values for men were only found in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Hungary, and for women – also in Croatia, Czech Republic and Slovakia; the differences in life expectancy values between men and women in Poland’s rural areas (8.7 years) are among the widest in the EU. Wider differences were only observed in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia (9.0, 10.5 and 9.8 years, respectively), with the EU average of 5.4 years, and in some other countries where the differences did not exceed four years (Denmark, Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom); the infant mortality rate in Poland’s rural areas was higher than the EU average (in 2015, 4.1 and 3.6 deaths, resp., per 1000 live births) and higher than in most of the member states, with the exception of Bulgaria, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary, where it was higher (Tab. 2.13).

2.2.4. Migration In addition to the natural increase, permanent migration between rural and urban areas was the main factor contributing to the increase in the number of rural population. In 2014–2016: • in 2016, just as in 2014, the influx of the population from urban into rural areas was higher than the outflow from rural into urban areas, and in effect the balance of migration remained positive for rural areas, although it fell from 1.9 persons per 1000 rural population in 2014 to 1.6 persons in 2016; • in both these years, the balance of migration in rural areas was positive both for men and women and in most age groups except the 20-24 and In Poland, statistics concerning both internal and international migration are based on the population records concerning changes in the place of residence: for permanent residence – based on the information on registration for permanent residence purposes, and for temporary residence – based on the information on registration for purposes of temporary residence for over three months (until 2005 inclusive – for over two months). Unless stated otherwise, the data reflect migration registered in the population records.

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2. Rural population

32

25-29 age brackets, for which it was negative (in 2016, respectively, –1.5 and –6.3 persons per 1000 of rural population). In all the age groups with a positive balance of migration, in 2016 it was lower than in 2014, and higher than in 2014 in those age groups which had a negative balance of migration (Tab. 2.6); • in 2016, a positive balance of migration in rural areas was reported in the majority of voivodeships except Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, Podlaskie, Warmińsko-Mazurskie and Zachodniopomorskie, where it was negative (respectively, –0.3, –0.1, –0.9, –1.9 and –0.2 persons per 1000 population), and Świętokrzyskie, where it was at a zero level. In the voivodeships with a positive migration balance it was on the whole lower in 2016 than in 2014 (except Pomorskie and Wielkopolskie, where it rose), and mixed in the voivodeships with a negative balance. For instance, the overall balance fell in Podlaskie, rose in Warmińsko-Mazurskie and remained the same in Lubelskie (Tab. 2.2). As regards international migration of rural residents, the years 2014–2016 brought the following changes: • the balance of migration from rural areas to seek permanent residence in other countries, which was negative in 2014 (-3,800), in 2016 was positive (800). Such a change was due to a decrease in the number of emigrants from 7200 to 3500, and an increase in the number of immigrants from 3400 up to 4300 (also in cities, the previous negative balance of migration was replaced by a positive balance (Tab. 2.3); • the most numerous group of migrants from rural areas who left Poland to live abroad were people aged 20-34. Ever since 2010, the share of this group generally oscillated between 31%-33%, and grew from 31.1% to 32.9% in 2014–2016. The second largest group of migrants were people aged 35-49; their share throughout the period in question ranged from approximately 25% to 28%, with a fall from 27.1% to 25.4% recorded in 2014–2016. In the sex structure, the percentage of men steadily increased, from 45.0% in 2010 to 51.1% and 52.4% in 2014 and 2016, respectively. In the structure based on marital (legal) status, the largest groups included married people in addition to single men and single women, whose share throughout the period in question ranged, respectively, from approximately 41% to 50%, and from 32% to 38%, with a fall reported in the years 2014–2016 from 50.3% to 47.0% in the married group and an increase from 34.2% to 35.8% in the unmarried group (single men and women). Broadly similar changes in the marital status as well as age and sex structure were found in the migration from urban areas (Tab. 2.7). International migration reported in population records accounts only for a small part of its real volume because most migrants go abroad (and very


often stay abroad for many years) without completing the relevant residence registration formalities. The relatively most complete statistics about the migrant population staying temporarily abroad are provided by the 2011 National Census (NSP 2011). They reveal the following information about the size and selected structural features of the migrant population and their changes in comparison to the NSP 2002 findings: • at the time of the 2011 National Census, the overall number of people staying temporarily abroad for a period longer than three months totalled 2,018,000 as compared to 786,000 reported in the National Census 2002. In both years, more than one-third of such migrants were people living in rural areas before they left abroad (37.9% in 2002 and 34.1% in 2011). Nearly 80% migrants from both rural and rural areas stayed abroad for 12 months or longer; • women prevail in the sex structure, accounting for 52.4% of immigrants from rural areas in 2002 and 50.9% in 2011 (and, respectively, 54.7% and 51.2% of immigrants from cities); • in terms of age, the 20-34 years brackets were the most frequently represented: people of this age group in 2011 accounted for 47.0% of rural migrants and 43.2% of urban migrants, which was a higher value in both these groups than in 2002 (41.3% and 36.8%, respectively). At the same time, the share of the second most numerous group in the population of rural migrants (aged 35-49) fell from 30.1% to 25.3%, and of urban migrants – from 32.4% to 25.1%; • in the structure based on marital (legal) status, most migrants were married, although their share in the population of rural migrants declined from 52.7% in 2002 to 46.3% in 2011, and of urban migrants – from 52.5% to 43.7%; this process was accompanied by a rising share of unmarried men and women and divorcees (Tab. 2.8); • the intensity of migration from individual voivodeships varied from region to region. In 2002, the number of people staying abroad longer than three months in the population of rural migrants oscillated from 4.0 persons per 1000 population in Łódzkie to 127.1 in Opolskie, and in 2011 – from 18.3‰ in Mazowieckie to 117.5‰ in Opolskie. Relatively low values in that regard in 2011 were also found in Łódzkie (18.8‰) and Wielkopolskie (23.5‰), and high values – in Podlaskie (82.2‰) and WarmińskoMazurskie (65.0‰). In 2011, the relevant values for urban migrants abroad ranged from 33.5‰ in Mazowieckie to 97.6‰ in Podlaskie. Low values were also reported in Łódzkie (33.7‰) and Wielkopolskie (37.0‰), and high values – in Opolskie (96.1‰) and Podkarpackie (95.7‰). In 2011, the

The NSP 2002 data comprise those who reside temporarily abroad for longer than two months.

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2. Rural population

overall differences across regions in terms of the number of people staying abroad were in 2011 much more narrow than in 2002: in the population of rural migrants, the coefficient of variation was approximately 50% and 124%, respectively, and among urban migrants – approximately 31% and 69%, respectively. In nearly all the voivodeships, the indicators showing stays abroad were in 2011 lower among rural than urban residents, and ranged from approximately 5% in the Śląskie Voivodeship to nearly 50% in Świętokrzyskie; Opolskie was the only region from which rural residents were more prone to emigrate (Tab. 2.9); • in addition to national census data, GUS publishes annual estimates of the number of people staying temporarily abroad for longer than three months, regardless of whether the authorities in charge of population records were notified about the trip or not. These data indicate that the population in question increased most rapidly in the years directly following Poland’s accession to the EU, from 1,000,000 at the end of 2004 to 2,270,000 at the end of 2007. In the years that followed, the changes were relatively insignificant and in two directions: falling initially to 2,000,000 in 2010, and then rising steadily, to reach 2,515,000 at the end of 2016. The geography of migration also changed. First and foremost, the share of emigrants residing in European Union countries increased from 75.0% in 2004 to ca. 83.32% in 2016. In 2004, in the EU alone, the majority of emigrants were living in Germany (51.3%), followed by the United Kingdom (20.0%) and Italy (7.9%). In 2016, the United Kingdom was ranked first (37.6%), with Germany dropping down to second place (32.8%), and the Netherlands to third (5,5%). Ireland was ranked fourth (5.3%), followed by Italy, which fell to fifth place (4.4%). The GUS estimates do not provide information on the share of migrants coming from rural areas. However, it can be assumed with a high degree of probability that in all the years concerned it oscillated within the range reported in the NSP 2002 and the NSP 2011 censuses, that is, was slightly higher than one-third of all migrants staying temporarily abroad.

2.3. Changes in the administrative division into urban and rural areas Due to the adoption of an administrative criterion of division into urban and rural areas in the Polish statistical system, any changes in the administrative For the years 2004–2005 – over two months. GUS: Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach czasowej emigracji from Polski w latach 2004–2016 (http://gov.stat.pl).

34


division are also a factor affecting the changes in the size of the rural population. For nearly the whole period after World War II, the administrative changes led to a decline in these numbers. In 2015 and 2016, the number of rural residents fell as a result by approximately 22,000 (compared to approximately 14,000 in the previous two years). To sum up the data characterising the major demographic balance factors contributing to changes in the size of the rural population in 2015–2016, we can conclude that the factor that most strongly contributed to its increase was permanent migration from urban areas (approximately 49,000). The natural increase had a similar impact, albeit on a smaller scale (approximately 4,000), whereas permanent migration abroad and administrative changes reduced the scale of growth by approximately –3,000 and –22,000, respectively. In cities, the falling number of the population was associated mainly with a negative balance of migration between rural and urban areas (approx. –49,000), followed by a negative natural increase (approx. –35,000) and a negative balance of international migration (approx. –11,000). Only the changes in the administrative division had an opposite effect (approx. 22,000) (Tab. 2.10).

2.4. Structure of rural population by age and sex •

• • • •

The years 2014–2016 brought the following changes in that regard: in the rural population structure based on working age groups, the share of the population in pre-working age declined from 20.1% to 19.7% (and rose from 16.7% to 16.8% in cities), and in working age, from 63.3% to 62.9% (in cities – from 62.8% to 61.1%); it increased in post-working age, from 16.6% to 17.4% (in cities – from 20.6% to 22.1%); in the working-age population, the share of the older group in rural areas decreased from 22.9% to 22.8% (in cities – from 23.6% to 22.7%); as a consequence of changes in the number of the working and postworking age population, the old-age dependency ratio increased from 26 to 28 (in cities – from 33 to 36); taking into account all the changes in the age structure, the median age value rose from 37.7 to 38.4 years of age (in cities – from 40.6 to 41.4); the changes in the sex structure of the rural population were minimal: the total femininity ratio remained at an unchanged level of 1006 women per 1000 men (similarly in cities, at the same level of 1009). The value of the

In this classification, the following groups are distinguished: pre-working age: 0-17 years; working age: men 18-64 years; women 18-59 years, younger working age: 18-44 years; older working age: men 45-64 years; women 45-59 years; post-working age: men 65 years and over; women 60 years and over. The old-age dependency ratio has been calculated as the number of persons in post-working age per 100 persons in working age.

35

2. Rural population

femininity rate in the 20-29 age group (when women most frequently get married) increased from 937 to 940 women per 1000 men (and in cities – dropped from 986 to 982) (Tab. 2.11). The highest ageing level of the rural population and the biggest short ages of young women can be observed mostly in the regions which, until recently, were for many years characterised by a negative balance of mi gration from rural to urban areas, especially in the eastern and some of the central parts of the country. Similarly to 2014, in 2016 also the highest share of the population in post-working age and one of the highest median age values was recorded in the Podlaskie Voivodeship (20.7% and 40.5 years, respectively); this region also had the highest value of the dependency ratio (34) and the lowest femininity ratio in the 20-29 age group (900) (Tab. 2.12). The old-age level in Poland, including rural population, is among the lowest of all European Union countries and Iceland. Measured by the percentage of the population aged 65 years and over, in 2016 the lower level in comparison with the rural population in Poland was found only among the total population of Ireland, Iceland and Luxembourg, and that measured by the median age – in Cyprus, Ireland and Iceland. Only in Ireland, Luxembourg and Slovakia was the value of the dependency ratio10 lower than in Poland’s rural areas. Compared to Germany, a country with one of the highest values in that regard, in Poland they were lower, respectively, by 6.8 pp, 7.3 years and 11.3 persons (Tab. 2.13). The process of population ageing in Poland, also in its rural areas, which is relatively low compared to other EU countries, is drawing to an end because the coming years are expected to bring a considerable acceleration in that regard. According to GUS demographic forecasts for the years 2014–2050 concerning the population structure based on working age groups, the share of the population in post-working age in the total population will increase across the country from 18.4% in the forecast’s base year (2013) to 36.5% in the final year, a process which will be accompanied by a falling share of the population in pre-working age (from 18.2% to 14.6%) and in working age (from 63.4% to 48.8%). One of the major consequences of these changes will be a spike in the value of the dependency ratio (from 29 to 75 in the post-working age group per 100 population in working age). Similar tendencies are expected to be found in cities and in rural areas. In rural areas, the percentage of working-age population is expected to fall from 63.4% to 50.8% (in cities – from 63.5% to 47.3%), whereas the percentage of post-working age population is likely to increase from 16.2% to 33.9% 36

10

The number of people aged 65 or over per 100 population aged 15-64.


(in cities – from 19.8% to 38.7%), and the dependency ratio – from 29 to 67 persons (in cities – from 31 to 82 persons).

2.5. Employment11 Employment indicators are among the main measures of the use of labour resources in the national economy. At the beginning of the present decade, the change trends of these indicators were not very favourable overall, but the subsequent years, especially the recent ones, brought significant improvements. On the basis of the available data, we can show these changes as an annual average for the years 2014–2016 and partly for 2017. In 2014–2016: • the overall employment rate (15 years and over) in rural areas increased from 50.9% to 52.6%, including that in working age from 66.0% to 68.6% (in cities, respectively, from 51.4% to 52.9% and from 68.5% to 71.7%); • as regards the working-age population,12 one of the highest increases in rural areas was reported in the oldest age group:13 from 49.4% to 54.0% (in cities – from 53.1% to 56.8%). This is a continuation of the trend observable since the beginning of the present decade. A similar spike was recorded in the 18-24 age group, in which a downward trend was observed until 2014, from 37.9% to 42.4% (in cities – from 31.5% to 34.2%). A significant increase was also reported in the 25-54 age group – from 76.6% to 78.2% (in cities – from 79.6% to 81.8%). The only group which saw only a slight rise in the employment rate included post-working age rural population14 – from 6.1% to 6.3% (in cities – from 7.3% to 8.5%); • in the population of men, the overall employment rate increased in rural areas from 59.8% to 61.7%, and in the population of women – from 42.2% to 43.6% (in cities – from 58.8% to 60.3% and from 44.8% to 46.4%, respectively); • an increase in the employment values of rural population (overall employ ment and employment broken down by age and sex) was reported both in the farming population and non-farming (i.e. landless) population.15 The 11 Unless specified otherwise, all the data presented in this chapter come from the labour force survey (BAEL) carried out quarterly by GUS. The survey covers persons aged 15 years or over who are household members. Persons residing away from their households, i.e. abroad or in collective accommodation establishments in Poland (until Q2 2012 – for over three months, as of Q3 2012 – 12 months or longer) are not included. As of Q1 2010, the data include the findings from the NSP 2011 (cf. Aktywność Ekonomiczna Ludności Polski. II kwartał 2017 r. Warsaw. GUS 2017). 12 Men aged 18-64, women aged 18-59. 13 Men aged 55-64, women aged 55-59. 14 Men aged 65 or over, women aged 60 or over. 15 As of 2015, the data concerning the rural population broken down into the farming and non-farming (landless) population are prepared in two versions, based on the old and the new definition of the farm (agri

37

2. Rural population

•

•

•

•

38

only decrease in employment rates was observed in the post-working age population in farms associated with agriculture (from 15.5% in 2014 to 13.0% in 2016); similarly to the previous years, the employment rates of the non-farming rural population remained much lower than those of farmers: in 2016, the overall employment rate was, respectively, 46.8% and 65.0%. Likewise, the employment rate values in the non-farming rural population are also much lower than in cities16 (Tab. 2.14). Both in cities and in the two groups of the rural population, the rates of employment increase with the level of educational attainment. In the rural population with tertiary education, the employment rate in 2016 reached 79.4%; with secondary education – 62.7%, and with primary or lower education – 17.0%. Among people with secondary education, the employment rate was higher in the category of people with vocational than with general secondary education (66.8% and 51.9%, respectively), whereas people with basic vocational education were less frequently employed than those with secondary vocational education (61.1%). It should also be noted that, among the non-farming rural population, despite a much lower overall rate of employment than in cities, these values were generally similar for all levels of educational attainment, and in some cases even higher than those in cities (Tab. 2.15). This suggests that the key to increasing the overall rate of employment of the non-farming rural population up to the level observed in urban areas lies in improving the level of education of the non-farming population living in rural areas; the upward trend in the rates of employment prevailing in 2014–2016 was also continued in 2017. For example, according to the data for the second quarter (one of the three quarters for which the statistics for 2017 were available while writing this Report), the overall employment rate in rural areas rose from 52.7% in 2016 to 53.7% in 2017 – from 64.9% to 65.7% in the farming population, and from 46.9% to 48.3% in the nonfarming population (in cities – from 52,7 to 54,0%); similarly to 2012–2014, also in 2014–2016 the overall employment rates in rural areas increased in the majority of voivodeships (12, compared to 10 in the previous two years; in cities, respectively, in 14 and also 10 voivodships (Tab. 2.16).

cultural holding). As regards employment, the differences between these two versions are minimal. Therefore, it was concluded that the comparison of the 2014 data based on the old definition with the 2016 data based on the new definition captures the actual scale of changes that took place in the analysed period. 16 The employment rate values for the non-farming (landless) and those for the farming population are not fully comparable due to the differences in the labour relationships: market-based in the former and family-based in the latter. In terms of the labour relationships, the employment rate values for the non-farming population are fully comparable with those of the urban population.


Despite a substantial improvement in the recent years, the rates of employment of rural population in Poland are still lower than the EU average values and country values across the EU. This is especially true about women, youth aged 15-24 and older people aged 55-64. The gap is particularly wide between Poland and Germany, United Kingdom and the Nordic countries. For example, in 2016, the overall employment rate (for population aged 15-64) was in Poland lower by 17% than in Denmark, including by 9% for men and by 24% for women. In the 15-24 age brackets, the rate in Poland was nearly twice as low as in Denmark, and in the 55-64 age brackets – lower by one-third (Tab. 2.20). In 2014–2016, the basic change trends in the employment structure within the working population were the following (average annual values unless stated otherwise): • the process of disagrarianisation of the employment structure was continued: the share of employed in agriculture17 declined across the country from 11.5% in 2014 to 10.5% in 2016, including individual farming – from 10.5% to 9.4%. The decline in rural areas was, respectively, from 26.9% to 24.2% and from 25.0% to 22.0%; • the decline of the share employed in agriculture was also recorded in 2017. In the second quarter, it decreased in the overall working population from 10.8% in 2016 to 10.4% in 2017, including in the population living in rural areas from 24.7% to 24.0%; • the majority of those employed in agriculture are self-employed;18 in 2016, self-employed accounted for 87.3% of all employed in agriculture and 95.4% in individual farming, including in rural areas 89.1% and 96.2%, respectively; the rest are hired (contract) workers (employed on a permanent, seasonal or ad hoc basis); • the share of self-employed among those working outside agriculture is defi nitely lower and has been stable for many years now at a level of 11-12% among rural residents (in cities – 13-14% (Tab. 2.17); • The disagrarianisation of the employment structure affected almost all voivodeships (except Łódzkie and Małopolskie, where the share of employed in individual farming in 2016 was the same or higher than in 2014). In 2016, the share of employed in individual farming in relation to all people in work ranged from 2.0% in Śląskie to 22.1% in Podlaskie, and in relation to rural residents, from 5.08% to 53.1% in the above two 17 The classification of the employed based on occupational categories, including the farming population and the employed outside agriculture, was based on the criterion of the primary place of work. Unless stated otherwise, the data concerning agriculture in general also comprise forestry, hunting and fishery. 18 The self-employed category includes persons conducting individual business activity and employing no staff, also employers and family members helping them without remuneration.

39

2. Rural population

voivodeships. The regional map of the shares of the population employed in agriculture has been stable for years and does not considerably differ from the one recorded in the previous years (Tab. 2.18). As regards the sex and age structure of people in work, the years 2014– 2016 saw the following changes:19 • most rural residents in work are men, although men’s share fell from 58.6% in 2014 to 58.3% in 2016 (in cities – from 53.7% to 53.3%). The share of men in the rural population working in individual farming was in the two years lower than that in the population employed outside agriculture, and in 2016 totalled, respectively, 57.7% and 58.5%; • the structure of the rural population in work by working age groups20 re mained at nearly the same level in the two years in question: in 2016, the working-age population accounted for 97.3% of the total rural population in work, with the share of people in the younger working-age brackets nearly twice as high as in the older group (62.1% and 35.2%, respectively). People in the post-working age group accounted for 2.6% (in cities, in 2014–2016 the share of the working-age population fell from 96.3% to 95.5% of the total urban population in work, and increased from 3.6% to 4.5% in the post-working age group); in both years under analysis, similarly to the situation in rural areas, the share of employed in the younger working-age brackets in the total urban population in work was nearly twice as high as the share of employed in the older working-age brackets; • the population of people employed in individual farming is characterised by a much older age structure than that of rural residents working outside agriculture: in 2016, the share of employed in the older working-age was, respectively, 47.3% and 31.7%, and in post-working age – 5.1% and 1.8% (among people in work in cities, the percentage of older employees was lower than that of those employed in agriculture, but higher in comparison to rural residents working outside agriculture). Although the years 2014–2016 brought further improvement as far as the level of education of the rural population in work is concerned, it still remains much lower than that of people in work living in urban areas; • in the rural population, the share of employed with tertiary or secondary edu cation in 2014–2016 rose from 54.1% to 55.6% of the total rural population in work (in cities – from 76.9% to 78.6%), and with tertiary education alone – from 19.6% to 20.6% (in cities – from 40.9% to 42.2%);

40

19 The data concerning the employment structure in terms of sex, age and level of education show the situation in the third quarter (Q3) of a given year. 20 In the population aged 15 and over, the following age subgroups are distinguished: pre-working age: 15-17 years; working age: men aged 18-64, women aged 18-59; younger working age: 18-44 years, older working age: men aged 45-64, women aged 45-59; post-working age: men aged 65 or over, women aged 60 or over.


• the lowest level of education attainment characterises rural residents em ployed in individual farming: 34.9% of them in 2014 and 38.1% in 2016 had tertiary or secondary education (tertiary education – 5.2% and 5.9%, respectively); • in both years, the level of educational attainment of rural residents working outside agriculture was much higher than that of rural residents employed in agriculture, but lower than compared to that in cities. This is evidenced mainly by the lower than in cities share of the employed with tertiary education (in 2016, 24.8% compared to 42.2%) and higher than in cities share of people with lower secondary or lower education (6.8% compared to 3.2%) (Tab. 2.19). Compared to European Union countries, the share of employed in agri culture in Poland is among the highest. Calculated for the EU working-age population (15-64 years), in 2016 it was 10.4% on average (including forestry and fishery). Higher values were only recorded in Greece (11.7%) and Romania (20.7%). In the remaining countries, that share ranged from 1.0% in the United Kingdom to 7.7% in Lithuania. In Poland, people employed in agriculture in 2016 represented nearly one-fifth of the total population employed in the EU agriculture, that is nearly the same number as in France, Spain and the United Kingdom combined (Tab. 2.20).

2.6. Rural unemployment21 The falling unemployment, a process which began in 2012–2014, was also continued in the following two years, at a much faster pace. According to labour office statistics, the number of unemployed rural residents declined from 812,000 at the end of 2014 to 604,000 at the end of 2016, i.e. by 25.6% (compared to 13.5% in 2012–2014) and, according to the Polish labour force survey (BAEL), from 583,000 to 422,000 in the fourth quarters of those years, i.e. by 27.6% (compared to 14.0% in the previous two years). The substantially accelerated pace of falling unemployment in 2014–2016 was also recorded in cities and both rural population groups (i.e. associated and not associated with agricultural farms). Both the data from labour offices and from BAEL indicate that the rapid decrease in the number of unemployed was also continued in 2017 (Tables 2.21 and 2.22). 21 In Poland, there are two stable sources of statistical data about unemployment: the current registration of the unemployed conducted by labour offices and the labour force survey – BAEL. The latter’s scope of data is much broader than that of labour offices in terms of the division into urban and rural areas. Due to the differences in methodology, including the definition of the unemployed, data from these two sources differ in terms of the absolute number of the unemployed and unemployment structure, but reveal generally similar trends of change (for the two definitions of the unemployed, cf. Kwartalna informacja o rynku pracy IV kwartale 2015 r. GUS, Warsaw, February 2016).

41

2. Rural population

The basic trends of change in the structure of rural unemployment 2014– 2016 were as follows:22 • in the structure of unemployed by causes for seeking work, the most numer ous group were people who lost their jobs. In rural areas, the share of that group decreased from 40.2% to 34.7% (in cities – from 43.9% to 37.6%). The second most numerous group was made up of unemployed who wanted to re-enter the labour market; in rural areas, their share remained at a similar level of approximately 30-31% (in cities, it rose from 32.6% to 36.8%). The third group consisted of unemployed who started their first job; their share rose from 25.8% to 30.1% (in cities, it remained stable at approximately 17%). The smallest group included those unemployed who dropped out of work (in both years, 4-5% in rural areas and 6-9% in cities); • the share of women in the total number of the rural unemployed fell from 49.1% in 2014 to 42.4% in 2016 (in cities, it remained at a level of approximately 49%). In both years, it was higher in the farming than in the non-farming population (in 2016, it was, respectively, 44.2% and 41.8%); • most of the rural unemployed are people aged up to 34 years – their share rose from 60.0% to 62.2% (in cities, it remained at approximately 48.0%). Younger groups of the unemployed generally prevail in the population associated with farms (80.2% in 2016) rather than in the nonfarming population (57.0%). Both these groups also considerably differ in the percentage of the unemployed aged 45 and over, which is much lower in the former than in the latter group (11.6% and 23.9%, respectively); • in rural areas, in the unemployment structure based on the level of education, the share of people with tertiary education remained at a similar level of approximately 12-13% (in cities, it rose from 19.2% to 24.9%), and the share of people with secondary education fell from 37.7% to 34.2% (in cities, from 40.3% to 36.0%). In rural areas, the share of the unemployed who completed basic vocational school remained at a similar level, of about 36-37% (whereas urban areas saw a decline from 27.5% to 26.4%), and the share of unemployed with not more than lower secondary school education increased from 14.2% to 16.6% (in cities, it remained at the previous level of approximately 13%). In rural areas alone, the education level of the unemployed in the farming population is considerably higher than that in the non-farming population, which is partly associated with the younger age structure of the former than the latter population; • the years 2014–2016 brought a number of favourable changes in the un employment structure based on the time needed to find work. The percent 42

22

Unless not stated otherwise, BAEL data show the status for the third quarter (Q3).


age of long-term unemployed23 fell in rural areas from 34.7% to 27.0%, including those unemployed for over 24 months, from 16.0% to 11.3% (in cities, respectively, from 36.1% to 24.9% and from 16.8% to 11.3%). At the same time, the share of the unemployed seeking work up to six months increased from 43.9% to 53.7% in rural areas and from 43.6% to 56.5% in cities. As a result of such and other changes, the average time of seeking work dropped in rural areas from 13.0 to 11.9 months, and in cities – from 13.1 to 10.6 months (Tab. 2.23); • only a small percentage of the unemployed are entitled to unemployment benefit. According to labour office data from the end of 2016, 13.9% of rural unemployed and 14.0% of urban unemployed had the right to collect such a benefit (Tab. 2.21). The fall in the absolute number of the unemployed was accompanied by a fall in the unemployment rate.24 According to labour office statistics, the rate of registered unemployment nationwide decreased from 11.4% at the end of 2014 to 8.2% at the end of 2016 and, according to the BAEL data for the fourth quarter, from 8.1% to 5.5%. The pace of decline was faster than in the previous two years: according to labour office data, it was, respectively, 3.2 percentage points (pp) and 2.0 pp, and according to BAEL – 2.6 pp and 2.0 pp. The rapidly falling unemployment rate could also be observed in 2016–2017; according to labour office statistics from the end of September, it dropped from 8.3% to 6.8% over that period, and according to BAEL data from the third quarter, from 5.9% to 4.7%. Only BAEL data offer information on changes in the unemployment rate separately for rural and urban residents. According to its findings for the fourth quarter: • the unemployment rate decreased nationwide from 8.1% in 2014 to 5.5% in 2016, and in rural areas from 8.5% to 6.1% (in cities – from 7.8% to 5.1%). Both nationwide as well as in rural and urban areas, the scale of the decrease was greater than in the previous two years; • the falling unemployment rate was recorded both in rural and urban areas regardless of sex, age and level of education of the unemployed, and both in the farming and non-farming population; • similarly to the previous years, also in 2014–2016 the rate of unemployment in rural areas was higher among women than men, although in 2016 this gap was much smaller than in 2014 (when the unemployment rate of women was 9.8% and of men – 7.6%, compared to, respectively, 6.3% and 6.0% in 2016). A similar flattening of the values and differences in the unemployment rate of men and women was found in cities; Persons seeking a job for 13 months longer. The percentage of the unemployed to the economically active population, i.e. the sum of people in work and the unemployed. 23 24

43

2. Rural population

• broken down by age, the highest unemployment rate can be observed in the group of young people aged 18-24; in this group, the decrease recorded in 2014–2016 was also among the highest: from 23.6% to 17.4% in rural areas and from 20.6% to 14.4% in cities. In the group aged 25-29, the unemployment rate was in both years nearly two times lower, and in 2016 in the remaining age groups ranged between 4% and 7% in rural and urban areas alike; • in terms of the level of educational attainment, the unemployment rate in rural areas in 2016 was the lowest among people with tertiary education – 3.7%, and the highest – among primary and lower secondary school-leavers – 10.2% (in cities – 2.7% and 16.3%, respectively). In the population with secondary education, the unemployment rate was higher among people with general than vocational education, both in rural and urban areas; • in the two years under analysis, the overall unemployment rate of the non-farming population was higher in rural than in urban areas,25 and in 2016 reached, respectively, 7.65% and 5.1%. A similar tendency could be observed for partial indicators e.g. sex, age and level of education (Tables 2.24 and 2.25). Just as in 2014, in 2016 the overall unemployment rate of the rural population in Poland was also lower than the EU average. In 2016, how ever, the scale of the differences was much wider than two years before: –2.1 and –0.7 percentage points (pp), respectively. In 2016, similar or higher differences in the unemployment rate between Poland and the EU were also found in the 25-49 years and 50-64 years age brackets, as well as in male and female populations. Only in the in group of youth aged 15-24 years the unemployment rate in Poland’s rural areas was only slightly lower than the EU average (-0.7 pp). The unemployment rate in rural areas in Poland is also lower than that in most EU countries; in 2016, it was lower than in Poland in ten countries, the lowest values being recorded in the Czech Republic (4.0%) and Germany (4.1%), compared to 6.5% in Poland’s rural areas (Tab. 2.26).

Concluding remarks The main trends concerning the demographic changes in rural areas in 2014–2016 discussed in the Report coincided with the changes observed in the previous two years. The number of the rural population continued to increase, albeit at a lower pace than before (0.4% and 0.6%, respectively); the structure of the underlying demographic factors was also similar: in both these periods, 44

25 The date on the unemployment rate in landless rural households are fully comparable with the data on the urban unemployment rates.


the positive balance of migration between rural and urban areas contributed to the increase in the size of the rural population, so as – although on a much lesser scale – the positive natural increase. On the other hand, the factors impeding population growth in rural areas included a negative balance of international migration and, to a much greater extent, administrative changes. The average life expectancy continued to increase, but at a much slower pace than in the previous years; the slowdown affected both men and women, residents of rural areas and cities alike. The ageing process of the rural population continued: the percentage of the population in pre-working age decreased and the share of the population in post-working age increased, so as did the median age. Similarly, the old-age dependency ratio increased. The years 2014–2016 were characterised by an acceleration of advantageous changes on the labour market which began in the previous two-year period. This was manifested by a much sharper increase in employment indicators and a decrease in the unemployment rate both among the farming and non-farming population. Less frequent reasons for unemployment included dismissal from work; finding a new job was easier and the period needed to find employment was shorter. The demographic forecasts for Poland anticipate a gradual intensification of the shrinking of the working-age population and an increase in the number of the post-working age population, also in rural areas, although there these processes are occurring at a slower pace than in cities. Maintaining the extended retirement age introduced by the previous govern ment would alleviate the negative consequences of demographic change. Ne vertheless, even if the variant of an extended retirement age (which was reject ed by the present government and replaced by the former age limits) had been continued, it would have substantially depleted the labour resources and made the ratio of the working population to old age pensioners even more unfavourable. In such a situation, further increase in the economic activity of the population, decreasing unemployment and increased labour productivity in all sectors of the national economy will play an even more significant role.

45

2. Rural population

Tables Table 2.1. Population by place of residence (urban areas-rural areas) and rural population by voivodeship in 2010–2016a Voivodeship

Number (in thousand)

Increase (de% of rural population crease) in % 2010– 2012– 2014– 2010 2012 2014 2016 2010 2012 2014 2016 2012 2014 2016

38530 38533 38479 38433 Poland 23429 23336 23216 23129 Urban areas 15101 15197 15262 15304 Rural areas 877 886 894 902 Dolnośląskie 827 834 840 845 Kujawsko-Pom. 1166 1160 1155 1144 Lubelskie 373 376 377 357 Lubuskie 917 919 921 922 Łódzkie 1695 1715 1731 1745 Małopolskie 1886 1899 1907 1916 Mazowieckie 484 483 480 478 Opolskie 1246 1249 1249 1252 Podkarpackie 479 475 471 467 Podlaskie 776 793 809 829 Pomorskie 1027 1036 1043 1049 Śląskie 704 702 699 694 Świętokrzyskie 589 590 590 588 Warmińsko-Maz. 1519 1542 1560 1578 Wielkopolskie 535 538 538 538 Zachodniopom. a

0.0

–0.1

–0.1

39.2

39.4

39.7

–0.4

–0.5

–0.4

x

x

x

39.8 x

0.6

0.4

0.3

x

x

x

x

1.1

0.8

0.9

30.1

30.4

30.7

31.0

0.8

0.6

0.6

39.4

39.8

40.2

40.5

–0.4

–0.5

–1.0

53.5

53.6

53.8

53.6

0.6

0.2

–5.2

36.5

36.7

36.9

35.1

0.1

0.2

0.1

36.1

36.4

36.8

37.1 51.6

1.2

0.9

0.8

50.8

51.1

51.4

0.7

0.4

0.5

35.8

35.8

35.7

35.7

–0.4

–0.5

–0.5

47.6

47.8

48.0

48.1

0.3

0.0

0.2

58.5

58.6

58.7

58.8

–0.7

–0.9

–0.9

39.8

39.7

39.5

39.4 35.8

2.1

2.0

2.5

34.1

34.6

35.1

0.8

0.7

0.6

22.2

22.4

22.7

23.0

–0.2

–0.4

–0.7

54.9

55.1

55.4

55.4

0.2

–0.1

–0.2

40.5

40.7

40.8

41.0

1.5

1.2

1.1

44.1

44.5

44.9

45.3

0.5

0.5

0.1

31.0

31.2

31.4

31.5

As at 31 December.

Source: Rocznik Demograficzny 2013, 2015 and 2017, GUS, Warsaw 2013, 2015 and 2017; data from the GUS website (www.stat.gov.pl – demographics database) and author’s own calculations.

46


Table 2.2. Natural increase in urban areas and rural areas and net migration between urban areas and rural areas by voivodeship in 2012, 2014 and 2016 Natural increase Voivodeship

Poland Dolnośląskie Kujawsko-Pomorskie Lubelskie Lubuskie Łódzkie Małopolskie Mazowieckie Opolskie Podkarpackie Podlaskie Pomorskie Śląskie Świętokrzyskie Warmińsko-Mazurskie Wielkopolskie Zachodniopomorskie a

urban areas 2012 2014 2016 per 1000 of urban population –0.4 –0.5 –0.5 –1.6 –1.5 –1.5 –1.0 –1.2 –1.1 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.4 –0.2 –0.3 –3.4 –3.3 –3.4 0.2 0.3 1.2 0.8 1.0 1.3 –1.2 –1.3 –1.5 1.6 0.8 0.7 1.1 0.9 1.2 0.4 0.2 0.7 –1.3 –1.6 –1.7 –1.7 –2.3 –2.9 0.0 –0.2 –1.0 0.8 0.5 0.7 –1.1 –1.1 –1.4

rural areas 2012 2014 2016

Net migration from rural to urban areas in rural areasa 2012 2014 2016

per 1000 of rural population 0.7 0.0 2.0 –1.8 1.3 –2.2 2.4 0.0 –1.2 1.0 –3.2 5.1 0.2 –2.1 1.5 3.1 1.5

0.7 0.3 1.8 –2.2 0.8 –2.0 2.5 0.1 –1.1 0.7 –3.2 5.2 0.5 –2.3 1.7 3.2 1.1

0.3 –0.2 0.8 –2.3 –0.1 –2.2 2.1 0.1 –1.3 0.4 –3.8 4.4 –0.1 –2.5 0.3 2.9 0.6

2.3 5.1 2.4 –0.3 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 1.4 0.3 –0.5 4.6 4.2 0.7 –1.1 4.2 1.2

1.9 4.7 1.8 –0.3 1.0 2.6 2.2 2.2 1.1 0.2 –1.0 4.2 3.7 0.5 –1.4 3.5 0.6

1.6 3.7 1.6 –0.3 0.5 2.5 1.9 2.0 0.3 –0.1 –0.9 4.3 3.1 0.0 –1.9 3.8 –0.2

Persons who have notified the population records of their migration.

Source: Rocznik Demograficzny 2013, 2015 and 2017, GUS, Warsaw 2013, 2015 and 2017; data from the GUS website (www.stat.gov.pl – demographics database) and author’s own calculations.

47

2. Rural population

Table 2.3. Selected vital statistics and migration indicators; structure of women in fertility age (aged 15-49) in urban areas and rural areas in 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016 Urban areas 2010 2012 2014 2016 Vital statistics (in thousand) 241.9 223.7 217.7 226.3 Live births Deaths 227.5 233.0 229.7 236.7 14.5 –9.3 –12.0 –10.5 Natural increase Vital statistics per 1000 population 10.3 9.6 9.4 9.8 Live births Deaths 9.7 10.0 9.9 10.2 0.6 –0.4 –0.5 –0.5 Natural increase 1.29 1.21 1.22 1.33 Total fertility ratea Fertility of womenb aged: 15-19 14.1 13.5 12.5 11.7 20-24 45.3 40.9 39.9 44.1 25-29 88.2 82.1 81.1 87.8 30-34 75.4 71.6 73.5 80.6 35-39 31.8 31.0 32.2 35.1 40-44 5.9 6.0 6.6 7.3 45-49 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 Number of women in 5790 5660 5533 5428 fertility age (in thous.) incl. aged 20-34 – in thousand 2831 2721 2571 2394 –% 48.9 48.1 46.5 44.1 Infant deaths per 5.0 4.5 4.1 3.9 1000 live births Average life expectancy men 72.6 73.1 74.2 74.4 women 80.6 81.0 81.5 81.9 women – men 8.0 7.8 7.4 7.5 Internal migration for permanent residence (in thousand)c from rural areas to 93.8 92.2 98.6 93.4 urban areas from urban areas to –139.7 –127.6 –127.5 –118.4 rural areas net migration –46.0 –35.4 –28.9 –25.0 Migration for permanent residence (in thousand)c from rural areas to 13.2 15.9 20.9 8.5 urban areas from urban areas to 11.0 10.6 9.0 9.1 rural areas net migration –2.2 –5.2 –11.9 0.7 Item

Rural areas 2012 2014

2016

171.4 151.0 20.4

162.5 151.8 10.8

157.5 146.8 10.7

156.0 151.3 4.7

11.4 10.0 1.4 1.51

10.7 10.0 0.7 1.43

10.3 9.6 0.7 1.39

10.2 9.9 0.3 1.39

16.6 72.2 105.8 71.4 29.7 6.4 0.3

14.9 64.4 100.9 69.5 29.7 6.5 0.3

13.8 57.6 98.9 72.6 29.8 6.3 0.3

12.2 53.0 98.7 76.7 32.3 6.6 0.3

3725

3728

3717

3701

1722 46.2

1724 46.2

1711 46.0

1677 45.3

5.0

4.8

4.4

4.1

71.4 80.7 9.3

72.1 81.0 8.9

73.1 81.7 8.5

73.2 81.9 8.7

–93.8

–92.2

–98.6

–93.4

139.7

127.6

127.5

118.4

46.0

35.4

28.9

25.0

4.2

5.3

7.2

3.5

4.2

3.9

3.4

4.3

0.1

–1.4

–3.8

0.8

number of children born by woman during her fertility period (for a more detailed definition see footnote (4), b number of live births per 1000 women at a given age; c persons who have notified the population records of their migration. Source: Rocznik Demograficzny 2013, 2015 and 2017, GUS, Warsaw 2013, 2015 and 2017; data from the GUS website (www.stat.gov.pl – demographics database); author’s own calculations. a

48

2010


Table 2.4. Births and fertility of women in rural areas by voivodeship in 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016 Voivodeship Poland Dolnośląskie Kujawsko-Pom. Lubelskie Lubuskie Łódzkie Małopolskie Mazowieckie Opolskie Podkarpackie Podlaskie Pomorskie Śląskie Świętokrzyskie Warmińsko-Maz. Wielkopolskie Zachodniopom. a

Live births per 1000 population

Total fertility ratea

Fertility in rural families as % of fertility in urban families

2010 2012 2014 2016 2010 2012 2014 2016

2010

2012

2014

2016

11.4

10.7

116.5

117.6

114.2

105.1

10.8

10.0

11.9

11.2

10.6

10.1

11.5

10.3

10.2

1.51

1.43

1.39

1.39

9.9

9.6

1.39

1.31

1.31

1.31

112.4

113.5

111.2

103.4

10.6

10.0

1.57

1.49

1.42

1.36

122.9

127.7

119.7

105.9

9.3

9.2

1.47

1.41

1.31

1.29

117.4

120.1

112.2

104.7

10.7

10.1

9.8

1.49

1.40

1.34

1.33

117.3

112.3

110.5

101.5

10.7

10.2

9.7

9.6

1.50

1.45

1.38

1.38

117.7

120.9

114.0

106.9

11.8

11.2

10.9

10.9

1.53

1.45

1.42

1.43

121.2

123.3

122.2

106.4

11.6

10.8

10.5

10.6

1.58

1.48

1.45

1.48

114.5

114.5

109.7

101.8

9.1

9.1

8.8

8.9

1.17

1.17

1.16

1.20

101.9

104.7

104.1

99.7

10.8

10.3

9.7

9.8

1.41

1.35

1.28

1.29

119.3

118.2

115.2

109.1 106.8

10.0

9.4

9.3

9.2

1.47

1.38

1.36

1.35

120.9

120.5

117.7

13.8

12.9

12.5

12.2

1.74

1.64

1.61

1.59

128.7

130.3

127.2

110.8

10.8

10.3

10.0

9.9

1.42

1.35

1.35

1.36

107.3

108.1

108.5

104.1

10.1

9.5

9.0

9.0

1.39

1.31

1.26

1.26

115.7

115.8

116.8

113.3

12.0

10.9

10.8

10.0

1.58

1.45

1.45

1.37

126.1

126.0

126.3

112.4

12.7

11.8

11.6

11.6

1.61

1.50

1.51

1.54

117.0

118.5

119.4

110.2

11.5

10.6

10.1

9.9

1.52

1.42

1.37

1.37

125.7

125.5

118.9

109.3

number of children born by woman during her fertility period (for a more detailed definition see footnote 4).

Source: Rocznik Demograficzny 2013, 2015 and 2017, GUS, Warsaw 2013, 2015 and 2017; data from the GUS website (www.stat.gov.pl – demographics database); author’s own calculations.

Table 2.5. Average life expectancy in urban areas and rural areas by sex and by voivodeship in 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016 Urban areas

Voivodeship

2010 2012

Poland Dolnośląskie Kujawsko-Pom. Lubelskie Lubuskie Łódzkie Małopolskie Mazowieckie Opolskie Podkarpackie Podlaskie Pomorskie Śląskie Świętokrzyskie

72.6 72.1 71.7 72.7 72.3 70.3 74.2 73.6 73.0 74.5 73.5 73.4 71.5 72.9

73.1 72.6 73.2 73.9 72.8 70.7 74.4 73.9 73.1 75.6 74.0 73.9 71.8 73.3

2014

74.2 73.4 73.5 74.5 73.9 71.8 75.7 75.0 75.1 75.9 74.8 74.8 73.0 74.5

Difference between rural and urban areas

Rural areas 2016

2010

2012

2014

2016

2010

2012

2014

2016

74.4 74.0 74.0 75.0 73.5 72.1 76.0 75.1 74.8 76.4 75.3 75.0 73.4 74.8

Men 71.4 70.7 70.9 70.1 70.4 70.0 73.3 70.8 72.9 73.2 71.3 71.9 72.0 70.8

72.1 71.4 72.1 71.3 71.4 70.5 73.6 71.3 73.2 73.4 72.0 72.0 72.6 72.1

73.1 72.4 73.1 72.2 72.2 71.5 75.0 72.2 73.9 74.5 72.8 73.7 74.0 72.9

73.2 72.3 73.2 72.5 72.0 71.8 74.7 72.6 73.9 74.7 72.5 73.4 73.7 72.8

–1.2 –1.4 –0.8 –2.6 –1.9 –0.3 –0.9 –2.9 –0.1 –1.2 –2.2 –1.5 0.5 –2.1

–1.0 –1.2 –1.1 –2.6 –1.4 –0.2 –0.8 –2.6 0.1 –2.2 –2.0 –1.9 0.9 –1.1

–1.1 –1.0 –0.4 –2.3 –1.7 –0.3 –0.7 –2.8 –1.2 –1.4 –2.0 –1.1 1.0 –1.6

–1.2 –1.8 –0.8 –2.4 –1.5 –0.3 –1.3 –2.5 –0.9 –1.6 –2.8 –1.6 0.3 –2.0

49

2. Rural population

Tab. 2.5 cont. Voivodeship

Urban areas 2010 2012

2014

Difference between rural and urban areas

Rural areas 2016

2010

2012

Warmińsko-Maz. 72.2 73.0 74.1 73.5 70.0 70.0 Wielkopolskie 73.1 73.6 74.4 74.6 71.8 72.8 Zachodniopom. 72.1 73.1 74.3 74.0 69.6 71.2 Women 80.6 81.0 81.5 81.9 80.7 81.0 Poland Dolnośląskie 80.2 80.5 81.2 81.5 80.2 79.8 Kujawsko-Pom. 79.9 80.4 81.1 81.4 79.6 80.2 80.8 81.6 82.4 82.9 81.2 81.4 Lubelskie 80.3 80.6 81.2 81.7 79.6 79.7 Lubuskie Łódzkie 79.2 79.5 80.5 80.3 80.0 80.3 Małopolskie 81.4 81.9 82.5 82.9 81.4 81.8 Mazowieckie 81.2 81.4 81.9 82.3 80.8 81.1 80.4 80.9 81.4 81.7 80.4 80.4 Opolskie 82.1 82.4 82.8 82.9 81.5 81.9 Podkarpackie 82.2 82.5 82.8 83.0 81.4 82.1 Podlaskie Pomorskie 81.0 81.1 81.6 81.9 80.0 80.4 Śląskie 79.5 79.7 80.2 80.7 80.5 81.0 Świętokrzyskie 81.0 81.6 81.8 82.1 80.8 81.5 Warmińsko-Maz. 80.4 81.4 81.6 81.4 80.3 80.1 Wielkopolskie 80.4 80.9 81.3 81.7 80.5 80.5 Zachodniopom. 80.3 80.7 81.1 81.9 79.4 79.9

2014

2016

2010

2012

2014

2016

71.6 71.6 –2.1 –3.0 –2.5 –1.9 73.4 73.6 –1.3 –0.8 –1.0 –1.0 71.9 72.4 –2.5 –1.9 –2.4 –1.6 81.7 80.8 80.9 82.1 79.9 81.3 82.5 81.6 81.3 82.8 82.7 81.1 81.2 82.2 80.6 81.0 80.1

81.9 80.8 81.2 82.5 80.5 81.5 82.8 82.1 81.9 83.0 82.4 81.0 81.6 82.0 80.5 81.2 80.8

0.1 0.0 –0.3 0.4 –0.7 0.8 0.0 –0.4 0.1 –0.6 –0.8 –1.0 1.0 –0.2 –0.1 0.1 –0.9

0.0 –0.7 –0.2 –0.2 –0.9 0.8 –0.1 –0.3 –0.5 –0.5 –0.4 –0.7 1.3 0.0 –1.3 –0.4 –0.8

0.2 –0.4 –0.2 –0.3 –1.3 0.8 0.0 –0.3 –0.1 0.0 –0.1 –0.5 1.0 0.4 –1.0 –0.3 –1.0

0.0 –0.7 –0.2 –0.4 –1.2 1.1 –0.1 –0.2 0.2 0.1 –0.5 –1.0 0.9 –0.1 –0.8 –0.4 –1.1

Source: Rocznik Demograficzny 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017, GUS, Warsaw 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017; data from the GUS website (www.stat.gov.pl – demographics database); author’s own calculations.

Table 2.6. Internal migration for permanent residence urban areas-rural areas by age and sex in 2012, 2014 and 2016a Age, sex Total 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-44 45-59 60 or over Men Women a

50

From rural areas to From urban areas to Net migration in rural urban areas rural areas areas 2012 2014 2016 2012 2014 2016 2012 2014 2016 per 1000 rural population by a given sex and age group 6.1 6.5 6.1 8.4 8.4 7.8 2.3 1.9 1.6 7.6 8.1 7.8 11.9 12.2 11.7 4.3 4.1 3.9 3.2 3.9 3.8 5.7 6.0 5.7 2.5 2.1 1.9 8.1 7.7 7.2 7.4 6.8 5.7 –0.7 –0.9 –1.5 17.9 18.3 17.0 13.0 12.4 10.7 –4.9 –5.9 –6.3 7.7 8.4 8.1 12.2 11.8 11.1 4.4 3.5 3.0 2.2 2.6 2.5 5.6 5.5 5.1 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.1 2.5 2.3 3.4 3.8 3.6 1.3 1.4 1.3 5.4 5.8 5.5 8.2 8.1 7.6 2.8 2.3 2.1 6.8 7.1 6.7 8.7 8.6 8.0 1.9 1.5 1.2

persons who have notified the population records of their migration.

Source: Rocznik Demograficzny 2013, 2015 and 2017, GUS, Warsaw 2013, 2015 and 2017; data from the GUS website (www.stat.gov.pl – demographics database); author’s own calculations.


Table 2.7. Population emigrating for permanent residence abroad (a) by place of residence before migration, sex, age and marital status in 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016 (in %) Sex, age, marital statusb Total incl. men Age 0-14 15-19 20-34 35-49 50-59 60 or over Marital statusc unmarried/single married widowed divorced unknown a

2010 100.0 45.9

Urban areas 2012 2014 100.0 100.0 47.0 48.5

2016 100.0 51.5

2010 100.0 45.9

Rural areas 2012 2014 100.0 100.0 46.9 51.1

2016 100.0 52.4

13.1 5.8 37.0 26.4 11.3 6.3

16.1 5.8 35.6 26.2 9.9 6.5

16.8 6.6 33.4 27.2 9.0 6.9

15.3 8.7 32.8 28.5 8.7 6.0

13.7 6.4 33.3 27.6 11.5 7.5

15.1 6.7 32.4 26.7 11.8 7.4

17.5 6.9 31.1 27.1 10.1 7.3

16.8 8.0 32.9 25.4 9.2 7.7

38.7 40.8 1.6 7.4 11.6

32.2 47.2 2.1 9.1 9.5

33.7 47.2 1.9 9.4 7.8

35.1 45.6 1.6 8.6 9.1

38.1 40.7 1.7 4.1 15.4

32.0 48.6 1.9 5.6 11.9

34.2 50.3 1.8 7.1 6.6

35.8 47.0 1.8 7.3 8.1

persons who have notified the population records of their migration; b legal status, c migrants aged 15 or over.

Source: Rocznik Demograficzny 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017, GUS, Warsaw 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017; data from the GUS website (www.stat.gov.pl – demographics database); author’s own calculations.

Table 2.8. Persons staying temporarily abroada by place of residence before leaving, and by age, sex and marital status in 2002 and 2011 Item Total – in thousand incl. 12 months and longer (in %) Age (in %) 0-14 15-19 20-34 35-49 50-59 60 or over Sex – % of men Marital statusb (in %, age 15+) unmarried/single married widowed divorced unknown a

Total 2002 2011 786.1 2017.5 79.7 77.6

Urban areas 2002 2011 488.1 1330.2 79.3 77.3

Rural areas 2002 2011 298.0 687.3 80.2 78.1

7.8 6.0 38.4 31.5 9.3 7.0 46.2

11.2 3.2 44.9 25.3 10.4 5.0 48.9

7.4 5.8 36.8 32.4 10.5 7.1 45.3

10.9 3.2 43.8 25.1 11.3 5.5 48.8

8.2 6.4 41.3 30.1 7.4 6.7 47.6

11.7 3.2 47.0 25.3 8.5 4.2 49.1

32.3 52.5 3.2 4.7 7.3

34.3 44.6 1.9 6.8 12.5

31.0 52.5 3.1 5.9 7.6

33.6 43.7 1.9 7.8 12.9

34.4 52.7 3.3 2.7 7.0

35.6 46.2 1.8 4.8 11.6

in 2002, longer than 2 months, in 2011 – longer than 3 months; b legal status.

Source: Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludności i Mieszkań 2002. Migracje zagraniczne ludności, GUS, Warsaw 2003. Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludności i Mieszkań 2011. Migracje zagraniczne ludności, GUS, Warsaw 2013; author’s own calculations.

51

2. Rural population

Table 2.9. Persons staying temporarily abroad for longer than 3 monthsa by voivodeship and place of residence before leaving (urban areas-rural areas) in 2002 and 2011 Voivodeship Poland Dolnośląskie Kujawsko-Pomorskie Lubelskie Lubuskie Łódzkie Małopolskie Mazowieckie Opolskie Podkarpackie Podlaskie Pomorskie Śląskie Świętokrzyskie Warmińsko-Mazurskie Wielkopolskie Zachodniopomorskie Coefficient of change a

Total 2002

2011

20.6 20.6 10.2 14.1 15.5 6.8 24.8 10.7 98.8 36.7 45.5 20.2 26.3 13.9 22.9 6.8 15.0 92.4

52.4 62.2 50.8 51.6 59.5 29.0 56.2 28.1 106.3 84.0 91.4 58.6 49.9 50.0 74.6 31.0 62.4 36.8

Urban areas 2002 2011 per 1000 population 20.7 56.8 22.5 67.2 12.0 59.1 17.7 66.0 16.8 63.4 8.3 34.7 23.5 59.3 13.4 33.5 73.3 96.1 40.2 95.7 47.5 97.6 22.5 64.1 24.2 50.4 18.2 67.7 24.4 81.1 8.2 37.0 16.3 66.7 68.7 31.4

Rural areas 2002 2011 20.4 15.9 7.4 11.0 13.0 4.0 26.2 5.8 127.1 34.3 42.6 15.3 34.5 10.3 20.6 4.8 11.9 124.0

45.5 50.8 38.1 39.1 52.7 18.8 53.1 18.3 117.5 75.6 82.2 47.9 48.0 35.5 65.0 23.5 52.8 49.5

in 2002 – longer than 2 months.

Source: Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludności i Mieszkań 2002; Migracje zagraniczne ludności, GUS, Warsaw 2003; Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludności i Mieszkań 2011; Migracje zagraniczne ludności, GUS, Warsaw 2013; Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludności i Mieszkań 2011. Ludność. Stan i struktura demograficzno-społeczna, GUS, Warsaw 2013; author’s own calculations.

52


Table 2.10. Population changes in urban and rural areas by balance factors in 2011– 2016 (in thousand) Year

Total

a

natural increase

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2011+2012 2013+2014 2015+2016

–43.3 –49.5 –78.4 –41.5 –50.0 –36.9 –92.8 –119.9 –86.9

0.2 –9.3 –21.3 –12.0 –24.7 –10.5 –9.1 –33.3 –35.2

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2011+2012 2013+2014 2015+2016

51.8 44.4 40.8 24.5 8.5 33.2 96.2 65.3 41.7

12.7 10.8 3.6 10.7 –0.9 4.7 23.5 14.3 3.8

Including net migration for permanent residence internal internationalb Urban areas –39.8 –3.7 –35.4 –5.2 –37.8 –13.9 –29.0 –11.9 –24.1 –11.9 –25.0 0.7 –75.2 –8.9 –66.8 –25.8 –49.1 –11.2 Rural areas 39.8 –0.7 35.4 –1.4 37.8 –6.0 29.0 –3.8 24.1 –3.8 25.0 0.8 75.2 –2.1 66.8 –9.8 49.1 –3.0

net administrative changes 12.9 –0.1 0.1 13.8 17.5 4.8 12.8 13.9 22.3 –12.9 0.1 –0.1 –13.8 –17.5 –4.8 –12.8 –13.9 –22.3

taking into account the difference in the net migration of persons registered for temporary stay for longer than 3 months; b due to the lack of reliable statistics for 2015, the data for 2014 were used for that year (information by GUS). a

Source: Rocznik Demograficzny 2017, GUS, Warsaw 2017; author’s own calculations.

53

2. Rural population

Table 2.11. Population by economic age groups, sex and place of residence (urban areas-rural areas) in 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016a Old-age dependency ratio

total

incl. aged 20-29

Number of wo men per 1000 men

Age median

Population

2010

38530 7243 24831 15424 9407 6456 18,8

64,4 40,0 24,4

16,8 38,0

26

1066

968

2012

38533 7067 24606 15397 9209 6861 18,3

63,9 40,0 23,9

17,8 38,7

28

1066

966

2014

38479 6943 24230 15262 8968 7305 18,0

63,0 39,7 23,3

19,0 39,4

30

1067

965

2016

38433 6896 23768 15022 8746 7770 17,9

61,8 39,1 22,8

20,2 40,2

33

1067

963

in thousand

as % of total

post-working

upper limit

lower limit

working age

total

pre-working

post-working

upper limit

lower limit

working age

total

pre-working

total

Year

in ageb

Total

Urban areas

2010

23429 3998 15302

9338

5965 4129 17,1

65,3 39,9 25,5

17,6 39,3

27

1106

989

2012

23336 3917 14978

9249

5729 4442 16,8

64,2 39,6 24,6

19,0 39,9

30

1108

989

2014

23216 3876 14568

9093

5476 4772 16,7

62,8 39,2 23,6

20,6 40,6

33

1109

986

2016

23129 3881 14143

8889

5254 5106 16,8

61,1 38,4 22,7

22,1 41,4

36

1109

982

Rural areas

2010

15101 3245

9529

6086

3442 2327 21,5

63,1 40,3 22,8

15,4 36,2

24

1006

937

2012

15197 3150

9628

6148

3480 2419 20,7

63,4 40,5 22,9

15,9 36,9

25

1006

935

2014

15262 3067

9662

6169

3492 2533 20,1

63,3 40,4 22,9

16,6 37,7

26

1006

937

2016

15304 3015

9625

6133

3492 2664 19,7

62,9 40,1 22,8

17,4 38,4

28

1006

940

Status as at 31 December, taking into account results of NSP 2011 (National Census of Population and Housing); b age: pre-working: 0-17; working: men 18-64; women 18-59; working lower limit: 18-44, working upper limit: men 45-64, women 45-59; post-working: men 65 years or over, women 60 years or over. a

Source: Rocznik Demograficzny 2013, 2015 and 2017, GUS, Warsaw 2013, 2015 and 2017; author’s own calculations. Data from the GUS website (www.stat.gov.pl – demographics database); author’s own calculations.

54


Table 2.12. Rural population by age, sex and voivodeship in 2016a

post-working

19.7 18.9 20.2 18.6 19.3 18.7 20.8 20.1 16.5 19.3 17.9 22.9 18.6 17.8 20.1 21.2 19.5

as % of total 62.9 64.1 63.4 61.7 64.1 61.7 62.8 62.0 64.7 63.2 61.4 63.4 62.9 62.3 64.3 63.0 64.5

17.4 17.0 16.3 19.7 16.6 19.7 16.4 17.9 18.8 17.4 20.7 13.7 18.5 19.8 15.5 15.8 16.0

a

38.4 39.0 37.9 39.4 38.4 40.0 37.3 38.5 41.1 38.1 40.5 35.5 39.9 40.0 37.4 37.1 38.3

28 27 26 32 26 32 26 29 29 28 34 22 29 32 24 25 25

incl. aged 20-29

working

Poland Dolnośłąskie Kujawsko-Pom. Lubelskie Lubuskie Łódzkie Małopolskie Mazowieckie Opolskie Podkarpackie Podlaskie Pomorskie Śląskie Świętokrzyskie Warmińsko-Maz. Wielkopolskie Zachodniopom.

Old-age dependency ratio

pre-working

in thos. 15304 902 845 1144 357 922 1745 1916 478 1252 467 829 1049 694 588 1578 538

Voivodeship

Age median

total

in ageb

Number of women per 1000 men

total

Population

1006 1007 996 1017 995 1016 1014 1006 1034 1011 979 983 1036 1007 971 1002 985

940 943 943 925 954 936 951 937 978 938 900 942 962 934 923 944 919

Status as at 31 December; b as in Tab. 2.11.

Source: Rocznik Demograficzny 2017, GUS, Warsaw 2017; author’s own calculations.

55

2. Rural population

Table 2.13. Selected fertility, mortality rates and age structure of the population in European Union countries and Icelanda

Men

Women

Difference in life expectancy between men and women

Infant deaths per 1000 live births

Percentage of population aged 65 or over

Age median

Old-age dependency ratio

EU-28 Austria Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia Finland France Greece Spain Netherlands Ireland Iceland Lithuania Luxembourg Latvia Malta Germany Poland urban areas rural areas Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Sweden Hungary UK Italy

Total fertility rate

Country

Average life expectancy

1 1.58ep 1.49 1.70 1.53 1.40 1.32 1.57 1.71 1.58 1.65 1.96p 1.33 1.33 1.66 1.92p 1.80 1.70 1.47 1.70 1.45 1.50 1.29 1.24 1.35 1.31e 1.58e 1.40 1.57 1.85 1.45 1.80 1.35

2 77.9ep 78.8 78.7 71.2 74.4 79.9 75.7 78.8 73.2 78.7 79.2 78.5 80.1 79.9 79.6p 81.2 69.2 80.0 69.7 79.7 78.3 73.6 74.0 73.0 78.1 71.5e 73.1 77.8 80.4 72.3 79.2 80.3

3 83.3ep 83.7 83.4 78.2 80.5 83.7 81.6 82.7 82.2 84.4 85.5p 83.7 85.7 83.2 83.4p 83.8 79.7 84.7 79.5 84.0 83.1 81.6 81.5 81.7 84.3 78.7e 80.2 83.9 84.1 79.0 82.8e 84.9

4 5.4 4.9 4.7 7.0 6.1 3.8 5.9 3.9 9.0 5.7 6.3 5.2 5.6 3.3 3.8 2.6 10.5 4.7 9.8 4.3 4.8 8.0 7.5 8.7 6.2 7.2 7.1 6.1 3.7 6.7 3.6 4.6

5 3.6 3.1 3.3 6.6 4.1 2.7 2.5 3.7 2.5 1.7 3.7 4.0 2.7 3.3 3.4 2.2 4.2 2.8 4.1 5.8 3.3 4.0 4.0 4.1 2.9 7.6 5.1 1.6 2.5 4.2 3.9 2.9

6 19.2p 18.5 18.2 20.4 19.2 15.1 18.3 18.8 19.0 20.5 18.8p 21.3 18.7 18.2 13.2 13.9 19.0 14.2 19.6 19.0 21.1 16.4 17.8 14.3 20.7e 17.4 14.4 18.4 19.8 18.3 17.9e 22.0

7 42.6p 43.0 41.4 43.6 43.0 37.2 41.5 41.5 41.6 42.5 41.2p 43.9 42.8 42.4 36.6 36.1 43.1 39.3 42.9 41.1 45.8 40.3 41.5 38.5 44.0e 41.4 39.4 43.2 40.9 41.9 40.0e 45.5

8 29.3p 27.5 28.2 31.1 29.0 22.1 27.6 29.3 29.3 32.4 30.0p 33.1 28.3 27.8 20.4 21.0 28.6 20.5 30.2 28.6 32.0 23.9 26.1 20.7 31.8e 25.9 20.6 27.6 31.5 27.2 27.9e 34.3

Population in columns 1 to 5: data for 2015; in columns 6 to 9: data for 2016 as at: for Poland: 31 December, for the remaining countries: 1 January; e data are estimated; p data are provisional. a

Source: for EU and Iceland – Eurostat; for Poland – BLD GUS.

56


Table 2.14. Employment ratesa by age, sex, place of residence and links with agricultural holding in rural areas in 2010–2016b Year

c

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2015_N 2016_N 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2015_N 2016_N

Including in agee working Total Men posttotal 18-24 25-54 55-59/64f working Urban areas 49.7 64.5 32.2 77.6 41.5 5.8 56.9 50.1 65.2 30.3 77.9 45.2 6.1 57.5 50.1 65.8 30.0 78.0 47.3 6.4 57.5 50.1 66.3 29.2 77.9 50.3 6.5 57.4 51.4 68.5 31.5 79.6 53.1 7.3 58.8 52.2 70.0 32.3 80.7 55.0 8.0 59.4 52.9 71.7 34.2 81.8 56.8 8.5 60.3 Rural areas 50.4 64.8 39.6 76.5 39.4 6.9 59.1 50.4 64.7 37.2 76.2 43.3 7.2 59.4 50.4 64.8 36.6 75.9 46.4 6.6 59.4 50.3 64.8 35.9 75.6 48.5 6.4 59.4 50.9 66.0 37.9 76.6 49.4 6.1 59.8 51.6 67.0 37.8 77.7 50.9 6.0 60.6 52.6 68.6 42.4 78.2 54.0 6.3 61.7 Rural areas – population with links with agricultural holding in rural areasg 62.5 75.4 44.3 86.7 60.9 17.8 70.1 62.4 75.4 42.1 86.4 65.2 18.1 70.2 62.4 75.8 42.8 86.6 66.9 16.4 70.2 62.6 76.0 42.1 86.4 69.1 15.7 70.8 63.5 76.7 42.5 87.3 70.8 15.5 71.6 64.0 77.1 41.7 87.9 72.4 14.0 72.1 64.2 77.3 41.8 88.1 72.7 14.0 72.4 65.0 79.0 47.4 88.4 74.9 13.0 73.7 Rural areas – landless populationh 42.0 56.8 35.5 68.9 26.4 1.8 51.0 42.2 56.8 33.1 68.7 30.4 1.9 51.5 42.6 57.2 31.6 68.6 33.8 2.1 51.9 42.9 57.7 31.4 68.8 36.6 2.4 52.1 44.2 59.7 34.7 70.5 37.9 2.8 53.0 45.0 61.0 35.0 71.8 39.4 3.2 54.0 45.0 61.0 35.0 71.8 39.6 3.3 54.0 46.8 63.3 39.4 73.2 44.1 4.3 55.7 d

Women

43.4 43.5 43.7 43.7 44.8 45.9 46.4 41.8 41.6 41.5 41.3 42.2 42.7 43.6 54.4 54.1 54.1 53.8 54.6 55.2 55.3 55.6 33.5 33.5 33.8 34.4 36.0 36.5 36.6 38.5

a percentage of working population in the total population in a given category; b data average for the year (arithmetical mean of the data from four quarterly surveys), taking into account NSP 2011 results; c data for the years marked as N – based on the new definition of the agricultural holding; d aged 15 or over; e working age: men aged 18-64, women aged 18-59; post-working: men aged 65 or over, women aged 60 or over; f women aged 55-59, men aged 55-64; g based on the old definition of the agricultural holding: population in households working farms with agricultural land over 1 ha or a farm under 1 ha; based on the new definition – without agricultural holdings not engaged in farming activity and farms pursuing small-scale agricultural activity; h population in households with no farm holder, based on the old and new definition of the agricultural holding, respectively.

Source: author’s own calculations based on the Labour Force Survey data (BAEL).

57

2. Rural population

Table 2.15. Employment ratesa of population aged 15 or over by level of education, place of residence and links with agricultural holding in rural areas in 2010–2016b Yearc

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015_N 2016_N 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015_N 2016_N

Total

higher

Level of education secondary total

vocational

d

general

lower basic secondary, vocational primarye

Urban areas 57.5 39.0 50.3 11.2 57.7 39.2 49.4 11.6 57.0 40.0 48.1 11.6 55.8 40.5 47.0 11.1 55.8 42.2 47.9 11.3 56.0 42.3 48.1 11.9 66.8 43.1 47.9 11.6 Rural areas 50.4 78.2 62.4 67.7 47.9 64.2 20.3 50.4 77.2 62.0 67.8 46.2 63.9 19.7 50.4 76.5 61.6 67.4 46.2 62.4 19.1 50.3 77.1 61.3 67.0 46.4 61.0 18.1 50.9 77.9 61.6 67.0 47.9 61.1 17.7 51.6 78.3 62.0 67.1 48.4 61.4 17.7 52.6 79.4 62.7 66.8 51.9 61.1 17.0 Rural areas – population with links with agricultural holding in rural areas 62.5 81.0 73.0 78.6 56.0 79.9 33.0 62.4 80.2 72.8 79.4 52.9 79.6 31.6 62.4 79.1 73.3 79.5 54.2 78.7 30.6 62.6 80.5 73.2 79.2 55.1 78.1 29.8 63.5 79.8 73.7 79.5 56.3 79.3 29.3 64.2 80.2 74.5 80.4 56.1 79.5 28.6 65.0 83.1 76.4 81.4 59.0 79.3 26.9 Rural areas – landless population 42.0 77.0 55.0 59.8 43.0 52.1 11.6 42.2 75.8 54.5 59.4 42.3 51.7 11.6 42.6 75.3 53.9 58.9 41.8 50.5 11.6 42.9 75.7 53.9 59.0 41.8 49.5 11.2 44.2 77.2 54.9 59.6 43.9 50.1 11.5 45.0 77.6 55.3 59.6 44.9 50.7 12.2 46.8 78.2 57.5 60.9 49.1 51.5 12.6 49.7 50.1 50.1 50.1 51.4 52.2 52.9

75.9 75.5 75.2 75.1 76.1 76.9 77.3

51.3 51.6 51.4 50.7 51.3 51.6 56.0

percentage of working population in the total population in a given category; b data average for the year (arithmetical mean of the data from four quarterly surveys), taking into account NSP 2011 results; c data for the years marked as N – based on the new definition of the agricultural holding (see footnotes to Table 2.14); d together with post-secondary; e together with incomplete primary and with no school education. a


58


Table 2.16. Employment rates of population aged 15 or overa by place of residence and voivodeship in 2012, 2014 and 2016b Voivodeship Poland Dolnośłąskie Kujawsko-Pomorskie Lubelskie Lubuskie Łódzkie Małopolskie Mazowieckie Opolskie Podkarpackie Podlaskie Pomorskie Śląskie Świętokrzyskie Warmińsko-Mazurskie Wielkopolskie Zachodniopomorskie

2012 50.1 47.5 48.6 48.9 50.2 49.0 49.2 57.2 49.0 47.8 51.2 50.0 48.6 46.5 47.5 51.8 46.9

Urban areas 2014 51.4 50.4 48.7 49.7 49.5 52.5 50.7 58.8 48.9 45.8 50.6 52.3 49.8 45.3 47.0 52.1 48.4

2016 52.9 52.7 49.4 50.5 53.3 52.2 53.4 57.5 52.4 51.4 53.9 55.3 50.5 48.9 50.8 54.8 50.4

2012 50.4 48.5 51.0 52.1 46.5 52.8 49.9 52.1 49.4 49.5 49.6 50.6 47.8 52.3 43.1 53.1 45.6

Rural areas 2014 50.9 49.1 50.4 51.6 49.7 54.3 50.9 54.0 50.9 47.6 51.2 48.3 47.0 52.2 44.9 54.7 47.9

2016 52.6 54.9 53.4 50.8 52.5 55.5 52.7 55.0 51.5 50.0 50.3 53.1 50.3 51.2 46.2 56.0 47.8

percentage of working population in the total population in a given category; b data average for the year (arithmetical mean of the data from four quarterly surveys). a


Table 2.17. Employed in agriculture and outside agriculture, including self-employed, by place of residence in 2010–2016a Employed in agricultureb incl. in rural total areas

Employed outside agriculturec incl. self-employed

Year

as % in of total thouemsand ployed

in thousand

as % of total employed

total

urban areas

rural areas

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

2019 2008 1960 1867 1820 1850 1708

1847 1833 1797 1712 1660 1687 1547

30.9 30.4 29.6 28.2 26.9 26.9 24.2

13455 13554 13631 13701 14042 14235 14489

9332 9359 9364 9332 9522 9653 9642

4123 4195 4267 4369 4520 4582 4848

13.0 12.9 12.6 12.0 11.5 11.5 10.5

urban rural areas areas as % of total employ ed outside agriculture 13.0 13.6 11.6 13.0 13.6 11.7 12.8 13.5 11.4 12.8 13.3 11.5 12.7 13.2 11.6 12.5 12.8 12.0 12.9 13.3 12.1 total

data average for the year (arithmetical mean of the data from four quarterly surveys); b together with forestry, hunting and fishery; c without forestry, hunting and fishery. a


59

2. Rural population

Table 2.18. Employed solely or mainly on private farms as a percentage of total employed population by voivodeship in 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016a Voivodeship Poland Dolnośląskie Kujawsko-Pomorskie Lubelskie Lubuskie Łódzkie Małopolskie Mazowieckie Opolskie Podkarpackie Podlaskie Pomorskie Śląskie Świętokrzyskie Warmińsko-Mazurskie Wielkopolskie Zachodniopomorskie a

2010 12.1 5.2 12.7 28.0 5.3 12.7 14.3 11.1 9.5 21.6 22.9 6.1 2.3 22.4 10.7 13.2 6.2

Total 2012 2014 11.6 10.5 5.3 3.7 15.6 13.0 27.0 22.6 5.2 5.5 12.5 12.0 12.8 10.6 10.6 10.7 8.7 8.5 18.9 15.0 24.0 22.4 6.5 5.2 2.1 2.3 23.4 21.9 9.6 10.2 11.7 11.2 6.3 5.4

2016 9.4 3.3 12.2 20.5 4.1 12.2 10.6 10.4 7.8 12.1 22.1 5.0 2.0 18.6 10.1 9.8 3.8

Including rural residents 2010 2012 2014 29.2 27.7 25.0 15.3 14.7 10.5 30.7 35.4 28.6 48.8 46.1 39.2 12.9 13.2 12.9 34.7 31.6 31.2 27.1 24.3 19.4 30.5 29.8 29.5 19.8 17.3 16.8 32.0 29.5 23.7 57.9 59.2 55.2 18.3 18.8 14.4 8.6 7.5 8.1 37.1 40.0 36.6 28.2 24.2 25.7 27.0 23.7 22.4 19.6 19.3 14.4

2016 22.0 8.7 27.3 34.1 10.5 29.5 20.1 28.2 15.3 18.8 53.1 13.6 5.8 30.6 23.4 20.1 10.3

data average for the year (arithmetical mean of the data from four quarterly surveys).


Table 2.19. Employed by place of residence, sex, age, level of education and work on private farms in 2014 and 2016a (in %) Urban areas Item TOTAL incl. men

2014

2016

100.0 100.0 53.7 53.3

pre-working working lower limit upper limit post-working

0.1 96.3 61.0 35.3 3.6

0.1 95.5 60.8 34.6 4.5

higher total secondaryc secondary vocationalc secondary general basic vocational lower secondary, primaryd

40.9 36.0 26.5 9.5 19.6 3.5

42.2 36.4 27.2 9.2 18.2 3.2

Rural areas employed on total outside private private farms farms 2014 2016 2014 2016 2014 2016 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 58.6 58.3 57.1 57.7 59.1 58.5 Ageb 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 97.3 97.3 93.5 94.7 98.5 98.0 62.0 62.1 48.1 47.4 66.6 66.3 35.2 35.2 45.4 47.3 31.9 31.7 2.5 2.6 6.1 5.1 1.4 1.8 Education 19.6 20.6 5.2 5.9 24.3 24.8 34.6 35.0 29.7 32.2 36.2 35.8 26.8 27.2 23.9 27.0 27.7 27.2 7.8 7.8 5.8 5.2 8.4 8.6 36.0 35.5 45.9 45.6 32.8 32.6 9.9 8.9 19.1 16.2 6.8 6.8

in third quarter; b pre-working: 0-17; working: men 18-64; women 18-59; working lower limit: 18-44, working upper limit: men 45-64, women 45-59; post-working: men 65 years or over, women 60 years or over; c including post-secondary; d together with incomplete primary and with no school education. a

60



Table 2.20. Employment ratesa in 2012, 2014 and 2016 (in 2016 by age and sex) and employed in agricultureb in EU countries in 2016 Employment rates for 15-64 years of agec 2016 Country

EU-28 EU-15 Austria Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia Finland France Greece Spain Netherlands Ireland Iceland Lithuania Luxembourg Latvia Malta Germany Poland urban areas rural areas Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Sweden Hungary UK Italy

2012

2014

64.1 65.1 71.4 61.8 58.8 53.5 64.6 66.5 72.6 67.1 69.4 x 50.8 55.8 74.4 59.9 79.7 62.0 65.8 63.0 59.1 73.0 59.7 60.1 59.1 61.4 60.2 59.7 64.1 73.8 56.7 69.9 56.6

64.9 65.6 71.1 61.9 61 54.6 62.1 69.0 72.8 69.6 68.7 63.8 49.4 56.0 73.1 63.1 82.9 65.7 66.6 66.3 62.4 73.8 61.7 62.5 60.4 62.6 61.0 61.0 63.9 74.9 61.8 71.9 55.7

aged

total 66.7 67.1 71.5 62.3 63.4 56.9 63.7 72.0 74.9 72.1 69.1 64.2 52.0 59.5 74.8 66.5 86.6 69.4 65.6 68.7 65.8 74.7 64.5 65.7 62.8 65.2 61.6 64.9 65.8 76.2 66.5 73.5 57.2

15-24 33.9 35.7 51.0 22.7 19.8 25.6 26.4 28.6 58.2 37.5 41.7 27.8 13.0 18.4 60.8 42.1 77.6 30.2 24.9 32.8 46.2 45.7 28.4 25.2 31.8 23.9 22.3 25.2 28.6 44.5 28.1 50.8 16.6

25-54 78.8 78.5 83.6 79.1 76.2 72.4 76.6 85.7 82.5 82.6 79.9 79.7 66.0 71.5 82.9 75.7 89.9 82.7 82.5 79.7 78.8 83.9 80.3 81.8 78.2 80.2 77.6 80.0 83.5 85.9 82.2 82.9 68.8

55-64 55.3 57.2 49.2 45.4 54.5 38.1 52.2 58.5 67.8 65.2 61.4 49.8 36.3 49.1 63.5 57.2 84.6 64.6 39.6 61.4 44.1 68.6 46.2 46.7 45.1 52.1 42.8 49.0 38.5 75.5 49.8 63.4 50.3

men

women

71.9 72.1 75.4 66.5 66.7 61.4 68.6 79.3 77.7 75.7 70.5 67.6 61.0 64.8 79.6 71.8 89.4 70.0 70.5 70.0 78.3 78.4 71.0 71.3 70.6 68.3 69.7 71.4 68.9 77.5 73.0 78.3 66.5

61.4 62.2 67.7 58.1 60.0 52.4 59.3 64.4 72.0 68.6 67.6 60.9 43.3 54.3 70.1 61.2 83.6 68.8 60.4 67.6 52.7 70.8 58.1 60.3 54.5 62.4 53.3 58.3 62.6 74.8 60.2 68.8 48.1

Employed in agriculture in 2016 as % of total employed populationd Poland EU-28 4.0 100.0 2.5 50.5 3.9 1.8 1.2 0.6 6.6 2.2 6.8 1.2 3.2 0.1 2.9 1.6 2.3 0.7 3.9 0.3 3.4 0.9 2.8 8.3 11.7 4.9 4.2 8.7 2.0 1.9 4.6 1.0 3.8 0.1 7.7 1.2 0.9 0.0 7.6 0.7 1.3 0.0 1.2 5.7 10.4 18.9 x x x x 4.5 2.2 20.7 19.4 2.9 0.8 4.2 0.4 1.6 0.9 5.0 2.5 1.0 3.3 3.7 9.5

percentage of employed in total population in a given category; b solely or mainly (together with forestry and fishery); c average in year; d aged 15-64, average for the year. a

Source: employment indicators for Poland broken down by urban and rural areas – GUS, the remaining data – Eurostat.

61

62

–23.4

–35.2

–18.7

–19.7

–32.1

–20.4

–22.9

–27.6

–14.0

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

–15.6

–26.8

–14.6

data for 2010–2012, including the results of the NSP 2011 census; b as at the end of the month.

IV IV IV IV IV IV IV III III

-15.6

–27.8

–15.4

–15.7

–25.6

–13.5

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Labour offices’ data (registered unemployment)b number of unemployed % of persons entitled to employment benefit % of rural Year and quar% of rural urban rural residents residents ter of survey total areas (in urban rural areas total thous.) areas areas 37.0 2010 12 1955 1098 856 43.8 16.7 17.1 16.3 39.0 2011 12 1983 1108 875 44.1 16.5 17.0 15.7 38.6 2012 12 2137 1198 939 43.9 16.8 17.1 16.3 38.9 2013 12 2158 1203 955 44.3 13.8 14.3 13.2 41.3 2014 12 1825 1013 812 44.5 13.3 13.6 12.8 42.8 2015 12 1563 861 702 44.9 13.9 14.2 13.5 44.1 2016 12 1335 731 604 45.2 13.9 14.0 13.9 40.4 2016 9 1324 737 587 44.3 13.2 13.6 12.8 39.1 2017 9 1117 622 495 44.3 13.9 14.1 13.5 Increase/decrease in the period (in %)

Source: author’s own calculations based on BAEL data and registered unemployment statistics.

a

IV.2014/ IV.2012 IV.2016/ IV.2014 III.2017/ III.2016

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016 2017

Year and quarter of survey

BAEL dataa number of unemployed urban rural total areas (in areas thous.) 1597 1005 591 1682 1026 656 1757 1079 678 1700 1038 662 1410 827 583 1208 692 517 958 536 422 1027 611 415 818 497 320

Table 2.21. Unemployed, based on labour force survey (BAEL) and labour offices’ data, by place of residence in 2010–2017

2. Rural population


Table 2.22. Unemployed living in rural areas, by links with agricultural holding and sex in 2010–2017a Number of unemployed in households landless Year and quar- with links with agricultural holding ter of survey total men women total men in thousand 2010 IV 168 91 77 423 219 2011 IV 182 93 90 473 236 2012 IV 183 93 90 495 260 2013 IV 179 90 89 483 258 2014 IV 135 69 66 447 231 2015 IV 125 71 54 392 213 IV 121 69 52 397 216 2015_Nb IV 92 51 41 330 191 2016_Nb III 86 48 38 330 192 2016_Nb III 63 36 27 257 156 2017_Nb Increase/decrease in the period (in %) IV.2014/IV.2012 –26.2 –25.8 –26.7 –9.7 –11.2 IV.2016/IV.2014 –31.9 –26.1 –37.9 –26.2 –17.3 III.2017/III.2016 –26.7 –25.0 –28.9 –22.1 –18.8 data for 2010–2012, including the results of the NSP 2011 census; agricultural holding. a

b

women 205 237 235 225 216 179 181 140 138 101 –8.1 –35.2 –26.8

according to the new definition of the

Source: author’s own calculations based on BAEL data.

63

2. Rural population

Table 2.23. Unemployed by sex, age, level of education, reasons and period of seeking work, place of residence and links with an agricultural holding in rural areas in 2014 and 2016a Total Item

Total incl. women Total under 24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55 or over Total Higher Total secondaryc secondary vocationalc secondary general Basic vocational Lower secondary, primaryd Total Loss of work Resignation from work Labour market re-entry Labour market entry Total up to 6 months 7-12 13 months or longer incl. over 24 months Average period of seeking work (in months)

Urban areas

2014

2016

2014

2016

2014

100.0 49.4

100.0 46.7

100.0 23.7 29.0 20.0 16.5 10.9

100.0 24.2 28.9 20.8 14.9 11.2

100.0 16.5 39.3 25.8 13.5 30.7 13.5

100.0 19.7 35.2 24.2 11.0 30.8 14.2

100.0 42.5 5.3 31.5 20.7

100.0 36.4 6.9 34.3 22.4

100.0 43.6 20.8 35.6

100.0 55.1 19.1 25.7

16.5

11.3

16.8

11.3

16.0

13.0

11.1

13.1

10.6

13.0

Rural areas 2016 population total land ruralb less

as a percentage 100.0 100.0 100.0 49.8 49.1 42.4 Age 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 19.0 18.0 30.5 33.5 28.7 29.5 29.5 28.7 21.0 23.2 18.4 17.1 18.2 16.2 14.0 13.0 13.2 13.3 7.5 7.7 Education 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 19.2 24.9 12.5 12.0 40.3 36.0 37.7 34.2 25.6 23.7 26.0 25.1 14.7 12.3 11.8 9.2 27.5 26.4 35.6 37.3 13.0 12.8 14.2 16.6 Reasons for seeking work 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 43.9 37.6 40.2 34.7 6.1 8.5 4.2 4.6 32.6 36.8 29.8 30.6 17.3 17.0 25.8 30.1 Period of seeking work 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 43.6 56.5 43.9 53.7 20.4 19.0 21.4 19.3 36.1 24.9 34.7 27.0 100.0 49.4

100.0 44.2

100.0 41.8

100.0 52.3 27.9 8.1 7.0 4.7

100.0 28.2 28.8 19.7 14.8 9.1

100.0 11.6 44.2 31.4 12.8 34.9 9.3

100.0 12.1 31.2 23.0 8.2 37.9 18.5

x (.) (.) (.) (.)

x (.) (.) (.) (.)

x (.) (.) (.)

x (.) (.) (.)

11.3

(.)

(.)

11.9

(.)

(.)

in third quarter; b population with links with an agricultural holding (in 2016 based on the new definition of the agricultural holding); c together with post-secondary; d together with incomplete primary and with no school education. a

Note: (.) means no data available. Source: author’s own calculations based on BAEL data.

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Table 2.24. Unemployment ratea by data from labour force surveys (BAEL) and labour force data and BAEL data by place of residence and links with an agricultural holding in rural areas in 2010–2017b BAEL data year and quarter of survey 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015_Ne 2016_Ne 2016_Ne 2017_Ne

IV IV IV IV IV IV IV III III

total

urban areas

total

9.3 9.7 10.1 9.8 8.1 6.9 5.5 5.9 4.7

9.5 9.7 10.2 9.8 7.8 6.5 5.1 5.8 4.8

9.0 9.8 10.0 9.7 8.5 7.6 6.1 6.1 4.7

Labour office datac rural areas population farmingd landless 5.3 12.4 5.7 13.5 5.8 13.5 6.0 12.7 4.8 11.2 4.4 9.7 3.6 7.6 3.4 7.7 2.5 5.9

year of survey

total

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016 2017

12.4 12.5 13.4 13.4 11.4 9.7 8.2 8.3 6.8

12 12 12 12 12 12 12 9 9

number of unemployed as a percentage of economically active population (sum of employed and unemploy ed); b data for 2011–2011, taking into account NSP 2011 results; c as at the end of the month; d population with links with an agricultural holding; e based on the new definition of an agricultural holding. a

Source: author’s own calculations based on BAEL data and Bezrobocie rejestrowane I-III kwartał 2017 r., GUS, Warsaw 2017.

65

2. Rural population

Table 2.25. Unemployment ratea by sex, age, level of education, place of residence and links with an agricultural holding in rural areas in 2014 and 2016b Item Total Men Women Total by age 18-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 Total by education Higher Total secondaryc secondary vocational secondary general Basic vocational Lower secondary, primaryd

2014 8.1 7.6 8.7

2016 5.5 5.4 5.7

2014 7.8 7.6 8.1

2016 5.1 5.0 5.3

Rural areas incl. landless total population 2014 2016 2014 2016 8.5 6.1 11.2 7.6 7.6 6.0 10.1 7.6 9.8 6.3 12.8 7.7

22.2 11.2 7.1 5.8 6.6 5.6

16.0 7.3 5.4 4.3 3.8 3.8

20.6 10.2 7.1 5.7 6.8 6.0

14.4 7.1 5.0 4.1 3.8 3.8

23.6 12.8 7.4 5.9 6.3 5.0

17.4 7.7 6.1 4.6 4.0 3.9

27.3 14.7 8.9 7.5 9.8 7.4

18.4 8.7 7.4 6.3 5.1 5.8

4.6 8.4

3.0 5.8

4.3 8.0

2.7 5.5

5.7 9.1

3.7 6.3

5.4 11.0

3.8 7.4

7.4

5.0

6.9

4.6

8.1

5.6

10.0

6.9

11.5 9.5

8.3 7.0

11.0 11.3

8.1 7.7

12.7 8.1

8.6 6.4

14.3 12.1

8.9 8.9

16.9

12.6

22.4

16.3

13.6

10.2

24.4

15.9

Total

Urban areas

number of unemployed as a percentage of economically active population (sum of employed and unemployed); b in fourth quarter; c together with post-secondary; d together with incomplete primary and with no school education. a

Source: author’s own calculations based on BAEL data.

66


Table 2.26. Unemployment ratea in European Union countries and Iceland in 2012, 2014 and 2016 and by age and sex in 2016b Country EU-28 EU-15 Austria Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia Finland France Greece Spain Netherlands Ireland Iceland Lithuania Luxembourg Latvia Malta Germany Poland urban areas rural areas Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Sweden Hungary UK Italy

2012 total

2014 total

total

10.4 10.6 4.9 7.6 12.3 16.0 11.9 7.0 7.5 10.0 7.7 9.4 24.5 24.8 5.8 14.7 6.0 13.4 5.1 15.0 6.3 5.4 10.1 10.0 10.2 15.8 6.8 14.0 8.9 8.0 11.0 7.9 10.7

10.2 10.5 5.6 8.5 11.4 17.3 16.1 6.1 6.6 7.4 8.7 10.3 26.5 24.5 7.4 11.3 4.9 10.7 5.9 10.8 5.8 5.0 9.0 8.7 9.5 14.1 6.8 13.2 9.7 8.0 7.7 6.1 12.7

8.6 9.1 6.0 7.8 7.6 13.1 13.0 4.0 6.2 6.8 8.8 10.1 23.6 19.6 6.0 7.9 3.0 7.9 6.3 9.6 4.7 4.1 6.2 5.9 6.5 11.2 5.9 9.7 8.0 7.0 5.1 4.8 11.7

15-24 18.7 18.9 11.2 20.1 17.2 31.3 29.1 10.5 12.0 13.4 20.1 24.6 47.3 44.4 10.8 17.2 6.5 14.5 18.9 17.3 11.0 7.1 17.7 17.3 18.0 28.0 20.6 22.2 15.2 18.9 12.9 13.0 37.8

2016 aged 25-49 50-64 8.2 6.5 8.8 6.8 5.7 4.5 7.5 5.5 7.1 7.4 11.9 9.9 11.8 11.3 3.6 3.6 5.9 4.0 5.8 7.4 7.4 7.6 9.3 7.1 23.4 19.3 18.4 17.2 4.6 6.2 7.5 6.1 2.8 1.7 7.2 8.0 5.6 4.3 9.0 9.8 3.9 3.5 4.1 3.6 5.5 4.5 5.4 4.9 5.7 3.8 10.1 10.4 5.4 3.7 8.7 8.7 8.0 6.4 5.7 4.9 4.5 4.4 3.8 3.4 12.0 6.3

men

women

8.4 8.8 6.5 8.1 8.1 12.5 12.7 3.4 5.8 7.4 9.0 10.3 19.9 18.1 5.6 9.1 2.9 9.1 6.0 10.9 4.4 4.5 6.1 6.0 6.3 11.1 6.6 8.8 7.5 7.4 5.1 5.0 10.9

8.8 9.3 5.6 7.6 7.0 13.8 13.4 4.7 6.6 6.1 8.6 9.9 28.1 21.4 6.5 6.5 3.0 6.7 6.6 8.4 5.2 3.8 6.2 5.9 6.8 11.3 5.0 10.8 8.6 6.6 5.1 4.7 12.8

number of unemployed as a percentage of economically active population (sum of employed and unemployed) in a given category (data in columns showing total values and broken down by sex comprise persons aged 15-74); b average for the year. a

Source: employment indicators for Poland broken down by urban and rural areas – GUS, the remaining data – Eurostat.

67

2. Rural population

68


Barbara Fedyszak-Radziejowska*

Chapter 3. Rural communities: Attitudes, values and socio-economic determinants Introduction The Report on Poland’s rural areas and their residents published in 2018, the year when we celebrate the centenary of regaining independence by Poland, invites historical reflection. For this reason, the diagnosis of the status quo is preceded by a brief introduction that recalls the role played by Poland’s rural residents in the challenging process of building the country’s sovereignty post 1945. The social capital of rural residents was also being developed in the times when self-organisation and active support for civic values meant a risk of repressions and political exclusion. Our collective memory has not retained recollections of many of the events that took place in those hard times, and the stereotypical perception harboured by many urban residents is closer to the “my cottage is at the furthermost end (and I do not care)” attitude than to the historical realities experienced by the peasant population in the difficult period post 1945. It is because in the time of the Polish People’s Republic (Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa – PRL) peasants’ cottages were not “at the furthermost end” but were pitched in the very centre of events, and such values as independence, democracy, private ownership and civil rights were what many rural residents strived for.

3.1. Peasants, members of the peasant movement, farmers in the Polish People’s Republic Let us recall the dramatic years when the structures of power of the Polish People’s Republic were being forged and evoke histories of the fighters of the socalled “second independent underground”, dubbed the “Indomitable” or “Cursed” soldiers. Professor Zdzisław Zblewski, a historian, writes: “…in 1944–1956, various Polish pro-independence clandestine organisations attracted, on and off, between 120,000 and 180,000 people, of whom 60,000 to 90,000 had links with the underground structures associated with the Home Army (Armia Krajowa * Dr B. Fedyszak-Radziejowska, Coordinator of the Section of the National Development Council: rural areas, agriculture.

69

3. Rural communities...

– AK), and about 30,000-40,000 – with the nationalist underground movement. (...) Altogether, about 20,000 people filled the ranks of Polish pro-independence guerrilla units. (...) Residents of villages provided the main social basis for the anti-communist guerrilla movement. (...) Peasants or people of peasant origin can easily be found at all levels of the anti-communist clandestine activity.” In those hard and complicated times, Poland’s rural areas provided the supply base for the anti-communist, pro-independence guerrilla movement, giving food and shelter to the “indomitable” of the day, who were later for many years “cursed” from the official memory and history of Poland. The political representation of peasants and rural residents: ludowcy, that is members of the pre-war Polish Peasants’ Movement (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe – PSL), wiciowcy, members of the “Wici” Rural Youth Association, and bechowcy, members of the Peasant Battalions (Bataliony Chłopskie – BCh), were among those who were repressed by the Red Army entering Poland. The repressions were targeted at those leaders of the Polish Underground State who decided to take part in mock talks with the command of the Red Army and the NKVD secret police, accepted the invitation for a meeting in the town of Pruszków, from where they were flown to Moscow and incarcerated in the Lubyanka Prison. Members of the PSL were among the 16 representatives of the authorities and major political parties of the Polish Underground State accused of alleged collaboration with Nazi Germany against the Red Army, and pronounced guilty in the so-called Trial of the Sixteen in June 1945 in Moscow: Stanisław Mierzwa (sentenced to four months in prison), Adam Bień (sentenced to five years in prison) and Kazimierz Bagiński (sentenced to one year in prison). Leaders of the peasant movement suffered from another wave of repression after the 1946 Referendum and after the January 1947 election. In August 1947, in the so-called Kraków Trial of the Freedom and Independence Movement (Wolność i Niepodległość – WiN) and the Polish Peasants’ Movement (PSL), five PSL members were accused and four were sentenced to prison: Stanisław Mierzwa – 10 years in prison, Karol Buczek – 15 years, Mieczysław Kabat – 6 years, Karol Starmach – 10 years. Only Jerzy Kunce was acquitted. The publication Koniec jałtańskich złudzeń. Sfałszowane wybory 19.I.1947 [End of the Yalta illusions. The rigged election of 19 January 1947], edited by Michał Wenkler and published by the Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej – IPN) in Kraków in 2007, documents the extent of repressions, arrests and crimes committed before the 1946 Referendum and

70

Z. Zblewski, Udział chłopów w oporze społecznym w pierwszych latach po zakończeniu II wojny światowej, in: B. Fedyszak-Radziejowska (ed.), Wieś i rolnictwo w debacie publicznej- stereotypy, polityka, wiarygodność. Wyd. Kancelaria Prezydenta RP, Warsaw 2010 (conference paper), pp. 139-140. W. Roszkowski, Historia Polski 1914-2001, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2003, p. 153. W. Frazik, F. Musiał, M. Wenklar, Pod czerwonym pręgierzem. Proces krakowski WiN i PSL, IPN, Kraków 2017, p. 31; also: M. Wenklar (ed.), Koniec jałtańskich złudzeń. Sfałszowane wybory 19.I.1947, IPN, Kraków 2007.


in the period running up to the 1947 election on candidates, members and supporters of the peasant movement. We know the names of 110 victims – members of the PSL murdered in 1947, names of the 107 arrested parliamentary candidates in the election to the Sejm on the PSL ticket (!), and nearly 2,000 names of arrested grassroots activists. The IPN archives estimate the number of activists, members and supporters of the peasant movement imprisoned and repressed in 1946 and 1947 at about 100,000. That was how the decisions of the Big Three taken in Yalta, where the communists agreed to have a democratic election organised in Poland, were being put to life. The refusal in February 1946 by the PSL led by Stanisław Mikołajczyk of the offer to form one electoral bloc together with the communists and the decision to run independently in the election to the Sejm was a major contribution to upholding democracy. As a result, the 1947 election was more than merely a window-dressing exercise, even though its result, just as that of the Referendum, was rigged. We should add that Mikołajczyk’s PSL was an agrarian party whose political platform rested on four values: peasant way of life, rurality, private ownership of land and cooperative movement. The first two meant enhancing the status of farmers’ work, peasant traditions and rural areas as an attractive place to live. Private ownership of land was regarded as a source of peasants’ dignity and economic freedom, while cooperative movement was expected to foster the modernisation of Polish agriculture. When a new party, the United Peasants’ Movement (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe – ZSL), was formed at the Congress for the Unity of the Peasants’ Movement in Warsaw in November 1949, its programme firmly renounced agrarian values. The party’s mission statement also disavowed the pro-independence traditions of the peasant movement, recognised the primacy of the Polish United Workers Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza – PZPR), blocked party membership for “kulaks” and introduced the concept of the class struggle of “the poor against the kulaks” into the peasant party’s agenda. How did peasants react? In 1946, the PSL had about 800,000 members, compared to 194,000 members of the ZSL in 1950 following the parties’ unification. Despite the arrests of the leaders of the peasant movement, despite harassment and repressions, the collectivisation undertaken by the PRL regime suffered a defeat and failed to transform Polish agriculture into “socialist” agriculture, in line with the 1947 recommendations by Cominform. In 1951, nearly half of those arrested for alleged hostile “antisocialist propaganda” were peasants, both those with small holdings (25%) M. Szpytma, Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe? Geneza i historia ZSL ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem okresu stalinowskiego, in: Ruch ludowy przed, w czasie i po wojnie, Biuletyn IPN No. 10 – 11, October–November 2009, pp. 71-79.

71


and medium-sized holdings and the so-called rural “rich” (26%), who were critical of production cooperatives. In 1953 alone, over 8,000 peasants were arrested for “anti-socialist propaganda” and about 17,000 were arrested for alleged failure to supply the “mandatory quotas”. In 1952–1955, over 500,000 peasants were punished with seizure of property for failure to comply with the provision of “mandatory quotas”. The materials from the Ministry of Public Security (Ministerstwo Bezpie czeństwa Publicznego – MBP) kept at the Institute of National Remembrance offer a wealth of detailed information about the repressions of the day. For instance, “for the hostile activities during the ploughing of the cooperativeowned land in the Pętkowice municipality, district of Starachowice” five persons were sentenced in 1953 to two to six years in prison. The culprits “prevented the ploughing from going ahead and beat up the party activists”. The MBP Newsletter (January 1949) reported that: “(…) in the Kielce and Bydgoszcz voivodeships, peasants kill off large quantities of pigs on the grounds that they will not farm pigs for a kolkhoz”. In the district of Ełk, two peasants with middle-sized farms were arrested “for propagating a hostile version about kolkhozes and inciting peasants to liquidate their farms”. Another MBP report (August 1953) reads: “(…) in the past two months (…) over 50 aggressive acts were committed to prevent the measurement of the cooperative-owned land and finishing of the first ploughing; many of these acts were mass-scale events, previously planned, organised and combined with rallies during which religious songs were sung and [holy] pictures were brought”. In 1953, the Voivodeship Office for Public Security in the Kraków Voivodeship noted: “women were particularly active, not allowing to plough the land designated for the production cooperative, and throwing themselves under the tractors (…)”. A similar protest was held in Borek Nowy in the Rzeszów Voivodeship, where 300 women took part in a protest against ploughing, and on the following day another 120 women prevented the surveyor from taking the measurement. In Simiłowice, district of Miechów, “(…) on 14 September, before starting a joint ploughing activity, 100 women went out into the field (…) The women, armed with hoes and sticks, singing the Serdeczna Matko [Cordial Mary] hymn, attacked the tractor driver, thus preventing the ploughing”. In those days, in order to defend the private ownership of peasants’ land, plot boundary strips had to be protected against being ploughed over. Grzegorz Miernik wrote that, by October 1956, only 10,203 production cooperatives with a membership of 800,000 had been formed on 11% of

72

A. Kura, Aparat bezpieczeństwa i wymiar sprawiedliwości wobec kolektywizacji wsi polskiej 19481956, IPN, Warsaw 2006, quoted examples: pp. 128, 228-236, 261. G. Miernik, 2004, Dekolektywizacja polskiej wsi w Polsce w latach 1956 – 1957, in: J. Gmitruk, Z. Nawrocki (eds.) Represje wobec wsi i ruchu ludowego. (1956-1989), Vol .2, Muzeum Historii Polskiego Ruchu Ludowego i Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Warsaw 2004.


farmland. This was a very modest number since Poland’s rural population in 1955 totalled over 15,000,000 people, most of whom were associated with agriculture. Post 1956, fewer than 2,000 of the 10,000 cooperatives were still operational (19%), with 28,000 members. The speed at which the vast majority of cooperatives collapsed shows that they had a declared rather than actual existence. The numerous protests were effective in “defending the plot’s boundary strips”, as a result of which farmers could continue to work “their land” even though formally the land was now shared, cooperative-owned. We should add that Polish peasants did not receive deeds of title to their land following the agricultural reform introduced by the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) in 1944 until 1970. In the 1970s, they were released from the obligation to provide mandatory quotas and allowed to purchase tractors and combine harvesters not only as part of farmers’ associations but also individually, as farm owners. After the 1976 amendments, Article 11 of the Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic read: “The socialist economic system, based on socialised means of production and socialist production relations, shall constitute the foundation of the socio-economic system of the Polish People’s Republic”. Article 15 of the Constitution listed the following priorities: “The Polish People’s Republic (…) shall create for its agriculture favourable conditions promoting socialist transformations of rural areas, shall protect individual farms (…), support and assist (…) agricultural production cooperatives and (…) develop and strengthen stateowned farms (…)”. In the Polish People’s Republic, private ownership of land was not guaranteed by the Constitution. Similarly, the Act of 27 October 1977 on the Pension System, commonly referred to as “pension for land”, was viewed by farmers as an attempt of converting Polish agriculture into “socialist agriculture”. In the August 1980 Agreements, the authorities only apparently agreed to the “sustainable prospects for family farms” and to the “revival of rural selfgovernance”. The consent, however, did not extend to registration of a farm ers’ trade union. Between October 1980 and February 1981, on several occasions (29 October, 6 and 30 December, 30 January, 5 and 10 February) the Voivodeship Court, the Supreme Court, representatives of the Government and the Political Bureau of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) publicly refused registration owing to the “lack of legal grounds”. The applications submitted by the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union of Farmers (NSZZ Rolników), Rural Solidarity (Solidarność Wiejska), Bydgoszczbased Peasants’ Solidarity (Solidarność Chłopska), Peasants Trade Union of the Dobrzyń and Kujawy Region (Chłopski Związek Zawodowy Ziemi

K. Gorlach, Socjologia polska wobec kwestii chłopskiej, Universitas, Kraków 1990, p. 85.

73


Dobrzyńskiej i Kujaw) and the Wałbrzych-based Independent Peasants’ Trade Union (Chłopski Niezależny Związek Zawodowy) were all dismissed. In December 1980 in Ustrzyki Dolne, farmers began their struggle for their own trade-union representation. The agreement was signed on 18 February 1981 in Rzeszów and on 20 February 1981 in Ustrzyki Dolne, and the new trade union – “Solidarity” Independent Self-Governing Trade Union of Individual Farmers (NSZZ RI “S”), was registered on 12 May 1981. Farmers ensured a provision on the “statutory enhancement of the guarantees of the inviolability of peasants’ property, particularly the land and the right to inherit it, as well as recognition of peasant agriculture as a sustainable element with equal rights in our national economy”. The authorities also pledged to “consistently implement the above principle in legislation and practice”. In addition to the above, democratisation of local self-governance was to be ensured: “...the municipal heads (naczelnik) were to be elected by municipal people’s council (…) in a secret ballot (…) from among the candidates proposed by the councillors”, and “regulations enabling the boards of the municipal people’s councils to approve the election of the village mayors (sołtys) were to be abolished”. Moreover, “full presentation of historical truth in teaching history” was promised (Section 3), so as “granting planning permits for the construction of religious buildings” (Section 4) and “providing priests’ service in the army and in prisons”, “granting permits for organising nurseries and kindergartens by nuns” and “increasing the print run of the Catholic press” (Section 6). Putting those assurances into life was halted by the introduction of the martial law on 13 December 1981. The authorities of the Polish People’s Republic feared more than just the workers’ Solidarity. The memories of the failed collectivisation of 1946 and 1947 and the fear that agrarianism would be reborn were still vivid and posed a source of concern for the PZPR leaders. It should be borne in mind, therefore, that in the Polish People’s Republic not only residents of largest cities, intelligentsia and university students were engaged in civic activities for civil rights and liberties but also peasants, farmers and rural residents.

3.2. Attitudes, values and socio-economic situation of farmers and rural residents Rural residents about their place of residence

74

Both in the time of the Polish People’s Republic and post 1989, the social changes in the Polish society were described using the language of the “urba nisation process”, most visibly manifested by “migration from rural to urban


areas” commonly dubbed as “going up to the city”, in the sense of upward mobility. It seemed that the number of the rural population would shrink from year to year. The first symptoms that the settlement structure had stabilised appeared post 2004, while the change in the direction of migration from cities to rural areas, and the accompanying visible boost in the attractiveness of rural areas was noted in our Reports on the State of Rural Areas 2014 and 2016. In a similar vein, the GUS 2016 Report corroborated the stabilisation of the trend: in 2016, the total balance of migration per 1000 of urban population was –1.1, and in rural areas it was positive, at +1.7. In absolute numbers, the influx of residents into rural areas (178,200) exceeded the outflow (153,200). In cities, the outflow (225,000) exceeded the inflow of residents, which totalled 200,000 in 2016. It should be added that the birth rate per 1000 population was in 2016 higher in rural areas (10.2), than in urban areas (9.8). In the first half of 2017, the natural increase, negative across Poland, totalled –11,700 in urban areas and +900 in rural areas. At the end of June 2017, a total of 23,126,000 residents lived in cities (60% of the population), compared to 15,297,000 in rural areas.10 The survey findings in the recent years indicate that, as a society, we are generally satisfied with the place of residence. At the end of 2017 and the beginning of 2018, 81% of Poles surveyed by CBOS expressed their satis faction in that regard.11 Interestingly, the share of those satisfied with living in rural areas (85%) was not only higher than average but also higher than the percentage of respondents satisfied with their living in largest cities, with a population over 500,000 (84%). In 2016, the level of satisfaction with having the place of residence in rural areas was distinctly lower (80%) than in large cities (89%). In 2018, to the question “are you generally satisfied with your place of residence” asked by CBOS, 85% of rural residents, 84% of small-town dwellers (under 20,000) and 84% of largest-city dwellers gave a positive answer. The satisfaction of dwellers of largest cities and rural residents with the place where they live was nearly identical. Less satisfied were only dwellers of small cities, with a population of 20,000-99,000 (77%), and medium-sized cities, with a population of 100,000-499,000 (75%) . Rural areas as a place to live were most frequently accepted by respondents working on private farms (92%) and farmers (87%). The positive balance of migration from urban to rural areas as a consequence of a deliberate choice of countryside life by some of the metropolitan elites is a manifestation of Polska wieś 2014, Polska wieś 2016 Raport o stanie wsi, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 2014 and 2016. http://stat.gov.pl/obszary tematyczne/ludność 10 GUS, Ludność. Stan i struktura w przekroju terytorialnym. Stan w dniu 30.VI 2017 r., Warsaw 2017. 11 CBOS 5/2018, Zadowolenie z życia, CBOS 4/2016, Zadowolenie z życia.

75


a certain “ruralisation” of the Polish society. The process has its sources also in the growing approval for rural areas on the part of those who were born there and have lifelong ties with their family farms. What seems particularly interesting is the fact that the main appeal of living in rural areas lies not in the material conditions of living in the countryside since the satisfaction of farmers with their place of residence is not accompanied by a comparable degree of satisfaction with their level of income, financial situation, prospects for the future, material living and dwelling conditions, etc. (Tab. 1). Table 3.1. Level of satisfaction of farmers and rural residents with their present professional, material and social situation (in %) Are you generally satisfied? with your income and financial situation with material living and dwelling conditions with your friends and best acquaintances with your place of residence with your prospects for the future

Satisfied

Not satisfied

More or less satisfied rural farmers residents

farmers

rural residents

farmers

rural residents

22.0

31.0

20.0

24.0

58.0

45.0

48.0

58.0

9.0

9.0

42.0

34.0

82.0

83.0

0.0

2.0

18.0

14.0

87.0

85.0

0.0

4.0

13.0

12.0

42.0

50.0

10.0

10.0

44.0

32.0

Source: CBOS 5/2018, Zadowolenie z życia.

Comparing the significance of various sources of satisfaction suggests that such values as a community, social ties, a sense of embeddedness and attach ment to the rural lifestyle matters more than the material situation, income, living conditions or prospects for the future.

The material situation and aspirations of rural residents Following the EU accession, the material situation of rural residents and farmers came to be viewed by many urban dwellers as an epitome of extra ordinary profits brought to farmers by the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Cohesion Policy. After EU accession, opinions about exorbitant incomes of Polish farmers started to circulate in the Polish society, which was reflected in the 2013 report by CBOS.12 These opinions were not corroborated in the biannual reports entitled Diagnoza Społeczna [Social diagnosis], 76

12

CBOS 127/2013. Polacy o zarobkach różnych grup zawodowych.


published in 2013 and 2015, with Janusz Czapiński and Tomasz Panek as editors.13 Similarly, subsequent CBOS polls do not corroborate the opinion that urban residents hold about high incomes of farmers, although it certainly cannot escape attention that the material conditions of existence of farmers and rural residents alike have significantly improved. Nevertheless, the subjective self-assessment of their own affluence is still lower in rural communities than among city dwellers. Likewise, in the CBOS poll from March 2017, farmers and rural residents expressed more critical views about their material situation (Tab. 3.2) than representatives of other socio-professional groups.14 Table 3.2. Evaluation of the material situation of one’s household Which of the following statements best characterise management of cash in your household? (in %) We live in very poor We live in average We live in good or August 2017 or modest conditions conditions very good conditions 19.0 55.0 26.0 Total 20.0 57.0 23.0 Rural residents Residents of small 25.0 50.0 24.0 cities Residents of largest 11.0 64.0 26.0 cities Farmers 26.0 56.0 18.0 Skilled workers 13.0 62.0 25.0 Self-employed 6.0 52.0 42.0 Source: CBOS, Opinie i Diagnozy, No. 40/2017, Czy żyje nam się lepiej? Opinie o gospodarce, rynku pracy i własnej sytuacji materialnej.

Farmers chose the answer “we live in very poor or modest conditions” twice as often as skilled workers, similarly to rural residents, when compared with dwellers of largest cities. Residents of smallest cities (up to 20,000) resemble rural residents and farmers as far as their self-assessment is concerned. It should be noted, however, that most farmers believe that they live “in average conditions” (56%), and nearly one in five (18%), that they live “in good or very good conditions”. This indicates that the situation in that regard has improved and social inequalities between farmers and other vocational groups have been reduced. In their answers to another question, farmers (58%) and rural residents (46%) declared that they do not fear poverty although are concerned that their situation might deteriorate. However, even if they fear poverty, they think they 13 Diagnoza społeczna 2015. Warunki i jakość życia Polaków, ed. by J. Czapiński, T. Panek. Rada Mo nitoringu Społecznego. 14 CBOS Opinie i Diagnozy No. 40/2017, Czy żyje się nam lepiej? Opinie o gospodarce, rynku pracy i własnej sytuacji materialnej, ed. by M. Omyła-Rudzka, M. Feliksiak, pp. 125, 126.

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will cope somehow (17% farmers, 24% rural residents). At the same time, they are less frequently than the surveyed Poles (30%) confident that they will manage financially (18% farmers and 23% rural residents). To sum up, worse self-assessment of their own material situation is not as common among farmers as it was several years ago, and the distribution of answers demonstrates that the gap dividing farmers and rural residents from other socio-professional groups has narrowed. It should be added that, according to Poles surveyed by CBOS,15 the poverty threshold is PLN 905.45 net per person. Although rural residents consider poverty to begin from a similar level of income, PLN 901.66 per person, according to farmers such an income is not yet poverty, which – in their opinion – is below PLN 802.49 net per person. The subjective dimension of how poverty is perceived is a significant piece of information that corroborates the hypothesis about relatively lower incomes of farmers compared to other socio-professional groups. Additionally, half of farmers (49%), when asked to compare the level of income of their own family with the average income of families in Poland, believe that it is lower, and 40% that it is on a similar level as that of other families. Only the unemployed (57%) and disability pensioners (66%) view their income to be lower than that of other families more frequently than farmers. Table 3.3. Appliances and equipment in households passenger car Total Farmers Skilled workers Rural residents Residents of largest cities

75.0 87.0

Yes, I have in my household a/an (in %) automatic mobile flat-screen digital washing phone TV camera machine 97.0 95.0 86.0 43.0 96.0 95.0 87.0 42.0

dishwasher 42.0 39.0

77.0

96.0

100.0

90.0

44.0

38.0

80.0

94.0

93.0

83.0

40.0

38.0

67.0

100.0

99.0

84.0

61.0

49.0

Source: CBOS Opinie i Diagnozy, No. 40/2017, Czy żyje się nam lepiej? Opinie o gospodarce, rynku pracy i własnej sytuacji materialnej.

Another premise, that is the equipment found in rural and urban households, suggests, however, that the differences in the standards of living have narrowed (Tab. 3.3). These are not wide differences, although such devices as dishwashers and digital cameras are definitely more frequently seen in largest cities than in villages, and cars – more frequently in rural areas than in cities. 78

15

CBOS Opinie i Diagnozy, No. 40/217, op. cit.


Automatic dishwashers, mobile phones and flat-screen TVs are present in most households, whether rural or urban. Wider differences in the affluence of rural and urban residents can be ob served if their cash savings are compared. In 2017, nearly one in two respondents interviewed by CBOS (49%) had some savings, so as the majority of residents of largest cities (58%), the minority of farmers (43%) and minority of rural residents (43%). The share of respondents with savings was lower than that of farmers and rural residents only among old age pensioners (37%), disability pensioners (25%) and the unemployed (35%). Similar differences can be observed among those who go on holiday or tourist trips for a minimum of two days (with accommodation). In 2017, 54% of Poles undertook such travel,16 including 74% of residents of largest cities and only 38% of rural residents. Farmers very seldom go on holidays (20%); even old age pensioners (34%) and disability pensioners (31%) do it more frequently than farmers and persons employed in private farms (13%). Even if the very nature of the farming profession offers a convincing explanation of these differences, we should bear in mind that the question referred to a merely two-day rest, and not a two-week holiday. It is difficult to unequivocally summarise the still visible albeit diminishing inequalities between farmers, rural residents and residents of cities, especially the largest ones with a population over 500,000. Nevertheless, the CBOS 2017 polls justify the hypothesis on the decreasing gap between urban and rural households.

3.3. Human and social capital of rural residents What is currently termed as “human capital” is contemporarily much more fully defined by education, and knowledge, but also access to state-of-the-art information and communication channels and ability to use them on a dayto-day basis. For many years, the differences in the level of human capital between rural and urban communities were determined by the share of the population with secondary and higher education. Likewise, in 2015, university graduates could be encountered twice as often as in cities (26%) than in rural areas (11%); this difference, however, has been steadily decreasing. Naturally, cities offer many more education and further training opportunities than rural areas, but due to the number of educational and training projects available for rural residents and the development of information technologies the traditional method of measuring human capital only by the level of educational attainment 16

CBOS 28/2018, Wyjazdy wypoczynkowe Polaków w 2017 roku i plany na rok 2018.

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of members of a given community is no longer sufficient, as it was only three or four years ago. Changes are currently occurring at a fast pace and cover the whole country, including urban and rural communities. In 2015, 64.8% of the population aged over 16 used the Internet,17 while in August 2017 access to the Internet in their own household was declared by 80% of Poles surveyed by CBOS. Naturally, that percentage was slightly higher (87%) in largest cities but, nevertheless, rural areas have considerably closed the distance to urban areas. In 2015, 55.6% of rural residents had Internet access, and in 2017 household Internet access was declared by 75% of rural residents. What is more, a similar declaration was made by 87% farmers and 86% employed in private farms (Tab. 3.4). Table 3.4. Computers, laptops and tablets in households in 2017 Socioprofessional group Total Residents of cities > 500,000 Rural residents Farmers Workers

desktop computer 37.0

Do you have in your household a/an? (in %) portable cable or mobile computer, tablet satellite tv on phone laptop, subscription notebook 95.0 68.0 37.0 67.0

44.0

99.0

70.0

39.0

73.0

36.0 42.0 39.0

93.0 95.0 100.0

64.0 72.0 76.0

38.0 38.0 40.0

57.0 53.0 74.0

Source: CBOS Opinie i Diagnozy, No. 40/2017, Czy żyje się nam lepiej? Opinie o gospodarce, rynku pracy i własnej sytuacji materialnej.

Somewhat surprisingly, not only the near-ubiquity of mobile phones and laptops in both rural and urban areas, but also the fact that the owners of tablets, subscription cable or satellite TV and desktop computers repre sent a group of a similar size both among farmers and workers, and among rural residents and dwellers of largest cities. The differences be tween farmers and rural residents and city dwellers are wider only among subscribers of paid satellite TV. Not only the proverbial youth but also farmers and workers benefit from the development of digital civilisation. As recently as two years ago, the share of users of these technologies was distinctly lower in rural areas and among farmers than in cities. Today, the level of human capital measured by access to modern commu nication channels seems similar across the society, irrespective of the place of residence. Wider differences become visible when we analyse participation in culture: urban residents much more frequently than farmers have collections 80

17 Diagnoza Społeczna 2015, and CBOS, Opinie i Diagnozy, No. 40/2017, Czy żyje się nam lepiej? pp. 132–136.


of paper books and e-books, DVD or music CD collections. Quite likely, these differences can be traced back to the specific pragmatism of rural residents which makes them prefer the practical utility of the material goods they have in their household to their recreational or cultural value. It is probably not a coincidence that farmers and rural residents not only go on holidays less frequently but also less frequently have collections of books, CDs or DVDs at their homes. The findings from the CBOS survey concerning Poles’ participation in cultural and sports events, travel and recreation can be viewed as an interesting confirmation of such a statement (Tab. 3.5). Table 3.5. Participation in culture and travels of Poles in 2017 Socioprofessional groups Total Residents of cities > 500,000 Rural residents Farmers Workers*

During the past year, have you been to …? (in %) a museum/ the cinema a concert the theatre abroad exhibition 49.0 41.0 33.0 22.0 31.0 66.0

50.0

50.0

44.0

46.0

32.0 25.0 50.0

30.0 20.0 53.0

21.0 11.0 22.0

13.0 13.0 10.0

22.0 24.0 25.0

* skilled workers Source: CBOS 17/2018, Aktywności i doświadczenia Polaków w 2017 roku.

The poll findings seem to confirm not only the rising level of affluence of the Polish society, but also the fact that its material resources are spent on recreation and cultural activities. In 2017, many more Poles took part in different forms of activity, and did so not only on a broader scale than in 2016, but also on a scale “that was in many cases the largest in the history of our research”, as Michał Feliksiak writes.18 “Participation in culture and sports events has increased, so as book reading. More people than ever before went on holidays and participated in social activities, in particular going out to restaurants.” Such a change also embraced rural residents and farmers, albeit to a lesser degree than urban residents. A lower percentage of farmers and rural residents going to the cinema, theatre or art galleries is probably a consequence of the fact that all these cultural institutions are found mostly in cities. Reading a book for enjoyment, however, does not require any cultural institutions. In 2017, this was an activity undertaken by 64% Poles, 49% rural residents, 43% farmers, 84% urban residents and 52% skilled workers. Although rural communities read books visibly more often than they go to 18

M. Feliksiak, in: CBOS, 17/2018, Aktywności i doświadczenia Polaków w 2017 roku, p. 6.

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the theatre, reading is much more common in cities. It should be added that reading books is most often declared by school and university students (84%). These two groups are as a rule urban residents, even if only “temporarily”, because secondary, post-secondary and higher education institutions are typically located in cities. It was found yet again that urban residents travel abroad twice as often as rural residents. This is not surprising because tourist trips abroad require financial resources which are more scarce among rural residents. Nevertheless, farmers and workers alike may travel abroad to earn money. It is small wonder that the percentage of farmers (24%) and workers (25%) who declared staying abroad is very similar. Unfortunately, the CBOS 17/2018 survey did not ask the respondents about their specific reasons for going abroad.

3.4. Social capital The condition of social capital in Poland’s rural areas has always been a significant factor in diagnosing the situation of rural communities and a strong argument in the debate on the sources of the phenomenon which is commonly dubbed the “backwardness” of the rural areas in Poland.19 The hypothesis on the barrier to modernisation of agriculture and rural development posed by the low level of social capital in rural communities gained some journalistic currency. The lack of civic activity of rural residents and an attitude of distrust rife among Polish farmers were regarded as reasons explaining low economic effectiveness of farms and the distance separating rural from urban areas in Poland. The dispute was also about the role that the state should play in the mo dernisation of agriculture and transformation of Poland’s rural areas, i.e. the agricultural policy, and the role of the “mindset of rural residents”, that is a low level of social capital measured by unwillingness to cooperate, low level of self-organisation and lack of social trust. A noteworthy although isolated contribution to that debate was an article by Jan Herbst published in 2008 in the book Wiejskie organizacje pozarządowe [Rural NGOs].20 In his view, the opinion about the low level of civic activity in Poland’s rural areas, prevalent among the researchers of social capital, fails to capture the situation in its complexity. The focus on statistics, that is the number of non-governmental institutions, of which only one in five is situated

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19 Cf. B. Fedyszak-Radziejowska: Wieś w polityce i debacie publicznej, in: Wieś i Rolnictwo, IRWiR PAN, No. 1/2002, pp. 74-75. 20 J. Herbst, Inny trzeci sektor. Organizacje pozarządowe na terenach wiejskich, in: Wiejskie organizacje pozarządowe, ed. by M. Halamska, IRWiR PAN, Warsaw 2008, pp. 33-75.


in rural areas, did not fully reflect the specific nature of civic activity of rural residents. Its specific nature, among others, lies in the fact that in addition to the few, 13,000 registered organisations operating in rural areas in 2008, there were, for instance, 8,000 associations having ties with the Catholic Church and 15,000 active, “traditional” voluntary fire brigades (Ochotnicza Straż Pożarna – OSP). In turn, within the OSP structures there were 800 orchestras, 300 artistic groups, 600 sports teams and approximately 1,000 chambers of tradition. Herbst was the first researcher to note and describe the specific nature of rural residents’ social capital. The changes that took place in the civic activity of rural residents in the recent years confirmed the considerable value of his diagnosis.21 Today, the empirical material provides many arguments that there are no major differences between social capital and the level of self-organisation of urban and rural communities (Tab. 3.6). Table 3.6. Respondents who declared volunteer work in NGOs 2015 and 2017 Socio-professional groups Total Rural areas Residents of cities > 500,000 Farmers Workers*

Share of respondents who declared volunteer work in NGOs (in %) in one area

in two areas

in three or more areas

total

2015 16.0 16.0

2017 18.0 19.0

2015 8.0 8.0

2017 8.0 9.0

2015 13.0 11.0

2017 14.0 12.0

2015 37.0 35.0

2017 40.0 40.0

13.0

14.0

11.0

13.0

25.0

18.0

49.0

45.0

24.0 21.0

24.0 19.0

8.0 8.0

15.0 7.0

6.0 8.0

18.0 8.0

38.0 37.0

57.0 34.0

* skilled workers. Source: CBOS 13/2016, Aktywność Polaków w organizacjach obywatelskich, and CBOS 29/201, Aktywność Polaków w organizacjach obywatelskich.

A comparison of the findings from 2015 and 2017 shows an interesting change: a slight decrease of activity in NGOs in large-city and workers’ communities (as a total of all activities) and a distinct increase of activity in the farmers’ community (by 19 pp) and slightly lower (by 5 pp) – in rural communities. It should be added that, in 2017, only two socio-pro fessional groups were more active in non-governmental organisations than farmers: managers and professionals with university education (65.0%) and technicians and associate professionals (67.0%). The level of organised forms of civic activity is visibly affected by such factors as: higher education (48.0% 21

Changes in the NGO sector in rural areas are discussed in Chapter 8 below, authored by Jan Herbst.

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of active people), participation in religious practices once a week (45% of active people) and several times a week (69% of active people). The composite index of engagement in volunteer work, which takes into account both unorganised, voluntary and unpaid work for the local community and people in need, and engagement in NGOs, confirms that the hypothesis on the low level of social capital in rural areas in Poland is unjustified in light of the 2017 survey findings (Tab. 3.7). Table 3.7. Composite index22 of engagement in volunteer work in 2015 and 2017 (in %) Socio-professional groups Total Poles Residents of cities > 500,000 Rural residents Farmers Skilled workers Self-employed

2015 44.0 49.0 46.0 58.0 45.0 51.0

2017 48.0 53.0 51.0 67.0 40.0 44.0

Source: CBOS 13/2016, Aktywność Polaków w organizacjach obywatelskich, and CBOS 29/2018, Aktywność Polaków w organizacjach obywatelskich.

As early as in 2015, the composite index of engagement in volunteer work was higher among farmers and rural residents than the country’s average. Two years later, in 2017, its value increased not only across the country but also visibly (by 9 pp) among farmers and slightly less among rural residents. Reduced level of engagement in volunteer work was found in the groups of skilled workers and self-employed. It should also be added that – as in the past – also in 2017, managers and professionals (70.0%) and associate professionals and technicians (72.0%) represented an elite of the communities involved in volunteer work. Farmers were the third largest group (58%), followed by school and university students (56%). In social sciences, there is a universally accepted view of the fundamental role that two attitudes play in the building of civil society: acceptance of the norm that promotes cooperation and an ability to trust other people.23 Research shows that the norm that accepts joint activities with other people is shared by a definite majority of Poles, farmers and rural re sidents (Tab. 3.8). Moreover, the share of farmers convinced that they will achieve more when cooperating with others than when acting on their own considerably increased in comparison to 2016 (by 7 pp).

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22 Composite index of engagement: respondents doing voluntary work for their community or those in need either in NGOs and/or outside of NGOs. 23 Cf. F. Fukuyama, Zaufanie. Kapitał społeczny a droga do dobrobytu, PWN, Warsaw/Wrocław 1997, and R. Putnam, Demokracja w działaniu: tradycje obywatelskie we współczesnych Włoszech, Znak, Kraków 1995.


Table 3.8. Acceptance of the norm of cooperation with other people Socioprofessional groups Total Rural residents Farmers

Which of the following opinions is closer to your views? (in %) By cooperating with other Cooperating with other people is people you can achieve more usually a waste of time than by acting on your own 2016 2018 2016 2018 81.0 82.0 9.0 8.0 76.0 77.0 12.0 10.0 74.0 81.0 15.0 10.0

Source: CBOS 22/2016, Gotowość do współpracy, CBOS 30/2018, Gotowość Polaków do współpracy.

The majority of the respondents understand the significance of cooperation and are willing to act together. However, the same majority do not trust other people. The authors of the CBOS report on distrust and trust, Agnieszka Cybulska and Krzysztof Pankowski, wrote that: “the declared views reported since 2002 invariably indicate that, in social life, Poles tend to be rather distrustful (…) The opinion that, as a rule, one is better off not trusting one’s neighbours is currently shared by as many respondents as two, four or six years ago, although somewhat less frequently than in 2002–2006.” The share of people who are distrustful in their relations with strangers increased by as much as 12 pp in the years 2016–2018.24 In 2016, the opinion that “generally speaking, most people can be trusted” was shared by only 23% Poles, 15% of rural residents and 18% farmers. The definite majority of Poles (74%), rural residents (82%) and farmers (78%) opted for the opinion that: “one should be extremely cautious in relations with others”. Table 3.9. Composite index of trust on a scale from –3 to +3 Socio-demographic features Total Residents of cities > 500,000 Managers and professionals Per capita income of PLN 2000 or over Farmers Skilled workers Rural residents People with elementary education Unskilled workers

Overall index of trust on a scale from –3 to +3 –0.89 +0.24 +0.01 –0.15 – 0.90 –0.98 –1.26 –1.46 –1.57

Source: CBOS 35/2018, O nieufności i zaufaniu.

On the basis of the answers to several questions: about trusting other people; trusting strangers encountered in various life situations and trusting business 24 Komunikat CBOS 35/2018, O nieufności i zaufaniu, p. 1, cf. also CBOS, 18/2016, Zaufanie społeczne, CBOS 30/2018, Gotowość Polaków do współpracy.

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partners, the authors of the communication developed a composite index of trust (Tab. 3.9). The overall composite index of trust has a negative value in our society, which means that the hypothesis on the prevalence of an attitude of distrust over that of trust is corroborated. Only residents of largest cities and managers and professionals with university education trust others – in those groups, the overall index of trust has a positive value. On the other hand, the highest level of distrust is encountered among unskilled workers and people with elementary education. It can be assumed that the attitude of trust to other people is facilitated by affluence (per capita income of PLN 2000 or more), higher education and living in a large city, which offers relatively more opportunities for finding a good job and earning a high income. On the other hand, distrust is more common in rural communities, among people with elementary education and unskilled workers, that is, in milieus where poor education and a difficult labour market (e.g. in rural areas) pose barriers to finding well-paid employment. In between those two groups, there are farmers whose index of trust also has a negative value but is at a slightly higher level than that of rural residents and workers. Farmers live in rural areas and do not always have higher education, but receive training for the farmer’s occupation in agricultural vocational schools and in their family farms. Equally importantly, they own their workplace – their family farm. Farmers form a specific community that has a strong bearing on civic attitudes, cooperation and social capital in rural areas. It is farmers who more frequently than others engage in non-governmental organisations and are involved in various activities for their own communities (cf. Tab. 3.6, Tab. 3.7, Tab. 3.8). Does it mean that they have a sense of influence on public matters, both in the country at large and in their own local communities? Table 3.10. Sense of impact on the matters of the country, town and municipality (‘Yes’ answers, in %) Socio-economic groups Total Rural residents Residents of cities >500,000 Managers, professionals Farmers Skilled workers Self-employed

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Do you think people like you can have a say on: matters of town/village/ country’s matters? municipality? 38.0 59.0 31.0 60.0 47.0 62.0 56.0 80.0 40.0 59.0 31.0 53.0 35.0 60.0

Source: CBOS 33/2018, Poczucie wpływu obywateli na sprawy publiczne.


It should be noted that a sense of impact on the social sphere is clearly locally delineated in the Polish society. For the respondents surveyed by CBOS, issues concerning cities and municipalities are more susceptible to their control (impact) than issues concerning the country at large. Only in two socio-professional groups: school and university students (63%), and managers and professionals with university education (56%), the share of people believing they have an impact on the country’s matters is in excess of 50%. In the groups of farmers (40%), workers (31%), self-employed persons (35%), rural residents (31%) and residents of largest cities (47%), less than half of the respondents are of the opinion that they can have a say in the country’s matters. The significant role that farmers play in the local communities is confirmed by a distinct majority (59%) of those farmers who declare a sense of influence on the matters of their villages and municipalities, and a higher percentage of farmers (40%) who declare a sense of impact also on the country’s matters than that of workers (31%) and self-employed persons (35%). To sum up, the social capital of farmers is clearly no longer a barrier to growth, and the role of farmers in rural communities resembles (muta tis mutandis) the role of managers and professionals with university edu cation in urban communities. Another measure of civic engagement is participating in elections. In Janu ary 2018, 79% of respondents surveyed by CBOS25 declared their intention to take part in local elections: 77% of rural residents, 86% farmers, 75% workers and 86% of largest city dwellers. Regardless of the experiences of the researchers who have for many years now reported a higher degree of declared participation in elections, and not the actual turnout, a very high percentage of farmers intending to vote in the local elections confirms their role in shaping the social capital and civic activity in rural areas. What is more, interest in the decisions of the municipal councils in cities and villages and decisions of the village/city mayor was expressed by 80% of rural residents and 84% farmers. The share of respondents interested in the decisions of the local authorities is higher in rural areas (80%) than in largest cities (73%), and the share of farmers (84%) is higher than that of workers (81%) and, quite surprisingly, that of managers and professionals (83%).

3.5. Some remarks on the religiousness of rural residents Rural residents have for years been a community that declared faith and participating in religious practices more frequently than residents of cities, 25 CBOS 33/2018, Poczucie wpływu obywateli na sprawy publiczne, CBOS23/2018, Wybory samorządowe- znaczenie, gotowość uczestnictwa oraz zainteresowanie decyzjami władz różnych szczebli.

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especially the largest ones. In January 2017, CBOS conducted a survey26 looking at the role of faith and Catholicism in the system of Poles’ moral norms. The respondents were asked about their attitude to the moral principles of the Catholic faith and about the values on which raising children in public schools should be based. As regards the former issue, the respondents were to choose an answer to the question on the source of their own moral values from among five proposals. Three answers were the most popular: “the moral standards of Catholicism are the best and sufficient morality”; (18%), “all principles of the Catholic faith are right, but since life is complicated they should be complemented by some other principles” (25%), and “the majority of moral standards are right, but I do not agree with all of them, and those which are right are certainly not sufficient for individuals” (46%). The first and the second answer was selected by a total of 43% of all the respondents surveyed by CBOS, 38% of largest-city dwellers and 52% of rural residents. The third option, which demonstrates an attitude of distance to the moral standards of Catholicism, was chosen by 42% rural residents. Farmers more frequently (61% altogether) opted for the acceptance of the Catholic moral standards. These principles were regarded as the best and sufficient ones by 30%; another 31% selected the answer “all principles of the Catholic faith are right, but since life is complicated they should be complemented by some other principles”. A more detached attitude to the Catholic moral principles: most of them are right, but I do not agree with all of them – was expressed by 36% farmers. Residents of largest cities were in favour of accepting the Catholic moral principles somewhat less frequently, similarly to managers, professionals with university education and self-employed persons. At the same time, a detached attitude to the Catholic principles – the majority of moral standards are right, but I do not agree with all of them – was declared by 40% of residents of largest cities, 41% managers and professionals and 56% of self-employed. It should be added that relatively many residents of largest cities opted for two opinions which were selected only occasionally by other respondents: “religious morality is alien to me, but I regard some of the Catholic principles to be right” – 12% and “the moral principles of the Catholic faith are completely alien to me” – 10%. In light of the above research, the religiousness of farmers means participation in religious practices but also acceptance for the moral principles of the Catholic faith. It should not be found surprising that acceptance for such principles was expressed, in all, by 84% of respondents going to church several times a week, 54% of those who go to church once a week, and the unemployed (58%) with lowest income, up to PLN 649 per capita (54%). 88

26

CBOS 4/2017, Zasady moralne a religia.


Farmers offered similar answers to the question on the values and norms which should provide the basis for raising children in public schools. Invoking the values stemming from the Catholic ethics preached by the Catholic Church and from more broadly understood Christian ethics was chosen by a total of 25% Poles, 21% managers and professionals, 36% farmers, 33% rural residents and 17% of dwellers of largest cities. Other two possible options – “moral education should be based on the principles of humanism, invoking the commonly shared principles, recognised by believers and non-believers alike” and “invoking the ethics developed by various religions” – were chosen by a total of 57% respondents, 74% managers and professionals, 73% residents of largest cities, 45% rural residents and 37% farmers. To sum up, it can be concluded that faith, religious practices and attachment to the Catholic moral principles all have a much stronger presence among farmers and rural residents than in other socio-professional groups. It does not mean, however, that farmers and rural residents represent a monolith and fail to see the values inherent in other religions or rights of non-believers.

3.6. Rural residents and farmers about the European Union: A stable acceptance The attitudes of residents of Poland’s rural areas and farmers to Poland’s membership of the European Union have considerably evolved since the terms of Poland’s integration were being negotiated. The scepticism visible in 2003 as a consequence of media coverage which presented direct payments to Polish farmers as an unjustified claim rather than as a precondition of a level-playing field in competing on the European market disappeared as soon as three years after the accession. Today, support for EU membership (Tab. 3.11) is stable and strong practically in all communities and socio-professional groups. Tab. 3.11. Attitude of rural residents and farmers to EU integration (in %) Socio-professional groups Total Rural residents Residents of cities >500,000 Farmers Self-employed Skilled workers

Do you approve of or are you against Poland’s EU membership? 2003 60.0 47.0 82.0 45.0 73.0 53.0

I approve 2008 2013 88.0 81.0 85.0 80.0 87.0 80.0 79.0 85.0 94.0 95.0 92.0 85.0

2017 85.0 85.0 91.0 81.0 97.0 82.0

I am against 2003 2017 25.0 8.0 35.0 8.0 10.0 7.0 48.0 6.0 25.0 3.0 30.0 13.0

Source: CBOS No. 27/2003, CBOS No. 66/2008, CBOS No. 158/2013, CBOS No. 171/2017.

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Even the triggering of Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union27 did not undermine Poles’ support for EU membership. Some of the Poles surveyed by CBOS regard the decision as justified (38%), some more (43%) as unjustified. Among those who think it is unjustified there are more rural residents (48%), farmers (61%) and skilled workers (54%), whereas it is considered reasonable first and foremost by the self-employed (52%), managers and professionals with university education (53%) and residents of largest cities (51%).

Concluding remarks

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The diagnosis of the economic, social and civic situation in 2018 does not diverge from the diagnoses formulated for the society at large. The differences between urban and rural areas are diminishing: the households of their residents are fitted out with similar equipment; likewise, access to the Internet and modern channels of communication is also similar. The human and social capital in rural areas and in cities, while maintaining the specific areas of these two communities, is not so wide apart as eight or ten years ago. These changes were driven, among others, by the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy and EU and Polish programmes for the development of rural areas. Both urban and rural residents similarly benefit from the improved labour market situation and increased level of affluence of the Polish society. Likewise, both urban and rural areas express a similar degree of satisfaction with their place of residence; they also have a similar level of support for Poland’s membership of the EU. This, however, does not imply full uniformisation of attitudes and views nor fully equalised standards of living and economic standing of rural and urban households. The gap has been substantially narrowed; the level of human and social capital in the farmers’ community is not only comparable but in several dimensions even more robust than in urban communities. Nevertheless, the social identities of urban and rural areas seems to vary in several aspects. A higher percentage of rural than urban families still perceive their material situation as inferior to that of other families. The level of income that is tantamount to poverty for urban residents is not seen as poverty by farmers. Objective indicators still place the affluence of rural residents and farmers slightly below that of residents of largest cities. Rural residents, and mostly farmers, more frequently than urban dwellers embrace the moral standards of Catholicism and treat them as their own. They are of the opinion that the state should play an active role in the economy 27

CBOS, 14/2018 Reakcje na uruchomienie wobec Polski art. 7 Traktatu o Unii Europejskiej.


definitely more often than other socio-professional groups. Such an opinion was expressed by 72% farmers, 65% rural residents, 46% dwellers of largest cities, 50% managers and professionals, 61% skilled workers and 58% of all Poles surveyed by CBOS.28 If we were to seek a brief and broadly general diagnosis of today’s situation of farmers and rural residents in comparison with urban communities, we could propose the following formula: we deal with two concurrent processes of urbanisation and ruralisation, which are changing both rural and urban areas in various aspects and issues but leave the two communities in concord with their own traditions and identities.

28

CBOS, Opinie i Diagnozy, No. 40/2017, Czy żyje się nam lepiej? p. 167.

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Pagina

92


Agnieszka Baer-Nawrocka, Walenty Poczta*

Chapter 4. Polish agriculture – changes and regional differences The chapter of the Report devoted to agriculture and the changes taking place in that sector is characterised by a relatively stable profile of the underlying analyses. As a rule, however, the emphasis is on each occasion placed differently. In the present Report, we decided to give more attention to the changes in the Polish agricultural sector seen from a regional perspective. All human activity, being linked to specific location, is spatial in nature. The space in which human beings live is diverse due to a whole range of natural and anthropogenic reasons. Spatial differentiation is also a distinguishing feature of socio-economic development in different sectors of the economy, particularly in the agricultural sector in which the very nature of production is spatial. Therefore, the chapter mostly looks at the regional differences characterising Polish agriculture. It reveals the regional disparities regarding the production potential and relations between the factor of production, area structure of farms, livestock farming, production output, economic results and effectiveness of production. The analysis carried out in static terms (for 2016) revealed the level of differences with respect to the analysed variables, and in dynamic terms (in comparison to 2007) identified the regions with the fastest pace of changes. As before, the chapter discusses the role of Polish agriculture in the national economy, taking note of the role of foreign trade in agri-food products.

4.1. Polish agriculture in the national economy The observable changes in the role of agriculture in the national economy in 2007–2016 indicate that (Tab. 4.1): • given the number of employed broken down by sections and divisions, it can be concluded that, in 2016, agriculture in Poland employed 15.6% of the over all national pool of labour (15.9%, including forestry, hunting and fishery), and that changes in that regard are taking place at a relatively slow pace; *

Dr. Agnieszka Baer-Nawrocka, prof. dr hab. Walenty Poczta, Poznań University of Life Sciences.

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4. Polish agriculture...

- over 37% of the employed work in the agricultural sector in the Lubelskie Voivodeship, and about 30% in the Świętokrzyskie, Podkarpackie and Podlaskie Voivodeships; - the smallest percentage of people working in agriculture in the total number of people in work, ranging from 6% to 8%, is found in the Śląskie, Dolnośląskie and Pomorskie Voivodeships; • the share of agriculture in generating the global output and gross domes tic product is falling; in 2016 it reached 3.2% and 2.4%, respectively; • similar tendencies can be observed regarding the share of the agricultural sector in the ownership of fixed production assets: in 2016, Polish agri culture had 4.6% of all fixed assets in the economy, compared to 6.8% in 2007; - the highest such share, close to 11%, is found in the Podlaskie Voivodeship, and over 8% in the Warmińsko-Mazurskie and Lubelskie Voivodeships; - the lowest share in the gross value of fixed assets is found in the Śląskie (1.5%), Mazowieckie, Małopolskie (2.8%), Dolnośląskie and Lubuskie Voivodeships (3%); • the share of agriculture in the capital expenditure of the whole national eco nomy in the analysed years remained at a relatively stable level of approx. 2%; this, compared with its share in fixed assets (4.6%), means that the replacement of fixed assets in agriculture is more than two times lower than in the economy at large; - capital expenditure in agriculture considerably varies from region to region, and its share ranges from 0.6% in Śląskie and 1.3-1.5% in Małopolskie, Dolnośląskie, Mazowieckie, Pomorskie, to 8.5% of the total capital expenditure in the economy in Podlaskie. Table 4.1. Agriculturea in the national economy (in %)

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Year

Global output

GDP

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

4.9 4.7 5.0 4.5 4.2 4.0 4.0 3.9

4.0 3.9 4.5 4.0 3.7 4.3 3.7 3.6

Capital expenditureb 2.1 2.0 2.2 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.7

Gross fixed assets 8.2 8.2 7.9 7.6 7.1 6.8 6.4 6.2

Employmentc 15.6 15.7 15.6 15.5 15.3 14.8 14.2 14.2

The large share of employment in in those voivodeships, the unfavourable labour market equilibrium and therefore the low pace of their overall development is pointed out by M. Stanny, Społeczno-ekonomiczne zróżnicowanie obszarów wiejskich, in: J. Wilkin, I. Nurzyńska (eds), Polska wieś 2012. Raport o stanie wsi, FDPA; Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 2012, and J. Wilkin, Wieś i rolnictwo w strukturach współczesnej Polski, in: M. Drygas, K. Zawalińska (eds.), Uwarunkowania ekonomiczne polityki rozwoju polskiej wsi i rolnictwa, IRWiR PIB, Warsaw 2012.


Tab. 4.1 cont. Year

Global output

GDP

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

3.8 4.1 4.1 3.7 3.6 3.3 3.2

3.3 3.6 3.5 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.4

Capital expenditureb 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.1

Gross fixed assets 5.9 5.6 5.4 5.2 5.0 4.8 4.6

Employmentc 14.6 14.4 14.9 16.3 16.0 15.8 15.9

Data for Agriculture with forestry, hunting and fishery. b Data for Crop and animal production and hunting, without buildings. c By sections and divisions, yearly average. a

Source: Rocznik statystyczny RP (relevant yearbooks), GUS, Warsaw; Pracujący w gospodarce narodowej (relevant yearbooks), GUS, Warsaw; Środki trwałe w gospodarce narodowej (relevant yearbooks), GUS, Warsaw, authors’ own calculations.

14

35000

12

30000 25000

10

20000

8

15000

6

10000

4

5000

2

0

0

-5000

Balance

Share in total imports (%)

Trade balance (in million PLN)

Share in trade (in %)

The role of the agri-food sector in the national economy is also epitomised by its share in foreign trade (Fig. 4.1). Over the past dozen years or so, the share of foreign trade in agri-food products in trade as such has been consistently growing. A rapid increase of exports of these products should be particularly highlighted. In 2007–2016, the value of exported agricultural produce and food industry products grew nearly threefold, from PLN 38,277.0 million to PLN 105,781.4 million, which meant a rise in the share of such products in total exports by 3.3 pp, up to 13.2%. Imports also increased, but at a lower pace, as a result of which the positive balance of trade in agri-products was rising. In 2016, it totalled PLN 30,610.9 million.

Share in total exports (%)

Figure 4.1. Share of agri-food exports and imports in total trade (in %) and balance of trade in agri-food products (in million PLN) in 2000–2016 Source: Rocznik handlu zagranicznego (relevant yearbooks), GUS, Warsaw, authors’ own calculations.

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4.2. Resources and inputs of factors of production and relations between them The resources of production factors represent the core of the production potential in agriculture. To assess that potential, mutual relations between the factors of production and the intensity of their use defining the effectiveness of its management need to be examined. According to Stanisław Krasowicz and Jan Kuś (2010), how the potential of agriculture is used depends on various determinants, both favourable and adverse. Due to the diversity of such de terminants, in given natural, organisational, economic, legal and social con ditions, the degree of tapping the potential of agriculture is varied and subject to a different dynamic of change. • Land as the basic factor of production plays a much bigger role in agriculture than in other sectors of production: it is production space and a factor of production that serves a double role: that of the object of labour and the means of labour. It also largely defines the mode of farming and type of agriculture, and in consequence also its effectiveness and competitiveness. In 2016, Polish farms occupied a total of 14,525,500 ha, that is, an area by about 1,300,000 ha smaller than in 2007 (farms over 1 ha). Although a decrease in the area of farmland could be observed in all the voivodeships, the scale of such changes differed from region to region: - a considerable shrinkage of agricultural land in farms, both in abso lute and relative terms, was reported mostly in the voivodeships of southern Poland: Podkarpackie, Małopolskie, Świętokrzyskie and Śląskie; - such changes were the smallest in Warmińsko-Mazurskie, Kujawsko-Pomorskie and Podlaskie; • in agricultural production, labour resources are considered the major, sole active and creative factor of production. In relation to the labour resources, the remaining production factors provide conditions for operation and contribute to the generation of the product, while performing an ancillary role. Owing to a substantial share of part-time labour and seasonal hiring of temporary workforce, the analysis of the factor of labour is based on its inputs expressed in annual work units (AWU). In Polish agriculture, the input of labour in 2016 totalled 1,675,800 AWU, which means a drop by over 620,000 persons in comparison to 2007. The greatest such inputs, of as

96

A. Baer-Nawrocka, W. Poczta, Polskie rolnictwo na tle rolnictwa Unii Europejskiej, in: J. Wilkin, I. Nurzyńska (eds.), Polska wieś 2016. Raport o stanie wsi, FDPA; Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 2016. S. Krasowicz, J. Kuś, Kierunki zmian w produkcji rolniczej w Polsce do 2020 r. – próba prognozy, Zagadnienia Ekonomiki Rolnej, No. 324 (3), 2010, pp. 5-18.


many as 29 AWU per 100 ha of farmland, were recorded in Małopolskie, and slightly lower – in the agriculture of the Podkarpackie and Święto krzyskie – respectively, 21.5 and 20.7 AWU per 100 ha of farmland, com pared to the national average of 11.5 AWU per 100 ha of farmland. At the same time, Małopolskie and Podkarpackie were the voivodeships which saw the largest drop of labour inputs in absolute terms; • based on the available statistics, changes in the capital resources in agri culture were assessed on the basis of the gross value of total fixed assets. In addition to the stock of land per one employed person, the stock of fixed assets (machines, equipment, buildings, etc.) is largely responsible for the differences in the level of social productivity of labour. In 2016, 1 AWU in Polish agriculture denoted PLN 93,900, which was PLN 42,800 more than in 2007. The regional analysis indicates that: - a person working in Zachodniopomorskie has at their disposal twice as high value of fixed assets, and nearly twice as high – a person working in Warmińsko-Mazurskie and Opolskie; - in the analysed period, the greatest improvement in the technical equipment of labour in absolute terms was recorded in the Zachodniopomorskie, Opolskie and Śląskie Voivodeships; - definitely the lowest value of fixed assets (about 50-60% of the average for Poland) per one working person was found in the Małopolskie, Podkarpackie and Świętokrzyskie Voivodeships. Such a state of affairs can undoubtedly be attributed to the differences in the agrarian structure of agriculture and the level of labour inputs in individual voivodeships. Fewer differences between the regions can be found in relation to the stock of fixed assets per 1 ha of agricultural land. It should also be noted that the depreciation of assets in the agricultural sector is high and growing from year to year; in 2016, it reached 77%, and for active fixed technical assets, i.e. means of transport and machinery and equipment, it was 93% and 81.7%, respectively (Tab. 4.2). In this context, making capital expenditure on replacement of fixed assets is of cardinal importance. In the analysed period, the level of capital expenditure in agriculture (including forestry, hunting and fishery) nationwide increased from PLN 3.6 billion in 2007 to PLN 5.6 billion in 2016, which led to an increase in the value of net fixed assets. An analysis at the level of voivodeships demonstrated that: • per 1 ha of UAA (Utilised Agricultural Area), the level of capital expenditure in agriculture ranges from PLN 298.30 in Kujawsko-Pomorskie to PLN 528.80 in Wielkopolskie; According to the definition applied by GUS, the gross value of fixed assets means the value equal to the expenditure incurred to buy or manufacture them, without deducting the value of wear and tear (depreciation): Produkt Krajowy Brutto – rachunki regionalne w 2007 r.

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• per 1 AWU, the capital expenditure in the voivodeship where it reached the highest value (Zachodniopomorskie) exceeds nearly sevenfold its le vel in Małopolskie, with the lowest recorded value of such expenditure. In 2016, the average capital expenditure in Poland per 1 AWU was PLN 3,354.80. Table 4.2. Fixed assets and capital expenditure (as at 31 December)a Year 2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 incl.: buildings and structures machinery and equipment means of transport a

Gross fixed assets (current prices) (billion PLN) 110.5 112.4 114.7 117.4 119.7 122.6 124.3 127.1 130.4 134.0 137.4 139.6 143.0

69.0 71.1 73.6 74.9 74.9 77.3 76.7 76.8 76.9 76.7 76.5 76.7 77.0

Net fixed assets (current prices) (billion PLN) 32.3 30.5 28.5 28.4 28.3 27.8 27.4 28.0 28.7 29.8 30.9 31.2 31.5

Capital expenditure (current prices) (billion PLN) 2.2 2.4 3.0 3.6 4.0 3.7 3.7 4.3 4.5 4.9 5.2 5.3 5.0

80.1

71.4

22.9

2.2

26.2

81.7

4.8

1.4

17.7

93.0

1.2

0.8

Depreciation (%)

data for Crops and animal production, hunting.

Source: Rocznik statystyczny RP (relevant yearbooks), GUS, Warsaw, Środki trwałe w gospodarce narodowej (relevant yearbooks), GUS, Warsaw, authors’ own calculations.

4.3. The area structure of farms

98

An analysis of the acreage structure of farms and its changes in 2007–2016 at the national and regional level leads to the following conclusions (Tables 1-2, Annex): • of the total farmland held by farms with acreage over 1 ha of UAA in Poland, nearly a half (47.5%) is owned by farms with acreage up to 20 ha; these farms account for 90.2% of all agricultural holdings with utilised agricultural area;


• what can be viewed as a positive phenomenon is that the number of smallest farms (1–10 ha), and thereby the area in their use, declined at the fastest pace; • in parallel, in the analysed period the number of farms in the acreage group over 30 ha increased – a process which was the fastest in absolute terms in the group of farms with 50–100 ha of UAA; • in 2016, farms with the largest acreage (100 ha or more of UAA) occupied 21.2% of the total arable land and represented 0.9% of the total number of farms with UAA, that is, respectively, 68,500 ha of farmland and 4,000 farms more than in 2007; • the regional differences in the structure of farms can still be visible: - the highest share of farms – ranging between 35% and 38% – with up to 2 ha of UAA to the total number of farms is found in the south of Poland, i.e. in the Podkarpackie, Małopolskie and Śląskie Voivodeships; the share of farmed agricultural land in this category of farms in those voivodeships, particularly Małopolskie and Podkarpackie, was much higher than the country’s average, reaching, respectively, 13.3% and 11.6% compared to 2.7% on average in Poland; - the share of farms with an area of 50 ha or more was the highest in Zachodniopomorskie (12.5%), Warmińsko-Mazurskie (9.2%) and Lubuskie (8.1%), and such farms in those voivodeships held the prevalent share of farmland, particularly in the Zachodniopomorskie (68.9%) and Lubuskie (61%) Voivodeships. It can be said, therefore, that the area structure continues to be unfavourable in many regions of Poland and large areas of land are used by farms with a small area. The process of concentration in those regions is negatively affected by many factors of historical, economic and socio-cultural nature which are inherent in agriculture as such and in its environment. The studies by Sadowski and Antczak (2012) and Czubak et al. (2014) indicate that, in small farms, the absorption of modernisation and innovative investments is as a rule more difficult, which considerably cripples their competitiveness. In addition, the question of agricultural structures is closely linked to environmental considerations. Sadowski (2012) and Wrzaszcz (2012) argue that larger farms, and thereby A. Sadowski, W. Antczak, Kierunki wykorzystania dopłat bezpośrednich przez gospodarstwa rolne położone w wybranych województwach, Journal of Agribusiness and Rural Development, 4 (26), 2012, pp. 103–113. W. Czubak, A. Sadowski, M. Wigier, A. Mrówczyńska-Kamińska, Inwestycje w rolnictwie polskim po integracji z Unią Europejską, Wydawnictwo UP w Poznaniu, Poznań 2014. This does not apply to farms specialising in poultry or vegetable production, where highly intensive production is pursued on a relatively small area. A. Sadowski, Zrównoważony rozwój gospodarstw rolnych z uwzględnieniem wpływu Wspólnej Polityki Rolnej Unii Europejskiej, Wydawnictwo UP w Poznaniu, Poznań 2012; W. Wrzaszcz, Poziom zrównoważenia indywidualnych gospodarstw rolnych w Polsce (na podstawie badań FADN), IERiGŻ, Warsaw 2012.

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as a rule stronger economically, are more likely to fulfil the sustainability criteria in the economic, social and environmental dimensions.

4.4. Structure of livestock farming

100

The area structure of agriculture and its changes are reflected in the structure of livestock farming in Poland. As regards the scale of cattle farming, it can be said that (Tables 3-4, Annex): • in 2016, 35.5% of all agricultural holdings farming cattle had one to four animals (head) per farm, and another 20% or so farms had herds of five to nine head; at the same time, it should be emphasised that, in comparison to 2007, the number of farms with four-animal herds fell by nearly 73%, and those with herds of five to nine head – by 42%; In market terms, the livestock structure is very important because it shows whether agriculture is capable of fulfilling the expectations of the processing industry; • in 2016, herds with fewer than 10 head had altogether 12.4% of livestock nationwide (compared to over 28% in 2007), while nearly 60% of the overall cattle population is currently reared in herds counting 20 to 100 head (including 34.8% in herds of 20–49 head); • More favourable farm and livestock structures compared to the rest of Poland can be found primarily in Warmińsko-Mazurskie, Opolskie, Zachod niopomorskie, Wielkopolskie and Lubuskie, where the share of livestock in the smallest herds was far lower than the country’s average and, at the same time, a larger cattle population was found in the biggest herds, with 100–199 head and over 200 head. Notably, while the number of farms with herds over 200 head increased nationwide, in those voivodeships where the share of livestock in such herds was the highest (in 2016, at a level of 2030% of all cattle in a given voivodeship), the number of farms and the cattle population in herds over 200 head decreased in comparison to 2007. This indicates a trend to forgo milk production in many of the largest farms established from former state-owned farms (PGR). This process does not only refer to milk production but also animal production as such, and a concentration of these farms solely on plant production. An analysis of the scale of dairy cow farming leads to the following con clusions (Tables 5-6, Annex): • in the analysed years, the share of milk-producing farms with herds under 10 head shrank from 88.4% to 72.0%, and in 2016 such herds held about 23% of the cow population (compared to nearly 44% in 2007);


• an increase in the size of the herds is visible starting from herds with 20–49 dairy cows upwards, with the highest rise (both in relative and absolute terms) being observed in herds of 50–99 head; • in parallel to the changes in the size of the cattle population, in voivodeships with the highest holdings of dairy cows in largest herds, including Zachod niopomorskie, Opolskie, Lubuskie, Dolnośląskie, there was a visible de crease in the number of cows in such herds in comparison to 2007; • an extreme deconcentration of dairy cow farming, despite some changes, can still be observed in the Podkarpackie, Małopolskie and Świętokrzyskie Voivodeships. A deconcentration of the scale of livestock farming and its regional varia tions can also be observed in pig farming (Tables 7-8, Annex): • nearly 40% farms in Poland active in that form of production hold pig herds with up to nine head, and another 40.6% – herds with 10–49 head. However, herds up to 50 head keep nearly 28% of the total pig population (compared to almost 50% in 2007); 72.2% of the livestock are held in herds with over 100 head, of which nearly 47% – in herds counting 500 or more pigs; • in seven voivodeships: Zachodniopomorskie, Pomorskie, Lubuskie, Dolno śląskie, Wielkopolskie, Warmińsko-Mazurskie and Podlaskie, the share of pigs held in herds over 500 head was higher than the country’s average, and ranged from 50.1% in Warmińsko- to 82% in Zachodniopomorskie. The increasing level of mechanisation and progress of genetics, stricter requirements of processing plants regarding the quality and quantity of supplied raw materials, coupled with the price scissors in amounts which were unfavourable for agricultural producers, mean a growing impact of the economies of scale in production. In effect, the minimum size of the herd ensuring a growth of production and the whole increases.

4.5. Production output Crop production In 2016, the crop area in Poland totalled 10,640,000 ha, i.e. nearly 643,000 ha less when compared to 2007. As regards the main crops, the situation was as follows: W. Ziętara, M. Adamski, Skala produkcji, efektywność i konkurencyjność polskich gospodarstw wyspecjalizowanych w produkcji mleka, Zagadnienia Ekonomiki Rolnej, 1, 2014, pp. 98–115; W. Ziętara, Z. Mirkowska, M. Adamski, T. Blicharski, Polskie gospodarstwa trzodowe i drobiarskie na tle gospodarstw wybranych krajów Unii Europejskiej, IERiGŻ PIB, Warsaw 2014.

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102

• 63% of the total crop area was occupied by cereal production (compared to 71% in 2007); - in 2016, cereal production totalled 25,344,200 tonnes and was similar to the 2007 value, which – given the lesser area of cereal crops by ca. 1.3 million ha points to a higher yield: in 2016, it reached an average level of 37.8 dt/ha compared to 31.6 dt/ha (Tab. A9, Annex); it should be emphasised, however, that such a yield level represents only a half of the yield obtained by largest EU cereal producers, i.e. France and Germany; - in the two analysed years, the highest yield was recorded in the Opolskie (55.2 dt/ha) and Dolnośląskie (49.4 dt/ha) Voivodeships; these voivode ships were in the group of regions with a relatively highest yield increase, in addition to the Lubuskie, Zachodniopomorskie and Lubelskie Voivodeships, where the yield level was also above the country’s average; • the potato growing area decreased in the analysed years by 45%, and their share in the crop structure currently stands at 2.8%: - a greater role of potatoes in the crop structure can be observed in the south-eastern regions of Poland (Małopolskie – 7.4%, Podkarpackie – 7.2% and Świętokrzyskie – 4.2%, also Łódzkie – 4.6%); - the above voivodeships (except Łódzkie, characterised by an extensive specialised potato production, mostly consumption varieties) also typically produce lower potato yields than the average for Poland; it should also be noted that this average, 287 dt/ha, is considerably below the yield levels in those EU countries which are major potato producers; e.g. the yield in British agriculture is 450 dt/ha, German – 444.2 dt/ha, and French – 388.8 dt/ha; • in 2016, sugar beet was sown on 2% of the aggregate crop area, which means a slight drop in comparison to 2007; this value was the highest in the Kujawsko-Pomorskie Voivodeship (4.7%); - 37% of total sugar beet production originates from two voivodeships: Wielkopolskie and Lubelskie; - in 2016, the average yield reached 665 dt/ha and was nearly 30% higher than in 2007; increased yield values were recorded in all the voivodeships; with the highest growth reported in Zachodniopomorskie, currently with the highest yield level of all Polish regions, close to 800 dt/ha, which corresponds to the average crop yield produced by German and French agriculture; • in 2016, the share of rape in the crop structure and its crop area slightly in creased in comparison to 2007 and was, respectively, 7.7% and 822,600 ha; - rape has the highest share in the crop structure in the Zachodniopomorskie, Dolnośląskie and Opolskie (ca. 15-16%), as well as Lubuskie and Pomorskie Voivodeships (over 11%);


- nearly 70% of the rape production originated from five voivodeships: Dolnośląskie, Kujawsko-Pomorskie, Wielkopolskie, Zachodniopomorskie and Opolskie; - similarly to other crops, the yield is relatively low compared to the yield obtained by the largest EU producers, and in 2016 reached a level of 27 dt/ha nationwide; - in the majority of voivodeships, the yield values were similar to the country’s average and ranged from 21.7 dt/ha in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship to 31.9 dt/ha in the Opolskie Voivodeship.

Animal production Compared to crop production, animal production is more capital and labour intensive. Its distribution and structure are underpinned by an array of factors, including notably natural and cultural (livestock breeding traditions) factors as well as demand factors, including structure of consumption of meat and products of animal origin. • In 2007–2016, the size of the cattle population in Poland increased by ca. 1.6% to 5,951,000 head, which – alongside decreased farmland acreage – increased the country’s average livestock density per 100 ha of UAA from 37 to 41 head; - twice as high cattle density was recorded in the Podlaskie Voivodeship (84.7 head); - cattle density was higher than Poland’s average, i.e. 46–59 head per 100 ha of UAA, also in the Wielkopolskie, Mazowieckie, Kujawsko-Pomorskie and Łódzkie Voivodeships; altogether, in 2016 the cattle population in those voivodeships (together with the Podlaskie Voivodeship) accounted for 66% of the total cattle population in Poland, and those voivodeships recorded its most robust increase; • the dairy cow population in Poland declined and in 2016 was over 457,000 head lower than in 2007; a reduction of dairy cow herds was visible in all the voivodeships except Warmińsko-Mazurskie, with the highest fall being recorded in the regions of south-eastern Poland (Pod karpackie, Małopolskie, Świętokrzyskie, Lubelskie); - the regional differences in cow density were similar to the differences relating to cattle density as such. • the scale of changes in the pig population in 2007–2016 was the largest, with a 40.7% fall recorded in Poland – in 2016, the total pig population stood at 10,982,800 head; - the pig population declines in all the voivodeships while maintaining the existing differences in its distribution: about 46% of pigs were con-

103


centrated in the Wielkopolskie and Kujawsko-Pomorskie Voivodeships; in the Wielkopolskie Voivodeship, the share of its pig population in the country’s total population rose from 28.9% to 35.6%; Wielkopolskie remained the region with the highest cattle density at 231.3 head per 100 ha of UAA; - an increased share in the country’s total pig population was also recorded in the Łódzkie and Pomorskie Voivodeships, with pig density in excess of 100 head per 100 ha of UAA; - in the remaining voivodeships, pig density was broadly at a level of the country’s average (Opolskie and Śląskie) or much lower (the other voivodeships).

4.6. Value of market production and purchasing

104

An analysis of overall trends regarding the volume of production and the produced economic surplus in Polish agriculture in comparison to 2000 points to their increase (Fig. 4.2). After these values fell in 2015, they rebounded in 2016, although the level of gross value added was lower both in comparison to 2005 and to 2010. The economic results in agriculture are considerably influenced by the price relations between the sold agricultural produce and the goods and services bought by farmers, i.e. the so-called price scissors (price gap indicator). In the recent years, these relations were usually unfavourable for agriculture (Fig. 4.3): • in 2016, the price scissors were at 93.3% compared to 2000, which means that the economic conditions of exchange for agriculture dete riorated in that period by nearly 7%; • only in 2001, 2007, 2011, 2012 the prices of products sold by agricultural pro ducers increased more than the prices of goods and services bought by them; • from 2014 onwards, both these prices visibly fell, with the prices of pur chased goods and services diminishing at a lower rate, which means that the exchange rate is not favourable for agriculture. In 2016, Polish agriculture sold agriculture produce valued at PLN 79.8 billion (by PLN 36.2 billion more than in 2007), of which nearly three-fourths under purchasing schemes which determine the provision of raw materials for the agri-food industry (Tab. A10, Annex). It should be noted that in 2007 the value of purchased agricultural produce accounted for over 82% of total sales, which means that the share of purchasing in market production declined: • in the two analysed years, in the voivodeships characterised by farms with small acreage (Małopolskie, Świętokrzyskie, Podkarpackie, Śląskie)


purchase accounted for 40-50% of market production, and in the voivode ships with a more favourable farm structure (Pomorskie, Kujawsko-Po morskie, Warmińsko-Mazurskie) – about 80-90%. 170.0

160.0 150.0 140.0 130.0 120.0

110.0 100.0 90.0 80.0 70.0

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Global output

Final output

Market output

Gross value added

Figure 4.2. Dynamics of production and added gross value in Polish agriculture in 2000–2016 (fixed prices, 2000 = 100) Source: calculated and elaborated by the authors based on: Rocznik statystyczny RP (relevant yearbooks).

200.0

180.0 160.0 140.0

120.0 100.0 80.0

60.0 40.0

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Prices of agricultural produce sold WƌŝĐĞƐŽĨƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐĂŶĚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐďŽƵŐŚƚĨŽƌĂŐƌŝĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƉƌŽĚƵĐƟŽŶ Figure 4.3. Dynamics of prices in agriculture (2000 = 100) Source: calculated and elaborated by the authors based on: Rocznik statystyczny RP (relevant yearbooks).

4.7. Productivity of production factors The effectiveness of the factors of production was evaluated on the basis of partial analyses of land and labour productivity. As the measure of effect,

105


global output and gross value added (GVA) were used. The productivity level is shaped, on the one hand, by changes in the proportions and relations between production factors, and on the other – by changes in the level of output.

Land productivity The efficiency index (productivity) tells us about the volume of production or income obtained from one unit of land (1 ha of UAA). • In 2015, the value of global output nationwide per 1 ha of farmland was PLN 7,044, i.e. by nearly PLN 3,000 higher than in 2007; - the highest land productivity, over 44% higher than the national average both in 2007 and in 2015, was achieved by the agriculture in the Wielkopolskie Voivodeship; in 2015, it was PLN 10,180 per 1 ha; - the agriculture of the Mazowieckie, Łódzkie and Śląskie was also conspicuous, with their land productivity higher than the country’s average by, respectively, 26.4%; 19.1% and 11.4%; it should also be noted that the highest spike in land productivity in absolute terms was reported in Mazowieckie and Wielkopolskie (by over PLN 4,000); - the lowest land productivity, at PLN 4,146, i.e. less than 60% of the country’s average, was reported in the Podkarpackie Voivodeship; notably, that region also had the smallest dynamics of changes in both relative and absolute terms; similarly low land productivity (under PLN 5,000/1 ha of UAA) was also recorded in the agriculture of the Zachodniopomorskie and Dolnośląskie Voivodeships. • in 2015, gross value added per 1 ha of UAA in Poland was on average PLN 2,630 , i.e. 3.5% down compared to 2007. It can be said that that the relative level of land productivity in individual voivodeships (i.e. relative to the country’s average in agriculture), measured both by global output and gross value added, is highly similar. Nevertheless, some voivodeships have a relatively high capital intensity of agricultural production (Kujawsko-Pomorskie and Opolskie), which means that land productivity in those regions measured by gross value added is relatively lower than if measured with global output.

Labour productivity

106

Social productivity of labour (efficiency) tells us what value of production or income was generated by 1 AWU in agriculture. In 2015, labour produc tivity in Polish agriculture measured by global output was PLN 61,131, which means more than a twofold increase in comparison to 2007, i.e. by PLN 32,235.


• the highest relative increase was recorded in the Śląskie and Mazowieckie Voivodeships (about 2.5 times) and, in terms of value, in the Zachodnio pomorskie Voivodeship where the global output generated by 1 AWU was in 2015 by PLN 65,700 higher than in 2007; Zachodniopomorskie along with Lubuskie, Wielkopolskie, Warmińsko-Mazurskie, Opolskie and Pomorskie are regions with the highest labour productivity in agri culture, ranging from PLN 127,100 (Zachodniopomorskie) to PLN 90,300 (Pomorskie); • in 2015, extremely low labour productivity, at 30-40% of the country’s average, was reported, just as in 2007, in the agriculture of the Podkarpackie (PLN 19,390) and Małopolskie (PLN 23,056) Voivodeships; • other voivodeships with lower labour productivity in agriculture than the average for Poland included Lubelskie, Świętokrzyskie, Śląskie and Łódzkie. Similar conclusions concerning the differences observable in labour pro ductivity can be drawn from an analysis of the gross value added per 1 AWU: • the lowest productivity was reported in the regions of south-eastern Po land (Podkarpackie and Małopolskie), characterised by high employment in agriculture and a low share of the sector in the region’s gross value added; • unquestionably the highest gross value added per 1 AWU is found in the voivodeships of northern Poland, with the most favourable agricultural structure and lowest employment in the sector.

Capital productivity Capital is the third factor of production in addition to labour and land. Capital productivity is discussed in relation to the stock of fixed assets and measured using the category of gross value added. The provision of agri culture with fixed assets has a bearing on the development level and intensity of production. • Nationwide, PLN 1 of fixed assets accumulated in agriculture generated PLN 0.24 of gross value added, down by PLN 0.13 in comparison to 2007. The value of this measure fell in all the voivodeships, and differed from region to region: - the highest value was recorded in the agriculture of the Mazowieckie (PLN 0.39) and Lubuskie (PLN 0.38) Voivodeships, where it was 55-60% higher than the country’s average; - the lowest value of fixed assets accumulated in agriculture was found in the Podkarpackie (PLN 0.12) and Opolskie (PLN 0.14) Voivodeships, i.e., respectively, by ca. 49% and 59% of the country’s average, whereas

107


in the Dolnośląskie, Małopolskie, Lubelskie, Podlaskie and Śląskie Voivodeships it was 13-23% lower; - in the remaining regions, productivity of fixed assets measured by gross value added oscillated around the national average.

Concluding remarks The diagnosis of the condition of Polish agriculture offered in this chapter indicates that the sector is losing in importance in terms of quantitative characteristics related to its share in GDP generation, global output and production resources, whereas its role in trade is increasing, which creates opportunities for continued development of the whole agri-food economy. The structure of agriculture, albeit slowly, is improving, as evidenced by a drop in the number of smallest farms, and in effect in their share in land use. In parallel, the number of larger-acreage farms is on the increase. The observable processes of concentrating animal production in larger agricultural holdings can also be regarded as positive – reduction of the livestock numbers and fall in the number of farms raising livestock is accompanied by an increase in the average headage of herds. The workforce remains the crucial and most challenging issue in the transformation of Polish agriculture. Its reduction would improve the relation between land and labour and between capital and labour. Rationalising the relation between the production factors would improve overall efficiency of production and increase labour and capital productivity. An analysis at the level of several voivodeships indicates that differences between regions are still visible in Polish agriculture in several interlinked aspects such as the level and structure of production factors, the scale and nature of production and its marketable share, production structures and effectiveness of management. These differences can also be observed in the level of progress and pace of change. Although the direction of such changes is largely similar in individual voivodeships, the absolute measures of changes demonstrate that the spatial disparities in the development of agriculture are widening. This is evidenced among others by the growing disparities in the relations between the production factors and their productivity levels as well as the increasing regional specialisation in animal production.

108


Barbara Chmielewska, Józef Stanisław Zegar*

Chapter 5. Convergence and divergence processes in rural areas and society at large with regard to income Introduction Lower per capita incomes in rural areas compared to cities typically occur all over the world. This phenomenon, which has strong roots in history, was strengthened even further in the period of industrial development ac companied by rapid urbanisation and rural disagrarianisation processes. The direct causes underpinning those two processes could be attributed to the transformation of agriculture from natural into industrial and replacing non- agricultural activities of rural population (crafts, handicrafts, small industry) by urban industry characterised by a large scale of production. Such industrial agriculture employed less and less workforce (labour inputs), and in consequence provided income (livelihood) to a constantly decreasing share of rural population. This in turn meant that agriculture, a dominant sector in socio-economic structure of rural areas in terms of jobs, generating income and source of livelihood, began to lose its position. Work in agriculture brought lower and lower income, and paid less than other occupations. Due to the prevalent role of agriculture in the rural areas, it had a direct bearing on the income of rural residents and increased income disparity between urban and rural areas that was unfavourable for the latter. This situation gradually began to change in the post-industrial period. First and foremost, there was a greater awareness of the role of nature for the quality of life and socio-economic development, given the fact that the major natural resources are found in rural areas. Moreover, there was a growing appreciation for cultural and traditional values that rural areas were a repository of. These factors played an important part in making rural areas, especially those with well-developed transport links with cities, attractive destinations to live also for urban residents, notably professionals and people with unearned sources of income. Overall, it means that many developed countries are witnessing a * Dr. hab. prof. nadzw. Barbara Chmielewska, prof. dr hab Józef Stanisław Zegar, Institute of Agricultural and Food Economics, National Research Institute in Warsaw

109

5. Convergence and divergence processes...

reversal of a long-lasting trend – the negative balance of migration from urban to rural areas is replaced by a positive one. The intensification and popularisation of the industrial model of agri culture is necessitated by increasing competition caused by liberalisation of trade and the developing corporate food system. At the same time, deficiencies of the industrial model of agriculture are more and more vi sible, including e.g. impact of such agriculture on the natural environment, quality of food and condition of rural communities. The falling number of farms, accompanied by rapid technological development, leads to a falling demand for human labour since individuals can find more profitable sources of income in other sectors. In Poland, the number of employed in agriculture accounts for slightly over 10% of all people working in the national economy, and about 23% of people working in rural areas. It can be said, therefore, that contemporarily agriculture is not a dominant sector in rural areas either in creating jobs or in providing income. The aim of this chapter is to discuss changes in the income relations be tween rural and urban areas and between basic socio-economic groups following Poland’s accession to the European Union (EU). On the basis of the Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS) and Eurostat data, the authors set out to examine whether income disparities are becoming smaller (convergence) or wider (divergence). The chapter opens with a review of trends regarding the incomes of rural and urban population (per capita) and in socio-economic household groups, showing the level and relations of such incomes. Then, the structure of the sources of livelihood (income) of the rural and urban population is discussed, also with regard to socio-economic groups. The phenomenon of poverty is outlined both with regard to urban and rural areas and socio-economic groups. The subsequent section describes the role of agriculture in shaping the incomes (sources of livelihood) of families – households with farm operators – in rural, rural-urban and urban municipalities in the years 2005–2016. Finally, changes in incomes in Poland are examined in comparison to other European Union countries. The chapter concludes with a summary.

5.1. Income trends of rural and urban populations

110

Lower profitability of working in agriculture, when farmers and farming prevailed in the socio-economic structure of rural areas, was of cardinal importance for the incomes of rural population. In the recent decades, the process of disagrarianisation in Poland has accelerated: fewer and fewer people find work in agriculture, and agriculture itself is a source of livelihood


for fewer and fewer families (households). More and more rural residents find employment in non-agricultural sectors which offer higher income than agriculture, whereas the social insurance and social welfare system provides sustenance to a large group of rural residents. The accession to the European Union brought a major change because it in a sense “appreciated the status” of agriculture, facilitated migration (both domestic and international) and fostered creation of new jobs directly in rural areas. This produced greater income dynamics of rural than urban residents (including those living in largest cities), although in terms of income levels in absolute numbers rural residents still earn less than residents of cities (Tab. 5.1). Table 5.1. Average monthly nominal disposable household income per capita by place of residence in 2004–2016 (in PLN) Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Total 735 761 835 929 1046 1114 1193 1227 1278 1299 1340 1386 1475

Total 848 866 944 1044 1176 1255 1342 1384 1440 1453 1516 1566 1642

Cities With population (in thousand) under 20 693 707 770 840 982 1031 1098 1158 1200 1192 1233 1294 1419

20–99 784 789 845 932 1044 1132 1206 1227 1273 1318 1380 1410 1484

100–199 200–499 773 815 863 974 1133 1209 1255 1306 1320 1344 1444 1496 1575

871 930 1027 1124 1219 1272 1389 1422 1497 1498 1583 1607 1715

500 or over 1143 1146 1276 1420 1593 1735 1880 1920 2012 2002 2046 2122 2108

Rural areas 556 593 659 744 836 889 953 975 1028 1060 1067 1106 1214

Source: GUS statistics (Sytuacja społeczno-ekonomiczna gospodarstw domowych w latach 2000–2011. Zróżnicowanie Miasto-Wieś, GUS, Warsaw 2013, pp. 66–68 and Budżety gospodarstw domowych (for individual years).

In 2004–2016, nominal per capita incomes of rural residents rose by 118%, and those of urban residents – by 94% (in smallest cities by 105%, and in largest cities by 84%). Interestingly, incomes of residents of small cities (with a population under 20,000) were up 105%, and in largest cities (500,000 and over) by 84%, i.e. by 34 percentage points less than in the case of rural residents. Real incomes of rural residents grew by 78%, and those of urban residents – by 50% (in smallest cities by 58%, and in largest cities by 42%). Higher income dynamics of rural residents led to a slight decrease in the income disparities between rural and urban areas (Fig. 5.1). Incomes of

111


rural residents most strongly diverge from those of residents of largest cities and most closely resemble those of residents of smallest cities (Tab. 5.2). 200 180 160 140 120 100 100 80 66

60

99.7

107.5

68

70

71

127.7

123.4

115.2

71

71

147.2

144.9 133.0

71

149.6

130.6

130.3

130.3

135.9

70

71

73

70

141.8

74

71

Rural

40

Urban

20 0

115.5

104.5

148.4

141.8

137.3

127.6

178.4

161.1

152.9

151.3

Rural / Urban, %

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Figure 5.1. Dynamics and relations of nominal per capita incomes of rural and urban residents in 2004–2016 (in %) Source: see Tab. 5.1.

Table 5.2. Relations between disposable incomes of rural and urban residents in 2004–2016 (%) With population (in thousand)

Year

Total cities

under 20

20–99

100–199

200–499

500 or over

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

66 68 70 71 71 71 71 70 71 73 70 71 74

80 84 86 89 85 86 87 84 86 89 87 85 86

71 75 78 80 80 79 79 79 81 80 77 78 84

72 73 76 76 74 74 76 75 78 79 74 74 77

64 64 64 66 69 70 69 69 69 71 67 69 71

49 52 52 52 52 51 51 51 51 53 52 52 58

Source: see Tab. 5.1.

112

The higher income dynamics of rural than urban residents was un doubtedly driven by the improved income situation of farmers thanks to the transfer of funds under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) me chanisms. In 2004–2016, the incomes of farmers’ households rose by 113%, i.e. more than an average household (up 101%), and even more than those of


households of self-employed working outside agriculture (up 92%) (Tab. 5.3). In contrast, the continued high prevalence of incomes of large-city dwellers over those of rural residents is mostly due to three factors. Firstly, those cities have institutions and businesses that pay higher wages but require their employees to have a higher level of educational attainment. Secondly, a lower level of educational attainment of rural residents cripples their opportunities to find employment in well-paid occupations. 12% of rural residents have university education compared to 28% in cities and 43% in largest cities. Thirdly, the number of persons in an average rural family is higher than that in an urban one (3.1 compared to 2.4 in 2016), so as the percentage of families with many children. Table 5.3. Average monthly nominal disposable household income per capita by socioeconomic groups in 2004–2016 (in PLN) Year

Total

Farmers

Workers

Selfemployed

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

735 761 835 929 1046 1114 1193 1227 1278 1299 1340 1386 1475

541 606 690 847 887 884 1025 984 1092 1156 1051 1046 1151

782 770 829 915 1050 1123 1199 1244 1289 1306 1349 1387 1495

935 977 1103 1251 1339 1396 1468 1497 1537 1580 1632 1739 1792

Old age and disability pensioners 779 800 873 938 1032 1116 1181 1233 1298 1329 1382 1438 1499

Source: Budżety gospodarstw domowych, GUS.

When looking at the higher income dynamics in farmers’ households, three factors should be taken into account. Firstly, in the period before the EU accession incomes of farmers’ households strongly diverged from the incomes of other socio-economic groups, and these disparities were somewhat narrowed following the accession. Secondly, farmers’ incomes are characterised by fluctuations caused by the economic situation on the agricultural market, and 2016 brought an improvement in that regard. Thirdly, we have here a statistical trap associated with the criterion whereby farmers’ households are

p. 82.

Dochody i warunki życia ludności Polski (raport z badania EU-SILC 2015), GUS, Warsaw 2017, Budżety gospodarstw domowych w 2016 r., GUS, Warsaw 2017, p. 92.

113


identified on the basis of prevalent income from farming activity. In the years 2004–2016, when the number of households slightly grew overall, the number of households including a farm operator fell by 19%, and that of farmers’ households – by 23%. It can be surmised that mostly weaker farms, with lower incomes, were removed from the category of farmers’ households. In 2004, households that included a farm user accounted for 39% of rural households, compared to 32% in 2016, with farmers’ households, respectively, 14% and 11%. The latter represented, respectively, about 18% and 12% of the rural population. This means that farmers’ households and households with farm operators have a steadily decreasing effect on the income situation of rural residents.

5.2. Structure of sources of livelihood The budgets of rural families, also those of farm operators, have been changing for many years in terms of amounts and significance of income from various sources, especially income from gainful employment, work in agriculture and income from unearned sources. The reasons for such a situation were described above. The data in Tab. 5.4 illustrate the changes in the sources of income of rural and urban households. In 2016, income from gainful employment accounted for 48.5% of total household income in rural areas (54.8% in cities), from self-employed work – 7.2% (in cities 9.0%), and income from agriculture in individual farms – 9.3% (in cities 0.4%). Social benefits still play a significant role in the structure of household budgets; their share represents 31.9% of total rural household incomes and 30.8% of urban incomes. In the column denoting welfare, the share of “benefits and other childcare allowances” in rural areas is much higher than in cities (14% compared to 7%). This is mainly due to the fact that rural families are large and have more children. Nominal per capita incomes of rural households after the EU accession (2004–2016) increased more than twofold, income from gainful work and from self-employed work outside agriculture rising at the fastest rate (2.9 and 2.7 times, respectively). Income from social transfers increased at a slower rate (nearly 1.8 times), and income from agricultural holding was the slowest to rise (1.5 times). Income from other types of welfare transfers (comprising

114

In statistics, a farmer household is one where the bulk of income (> 50%) comes from agricultural activity in an agricultural holding. Regarding households across the country, it was 4.8% and 3.6%, respectively. Income from self-employed work comprises part of the income earned as self-employed activity outside private farm in agriculture and part from pursuing a profession. For more information see: Budżety gospodarstw domowych w 2016 r., GUS, Warsaw 2017, p. 19.


Table 5.4. Average monthly nominal disposable income per capita in rural and urban households by source (in PLN) Sources of income

Year

total

from gainful employment

from self-employed work

from agriculture in individual farm

from welfarea

rural areas

rural areas

rural areas

rural areas

rural areas

urban areas

urban areas

urban areas

urban areas

2004

556

848

205

416

32

76

73

3

217

2005

593

866

222

430

33

79

83

3

2006

659

944

260

482

40

90

93

5

2007

744

1044

312

563

46

106

111

2008

836

1176

384

671

58

113

2009

889

1255

417

704

66

2010

953

1342

443

757

2011

975

1384

468

2012

1028

1440

2013

1060

2014

urban areas

other rural areas

urban areas

288

29

64

223

293

32

61

237

307

30

60

4

244

307

30

63

106

4

255

326

32

63

123

106

4

268

357

33

67

70

134

123

5

283

371

34

76

791

71

133

110

4

293

384

34

72

485

814

78

128

129

4

297

415

37

78

1453

497

814

82

131

139

5

307

424

35

79

1067

1516

527

850

82

136

103

7

316

434

40

89

2015

1106

1566

556

887

82

145

105

5

323

445

39

84

2016

1214

1642

589

899

87

148

113

7

387

505

38

82

Average monthly per capita disposable household income in PLN

Income from welfare comprises income from social security transfers (including old age and disability pensions) and income from other social benefits (including unemployment benefits). a.

Source: GUS data (Sytuacja społeczno-ekonomiczna gospodarstw domowych w latach 2000–2011. Zróżnicowanie Miasto-Wieś, GUS, Warsaw 2013, pp. 66–69; Budżety gospodarstw domowych, GUS, subsequent years).

benefits and childcare allowances, including the “Family 500+” programme) increased on a particularly extensive scale. The level of such transfers in 2004–2015 increased by merely 12%, to rise in 2016 as fast as 2.7 times as a consequence of payments under the 500+ childcare benefit programme, which unquestionably helped to tangibly improve the economic standing of many rural families. The relatively lower increase of incomes from social transfers is due to the falling number of beneficiaries and the manner in which such transfers are adjusted for inflation. The number of individual farmers covered by the social security system fell from 1,645,000 in 2005 to 1,194,000 in 2016 (the number of beneficiaries under the non-agricultural social security system rose from 7,524,000 to 7,715,000). Over that period, the average monthly pensions for individual farmers rose less than those of non-farmers (52% compared to 69%). The differences in the structure of incomes providing livelihood for urban and rural households are quite significant (Fig. 5.2).

Rocznik Statystyczny 2017, GUS, Warsaw 2016, pp. 282-283, Tab. 1(199) and 2(200).

115


100%

5.3

7.6

39.1

34

90% 80% 70% 60% 50%

13.1

40%

5.7

30% 20%

0.4 9

4.5

6.4

35.9

32.5

14.1

0.5 9.5

3.9

5.4

3.6

5.6

3.6

5.4

3.7

5.9

3.2

5

30.5

27.7

29.7

27.6

28.9

28.9

29.6

28.6

31.9

30.8

0.3 9.6

12.9

0.4 10.0

12.6

0.3 8.9

9.7

0.5 8.9

9.3

0.4 9

12.7

7.6

7.3

6.9

7.7

7.2

6.1

49.1 36.8

51.1

46.0

39.4

57.0

46.5

56.4

47.2

56.6

49.4

56.1

48.5

54.8

10% 0%

Rural Urban

Rural Urban

Rural Urban

Rural Urban

Rural Urban

Rural Urban

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

gainful work

self-employed

private farm in agriculture

ǁĞůĨĂƌĞďĞŶĞĮƚƐ

Rural Urban 2016

other sources

Figure 5.2. Households by sources of income in 2004–2016 Source: see Tab. 5.4.

The absolute level of incomes is important so as relations between different groups, but the subjective assessment of the material situation of households by rural and urban residents also plays a role. In 2004–2016, very positive and rather positive opinions were on the increase, whereas the number of rather negative and negative opinions decreased (Fig. 5.3). The share of very positive and positive opinions in rural areas is distinctly lower than in cities, the share of average ratings is smaller, and that of negative and rather negative – similar. It can be concluded that, as a rule, rural residents, notably farmers, are characterised by somewhat less lofty aspirations and therefore their subjective assessment of their material situation is higher than could be expected based on the absolute level of income. In the case of farmers’ households, farming certainly helps to avoid extreme poverty because the farm offers opportunities for producing food to cater to the household needs – the so-called self-supply of goods for consumption. The subjective assessment of the material situation differs considerably depending on the socio-economic type of the household. Households of selfemployed persons outside agriculture and of contract workers take the most positive view of their situation in that regard, whereas households of farmers, old age and disability pensioners look at their situation less favourably (Fig. 5.4). 116

It is indicated by a comparative analysis of the proportions between the amount of income per capita in urban and rural areas and the share of individual rating categories, as well as a similar analysis of individual socio-economic household groups.


70 60

% of households %

61 59 51

50

54

51

54

40 30 20 21

20 12

10 0

16 10

6

1

17

15

23

19

19

11 9

9

14

12 10

5 4

4 3

Urban

Rural

1

Urban

Rural

Urban

Very good

Rural

Good

Urban

2004

Rural

Average 2015 2016

Urban

Rural

14

Rather bad

Bad

Figure 5.3. Subjective assessment of the material situation of household by type of place of residence (% households) Source: elaborated based on GUS data (Sytuacja społeczno-ekonomiczna gospodarstw domowych w latach 2000–2015, GUS, Warsaw 2017; Sytuacja społeczno-ekonomiczna gospodarstw domowych w 2016 r. (w świetle wyników badań budżetów gospodarstw domowych), GUS, Warsaw, 2.06.2017).

% % 70 70

58 58

60 60 50 50 40 40 30 30

% of households % of households 64 64 57 57 54 53 54 53 39 39

39 39

34 34

28 28

24 24

20 20

20 20

13 13

10 10 0 0

Very good + good Very good + good Total Total

Farmers Farmers

Average Average Workers Workers

Self-employed Self-employed

8 8

9 9

4 4

Rather bad + bad Rather bad + bad Old age and disability pensioners Old age and disability pensioners

Figure 5.4. Subjective assessment of the material situation of households by socioeconomic groups in 2016 (% of households) Source: see Fig. 5.3.

5.3. Poverty In addition to the level of income, poverty is a key factor in assessing the economic situation due to the consequences it produces. GUS estimates the extent of economic poverty using three poverty thresholds: extreme The basic measure is the so-called poverty rate, i.e. the percentage of people in a household where the level of expenditure (including the value of goods received for free and value of natural consumption) was lower than the adopted poverty line. Zasięg ubóstwa ekonomicznego in Poland w 2015 r. (na podstawie badań budżetów gospodarstw domowych), GUS, preliminary report, Warsaw, 12.05.2015.

117

118

8.2

5.4

1.0

Total cities

under 20,000

500,000 and over

1.0

8.5

4.6

11.8

21.1

12.5

5.8

4.1

6.5

12.1

7.4

1.1

5.4

3.5

11.3

17.9

10.7

5.0

3.1

5.6

14.7

6.5

2015 18.1

2005 16.2

2014 15.5

2015

relative poverty threshold

1.1

4.0

2.9

8.0

15.9

8.5

3.9

2.2

3.9

11.0

36.2

25.5

12.1

8.9

15.2

28.0

11.0

24.4

3.8

19.0 3.4

18.8

With population

12.5

27.0

Place of residence

38.5

25.6

10.1

10.2

16.9

26.4

3.3

14.5

10.0

24.0

36.1

23.2

11.4

8.9

14.4

28.9

Socio-economic groups in households

4.9

2016

4.5

11.3

9.5

20.8

31.6

21.8

10.9

8.3

12.5

26.5

13.9

2016

1.9

12.4

12.3

27.3

40.1

23.1

8.5

10.6

17.3

28.2

18.1

2.3

13.4

8.0

18.7

29.9

17.8

7.2

6.8

11.9

21.2

12.2

2014

2.2

10.6

7.4

19.8

30.3

15.9

7.3

7.0

11.7

25.2

12.2

2015

3.6

9.3

8.2

19.7

30.6

16.9

8.0

8.1

11.9

25.8

12.7

2016

statutory poverty threshold 2005

% persons in households with expenditure below:

Source: elaborated on the basis of GUS data (Sytuacja gospodarstw domowych w 2006 r. w świetle wyników badań budżetów gospodarstw domowych, GUS, material for press conference on 26.06.2007, p. 16 and Zasięg ubóstwa ekonomicznego in Poland w 2016 r., GUS, preliminary report, Warsaw, 23.06.2017, pp. 11 and 15).

18.7

Rural areas

6.3

Old age pensioners

29.9

6.3

Self-employed

Living on unearned sources of income

11.2

Employees

17.5

18.1

Farmers

Disability pensioners

12.3

2014

extreme poverty threshold

2005

Total

Item

Table 5.5. Extent of poverty of households in 2005–2016



(minimum subsistence level), relative and statutory. The extent of economic poverty in Poland considerably diminished following EU accession, with continued disparities being visible between urban and rural households and socio-economic groups of households (Tab. 5.5). In 2016, in comparison with 2005, the percentage of persons living in extreme poverty households (expenditure below minimum subsistence level) declined from 12.3% to 4.9%, and in the case of farmers’ households – from 18.1% to 11.0%. 20,0 18,0

% 18.5

18.7

16,0 14,0 12.0

12,0

10.5

10,0 8,0

7.7

9.2

9.4

9.2

11.0

11.6

11.8

11.3

10.6

8.2

8.0 5.2

6,0 4,0

4.1

3.3

3.5

3.4

4.1

4.3

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

4.6

4.6

3.5

2,0 0,0

2004

2005

2006

Urban

2013

2014

2015

2.9

2016

Rural

Figure 5.5. Extent of extreme poverty in rural and urban areas in 2004–2016 Source: elaborated on the basis of data from Tab. 5.5.

The risk of poverty still remains higher in rural than in urban areas (Fig. 5.5). In 2004, the extent of extreme poverty was 2.4 times higher in rural areas than in cities. After 12 years these disparities widened to 2.8 times (and could also be an effect of the growing economic stratification of the rural areas). The greatest disparities in the extent of rural poverty are reported in relation to largest cities (with a population of 500,000 and over). In the case of rural population, the income level is determined primarily on the basis of the production potential of agricultural holdings (land, fixed assets and human capital). Farms with a considerable production potential are likely to earn, and usually do, relatively high income. Such farms also have good development prospects and opportunities to generate income in the future, but represent a minority. Most farms are agricultural The statutory poverty line is the amount which, under the Social Welfare Act, entitles a given person to apply for a cash benefit as part of the social welfare system. The minimum subsistence level, calculated by the Institute of Labour and Social Studies (IPiSS), takes into account only those needs whose satisfaction cannot be delayed in time, and consumption below that level leads to biological deprivation. The relative poverty line is determined by 50% of average expenditure by all households.

119


holdings with little economic power and small size, which generate low income. In addition to the aforementioned three basic measures of poverty, a new measure based not on income but on household expenditure is the sphere of deprivation was adopted.10 The sphere of deprivation includes more people living in rural areas than in cities. The share of persons living in the deprivation households falls as the population increases, and is the lowest in cities with the greatest number of the population (Tab. 5.6). Table 5.6. Sphere of poverty and deprivation by place of residence in 2014–2016 % persons living in households below: Type of location

Total Total cities - >500,000 -2 00,000– 500,000 -1 00,000– 200,000 -2 0,000– 100,000 < 20,000 Rural areas

minimum subsistence amount (sphere of deprivation) 2014 2015 43.4 42.7 34.5 33.8 18.6 18.1

statutory poverty threshold

minimum subsistence level

relative poverty line

2014 12.2 8.0 2.3

2016 12.7 8.2 3.6

2014 7.4 4.6 1.0

2016 4.9 2.9 1.1

2014 16.2 11.0 3.4

2016 13.9 9.5 4.5

30.1

29.8

6.5

6.2

3.2

1.9

9.6

7.2

34.0

33.5

6.8

8.9

3.7

2.8

9.4

9.2

37.3

38.4

8.9

11.2

5.1

3.9

11.6

12.7

48.1 57.1

44.8 56.5

13.4 18.7

9.3 19.7

8.5 11.8

4.0 8.0

18.8 24.4

11.3 20.8

Source: GUS (Ubóstwo in Poland w latach 2013 i 2014. GUS, Warsaw, passim, and Zasięg ubóstwa ekonomicznego w Polsce w 2016 r. (na podstawie budżetów gospodarstw domowych), GUS, Warsaw 23.06.217, typescript, p. 15; Sfera niedostatku w Polsce w latach 2012–2015 – podstawowe dane, GUS, Warsaw, 12.08.2016, p. 5).

5.4. Changes in the sources of livelihood of rural population by types of municipalities The falling trend in the share of agriculture in the socio-economic rural structure is objective and omnipresent. More intensive in the industrialisation period, it is visible also in the post-industrial development stage. Poland’s EU accession created conditions for the modernisation and restructuring of agriculture thanks to transfers of funds both into agriculture and rural areas,

120

10 A household (and thereby all persons living in it) is considered as a deprivation household if the level of its expenditure (including the value of goods received for free and value of natural consumption) was lower than the deprivation line based on the minimum subsistence amount as calculated by IPiSS; the level of that threshold is about two times higher than the extreme poverty threshold, determined on the basis of the minimum subsistence level (Ubóstwo w Polsce w latach 2013 i 2014, GUS, Warsaw 2015, pp. 31–32).


migration opportunities to cities and abroad, and for the creation of jobs in nonagricultural activities in rural areas themselves. In particular, the process of liquidation of unprofitable farms was accelerated, labour resources were shrinking and farms tended to forgo livestock raising. Some differences can be observed in how these changes have been progressing depending on the nature (type) of the municipality. We only summarily tackle those changes (Fig. 5.6) as they are not the topic of the chapter, and instead focus on the question of the incomes of households with farm operators. We examined the sources of income of families (households) who operated farms; volumes of gainful activities pursued on the basis of the farm resources and the socioeconomic structure of households with farm operators. This applies to agricultural holdings engaged in farming activity and operating 1 ha or more of farmland in the so-called good agricultural and environmental condition (GAEC).11 140 120 99

100 81

80

88 78

115

107 105

105

95

89

82

79

76

119 101

99 92

86

89

83

60 40 20 0

Number of farms

Agricultural land

Total

Rural

Labour input (AWU)

Urban-rural

Standard output

Livestock

Urban

Figure 5.6. Changes in individual farming in 2005–2016 by type of municipality (in %, 2005 = 100)a changes calculated for farmland area in ha, labour input in so-called AWU (an equivalent of 2120 hours of work per year), standard output in EUR ‘000, livestock population in so-called livestock units (LSU). a

Source: prepared on the basis of data from representative research on the structure of agricultural holdings carried out by GUS in 2005 and 2016; the calculations were made by the Statistical Office in Olsztyn.

The situation regarding the number of agricultural holdings earning income outside agriculture in the analysed years is shown in Tab. 5.7. In the analysed period, the percentage of farms with non-agricultural income increased, while the share of farms engaged in gainful activities of the farm 11

Please take note that GUS publications only include farms with over 1 ha of agricultural land.

121


Table 5.7. Private farms with non-agricultural incomes by type of municipality (in thousand) Item Total farms Total farms with nonagricultural income - from non-agricultural activity - from gainful employment - from old age or disability pension - from other unearned sources

Total 2005 2016 1723.9 1398.1 1317.4 1149.0

Rural 2005 2016 1116.4 872.6

Urban-rural 2005 2016 441.4 389.1

Urban 2005 2016 166.1 136.5

833.0

700.9

335.5

318.4

148.9

129.7

159.1

213.0

89.2

119.3

44.0

62.1

25.9

31.6

692.5

668.3

433.7

413.8

174.8

183.9

84.0

70.6

668.6

462.1

442.9

286.7

169.9

129.1

55.8

46.3

75.2

106.3

49.7

72.1

19.9

25.3

5.6

8.9

Source: see Fig. 5.6.

declined with the exception of agri-tourism, handicrafts and renewable ener gy production (Tab. 5.8). The reasons for such a situation lie primarily in the progressing industrialisation of agriculture and the diminishing labour resources of agricultural families. Transfers of funds to agriculture under the CAP mechanisms helped to upgrade the technical equipment of many agricultural holdings, especially those with greater production potential, which made it possible for them to increase output without increasing the input of family work (although specialisation produces demand for seasonal work) and reduce demand for contract work. In parallel, the decreasing family size and opportunities to find better-paid jobs outside the farm weaken the interest in gainful activities of the farm. Table 5.8. Farms with gainful farm-based activity (in thousand) Item

122

Number of farms Total farms engaged in gainful activities - agri-tourism - handicraft -p rocessing of farm products -p roduction of renewable energy - aquaculture -a gricultural contractual work - other activities Source: see Fig. 5.6.

Total 2005 2016 1723.9 1398.1

Rural 2005 2016 1116.4 872.6

Urban-rural 2005 2016 441.4 389.1

Urban 2005 2016 166.1 136.5

107.1

39.7

62.0

24.3

29.8

12.5

15.3

3.0

8.2 1.7

10.6 1.4

4.9 1.0

6.8 0.9

2.4 0.6

3.1 0.4

0.9 0.1

0.8 0.0

4.4

2.6

3.2

1.7

0.9

0.5

0.4

0.5

0.3

0.4

0.0

0.2

0.2

0.1

0.0

0.0

12.1

0.9

7.2

0.5

3.2

0.3

1.7

0.1

26.9

3.8

16.9

2.3

7.5

1.5

2.5

0.1

57.6

21.8

31.2

13.0

16.1

7.2

10.2

1.6


The period in question saw considerable changes in the number of house holds with farm operator by primary source of livelihood (Tab. 5.9). Table 5.9. Farms by primary source of livelihood in 2005 and 2016 ( in thousand) Total

Item

2005

Rural

2016

2005

1579.5 1311.9 1017.6 Total 620.6 476.9 435.9 - from agricultural activity - from agricultural activity and 17.9 14.7 13.3 gainful employment 443.4 445.4 261.9 - from gainful employment - from gainful employment 57.2 45.2 38.7 and agricultural activity - from old-age and disability 332.4 190.2 210.2 pensions 85.8 104.9 43.8 - from non-agricultural activity - from unearned sources of 22.2 34.7 13.7 income (other than old-age and disability pensions)

Urban-rural

Urban

2016

2005

2016

2005

2016

817.3

406.3

365.7

155.7

128.8

326.0

160.3

132.4

24.4

18.4

10.2

4.1

3.8

0.5

0.6

269.9

111.9

122.7

69.6

52.9

28.6

15.2

13.5

3.3

3.0

107.1

84.9

53.7

37.2

29.4

55.0

24.0

30.4

18.0

19.5

20.5

5.8

9.1

2.7

5.1

Source: see Fig. 5.8.

This is followed by changes in the socio-economic structure of households with farm operator, whereby gainful employment, non-agricultural activities and unearned sources of income are gaining in importance (Fig. 5.7).12 100% 90% 80%

5.4

8.0

4.3

6.7

21.0

14.5

20.7

13.1

5.9

8.3

20.9

14.7

15.1

23.9

70% 60%

11.5

37.3

31.7

36.5

29.5

31.2

22.8

37.2

50% 40%

46.8

43.3

16.0

14.8

30% 20%

40.4

37.4

44.1

41.2

40.5

37.2

10% 0%

2005

2016 Total

2005

2016 Rural

2005

2016

Urban-rural

2005

2016 Urban

Figure Farming 5.7. StructureGainful of farms source of livelihood of municipality (%) workby primary Old age and disability pensionsand type Work outside agriculture Source: see Fig. 5.8. 12 For better transparency, farmer households were categorised together with households in which the main income comes from agricultural activity, and supplementary income from gainful activity, and households with prevalent income from gainful activity and households with main income from gainful activity and supplementary income from agricultural activity.

123


Given the overall decline in the number of farms by 19% in 2005–2016, which was the sharpest in rural areas (22%), followed by urban areas (18%), and the smallest in urban-rural areas (12%), the number of households in individual socio-economic groups changed in a variety of ways, with some visible differences depending on the nature of the municipality where the farm was situated (Fig. 5.8). What is particularly notable is the rise in the number of farms living on unearned sources of income (other than old-age and disability pensions) and from non-agricultural activities, and a decline in the number of farms living on old-age and disability pensions in all types of municipalities. 200 180

%

Rural

186

Urban-rural

160

Urban

140

150

100 80

126 127

119

120

75

83

93 76

77

157

103

109

110 76

74

89

92 79 63

60

51

40

20 0

Farming

Farming and ǁage labor

Wage labor

Wage labor and farming

Old age and disability pensions

Work outside agriculture

EŽŶͲƉƌŽĮƚ sources

Figure 5.8. Changes in the number of farms by primary source of livelihood in 2005– 2016 (%, 2005 = 100%) Source: see Fig. 5.6.

5.5. Incomes in the European Union member states Disposable incomes of households per equivalent person13 of rural residents are lower than those in cities (Tab. 5.10). This is true for nearly all EU member states, the only exceptions being Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Ireland, Czech Republic and Estonia, where the incomes of rural residents in 2016 were higher than those of urban residents. The income disparities are wider

124

13 Equivalent units are parameters allowing for comparing the material situation of households with different sizes and demographic structures. The demonstrate the impact of the household’s demographic makeup on its living costs. The so-called OECD modified equivalence scale has been used, calculated as follows: 1 – for the first adult in the household; 0.5 – for every subsequent household member aged 14 or over; 0.3 – for every child under 14. In addition, the same income value is assigned to every person in the household (Budżety gospodarstw domowych w 2016 r., GUS, Warsaw 2017, p. 22).


in comparison with larger than with towns and suburbs;14 as the country’s affluence increases, those income disparities tend to narrow, although relatively less so in the EU-15 than in the EU-13 countries. In 2005–2016, the average relation of incomes of rural residents compared to residents of cities in EU-27 rose from 62.3% to 79.7%, and compared to residents of towns and suburbs – from 61.7% to 83.3%. The most substantial changes could be observed in the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Portugal, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Bulgaria. In Poland, the relation of rural residents’ incomes to those of residents of cities after the EU accession rose from 70% to 72%, and compared to residents of towns and suburbs, it shrank from 88% to 83%15 (Tab. 5.10, Fig. 5.9 and Tab. 5.10). The smaller income disparities between rural and urban residents mostly originated from a much higher pace of income increase in rural than in urban areas. In 2016, compared to 2005, the disposable income per equivalent person rose in EU-27 rural areas by 64%, by 28% in cities, and by 21% in towns and suburbs. In Poland, incomes in rural areas increased by 122%, which was less than in towns and suburbs (by 137%), but more than in cities (by 115%). Table 5.10. Household disposable income per equalised unit in Poland and EU-27 by level of urbanisation Level of urbanisation Rural EU areas Poland

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

in EUR 9898 10214 10907 12433 12733 12935 13056 15651 15216 15371 15998 16229 2539

3061

3496

4147

5015

4287

4940

4854

4954

5082

5324

5644

16038 16208 1513 18673 18805 19076 19099 18262 18516 19089 19317 19495 Small EU cities Poland 2891 3473 3844 4561 5475 4761 5398 5988 6144 6401 6523 6842 15879 16263 17558 18504 18410 18492 18728 19023 19030 19458 19853 20372 Large EU cities Poland 3654 4518 5010 5983 7312 6194 6959 7126 7157 7365 7664 7848 Source: prepared on the basis of Eurostat data.

In the European Union, despite a high level of socio-economic development, the risk of poverty and/or social exclusion occurs on quite a large scale, with considerable differences being visible across countries, regions and social groups. In 2016, this phenomenon affected 117.5 million people, which means that nearly one-fourth of the EU’s population were in at least one 14 The new classification distinguishes three categories of administrative units: (1) cities, (2) towns and suburbs, and (3) rural areas. Cities – at least 50% of the population live in grid cells with large population density; towns and suburbs – less than 50% live in rural grid cells; rural areas – over 50% live in rural areas. Grid cell – unit adopted to calculate population density (A harmonised definition of cities and rural areas: The new degree of urbanisation, European Commission Working Papers, WP 01/2014, Regional Working Papers, pp. 5-6). 15 Calculated on the basis of data provided in Tab.5.10.

125


of the following three conditions: at risk of poverty after social transfers (income poverty), severely materially deprived or living in households with very low work intensity. In 2008–2016, the share of people at risk or poverty or social exclusion in households fell only slightly: from 23.7% to 23.4%. 140 120

ůĂƌŐĞĐŝƟĞƐ = 100

%

100

80 60 40

2005

2016

Cyprus Czech Republic Estonia Lithuania Latvia Malta Slovakia Slovenia Hungary Bulgaria Romania ƌŽĂƟĂ

Belgium France Netherlands Luxembourg Germany Italy Denmark Ireland UK Greece Spain Portugal Austria Finland Sweden

0

UE-27 Poland

20

Figure 5.9. Relation of household incomesa in rural areas to incomes in cities in European Union countries (%) a

Household disposable income per equalised unit. Bulgaria in 2006, Romania in 2007, Croatia in 2010.

Source: prepared on the basis of Eurostat data.

140 120

%

ƐŵĂůůĐŝƟĞƐ = 100

100

80 60

40

2005

2016

Cyprus Czech Republic Estonia Latvia Lithuania Malta Slovakia Slovenia Hungary Bulgaria Romania ƌŽĂƟĂ

Belgium France Netherlands Luxembourg Germany Italy Denmark Ireland UK Greece Spain Portugal Austria Finland Sweden

0

UE-27 Poland

20

Figure 5.10. Relation of household incomesa in rural areas to incomes in towns and suburbs in European Union countries (%) a

126

Household disposable income per equalised unit. Bulgaria in 2006, Romania in 2007, Croatia in 2010.

Source: prepared on the basis of Eurostat data.


In 2016, the greatest number of poor or socially excluded persons were living in Italy, Germany, United Kingdom, Spain and France. A high place in that ranking was also occupied by Poland and Romania.16 All of them are countries with large populations. In contrast, the highest share of persons at risk of poverty and/or social exclusion in the overall population of a given country can be found in Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and Lithuania. The lowest such share was reported in the Czech Republic, Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands. Post EU accession, Poland saw the largest decrease in the risk of poverty and/or social exclusion of all EU countries (from 11.5 million in 2008 to 8.2 million in 2016; and as a percentage, from 30.5% to 21.9%). Poland effectively implemented measures regarding all component factors facilitating combating risk of poverty or social exclusion following the accession (Fig. 5.11). 50,0 45,0

40,0 35,0

%

2008

2016

30,0 25,0

23.7

20,0

23.4

15,0 10,0

Ireland Spain Italy Portugal Greece Hungary Latvia Poland Lithuania Romania Bulgaria ƌŽĂƟĂ

UE

0,0

Netherlands Sweden Czech Rep. Denmark Finland Slovenia France Malta Germany Slovakia Austria Belgium Estonia UK Cyprus

5,0

Figure 5.11. Risk of poverty and/or social exclusion in EU member states in 2008– 2016a (%) a

Countries ranked from lowest to highest risk in 2008.

Source: prepared on the basis of: Downward trend in the share of persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion in the EU, Eurostat News Release 155/2017, 16 October 2017, p. 2.

In the majority of the member states, the risk of poverty and social exclusion is higher among rural than urban residents; it is also higher in EU-13 than in EU-15 countries. At the moment of EU accession, Poland was in the group of EU-13 countries characterised by the highest risk of poverty and/or social exclu16 Let us note that the threshold value of the poverty line considerably matters for the extent of the phenomenon of poverty; in Poland the poverty line for a single-person household in 2016 was set at a low level (EUR 3,500). For Luxembourg, it was EUR 21,200 (highest threshold), for Romania – EUR 1,500 (lowest threshold). Rocznik Statystyczny 2017, GUS, Warsaw 2017, p. 799.

127


sion. In 2005, more than half of the whole rural population (50.6%; 8,814,000 people) belonged to that category. A higher percentage was found only in Latvia (50.9%; 595,000 people) and Bulgaria (67,2%; 2,870,000 people). The risk of poverty was lower among the urban population, although it also was high. In Poland, as many as 47.2% residents of towns and suburbs (2,302,000 people) and 38.6% residents of cities (5,965,000 people) were at risk of poverty and/or social exclusion. A higher percentage was recorded only in Latvia (51.3% and 40.8%, respectively) and in Bulgaria (64.4% and 53.3%, respectively). After the accession, the share of people at risk of poverty and/or social exclusion declined nearly in all EU-13 countries both in rural and urban areas. Poland was the country where the social situation improved the most. Until 2016, the percentage of poor people in Poland declined to 28% in rural areas, to 16% in cities and 19% in towns and suburbs. A large decrease in the risk of poverty in rural areas was also reported in Latvia, Slovakia and Bulgaria. In the same period, a decrease in the risk of poverty and/or social exclusion in rural areas was also observed in nearly all EU-15 countries except Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden and Greece, where it slightly increased (Fig. 5.12). 70

%

60

2005

50

2016

40 30 20

ƌŽĂƟĂ

Romania

UE-3

Bulgaria

Hungary

Slovakia

Slovenia

Malta

Poland

Latvia

Lithuania

Estonia

Czech Rep.

UE-10

Cyprus

Sweden

Austria

Finland

Spain

Portugal

UK

Greece

Ireland

Italy

Denmark

Germany

Luxembourg

France

Netherlands

UE-15

0

Belgium

10

Figure 5.12. Risk of poverty and/or social exclusion in rural areas in EU member states in 2005 and 2016 (%) Source: prepared on the basis of Eurostat data.

128

Despite the shrinking share of agriculture in the socio-economic structure of rural areas, income earned from agricultural activity still plays an important role. The level and dynamics of agricultural incomes in the EU shows that they differ considerably across the member states, with greater incomes being earned by farmers from the EU-15 than the EU-13. The leaders in the ranking


of income from agriculture per 1 average work unit (AWU17), ranked from the highest to the lowest level in the EU-15 are: Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, United Kingdom and France, whereas the lowest income was recorded in Portugal and Greece. In the EU-13 group, the highest income from farming is earned by farmers in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovakia, Malta and Cyprus. In Poland, which joined the EU in 2004, the nominal income from farming per 1 AWU was at a lower level, below the EU average, and ranged from EUR 2,432 per year in 2005 to EUR 5,767 in 2013 (the highest level) and EUR 4,883 in 2016. In that regard, the gap was the widest between Polish and Dutch farmers, whose income in the first year following the EU integration were 15 times higher than in Poland, and between Danish and Belgian farmers (11 times higher). Income from agriculture per 1 AWU in Poland was closest to income from agriculture in the poorest EU-15 countries, i.e. Greece and Portugal, but even in those countries such income was five or three times higher.18 At the beginning of the integration, the real income of Polish farmers (per 1 AWU) was also lower than in the countries which joined the EU together with Poland. In that case, the income disparities to Poland’s disadvantage were much smaller, and ranged from slightly over three times lower than in the Czech Republic to 17% lower than in Lithuania. The only countries with agricultural income lower than that in Poland were Latvia, Bulgaria and Romania.19 The participation in the CAP mechanisms significantly improved the relation of income from Polish agriculture per 1 AWU to the income in other EU member states, particularly in the EU-15 since the gap in agricultural incomes in the most developed countries of the EU-15 fell nearly two times in comparison with Poland. Polish farmers saw an improvement of their income situation in relation to farmers from the “new” member states only comparison with Estonia, Slovenia and Croatia; these disparities in comparison with other countries even became wider (Fig. 5.13).

17 The Annual Work Unit – AWU represents an equivalent of a full-time job. It is calculated by dividing the number of hours worked in a given year by the annual number of hours equal to a full-time job (1 FTE). In Poland, 2120 working hours were adopted as an equivalent of 1 FTE, i.e. 265 working days with 8 working hours per day. In calculating the input of labour expressed as AWU (according to the Eurostat methodology), the principle was used that 1 person cannot represent more than 1 AWU, even if in reality they work longer: https://geo.stat.gov.pl/psr-2010, accessed on: 12.02.2018. 18 Source: prepared on the basis of Eurostat data. 19 Malta and Cyprus are left out of the comparison due to the insignificant scale of agriculture in those countries. Compared to Poland, income from agriculture per 1 AWU was six times higher in Malta and five times higher in Cyprus.

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Cyprus Czech Republic Estonia Latvia Lithuania Malta Slovakia Slovenia Hungary Bulgaria Romania ƌŽĂƟĂ

UE-15 Belgium France Netherlands Luxembourg Germany Italy Denmark Ireland UK Greece Spain Portugal Sweden Finland UE-12

Poland

EU-28

Poland

Figure 5.13. Relation of nominal agricultural income per 1 AWU in the EU member states and agricultural income in Poland (%) Source: prepared on the basis of Eurostat data.

The disparities in agricultural income between Poland and other EU countries decreased due to such factors as direct payments and other transfers, reduced employment in agriculture, improved farm structure and economic strength of farms, and greater specialisation of production in farms. An analysis of changes in the relations between agricultural incomes in the EU member states indicates that the years in the wake of EU accession were for Poland a period of closing the gap to EU-15 countries. The year 2013 was the most favourable for Polish farmers: then, the real agricultural income compared to 2005 increased more than twofold compared to the average increase in the EU-28 by 39%, and by 24% in the EU-15. It fell in the subsequent years, but nevertheless the dynamics of growth compared to the first year after the accession was in Poland higher than the average for EU28 and EU-15. In 2016, income from agriculture in comparison to 2005 was higher: by 75% in Poland, by 33% in EU-28 and by 12% in EU-15. The years 2016 and 2017 brought anew an increase in the agricultural income in Poland. Convergence processes in the sphere of agricultural income could be observed in the relation of Poland and all EU-15 member states, although they were characterised by different level of disparities and pace of change.

Concluding remarks 130

In Poland, as in other countries, thanks to economic development more and more rural residents find employment outside agriculture, in sectors where


they earn a better income than in farming. As a result, agriculture is the source of livelihood for a constantly decreasing number of families (households). Similarly, the social security and welfare system provides subsistence for a large share of rural residents. It means that the socio-economic structure of rural households is changing, including households with farm operators. What is gaining in importance is contract work, non-farming activities and unearned sources of income. Poland’s EU accession and transfers of funds under the CAP mechanisms boosted the income dynamics of farmers’ households compared to other socio-economic household groups and incomes of rural residents in comparison with urban residents. The changes that took place following Poland’s joining the European Union were manifested by increased incomes of the farming, and rural population, which helped to narrow the income disparities. A process of convergence between the incomes farming and rural families in relation to non-agricultural and urban families could be observed. Nevertheless, the incomes of farmers’ households still remain lower than those of households deriving their income mostly from outside agriculture; similarly the incomes of rural residents are lower than those in towns and cities, especially largest ones. The conditions facilitating modernisation and restructuring of agriculture created by the EU accession led to an accelerated the process of liquidating unprofitable farms, reduced labour inputs in agriculture and withdrawal of farms from livestock raising. Some differences in how these changes took place can be observed, depending on the nature (type) of the municipality. In the EU, despite a high level of socio-economic development, the risk of poverty and/or social exclusion occurs on a large scale, with considerable differences observable across countries, regions and social groups. In 2016, such a risk affected 117.5 million people. The scale of poverty in the EU shows a slight downward trend. The social situation improved the most visibly in Poland, where the percentage of poor and/or socially excluded persons declined in rural areas from 50.6% to 28%. When it joined the European Union in 2004, Poland was a country where nominal farmers’ incomes were below the EU average. Gradually, the relation between the incomes of Polish and EU farmers, especially those from the EU-15 countries, improved. A convergence process of agricultural incomes in Poland in relation to such incomes in the remaining EU member states could be observed, although these disparities became even wider in relation to several of these countries. However, the income level of Polish farmers is still lower than that of most farmers in the remaining EU countries. Favourable effects of the EU accession also include improving the condition of rural infrastructure, which in effect led to a tangible improvement in the living

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conditions of rural residents and farmers and upgraded the status of both rural areas and the farmer’s occupation. Despite the visible progress, rural areas in Poland are still facing the challenge which is to close the income gap in relation to cities and to Western European countries. The challenge should be taken up in new circumstances. First and foremost, the demographics of rural population is changing dramatically. The share of elderly people is constantly increasing, which has consequences for the state’s old-age and healthcare policies, let alone the diminishing potential of labour in rural areas due to the falling number of children in average rural families and migration, which on the one hand will force agrarian changes, and on the other hand will hamper the development of farms (agricultural holdings) based mostly on contract work. In addition, it can be expected that the volume of transfers to agriculture and rural areas will fall, although it may not be as obvious owing to the growing appreciation in the society of the natural assets and eco-system services. There is a pressing need not only to make air and water cleaner, but also to give more care to the soils and halt the regression of biological diversity. In that regard, a lot depends on the national policies and the European Union in corpore.

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Iwona Nurzyńska

Chapter 6. Poland as a beneficiary of the Common Agricultural Policy Introduction An analysis of the evolution of the European Union’s Common Agricul tural Policy (CAP) suggests that its directions were underpinned by sub sequent enlargement rounds, debates on the Community budget for the en suing programming periods and, in the last decade, the rapidly changing international situation. The historically biggest EU enlargement of 2004 was preceded by a reform of EU policies, which was, among others, a response to the proposal to accept a group of countries at a much lower level of socio-economic development, which were particularly backward with regard to modernisation of socio-economic structures in rural areas and agriculture. In the process of transition and development of Polish agriculture, the year 2004 was a historical milestone that marked the beginning of long-term and ever-increasing financial support provided on an unprecedented scale in 100 years of Poland’s history. By joining the EU, Poland became a fullyfledged beneficiary of CAP and obtained access to funds earmarked for modernisation of agriculture, improvement of the living standards and reshaping the structure of the rural economy. While analysing benefits derived from Poland’s EU membership, essential aspects whose significance is not as obvious as the value of the funds allocated in the course of budgetary negotiations, such as access to the Single European Market, tend to be underestimated. The chapter discusses the broader dimension of Poland’s EU membership, focusing in depth on some selected issues (also those that still wait to be resolved) and aspects of changes that took place in rural areas and CAP was established in the Treaty of Rome (1957), which laid down its objectives that remain unchanged until today (to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum utilisation of the factors of production in particular labour; ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture; stabilise markets; assure the availability of supplies; ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices). For more information on the determinants of the CAP reform see the research report: I. Nurzyńska, M. Drygas, L. Goraj, System dopłat bezpośrednich Wspólnej Polityki Rolnej Unii Europejskiej. Rola, znaczenie i ewolucja, EFRWP, Warsaw 2017.

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6. Poland as a beneficiary...

in the agricultural sector during the past 14 years of EU membership and the role of CAP in those processes. Special attention is devoted to income support, creation of jobs in rural areas, farm succession and support to small farms. The analysis was carried out against the backdrop of other EU member states, based on Eurostat data.

6.1. Participation in the Single European Market – an unappreciated benefit In public debate, Poland’ EU membership is often brought down to the value of financial transfers for Poland from the EU budget. This seems to be an oversimplified description of Poles’ attitudes to the EU, hence it would be worthwhile to take note of another major dimension of the process of socioeconomic integration. EU funds provide major stimuli for investment projects in areas for which in many cases national budgets lack the funds. In this lies the main difference between national budgets and the Community budget. The latter is a typical investment budget focused on strategic goals agreed at the Community level which generate multiplier effects and synergies in the economies of the member states (Community added value). What is more, EU funds invested in a given member state generate indirect profits both in the remaining countries and at the level of the whole EU as an economic grouping. As the authors of a report led by Professor Jerzy Wilkin on European integration and Poland’s role in the process point out: “EU membership was not only a token of appreciation for the effectiveness of the post-socialist systemic transition started in 1989, but also opened up unique development opportunities in all areas of operation of the state, society, culture and the economy.” The key sphere in which such development occurred was the integration of the Polish economy with the Single European Market (SEM). Participation in SEM ensures a treaty-secured free flow of people, goods, services and

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The problem of succession in agriculture was already tackled by Professor Leszek Klank in his 2006 publication entitled: Sukcesja gospodarstw rolnych w Polsce (IRWIR PAN). For more information see: Korzyści i koszty członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej, Centrum Europejskie Natolin, Warsaw 2003. For example, investment in preventing climate change; investment in human capital as a key driver of growth, the effect of which can only be seen in the long term, and which lose in the competition with current expenditure or expenditure that quickly produces results (so-called hard investment). Raport środowiska naukowego PAN dotyczący integracji europejskiej i miejsca Polski w tym proce sie, J. Wilkin (ed.), Polish Academy of Sciences, Division I: Humanities and Social Sciences, Warsaw 2017.


capital, and any violation in that regard, even if committed by the major political and economic powers, is under the scrutiny of specialised EU institutions. SEM means stabilisation and harmonisation of laws for all of its participants, and pursuing a common trade policy enables EU bodies to negotiate the terms of exchange on behalf of all the members, giving them a better bargaining position than if such terms were to be negotiated by individual countries. One of the major effects of SEM has been the relocation of production processes in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI). Poland found itself in the group of those EU-12 countries which definitely benefited from the relocation of industrial production from EU-15 countries post 2004. In the years 2004–2016 Poland was the leader in terms of the value of inward capital invested in the Visegrad Group countries. By the end of 2016, Poland had attracted a total of over PLN 778 billion of foreign direct investment, a threefold rise in comparison to 2004.10 Another “conveyor belt” for profits offered by SEM is trade exchange (trade creation and trade diversion effects). Thanks to the removal of the barriers to trade between countries and preferences for EU producers and manufacturers the Polish agri-food sector has not only seen increasing exports but also has had a positive balance of foreign trade practically since the EU accession onwards. According to the analyses of the National Support Centre for Agriculture (KOWR), over 80% of Poland’s agri-food exports is sold on the markets of EU countries. Compared to ten months of 2016, the value of exports increased by 13% up to EUR 22.7 billion. This means that Poland’s exports to the EU have continually increased since the EU accession. A positive balance of foreign trade in agri-food products totalled EUR 7.1 billion, i.e. was by 21% higher than in the same period of 2016. The share of agri-food products in the aggregate value of Polish exports was 13%, just as in the same period of the previous year.11 It should be noted that, in the case of the market, the process of integration still encounters some obstacles (e.g. transport services). Although, as Andrzej Karpiński remarks in his book Przemiany strukturalne w procesie transformacji Polski 1989-2003-2025 issued in 2008 by the SGH Warsaw School of Economics in Warsaw, after 1989 adverse deindustrialisation processes could be observed in Poland, as a result of which employment in industry dropped by 20% to 30% depending on the sector. High-tech sectors were also affected as they were not able to compete with Western countries once the market was fully opened. The restructuring process did not stimulate the creation of new plants offering jobs. People who were made redundant would go back to rural areas in a situation when Polish agriculture employed over 20% of the workforce. In that sense, the structural transformation in Poland in that period differed from the trends in Europe and provided a strong stimulus for deactivation of the pool of labour, a process which was manifested in agriculture in the form of hidden unemployment. The Visegrad Group includes Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. 10 Zagraniczne inwestycje bezpośrednie w Polsce i polskie inwestycje bezpośrednie za granicą w 2016 roku, National Bank of Poland, Warsaw 2017, p. 66. 11 Polski handel zagraniczny towarami rolno-spożywczymi w okresie styczeń–październik 2017, KOWR, Warsaw 2018, p. 2.

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Some of EU member states better embrace the opportunities offered by SEM than others. According to the calculations of the European Commission based on the analyses of German researchers,12 the greatest beneficiaries of SEM include the countries with the strongest economies, and a robust export and investment potential such as Germany, United Kingdom, France, Netherlands and Italy, but also Poland and Spain (Fig. 6.1).13 Germany is the unquestionable leader in that ranking, with annual gains estimated at EUR 120 billion. The United Kingdom was ranked second, with gains half as those of Germany.14 It should be noted that Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom are the countries whose share in the FDI in Poland is the highest. 140 120 100 80 60 40

Malta

Cyprus

Lithuania

Latvia

Estonia

ƌŽĂƟĂ

Bulgaria

Greece

Slovenia

Slovakia

Portugal

Finland

Romania

Hungary

Luxembourg

Denmark

Ireland

Czech Republic

Austria

Sweden

Spain

Poland

Italy

Belgium

UK

Netherlands

France

0

Germany

20

Figure 6.1. Benefits of participation in SEM by country in EU-28 in billion EUR (simulation) Source: prepared by the author based on: A New, Modern Multiannual Financial Framework for a European Union, COM(2018) 98 final, Brussels 14.02.2018, p. 4.

At the same time, the simulations confirmed that in the so-called net payer countries, about one-fourth of additional economic growth can be attributed to indirect benefits produced by extra trade streams from the sale of goods and services generated in the so-called Cohesion countries. The Cohesion funds, with injections from the EU budget, generate additional economic growth

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12 G. Felbermayr, J. Gröschl, I. Heiland, Undoing Europe In a New Quantitative Trade Model, IFO Working Paper No. 250, 2018. The results of analyses and model-based simulations demonstrated a stronger dependency of the “new” EU-13 countries from trade exchange within the internal market than in the case of the “old” EU-15. Using the data panel for 2010–2014, the researchers tested various scenarios, including the consequences of abolishing SEM. 13 A New, Modern Multiannual Financial Framework for a European Union, COM(2018) 98 final, Brussels 14.02.2018, p. 4 14 Ibid.


in the net payer countries.15 In effect, a sizeable portion of the national contribution returns to the net payer country via proceeds from the sale of services and investment goods “imported” by such countries as Poland (investment “import” in the Cohesion countries induced by EU funds). The simulations run using economic models have been positively verified by the Brexit realities. According to the analyses published by the Financial Times, the decision on leaving the EU alone (before the actual Brexit) led in 2017 to about a 1% drop of Britain’s GDP, in what was a period of economic prosperity throughout Europe.

6.2. Financial transfers from the EU budget to Poland in 2004–2017

UK Germany

Italy

France

Sweden

Netherlands

Austria

Belgium

Finland

Denmark

Luxembourg

Malta

Cyprus

Ireland

ƌŽĂƟĂ

Estonia

Slovenia

Latvia

Lithuania

Bulgaria

Portugal

Spain

Slovakia

Czech Republic

Greece

Hungary

Poland

Romania

In financial terms (i.e. looking only at transfers between the national and the Community budgets) Poland is a net beneficiary of such settlements. Their average annual balance for the years 2014–2016 totalled over EUR 10 billion, making Poland the number one net beneficiary of all the EU countries (Fig. 6.2).

Figure 6.2. Balance of member states’ settlements with the EU budget in 2014–2016 Source: A new, modern Multiannual Financial Framework for a European Union, COM(2018) 98 final, Brussels 14.02.2018.

Notably, Romania is the second largest net beneficiary, although in its case the net balance is half the amount of Poland’s. At the other extreme is Germany, the largest contributor to the EU budget, with a negative average annual balance for the years 2014–2016 amounting to EUR 13.6 billion. Other significant net payers include the United Kingdom and France, with the negative balance of settlements in excess of EUR 7 billion each. 15 G. Chris, The real price of Brexit begins to emerge, Financial Times, 18.12.2017; https://www.ft. com/content/e3b29230-db5f-11e7-a039-c64b1c09b482.

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Given the above, the anticipated Brexit is bound to palpably reduce the EU budget, according to some estimates by as much as EUR 9–11 billion per year. If no decision is made on increasing the share of the EU budget in the EU’s GDP up to 1.2% or even 1.3%, this will inevitably mean cuts in the EU expenditure, agricultural policy included (according to various estimates, from 30% to 5% in real terms). In the opinion of Günther Oettinger, European Commissioner for Budget and Human Resources, the depletion caused by Brexit will have to be compensated partly from savings (cuts in expenditure) and partly from increased national contributions.16 3.82% 3.82%

0.25% 1.04% 1.04% 0.25% Direct payments Direct payments (EUR 27,988 million) (EUR 27,988 million)

36.70% 36.70%

RDPRDP (EUR 17,350 million) (EUR 17,350 million) Market instruments Market instruments (EUR 1,807 million) (EUR 1,807 million) Other CAPCAP transfers Other transfers (EUR 117 million) (EUR 117 million) 59.23% 59.23%

SAPARD SAPARD (EUR 492492 million) (EUR million)

Figure 6.3. Transfers from the EU budget under CAP in 2004–2017, in million EUR Source: prepared by the author based on the Ministry of Finance data.

In the years 2004–2017, as part of EU co-financed programmes, Poland received over EUR 147 billion from the EU budget, of which nearly one-third were funds transferred under CAP (EUR 47 billion) for projects implemented in the agri-food sector and in rural areas.17 An analysis of the structure of CAP transfers confirms that, in the period in question, agricultural producers received nearly EUR 28 billion as direct payments from the EU budget (Fig. 6.3), which makes this particular socio-economic group the largest group of direct beneficiaries of EU membership.18 Under the 13 fully completed direct payments campaigns, the Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture (ARiMR), as the paying agency, paid out over PLN 143 billion of public funds to agricultural producers (including national funds in the form of complementary national direct payments in the initial

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16 Poland is in a group of countries supporting the increasing of national contributions to the EU budget. 17 As reimbursement of some of the costs of completed projects co-financed from the EU funds and transfers for CAP instruments 100% funded by the EU. 18 Every year, over 1.3 million agricultural producers submit applications for direct payments.


years of membership). In the 2016 campaign, the national envelope (that is the maximum amount allocated annually to all beneficiaries of the direct support system) totalled PLN 14 billion.19 An analysis of the transfer structure indicates changes in the relations of funds received by Poland under Pillars I and II of CAP. While in the initial years of Poland’s membership these proportions remained at a 50:50 level, in the 2014–2020 perspective they changed to 60:40 in favour of Pillar I (direct payments). This is the outcome of the decision that Poland took as part of the freedom awarded to the member states to transfer some of the funds between the two pillars. Poland found itself in a small group of five new member states which resolved to shift the funds from Pillar II (rural areas development) to Pillar I. 8000 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0

from PI to PII (FR, LV, UK, BE, CZ, DK, DE, EE, EL, NL, RO, BG, IE,ES, IT, CY, PT, SE)

from PII to PI (PL, HR, HU, SK, MT)

Net transfer of funds from PI to PII

Figure 6.4. Transfer of funds between CAP Pillars by EU member states in 2014-2020 (in million EUR) Source: based on the EC data.

Poland was the only country to move the maximum permitted share of 25% of the aggregate value of funds allocated to the development of rural areas to Pillar I (direct support system). The vast majority of countries moved their funds from Pillar I to Pillar II.

6.3. The Common Agricultural Policy and jobs Job creation is not a treaty-enshrined objective of the Common Agricultural Policy. However, due to direct payments which became a significant source of income for farmers’ households, CAP has a bearing on maintaining jobs in agriculture, particularly in the years of economic crises. EU agriculture is 19 Annual Report of the Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture for 2016, ARiMR, Warsaw 2017, p. 26.

139


mostly based on family farms (97%) relying on their own (family) labour even if it does not guarantee full employment.20 The bulk of them (two-thirds) are small farms up to 5 ha and the Standard Output value up to EUR 4,000. As a result, many of them derive income from various sources outside agriculture, but there are no relevant detailed statistics. During the past ten years, employment in agriculture has fallen considerably (Fig. 6.4), although the scale of changes is definitely larger in the socalled new member states (EU-13) than in the “old” member states (EU-15).21 This is an effect of delayed structural changes occurring in the economies of the EU-13. It should be noted, however, that the group of new member states (EU-13) is strongly internally diversified. While agricultural holdings in Poland rely en masse on their own (family) labour, agriculture in some of EU-13 countries is based on hired labour. This is a consequence of a different development path of the agricultural sector in such countries as Estonia, Slovakia or the Czech Republic, where hired labour currently represents the bulk of employment in the agricultural sector and accounts, respectively, for 59.1%. 72.4% and 74.2%.22 In addition, the Czech Republic has the highest average farm area of the whole EU-28, at 133 ha compared to 16 ha of the EU average. According to the Farm Structures Survey 2013, a study which examined the agricultural structures in the EU, agriculture is the source of full employment expressed in AWU23 for over 9 million people. The same survey indicates that Poland has the greatest pool of workforce in agriculture expressed in AWU – over 1.5 million people, i.e. 17% of the total workforce. CAP, by supporting incomes of family farms, even the smallest ones, protects jobs in agriculture, and in the periods of economic crises agriculture becomes the buffer alleviating adverse effects of economic slowdown expressed in the form of the unemployment rate. Taking into account the volume of agricultural output generated by Polish agriculture, “superfluous” employment in family farms results in low productivity of production factors. The last two decades brought far-reaching changes in the socio-economic structure of rural population in Poland. Many studies24 indicate that currently

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20 Thinking CAP. Supporting Agricultural Jobs and Income in the EU, World Bank, Washington D.C. 2017, p. 18. 21 When analysing Eurostat data, one should take into account methodological changes in data presentation. For example, in 2010 the definition of an agricultural holding was changed in several new member states, which in effect led to reducing the number of farms in those countries. 22 Farm Structure Survey 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Farm_ structure_survey_2013_-_main_results#Agricultural_labour_force. 23 AWU – Agricultural Working Unit. 24 Cf. M. Halamska, Struktura społeczna ludności wiejskiej na początku XXI wieku, in: Studia nad strukturą społeczną wiejskiej Polski, IRWIR PAN, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 2016, Vol. 1, pp. 11-96, and I. Frenkel, Population of rural areas, in: I. Wilkin, I. Nurzyńska (eds.), Rural Poland 2016: The report on the state of rural areas, FDPA, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 2016, pp. 17-51.


75% of rural residents declare they have no links with farms. That group earns their income from outside agriculture, mainly as hired labour. In parallel, some of those employed in agriculture work on a part-time basis, which is a form of hidden unemployment. For this reason, the key challenge for the country’s economic development policy is to open up opportunities for creating non-agricultural jobs in rural areas. Both prior to and after Poland’s EU accession measures aimed to create non-agricultural jobs and diversify sources of income, also outside, agriculture, formed an integral part of subsequent rural development programmes financed under CAP (Tab. 6.1). Table 6.1. Public support to measures aimed to create new jobs and new sources of income in rural areas in 2002-2020 Supported measures

Programme SAPARD (2000–2006) SOP Agriculture 2004-2006 RDP 2007–2013

diversification of economic activity new sources of income on farms diversification of economic activity outside agriculture micro-businesses

Completed projects

Share in disbursed amounts (%)

4071

6.75

4015

6.00

15718

1.85

14650

3.53

Source: prepared by the author.

In the Rural Development Programme for 2014–2020, sustainable territo rial development of rural areas, including creation of jobs in rural areas, was named as one of the complementary goals for the main goal, which is to improve the competitiveness of agriculture. The data provided in Tab. 6.1 confirm that the allocation of funds to stimulate enterprise outside agriculture in rural development programmes was reduced. The period 2004–2015 (2013+2 years) saw the completion of over 40,000 projects intended to create non-agricultural jobs in rural areas. Some of them indirectly ge nerated additional jobs. By way of “compensation”, it was planned that, in 2014, in 16 regional operational programmes (ROP), approximately EUR 5.2 billion would be earmarked for development of rural areas. Such an amount was budgeted in the so-called Partnership Agreement, to be spent on financial supports on measures promoting rural development. At the present stage, however, it is difficult to conclude to what extent these activities will directly help create non-agricultural jobs in rural areas.

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6.4. CAP support to farmers’ incomes The direct payment system is a major non-market instrument of support to agricultural incomes and a mechanism alleviating volatility on markets for agricultural products or means of production. It is an important element of coping with climate change (the widespread greening requirements under Pillar I imposed on farmers receiving direct payments and comprising the majority of agricultural land in the EU). It is also an instrument aimed to ensure continuity of agricultural production in Europe, preventing European farmland from being abandoned. On average, direct payments in the EU-28 countries account for 50% of agricultural income. The absence of that instrument without a fundamental change in the relation of market prices of means of production and agricultural products would drastically worsen the income situation of farmers also in comparison to other sectors of the economy. In consequence of the subsequent CAP reforms,25 direct payments were separated from agricultural production (decoupled payments) and are allocated to the acreage of agricultural land eligible for such payments irrespective of the nature of production. This implies a strong interdependence between the value of allocated direct payments and the size of the agricultural land used by agricultural producers. In the EU-28, the direct payment system covers over 155 million ha of agricultural land eligible for such payments. In 2016, the EU spent over EUR 41 billion26 under the direct payment system, providing support to more than 6.7 million agricultural producers. However, more than half of the beneficiaries received not more than EUR 1,250. Altogether, that category of farmers absorbed nearly 4.5% of the annual EU envelope earmarked for direct payments for all the countries.27 A large number of small farms means high costs of processing direct payment applications for the agricultural administrations of the member states as well as the need to inspect whether the compulsory requirements are complied with. The CAP reform of 2013 introduced a new instrument for small farmers as part of the direct support system (Small Farmer Scheme). In

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25 Following the Luxembourg reform of 2003, a single payment to an agricultural holding or a single regional payment in the Single Payment Scheme were introduced, calculated on the basis of direct payments for the years 2000–2003. The majority of the new member states, including Poland, implemented SAPS (Single Area Payment Scheme), a system which introduced a single flat-rate payment allocated to every hectare of agricultural land eligible for such payments. Such a direction of the system’s reform was intended to make a shift whereby the producer would be supported instead of the product. 26 In 2016, EU countries processed the payments under the 2015 campaign. 27 https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/statistics/facts-figures/direct-payments.pdf.


2015, the SFS system was implemented by 15 countries, including Poland (Fig. 6.5), and comprised a total 2.9 million farmers (who accounted for 42% of all beneficiaries). It refers to a group of small holdings where the average size of agricultural area is only 2.2 ha. The total size of agricultural area used by that group of farms covers 7% of agricultural land declared for EU direct payments.28 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

EU13

EU15

EU28 2000

Brazil

China

USA

2015

Figure 6.5. Changes in employment in agriculture in the EU and selected countries in 2000-2015 (% of total employment) Source: Thinking CAP: Supporting Agricultural Jobs and Income in the EU, World Bank, Washington D.C. 2017, p. 18..

The group of countries with the highest share of SFS beneficiaries in 2015 included: Malta (90.4%), Romania (80.7%), Poland (55.6%), Italy (53.2%), Portugal (48.6%), Greece (47.5%) and Spain (43.6%). In Poland nearly 712,000 farmers joined the SFS system in 2015 (55% of all beneficiaries), some of whom were automatically incorporated into the system.29 In 2016, farmers were not able to join the system and could only opt out (in 2016, such a decision was made by over 10,000 farmers).30 The group in question used less than 10% agricultural land comprised by direct payments in Poland. Ibid. The simplified system of payments for small holdings – the support amount as part of the system is EUR 1,250 per farm maximum. Farmers who participated in the system of payments for small holdings are exempted from standards and cross-compliance inspections, and from the obligation to carry out greening practices. In 2015, farmers whose total sum of direct payments did not exceed the PLN equivalent of EUR 1,250 per farm were “automatically” incorporated into the system. Also farmers whose direct payments totalled over the PLN equivalent of EUR 1,250 and who met the prescribed conditions could join the system. 30 Annual report of the Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture for 2016, ARiMR, Warsaw 2017, p. 24. 28 29

143


As a rule, a small size of the farm means a low economic size expressed as the Standard Output, which is the basic category used in the FADN (Farm Accountancy Data Network). The data from the Polish FADN indicate that there are approx. 730,000 agricultural holdings in Poland with the Standard Output value of at least EUR 4,000.31 It means that, of 1.3 million of direct payments beneficiaries, nearly 600,000 farmers de facto do not produce for the market but remain agricultural policy subjects receiving direct payments every year, which in that particular case serve as a form of social support. Over 570,000 farms covered by the field of observation of the Polish FADN32 do not earn income parity from farming, i.e. the average net income in the national economy. In 2015, agricultural holdings whose economic size exceeded EUR 25,000 in the Standard Output (SO) value formed a group of entities earning at least the parity income, which included approx. 150,000 agricultural holdings. The average size of the farm in the category of small and medium-sized farms (SO in the range of EUR 25,000–50,000) was 23.9 ha, i.e. nearly three times more than the average farm size in Poland. In very large farms (SO > EUR 500,000), the average farm area was 610 ha (Fig. 6.7). 100

90.4

90

80.7

80

71.2

70

55.6

60 40

25.5

30

20 15.7 10 0

53.2

47.2

50

1.4 BG

29.1 20.8

11.8 1.2 EE

2.3 LV

48.6

43.6

2.2 HU

9.6

20.1 13.2

10 RO

DE

11.6

3

0.5 PL

23.8

EL

^ŚĂƌĞŝŶƚŽƚĂůŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĂƉƉůŝĐĂƟŽŶƐ;йͿ

HR

5.2

4.6 IT

ES

MT

AT

6.4 PT

3.2 0.9 SI

^ŚĂƌĞŽĨĂƌĞĂƵŶĚĞƌ^&^;йͿ

Figure 6.6. SFS and direct payments in the 2015 campaign Source: EC data. https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/statistics/facts-figures/direct-payments. pdf

144

31 The sum of EUR 4,000 is the minimal Standard Output value that a farm must achieve to be eligible for the Polish FADN. 32 The field of observation of the Polish FADN covers ca. 730,000 of agricultural holdings, which, in accordance with the methodological assumptions, comprise at least 90% of the Standard Output (SO) of all farms in Poland.


700 600

610.48

775 741

900 000 800 000 700 000

500

600 000

400

500 000

300

400 000

ha 273 992

307 443

200 100 0

300 000 95 332

2.78

6.37

11.95

€ 3000 ha

700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0

EU

Brasil

Chile

USA

Canada

ƌŐĞŶƟŶĂ

Australia

Figure 6.8. Average farm size in selected countries and in EU-27 Source: prepared by the author based on EC presentation: Structures and dynamics of EU farms 2005-2010, ECON13(9738).

In 2013, the farm area did not exceed 5 ha in more than 66% of agri cultural holdings in the EU (EU-28).34 In 2013, according to the Farm Structure Survey, the average area of an EU farm was 16 ha. In the case of the Farm Structure Survey, one should take into account potential methodological changes, which on a one-time basis could lead to substantial structural changes (e.g. in 2010 countries such as Poland 33 34

145


50

45.0

40 30 21.3

20

11.8

10 0

Wd d ,h &> ' / ,Z ^ >d ^< >s < ^/ E> z >h Dd

Figure 6.14. RDP allocations in 2014–2020, in million EUR, by country Source: EC presentation, Rural Development Programmes 2014-2020.

In consequence, such countries as France, Germany and Italy overtook Poland in terms of the value of EAFRD funds earmarked for supporting the development of rural areas. It should be borne in mind that the governments in those countries decided to transfer the CAP funds from Pillar I to Pillar II, thus promoting rural development. As Pillar II of CAP, rural development policy was financed in the EU as part of three financial perspectives, even though some structural measures (the so-called accompanying instruments) were introduced much earlier. It is generally accepted that also other EU funds foster the development of rural areas. The relevant analyses indicate, however, that their contribution has been decreasing for many years now. In the first financial perspective, after Pillar II of CAP was introduced in the years 2000–2006, almost 20% funds were earmarked for the development of rural areas (Tab. 6.4). The analyses made by the European Committee of the Regions suggest that the share of the remaining structural funds, notably the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), plays a major role in supporting rural development, surpassed only by the Agricultural Funds. 152


Table 6.4. Contribution (in %) of Structural Funds (disbursed payments) to rural development in the EU in individual programming periods43 MFF 2014–2020 2007–2013 2000–2006 1994–1999

EAFRD /EAGGF 15.9 18.5 19.9 19.4

EFRD 3.6 10.8 0.4 2.2

ESF 1.0 0.6 * 0.6

SF 0.7 2.7 0.0 0.0

Total 21.3 32.6 20.3 22.1

Source: The need for a White Paper on Rurality from local and regional perspective: For a European rural agenda post 2020, European Committee of the Regions, Brussels 2017.

The period 2007–2013 was the most favourable in that regard, with over 14% of the Cohesion Funds (EFRD, SF, ESF) being allocated as support to rural areas. It is estimated that in 2014–2020 this share will reach a mere 5.4%. A decrease in disbursed payments to support rural deve lopment can be observed within EAFRD itself, a process that should be regarded as unfavourable. The results of EU-wide social consultations concerning the future shape of CAP44 confirmed that its main task is to guarantee a level-playing field for competition within the European market on the one hand, and on the other to ensure food security and protect natural resources in farming. They also confirmed the need to continue important social goals aimed to ensure socioeconomic cohesion of rural areas in Europe, which in itself warrants that the financing of the joint rural development policies as part of CAP will remain in place. Both protecting agricultural income and improving the living standards of farmers’ families is expected to be among the main objectives of the new CAP after 2020. This particularly applies to supporting the incomes of farmers working land with outstanding natural values and of young farmers. As part of EU’s financial solidarity, it is pointed out that reduced payments for large producers (capping, degressivity) should be maintained, so as the support to smaller agricultural holdings that will fulfil the requirement to pursue practices which are particularly beneficial for the natural environment.

Concluding remarks The EU has opened a debate on the future shape of CAP following the proposals submitted by the European Commission. Budget negotiations for the years 2020+ have also begun and are expected to bring important solutions 43 It should be borne in mind that the presentation in question is based on the values of funds approved for disbursement (payments), which as a rule are lower than commitments in the multiannual financial frameworks of individual financial periods. 44 Modernising and Simplifying the Common Agricultural Policy, EC, Brussels 2017. https://ec.europa. eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/consultations/cap-modernising/highlights-public-consul_en.pdf.

153


regarding CAP financing. It cannot escape attention that CAP has since its very beginning attempted to reconcile objectives which are in a sense selfcontradictory: the need to effectively employ the factors of production and the need to ensure a sufficient income for farmers. This often leads to disbursing support which not always fulfils the criterion of economic effectiveness to entities which can successfully operate on the market even without receiving such assistance. Therefore, in the face of such problems, the EU is undertaking efforts aimed to introduce adequate solutions and measures. Unquestionably, the direst challenge facing rural policy is the issue of support to small and tiny farms, which represent the majority of farms in the EU-28 (two-thirds of all agricultural holdings). This issue affects Poland but, as the chapter points out, it is also experienced by many other countries, including some from the EU-15. And, even though the acreage of agricultural land in their use is rela tively insignificant, these holdings perform a socially significant function of guaranteeing viability and durability of rural Europe. They also provide jobs for many rural residents. At the same time, the EU must guarantee its own food security and pursue policies that support competitive agricultural holdings which are market-oriented and secure continuity of agricultural production and succession of farms. Currently, there is no alternative for CAP with its EU-wide dimension and joint budget. Nevertheless, efforts should be made to ensure that financial support under CAP is well-addressed and aimed to produce notable effects in terms of sustainable economic, social and environmental development.

154


Jerzy Bartkowski*

Chapter 7. The political map of Poland’s rural areas Introduction The chapter presents the political awareness of rural residents and farmers. Farmers and the rural population strongly support the government of Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – PiS). Similarly, presidential candidates running on that party’s ticket invariably win greater support in this particular portion of the electorate than in other social groups. Such solid support for PiS is not a new phenomenon, but rather a continuation and consequence of the earlier attitudes. PiS became the strongest party in rural areas and among farmers post the 2001 election. Such strong support was also visible in both rounds of the presidential election (10 May and 24 May 2015) and in the parliamentary election (25 October 2015). In the latter, the higher turnout of rural voters, including farmers, was a major factor that helped to tip the scales of power in Poland. In addition to the rural mobilisation, also a fundamental shift of the general public and failure to win any seats in the Sejm by a major political party also played an important part, while the unexpected victory of Andrzej Duda in the presidential election acted as an initial driver in that regard. His election was unexpected in the sense that neither the earlier popularity of the candidate nor the public opinion soundings suggested such an outcome. In a stable political situation, the incumbent president as a rule has no problems with being re-elected. Duda’s election revealed the prevalent sentiment in the electorate and encouraged the proponents of that political option to take part in the subsequent elections. The assumption of the two main state functions by the president and prime minister backed by PiS was warmly welcomed in rural areas. The opinion polls carried out by CBOS showed a surge in the support for the persons holding the prime minister’s and the president’s offices compared to their predecessors, in addition to improved popularity ratings for the government, higher approval ratings for major political institutions and an improve* Dr hab. Jerzy Bartkowski, Professor, Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw

155

7. The political map...

156

ment of the general sentiment among the public. In some cases, the perception of some institutions was fundamentally altered. Such a solid support for PiS has continued to date. Likewise, the forming of a new PiS cabinet was welcomed with better government ratings and an upward swing in the public mood. Such a response is not accidental, but associated with current factors such as policies, measures and their economic effects; it also has wider roots in the kind of social and political culture espoused by rural residents and farmers. It is also a manifestation of a marked trend in the electorate which can be viewed as a backlash against the earlier policies and which was much stronger in that particular group. These attitudes cannot be reduced to the question of a purely political support or reaction to new economic programmes. By a similar token, they are neither straightforward nor unambiguous – hence the scope of issues tackled by this chapter. In addition to support expressed for the main political actors, the perception of the institutional world and public sentiment is also analysed. The chapter discusses the approval rates for individual components of the PiS political platform and government activities in the past two years. Such attitudes should be set in the context of approaches to the constitutional principles and a broader framework of Polish politics and outlook on the European Union. This shows not only the extent of support or the consequences of shifting generalised support to new situations, but also the limits of such support. This issue is discussed on the basis of CBOS opinion surveys, wellplaced to tackle such questions. The polls measure the public opinion on the country’s major current issues and use a fixed set of indicators to assess the current situation, attitudes to the government, politicians’ popularity and voter preferences. Additionally, they regularly ask questions on the ratings of major institutions and attitudes to major constitutional issues concerning Poland, approval for the political system and role of Poland in Europe and globally. The polls offer good analytical material since social attitudes should be viewed in a context. The current attitudes should be discussed against the backdrop of other opinions and earlier views. In sociology, it is the differences in the opinions between the analysed group and the overall pool of respondents that often provide accurate information about public sentiment. Secondly, they offer analyses of opinion trends and comparisons with the earlier views, and show how significant the changes are. However, in the public view the random factor frequently occurs in the form of unexpected fluctuations. Views are not only susceptible to political developments but are also subject to momentary fluctuations. Showing the opinion dynamics requires an adequate selection of time points. To the extent possible, we tried to use the following criteria in selecting


the dates of the polls considered in the study. The point of reference was the most current result, i.e. one closest in time to the date of the publication; then, we used the data from the mid-point of the current term and the last measure for the previous period, taken before the election campaign began. In the case of political developments such as change of the prime minister, only a stable result of surveys conducted after the period of initial hopes and courteously positive views is valuable, when the amount of data is sufficient yet again to form an opinion. The presented data are broken into opinions of the general public (all respondents), residents of rural areas and farmers. In consequence of the changes taking place in rural areas, they are no longer places of work and places of residence. Nevertheless, agriculture still remains a key activity for such areas, and hence the significance of opinions in that particular social group.

7.1. Perception of the government and the president CBOS uses a wide-ranging set of questions to show the stance of the public towards the government. The set includes questions about general opinions indicating the number of the government’s proponents and opponents as well as questions about the opinion on its activities since its formation, the accompanying hopes and, last but not least, satisfaction with the person of the prime minister. The questions asked encompass both the opinion on the achievements so far and prospects for the future; they concern the government as such and its key member – the prime minister. The latter matters in the sense that a mere evaluation of the government’s achievements or the opinions about prospects for the future do not necessarily have to imply approval for a specific person. In the case of the prime minister and the government, not only the overall assessment but also individual questions looking at specific dimensions and aspects help to capture the issue in its complexity. At the same time, these attitudes form a consistent whole, along with how the situation in the country at large is perceived. Only when the situation in the country at large is shown, the evaluation of the government as expressed in the opinion polls can be more sophisticated. The need for such a more complex, multidimensional and nuanced approach to evaluating the modus operandi of the present government arises from the complexity of the evaluated issue and the wealth of possible attitudes. 157


Table 7.1. Attitude to the government (in %) in 2015-2018 Proponents Opponents Neutral Hard to say Rural residents Proponents Opponents Neutral Hard to say Farmers Proponents Opponents Neutral Hard to say

IV.2015 31 32 32 6

II.2016 35 32 27 6

II.2017 37 33 26 4

X.2017 44 27 26 2

XII.2017* 39 30 29 2

I.2018 42 14 33 11

II.2018 40 17 34 9

28 32 35 5

38 24 32 7

46 22 29 3

49 19 29 3

51 17 30 2

46 8 35 11

40 11 40 10

29 37 34 0

54 12 28 5

51 13 34 2

65 9 22 3

48 14 34 4

61 10 29 0

55 6 30 8

* last rating of Beata Szydło’s cabinet. Source: CBOS.

Let us begin with a summative evaluation (Tab. 7.1). Towards the end of its term, the cabinet led by Ewa Kopacz had low ratings, with insignificant differences being visible between the proponents, opponents and neutral respondents. Negative ratings distinctly prevailed among rural residents and farmers. The coming to power of PiS in 2015 brought an increase in positive ratings of the government. The ratings improved even further during the government’s term of office as the number of its opponents and undecided persons decreased. The consecutive change of the person of the prime minister brought a rise both in positive ratings and in the number of persons without an opinion. The latter should not be found surprising at the beginning of the new prime minister’s term of office. The ratings of farmers and rural residents tend to change similarly to those in the overall pool of respondents, except that the support for the government is stronger among them, and the share of respondents defining themselves as its opponents was very low. The farmers’ group is characterised by the most positive ratings for the government and the most positive attitudes towards it. The evaluation of the government’s activities fluctuates over time, just as the respondents’ attitude towards the government. By a similar token, its ratings are also socially diversified (Tab. 7.2). In that regard, the opinions about the effects of the government’s activities changed from negative to positive after the new cabinet came to power. 158

Question: How would you describe your attitude to the government …..? Are you its: 1. strong proponent, 2. moderate proponent, 3. moderate opponent, 4. strong opponent, 5. or do you have a neutral attitude to the government ……….?


Table 7.2. Evaluation of government activity since its formation (in %) Good Poor Hard to say Rural residents Good Poor Hard to say Farmers Good Poor Hard to say

IV.2015 36 42 22

II.2016 41 39 20

II.2017 49 37 14

X.2017 58 31 11

XII.2017 54 35 10

II.2018 49 16 35

34 42 24

45 32 23

62 26 13

68 22 10

68 21 11

50 12 38

29 49 23

62 25 13

76 18 8

81 11 8

66 18 17

64 9 26

Source: CBOS.

During the term of office of Beata Szydło’s cabinet the share of positive ratings went up, and the share of negative and “hard to say” answers decreased. Nevertheless, towards the end of her government’s term the ratings did deteriorate. After the cabinet reshuffle and appointment of a new prime minister at the end of 2017, positive ratings still substantially outweighed negative ones. As the same time, the share of undecided opinions increased, but is very likely to fall in the future. Table 7.3. Does the government policy offer opportunities to boost the economic situation? (in %) Total Yes No Hard to say Rural residents Yes No Hard to say Farmers Yes No Hard to say

IV.2015

II.2016

II.2017

X.2017

XII.2017

II.2018

27 58 15

39 49 12

43 45 12

55 34 17

49 40 11

55 28 17

28 58 15

43 43 14

43 43 14

62 25 13

58 29 13

58 23 18

27 63 11

43 45 12

43 45 12

69 20 11

61 26 13

71 17 12

Source: CBOS.

Question: How would you assess the results of government ….. activity since its formation? 1. Very good; 2. Rather good; 3. Rather poor; 4. Very poor; 5. Hard to say. Question: In your opinion, does the policy of the present government offer opportunities to boost the economic situation? 1. Definitely yes; 2. Rather yes; 3. Rather no; 4. Definitely no; 5. Hard to say.

159


Table 7.3 shows the economic dimension of the opinions evaluating the government’s activities. In that regard, the ratings of Beata Szydło’s cabinet changed more slowly and were less enthusiastic. The ratings constantly improved, although before the end of its term of office they somewhat declined and there were more undecided answers. The change of the person of the prime minister led to a considerable increase in positive ratings and a decrease in pessimism (Tab. 7.4). The attitudes of rural residents and farmers tend to evolve in similar ways, except that their support for the present government, so as dissatisfaction with the actions of the former government, is greater. Among farmers, such a stance was manifested by a reversal of pessimist attitudes into optimistic ones, and, after the change of the prime minister, the prevalence of optimism was palpably visible. Table 7.4. Satisfaction with the person of the prime minister (in %) Total Yes No Hard to say Rural residents Yes No Hard to say Farmers Yes No Hard to say

IV.2015

II.2016

II.2017

X.2017

XII.2017*

I.2018

II.2018

35 46 19

43 39 18

46 40 14

53 35 12

49 39 12

54 20 26

53 18 29

35 47 17

48 31 21

56 30 14

62 26 11

65 23 12

56 15 29

54 16 31

27 57 15

69 10 21

71 21 8

62 26 11

58 20 22

63 8 29

66 18 17

Source: CBOS.

Satisfaction with the person of the prime minister can be regarded as a summative rating of the government. The evaluation of the government’s achievements may be positive despite a negative view on the person who leads it; it is similarly so with pessimism or hopes for the future. One argument in favour of using such a measure is that this particular dimension of personal ratings matters considerably in analysing the attitudes of rural residents since, for them, the personal aspect plays a significant role. Here, a similar dynamic can be observed as before (Tab. 7.4). First, the change of the government was reflected in the polls. It led to a turn in the overall ratings from negative to positive among the public at large and the rural population alike. After the most recent change of the person of the prime minister, the percentage of 160

Question: Is it OK for you that the government is led by …? 1. Definitely yes; 2. Rather yes; 3. Rather no; 4. Definitely no; 5. Hard to say.


satisfied respondents remained unchanged, but the share of respondents with no definite opinion went up due to the short term of office of the new cabinet. In the groups of farmers and rural residents, changes of opinion were similar as in the electorate at large, albeit with a stronger and more distinct element of approval and hope. Table 7.5. Attitudes to the ruling camp in Poland (in %) (Dec 2017) How do you view yourself? Total Rural areas Farmers

Proponent of the ruling camp 32 35 44

Does not side with the govern ment nor with the opposition 44 50 44

Opponent of the ruling camp 20 11 9

Hard to say

4 4 2

Source: CBOS.

The mode of exercising power two years after the new camp had come into power triggered such strong emotions that other than simply standard measures are required. They do not reflect the ratings of individual institutions or persons, but rather the political process as such. They are manifested in statements expressing strong involvement in the form of support or disapproval – hence the more generalised question whether the respondents view themselves as proponents or opponents of the ruling camp (Tab. 7.5). The “no” answers mainly show the prevalence of middle-of-the-road attitudes, which is a relatively stable phenomenon across various social groups. Rural residents and farmers are characterised by a higher percentage of respondents declaring themselves as proponents, and a lower share – as opponents. However, among them, just as across the Polish society in general, moderate attitudes prevail, without any firm declarations in favour or against. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that confirmed proponents of the ruling camp prevail despite a marked domination of supporters over declared opponents. A more detailed picture of the president’s popularity is quite similar. The comparison of the meaningful time points (Tab. 7.6) shows similar dynamics to the attitudes analysed above, even though some differences can also be observed. No initial surge following the presidential election is visible, but distinct and constant support, with some observable fluctuations. The effect of the centrality of the person of the president for the overall view is revealed; it is expressed in widespread, one could say universal, knowledge of who he is. The president is in Poland viewed definitely positively, and any changes of opinion as a rule take place within the positive field.

Question: Answer options as in Tab. 5.

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Table 7.6. Evaluation of the activity of the president* (in %) Total Good Poor Hard to say Rural residents Good Poor Hard to say Farmers Good Poor Hard to say

IV.2015*

II.2016

II.2017

X.2017

XII.2017

II.2018

60 31 9

47 38 15

54 37 9

68 24 8

64 27 9

65 26 9

65 27 8

54 29 17

65 25 10

76 16 8

75 16 9

74 17 9

58 37 5

76 21 3

65 24 11

83 14 3

68 14 18

84 14 1

* 04.2015 – last rating of Bronisław Komorowski’s presidency. * Question worded as in Table 7.2. Source: CBOS.

Table 7.7. Anticipated direction of change in Poland’s situation (in %) Is the situation in Poland heading in a good or bad direction?

IV.2015

total Good Bad Hard to say

26 56 18

rural areas 23 60 17

II.2018

farmers

total

11 60 29

50 34 16


farmers 58 29 13

Source: CBOS.

162

Opinions on the current situation in the country are a major factor, strongly associated with government ratings; they are regularly measured once a month by CBOS and refer to the main aspects of the country’s situation. The situation in Poland can be evaluated in three dimensions: general, political, economic and the labour market; the surveys look both at the current situation and hopes for the future, and aim to capture both general and individual aspects. From the CBOS’ set of general measures, our further analyses leave out only the workplace situation of the respondents, which seems less relevant considering the specific nature of the farmers’ group. To keep the text succinct, the analysis only compares the opinions in the run-up to the elections with the most current ones. The assessment of the country’s situation before the 2015 election was negative among the general public with respect to both political and


economic dimensions. Rural residents and farmers followed the general opinion trends in their views. Two and a half years later, the view of the economic situation changed to definitely positive. Rural residents and farmers perceive it similarly to the overall respondent pool, slightly more favourably than the rest of the respondents but with no marked differences visible. Table 7.8. Evaluation of Poland’s political and economic situation (in %) Neither good Bad nor bad IV.2015 How do you view the current situation: Good

total political in Poland economic in Poland rural residents political in Poland economic in Poland farmers political in Poland economic in Poland

total political in Poland economic in Poland rural residents political in Poland economic in Poland farmers political in Poland economic in Poland

Hard to say

9 18

37 37

48 40

6 5

8 14

37 36

48 43

6 7

22 48 32 50 II.2018 How do you view the current situation:

13 7

17 12

28 55

33 31

32 9

7 5

30 53

36 32

26 8

8 7

37 61

31 27

29 8

4 4

Source: CBOS.

In contrast, the evaluation of the current political situation somewhat differs between these groups, although some similarities can also be observed. First and foremost, it is viewed as much worse than the economic situation: the difference in the percentage of positive opinions about politics and the economy is about 20-30 percentage points (pp), being unfavourable for the former. The prevalent answer in all the respondent groups is “neither good nor bad”, even though the general tenor of these opinions shows some differences. The general public perceives politics more negatively than the group of rural residents and farmers. While in the overall pool of respondents there are more negative than positive opinions, it is reversed among rural respondents and farmers. Nevertheless, these are not marked differences (Tab. 7.8).

163


Table 7.9. Evaluation of the family’s material conditions (in %) What kind of life is your family living now: Total Rural areas Farmers

good 45 41 36

IV.2015 neither good nor bad 43 49 54

bad

good

11 9 11

62 57 75

II.2018 neither good nor bad 34 38 23

bad 4 4 2

Source: CBOS.

An analysis of the opinions about the economic situation of families reveals a similar portrait of the changes as in the opinions analysed above. While on the eve of the political change negative opinions about the family’s situation were in the majority, grouped around such statements as “neither good nor bad”, currently the dominant trend has shifted towards positive opinions, with fewer neutral and negative opinions being expressed. While among the respondent pool the difference between negative and positive answers is nearly 30 pp, it exceeds 70 pp among farmers (Tab. 7.9). Table 7.10. Situation on the local labour market (in %) IV.2015 How would you describe the situation on your local labour market: You can find a good job without serious problems You can find a job, but it’s not easy to find a good job It’s difficult to find any job You can’t find any job Hard to say

total

rural areas

II.2018 farmers

total

rural areas

farmers

4

3

0

15

15

14

33

26

36

57

54

56

45 15 3

48 21 2

43 19 2

19 3 6

24 4 3

27 1 1

Source: CBOS.

164

There has been a similar change in the perception of the local labour market. Earlier opinions were rather pessimistic, with most answers pointing to difficulties with finding any job whatsoever (Tab. 10). Now, there has been a shift of opinion towards the perceived opportunities for finding a job easily. According to the general public, the situation in that regard has remarkably improved. It does not imply that there are no difficulties with finding a job fully satisfying one’s preferences, but that there is no threat of unemployment. The current situation does not threaten one’s very subsistence. The changes in the answers provided by rural respondents and farmers follow the general trend.


Table 7.11. Hopes for change in Poland’s situation in the year ahead (in %) Total Will improve Will stay the same Will deteriorate Hard to say Rural residents Will improve Will stay the same Will deteriorate Hard to say Farmers Will improve Will stay the same Will deteriorate Hard to say

V.2014

V.2016

XII.2017

15 56 21 8

21 39 31 9

30 41 22 7

13 59 20 8

21 42 27 11

35 42 15 8

15 50 31 5

24 35 24 17

25 37 15 22

Source: CBOS.

Similar changes can be observed in the opinions expressing a major aspect of life – hopes for the future (Tab. 7.11). The prevalent sentiment in Poland before the changeover of power was that the situation would remain the same over the coming year. Afterwards, a gradual increase in the share of opinions expressing optimism could be observed. In every subsequent poll, the expectations that nothing would change were diminished. That trend in the overall pool of respondents and among rural residents and farmers was similar. If considered in terms of the initial state, the current state and hopes for the future, the following broad picture emerges. Prior to the shift of power, most respondents viewed the situation as negative or stagnating, with pessimism expressed in relation to the future, both with regard to individual respondents and their families and to the country at large. Opinions about the country’s economic situation and living conditions of families changed to positive. Individuals take an optimistic view both of their own situation and of the overall business climate, and optimistically look at the future. Respondents expect that their living conditions will improve and see no threat in the current situation for themselves, their families or the country as a whole. Only the sphere of politics does not tally with this positive picture: it is still viewed at least as negative, if not as a much greater restraint than the sphere of the economy. How to explain such a picture, in its broad sense and a more detailed one, emerging from the monthly CBOS surveys? The detailed changes in the Question: Do you think in the year ahead the situation in Poland will improve, deteriorate or stay the same? For answers see Tab. 11.

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public opinion are rather difficult to explain by researchers: when juxtaposed with the current political developments, the respondents’ opinions seem to be utterly unrelated. The frequent changes in the respondents’ sentiment are not only connected with such developments but sometimes even apparently contradict them. An explanation of this phenomenon can be offered by analyses which relate the opinions expressed by respondents to other kinds of events such as the country’s overall economic situation, living standards and labour market situation. Evaluation of the situation and popularity ratings of key political actors echo the fluctuations in the living standards in Poland and the labour market situation. Although these analyses examine the opinions and declarations of the broad pool of respondents, arguably they can also be related to individual groups and strata of the Polish society. The hypothesis on the correlation between support for PiS and improved economic situation and its implications for the situation of individuals and their families seems to be well-founded. A similar effect could be observed during the term of Donald Tusk’s cabinet. This phenomenon, sometimes referred to as economic voting, is encountered not only in Poland. These data reveal such a correlation to be in direct correspondence with the changes in the evaluation of key aspects of economic life from the perspective of individuals and from the perspective of social and political opinions. It can be said, therefore, that the support for PiS has its roots both in the overall economic situation and in the strongly socially-oriented policy of the government. However, it should not be brought down to the economy and profits alone, i.e. purely utilitarian aspects. Rather, such support is determined by the favourable climate for some members of the public to identify themselves with the government. If not for such a situation, the same events would have produced different consequences and would be differently perceived by the general public.

7.2. Political participation. Willingness to take part in elections and voter preferences Voter preferences and declared participation in elections are important elements of the political map since they accurately render the current political sentiment. Willingness to vote is quite lasting and not very prone to wide fluctuations. It should be noted that the respondents’ declared willingness is much higher 166

CBOS. Komunikat nr 158/2017, Subiektywne vs obiektywne wskaźniki stanu gospodarki i warunków materialnych, CBOS, Warsaw 2017.


than the actual turnout at the elections, and should be treated as an indicator rather than a definite statement. It is currently slightly higher than average, which points to voter mobilisation (Tab. 7.12). Table. 7.12. Declared willingness to vote in parliamentary elections (in %) X.2015 total 62 23 15

Certainly yes Don’t know Certainly no

X.2016

rural farmers areas 57 62 26 22 16 16

total 64 14 22


II.2018 farmers

total

59 14 27

71 14 15

SLD

Kukiz ‘15


farmers 74 12 14

Source: CBOS.

Table. 7.13. Voter intentions (in %) PiS

PO

Razem

Korwin

PSL

Nowo- Hard to czesna say

Total Rural areas Farmers

34

27

1

3

3

6

8

7

9

46

20

2

7

4

6

2

10

50

15

7

9


38

15

2

3 16 X.2016 3 4

4

6

16

11

50

9

3

4

6

3

6

9

10

75

0

0

8

4

4

2

7

0


43

17

1

2

4

4

7

5

15

50

11

1

2

7

2

8

2

15

55

5

3

16

2

2

15

X.2015

32

II.2018

Source: CBOS.

To better illustrate the analyses, the current declarations (February 2016) were juxtaposed with the results of the last survey preceding the 2015 par liamentary election and the survey carried out a year later. The revealed support for political parties shows considerable stability and significant changes at the same time. The overall tendency can be summed up as the stability of political options. The data point to a relative constancy in the readiness to support the main political forces since their system does not show any distinct changes. Against this backdrop, some trends can be visible such as fluctuating support for “Nowoczesna”, most likely associated with the person of its chairman. In addition to parties with a stable presence above the election threshold there are also parties whose popularity verges on the threshold of

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winning a sufficient number of votes to sit in the Sejm; these mostly include parties of the divided Left. In the category of rural areas and rural population, there is a visible division into rural and urban parties. While in urban areas the spectrum of supported political parties is quite broad, the picture is considerably more narrow in rural areas and among farmers; here, only a small number of parties matter: the ruling PiS and its coalition partners, as well as PO, Kukiz ‘15 and PSL in the Opposition. Visibly, PiS enjoys the strongest support while other parties such as “Nowoczesna” are structurally weak and are not able to penetrate this group of the electorate, and the left-wing SLD is slowly sinking into oblivion (Tab. 7.13). There is also an important issue of predictability. It should be noted that the measures of support for political parties can also show momentary volatility that is difficult to explain. In December 2017, the CBOS report showed 0% support for PO among farmers (34 farmers). This is the effect of a sense of uncertainty among the electorate rather than the unreliability of the employed measure. The survey findings continue to show high rates of indecisiveness, and the answer “hard to say” nearly always comes third in the respondents’ answers, whether overall or rural and farmers. In the elections, also the protest electorate is revealed, which in Poland represents one-fifth to one-fourth of the total electorate. These are voters who vote for anti-system or anti-establishment parties. They tend not to reveal their voter preferences beforehand. Such alienation attitudes may also encourage passivity and absence in the elections. In the current situation, it can only be expected that readiness to embrace various forms of protest, including voting for anti-system if not opposition parties, may be higher. Nevertheless, it is difficult to predict what form of protest voters will opt for, which makes it difficult to forecast election results based on the opinion polls alone.

7.3. Key political issues: European Union, supranational institutions, institutional system and democracy

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In addition to various opinions associated with the political life or evalua tion of the current situation, there is a major question concerning the sphere of “deeper” attitudes. This is the standpoint on crucial constitutional issues and strategic political decisions that determine Poland’s place in Europe. The crucial political issues which were singled out due to their significance include: Europe, supranational institutions, institutional system and democracy. All these issues are less affected by the politics of the day. The emerging picture


is not unequivocal but complex, sometimes ambiguous, and therefore calls for careful and thorough analysis. Arguably, it represents a significant component of public attitudes, which is important to better locate the opinions analysed earlier. Table 7.14. Support for Poland’s EU membership (in %) I am for Total Rural areas Farmers

84 78 88


88 83 85

I am against XI.2015 10 12 12 IV.2017 8 11 11

Hard to say 6 9 0 4 6 4

Source: CBOS.

Support for the European Union and Poland’s presence in the EU, in united Europe, remains firmly high and is not subject to fluctuations. Despite the conflict between the Polish government and the EU, and the emotional refugee issue, support for the EU remains stable and strong. Both the surveys conducted before the new ruling camp came to power and the current ones produced similar results. Rural residents and farmers express a similar attitude, and the observable differences in the rate of support do not substantially exceed proportions that could be considered momentary fluctuations. This is an issue in which the expressed attitudes are clear and constant. Among the surveyed rural residents and farmers, there is no increase of the “hard to say” answer that is so characteristic and frequent in more general, political questions (Tab. 7.14). Table 7.15. Attitudes towards European integration (in %) Europe’s unification has gone too far

Ambivalent opinion


25 27 15

30 29 36


24 25 32

20 20 25

Europe should unite even more

Hard to say

XI.2015 39 34 37

6 9 13

48 46 40

8 9 4

IV.2017

Source: CBOS.

Question: Are you personally in favour of Poland’s EU membership or are you against it?

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Projects aimed to strengthen European integration also receive support, implying a generalised direction towards the strengthening of the EU. The respondents, asked before the changeover of power and now, expressed their conviction that such efforts were necessary. However, the differences of opinion and lesser support for integration and greater readiness to agree with suggestions on excessive centralisation of the EU do not tip the balance of the high support for increasing integration both among the overall pool of respondents and among rural residents and farmers (Tab. 7.15). Table 7.16. Attitude to increasing EU integration (in %) (IV 2017) Is it in Poland’s interest to: Total Rural areas Farmers

belong to a group most closely cooperating countries 50

remain in the group of loosely cooperating countries 35

43 39

leave the EU

Hard to say

4

12

39

4

13

46

5

11

Source: CBOS.

A similar tendency can be observed when the survey tackles the question of the so-called two-speed Europe, i.e. voluntary division of EU countries into those more closely cooperating and those which more loosely coordinate their policies, but without disintegrating the whole. The tendency showing support for Poland’s presence in the group of more closely cooperating countries seems to prevail, although it obtains more lukewarm support in rural areas and is rather rejected by farmers (Tab. 7.16). Table 7.17. Attitude to introducing the euro in Poland (in %) IV.2017 Total Rural areas Farmers

I am for 22 16 14

I am against 72 77 75

Hard to say 6 7 11

Source: CBOS.

On the other hand, the questions about the strengthening and enlargement of the EU and its internal organisation reveal certain differences, albeit remaining within the limits of acceptance for Poland’s long-lasting presence in the EU. What meets with disapproval is the introduction of the euro and the refugee question. The public opinion in Poland definitely opposes the idea of introducing the euro (Tab. 7.17). 170

Question: Would you agree to have the Polish currency (złoty) replaced by the euro, the currency used by many EU countries?


Table 7.18. Attitudes to receiving refugees from countries at war (in %) Yes, we should host them and let them settle here Total Rural areas Farmers

5 1 3


5 3 2


4 1

Yes, we should No, Poland host them until should not host the moment they refugees can return home XII.2015* 37 53 30 63 31 57 XI.2016 38 53 42 47 30 66 X.2017 29 63 19 76 22 72

Hard to say

5 6 9 4 8 2 4 3 6

* Survey XII 2015 was carried out after the terrorist attack in Paris. Source: CBOS.

Another unwelcome consequence of EU membership is hosting refugees. Attitudes against it prevail in Polish society; they are more distinctly visible in rural areas and among farmers. Unwillingness to host refugees is older than the current propaganda orientation, which has only made it stronger (Tab. 7.18). Table 7.19. Support for NATO membership (w %) II.2017 Total Rural areas Farmers

I am definitely for 45 35 37

I am rather for

I do not care

I am rather against

37 44 45

10 10 10

2 2 5

I am definitely against 1 1 0

Hard to say 6 8 2

As with the EU, support for Poland’s NATO membership is strong and last ing, and remains stable and high. It is only slightly less widespread among the rural and farming population. Nevertheless, the overall tenor of the answers is similar to the overall pool of voters (Tab. 7.19). In this case, a similar ambivalence between membership as such and specific initiatives could be observed, mostly regarding Poland’s participation in NATO’s collective operations in the form of a military contingent. The attitude to democracy is another important matter. In addition to questions about purely opportunistic issues, one might also wish to know if support for democracy and democratic institutions and procedures is stable.

171


The CBOS surveys examined the attitudes towards democracy using three repeated questions: on the value of democracy, its personal significance for the respondent and evaluation of how it functions in Poland. This attitude is measured for the country at large and for individuals, both in general and specific categories. Table 7.20. Attitudes towards democracy: democracy is superior to all other forms of government (in %) Yes Total Rural areas Farmers

70 61 57


66 62 68

No I.2016 18 22 22 I.2017 19 18 17

Hard to say 12 17 20 15 20 15

Source: CBOS.

The question about the value of democracy elicited answers confirming its widespread acceptance and high perceived value. The pro-democratic stance is stable and strong, and there is a qualitative prevalence of answers expressing approval over those of disapproval. In rural areas, such support became even stronger if we compare the answers provided in early 2016 and a year later, in January 2017 (Tab. 7.20). Table 7.21. Attitudes to democracy: for people like me it doesn’t really matter whether the government is democratic or not (in %) I.2016 Total Rural areas Farmers I 2017 Total Rural areas Farmers

I agree

I don’t agree

Hard to say

29 33 35

62 56 51

9 10 14

I agree

I don’t agree

Hard to say

28 30 30

64 57 60

8 6 10

Source: CBOS.

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Another question in the series asks about the respondent’s individual attitude to democracy – whether the form of government personally and privately matters for the respondent. The format of the question is worth noting as it was intended to avoid the so-called tendency to accept questions. In order to give a pro-democratic response, the respondent had to contradict the suggestion


included in the question. The survey reveals an unequivocal and distinct approval for the value and significance of democracy for the respondent; the respondents tended to strongly reject such suggestions (Tab. 7.21). Table 7.22. Evaluation of the freedom of speech: can you freely express your views currently in Poland or is it better to be cautious in what you say (in %) III.2017 Total Rural areas Farmers

You can freely express your views 37 39 29

It’s better to be cautious in what you say 58 56 65

Hard to say 5 5 6

Source: CBOS.

Notwithstanding the above, the respondents feel that democracy is under threat. Such a sentiment is visible even among those groups which strongly support and identify themselves with the ruling camp and approve its decisions. There is a palpable feeling of freedom of speech being restricted also among the rural population despite its firm support for PiS (Tab.7.22). Table 7.23. Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Poland (in %) I.2016 Total Rural areas Farmers I.2017 Total Rural areas Farmers

Satisfied 39 36 49 Satisfied 39 44 46

Dissatisfied 50 50 41 Dissatisfied 52 43 48

Hard to say 11 14 10 Hard to say 9 13 6

Source: CBOS.

In addition, dissatisfaction with the condition of democracy and the way it functions in Poland can be observed. Even though a large group declares satisfaction, its deficiencies are underscored and a general feeling of discontent is expressed (Tab. 7.23). It tallies with the evaluation of the political situation of the country, discussed above, which is viewed much more negatively than the economic situation (see Tab. 8). A sense of dissatisfaction is visible both in the overall pool of respondents and in the group of rural residents and farmers. Among the surveyed respondents, there is a clear prevalence of negative opinions about the state of democracy in Poland. By contrast, the shares of respondents expressing satisfaction and dissatisfaction are similar among rural residents and farmers. In that group, negative opinions are also strong.

173


7.4. Evaluation of the PiS programme and the government’s activities The success of PiS has been strongly underpinned by its political platform, which not only addressed the society’s needs and expectations but also legitimised them, and demonstrated that they can indeed be put to life. The latter aspect should be especially emphasised. PiS is fulfilling social expectations after a long period of a government in power which rejected many of them for economic reasons. Some of these decisions reversed the reforms introduced by the previous government as economically necessary for Poland, such as extending of the retirement age. Leaving aside the question of their feasibility, possibility of their implementation in the long run or short- and long-term effects, their reception in the society should be analysed. Evaluation of the coherence and realism of these proposals is beyond the scope of analysis of their perception by the general public and the attitude towards them among rural residents and farmers (Tab. 7.24). Table 7.24. Support to programmes and activities of the PiS government (in %) III.2016 500+ programme Lower retirement age Higher tax-free amount Bank tax Tax for large supermarkets Reform of the education systema Reduced number of terms of office in local governmentsb Claiming reparations from Germany a

Total 80 80 75 46 42 57

Rural areas 86 86 71 43 41 61

Farmers 88 94 79 58 59 60

51

54

69

54

57

58

evaluation of the reform – CBOS I.2017; evaluation of the reduced number of terms – CBOS II.2017. b

Source: CBOS.

174

The results of CBOS surveys indicate that what could be termed as PiS flagship proposals resonated strongly with the public. There is a very strong support for the “Family 500+” programme, lowered retirement age or increased tax-free amount, which ranges from 70% to 80% in the overall pool of respondents. In the group of rural residents and farmers, such support is even higher, if not outright enthusiastic. The stronger support of the rural population and farmers also for other proposals submitted after PiS came to power or for its stance in subsequent disputes is stable and systematic. Despite a constant tendency for high and generalised support, various PiS initiatives did not meet with the same degree of approval. Less supported


proposals were those that could hardly be identified as a real social gain for the poorer segments of society (education reform, bank tax) or those whose cost of implementation could be charged to consumers (tax on large-format retailers). Similarly, the question whether democracy will be improved in local government if the term of office of mayors is reduced may arise doubts; it is precisely because of rural votes that terms of office can be so long. Strong support for the “Family 500+” programme is quite interesting. It is discussed in more detailed in the CBOS survey from March 2016, which confirms – similarly to other opinion polls – that the programme enjoys huge support in the society, with 98% respondents having heard about it. However, questions about benefits or gains with which the programme is often identified reveal that their extent is societally limited. It transpired that the group of actual beneficiaries of the programme is not large at all (16% of all respondents), just as the group that might potentially be interested in the programme’s extension (28% respondents have children aged up to 18).10 The report does not break down the respondents’ opinions into categories of interest to the present analysis. It could be assumed that the respective percentage values would be higher since rural families typically have more children. Nevertheless, the qualitative assessment of the programme would probably be similar. A hypo thesis could be proposed that the “Family 500+” programme, in addition to its material aspect, has a social component and is a measure that can be qualified as a political communication exercise that highlights the role of social issues in the policy priorities of the ruling camp. Table 7.25. Support for the Morawiecki Plan (in %) I am for I am against The Morawiecki Plan announced in February 2016 49 14 Total 57 8 Rural areas Farmers 61 9 Amendments to the electoral law of December 2017 31 46 Total 36 24 Rural areas Farmers 39 18

Hard to say 37 35 30 32 39 44

Source: CBOS.

An analysis of other PiS policy proposals indicates that in many cases support for that party is the transposition of overall approval onto specific issues. With more complex or constitutional matters, this suggests a specific picture of interdependence. It can be illustrated using the support for the 10 CBOS. Komunikat nr 36/2017. Ocena programu „Rodzina 500 plus po blisko roku od jego wprowadzenia, CBOS, Warsaw 2017.

175


Morawiecki Plan or amendments to the electoral law. There is a difference in the support expressed by the overall pool of respondents and the opinions of rural residents and farmers, even though the support for the analysed proposals is higher. The number of negative answers is definitely lower, but the number of the answers “hard to say” is on the increase. In effect, the answers “yes” definitely prevail over the answers “no”, with an accompanying high share of the answer “hard to say” (Tab. 7.25). Table 7.26. The Constitutional Tribunal crisis – which side are respondents on (in %) IV.2016 Total Rural areas Farmers

On the side of the ruling party and the present government 29 33 39

On the side of the Constitutional Tribunal and political parties opposing PiS 45 36 27

Hard to say 26 31 35

Source: CBOS.

We encounter a similar situation as regards attitudes to the political developments that aroused a lot of emotion and strongly divided the public opinion during that period. It is well visible in the case of the Constitutional Tribunal crisis (Tab. 7.26) or the evaluation of the occupation of parliamentary premises by a group of PO (Civic Platform) MPs (Tab. 7.27). Here, we can see a similar effect of transposing the generalised support onto specific situations. The opinions “in favour” prevail over the opinions “against”, accompanied by a high share of “hard to say” answers. A similar picture, albeit differing in some details depending on the context of a given issue, emerges in many other cases. Table 7.27. Occupation of parliamentary rooms by a group of MPs – which side are you on (in %) I.2017 Total Rural areas Farmers

On the side of the ruling party and the present government 28 34 40

On the side of the political parties and groups opposing PiS activities 24 16 16

Hard to say 43 45 44

Source: CBOS.

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In some cases, the surveys are more detailed and allow to discuss the set of attitudes accompanying a given situation more thoroughly. Occasionally, it resembles a trail of thought as expressed in the survey opinions in which it is difficult to find any general consistency. This can be well illustrated using


the example of the occupation of parliamentary premises. One survey shows, simultaneously, support for the government and positive answers in response to statements that “PiS is abusing power, is trying to install authoritative rule, without any control by other institutions” (54% rural residents, farmers – 52%); that the Opposition wants to overturn the legally elected Polish government (54% rural residents, 67% – farmers), and that such a form of protest as occupying parliamentary premises by a group of MPs is an unacceptable act (rural residents – 68%, farmers – 79%). A similar trail of thought can be observed while analysing the proposal to demand war reparations from Germany. Although the survey reveals support for such government statements, some opinions show that they have no pragmatic sense or could even prove very damaging for Poland. Respondents are of the opinion that, by such demands, Poland could lose more (rural residents – 42%, farmers – 37%) than gain (rural residents – 31%, farmers – 40%). Even though the proposal is viewed as morally right (rural residents – 71%, farmers – 78%), chances for receiving reparations from Germany are estimated as poor (rural residents – 73%, farmers – 83%). It is also widely acknowledged that making such demands would wreck Polish-German relations (rural residents – 70%, farmers – 78%), and that it is too late to put forward such claims (rural residents – 52% and farmers – 65%). Arguably, such an attitude cannot be simply reduced to sheer inconsistency – also on the part of a large portion of the public, but should rather be viewed as ambivalent. Such ambivalence can be manipulated, by presenting the situation in a particular way. Nonetheless, it is difficult to conclude whether such support is entirely independent. Support of the public in various segments of the society clearly affects the degree of approval for such proposals and the resulting actions. However, there is also a wide awareness of the complexity of the situation, including the plausibility of these demands being actually fulfilled.

Concluding remarks Farmers and population in rural areas strongly support the PiS government; they warmly welcomed the formation of Beata Szydło’s government. The opinion polls carried out by CBOS following the cabinet reshuffle demonstrated a surge in the support for the government and the president alongside improved ratings of the associated institutions. Leading PiS politicians enjoy strong support, so as the party’s political platform, and successive government decisions are received with approval. Even those PiS politicians at whom the public opinion previously looked with disfavour are

177


178

now viewed positively. Such a state of strong support and positive climate still continues and the recent changes in the government resulted in even higher ratings and stronger support. The attitudes expressed by the rural population and farmers are no exception but reflect the overall public opinion trend. Support for the PiS government and its actions is associated with the overall situation and the condition of the economy. At the onset of the political change, negative opinions about the country’s situation prevailed, coupled with a deeply pessimistic outlook on the future. The current picture shows a distinct improvement of the economic situation, employment prospects and living conditions of families, while negative opinions are expressed with regard to the sphere of politics. The main components of the PiS political and electoral agenda and its later policies and actions are overwhelmingly supported by rural residents and farmers. In addition to the economic factor, it implies a clear effect of transposing generalised approval onto new projects and activities, and onto support for PiS as a party in subsequent conflicts and disputes. Nevertheless, this support is neither unqualified nor unconditional, with attitudes showing criticism or ambivalence still being strong. This is distinctly visible in the approach of the public to many different issues. Some elements of the PiS agenda that could be negatively reflected in the prices of staple goods (tax for large retailers) received weaker support. In some cases, it is inconsistency that arises from difficulties with forming an opinion about complex issues of public finances, as manifested from the concurrent support for the “Family 500+” programme, lowered retirement age and lower taxes. It should be noted that, in these issues, rural residents and farmers are no different from the overall pool of respondents. Under closer scrutiny, the analysed attitudes show an ambivalence between generalised support for the government decisions and concerns relating to broader aspects of its activities such as relations with the European Union. The manifested attitudes towards the EU and NATO are strong, stable and definitely approving of Poland’s membership. Rural population and farmers support the EU, would like its institutions to be strengthened and integration extended. At the same time, they opt for a greater autonomy of the member states but without leaving the Com munity. As concerns democracy, its principles are strongly supported. At the same time, subsequent PiS activities are backed up, but some trends of change are viewed critically, such as strengthened party power or the perceived feeling of deteriorated freedom of expressing opinion. The firm support for rural residents and farmers for PiS and its policies is due to a number of factors. It stems from the economic situation and prosocial leanings of the government and is underpinned by many profits that


these residents receive in the new political conditions. Although the elements of interests do matter, yet support cannot be reduced to interests alone. Its extent is wider than the range of its beneficiaries. The social policy also has a symbolic dimension as it communicates a specific political message. Nevertheless, social programmes may over time lose their appeal of novelty, and their continuation or extension many not be possible due to the depletion of public funds or sources of credit. It should be noted that, in addition to government activities that produce positive effects, there are those that may lead to negative consequences. The government’s policies target a wider social base, of which rural residents and farmers are merely a part. The cultural and political dimension is also a major aspect of the sources of support for PiS. The present government invokes patriotic values, tries to rekindle economic nationalism, praises the value of land – the farmer’s workplace – and the role of keeping land in Polish hands, cherishes patriotic traditions, emphasises national pride and creates an impression that Poland is defending its good name on the global scene. It also fights contemporary libertarianism, criticises the changes in the formula of marriage and family and restricts abortion rights. Importantly these were not paramount values or ones which had a sufficient earlier presence in politics or social life. Such support is also mobilised by greater susceptibility to propaganda and increased dependency on sources of information controlled by PiS, such as public television. These attitudes mingle the environmental and general factors. Such a firm stance is a sum of two effects: a distinct shift in the public mood and the unique nature of a specific environment. It is the effect of the proximity of values and political platform adopted by the government of the day. Nevertheless, support for it is not overwhelming nor unqualified, as e.g. in matters concerning the EU or democracy. Therefore, it is difficult to make any firm or decisive forecasts as to how they will affect key political activities – voter behaviours.

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Pagina

180


Jan Herbst*

Chapter 8. Undervalued, underappreciated. The scale of activity of social organisations in rural areas Introduction The reader who will find the time to read the first statistical yearbook issued after Poland had regained independence in 1918 may be somewhat surprised. The plan of that publication, submitted for print in November 1921, heralded two chapters to be published in chapter II devoted to “Associations with a gainful purpose” and those “without a gainful purpose” (chapters XVI and XVII, respectively). By this token, they were accorded a similar status in the publication’s structure as such fundamental branches of statistics as vital statistics, agriculture, trade or public administration. At the end of the day, however, those plans were abandoned and there were no such chapters in the published volume, issued in 1923; they would not appear in a similar form until the 1930s. Such a decision may have been due to personal reasons or organisational difficulties encountered with the unification of data gathered earlier in the three statistical systems being the legacy of Poland’s Partitions (1773–1918). Nevertheless, the subsequent yearbooks offered statistical data concerning various forms of social self-organisation (education, professional, credit, agricultural, voluntary fire brigade, care associations, etc.). In parallel, sectoral studies such as yearbooks of the cooperative movement were published in addition to monographs or reviews.

8.1. The forgotten actor: social organisations in Poland’s social development Such a visible manifestation of that particular dimension of social life in the documents of the bygone era seems to speak volumes from today’s * Jan Herbst, Research Executive, Unit for Social Innovation and Research – Shipyard. 1 Rocznik Statystyki Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Yearbook 1, GUS, Warsaw 1921. The foundation of the Central Statistical Office (Główny Urząd Statystyczny – GUS) and the initial work on its first yearbook was initiated by Ludwik Krzywicki, one of the founding fathers of Polish sociology, a perceptive researcher and enthusiast of various forms of social self-organisation, particularly the cooperative movement. However, it was Józef Buzek who was appointed in 1918 as the first president of the newly founded institution.

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8. Undervalued, underappreciated...

perspective, especially if we compare it to how these issues were treated in the first years of the Third Republic. Even though after the demise of communism social organisations were on the banners as a symbol epitomising the regained freedoms and a longed-for indication of a democratic maturity of Polish society, for the next two and a half decades they effectively remained off the radar of public statistics. Naturally, it does not mean that there was no interest in such issues at all, but it will not be an exaggeration to say that for a very long time it was a niche domain, practised mainly if not solely as a purely scientific pursuit or by the so-called third sector. It was not until after 2008, on the wave of interest in so-called social economy (incidentally, the term has a long tradition in Poland, and is associated, among others, with Ludwik Krzywicki), GUS started systematic surveys of non-profit organisations, which in 2014 were accorded – or rather accorded again – a separate chapter in statistical yearbooks. It is hard not to ask the question about the reasons for such interest – on the eve of independence and today. Why was once the condition of social organisations a major, or at least a visible motif in the debate on the condition of the state? Why is the issue present in the debate again? The answer to this question seems to be simple: because of their real significance. In the partitioned Poland, social organisations served as repositories of national identity and independence traditions. In the interwar period, they played a major, sometimes a crucial role in the provision of basic social services: from fire protection to mutual insurance, business cooperation, education, combating poverty to promotion of culture. This is well illustrated by the data in the last statistical yearbook of the Republic of Poland to be published before the outbreak of World War II. Even though these data do not reflect the whole range of activity of voluntary organisations (nor, as a matter of course, non-formalised activities, including such significant social institutions in rural areas as communal work (such as “Tłoka”), activities centred around the parish, shared used of land and farm ing machinery), they make a striking impression nevertheless. The broadly understood social sector on the eve of the war included, among others, 13,700 of affiliated cooperatives (3 million members) and 4,500 of non-affiliated cooperatives (120,000 members), 300 trade unions with 7,400 branches and 940,000 members, nearly 8,200 sports associations (other than school ones) bringing together 470,000 members, 3,000 clubs and sections of sports

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Currently dubbed “non-governmental”, in an American style, which admittedly has had a bearing on the term’s broad meaning. Here, “third sector” means the sector of organisations from outside the public sector, which are not market oriented and have non-commercial goals. The latter dimension was examined by public statistics in the 1950s, and merits a separate analysis.


associations, and no fewer than 90,000 clubs, establishments or branches and nearly 5.5 million members of various educational and cultural initiatives and of public utility organisations (that is, only the biggest ones, including 12,500 branches of Związek Strzelecki (Riflemen’s Association), 17,500 branches of Liga Obrony Powietrznej (Airborne Defence League), 12,100 branches of Towarzystwo Budowy Szkół Powszechnych (Association for Building Public Schools), 9,000 Polish Red Cross divisions, etc.). We should also mention 13,000 public educational libraries (and 618,000 library members – 63% of all users of library services), 1,173 of 1,659 kindergartens (70.7%), 166 of 170 (98%) art schools, nearly 200 public job brokerage agencies (with 47,000 “brokered” clients), 66% of all in-patient care establishments (nearly 500 establishments) and 56% of patients of such establishments, 9,000 flats built from the loans of Towarzystwo Osiedli Robotniczych (Association for Workers’ Housing Estates) in 1934–1938 (12% of the total number of flats built from the loans of the BGK bank), over 1,500 no-interest loan funds (mostly Jewish), over one-fourth (154) of all care establishments (so-called care stations) for mothers with children, 31% of all public and private expenditure on summer camps and summer play centres for children, 71% of expenditure on the Winter Welfare programme. In rural areas proper, the potential and “pre-war” achievements were impressive: 14,000 of Ochotnicze Straże Pożarne – OSP (Voluntary Fire Brigades) (360,000 members – 98% of all firemen), over 7,000 farm ing, agri-food, agri-trade or dairy cooperatives, 3,700 farmers’ loan cooperatives, 6,000 rural choirs, over 1,000 rural theatres, nearly 1,000 rural culture centres, about 5,5000 branches of Centralny Związek Młodej Wsi (Central Young Villagers Association) (170,000 members and 3,500 libraries), 3,000 branches of Związek Młodzieży Wiejskiej RP (Association of Polish Rural Youth) and a similar number of Koła Gospodyń Wiejskich – KGW (Rural Homemakers’ Clubs) (which dealt not only with culture but also provided care services, e.g. ran 1,400 orphanages and over 230 mothers’ and children’s centres providing care to over 100,000 children), etc. These are only some of the aspects of the potential for collective activity in those days. What is the situation like today? How do such activities manifest themselves today and what is their role for rural development? These two questions delimit the field of the analyses offered below.

Cf. Mały Rocznik Statystyczny 1939, GUS, Warsaw 1939. For more on this subject see: J. Bartkowski, Tradycja i polityka. Wpływ tradycji kulturowych polskich regionów na współczesne zachowania społeczne i polityczne, Żak, Warsaw 2003.

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8.2. “Non-governmental organisations” in Poland’s rural landscape: definition traps Before discussing the available data concerning this sphere, we should consider some terminological issues. In this particular case, they are not only purely academic, but significantly affect the opinions on the condition of institutionalised activity in rural areas. Until now, such diagnoses were made in Poland mainly in connection with analyses of civil society development. By their very nature, they were strongly ideologically tainted and focused primarily on institutions whose development started after 1989 rather than on those which have a considerably longer history and cannot be treated simply as a “success” of the transition period. They also represent a different selforganisation model, alternative to the one being promoted in the debate on the non-governmental sector, other management styles, priorities and even other value systems. For instance, they are involved in business cooperation and not social services (farmers’ associations, producers’ groups), can be strongly leader-oriented, procedurally and institutionally weak or simply informal (nowadays e.g. a considerable portion of rural homemakers’ clubs or parish communities, having no legal personality whatsoever), financed on a compulsory basis from public funds (voluntary fire brigades). As authors such as Ilona Iłowiecka-Tańska indicate, many of them in the era of systemic transformation found themselves outside the sphere of interest of third-sector founders and ideologists. Due to their specific nature, they can hardly be discussed together with other non-governmental organisations not only at the level of interpreting the relevant data, but also at the level of technical solutions associated with collecting such data – in other words, they can hardly be examined together. Therefore, for many years they were deliberately omitted in many leading studies on the condition of the non-governmental sector, not because their role was not appreciated but simply because they were not categorised in that very sector in ideological terms. By narrowing its definition, the results of diagnoses looking at the condition of civil society in rural areas were in a sense predetermined. With the primary focus falling predominantly on “new” organisations (such a label is used not only with reference to newly registered organisations but, in the literature of the subject, is also used as

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Cf. e.g. J. Herbst, Inny trzeci sektor. Organizacje pozarządowe na terenach wiejskich, in: M. Halamska (ed.), Wiejskie organisations pozarządowe, IRWiR, Warsaw 2008. P. Gliński, Style działań organizacji pozarządowych w Polsce. Grupy interesu czy pożytku publicznego?, IFiS PAN, Warsaw 2006. I. Iłowiecka-Tańska, Liderzy i działacze. O idei trzeciego sektora w Polsce, WUW, Warsaw 2011, p. 83.


a definition category referring precisely to entities other than “traditional” social organisations), mainly “urban” organisations were examined, which in turn was translated into a critical evaluation of civil and social activity of rural residents.10,11 For practical reasons, associated with the research organisation process, the debate also left out entities with an insufficient degree of institutionalisation, acting informally or making use of legal personality of other entities (so-called grassroots, self-help associations, Catholic churchcentred initiatives,12 etc.). To avoid such errors in describing the condition and social role of rural organisations, one should use the broadest possible definition of such activity, and refer not to the institutional spectrum typically associated with the term “non-governmental organisations”, but rather to a broader notion of the “third sector” or “social economy”13 or, even better still, to activities undertaken as part of the existing institutions – even if they do not fall within the criteria defining the sector, e.g. activities in schools, cooperatives, sectoral organisations, etc.). In practice, however, this is difficult to achieve because the very nature of various segments making up the broadly understood social sector practically precludes examining them in an aggregate manner. Due to the lack of such summative research the analyses presented below, except the basis ones concerning the sector’s “demographics”, of necessity cover those types of the constituent institutions which are the most numerous and captured in the available data, that is associations, foundations, other member organisations (except the cooperative sector and trade unions), social denominational entities. Other forms of activity are only quoted insofar as we have the relevant data and the planned scope of this chapter permits it.

8.3. The institutional potential of social organisations in rural areas – basic data Quite naturally, the starting point for analyses examining the condition of rural organisations must be the question about their membership size. The 10 B. Fedyszak-Radziejowska (ed.), Proces demarginalizacji polskiej wsi. Programy pomocowe, liderzy, elity i organisations pozarządowe, ISP, Warsaw 2005. 11 A hypothesis could be formulated that, paradoxically, the visible differences between rural and urban areas in the development dynamics of NGOs in rural areas post 1989 (favouring cities) were associated with a well-established presence of networks of traditional forms of self-organisation in the rural environment that acted as catalysts of social activity. To date, the hypothesis has not been taken up in serious research. 12 W. Okrasa, Sektor trzeci jako przedmiot badań statystyki publicznej. Wybrane problemy, www.stat. gov.pl/cps/rde, 2016. 13 For more about such differences see e.g. J. Defourny, Introduction: From third sector to social en terprise, in: C. Borzaga, J. Defourny, S. Adam, J. Callaghan (eds.), The Emergence of Social Enterprise, Routledge, London 2001.

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question is even more pertinent as it allows to delineate the sector’s structure and highlight its diversity. It is also somewhat troublesome because resolving such a basic issue as that one presents some difficulties because, on the one hand, as mentioned above, considerable portion of organised activity in Poland – and quite possibly especially in rural areas – takes place in structures which are informal, legally speaking. On the other hand, however, not all organisations having legal personality are actually operational (many wound-up organisations do not report termination of activity to the relevant registers). As a result, even though the register status of the main segments making up the sector is well known (according to the most recent data available in December 2017 – there are over 150,000 associations, foundations and other social organisations nationwide), it is also well known that it has little in common with the actual situation. According to the GUS surveys, which, unfortunately, are conducted only at the country level, many of them are entities which are in practice inactive. Public statistics estimates the percentage of such entities, depending on the adopted criteria, from 14% (the percentage that confirmed the fact of not being operational) to 21% (including the number of entities that could not be contacted).14 Other sources, however, estimate that share to be as high as 30%.15 What is more, GUS itself, in its most recent publications, estimated the number of active organisations in 2016 at 91,800 entities, i.e. a mere 65% of the registered number quoted above.16 These inconsistencies most likely result from the differences in how the notion of an “inactive organisation” is defined (which, in the case of some Polish organisations acting on a purely voluntary basis and in a very irregular way, is not an easy thing to do), and how broadly the institutional range of the term “non-profit sector” is demarcated. The scale of the problem of “dead souls” in the registers most likely differs depending on the type of the organisation (some of them are burdened with broader reporting duties, which can be an additional stimulus to complete the deregistration procedures prescribed by law). However, since no detailed data are made available, the estimations below refer mostly to data as provided in the registers. Another controversy surrounds the issue of entities to which the aforemen tioned figures refer. Most of statistical surveys concerning non-profit organisations, including those listed above, follows the practice whereby the organisation’s parent entity is regarded as a single body. In other words, units with the status of local branches of an organisation (which have their own, so-called Sektor non-profit w 2014 r., GUS, Warsaw 2016, p. 28. A. Adamiak, B. Charycka, M. Gumkowska, Kondycja sektora organizacji pozarządowych w Polsce 2015, Stowarzyszenie Klon/Jawor, Warsaw 2016, p. 27. 16 Działalność stowarzyszeń i podobnych organizacji społecznych, fundacji, społecznych podmiotów wyznaniowych oraz samorządu gospodarczego i zawodowego w 2016 r. Wyniki wstępne, GUS, Warsaw 2017, p. 1. 14 15

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long REGON number) are not regarded by them as separate entities. Such a convention seems to be partly justified at the level of analyses pertaining to the economy at large: for example, parts of the enterprise located at the same address as their parent entity, separated out for formal or even tax reasons (socalled self-balancing enterprises or seats of the management of other legal entities), or entities without permanent location (e.g. mobile sales outlets, service providers providing services at the client’s location) can be such a local unit. This is also a rational strategy in methodological terms as it allows for treating the research sample in representative surveys of such entities as an independent sample. In the case of non-profit organisations, however, it strongly affects the conclusions relating to the demography and geography of such a form of activity. In that regard, local branches are usually either establishments offering specific services (e.g. schools, care homes), or local representative units /branches of larger networks (e.g. branches of Polskie Towarzystwo Turystyczno-Krajoznawcze (Polish Tourist and Sightseeing Society – PTTK), Polski Związek Wędkarski (Polish Angling Association – PZW), troops of Związek Harcerstwa Polskiego (Polish Scouting Organisation – ZHP) or branches of Voluntary Fire Brigades). In extreme cases, the decision to regard them all as one entity means reducing the estimated volume by as many as several thousand units (as is for example in the case of Stowarzyszenia Ogrodowe (Gardeners’ Associations), over 5,000 of which are registered in the REGON system, and only 31 are parent entities). In the entire non-profit sector, there were nearly 17,000 such local branches (as at beginning of 2015), including 6,000 in rural or rural-urban municipalities, i.e. more than 11% of all entities registered in REGON and nearly 7% of units in rural areas, which are “invisible” in official statistics concerning demography of business entities, most of which make their own contribution to self-organisation processes at local level. Including such entities, the whole organisational potential of the non-profit sector in Poland (excluding unregistered activity, discussed in more detail below) today17 can be estimated at over 160,000 units, of which nearly 15,000 are parent entities. Even with the most conservative estimates, it can be assumed that nearly 100,000 of them are organisations which actually operate.18 As GUS estimates and registration data suggest, one-third of organisations have their seats in rural areas.19 It should be mentioned at this point that the definition of rural areas applied by public statistics in Poland is based 17 The estimates are for 31.12.2017 and are based on REGON system data on registered foundations, associations and other social organisations – data published by the GUS local data bank (BDL GUS). 18 It should be emphasised that these data are merely estimates, based on the comparison of the current status of the REGON system and estimations of proportions of active organisations in most recent available GUS publications for 2014. 19 Sektor non-profit w 2014 r., op. cit., p. 268.

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on the administrative criterion. Therefore, organisations with their seats in rural municipalities or in the rural parts of rural-urban municipalities are categorised as rural. Such a convention may have rather unfortunate con sequences for analyses of non-governmental organisations (and business entities as such). Quite understandably, many organisations operating in ruralurban municipalities choose the urban centre of such municipalities as their headquarters, which does not mean that they do not operate nor focus their activities outside of these cities. If we take this under consideration and treat organisations having their seats in rural and rural-urban municipalities as rural, their share in the whole group of non-profit organisations will substantially increase, up to 44%. At the same time, based on OECD standards (rurality as a feature of areas characterised by population density under 150 persons/km2), 35% of registered non-profit organisation can be regarded as rural. The strength of the latter definition is that it allows to partly consider the effects associated with the concentration of some types of organisations around large urban centres. However, due to limited availability of relevant data, most of the analyses presented below (unless specified otherwise) are based on the broadest of the aforementioned “rurality criteria”. What types of organisations make up the rural third sector? At the broadest level, they can be divided into those with legal personality, even if deficient, and those which are not present in any way in available national registers. This differentiation is of particular importance in rural areas because, as it is shown below, the number of entities in the “informal” non-profit sector is here possibly comparable with the size of the category of registered organisations (which does not mean that the nature or scale of their activities can be compared, as discussed in more detail below). Among registered organisations, the largest group (85%) are associations and other member organisations. Altogether, according to the registration data from early 2018,20 the number of such organisations in rural and rural-urban municipalities can be estimated at over 60,000 (of which 15,000 are organisations with headquarters in the urban parts of rural-urban municipalities). Among them, voluntary fire brigades (OSP) are particularly widespread (15,000 to 16,000 entities, depending on the adopted definition of rurality) as well as clubs and sports associations (up to 15,000 entities). Ordinary associations,21 the accurate number of which is difficult to assess on the basis of avail-

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20 Due to the lack of up-to-date public data on the subject, the estimates are based on the analysis of the combined databases of REGON and the National Court Register, made available to the author by Klon/ Jawor Association and cleared by Klon/Jawor of entities which, in accordance with its database of NGOs, are known to be practically inactive. These data apply to the organisations’ parent entities, but, in the case of gardeners’ associations, also include local units added by the author. 21 Simplified form of an association, governed by the provisions of the Act – Law on Associations (Dziennik Ustaw Journal of Laws of 2017, item 210), which does not need to be registered in the National Court Register.


able data, are roughly estimated at 3,000–3,500 entities, are much less popular. Other categories of member organisations are much less frequent, which does not necessarily mean that they do not play any significant role in the relevant spheres of social life in rural areas. Here, such organisations as Koła Łowieckie (Hunting Clubs) (ca. 1,500–2,000 units in rural areas) and Kółka Rolnicze (Farmers’ Associations) (1,000–1,200) can be listed, so as other farmers’ organisations (under 1,000). In addition to them, there are 4,400 foundations (of which 3,000 outside the urban centres of rural-urban municipalities). It should be noted that they, depending on the adopted criterion of rurality, altogether represent merely 13-19% of all such organisations in Poland, and it can be said that such a formula of operation is more typical of urban environment. In addition to all the aforementioned entities, unregistered entities can also be significant actors of collective activities in rural areas. As before, estimating the scale of their activity is not an easy task, but on the basis of available sources at least their basic typology can be attempted and their overall potential assessed. It can definitely be concluded that parish communities – social initiatives centred around the Catholic Church (and other churches, although in the latter case they represent a mere 4% of all such entities)22 are the most numerous collective actor in that sense. Both in terms of numbers, a specific mode of operation and a strong focus on the sphere of the sacred, such communities represent an alternative pool of activities alternative to the “secular” third sector upholding different values than secular organisations and following other principles (being strongly subordinated to the Church hierarchy).23 It is invisible, and therefore often not perceived, but maybe crucial for a better understanding of the peculiarities of social life in rural areas.24 According to the most recent data,25 there are as many as over 40,000 of such entities (71% of all) operating in rural areas, of which over 30,000 – outside of rural-urban municipalities. Rural homemakers’ clubs (KGW), unquestionably the most widely recognisable platform of women’s activity in rural areas, are another such major actor,26 one, Cf. Sektor non-profit w 2014 r., op.cit. It can also be noted that, alongside these communities, there operate also so-called social denominational entities, which are usually bodies established and controlled by the Catholic Church to provide various social services (such as care homes, schools, etc.). About 1,900 such entities operate across Poland, but there are no data to determine their number in rural areas. 24 J. Herbst, Drugi trzeci sektor, czyli o aktywności społecznej wokół Kościoła katolickiego w Polsce, Teologia Polityczna, No. 5 (2009/2010). 25 Działalność stowarzyszeń i podobnych organizacji społecznych…, op. cit. Author’s own estimates based on the number of such entities quoted in the present study and older, available data about their structure broken down into urban and rural areas, cf. Stowarzyszenia, fundacje i społeczne podmioty wyznaniowe w 2008 r., GUS, Warsaw 2010, p. 205. 26 Especially since women take relatively little part in the activities of other typically rural organisations: according to GUS (Sektor non-profit w 2014 r., op. cit., p. 117), they represent 45% members/participants of associations and foundations outside sport, 31% members of sports associations, 10% members of voluntary fire brigades and only 2% members of hunting clubs. 22 23

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Table 8.1. Number of non-profit entities (registered and unregistered) in rural areas Type of organistion Foundations Associations of which: OSP of which: sports clubs and associations of which: physical culture associations of which: Gardeners Associations* of which: ordinary associations Social organisations not listed separately * Hunting Clubs Farmers’ Associations Other farmers’ organisations Parish communities Rural Homemakers’ Associations

Number (in thousand) rural and municipalities rural areas – rural-urban < 150 persons/ GUS municipalities km2 3.0 4.4 3.0 45.6 61.0 48.8 15.2 15.9 14.3 10.4

15.1

11.5

1.3 0.7 3.0

1.9 1.7 3.7

1.3 1.2 3.0

1.1

1.8

1.5

31.0

1.5–2 1–1.2 0.7 41.9 7–10

nn

* including local branches. Source: prepared by the author based on the REGON and KRS data and GUS reports.27

nevertheless, that is surprisingly poorly described in statistical terms (as corroborated by other researchers such as Maria Halamska).28 The studies on rural homemakers’ clubs either refer to outdated data from the period of their prime and strong links with the structures of Farmers’ Associations at the end of the 1980s (when their number allegedly reached a staggering 35,000), either refer to – apparently – long-obsolete information about 26,000 such Associations, which was once available on the website of the National Association of Farmers, Farmers’ Clubs and Organisations. In public statistical publications devoted to non-profit organisations, rural homemakers’ clubs appear only in the context of analysing their operations (2,100 rural homemakers’ clubs were recorded in such structures). However, it is known from other sources29 that relatively few such entities are currently operating in them, with half of them not having or using any legal personality. It is also known that according to other data30 rural homemakers’ clubs represent 13.4% of over 25,000 branches or clubs affiliated with culture centres, which

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27 Sektor non-profit w 2014 r., op. cit., and Działalność stowarzyszeń i podobnych organizacji społecznych…, op. cit. 28 Interview with Professor Maria Halamska: Chłop nie obywatel, Kultura Liberalna, No. 314 (3/2015), http://kulturaliberalna.pl/2015/01/13/wies-spoleczenstwo-obywatelskie-maria-halamska/. 29 Cf. e.g. J. Mencwel, K. Milczewska, J. Wiśniewski, Koła Gospodyń Wiejskich. Nie tylko od kuchni. Raport z badań, Stocznia, Warsaw 2014; M. Biejat, K. Wójcikowska, O roli tradycji we współczesnej działalności kół gospodyń wiejskich, Wieś i Rolnictwo, No. 1.2 (166.2), 2015. 30 Działalność centrów kultury, domów kultury, ośrodków kultury, klubów i świetlic w 2016 r., http:// stat.gov.pl/files/gfx/portalinformacyjny/pl/defaultaktualnosci/5493/9/1/1/centra_kultury_2016.pdf, GUS, 2017, p. 4.


gives an aggregate number of 3,400 entities involved in the operation of these institutions. It is known that, some of the clubs resolved to operate as associations (with 638 such entities being currently registered in the REGON system). In the studies by the Shipyard Foundation quoted above (which informed the publications by Mencwel et al. and Biejat and Wójcikowska), their total number was estimated, in a specially designed survey, at no fewer than 7,000 entities, although these estimates, due to methodological concerns as to their accuracy, were not regarded as binding nor were incorporated in the main research report (even though the authors refer to them in their media interviews).31 All the above estimates are summarised in Tab. 8.1.

8.4. Development of the non-profit sector – macrotrends Due to the limited availability of data, it is difficult to thoroughly analyse the trends relating to the development dynamics of all the segments of the third sector in rural areas referred to above. On the other hand, it is well known that, for many of them, such analysis in the period concerned (post 2008) contributes rather little since, over time, their number has not considerably changed. This is the situation with regard to voluntary fire brigades, hunting clubs, farmers’ associations or parish communities, the number of which even went up in the last decade (being estimated in the 2008 pilot survey in rural and rural-urban municipalities at about 38,000, i.e. about 10% less than at present). However, the real boost could be observed in two other segments: associations and foundations. During the last decade, a spectacular increase in their number was recorded: as many as 19,000 new foundations and other member organisations and 3,600 foundations were established in rural and ruralurban municipalities. The trend itself is actually longer, being observable since the beginning of the systemic transformation.32 Although, obviously, such increase does not imply in itself a net increase in the number of organisations (due to the low propensity on the part of organisations to deregister, discussed above), also the GUS estimates concerning the number of active organisations point to a qualitative change in the potential of the non-governmental sector in rural areas. Archival GUS reports33 indicate that in 2008, across the country 31 K. Milczewska, Koła Gospodyń Wiejskich. Nie tylko od kuchni, Kultura Liberalna, No. 2 (2015), https://kulturaliberalna.pl/2015/01/13/kola-gospodyn-wiejskich-milczewska/. 32 Nevertheless, the measures taken in the mid-1990s are not reliable, because the changes in the REGON system introduced at that time, such as adding voluntary fire brigades to the system, would result in an increased number of entities. 33 Cf. Stowarzyszenia, fundacje i społeczne podmioty wyznaniowe w 2008 r., op. cit.

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(including cities), there were 5,900 active foundations, about 20,000 sports associations and 30,000 other associations, while the most recent survey the number of foundations was estimated at 13,600 (up 130%), and the number of associations excluding sports associations – at 36,100 (up 22%).34 What is equally interesting is that the estimates concerning sports association practically remained unchanged in that period. It means that, in the analysed period, the non-governmental sector not only increased in size but also in range of activity, expanding its diversity. 70

22,5 Foundations’ growth dynamics – nominal 20,0 17,5

50

15,0 12,5

40

10,0

30

7,5

20

5,0

10

rural areas according to GUS

2016

2017 2017

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

Associations’ growth dynamics – %, yoy

2005

2017

2016

98 2015

95 2014

100

2013

100

2012

102

2011

105

2010

104

2009

110

2008

106

2007

115

2006

108

2005

120

2004

110

2003

125

2004

2003

112

Foundations’ growth dynamics – %, yoy

2004

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

0

2003

130

2003

2,5 0

Associations’ growth dynamics – nominal

60

urban areas

rural and rural-urban municipalities

Figure 8.1. Development dynamics of selected segments of the non-profit sector in rural and urban areas Source: author’s own calculations based on GUS data.

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34

Cf. Działalność stowarzyszeń i podobnych organizacji społecznych…, op. cit., p. 2.


Although we do not have equally accurate estimates concerning the changes in the number of actually active organisations for rural areas alone, registration data suggest that their development manifested similar dynamics as in cities. During the last decade, the REGON register in rural and rural-urban municipalities increased by 2,100 associations and nearly 400 foundations. In case of associations, the nominal year-on-year increase was even higher than in cities (in which a distinct decline in the pace of registration of such entities could be observed post 2008, down to a level of ca. 1,900 per year – cf. Fig. 8.1). This, however, does not change the fact that in the recent years the growth dynamics seems to dwindle. The situation with foundations is different: their development nationwide was definitely accelerated starting from 2009/2010. Incidentally, the process had little to do with a sudden reinforcement of civic trends in the society; it can rather be interpreted as the outcome of a distinct strategic change in the sphere of providing important social services by public providers – the effect of “withdrawal” from such services (arguably, when we follow the trend relating to their financing and changes in other registers such as e.g. the Information System on Education (SIO), many of the new foundations are schools, kindergartens, cultural institutions, etc., turned into foundations). In cities, the nominal increase of such registered (i.e. formally in operation) entities increased in that period from ca. 500–600 per year to even 2,000 per year in the peak period (2014–2015). Even though in rural areas such increase in absolute numbers was smaller (from about 100 entities in 2007–2008 to over 700 in 2014–2015), the relative dynamics was even greater than that in cities. These data to some extent contradict the stereotypical opinions about the “enclave” nature and urban character of the so-called new third sector (a term referring to associations other than voluntary fire brigades and foundations) or about the widening gap in the scale of such activities between urban and rural areas nationwide (even though wider disparities in the number of foundations are unquestionable). It does not mean, however, that there are no grounds to claim that significant differences in that area are more profound, but in other aspects. To see them, the analysed data should be considered while taking into account the spatial factor and the findings from the research on the scope of activities of organisations in rural areas and in cities. The characteristics features of the geography of the third sector in Poland include e.g. the location of nearly one-fourth of all foundations (and 8% of all NGOs) in Warsaw, higher penetration rate of farmers’ associations in Wielkopolskie (26%), distinct prevalence of social religious entities in Małopolskie (15%) or in Podkarpackie. In parallel, Mazowieckie has a prevalence of hunting clubs (13%), voluntary fire brigades (12%) and sports associations (11%).35 35

Ibid.

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Associations and foundations per capita

NGOs other than OSP in 2016 number / per 10,000 population

OSP per capita

OSP in 2016 number / per 10,000 liczba podmiotów / 10population tys. mieszk.

194


Parish communities per capita

Parish communities in 2008 number / per 10,000 population

Figure 8.2. Geography of forms of collective activity in Poland – regional characteristics Source: NGO and OSP: prepared by the author based on REGON; parish communities after: Okrasa, Herbst, Zdaniewicz.36

Nevertheless, the statistics alone does not explain the determinants underpinning such spatial segmentation. These determinants were on many occasions described in the literature.37 The prevalent segment of associations and foundations in rural areas includes sports clubs and voluntary fire brigades,38 and in cities – assistance, educational and cultural organisations. What is more, the spatial distribution of some of their types is distinctly not random as it recreates lasting, historical social and developmental differences (or maybe petrifies them, too?). If we look at voluntary fire brigades (OSP) alone of all registered organisations, the Polish map of the non-governmental 36 Cf. W. Okrasa, J. Herbst, W. Zdaniewicz, Organizacje, wspólnoty i instytucje społeczne Kościoła katolickiego. Potencjał i specyfika kościelnego trzeciego sektora w Polsce, in: Stowarzyszenia, fundacje i społeczne podmioty wyznaniowe w 2008 r., op. cit. 37 Cf. e.g. Bartkowski, Tradycja i polityka…, op.cit.; J. Herbst, Oblicza społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, FRSO, Warsaw 2005; P. Swianiewicz, J. Herbst, M. Lackowska, A. Mielczarek, Szafarze darów europejskich. Kapitał społeczny a realizacja polityki regionalnej w polskich województwach, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 2008. 38 Adamiak et al., Kondycja…, op. cit.

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sector is clearly broken down along the boundaries of the territory under Russian rule in the period of the Partitions (1773–1918) and follows the patterns determined by the centre-the periphery paradigm (cf. Fig. 8.2). Similarly, parish communities, particularly widespread in south-eastern Poland (the historic area of former Galicia), also show a specific spatial distribution. Even though no detailed data on this subject have been published, the available maps are sufficient to conclude that such communities can be encountered on average twice as frequently (if we take the number of the population into account) in the Podkarpackie or Małopolskie Voivodeships as in the parishes of the Zachodniopomorskie or Lubuskie, Mazowieckie and Podlaskie Voivodeships. These divisions are not only enduring but seem to deepen even further. Even though we do not have data allowing us to draw precise comparisons, the available statistics indicate that, in the past decade, associations and foundations developed primarily in those areas where their number had been larger before, that is around metropolises and in the west and south-west of Poland. Some earlier studies (available, unfortunately, only for the period 2003–2008 indicate that the development of parish communities followed a completely different trajectory, with their role increasing in the east and south-east, and waning in other regions. Therefore, with all the caution that the flaws in the presented data suggest, we can say that not only spatial “poles” of models of collective activity exist in Poland, but that the spatial polarisation around them is increasing.

8.5. Scale of activity of rural organisations Much less than about the mere number of rural non-profit organisations is known about the scale and scope of their activities. Although public statistics prepares estimates of membership numbers, financial resources, voluntary and paid work, fields of operation, etc., these data are not published in a form that makes it possible to isolate from them information on rural organisations. Nevertheless, based on such information, the data on the share of rural organisations in the whole population and based on estimates from other studies (notably the research project entitled “Condition of the NGO sector in Poland” by the Klon/Jawor Association)39 on the differences in the average situation of rural and urban organisations (np. median number of members, budget , etc.), one can assess the contribution of these entities to the large numbers reported by GUS. A caveat should be made here that these are very 196

39 The last round of the research project took place in 2015 and comprised a random, representative sample of nearly 4,000 associations and foundations (cf. Adamiak et al., Kondycja…, op. cit.).


preliminary calculations and, as all estimations based on many studies, fraught with a serious risk of error. They imply, however, that of the 9.1 million membership40 of associations, foundations and other non-profit entities (excluding business and sectoral association) as estimated by GUS, rural organisations bring together 4 million members (voluntary fire brigades being major independent actors in that regard), plus about 0.5 million of external volunteers who should be added here. Quite interestingly, such estimates are somewhat easier to make for certain organisations, also those unregistered ones. As regards voluntary fire brigades, relevant statistics (other than financial ones) are provided by GUS, which estimates that today voluntary fire brigades (OSP) organise 600,000 members and also offer 1,200 jobs based on civil law contracts (such as contracts of mandate and item-of-service contracts) and only 300 jobs based on regular contracts of employment (naturally, these calculations do not pertain to the service as such nor equivalent for it). To estimate such proceeds, information on the scale of transfers to such organisations associated with fire protection made by local governments and other revenues is needed. The budget reports of local governments units published by the Ministry of Finance (author’s own calculations, accessed on: 10.04.2018), indicate that all of the expenditure on the statutory activity of voluntary fire brigades nationwide in 2017 totalled over PLN 970 million, of which more than half was investment expenditure, that is outlays on equipment, repairs and materials. The research by the Klon/Jawor Association demonstrated that, other than those funds, voluntary fire brigades only have modest additional funds (at an average level of ca. PLN 3,000 according to the author’s estimates).41 If we put these facts together, we will see that the total financial dimension of voluntary fire brigades’ activities can be estimated as slightly over 1 billion per year (and it goes without saying that these estimations should not be treated as “putting a price” on the value of their activities for the society). Regrettably, there are no reliable data that would allow presenting the full scale of operation of rural homemakers’ clubs. We have hardly any sources to assess their financial potential. As regards the human potential, a lot is known about the noble past of those institutions (which in the period of the Polish People’s Republic organised more than 1 million female members), but much less about their contemporary operations. The National Association of Farmers, Farmers’ Clubs and Organisations reports it to be 857,000 people, but this information does not seem to be up to date (even though it is still quoted 40 Let us recall that, “membership” is not tantamount with the number of members: it is the sum of members reported by all organisations (and one person can be a member of more than one organisation). 41 P. Adamiak, Ochotnicze Straże Pożarne – lokalne centra kultury. Raport z badań, Stowarzyszenie Klon/Jawor, Warsaw 2016, p. 14.

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even today – when seeking relevant information, the author came across quite recent statements invoking that number). According to more conservative estimates,42 the current membership of rural homemakers’ clubs is esti mated at 160,000 women. As regards another significant (although also hidden) “actor” on the rural scene of the rural scene of collective activity, that is parish communities and social institutions associated with the Catholic Church, we have interesting estimates of the Institute for Catholic Church Statistics, prepared as part of the first, pilot study of such initiatives carried out in collaboration with GUS (2010) (data for 2008). They indicate that the then potential of parish communities in rural areas (in rural and rural-urban municipalities) comprised 1.5 to 1.8 million members. Taking into account a visible increase in the number of such entities since the time those estimates were made, and considering the fact that no significant changes have taken part in their mode of operation, it can be safely assumed that currently this potential would total 1.65 to 2 million members. These organisations, unlike the so-called social religious entities (i.e. formally existing Church-linked institutions providing various social services and, according to the most recent available data,43 generating per year 33,000 full-time jobs, yet mostly located in cities) practically do not employ salaried staff (which would not be possible anyway due to formal reasons). Similarly, they do not have any significant funds at their disposal; the funds that they have come mainly from contributions, gifts and donations (there are no data on the volume of such proceeds).

8.6. Activity of rural organisations and their role in service provision The question begs to be asked how that huge potential is used and what activities of rural organisations focus on today. Since the author is not aware of any study that would address that question in relation to the sector in its entirety (which also applies to GUS studies which, although they cover nearly all of its spectrum, are discussed broken down into subsectors of “typical”44 associations, foundations and other social organisations, denominational organisations of various types, etc.), the answer should be offered separately for each of its major segments. Since, as far as the author is aware, GUS does not publish the findings from such studies for rural areas, the analysis below Milczewska, Koła Gospodyń Wiejskich, op. cit. Cf. Sektor non-profit w 2014 r.… op. cit. 44 Quoted phrase. 42

198

43


is based mainly on the research done by the Klon/Jawor Association45 and on secondary data. The research concerned indicates that, of the so-called new sector organisations (associations and foundations other than voluntary fire brigades), a definite majority is primarily involved sports or recreation: as many as three-fourths rural NGOs engage in this sphere of activity, and half consider it as the main field of their operations. Notably, it is one of the characteristics of the non-governmental sector in rural areas that definitely separate it from the group of “metropolitan” organisations (cf. Fig. 8.3). Nevertheless, that share has been decreasing in the recent years while the share of rural organisations focused on other types of activity, particularly in the sphere of education, social welfare and social services has been on the increase. Currently, the former represent a vital area for nearly half of organisations in rural areas (and one in ten regards such an area as the leading one). What also matters is their activity in the sphere of culture and art (respectively, 39% and 15%), local development (25% and 9%) or social services and social policy; 17% of such organisations are also involved in activities associated with environmental or health protection, although these spheres less frequently represent their core areas of activity. We should emphasise that this information pertains to the “narrowly” delimited third sector, which means that it leaves out organisations so typically associated with rural environment as voluntary fire brigades, rural homemakers’ clubs or parish communities. What do we know about them? As regards voluntary fire brigades, it should not be found surprising that, in answering the question about their field of activity, they en masse pointed to rescue. Still, other areas indicated by them are perhaps more interesting because these organisations are often, quite unjustly, identified solely with rescue activity, while in reality they also play a crucial role in other spheres (which does not mean that it is always the case, as once critically pointed out by Piotr Gliński,46 who, using their example, illustrated a mode of operation that he dubbed “idle nostalgia” [for the Polish People’s Republic]”). According to Piotr Adamiak,47 nearly 40% of them declare activities in the sphere of education, sports, recreation or hobby; nearly one-third regard environmental protection/ecology as their domain of activity, and onefourth – also culture. Quite interestingly, 15% point to religion as an area personally important for them (attachment to tradition and religiousness are OSP’ trademarks that distinguish this organisation from most secular 45 Special thanks are due to the Association for making available the research findings for analysis. These analyses were based on the study “Condition of the NGO sector in Poland 2015”, on a random, representative sample of 3,800 associations and foundations and on a similar survey of 400 voluntary fire brigades. 46 Gliński, Style działań organizacjipozarządowych w Polsce, op.cit., p. 86 ff. 47 Adamiak, Ochotnicze Straże Pożarne…, op. cit.

199


NGOs),48 and one in 10 also declares various activities in the sphere of social services, support to other non-governmental organisations, health protection and local development. ^ƉŽƌƚ͕ƚŽƵƌŝƐŵ͕ƌĞĐƌĞĂƟŽŶ͕ŚŽďďǇ

36.5

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ƵůƚƵƌĞĂŶĚĂƌƚ

32.7

14.2

ĚƵĐĂƟŽŶ

54.7

18.8

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11.5

>ŽĐĂůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ

18.0

4.3 8.7

^ŽĐŝĂůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ͕ƐŽĐŝĂůĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ

22.0

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15.5

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19.9

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16.6

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9.4

ŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůƉƌŽƚĞĐƟŽŶ͕ĞĐŽůŽŐǇ

13.1

ĚƵĐĂƟŽŶ

38

Sport, tourism, ƌĞĐƌĞĂƟŽŶ͕ŚŽďďǇ

37

14.7

3.2

7.0

3.2

5.2

ZĞůŝŐŝŽŶ

3.1 12.9

3.3

R&D

17.6

3.5 2.1 8.4

ZĞƐĐƵĞ͕ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͕ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ

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20

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30


28

ZĞůŝŐŝŽŶ

2.9

>ĂďŽƵƌŵĂƌŬĞƚ͕ǀŽĐĂƟŽŶĂůĂĐƟǀĂƟŽŶ

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60

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15

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12

NGO support

12

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11

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WƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů͕ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞĂŶĚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇŝƐƐƵĞƐ

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25.1

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/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂůĂĐƟǀŝƚǇ͕ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂŝĚ

74.3 38.5

14.8

10

0

20

40

60

ůůĂĐƟǀŝƟĞƐ

Associations and foundations other than OSP

OSP

Figure 8.3. Area of activity of associations and foundations – rural aspects Source: left-hand panel: author’s own calculations based on Klon/Jawor research (2015), right-hand panel: Adamiak, Ochotnicze Straże Pożarne…, op. cit.

As regards the remaining entities that make up the broadly understood social sector in rural areas, our knowledge is limited. Although parish communities are now being surveyed by GUS (the reports for 2014 are provided below), no survey results for rural areas alone are available. What is only known is that, nationwide, over 80% of such associations focus on activities related to religion. However, nearly one-third also declare activities in the sphere of education, one-fourth are involved in cultural activity, and one-fifth – in sport and recreation. If we convert these data into estimates of the number of such entities in rural areas (assuming that their structure, due to the field of activity, would be similar), it will mean over 13,000 communities active in the sphere of education, nearly 10,000 initiatives in culture, close to 9,000 communities engaged in sport, etc. As regards rural homemakers’ clubs, the available data suggest that these organisations engage themselves in various 200

48

Cf. Herbst, Inny trzeci sektor…, op. cit.

80 100


initiatives promoting integration of women (mainly around cooking), and in various cultural and educational activities. ZĞůŝŐŝŽŶ

Cooking, cuisine

83

ĚƵĐĂƟŽŶ

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31


23

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WƌŽŵŽƚĞƐůŽĐĂůƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ

21

R

18 9

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ZĞͲĞŶĂĐƚŵĞŶƚŽĨƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇĂŶĚƚƌĂĚŝƟŽŶƐ ZƵŶƐĂĨŽůŬƚŚĞĂƚƌĞ ŽͲŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞƐĞǀĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚĨĞƐƟǀŝƟĞƐ ZƵŶƐĂĨŽůŬĚĂŶĐŝŶŐĞŶƐĞŵďůĞ

>ŽĐĂů͕ƐŽĐŝĂů͕ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ

KƚŚĞƌ 0

20

40

60

80 100

Activities of rural homemakers’ clubs

ŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůƉƌŽƚĞĐƟŽŶ >ĂǁĂŶĚůĂǁĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ͕ ŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂůĂĐƟǀŝƚǇ WƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů͕ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ͕͛ ƐĞĐƚŽƌĂůŝƐƐƵĞƐ >ĂďŽƵƌŵĂƌŬĞƚ͕ ǀŽĐĂƟŽŶĂůĂĐƟǀĂƟŽŶ

0 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Activities of parish communities

Figure 8.4. Areas of activity of non-formal or semi-formal entities * answers by parish communities – data for Poland Source: for rural homemakers’ clubs: Mencwel et al., Koła Gospodyń Wiejskich, op. cit.; for parish communities: Sektor non-profit w 2014 r.…, op. cit.

All this activity makes organisations important actors also due to develop ment processes, not only due to the scale of their operations but also due to their nature. Organisations provide an institutional “skeleton” for processes of social mobilisation, participation, innovation. Their value cannot be reduced to the value of services that they offer, but is also manifested in their mode of operation: their grass-roots character, quintessentially democratic structure, freedom of association and, last but not least, flexibility in adapting to the changing conditions and ability to combine activities across different areas – the latter being regarded by many as their weakness. However, even if we omit that aspect and look only at the “dry figures” showing their impact, we can appreciate their significance. For example, as the analysis of budget reports of local government units for 2017 indicates,49 the amount of PLN 2.15 billion was earmarked for the execution of statutory tasks of public entities at the municipal level alone – leaving aside much larger funds that LGUs receive outside of the overall subsidy allocation procedure due to their provision of specific tasks (e.g. under the Education Act or Social Welfare Act). Rural and rural-urban municipalities receive 27% (over PLN 570 million) of that aggregate amount, and that share increases from year to year. Even though these data are 49 Calculated by the author based on the data from RB28s reports made available by the Ministry of Finance.

201


usually quoted in the context of the “dependency” of organisations on public funds (such criticism being actually partly justified) or used to question the legitimacy of such expenditure, it should be recalled that, in their essence, these are always funds earmarked for performing specific public tasks. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of these funds are allocated to organisations following the procedure termed in the Act on Public Utility and Voluntary Activities as “support”, which means that such funds also include the organisations’ own financial or equivalent contribution that they need to document when using such funds. It should also be borne in mind that organisations do not pursue their activities solely for the local governments’ funds but also generate their own income or raise it from private sources. For instance, as regards rural associations and foundations (and from cities up to 20,000 residents), the most recent research by Klon/Jawor (2015) indicates that 61% of them use local government funding, and such funding represents 57% of revenue for an average such organisation. This is obviously a lot, but in fact the remaining 43% is the contribution of the organisations for local development activities, often in the spheres which have been completely neglected by the public actors and which are important for the public. Organisations not only “depend” on public funding and not only “cooperate” with the administration, but in many cases “replace” it – by addressing the pressing problems and niches of the local communities. This is for example the situation with care services for elderly and dependent persons, which, according to the available data (REGON, as at beginning of 2015), were provided, or at least registered as separate activity, by over 3,000 organisations across Poland, both in rural and urban areas. We deal with a similar situation in the education sector, in which non-go vernmental organisations already occupy a sizeable portion of the market: they run 2,000 kindergartens in rural and rural-urban municipalities50 and over 1,800 day care facilities. The share of non-public establishments in the kindergarten network, even excluding day care facilities, increased in rural areas51 from 5% to 36% over the last two decades. Such a trend is particularly well visible in rural areas, where non-public kindergartens represent 41% of all such facilities in Poland. Similar dynamics can also be observed in the data concerning education at primary school level. The consecutive reforms and consolidation of the school network have led to an increase in the number of establishments (small schools) taken over by organisations. In effect, today establishments run by associations, foundations and other social or denominational organisations represent nearly 10% of all primary schools in rural and rural-urban municipalities (10% in rural areas alone) and provide instruction to 3% of the student force in these areas (33,000 children in 2016). 202

50 51

According to GUS data for 2016, but including commercial entities. Rural and rural-urban municipalities.

rural Poland 2018. the Report on the state of rural areas 45 4540 40

35

35

30

30

25

25

20

20

1515 1010 55 0

01995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 % of non-public kindergartens in rural areas йŽĨƐĐŚŽŽůƐƌƵŶďǇƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐ͕ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŽƌƐŽĐŝĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶƐŝŶƌƵƌĂůĂƌĞĂƐ non-public in rural areas йŽĨƌƵƌĂůĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶŝŶƐĐŚŽŽůƐƌƵŶďǇƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐ͕ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŽƌƐŽĐŝĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶƐ йŽĨƐĐŚŽŽůƐƌƵŶďǇƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐ͕ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŽƌƐŽĐŝĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶƐŝŶƌƵƌĂůĂƌĞĂƐ %% ofof rural children inkindergartens non-public kindergartens 000 2001 2002 2003 2004% 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2015 2016 of rural children in non-public kindergartens 2013 2014 йŽĨƌƵƌĂůĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶŝŶƐĐŚŽŽůƐƌƵŶďǇƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐ͕ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŽƌƐŽĐŝĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶƐ

s in rural areas blic kindergartens

йŽĨƐĐŚŽŽůƐƌƵŶďǇƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐ͕ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŽƌƐŽĐŝĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶƐŝŶƌƵƌĂůĂƌĞĂƐ йŽĨƌƵƌĂůĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶŝŶƐĐŚŽŽůƐƌƵŶďǇƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐ͕ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŽƌƐŽĐŝĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƟŽŶƐ

Figure 8.5. NGOs and non-public entities in the education system in rural areas Source: prepared by the author based on BDL GUS data.

Concluding remarks All the above considerations do not aim to extol non-governmental organi sations nor exaggerate their real social role. The author of the present study has sufficiently long combined researching social activity with actually pursuing it to be aware of all the weaknesses of the non-governmental sector. The problem is how not to let these weaknesses overshadow the gargantuan work of NGOs, perhaps first and foremost in rural areas, where the conditions and “opportunities” for their development are certainly less propitious than in large cities. In addition, it would perhaps be worthwhile to part with artificial or historically rooted definition subtleties that may dim our perception and use of the potential imminent in the traditional social institutions of Poland’s rural areas, even if their modernisation and tapping their potential is not quite a straightforward issue, and even if they themselves are afflicted by many different problems or deficits. That, however, would probably merit a separate analysis.

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Pagina

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Jerzy Wilkin

Chapter 9. Evolution of rural areas and agriculture in Poland in 1918–2018 Introduction In the development of Poland’s rural areas and agriculture during the 100 years after regaining independence in 1918, no fewer than five periods can be identified, dissimilar in terms of institutional systems, the actual state bound aries, conditions of management, extent of economic and political freedom and the international situation, i.e.: 1. The interwar period – the Second Republic of Poland (1918–1939) 2. World War II (1939–1945) 3. Polish People’s Republic (PRL) – state socialism (1945–1989) 4. Post-socialist transformation and building of the Third Republic of Po land (1989–2004) 5. Poland in the European Union (post 2004) In each of these periods, subperiods – in some cases quite substantially different – can be distinguished. However, owing to the concise nature of the chapter, their detailed chronological description is not provided. When analysing such a long period of socio-economic transformation, every researcher will probably ask what is, and what should be, a theme binding such a broad range of analyses together. The description should not be merely idiographic, but should also incorporate a nomothetic analysis that attempts to identify the regularity or permanence of the analysed phenomena. The latter dimension of research underpins the formulation of scientific theory also in the humanities and social sciences. The succinct presentation of the evolution of rural areas and agriculture during the 100 years since Poland regained independence in 1918 aims to present both the elements of continuity, permanence and similarity in the situation of rural areas over that period and the distinctly differentiating features, including the specific characteristics of the individual periods. On another plane, the analysis aims to show whether, and how, rural areas were integrated with the economy, society and the state’s institutional system. Has the “joining of rural areas to Poland” actually taken place?

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9. Evolution of rural areas...

9.1. Waves of institutional and systemic reforms During the 100 years under analysis, on several occasions Poland had to undertake sweeping institutional reforms in order to adapt to the changed, sometimes drastically, internal and external conditions. The efficiently managed institutional adaptation that involved establishment of new institutions, modifying the existing ones, improving their coherence and complementarity, is a prerequisite for development, if not for survival of societies and economies alike. The main waves of institutional reforms (systemic and institutional transformation) could be summarised as follows: 1. Building the state post 1918. It was not rebuilding of the Polish state which had been erased from the map for over 123 years, but a comprehensive construction of the foundation of a sovereign state from scratch. The process first and foremost involved the legal and functional amalgamation of the three parts of Poland which had been under the rule of the neighbouring countries as a result of the Partitions. Forming a state’s legal system founded on the constitution as its pillar is an extremely complicated and as a rule lengthy process. In the case of Poland, that process had to be completed exceptionally quickly. In addition, the Polish state had to adapt to the international situation shaped in the aftermath of World War I. The treaty-based decisions altering the map of Europe were negotiated for several years after the war had ended. 2. The second stage of the systemic and institutional transformation took place after World War II. In many aspects, this was a similar process as in the case of building the Second Republic: when the war had ended, Poland was a country in ruin, its economy. The state borders had changed and a new international order emerged. After several years of post-war economic recovery (until 1948), the process intended to lay the institutional foundations for the socialist state, including socialised, planned economy and authoritarian rule, was begun. The system in question survived until the end of 1989. 3. The post-socialist systemic transition began following the election of the so-called Contract Sejm, appointment of Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s government and implementation of a package of economic reforms led by deputy prime minister Leszek Balcerowicz. The characteristic features of the new political and economic system included introduction of market mechanisms as the

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For more information on institutional determinants of growth see: J. Wilkin, Instytucjonalne i kulturowe podstawy gospodarowania. Humanistyczna perspektywa ekonomii, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 2016. The major role of deeply rooted so-called informal institutions (including “mental habits”) is demonstrated by the long-lasting nature of many developmental gaps inherited from the era of the Partitions and visible to this day.


basis underpinning the new economic system, privatisation of the bulk of the manufacturing assets, opening up of the economy to international contacts and competition and building the foundations of the rule of law and parliamentary democracy. The 15 years of building the foundations for the Third Republic (1989-2004) proved so effective and productive that Poland was able to join the European Union in 2004. 4.The year 2004 opened a new stage of the reconstruction of the institutional system of both the Polish economy and the Polish state. Poland had to adapt to the demanding political and democratic standards embraced by the EU and to the single European market, and to lay the institutional foundations for the implementation of many Community policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). As we can see, Poland has undergone four huge institutional and sys temic transformations within a space of 100 years. In these changes, and in the processes of socio-economic development taking place in such a volatile and turbulent historical context, rural areas and agriculture played a major role, which more often than not is neither duly realised nor appreciated. The forthcoming centenary of Poland’s regaining independence after 123 years of foreign rule offers a good opportunity to recall and clarify that role. In the interwar period, during World War II and shortly thereafter, most of the population of Poland lived in rural areas, and work in agriculture provided the main source of subsistence for rural residents. In the interwar period, over 70% of the country’s population lived in rural areas. Throughout that period, mainly peasants working small farms were rural residents, employed in agriculture. In the interwar period, the peasant population accounted for 51-52% of Poland’s overall population and some 70% of rural population.

9.2. “Joining rural areas to Poland” in the interwar period The aforementioned 100-year period is an opportunity to trace the evolu tion of the rural economy in the changing systemic conditions, and also to demonstrate how rural and farmers’ communities integrated with the country at large, with the nation, the Polish state, its interests and identity. The process That is the aim of the research project entitled: “Continuity and change – one hundred years of Polish countryside (1918-2018)”, being carried out at the Institute of Rural and Agriculture Development of the Polish Academy of Sciences (IRWIR PAN). The present chapter refers on many occasions to studies conducted as part of the said project. It should be borne in mind that peasant economy is the oldest, most common and longest functioning system of management and social life in history.

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of “joining rural areas to Poland” was not only limited to the interwar period when it was of paramount importance, but also covered the years after World War II and post 1989. In order to understand that long-term evolution, we need to go further back, particularly to the reform granting property rights to peasants in the Kingdom of Poland (1864) and similar reforms conducted in the territory of Poland remaining under the rule of the other partitioning powers. Of necessity, the time frame of our analysis is therefore extended. In the opinion of researchers, farmers and rural residents alike, expressed in such forms as diaries, memoirs or accounts, the legacy of these reforms which took place in different periods and on different terms in each of the three parts of the partitioned Poland played a significant part in the later development of rural areas and agriculture, also when Poland had regained independence after 1918. According to William Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, eminent researchers of Polish peasantry in the 19th century and in the early 20th century: After the completion of the process of granting land and property rights to peasants, their situation did not initially improve, and in some cases even deteriorated in comparison with how they had lived before. Although they had been released from the levies and obligations to be performed for their lord, they had to pay high taxes; they could not look to anyone for help in emergency and often lacked the necessary financial and moral preparation for managing their farms on their own. Gradually, however, they would adapt to the new conditions. Sometimes in the first generation, but as a rule in the second or third, a strong need for economic advancement would arise in them, a “force that pushes one forward”, as one of the peasants put it. In the interwar period (1918–1939), some attempts were made to pursue a state policy that was intended to support the development of agriculture and rural areas. Its major part included a series of agrarian reforms that increased access of the rural population to their main means of production – agricultural land. These reforms aimed to fulfil a number of economic, social and political objectives. One major goal of these reforms was to alleviate a sense of deprivation and humiliation of peasantry, another – to increase a sense of empowerment of peasants and rural residents in the system of the functioning, reborn Polish state. Quite understandably, the conditions of enslavement, poverty and humi liation in which peasants had lived for centuries, engendered fury, hate and cruelty, which led to peasant uprising and wars. In Poland, their best known example was the Peasant Uprising of 1846 led by Jakub Szela, described in literature and legendary among peasants. Andrzej Leder wrote: 208

W.I. Thomas, F. Znaniecki, Chłop polski w Europie i Ameryce, LSW, Warsaw 1976, pp. 163-164.


In my opinion, cruelty performs a ‘dignifying’ role in peasant wars. To settle the score for the centuries of amassed injustice, for the disdain with which they were treated, and the humiliating hopelessness with which they bore such disdain, for the imaginary superiority of the phantasmatic figure of the master and the humiliating pleasure with which they trans-passively succumbed to such superiority, peasants wished not only for their master to die, but wanted to strip the master of his dignity, to take it away from him, to use it at will. In turn, Wincenty Witos in his memoirs wrote about Szela’s Uprising (Galicia 1846) as follows: Szela’s name was known practically to every peasant and uttered with respect. The old would boast that they had seen him in person; the young would listen enthralled to stories about him. Not everybody was familiar with his deeds and not everybody looked at them in the same way. However, practically everybody agreed that had Szela slaughtered the noblemen, not only peasants would have become completely free, but also the noblemen’s estates would have been theirs to own. The granting of property rights to peasants, first introduced in the part of Poland under Prussian rule, was only one of the factors that fostered the development of agriculture, particularly in the long term. It was an institutional factor, because the property rights granted to farmers allowed them to better manage their workplace, and the ownership change provided major stimuli to invest and develop the farm. This correlation has been widely discussed in property rights economics. The situation of peasants and other farmers largely depended on the overall development level of a given region as it determined opportunities for finding jobs outside agriculture, boosted the development of the agri-food industry, capacity of the sales market for agricultural produce and the structure and profitability of farms. What also mattered was the region’s location in relation to the centre of the country and its best-developed parts. From such a perspective, best opportunities for growth could be found in the Greater Poland region (Wielkopolskie), and the worst in Galicia, a backwarded and peripheral province of Austro-Hungary. However, acquisition of land, by parcelling out, allocation or purchase, did not guarantee to its new owners or users economic independence, chances for a decent income or development. They did not have sufficient means of production (seeds, fertilizers, tools), traction power and access to funding (loan market). In many cases, they also lacked the requisite knowledge needed for independent farm management in market conditions. A. Leder, Prześniona rewolucja. Ćwiczenia z logiki historycznej, Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej, Warsaw 2014, p. 109. W. Witos, Moje wspomnienia, LSW, Warsaw 1978, p. 141.

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9.3. The difficult independence The war activities of 1914–1918 left Poland’s rural areas in complete ruin. Nearly 90% of rural areas were affected by military action. According to estimates, 1,650,000 buildings, mostly rural and agricultural, were demolished. The share of destroyed residential and farm buildings reached 22% of the total number of buildings. The cattle population fell by 30%; there was a shortage of workforce and equipment. Despite huge demand for food, in 1920 about 3.5 million hectares of arable land lay waste. It is estimated that in 1920, that is after the end of World War I and the Polish-Soviet War, cereal crops in Galicia, the former Kingdom of Poland and the western voivodships did not exceed 38% of their pre-war level. There was an acute shortage of means of production that would make it possible to use both arable land and the huge pool of labour. The peasant question and the agrarian question were among the most pressing and crucial political and social problems of the Reborn Republic. Tension increased in rural areas, coupled with demands for radical economic and political reforms. In November 1918, the peasant leaders proclaimed the Republic of Tarnobrzeg. Throughout the entire interwar period, 60%-64% of the country’s population lived from agriculture. In the analysed period (1918-2018), all socio-economic, political and cultural institutions that were the pillars of economic growth and political and social life were subject to change. The borders of the Polish state also changed, which makes the analysis of evolution processes in rural areas and agriculture even more complex. In the two decades between World War I and World War II, in addition to the need to cope with the war damages, uniting the country and establishing the institutional foundations of a modern state, half through that period an economic crisis broke out (1929–1933), which proved to be the most severe crisis of the 20th century and which led to a drop in the Gross Domestic Product by over 30%. Unlike the changes in the level of industrial output, the volume of GDP and increased unemployment, the severity of the crisis in agriculture did not mean a falling agricultural output, but a drastic deterioration of the economic conditions for the functioning of agriculture. These harsh conditions were evidenced e.g. by the so-called price scissors, that is an abrupt change in the relation between prices of agricultural 210

J. Gościcki, Dziesięciolecie rolnictwa, in: Dziesięciolecie Polski odrodzonej 1918-1928, 2nd ed., Ilustrowany Kuryer Codzienny, Kraków – Warsaw 1933, p. 943. S. Inglot (ed.), Historia chłopów polskich, Vol. III, LSW, Warsaw 1980, p. 27.


produce and the prices of products bought by farmers. In effect, farmers had to sell nearly three times more agricultural produce than before the crisis to buy the same products that they needed to buy both for their households and for farming production. The burden of the crisis was therefore mainly borne by peasants.

9.4. Agrarian reforms as institutionalisation of social and economic transformation of rural areas Although the notion of agrarian reforms is used interchangeably with that of agricultural reforms, either of them can mean a different perspective and scope. In his analysis of the first decade following the regaining of inde pendence (1918–1928), Karol Kasiński argued that: Although the notion of agricultural reform should encompass all issues associated with the overhaul of the agricultural system and all of the constituent elements of the process, the practice here in the first years of independence, quite inadequately, was to use the term only to denote the division of larger land estates into small farms and plots of land. In effect, the understanding of the agricultural reform was unduly narrowed, as it concurrently and inter dependently comprises the issues of amalgamation, parcelling out, liquidation of servitude and division of common land.10 The huge significance of the agricultural reforms for the development of agriculture, the economy and political situation in the country was well visible and appreciated from the very first days of independent Poland. The first action introducing the agricultural reform was the resolution of the Sejm dated 10 July 1919 and the Act on the Implementation of the Agricultural Reform, passed a year later (15 July 1920). These activities, however, only comprised the division of larger properties owned by the state, the Church and private individuals, and mainly played a propaganda role: their objective was to win the support of the peasants for the new government and state and to popularise patriotic attitudes in the face of external threats to the newly regained independence. Military activities (Polish-Soviet War) and the absence of a Constitution hampered the introduction of agrarian reforms in an allencompassing, comprehensive and rational manner. In 1923, the Ministry for Agricultural Reform was established, which, in collaboration with the Ministry for Agriculture was to lead the large-scale redevelopment of the agricultural system in Poland. To accelerate the process, the Act on the Introduction of the Agricultural Reform was crucially passed on 28 December 1925. The number 10

K. Kasiński, Reforma rolna, in: Dziesięciolecie Polski odrodzonej, op. cit. p. 992.

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of regulated agricultural holdings increased from 62 in 1919 to 13,934 in 1926 and 49,746 in 1928.11 In 1932, the Ministry for Agriculture was merged with the Ministry for Agricultural Reform. The new ministry had a broad range of activity. In addition to promoting development of agriculture and continuation of insti tutional reforms (including parcelling out of land), it dealt with farming education, veterinary care, food provision, land amalgamation, liquidation of servitude, etc. The implementation of the reforms was significantly affected by the adop tion of a new Constitution on 17 March 1921, which espoused the principle of private property protection. Earlier, land owned by large holdings could be expropriated against partial compensation. Once the Constitution was adopted in 1921, the compensation for the expropriated land had to be 100% of the market price for the land. Nonetheless, the agricultural reforms, including creation and enlargement of small farms, were stepped up. According to Kazimierz Konopka: “Despite various difficulties, the changes in Polish agri culture were going ahead. Throughout the interwar period, 2.65 million ha of land was expropriated, parcelled out and sold to smallholders and landless peasants, and 5.5 million ha of land in peasant farms was amalgamated”.12 Over half (more than 1.4 million ha) of the parcelled-out land was passed to newly created farms; in the analysed period, their number totalled nearly 154,000, whilst an average farm area was 9.3 ha. The aggregate number of farms created in the interwar period as a result of parcelling out of land was 694,400, with an average areas of 3.8 ha.13 By comparison, in the agricultural reform implemented in the Polish People’s Republic in 1944–1948, over 6 million land was parcelled out, the number of created farms was 1,068,000, and the average area of land allocated to one farm was 5.7 ha.14 The liquidation of servitude, associated mainly with the peasants’ right to use forests and pastures owned by large landowners, was a major and com plicated aspect of the agrarian reform. Nearly 100,000 holdings were bene ficiaries of those residues of old peasant privileges15 that led to conflicts and made it difficult to use land (including forests), being paid an average Ibid., p. 994. K. Konopka, Reformy agrarne a mechanizm rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczego w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (1918-1939), Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Białostockiej, Białystok 2014, p. 174. 13 Historia Polski w liczbach. Polska w Europie, Vol. III, Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Warsaw 2014, p. 226. 14 Ibid., p. 227. 15 A detailed description of the liquidation of servitude and the accompanying disputes in the Zamojski Entail is found in Albin Koprukowniak’s study. The following data show the scale of the problem, in the aforementioned entail alone: “After the 1864 granting property rights to land to peasants, the entail was obliged to provide servitude to 346 villages with 15,962 “entitled farms”. Cf. A. Koprukowniak, Likwidacja serwitutów w Ordynacji Zamojskiej (1920-1932), Rocznik Lubelski, No. 3, pp. 226-240. 11

12

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compensation of 3 ha per farm.16 Until 1927, the abolition of servitude was done by voluntary agreements, and became compulsory after the promulgation of the Decree of the President of the Republic of Poland in 1927. The agricultural reform, just as any sweeping institutional reform, led to political disputes and conflicts which accompanied the agrarian reforms throughout the two decades of the interwar period. There was a clear conflict of interest, manifested also on the political arena, between the peasantry, a social group that predominated in agriculture and in rural areas, and landowners, especially large ones. The strong political significance of large landowners, however, increasingly met with organised resistance of peasants working small and medium-sized farms. Mieczysław Mieszczankowski, one of the key analysts of the agrarian structure in the interwar period, included agricultural holdings with 50 ha or over in size as large land properties. They also included forest areas, which, especially in the case of largest holdings (estates), (over 1,000 ha) occupied slightly over 50% of their area. In 1921, estates with an area over 1,000 ha represented 60.5% of all land held by landowners (using Mieszczankowski’s terminology). the average acreage of holdings in that property group was 3,000 ha. Among them, huge latifundia held by aristocratic families prevailed: Zamojski (191,000 ha), Radziwiłł (177,000 ha), Potocki (19,000 ha), Czartoryski, Lubomirski and many others. These estates were extensive in character, and over half of them were covered by forests.17 That the agrarian reforms in the interwar period had only a modest impact on reducing the sector of huge land holdings is evidenced by the fact that, while in 1921 holdings with an area over 100 ha covered 35.4% of all agricultural land, that share fell to a mere 27.6% in 1938.18 The economic and political situation in Poland in the 1930s (the after math of the 1926 Coup d’État, including the incarceration of the peasant leader Wincenty Witos, and the subsequent economic crisis) radicalised the peasants. This led to a series of strikes and protests on the part of the peasant population, particularly in Lesser Poland (Małopolska). In 1936, a demonstration was mounted by peasant activists in the district of Przeworsk with some 100,000-150,000 participating peasants.19 Their main demands were political in character, relating to elections and a new constitution. Throughout the Second Republic of Poland, particularly in the first years after regaining independence and then later in the mid-1930s, there emerged a group of genuine and influential peasant leaders, able to assume high-ranking positions in the state’s political structures. Unquestionably most eminent K. Kasiński, Reforma rolna, op. cit., p. 993. M. Mieszczankowski, Struktura agrarna Polski międzywojennej, PWN, Warsaw 1960, p. 21. Historia Polski w liczbach, op. cit., p. 233. 19 K. Przybysz, Chłopi polscy wobec okupacji hitlerowskiej 1939-1945, LSW, Warsaw 16 17 18

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of them was Wincenty Witos, three times the prime minister in the Second Republic.20 Despite the outstanding services of this politician for Poland’s development and his role in the empowerment of Poland’s rural areas and their integration with the state, after the 1926 Coup d’État he was condemned as an enemy of Polish statehood and imprisoned. In his memoirs, he wrote the following about those times and the role played by Józef Piłsudski: “Mr Piłsudski had gone to eternity regarded as a paragon of all virtues and excellence, and the place accorded to him for eternal rest was one meant for the nation’s greatest. I was slandered by him and ill-treated, stripped of the fruits of my work by his supporters and lackeys. Piłsudski was the first to believe in his grandeur and historic services, and made an inviolable canon of it”.21 Other notable peasant leaders of the day included Maciej Rataj, Speaker of the Sejm. In the interwar period, PSL “Piast” was the major national peasant party. In that period, there were several political groupings organising peasants that played quite a significant role in the political system of the state. Peasant parties had the strongest political position in the first years after regaining independence, which was marginalised during the rule of the Sanation (Sanacja) camp grouping Piłsudski’s followers. While in the 1919 election peasant parties won 117 seats, that number fell to merely 48 in the 1930 election. As Jan Borkowski wrote: “The Brześć election crowned the ‘master’s’ policy, summarised in the slogan: ‘peasants are good for forks and manure’ (…) The Sanation camp could vote any act through the Sejm without asking the opinion of peasant or workers’ MPs”.22

9.5. The fight of peasants and the fight for peasants In the interwar period and shortly after World War II, and during the postsocialist transformation, some political and economic programmes appeared which promoted the interests of smallholders and landless rural residents. In each of these periods, the aim of such programmes was to win the support of rural residents and rural proletariat to the proposed systemic and institutional changes and interests of the new ruling camp. In effect, they led to agricultural reforms that changed the structure of agricultural holdings, which involved land fragmentation and increase in the number of small and very small farms. This was what happened with the subsequent agrarian reforms in the Second

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20 Despite the many years of Witos’ participation in parliamentary work and in holding highest state functions, for over 20 years (1908-1931) he also served as a mayor in his home municipality (W. Witos, Moje wspomnienia, op. cit., p. 7). 21 W. Witos, Moje wspomnienia, LSW, Warsaw 1990, Vol. 2, p. 482. 22 J. Borkowski, Działalność społeczno-polityczna i postawa chłopów w latach 1918-1939, in: Historia chłopów polskich, op. cit., p. 231.


Republic as a result of the Decree of the Polish Committee for National Liberation (PKWN) on agricultural reform in 1944 and the ensuing reforms in the Polish People’s Republic. Similarly, post 1989 the transformation of large-acreage state farms (PGR) was aimed to pass over land to family farms, typically rather small in size. Leder characterised that process as follows: “It seems that in 1944 the communists were aware that winning peasants over and destroying the political and cultural supremacy of the landed gentry is vitally important for them. (…) The material and financial status of various social groups, strata and classes more and more diverged from the pre-war one, legitimised by tradition. To make revolution a reality in an agrarian society such as the Polish one, a change in the ownership of land and an agricultural reform had to be effected.”23 Characteristically, both in the interwar period and after World War II, the new authorities made attempts to win the political support of peasants as the most numerous social group, by proclaiming and partly introducing agricultural reforms to strengthen the holding of land by smaller farms and landless population. However, after the consolidation of power, those processes were halted, which is well illustrated by the history of the agrarian reforms in the 1930s, which upheld the role of landed gentry, and post 1948 (collectivisation). 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0

80.00%

70.00% 60.00% 50.00% 40.00% 30.00% 20.00% 10.00% 1921

1931

1950

1960

1970

N million

1980

1990

2000

2010

0.00%

%

Figure 9.1. Population in rural areas 1921-2010 Source: a study by M. Halamska and D. Zwęglińska prepared under an IRWiR PAN project (2018).

Although the rural – and farming – population potentially represented a major political force (Fig. 9.1), it was not able except in short periods in the interwar period to form influential political parties (peasant parties were 23

A. Leder, op. cit. , pp. 95, 129.

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divided and conflicted) or strong organisations and elect charismatic leaders (Wincenty Witos was an exception), which would allow for real empowerment and gaining a major role in the structure of political power. This is particularly true in relation to the period after World War II.

9.6. Rural areas and agriculture during the Polish People’s Republic The period comprising the years 1944–1989 was not homogeneous in terms of institutional and systemic conditions. Nevertheless, their key feature was the dominant political role of the communist authorities, installed by the Soviet Union in the wake of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements and their attempts, undertaken with varying intensity and effect, to establish a political and economic system typical of so-called state socialism, also known as Soviet-style socialism. It goes without saying that the process in question affected Poland’s rural areas and agriculture. It should be strongly emphasised, however, that the process of building socialism in Poland’s rural areas met with more resistance and was less successful than in other major spheres of the economy and society. Polish peasants modified Polish socialism more than any other social group. In 1988, I summarised it thus: “The vicissitudes of peasants and peasant economy in socialist countries represent one of the most tumultuous, dramatic and complex elements of modern history. These vicissitudes, despite various trends, varieties and turbulences in individual socialist countries, clearly form a trail of events and processes that largely modified the shape of the economy and society in those countries. Even more importantly, such modification does not affect secondary issues as it reaches the very basis of the economic system, social institutions, fundamental regulations of law and ideology”.24 That remark in its broadest sense applied to Poland. World War II left rural areas and agriculture in utter ruin, and the consequences of war damages were felt for many years to come. This is what economy historian Jan Kaliński wrote about it: “Post-war renewal of agriculture was a much more difficult process than rebuilding industry from ruin. In 1949, livestock farming was still at a lower level than in the interwar period, both with regard to the former and current shape of Poland. Similarly, plant production had not reached the pre-war level at that time”.25 This re sembles the situation of agriculture and rural areas post World War I, when

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24 J. Wilkin, Chłopski składnik losów gospodarki socjalistycznej (ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem polskich doświadczeń), in: J. Wilkin (ed.), Gospodarka chłopska w systemie gospodarki socjalistycznej. Podstawy i skuteczność mechanizmów adaptacji. WNE UW, Warsaw 1988, p. 8. 25 J. Kaliński, Gospodarka w PRL, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Warsaw 2012, p. 63.


reaching the level from before the war took longer than in the non-agricultural sectors of the economy. The characteristic feature of the period post World War II was the size of the rural population in Poland which still remained at a level of 15 million. What had changed was the share of that population in the country’s overall population: from over 60% shortly after the war to nearly 40% at present (see also Fig. 9.1). Therefore, it can be said that, in the period of the Polish People’s Republic, rural areas gave to cities nearly all of its natural increase. It should be noted, however, that post 2000 the migration trends had changed regarding movement between rural and urban areas – contemporarily the influx of the population to rural areas is greater than the outflow from rural areas to cities. The emergence of a large group of so-called farmer-workers brought about serious consequences for the socio-economic structure of rural areas and the material situation of their residents in the Polish People’s Republic. These were holders of usually very small farms who, without abandoning farming activity, took a job in industrial or service plants in cities. That phenomenon dates back to the period of socialist industrialisation in the late 1940s, defined by Marta Błąd26 as multi-skilling, lasted on an increasing scale until the end of the 1970s, and comprised over a million farms. It is estimated that one in three farmers (whether farm holders or users) took up employment outside agriculture during that period. The phenomenon had a positive bearing on the income level of farmers’ families, but also petrified the fragmented structure of Polish agriculture. The major events for the situation in rural areas in the first post-war years included the agricultural reform initiated by the PKWN Decree of 6 September 1944, mass migration coupled with settlement of the population in the so-called Regained Territories (Western and Northern Poland) and the Three-Year Plan of Economic Recovery (1947–1949). It was also a period of various clashing political forces, disputes concerning the shape of the state and the economy and of consolidation of the communist rule in Poland. On 1 March 1945 the Regulation of the Minister for Agriculture and Agricultural Reforms on the said Decree was published, which radically changed the structure of Polish agriculture. As a result of these reforms land was strongly fragmented, the landed gentry was liquidated as a social group and a major segment of agriculture and the number and share of small agricultural holdings increased. Land estates owned by the gentry were parcelled out, so as larger farms with an area over 50 ha (and 100 ha in some parts of the country). Parcelled-out land could be held by landless peasants, farm labourers and 26 M. Błąd, Wielozawodowość w rodzinach rolniczych. Przyczyny, uwarunkowania i tendencje rozwoju. IRWIR PAN, Warsaw 2011.

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owners of very small farms. The aforementioned Regulation adopted the following definition of farms which were eligible to increase their size as a result of the agricultural reform: “§ 2. Farms smaller in size than 2 ha are regarded as dwarf holdings, farms between 2 and 5 ha – as small holdings, and farms with 5 to 10 ha of agricultural land, whose holders have large families, are regarded as medium farms, eligible under the agricultural reform”.27 Over a million families were beneficiaries of the agricultural reform (1945– 1950); they started new farms or enlarged the existing ones. To this end, 2.3 million ha were allocated in the territory of pre-war Poland (so-called Old Territories). Additional opportunities to acquire land were available due to the settlement of the Western and Northern Poland, where 4.7 million people had settled by 1950. Over half of the settlers came from the central and southern regions of Poland, and the rest from the former territories of Poland, now incorporated into the Soviet Union, and from other countries. However, the agricultural reform and the settlement of the Western and Northern Territories failed to get rid of huge overpopulation in rural areas. It is estimated that in the late 1940s and the early 1950s, agrarian overpopulation (also termed hidden unemployment) totalled 1.3 million people.28 Rural areas remained overpopulated for the decades to come, and in the early 1990s its scale was estimated at about 900,000. The source of the phenomenon can be found in the deficient agrarian structure dominated by small farms (up to 5 ha in size), which in various ways bound the workforce with agriculture, but could offer neither full employment nor sufficient income. Agrarian overpopulation is regarded as superfluous employment in agriculture, and its elimination does not diminish agricultural output; it is assumed that the so-called marginal productivity of the group in question is equal or close to zero. Throughout the period of the Polish People’s Republic, despite the in troduced agrarian reforms, including the agricultural reform and later collectivisation attempts, relatively small holdings remained the pillars on which Polish agriculture was founded. In 1990, that is after the end of the PRL regime, an average agricultural holding had an area of merely about 7 ha, which was a similar size as in 1949, at the onset of the transformation in agriculture. Over 77% of agricultural land was held by individual farms. Also in the period that followed, i.e. 1990-2018, Poland’s agrarian structure did not substantially diverge from the model that prevailed throughout the hundred years of independent Poland described in this study. It is the structural element that can be considered an aspect of continuity in the image of Polish agriculture in the long period in question. Such an agrarian structure, based on 218

27 Regulation of the Minister for Agriculture and Agricultural Reforms dated 1 March 1945 on the implementation of the PKWN Decree of 6 September 1944. 28 J. Kaliński, Gospodarka w PRL, op. cit., p. 63.


the prevalence of small family farms, was the mainstay of peasant economy and culture. The prominent role of peasantry in Poland’s social and economic structure has been a characteristic and distinguishing feature of our country in comparison to contemporary Europe.

9.7. Attempts at collectivisation of agriculture At the end of 1948, the new leadership of the Polish Workers’ Party (Pol ska Partia Robotnicza – PPR) resolved to step up the collectivisation of agri culture (also termed socialisation of agriculture). In socialist countries, hold ings based on both collective and state forms of ownership were regarded as collective farms. In the initial period of collectivisation (1949–1953), setting up production cooperatives on the basis of small farms was regarded a priority. At the end of the day, that form of collectivisation proved a failure in Poland. Despite a massive propaganda campaign and various forms of pressure imposed on individual farmers to persuade them to contribute labour, land, traction power or means of production to cooperative farms, the effects of collectivisation were negligible. In its peak (1953), 9.6% of agricultural land was held by production cooperatives, which produced ca. 8% of global output in agriculture. Starting from 1953, the sector of production cooperatives shrank in size, and in 1960–1990 occupied only 1.2-4.0% of agricultural land. State-owned farms (PGR), established starting from 1949, were yet an other form of collectivisation in agriculture. Some of them were created from former State Agricultural Properties and State Animal Breeding Farms (especially horses). State-owned farms were most widespread in Western and Northern Poland, where they had been set up on the land and estates formerly held by Prussian landowners. After the failure of collectivisation in the form of cooperativisation of agriculture in the1950s the communist authorities focused on developing the sector of state-owned farms. That direction of “socialisation” of agri culture, motivated mainly by ideological aspects, was further strengthened in the so-called “Gierek era”, in the 1970s. The state-owned sector of agriculture was injected, among others, with the pool of arable land no longer in private use (also from individual farms passed over to the state in return for old-age and disability entitlement). The process was also continued in the 1980s. In the final years of the Polish People’s Republic, the state sector comprised nearly 20% of agricultural land compared to a mere 6.8% in 1946. An additional tool for socialisation of agriculture in the period of the PRL was extending state and cooperative control over the sector of supplies, providing agriculture

219


with means of production, and over the purchasing system, processing and distribution of agri-food products. Through centralised control of these links in the agri-food complex, that is the upstream and downstream sectors of agri-food economy, the communist authorities tried to subordinate the entire agricultural sector, the bulk of which was made up of small private holdings. This was a peculiar feature of the “socialisation” of agriculture in Poland, which largely stemmed from the failure in the attempts to collectivise agriculture, which was present on a much more wider scale than in other socialist countries, where cooperative and state owned farms occupied 80-90% of land. Not being able to enforce the transformation of peasant-owned, individual agriculture into collective farms reporting to centralised management of the economy, in addition to the controlling of the upstream and downstream sectors the authorities of the socialist state imposed obligatory quota of agri cultural produce supplies on farmers, dependent on the size of the farm, to be sold at administrative, relatively low prices. In many respects, this resembled the compulsory supplies imposed by the Nazi authorities during World War II. Compulsory supplies were not abolished until 1972 during the “Gierek era”. In the same year, individual farmers were granted access to public health care on similar terms as public sector employees. In 1977, individual farmers were partly included in the old-age pension system. Full social security (health, disability pensions and old-age pensions) for farmers was not introduced until the Act of 20 December 1990 r. (so-called KRUS reform). It was a very important step in the process dubbed here as the “joining of rural areas to Poland”.

9.8. Post-socialist transformation of Polish agriculture (1989–2003)

220

At the turn of the 1980s, as a result of the liberalisation of the market for agricultural and food products and releasing prices from administrative control, the incomes of agricultural producers considerably increased. In 1988 and 1989, the so-called agricultural income parity for the first time exceeded 100%, which meant that the income of farmers, in terms of an individual with full-time employment in agriculture, exceeded the individual income level in the entire national economy. This was a result of closing the painful gap between supply and demand on the agricultural market, when demand for food products significantly exceeded supply. It also occurred after a long period of rationing many food products (so-called coupon system), which was introduced in the early 1980s. These developments encouraged optimistic


expectations among farmers, associated with the liberalisation of the economic system and strengthening of the role of the market. The majority of farmers, who were working on their own land and were better adjusted to market conditions than most of the employed population, were convinced that they would do well in the new economy transformed by reforms of the so-called Balcerowicz Plan. However, they very quickly discovered that the conditions under the new system created by the reforms, including opening up of the economy to international competition and drastic cuts in state support for agriculture within the framework of the new agricultural policy, would create difficulties. The employees of former PGRs were in a particularly difficult situation, especially in regions where these farms occupied the greatest areas of farmland (Western and Northern Poland). Lack of appropriate institutional solutions for the state agricultural farms sector, which had over 400,000 employees at the end of the 1980s, bankruptcy of most of these farms and absence of alternative employment, created huge areas of poverty and social exclusion, the symptoms and consequences of which are still felt today. Restructuring and privatisation of land and production assets of the former PGR farms taken over by the State Treasury became a method which led to the creation of an entire new sector of large, private farms owned by individuals as well as legal entities. The State Treasury Agency for Agricultural Property took over 3.7 million hectares of agricultural land. The existing individual farms as well as newly created ones, usually with large areas of farmland, were expanded using these resources by way of purchase or lease. By 2010, a group of 7,600 farms with an area of 100 ha or more had been formed, including over 1,100 farms with an area of over 300 ha.29 The Agricultural Policy Act passed in 2003 established a 300 ha limit for an individual farm. However, it was possible to increase this area by leasehold. During the period 1989-2003 the relationship between prices of agricultural products sold by farmers and those bought for individual households and agricultural production (so-called price scissors) was highly unfavourable for the farmers. Only for five years was the price relationship index favourable for the farmers (over 100), being unfavourable for ten years. The situation was most unfavourable in 1990 and 1991, which was the very beginning of the sys temic transformation.30 The rapid growth of unemployment, in the entire economy as well as in rural regions, had a significant negative impact on the occupational 29 W. Dzun, Wpływ utworzenia i rozdysponowania Zasobu Własności Rolnej SP na strukturę własnościową, prawno-organizacyjną i obszarową gospodarstw rolnych w Polsce (unpublished) IRWiR PAN, Warsaw 2017. 30 A. Woś, W poszukiwaniu modelu rozwoju polskiego rolnictwa, IERiGŻ, Warsaw 2004, p. 65.

221


222

situation as well as incomes of the rural population. Rural areas, and farms in particular, had to accommodate hundreds of thousands of people laid off by enterprises which were either going bankrupt or undergoing severe restructuring (including in particular the so-called peasant-worker group). This was another instance when the rural areas served as a shock absorber for development turbulences, the “warehouse” for workforce redundant in periods of economic crisis. A similar phenomenon could be observed during the Great Depression of the interwar period (1929–1933). Summarising the experience of Polish agriculture in the 1990s and the beginning of the following decade (after Poland’s accession to the EU), we may conclude that: • the speed of structural changes in agriculture was very low during this period, which neither improved the competitiveness of Polish agriculture nor increased incomes of the sector of the population depending mainly or exclusively on agriculture for their livelihood. Particularly adverse financial conditions for agriculture were recorded in 1996. An important factor which petrified the structure of Polish agriculture was the situation on the labour market outside agriculture, including high unemployment; • the economic condition of most Polish farms deteriorated during this period, mainly due to unfavourable price relations and absence of financ ing for modernising farms and improving their productivity. Only some 10% of farms had any development capability at that time; • given the existing needs, public support for agriculture during this period was negligible and mainly concentrated on financing social security benefits by KRUS – the Agricultural Social Security Institution. The policy of supporting prices and producer incomes was implemented mainly by trade policy tools (high import duties) and subsidised farmer loans; • from 1991 until as late as 2003, the negative balance of trade in agri cultural and food products continued, while a large portion of Polish agricultural potential remained unutilised; • rural residents were pessimistic, with a negative approach to agricultural policy fear of the consequences of Poland’s accession to the EU; • as a result of the implementation of the so-called pre-accession programmes in 2000, financed by the EU, especially the SAPARD programme, focused on supporting the development of agriculture and rural areas, as well as the extensive information campaign presenting the potential benefits of European integration, in the accession referendum held in August 2003, 66% of the rural population supported Poland’s membership of the EU.


9.9. Poland’s rural areas in the European Union On 1 May 2004, Poland became a full member of the European Union and could start utilising EU programmes and funds available to its members. For Polish farmers and the rural population, the most important factor was access to the funds, tools and activities offered by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which is the largest and most expensive policy of the European Union. A very important advantage for farmers and other participants of the agricultural and food sector was free access of Polish producers to the common European (EU) market embracing 27 countries and over 500 million consumers. As it very quickly transpired, both farmers as well as food processors and distributors were capable of adjusting to the conditions of this huge and highly competitive market, which was clearly and succinctly demonstrated by the growing trade balance in agricultural and food products. The availability of EU direct payments for nearly 90% of Polish farmers had a great positive impact on the level of their incomes as well as the ability to modernise and develop their farms. The share of EU transfers in farm incomes reached 50%. EU financial support for investments in these farms reached a similar level. CAP also includes a portion of activities and payments aimed at developing rural areas, the so-called Second Pillar of the CAP. Poland became the greatest beneficiary of this portion of CAP in the entire European Union. Despite budget restrictions in the present financing period (2014-2020) in the EU, Polish negotiators were able to negotiate CAP funding for our country for a total amount of EUR 32.1 billion, that is 12% more than in the previous financing period (2007-2013). With the consent of the European Commission, the Polish government decided to shift 25% of Second Pillar CAP funds to direct payments, believing them to be the most efficient method of farmer support which brings the best results. Another positive factor for the development of agriculture since 2004 was the stable and predictable (usually over seven-year periods) agricultural policy, including financial instruments and means associated with it. Before EU accession, Polish agricultural policy underwent frequent changes, usually in line with changes in the position of Minister of Agriculture. The situation of farmers and the rural population has improved during the period of Poland’s EU membership not only as a result of using CAP funds. Rural areas benefit from development support from other EU funds and programmes. The Cohesion Policy, to which the EU currently allocates the largest amount of funds from the common budget, is of particular importance for the poorest regions of our country.

223


A permanent cause for concern during the entire post-war period continues to be significant decline in farmland area, which is increasingly used for nonagricultural purposes or not used at all. In 1950-2016, this decline totalled as much as 6 million hectares (Fig. 9.2). ϯϬ Ϯϱ ϮϬ ϭϱ ϭϬ ϱ Ϭ

ϭϵϮϭ

ϭϵϯϭ

ϭϵϯϴ

ϭϵϰϲ

ϭϵϴϵ

ϮϬϬϮ

ϮϬϭϲ

Figure 9.2. Agricultural land in million ha in 1921-2016 Source: prepared by the author based on GUS yearbooks.

Similarly, the proportions between plant and animal production are under going unfavourable changes; more and more holdings are farms which only specialise in plant production, without any livestock breeding (Fig. 9.3). For instance, Poland has become a net importer of pork, even though in the past it was a major branch of livestock production. 120

0

103 93

^ŚĞĞƉ ,ŽƌƐĞƐ

60

20

104

Pigs

80

40

113

ĂƩůĞ

100

62

41 35 22 14

18

32 21 13

9

29 15 13 8

54

35

19 13

56

43

47

4

14

11

18 14

80

67

69

13

22

16 9

20 5

41

39 33 3 2

2

2

1

2

Figure 9.3. Changes in the livestock population per 100 ha agricultural land in 1909/13 – 2015

224

Source: J. Zegar: Rolnictwo w przestrzeni społeczno-ekonomicznej Polski (unpublished).


Concluding remarks It is extremely difficult to sum up such complex and long-lasting processes of change that took place in rural areas and agriculture of Poland during the 100 years after it had regained independence in 1918, especially in such a short study as this chapter. Therefore, I would like to recall several indicators and measures that in my opinion symbolically epitomise the transformation of rural areas and agriculture. When it had regained independence in 1918, Poland was a devastated country with most of its population living in rural areas and subsisting from agriculture. In 1921, rural population accounted for over 70% of the country’s total population, whereas work in agriculture absorbed over 60% of active workforce. In 2016, almost 39% of the country’s residents were living in rural areas, most of whom had few if any ties with work in agriculture. Agriculture continued to absorb a considerable pool of labour, but the share of those employed in agriculture in the total number of people in work was only slightly over 10%. In the interwar period, so-called agrarian overpopulation in Poland’s rural areas was very acutely felt. The fragmented farm structure, large number of landless rural residents and scanty opportunities to find employment in cities led to massive unemployment, both open and hidden. Neither agricultural reforms nor economic migration solved the problem. Hidden unemployment in rural areas was also a widespread phenomenon post World War II. The breakthrough in that regard only came with Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004, opening up of the borders for unrestricted trade exchange, free flow of labour within the EU, increased support for rural and agricultural development and demographic changes. In 2017, the unemployment rate in the country at large and in rural areas was about 6%, i.e. at a lower level than the EU’s average. An acute shortage of labour appeared in Poland, which is now receiving more and more workers from other countries (over 1 million in 2016). Many of those economic immigrants find employment in Polish agriculture. On the other hand, several hundred (ca. 600,000) of rural residents emigrated to other European countries in search of better pay and better social conditions. During Poland’s EU membership, the agri-food sector in Poland has been thoroughly modernised, which led to considerably increased agrifood exports, particularly to European markets. The positive trade balance in that group of products has been on the increase since 2003, and currently stands at a level of ca. EUR 7 billion. In 1921-2016, wheat crops per ha increased fourfold, and so did the cow milk yield. The farm structure still re-

225


mains unfavourable, with too large a number of small, unproductive, mostly subsistence farms; at the same time, the group of large farms of over 30 ha in size which are in a position to invest and compete on the open European market has been distinctly growing. Rural areas have become attractive residential destinations, as evi denced by the positive balance of internal migration between rural areas and urban areas post 2000. The educational gap between urban and rural areas is narrowing, so as many other developmental divides (infrastructural, digital, income, etc.) We wrote about it in the earlier editions of the Report on the State of Rural Areas. To sum up, speaking in symbolic or metaphorical sense: rural areas have joined not only Poland, but also Europe and – they are doing quite well.

226

1117.5 1093.2

763.2

418.9

577.0

Podlaskie

Pomorskie

Śląskie

Świętokrzyskie

49.2

111.7

87.2

79.8

2007 66.0

2016 57.9

2007 64.9

2007 60.2

2016

20–30 ha

81.6

2007

5.3

40.1

18.0

53.5

25.9

30.1

23.9

19.8

39.6

16.5

27.2

25.9

18.3

15.0

20.9

96.3 100.4 102.0

20.0

10.8

63.0

36.5

19.8

85.1

36.9

6.6

33.0

22.8

47.9

6.1

7.8

94.0

34.9

64.7

5.5

27.9

5.5

26.3

34.6

37.7 18.1

31.3

61.6

26.4 80.3

73.7 59.3

66.3

59.0

54.9

96.2

71.6

67.3

31.6

69.7

83.1

29.6

21.5

64.8

2007

2016

18.8

26.9 18.0

44.7 29.2

44.4 16.7

55.7

32.8

60.1

28.1

26.0

73.4

36.9

27.7

72.3

18.1

26.7

81.3

28.1

33.8

83.1

27.0

39.2

44.2

52.9

37.6

10.8

23.7

83.7

99.3

67.6

22.6

39.3

11.0

59.1

20.6

65.7

98.6 252.8 248.0

65.7

78.2

75.3 217.9 201.1

62.9 110.5

20.3

62.2

72.0 118.0 115.0 145.0 161.7 126.8 173.8 334.2 341.2

35.3

23.5

53.6

24.3

52.1

58.8 217.3 184.9

80.8 140.7 128.9 148.0

11.0

25.7

44.8

60.5 115.5 104.3 133.0

20.7

44.9

41.8

58.1

39.4

42.7

39.2

97.0

47.0

98.2

70.7 109.5 135.5 482.6 450.2

92.5 238.7 208.0 261.7 216.9 176.0 147.9 214.4 193.7 194.9 195.7 141.6 183.9 434.5 426.6

45.6

75.6

38.4

88.0

2016

> 100 ha

15846.2 14525.5 613.4 396.2 1990.9 1507.7 2838.2 2184.2 2021.8 1659.3 1335.2 1147.7 1572.1 1485.9 1397.2 1538.8 1071.6 1531.4 3005.8 3074.3

8.3

33.5 25.9 103.6

10.1

41.7

42.0

55.6 181.9 154.9 196.9 172.4 174.2 141.5 202.0 182.7 154.6 168.5

111.5

34.5

37.5 25.4 167.6 121.5 198.7 131.3

49.2 24.4

10.6

14.6

96.2 67.9 273.3 185.2 151.1

13.7

72.8 45.7 288.9 214.6 555.6 418.3 382.6 321.7 236.2 195.8 259.6 246.9 161.7 187.8

44.9

41.9 29.8 167.4 141.8 332.5 243.2 204.2 156.6 116.3

10.2

2007

50–100 ha

89.7 106.3 133.2 356.0 358.7

2016

30–50 ha

95.8 150.4 141.8 147.7 151.0 100.9 129.6 197.0 232.3

42.1

2016

15–20 ha

44.8 130.6 104.8 143.7 120.1 110.7

46.0

2016

10–15 ha

Source: prepared by the authors based on: Charakterystyka gospodarstw rolnych w 2007 i w 2016 r.

Poland

850.0

1798.9 1691.1

Wielkopolskie

967.6

1042.1 1041.3

Warmińsko-Maz.

489.0

366.9

724.1

585.2

713.6

Podkarpackie

509.4

2167.1 1919.5

548.4

Zachodniopom.

9.6

67.7

2007

5–10 ha

62.0 39.2 268.2 234.9 436.3 321.2 237.9 190.2 136.5 120.7 133.0 139.0 104.7 133.9

14.6

27.1 17.2

2016

2–5 ha

2007 2016 2007

1–2 ha

557.4 111.3 74.3 284.3 195.0 141.6 121.0

959.8

399.6

Opolskie

Mazowieckie

662.4

1090.6

Łódzkie

Małopolskie

479.5

Lubuskie

1543.4 1427.6

Lubelskie

900.3

2016

1044.8 1029.8

953.0

2007

Total

Kujawsko-Pom.

Dolnośląskie

Voivodeship

Table 1. Agricultural land in farm area groups by voivodeship in 2007 and 2016 (in thousand ha) rural Poland 2018. the Report on the state of rural areas

Annex

227

228

–79.9 –16.7

Lubuskie

–88.0 –15.3 –12.1 –32.3

Świętokrzyskie

–74.3 –25.7 –137.3 –24.7

–89.3 –31.4 –20.6 –14.5

–25.6 –15.3 –89.3 –26.9

–22.1 –55.1 –27.6 –51.6

63.4

–4.1

–6.9

–5.6 –21.3

–6.9

–18.7 –32.2

–44.8 –17.1

–24.6 –25.6

–8.3 –11.0

–6.8 –17.7

–18.3 –20.8

–24.5 –12.4

–7.1 –17.0

–4.3 –10.2

–60.9 –15.9

–5.3 –11.8

–47.6 –23.3

–6.2 –20.6

–47.7 –20.1

–23.6 –16.4

%

1.0

10.9

5.9

1.6

–1.3

6.0

–8.6

–4.7

tys.

3.9

11.2

–0.3

19.3

9.3

–3.0

8.8

1.7

–1.1

–3.5

–9.7

–2.5

31.3

6.5

–1.5

–9.6

62.2

–0.7

0.8

16.7

10.0

7.1

1.8

13.9

16.1

4.4

26.1

9.0

22.1

0.4

29.2

3.3

8.1

tys.

0.4

11.5

55.2

26.6

2.2

9.0

96.4

7.9

16.1

83.3

35.1

1.1

27.9

2.2

9.9

%

30–50 ha

–5.5 141.6

26.0

42.3

47

19.1

17.2

13.7

65.8

17.8

75.7

–7.9

7.0

42.9

68.5

23.7 –32.4

29.9

37.1

9.6

6.6

–4.8

33.6

85.2 –10.6

21.1 –16.8

11.8 109.3

15.6

14.9

47.6

17.3

13.1

74.1

13.3 120.9 59.9

28.7

35.3

2.7

tys.

2.3

–6.7

–1.8

2.1

87.3

11.2

–1.9

51.1

–13.6

–7.7

14.8

63.7

34.9

–14.9

27.5

17.9

0.8

%

> 100 ha

31.3 –32.4

90.9

28.4

25.3

%

26.4 102.7

14.0

55.0

28.7

26.9

tys.

50–100 ha

10.1 459.8

–8.2 –50.0 –51.5 –27.5 –28.0

–28.1 –16.0 –20.7

–11.1 –13.4

5.7

2.0

–11.2 –17.3

–32.7 –18.8 –19.3

0.7

–4.4 –14.1

–4.9

39.3

1.6

–4.8

4.5

–5.7

–7.2

%

20–30 ha

–40.4 –17.1 –12.7

1.8

–20.0 –17.2

0.2

–15.8 –11.6

–14.9 –13.5

–15.8 –27.3

tys.

15–20 ha

–654 –23.0 –362.5 –17.9 –187.5 –14.0 –86.2

–3.1

–11.1 –10.7 –30.7 –12.9

17.7

–8.3 –217.2 –35.4 –483.2 –24.3

–2.8 –33.7

–7.6 –22.7

–4.6 –45.5

–21 –26.2

–7.4 –10.0

–46.1 –27.5 –67.4 –33.9

–32.4 –34.5

–8.5 –24.4

–9.1 –14.1 –27.0 –14.8

%

–13.8 –17.3

tys.

10–15 ha


–1320.7

–117.6 –12.2

Zachodniopom.

–6.0

–107.8

–0.1

Wielkopolskie

–0.8

–52.0 –12.4 –24.8 –50.4

–4.5 –42.5

Śląskie

–5.1

–6.8 –46.6

–39.1

–2.2

Pomorskie

Poland

–8.9 –25.8 –19.8

–33.3 –12.4 –115.1 –26.4

–4.4

–88.1 –32.2 –39.6 –26.2

–24.3

Warmińsko-Maz.

%

–128.4 –18.0 –28.3 –29.4

Podlaskie

Podkarpackie

tys.

–10.2 –30.9 –13.4 –28.0

–7.1

%

5–10 ha

–21.7 –32.1 –24.5 –21.9

tys.

2–5 ha

–7.1 –51.8

–39.0

–247.6 –11.4 –27.1 –37.2

Mazowieckie

Opolskie

–105 –15.9 –37.0 –33.2

–130.8 –12.0 –12.1 –28.9

–4.9 –48.0

Małopolskie

Łódzkie

–7.5 –22.8 –36.8

–115.8

Lubelskie

–5.0 –34.2

–1.4

–15.0

%

–9.9 –36.5

tys.

Kujawsko-Pom.

–5.5

%

1–2 ha

–52.7

tys.

Total

Dolnośląskie

Voivodeship

Table 2. Changes in the size of agricultural land in farm area groups by voivodeship in 2007-2016

annex

19.8

211.9

26.2

129.6

80.4

33.4

155.7

195.3

276.1

36.5

182.1

93.6

46.4

83.7

115.4

47.9

Lubuskie

Łódzkie

Małopolskie

Mazowieckie

Podlaskie

Pomorskie

Śląskie

Świętokrzyskie

Warmińsko-Maz.

8.6

6.5

28.1

8.1

36.3

19.8

8.3

16.5

59.1

7.2

66.0

62.7

6.2

32.5

7.9

29.2

11.8

10.0

24.4

23.1

6.5

77.6

21.2

47.1

8.0

61.6

17.8

15.4

2007

5.7

28.6

7.5

19.3

8.6

9.1

21.8

16.5

4.9

59.3

18.3

34.5

3.7

45.6

14.2

12.2

2016

4.8

21.4

7.7

6.3

3.2

7.2

16.1

3.5

3.5

31.6

3.8

17.1

2.5

19.7

11.8

6.6

2007

17.8

5.9

5.6

2.6

5.7

14.2

2.9

3.1

26.8

3.3

13.0

2.0

15.7

9.9

5.5

2016

10.2

4.8

1.7

1.3

3.8

10.1

1.1

1.8

13.8

1.0

6.8

1.1

7.9

6.4

3.3

2007

66.9

2.3

8.6

4.2

2.1

1.4

3.1

8.2

1.1

1.5

11.5

1.1

5.6

1.2

7.1

5.6

2.5

2016

15–20 ha

77.6

3.8

31.5

8.8

50.5

30.8

10.8

19.0

86.7

10.4

87.2

90.9

41.4

5.7

71.9

13.8

14.5

2016

10–15 ha

1808.2 1387.9 422.6 271.2 614.3 465.9 400.2 309.9 166.6 137.3

5.8

18.6

3.8

17.3

16.6

4.3

5.4

47.2

4.4

30.2

50.5

49.6

11.7

80.9

15.0

21.8

2007

5–10 ha


Poland

28.9

23.0

7.2

25.7

34.2

7.5

10.1

66.1

9.6

48.9

77.2

19.8

3.5

27.0

6.7

12.0

2016

2–5 ha

2.5

37.3

Zachodniopom.

119.1

42.3

83.3

51.9

38.0

137.9

28.6

7.0

42.6

10.1

19.0

2007

1–2 ha

3.3

135.8

Wielkopolskie

Podkarpackie

Opolskie

178.9

222.3

Lubelskie

122

62.8

73.3

Kujawsko-Pom.

54.9

2016

73.4

2007

Total

Dolnośląskie

Voivodeship

Table 3. Number of farms by area group and by voivodeship in 2007 and 2016

65.4

4.0

8.8

4.9

1.2

1.1

3.0

8.5

0.7

1.8

10.9

0.6

4.2

1.1

5.6

6.2

2.7

2007

61.5

1.9

8.0

4.7

1.6

1.1

3.0

7.6

1.2

1.8

10.3

0.9

4.3

1.1

5.7

5.8

2.5

2016

20–30 ha

37.4

2.7

5.2

3.8

0.5

0.7

2.2

4.2

0.4

1.5

4.4

0.3

1.7

0.9

2.8

3.9

2.1

2007

40.6

1.8

5.2

4.2

0.7

0.9

2.2

4.5

0.8

1.6

5.0

0.5

2.3

1.0

3.6

4.0

2.4

2016

30–50 ha

16.0

1.6

2.1

1.9

0.2

0.4

1.2

1.0

0.3

0.9

1.3

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.9

1.5

1.5

2007

22.5

1.9

2.7

2.6

0.3

0.6

1.4

1.7

0.5

1.1

2.1

0.4

0.8

0.8

1.7

1.9

1.9

2016

50–100 ha

8.1

1.1

1.1

0.9

0.1

0.2

0.7

0.2

0.2

0.5

0.4

0.1

0.2

0.5

0.3

0.6

1.0

2007

12.1

1.7

1.5

1.3

0.1

0.3

0.9

0.5

0.3

0.6

0.7

0.2

0.3

0.8

0.6

0.9

1.4

2016

> 100 ha


229

230

–52,5

–13,2

–8,4

Podkarpackie

Podlaskie

Pomorskie

–3,6 –20,2

–4,3 –53,8

–2,9 –13,7

–8,0

–9,0

–5,1

–0,5

–8,1

–3,9 –12,0

–0,4

–9,9 –33,9

–3,2 –27,1

–0,9

–2,6 –10,7

–6,6 –28,6

–1,6 –24,6

–11,4

–11,8

–11,1

–1,5 –31,3

–3,6 –16,8

–1,8 –23,4

–0,7

–0,6 –18,8

–1,5 –20,8

–1,9

–0,6 –17,1

–0,4

–4,8 –15,2

–0,5 –13,2

–4,1 –24,0

–0,5 –20,0

–4,0 –20,3

–1,9 –16,1

%

9,1

10,0

0,0

23,5

7,7

–0,2

–1,6 –15,7

–0,6 –12,5

0,4

0,1

–0,7 –18,4

–1,9 –18,8

0,0

–0,3 –16,7

–2,3 –16,7

0,1

–1,2 –17,6

0,1

–0,8 –10,1

–0,8 –12,5

–0,8 –24,2

in thou sand

15–20 ha

–0,8

–0,2

0,4

0,0

0,0

–0,9

0,5

0,0

–0,6

0,3

0,1

0,0

0,1

–0,4

–0,2

in thou sand

–6,0

–52,5

–9,1

–4,1

33,3

0,0

0,0

–10,6

71,4

0,0

–5,5

50,0

2,4

0,0

1,8

–6,5

–7,4

%

20–30 ha

–3,9

–2,1 –24,4

–3,4 –10,8

–0,7

–14,2 –28,1

–11,0 –35,7

–2,5 –23,1

–2,5 –13,2

–27,6 –31,8

–3,2 –30,8

–21,2 –24,3 –18,3 –23,6

–28,2 –31,0

–8,2 –16,5 –12,6 –26,8

–6,0 –51,3

%

–1,1 –16,7

in thou sand

10–15 ha

–420,3 –23,2 –151,4 –35,8 –148,4 –24,2 –90,3 –22,6 –29,3 –17,6 –10,7 –13,8

–2,0 –34,5

–8,0

–9,0 –11,1 –16,0 –26,0

–1,2

%

–3,2 –20,8

in thou sand

5–10 ha


Poland

–22,5

–4,4 –19,1

–3,4 –47,2

–8,4 –32,7

–17,6 –51,5

–3,2 –42,7

–4,7 –46,5

–18,9 –28,6

–5,2 –54,2

–18,7 –38,2

–26,7 –34,6

–8,8 –30,8

–3,5 –50,0

–15,6 –36,6

–3,4 –33,7

%

–7,3 –33,5

in thou sand

2–5 ha

–2,1

–8,4

Zachodniopom.

–12,3

–11,7

–27,8

–38,0

–18,1

–29,4

%

–7,0 –36,8

in thou sand

1–2 ha

–8,0

–16,7

Wielkopolskie

–5,6

–14,1

–10,3

Opolskie

Warmińsko-Maz.

–28,8

–64,2

Mazowieckie

–32,1

–28,2

–57,4

Małopolskie

Świętokrzyskie

–23,3

–33,7

Łódzkie

–31,8

–40,7

–13,6

Lubuskie

Śląskie

–19,5

–43,4

Lubelskie

–21,6

–14,3

–10,5

Kujawsko-Pom.

–25,2

%

–18,5

in thou sand

Total

Dolnośląskie

Voivodeship

Table 4. Changes in the number of farms by area group and by voivodeship in 2007 and 2016

3,2

–0,9

0,0

0,4

0,2

0,2

0,0

0,3

0,4

0,1

0,6

0,2

0,6

0,1

0,8

0,1

0,3

in thou sand

8,6

–33,3

0,0

10,5

40,0

28,6

0,0

7,1

100,0

6,7

13,6

66,7

35,3

11,1

28,6

2,6

14,3

%

30–50 ha

6,5

0,3

0,6

0,7

0,1

0,2

0,2

0,7

0,2

0,2

0,8

0,2

0,4

0,2

0,8

0,4

0,4

in thou sand

40,6

18,8

28,6

36,8

50,0

50,0

16,7

70,0

66,7

22,2

61,5

100,0

100,0

33,3

88,9

26,7

26,7

%

50–100 ha

4,0

0,6

0,4

0,4

0,0

0,1

0,2

0,3

0,1

0,1

0,3

0,1

0,1

0,3

0,3

0,3

0,4

in thou sand

49,4

54,5

36,4

44,4

0,0

50,0

28,6

150,0

50,0

20,0

75,0

100,0

50,0

60,0

100,0

50,0

40,0

%

> 100 ha

annex

41.3

80.1

438.9

186.1 142.7

82.1

465.1

254.3

1076.7 1089.6 126.1

Lubuskie

Łódzkie

Małopolskie

1.7 284.2

49.8

10.2

125.3

166.9

452.0

132.5

200.4

432.4

805.6 1002.4

110.0

5855.4 5951.3 890.4

Śląskie

Świętokrzyskie*

Warmińsko-Maz.

Wielkopolskie

Zachodniopom.

102.8

80.2

30.6

19.1

16.6

4.9

27.1

10.5

7.4

14.0

768.1

9.4

81.1

28.4

54.1

22.9

29.5

69.3

23.5

11.9

143.5

57.1

89.6

5.6

78.4

48.1

15.8

2007

453.4

5.0

43.4

14.5

37.0

13.4

16.2

36.2

15.4

6.3

82.3

46.6

47.6

3.4

51.9

25.0

9.0

1059.8

12.6

140.0

62.8

37.3

24.4

38.8

145.5

13.1

18.1

236.4

30.8

118.1

9.3

71.0

83.7

17.9

2007

1847.1

21.7

263.2

178.4

23.4

27.8

59.1

393.9

8.7

28.3

404.2

14.4

132.2

17.4

94.7

159.2

20.6

2007

2.8

29.8

9.8

23.5

58.6

10.4

2007

1.7

12.4

87.2

3.7

9.7

24.0

11.5

21.3

240.6

127.3

15.0

18.4

43.5

292.2

6.4

22.3

55.8

2.2

12.5

16.5

89.6

1.9

15.5

74.0

2.6

18.2

12.2

18.3

37.1

8.8

2016

31.2

.

11.6

20.7

12.1

4.1

34.2

17.4

5.0

8.4

27.4

11.2

43.7

31.8

2007

38.5

1.9

12.0

16.1

32.3

3.8

30.6

33.5

5.5

10.0

16.1

12.5

52.2

30.4

2016

200 or more

6.3

9.1

38.4

30.9

43.0 130.0 120.4 151.6

29.5

1.7

5.5

9.5

29.8

1.5

9.2

28.1

1.5

7.1

7.4

7.6

15.5

5.4

2007

100–199

2073.6 663.7 1315.5 207.6 504.4 418.6 477.8

24.0

319.1 108.2

164.6

44.5

38.7

71.4

369.4 149.4

19.6

31.8

237.9

8.0

79.6

16.5

57.5

112.0

17.0

2016

50–99

438.0 121.0

29.5

167.9

21.7

127.8

182.3

23.4

2016

20–49

Source: prepared by the authors based on: Charakterystyka gospodarstw rolnych w 2007 r. and unpublished GUS data.

842.5

10.7

101.1

46.4

39.2

19.7

34.1

92.7

16.0

12.1

182.5

43.1

89.7

8.8

71.6

62.0

12.9

2016

10–19

Farms raising cattle (in heads)

2016

5–9

* For 2007, the data for “100-199” heads of cattle are those for herds over 100 heads

Poland

14.9

205.1

200.7

Pomorskie

37.2

31.8

837.3

94.9 105.9

926.3

158.5

Podlaskie

2.6

26.0

1.4

Podkarpackie

11.0

9.8 33.1

125.1

79.9

5.3

27.6

Opolskie

121.3

50.8

372.6 131.1

417.4

Mazowieckie

480.4

436.4

Lubelskie

5.1

Kujawsko-Pom.

18.8

106.6

120.8

2016

Dolnośląskie

2007

2016

1–4

2007

Voivodeship

Total

Table 5. Cattle population by scale of farming and by voivodeship in 2007 and 2016 (in thousand heads) rural Poland 2018. the Report on the state of rural areas

231

232

60256.0

4425.0

21910.0

33768.0

4810.0

63875.0

90904.0

113387.0

9543.0

70540.0

52767.0

18092.0

23010.0

51527.0

22696.0

54567.0

7805.0

Lubuskie

Łódzkie

Małopolskie

Mazowieckie

Podkarpackie

Podlaskie

Pomorskie

Śląskie

Świętokrzyskie*

Warmińsko-Maz.

Wielkopolskie

Zachodniopom.

4440.0

20996.0

6543.0

39181.0

16524.0

8221.0

16538.0

65344.0

5131.0

58505.0

78767.0

699.0

6235.0

1827.0

11091.0

4394.0

2817.0

5046.0

17451.0

1074.0

15923.0

24552.0

10120.0

546.0

14483.0

3499.0

2220.0

2016

7154.0

7159.0

509.0

7784.0

3680.0

1372.0

2016

2447.0

8776.0

674.0

5406.0

6047.0

1349.0

2007

3288.0

6449.0

633.0

5309.0

4324.0

946.0

2016

10–19

532.0

4631.0

581.0

3275.0

5333.0

727.0

2007

1041.0

5555.0

701.0

4340.0

5888.0

757.0

2016

20–49

1415.0

12261.0

4165.0

8513.0

3480.0

4472.0

10225.0

3807.0

1788.0 1040.0

1353.0

4447.0

2895.0

1825.0

2887.0

745.0

919.0

6433.0 10235.0

2069.0

5664.0

2010.0

2383.0

5236.0 10440.0

2441.0

940.0 301.0

965.0 649.0

1023.0

775.0

7275.0

3252.0

2966.0

1472.0

2498.0

5253.0

1559.0

1297.0

2323.0

749.0

769.0

8856.0 10065.0

5905.0

869.0

961.0

2018.0

6648.0 12925.0 11574.0

1245.0

885.0

21536.0 12314.0 17324.0 13147.0 13808.0 14533.0

9092.0

13569.0

845.0

12214.0

7131.0

2512.0

2007

5–9

177.0

1681.0

1344.0

61.0

152.0

371.0

2363.0

28.0

191.0

1946.0

43.0

463.0

147.0

373.0

923.0

160.0

2007

322.0

3640.0

1935.0

230.0

285.0

646.0

4456.0

101.0

340.0

3652.0

125.0

1224.0

238.0

891.0

1684.0

246.0

2016

50–99

47.0

331.0

230.0

7.0

41.0

73.0

240.0

10.0

71.0

226.0

12.0

55.0

58.0

62.0

124.0

39.0

2007

61.0

.

27.0

48.0

35.0

9.0

44.0

42.0

11.0

21.0

35.0

27.0

75.0

67.0

2007

69.0

58.0

35.0

283.0

86.0

6.0

30.0

40.0

109.0

9.0

46.0

107.0

9.0

31.0

26.0

30.0

100.0

55.0

2016

200 or more

995.0 206.0

432.0

17.0

96.0

130.0

699.0

14.0

117.0

580.0

22.0

143.0

86.0

142.0

287.0

67.0

2016

100–199

718257,0 343221,0 447916,0 121976,0 117023,0 67892,0 78067,0 61111,0 62436,0 67327,0 10424,0 20016,0 1623,0 3897,0 768,0 1002,0

3414.0

34926.0

14854.0

21533.0

9584.0

10837.0

36191.0

36360.0

2470.0

67383.0

12034.0

9478.0

2007

1–4



Poland

Opolskie

2739.0

88739.0

Lubelskie

30681.0

32979.0

31667.0

5663.0

19462.0

14330.0

2016

Kujawsko-Pom.

2007

Total

Dolnośląskie

Voivodeship


Table 6. Number of farms farming cattle by scale of farming and by voivodeship in 2007 and 2016

annex

1.2

–3.1

–68.3

12.9

–3.8

Małopolskie

Mazowieckie

Opolskie

4.5

Pomorskie

1.6

95.9

Poland

–606.2

–8.5

–33.2

–10.0

–53.1

–20.1

–11.6

–23.3

–74.1

–8.4

–84.8

–91.9

–53.9

–3.9

–98.0

–17.7

–13.7

in thou sand

1–4

–68.1

–83.1

–66.7

–66.9

–66.2

–65.7

–61.1

–62.5

–70.0

–76.1

–67.2

–64.4

–67.5

–73.7

–74.8

–64.4

–72.7

%

–314.8

–4.3

–37.7

–13.8

–17.2

–9.5

–13.3

–33.1

–8.1

–5.6

–61.2

–10.5

–42.0

–2.2

–26.4

–23.1

–6.8

in thou sand

5–9

–41.0

–46.2

–46.5

–48.8

–31.7

–41.3

–45.1

–47.8

–34.4

–47.3

–42.6

–18.3

–46.9

–39.1

–33.7

–48.0

–42.8

%

–217.3

–1.8

–38.9

–16.5

1.9

–4.7

–4.7

–52.8

2.9

–6.0

–53.9

12.2

–28.4

–0.5

0.6

–21.7

–5.0

in thou sand %

–20.5

–14.6

–27.8

–26.2

5.2

–19.2

–12.2

–36.3

22.0

–33.3

–22.8

39.7

–24.1

–5.0

0.8

–25.9

–28.0

10–19

226.5

2.3

55.9

–13.8

21.1

10.9

12.3

–24.6

11.0

3.5

33.8

15.1

35.7

4.4

33.1

23.0

2.8

in thou sand

27.0

25.1

35.0

14.5

13.5

%

12.3

10.6

21.2

–7.7

90.4

39.3

20.9

–6.2

126.2

12.4

8.4

104.5

20–49

651.9

9.7

132.4

40.1

11.3

8.7

19.5

142.8

4.8

9.9

117.0

5.1

49.8

6.7

34.0

53.5

6.6 91.3

63.4

%

98.2

84.5

122.4

46.0

304.2

89.8

81.0

95.6

283.6

80.2

96.7

182.5

166.8

68.2

144.5

50–99 in thou sand


–6.6

–7.2

24.4

196.7

4.5

–16.7

Zachodniopom.

19.6

Warmińsko-Maz.

–5.4

Wielkopolskie

–33.4

Świętokrzyskie

Śląskie

2.2

10.6

89.0

–7.2

–40.1

–63.6

Podkarpackie

Podlaskie

–26.8

–5.6

Łódzkie

–2.5

–2.0

–26.2

Lubuskie

10.1

–10.7

44.0

–11.8

%

–44.8

Kujawsko-Pom.

–14.2

in thou sand

Total

Lubelskie

Dolnośląskie

Voivodeship


Table 7. Changes in the size of cattle population by scale of farming and by voivodeship in 2007-2016

296.8

2.9

87.0

26.3

0.5

7.1

7.0

59.8

0.4

6.4

45.9

1.1

11.1

4.8

10.7

21.5

3.4

in thou sand

142.9

46.1

202.6

89.2

32.4

128.4

73.5

200.3

25.0

69.6

163.2

72.1

156.9

64.2

141.7

138.6

62.5

%

100–199

59.1

–7.5

31.2

7.3

x

0.4

–4.6

20.2

–0.4

–3.6

16.1

0.5

1.6

–11.3

1.2

8.5

–1.5

in thou sand

14.1

–19.5

25.9

23.4

x

3.2

–22.4

166.4

–8.5

–10.5

92.2

10.2

19.4

–41.2

11.1

19.4

–4.6

%

200 or more


233

234

–1924.0 –77.9

–26240.0 –72.2

–54215.0 –68.8

–42582.0 –72.8

–4057.0 –79.1

–47893.0 –73.3

–11492.0 –69.5

–5404.0 –65.7

–12130.0 –73.4

–28090.0 –71.7

–4716.0 –72.1

–14761.0 –70.3

–3741.0 –84.3

–2071.0 –43.1

–33194.0 –52.0

–54713.0 –60.2

–53131.0 –46.9

–5118.0 –53.6

–48630.0 –68.9

–18999.0 –36.0

–7255.0 –40.1

–13426.0 –58.3

–29994.0 –58.2

–7842.0 –34.6

–19641.0 –36.0

–4391.0 –56.3

Lubuskie

Łódzkie

Małopolskie

Mazowieckie

Podkarpackie

Podlaskie

Pomorskie

Śląskie

Świętokrzyskie

Warmińsko-Maz.

Wielkopolskie

Zachodniopom.

%

–41.0

–97.0 –6.1

841.0

34.4

205.0

19.7

–468.0 –34.6

6.0

71.0

2.5

–353.0 –19.3

–389.0 –13.5

690.0

336.0

305.0

79.4

35.0

15.1

–670.0 –47.3

–144.0 –15.7

20.0

–5828.0 –47.5 –2960.0 –28.9 1209.0

61.9

78.0

87.5

74.1

591.0

44.0

169.0 277.0

133.0

275.0

88.6

73.0 260.7

149.0

87.7

82.0 190.7

761.0 164.4

91.0

145.0 7.8 9592.0

2.7

83.3

40.0

64.8

78.1

87.8

22.0

%

11.1

33.3

47.6

0.0

4.5

77.0

25.0

x

3.0

37.4

41.0

x

11.1

–8.0 –16.7

74.0 211.4

0.0

2.0

65.0 154.8

–2.0 –18.2

10.0

–9.0 –25.7

3.0

25.0

30.5

46.8 –23.0 –39.7

664.0 200.6

202.0

10.0 142.9

55.0 134.1

57.0

459.0 191.3

4.0

46.0

354.0 156.6

10.0

88.0 160.0

48.3

80.0 129.0 28.0

farms

200 or more

71.8 –12.0 –17.9

%

163.0 131.5

28.0

farms

100–199

92.0 2274.0 140.1 234.0

81.9

13.7 1959.0 116.5

–2096.0 –50.3 –1195.0 –26.9 –652.0 –11.0

–2849.0 –33.5

–1470.0 –42.2

–2089.0 –46.7

82.4

53.8

%

518.0 138.9

761.0

86.0

farms

5.3 1706.0

95.7

20.0

20.7

348.0 115.6

58.0

725.0

509.0

924.0

120.0

32.5

10.4

4.1

%

50–99

–4989.0 –48.8 –3792.0 –36.3 –1351.0 –10.5 2093.0

–1366.0 –35.9

–848.0 –47.4

–9222.0 –42.8 –4177.0 –24.1

–1938.0 –21.3

555.0

30.0

farms

20–49

–1.8 1065.0

–6410.0 –47.2 –2327.0 –26.5

–336.0 –39.8

–4430.0 –36.3

–3451.0 –48.4 –1723.0 –28.5

–403.0 –29.9

farms

10–19


Poland

Opolskie

%

–1140.0 –45.4

farms

5–9

–375036.0 –52.2 –325940.0 –72.8 –49131.0 –42.0 –16956.0 –21.7 4891.0

–52900.0 –78.5

–55760.0 –62.8

Lubelskie

Dolnośląskie

–8535.0 –70.9

%

–12205.0 –38.5

farms

Kujawsko-Pom.

%

1–4

–7258.0 –76.6

farms

Total

–8667.0 –60.5

Voivodeship


Table 8. Changes in the number of farms farming cattle by scale of farming and by voivodeship in 2007-2016

annex

46.2

71.1

44.8

Zachodniopom.

2824.6 2366.9

824.0

8.7

54.7

19.3

64.9

24.2

22.0

45.4

88.9

9.3

123.4

119.1

78.0

5.0

114.7

29.6

16.6

2007

2.7

20.1

8.5

20.6

7.9

10.9

18.1

25.9

3.2

40.0

44.3

25.4

1.8

32.9

10.2

5.0

2016

277.3

1–4

414.5

4.2

35.4

23.7

18.4

10.0

10.8

59.9

10.9

4.9

99.2

19.7

54.1

3.3

31.0

22.6

6.4

2007

5–9

257.3

3.3

21.0

16.7

12.6

6.5

7.1

30.6

7.5

2.7

60.8

20.4

25.7

2.7

21.0

14.3

4.5

2016

697.9

6.4

79.0

57.7

13.9

9.7

17.0

141.3

5.5

8.6

182.8

10.8

64.1

4.4

41.4

49.1

6.3

2007

600.6

572.5

830.7

11.7

93.9

84.6

9.4

11.4

24.6

209.3

7.4

11.6

183.6

7.0

62.5

8.9

37.6

56.8

10.4

2016

111.5

3.2

18.4

15.2

0.2

2.5

4.0

21.0

0.5

4.2

19.6

1.0

4.9

2.9

4.3

6.2

3.3

2007

225.9

3.8

38.4

27.4

0.8

5.6

7.0

52.8

1.3

6.2

41.7

1.0

9.8

4.8

6.7

13.9

4.8

2016

50–99

Source: prepared by the authors based on: Charakterystyka gospodarstw rolnych w 2007 i w 2016 r. and unpublished GUS data.

6.2

63.4

69.2

5.4

7.8

15.5

163.9

3.1

7.8

139.8

3.9

33.0

5.5

27.6

42.5

5.9

2007

20–49

6.3

56.2

47.6

13.7

9.7

13.9

105.1

7.7

6.6

149.4

13.5

55.3

6.0

37.5

38.5

5.4

2016

10–19


Poland

284.0

298.5

Wielkopolskie

41.3

203.3

Warmińsko-Maz. 199.5

57.8

59.4

Śląskie

433.1

51.7

88.8

184.2

30.6

103.6

78.0

Pomorskie

Świętokrzyskie*

438.7

Podlaskie

43.5

49.2

573.0

Mazowieckie

111.0

156.8

Małopolskie

Opolskie

237.5

Łódzkie

Podkarpackie

491.9

32.1

Lubuskie

140.9

224.4

Lubelskie

155.9

42.3

2016

166.7

51.3

2007

Total

Kujawsko-Pom.

Dolnośląskie

Voivodeship

Farms raising cows (in heads)

55.6

4.3

11.9

5.5

0.7

2.3

3.1

4.6

0.7

3.4

3.9

1.1

1.4

2.0

1.9

4.6

4.6

81.5

2.2

17.5

8.6

.

2.5

3.3

12.2

0.9

3.0

11.3

.

3.6

2.2

2.5

8.2

2.6

2016

100–199 2007

Table 9. Dairy cow population by scale of farming and by voivodeship in 2007 and 2016 (in thousand heads)

120.6

11.8

35.6

8.9

.

2.9

5.6

2.6

1.4

11.0

4.4

1.3

1.9

9.0

3.6

12.1

8.2

2007

121.7

11.4

37.1

10.0

.

2.5

4.3

5.0

1.0

10.3

5.3

.

1.9

4.2

2.9

14.1

9.6

2016

200 or more


235

236

26714.0

2115.0

48068.0

85114.0

4164.0

58096.0

85724.0

104413.0

Lubelskie

Lubuskie

Łódzkie

Małopolskie

Mazowieckie

28465.0

49478.0

15866.0

18657.0

46865.0

20654.0

45983.0

6652.0

Podlaskie

Pomorskie

Śląskie

Świętokrzyskie*

Warmińsko-Maz.

Wielkopolskie

Zachodniopom.

1667.0

758.0

416.0 438.0

639.0

515.0

2983.0

2442.0

1939.0

985.0

1121.0

456.0

4051.0

3341.0

1021.0

723.0

1020.0

7145.0

616.0

473.0

226.0

2301.0

2481.0

215.0

287.0

574.0

6074.0

119.0

283.0

403.0

3278.0

2890.0

341.0

390.0

855.0

7226.0

272.0

402.0

6506.0

257.0

2254.0

309.0

1341.0

2003.0

358.0

2016


471.0

5922.0

4123.0

1091.0

754.0

1243.0

4568.0 10179.0

1179.0

5263.0

148.0

1234.0

199.0

1029.0

1595.0

205.0

2007

46.0

278.0

242.0

4.0

37.0

58.0

342.0

7.0

62.0

323.0

14.0

80.0

47.0

69.0

95.0

49.0

2007

593.0

428.0

12.0

84.0

112.0

840.0

22.0

90.0

647.0

16.0

158.0

73.0

101.0

220.0

73.0

2016

50–99

85.0

43.0

4.0

17.0

23.0

35.0

6.0

25.0

31.0

8.0

10.0

15.0

15.0

32.0

33.0

2007

630.0

16.0

136.0

64.0

.

19.0

26.0

97.0

7.0

23.0

87.0

.

28.0

18.0

21.0

61.0

20.0

2016

100–199

412.0

612.0

5203.0

3510.0

2909.0

1568.0

1668.0

8978.0

1779.0

1009.0

4125.0

447.0

2724.0

2779.0

396.0

2016

20–49

656502.0 266993.0 517217.0 153908.0 62812.0 38555.0 51805.0 41006.0 22234.0 29086.0 1753.0 3527.0

1246.0

10897.0

3850.0

12363.0

4207.0

5258.0

8573.0

17116.0

850.0

4880.0

335.0

3079.0

3683.0

473.0

2007

10–19

9049.0 13643.0 10679.0

3216.0

3791.0

402.0

3225.0

2017.0

706.0

2016


Poland

3114.0

8151.0

512.0

4881.0

3293.0

972.0

2007

21084.0 14903.0

26495.0

12799.0

859.0

19295.0

5445.0

2755.0

2016

5–9

31.0

5246.0

32117.0

10236.0

42642.0

15985.0

12283.0

23864.0

66290.0

5747.0

70238.0

81587.0

43735.0

3038.0

76030.0

17516.0

10666.0

2007

1–4

55.0

2708.0

22022.0

13041.0

15679.0

6415.0

8405.0

3089.0

19215.0

7529.0

68642.0

Opolskie

Podkarpackie

31003.0

23161.0

12555.0

26244.0

Kujawsko-Pom.

4333.0

2016

12422.0

2007

Total

Dolnośląskie

Voivodeship


Table 10. Number of farms farming dairy cows by scale of farming and by voivodeship in 2007 in 2016

269.0

19.0

78.0

19.0

.

10.0

17.0

6.0

4.0

15.0

11.0

3.0

6.0

17.0

10.0

29.0

24.0

2007

281.0

17.0

84.0

26.0

.

7.0

13.0

16.0

3.0

18.0

16.0

.

6.0

7.0

7.0

30.0

25.0

2016

200 or more

annex

–14.2

–1.5

–53.2

–68.0

–81.1

Lubuskie

Łódzkie

Małopolskie

Mazowieckie

–1.3

–5.6

–6.9

Podlaskie

Pomorskie

–16.2

–457.7

–547

–6

–35

–11

–44

–16

–11

–27

–63

–6

–83

–75

–53

–3

–82

–19

–12

in thou sand

%

–66.3

–69.4

–63.3

–56.1

–68.3

–67.5

–50.3

–60.3

–70.8

–65.6

–67.6

–62.8

–67.4

–63.3

–71.3

–65.7

–70.0

1–4

–157.2

–0.9

–14.5

–7.0

–5.8

–3.5

–3.7

–29.3

–3.4

–2.2

–38.4

0.8

–28.5

–0.7

–10.0

–8.3

–1.8

in thou sand

%

–37.9

–22.0

–40.8

–29.5

–31.4

–35.4

–34.4

–48.8

–31.3

–45.3

–38.7

3.9

–52.6

–20.5

–32.1

–36.8

–28.9

5–9

–125.4

–0.1

–22.8

–10.1

–0.2

0.0

–3.0

–36.1

2.2

–2.0

–33.4

2.7

–8.8

1.6

–3.9

–10.5

–0.9

in thou sand

%

–18.0

–1.3

–28.9

–17.4

–1.6

0.0

–17.9

–25.6

39.6

–23.2

–18.3

24.7

–13.7

36.7

–9.5

–21.4

–14.4

10–19

47.5

31.3

80.9

89.6

61.0

36.3

33.5

77.6

%

230.1

5.5

30.5

15.4

4.0

3.6

9.1

45.4

102.7

38.3 114.5

108.3

79.9

228.8

129.5

73.8

151.2

176.2

48.2

112.2

7.2

101.7

67.1

55.6

123.7

43.4

%

17.3

20.0

12.2

0.6

3.2

3.0

31.8

0.9

2.0

22.0

0.1

4.9

1.9

2.4

7.7

1.5

in thou sand

50–99

0.6

88.1

48.1

22.2

74.1

45.9

58.4

27.7

4.3 137.2

3.7

43.8

3.1

29.6

3.4

10.0

14.3

4.6

in thou sand

20–49


Poland

–7.8

–3.5

Zachodniopom.

–4.8

–14.5

1.9

–44.2

–22.3

Wielkopolskie

3.8

–45.8

Świętokrzyskie

Warmińsko-Maz.

–13.3

Śląskie

–8.8

–11.6

–53.4

–5.7

Podkarpackie

Opolskie

–59.3

–43.4

–22.4

–4.7

–37.2

–83.4

Lubelskie

–6.5

–17.4

%

–10.8

–8.9

in thou sand

Total

Kujawsko-Pom.

Dolnośląskie

Voivodeship


25.9

–2.1

5.7

3.0

x

0.2

0.3

7.7

0.2

–0.4

7.4

x

2.1

0.3

0.6

3.6

–2.0

in thou sand

46.5

–48.5

47.7

55.1

x

9.0

8.3

167.3

23.1

–12.7

192.8

x

148.5

13.5

33.1

78.1

–43.5

%

100–199

Table 11. Changes in the size of dairy cow population by scale of farming and by voivodeship in 2007 and 2016

1.2

–0.4

1.4

1.1

x

–0.4

–1.3

2.4

–0.4

–0.7

0.8

x

0.0

–4.9

–0.7

2.0

1.4

in thou sand

1.0

–3.4

4.0

12.8

x

–12.4

–24.0

93.4

–27.3

–6.3

18.5

x

1.7

–53.7

–20.5

16.7

17.5

%

200 or more


237

238

%

%

–2179.0 –71.7

–49154.0 –70.0

–4080.0 –71.0

–49174.0 –74.2

–15291.0 –64.1

–2049.0 –49.2

–34935.0 –60.1

–54721.0 –63.8

–56345.0 –54.0

–4440.0 –59.0

–49427.0 –72.0

–21013.0 –42.5

–7461.0 –47.0

Lubuskie

Łódzkie

Małopolskie

Mazowieckie

Podkarpackie

Podlaskie

Pomorskie

–363309.0 –70.2

–389509.0 –59.3

–24257.0

–97.0

–2220.0

–1068.0

–970.0

–583.0

–547.0

–4410.0

–600.0

–342.0

–5854.0

102.0

–4360.0

–110.0

–1656.0

–1276.0

–266.0

farms

5–9

–38.6

–15.8

–42.7

–30.4

–33.3

–37.2

–32.8

–49.1

–33.7

–45.1

–39.3

3.3

–53.5

–21.5

–33.9

–38.7

–27.4

%

%

33.4

–11.5

18.7

40.6

–6.4

–4.1

–3.2 –10799.0 –20.8

–15.0

–1871.0 –31.6

–782.0 –19.0

–70.0

–31.0

–223.0 –17.9

–3034.0 –29.8

178.0

–166.0 –26.0

–2964.0 –21.7

159.0

–755.0 –15.5

112.0

–355.0

–904.0 –24.5

–77.0 –16.3

farms

10–19

6852.0

177.0

977.0

409.0

126.0

103.0

281.0

1152.0

153.0

119.0

1243.0

109.0

1020.0

110.0

312.0

408.0

153.0

farms

%

30.8

78.3

42.5

16.5

58.6

35.9

49.0

19.0

128.6

42.0

23.6

73.6

82.7

55.3

30.3

25.6

74.6

20–49


Poland

–4000.0 –76.2

–3944.0 –59.3

–21220.0 –66.1

–6386.0 –62.4

Zachodniopom.

–7613.0 –36.9

Warmińsko-Maz.

–30279.0 –71.0

–23961.0 –52.1

–31186.0 –66.5

Świętokrzyskie

–11778.0 –73.7

–7025.0 –57.2

–55092.0 –67.5

Wielkopolskie

–12242.0 –65.6

Śląskie

Opolskie

–56735.0 –74.6

–58400.0 –68.6

Lubelskie

–30936.0 –70.7

–12071.0 –68.9

–7911.0 –74.2

farms

1–4

–13689.0 –52.2

–8089.0 –65.1

farms

Total

Kujawsko-Pom.

Dolnośląskie

Voivodeship


1774.0

9.0

315.0

186.0

8.0

47.0

54.0

498.0

15.0

28.0

324.0

2.0

78.0

26.0

32.0

125.0

24.0

farms 49.0

%

101.2

19.6

113.3

76.9

200.0

127.0

93.1

145.6

214.3

45.2

100.3

14.3

97.5

55.3

46.4

131.6

50–99

218.0

–15.0

51.0

21.0

x

2.0

3.0

62.0

1.0

–2.0

56.0

x

18.0

3.0

6.0

29.0

–13.0

farms

–3.0

1.0

1.0

52.9

–48.4

60.0

48.8

x

11.8

13.0

177.1

16.7

–8.0

180.6

x

180.0

12.0

–2.0

6.0

7.0

x

–3.0

–4.0

10.0

–1.0

3.0

5.0

x

0.0

4.5

–10.5

7.7

36.8

x

–30.0

–23.5

166.7

–25.0

20.0

45.5

x

0.0

–58.8

–30.0

3.4

4.2

%

200 or more farms

20.0 –10.0

40.0

90.6

–39.4

%

100–199

Table 12. Changes in the number of farms farming dairy cows by scale of farming and by voivodeship in 2007-2016

annex

197.7

1163.0

600.8

160.7

1060.8

183.8

928.5

381.4

167.8

310.6

728.1

442.6

2212.5

1293.1

225.3

1462.8

533.4

1899.4

682.1

419.9

733.8

1001.7

Kujawsko-Pom.

Lubelskie

Lubuskie

Łódzkie

Małopolskie

Mazowieckie

Opolskie

Podkarpackie

Podlaskie

Pomorskie

216.9

460.1

3911.5

270.9

10982.8

856.9

5353.4

523.6

18512.3

Świętokrzyskie

Warmińsko-Maz.

Wielkopolskie

Zachodniopom.

1238.5

16.4

79.7

27.1

72.1

30.3

25.7

97.9

139.4

22.3

182.5

123.2

95.0

14.4

235.4

41.0

36.2

2007

1–9

285.1

3.8

35.1

5.8

15.8

6.7

9.1

11.7

27.4

5.8

35.8

27.0

25.5

2.8

52.0

14.4

6.6

2016

5042.4

97.3

883.4

146.5

221.3

121.2

211.2

266.1

163.7

139.1

744.2

249.5

558.0

57.8

592.0

462.3

128.9

2007

1583.4

19.0

380.6

38.7

65.5

53.7

77.9

38.7

58.1

56.7

165.5

67.6

176.2

15.4

154.0

188.0

27.8

2016

10–49

2941.9

74.6

976.3

104.9

53.8

69.6

153.4

83.8

44.3

127.9

273.5

67.1

227.9

33.6

159.5

431.8

59.8

2007

1181.2

9.8

400.2

39.0

23.4

36.3

58.2

19.2

20.9

68.6

82.3

26.2

127.8

12.6

56.6

186.2

13.8

2016

50–99

Farms raising pigs (in heads)

2814.4

51.1

1013.5

141.0

47.7

67.1

148.4

76.5

25.4

165.7

225.8

40.0

166.6

26.4

101.0

472.5

45.8

2007

1194.4

7.7

480.9

64.1

22.6

30.6

60.2

19.9

12.7

81.0

77.9

16.2

86.9

8.9

42.8

175.1

7.1

2016

100–199


Poland

240.2

411.6

460.2

Śląskie

Dolnośląskie

2016

2007

Voivodeship

Total

2450.7

35.7

873.2

152.2

30.1

49.6

109.0

80.8

20.2

136.9

191.9

28.0

165.7

20.2

99.9

428.3

28.9

1583.3

8.4

511.2

82.1

28.7

28.8

60.5

46.0

16.5

79.0

140.7

19.8

199.3

11.7

93.9

248.5

8.4

2016

200–499 2007

Table 13. Pig population by scale of farming and by voivodeship in 2007 and in 2016 (in thousand heads)

4024.4

248.6

1527.3

285.2

35.1

73.7

354.0

128.7

26.9

90.3

281.5

25.5

249.6

73.0

105.2

376.7

143.0

2007

5155.5

222.2

2103.6

230.4

60.9

84.3

462.1

175.1

32.1

90.4

426.4

27.1

445.2

109.2

201.7

350.8

134.0

2016

500 or more


239

240

15481

21729

1773

17119

11269

17413

5320

13726

5595

6894

4932

7644

4265

33849

1969

172249

40152

95165

7915

54325

64900

85073

15791

62926

41773

18919

18379

32725

16839

80537

10661

664023

Kujawsko-Pom.

Lubelskie

Lubuskie

Łódzkie

Małopolskie

Mazowieckie

Opolskie

Podkarpackie

Podlaskie

Pomorskie

Śląskie

Świętokrzyskie

Warmińsko-Maz.

Wielkopolskie

Zachodniopom.

355045

4652

19843

7328

20076

11001

6020

26167

53133

6101

41942

50932

22503

4409

60686

9712

10538

2007

1–9

68675

800

6944

1285

3766

1648

1848

3122

10176

1173

7115

7460

5581

756

12366

2968

1667

2016

233980

4334

35362

6252

11318

5623

9071

13393

8848

6051

36363

12527

26378

2696

30891

18858

6016

2007

69991

882

15255

1526

3214

2401

3451

1784

3068

2237

7815

3203

7941

688

7729

7504

1293

2016

10–49

43204

1097

14044

1500

828

1029

2232

1277

653

1846

4197

1021

3448

493

2381

6253

904

2007

17023

153

5711

553

348

533

851

264

306

954

1145

400

1954

185

849

2608

210

2016

50–99

20952

387

7525

1056

354

514

1102

560

198

1211

1672

309

1225

202

770

3527

342

2007

8742

61

3500

454

177

223

450

136

93

602

555

122

649

65

316

1286

53

2016

100–199


Poland

3275

2016

17944

2007

Total

Dolnośląskie

Voivodeship


Table 14. Number of farms farming pigs by scale of farming and by voivodeship in 2007 and 2016

8556

131

3072

511

106

173

379

269

69

487

664

95

578

72

344

1505

101

2007

5213

28

1710

271

93

96

205

142

55

275

447

67

631

38

297

830

29

2016

200–499

45 2605

2286

729

176

46

31

89

147

28

79

336

17

363

41

172

285

23

2016

62

690

193

41

38

115

108

24

95

235

15

194

43

93

298

42

2007

500 or more

annex

–55.3

–47.4

–53.5

–28.7

–27.5

–65.5

–51.1

–44.1

–60.0

–57.7

–27.3

–41.6

–52.9

–46.3

–26.9

–48.3

–40.7

–244.9

–1049.5

–692.2

–64.6

–402.0

–349.6

–970.9

–300.7

–252.1

–423.2

–273.7

–171.3

–243.3

–396.8

–1441.8

–252.8

–7529.5

Lubelskie

Lubuskie

Łódzkie

Małopolskie

Mazowieckie

Opolskie

Podkarpackie

Podlaskie

Pomorskie

Śląskie

Świętokrzyskie

Warmińsko-Maz.

Wielkopolskie

Zachodniopom.

–953.4

–12.7

–44.6

–21.2

–56.4

–23.7

–16.6

–86.2

–112.0

–16.5

–146.7

–96.2

–69.5

–11.6

–183.4

–26.6

–29.6

in thousand

1–9

–77.0

–77.2

–55.9

–78.5

–78.2

–78.0

–64.6

–88.0

–80.3

–74.2

–80.4

–78.1

–73.2

–80.2

–77.9

–65.0

–81.8

%

–3459.0

–78.3

–502.8

–107.8

–155.8

–67.5

–133.3

–227.4

–105.6

–82.4

–578.7

–181.9

–381.8

–42.4

–438.0

–274.2

–101.1

in thousand %

–68.6

–80.5

–56.9

–73.6

–70.4

–55.7

–63.1

–85.5

–64.5

–59.3

–77.8

–72.9

–68.4

–73.3

–74.0

–59.3

–78.4

10–49

–1760.7

–64.7

–576.1

–65.9

–30.4

–33.3

–95.2

–64.6

–23.4

–59.3

–191.2

–40.9

–100.2

–21.0

–102.9

–245.6

–46.0

in thousand %

–59.8

–86.8

–59.0

–62.8

–56.5

–47.9

–62.0

–77.1

–52.7

–46.4

–69.9

–60.9

–43.9

–62.5

–64.5

–56.9

–77.0

50–99

–1620.0

–43.4

–532.6

–77.0

–25.1

–36.5

–88.2

–56.6

–12.7

–84.7

–148.0

–23.9

–79.7

–17.5

–58.2

–297.4

–38.7

in thousand %

–57.6

–84.9

–52.6

–54.6

–52.6

–54.5

–59.5

–73.9

–50.0

–51.1

–65.5

–59.6

–47.8

–66.3

–57.6

–62.9

–84.6

100–199

Source: prepared by the authors based on: Charakterystyka gospodarstw rolnych w 2007 r. and unpublished GUS data

Poland

Kujawsko-Pom.

Dolnośląskie

%

Total

in thousand

Voivodeship


Table 15. Changes in the size of pig population by scale of farming and by voivodeship in 2007-2016

–867.4

–27.3

–362.0

–70.1

–1.4

–20.9

–48.5

–34.9

–3.6

–57.9

–51.2

–8.3

33.6

–8.5

–6.1

–179.8

–20.5

in thousand %

–35.4

–76.5

–41.5

–46.1

–4.6

–42.1

–44.5

–43.1

–18.0

–42.3

–26.7

–29.4

20.3

–41.9

–6.1

–42.0

–71.0

200–499

1131.1

–26.4

576.3

–54.8

25.8

10.6

108.1

46.5

5.2

0.1

144.9

1.5

195.5

36.2

96.4

–25.9

–8.9

in thousand

28.1

–10.6

37.7

–19.2

73.5

14.4

30.5

36.1

19.3

0.1

51.5

5.9

78.3

49.6

91.6

–6.9

–6.3

%

500 or more


241

242

–77.6

–79.5

–66.3

–78.2

–86.6

–81.5

–74.1

–6142.0

–37206.0

–53631.0

–67660.0

–10471.0

–49200.0

–36178.0

–12025.0

–13447.0

–25081.0

–12574.0

–46688.0

–8692.0

–491774.0

Lubuskie

Łódzkie

Małopolskie

Mazowieckie

Opolskie

Podkarpackie

Podlaskie

Pomorskie

Śląskie

Świętokrzyskie

Warmińsko-Maz.

Wielkopolskie

Zachodniopom.

–58.0

–74.7

–76.6

–73.2

–63.6

–82.6

–286370.0

–3852.0

–12899.0

–6043.0

–16310.0

–9353.0

–4172.0

–23045.0

–42957.0

–4928.0

–34827.0

–43472.0

–16922.0

–3653.0

–48320.0

–6744.0

–8871.0

farms

1–9

–80.7

–82.8

–65.0

–82.5

–81.2

–85.0

–69.3

–88.1

–80.8

–80.8

–83.0

–85.4

–75.2

–82.9

–79.6

–69.4

–84.2

%

–163989.0

–3452.0

–20107.0

–4726.0

–8104.0

–3222.0

–5620.0

–11609.0

–5780.0

–3814.0

–28548.0

–9324.0

–18437.0

–2008.0

–23162.0

–11354.0

–4723.0

farms.

10–49

–70.1

–79.6

–56.9

–75.6

–71.6

–57.3

–62.0

–86.7

–65.3

–63.0

–78.5

–74.4

–69.9

–74.5

–75.0

–60.2

–78.5

%

–26181.0

–944.0

–8333.0

–947.0

–480.0

–496.0

–1381.0

–1013.0

–347.0

–892.0

–3052.0

–621.0

–1494.0

–308.0

–1532.0

–3645.0

–694.0

farms

%

–60.6

–86.1

–59.3

–63.1

–58.0

–48.2

–61.9

–79.3

–53.1

–48.3

–72.7

–60.8

–43.3

–62.5

–64.3

–58.3

–76.8

50–99

–12210.0

–326.0

–4025.0

–602.0

–177.0

–291.0

–652.0

–424.0

–105.0

–609.0

–1117.0

–187.0

–576.0

–137.0

–454.0

–2241.0

–289.0

farms

%

–58.3

–84.2

–53.5

–57.0

–50.0

–56.6

–59.2

–75.7

–53.0

–50.3

–66.8

–60.5

–47.0

–67.8

–59.0

–63.5

–84.5

100–199


Poland

–77.2

–73436.0

–68.5

–61.4

–24671.0

Kujawsko-Pom.

Lubelskie

–81.7

%

–14669.0

farms

Total

Dolnośląskie

Voivodeship


–3343.0

–103.0

–1362.0

–240.0

–13.0

–77.0

–174.0

–127.0

–14.0

–212.0

–217.0

–28.0

53.0

–34.0

–47.0

–675.0

–72.0

farms

–39.1

–78.6

–44.3

–47.0

–12.3

–44.5

–45.9

–47.2

–20.3

–43.5

–32.7

–29.5

9.2

–47.2

–13.7

–44.9

–71.3

%

200–499

Table 16. Changes in the number of farms farming pigs by scale of farming and by voivodeship in 2007-2016

319.0

–17.0

39.0

–17.0

5.0

–7.0

–26.0

39.0

4.0

–16.0

101.0

2.0

169.0

–2.0

79.0

–13.0

–19.0

farms

14.0

–27.4

5.7

–8.8

12.2

–18.4

–22.6

36.1

16.7

–16.8

43.0

13.3

87.1

–4.7

84.9

–4.4

–45.2

%

500 or more

annex

396.3

Małopolskie

–9.6

–7.5

299.7 –96.6 –24.4

746.4 –79.6

287.8 –23.3

288.1

391.1

614.0

Śląskie

Świętokrzyskie

Warmińsko-Maz.

Zachodniopom.

–69.4 –11.6

–6.6

%

248.5 189.3

631.3 536.1

221.6 169.8

–59.2 –23.8

–95.2 –15.1

–51.8 –23.4

879.5 741.1 –138.4 –15.7

599.2 529.8

–30.6

in thousand

668.8

54.8

653.0 –43.5

11282.7 10640.0 –642.7

427.1 387.9

280.6 219.1

205.5 178.4

398.1 371.2

–6.3

–6.8

–39.2

–9.2

–61.5 –21.9

–27.1 –13.2

–26.9

–98.4 –19.8

–71.4 –27.1

–18.8

491.4 379.1 –112.3 –22.9

24.0

49.0

13.0

29.3

16.2

30.1

24.8

50.9

11.4

80.6

–3.1

%

–4.2 –17.7

–0.9

in thousand

–7.6 –62.3

–2.2 –19.3

–8.1 –50.0

–11.0 –36.5

–4.7 –36.2

14.8

–9.2 –38.3

32.9 –16.1 –32.9

8.3

13.6 –15.7 –53.6

8.1

19.1

8.4 –16.4 –66.1

22.3 –28.6 –56.2

9.2

35.0 –45.6 –56.6

22.3 –24.5 –52.4

34.6 –27.8 –44.6

4.6

20.3 –23.8 –54.0

19.5

27.9

2016

11.1

48.6

4.0

7.3

2.0

10.5

4.6

5.6

17.8

21.9

1.2

8.6

3.2

35.6

41.4

24.1

2007

9.8

39.3

2.8

3.6

2.0

9.3

0.1

3.7

14.6

12.6

1.2

5.8

1.5

35.8

43.0

18.5

2016 %

2007

0.6

–

–

66.5

8.3

20.1

54.4

4.4

17.0

78.7

25.2

4.1

17.0

–1.3 –11.7 104.7

13.0

in thousand

12.4

%

15.9

–4.1

29.8

92.7

–7.6

31.0

43.8

–0.6

0.9

10.4

–7.2

4.5

19.1

9.2 209.1

2.7

–3.2

7.5

3.8

–1.3

8.0

21.3

99.0

25.8

–5.7

–9.0

3.2

–5.4

–8.0

55.8 –10.7 –16.1

7.7

21.0

64.8

13.6

19.7

75.5

32.7

7.9

15.7

33.8

69.9

83.1 –20.6 –19.9

–9.3 –19.1 112.9 103.9

–1.2 –30.0

–3.7 –50.7

–

–1.2 –11.4

–4.5 –97.8

–1.9 –33.9

–3.2 –18.0

–9.3 –42.5

–

–2.8 –32.6

25.8

48.6

3.9 103.7

–1.7 –53.1

0.2

1.6

118.2

2016

change

Rape and agrimony

–5.6 –23.2 105.2

in thousand

change

Sugar beet

–5.7 8008.5 6698.3 –1310.2 –16.4 547.2 300.7 –246.5 –45.0 247.4 203.4 –44.0 –17.8 796.8 822.6

–6.2

–2.3 1083.3 880.5 –202.8 –18.7

8.9

321.1 –70.0 –17.9

1459.7 1426.6 –33.1

696.5

1.2

–9.4

497.6 399.2

263.8 192.4

300.1 281.3

46.8

62.4

12.2

44.1

23.7

28.8

2007

change

Potatoes

Source: prepared by the authors based on: Użytkowanie gruntów, powierzchnia zasiewów i pogłowie zwierząt gospodarskich w 2007 roku; Produkcja upraw rolnych i ogrodniczych w 2007 roku; Użytkowanie gruntów i powierzchnia zasiewów w 2016 roku.

Poland

6.7

261.1 –27.0

572.5

565.8

Pomorskie

0.9

688.3

682.3

6.0

308.4 –99.1 –24.3

407.5

Podlaskie

2.2

Podkarpackie

10.1

463.5

453.4

Opolskie

Wielkopolskie

2016

465.7 435.1

2007

change

Basic cereals with cereals mixed

1390.9 1207.4 –183.5 –13.2 1015.3 808.1 –207.2 –20.4

826.0

Łódzkie

Mazowieckie

311.1

Lubuskie

2.0

–9.1

17.7

916.9

899.2

1181.6 1074.4 –107.2

3.4

%

Kujawsko-Pom.

24.8

in thousand

Lubelskie

744.0

2016

719.2

2007

change

Dolnośląskie

Voivodeship

Total

Table 17. Sown area by voivodeship in 2007 and 2016 (in thousand ha) rural Poland 2018. the Report on the state of rural areas

243

244

3031.5

688.1

2502.4

633.5

1866.9

Lubelskie

Lubuskie

Łódzkie

54.6

529.1

–58.0

366.2

Opolskie

1400.3

0.1

0.2

–7.4

3.5

–17.4

6.0

5.3

–13.4

–20.9

14.6

–7.7

–13.3

147.4

607.8

603.0

767.0

2016

524.4

501.7

968.0

216.6

350.6

229.8

579.3

184.9

563.0

328.8

11791.1 8624.0

502.1

1144.0

278.4

520.7

358.6

671.0

505.0

1076.5

273.3

1656.1 1011.7

888.8

1444.0 1040.1

258.8

949.8

560.6

703.4

2007

7.6

9.0

20.3

–0.1

–3167.1 –26.9

–0.4

–176.0 –15.4

–61.8 –22.2

–170.1 –32.7

–128.8 –35.9

–91.7 –13.7

–320.1 –63.4

–513.5 –47.7

55.5

–644.4 –38.9

–364.4 –41.0

–403.9 –28.0

–111.4 –43.0

–342.0 –36.0

42.4

63.6

%

change in thousand

Potatoes

–40.6

507.0

402.8

11.6

26.1

3.8

–77.5

16.2

177.5

779.5

2750.2

166.2

842.2

254.7

272.0

–39.2

264.9 –101.9

127.0

689.2

4.8 –226.8

288.4

1031.2

867.2

86.5

330.1 –142.2

101.2

2247.9

2702.9

6.6

48.5

11.0

–19.1

–27.8

14.6

34.7

–97.9

10.0

0.4

–8.2

15.5

–30.1

–28.6

29.1

17.5

–15.6

%

change in thousand

1086.5 –201.3

2016

12681.6 13523.8

524.8

2478.2

205.4

366.8

110.8

511.7

231.6

262.3

1027.4

944.7

74.9

472.3

141.8

1740.9

2300.1

1287.8

2007

Sugar beet

2129.9

287.0

322.3

152.3

19.7

48.4

153.2

10.1

33.2

242.2

80.2

12.5

37.4

75.0

97.6

287.1

271.5

2007

2219.3

240.9

283.3

129.0

19.3

63.5

183.3

35.1

49.1

241.2

71.0

24.6

38.3

92.4

179.2

406.6

359.1

2016

89.4

–46.1

–39.0

–23.3

–0.4

15.1

30.1

25.0

15.9

–1.0

–9.2

12.1

0.9

17.4

81.6

119.5

87.6

in thousand

4.2

–16.1

–12.1

–15.3

–2.0

31.2

19.6

247.5

47.9

–0.4

–11.5

96.8

2.4

23.2

83.6

41.6

32.3

%

change

Rape and agrimony


26.3

3436.5 –274.5

48.5

25317.9 25344.2

Zachodniopom.

Poland

Wielkopolskie

1443.0

653.1 –137.1

40.6

3.1

3711.0

1650.1

Warmińsko-Maz.

713.6

1653.2

790.2

1394.5

Świętokrzyskie

673.0

Śląskie

73.6

1111.8 –171.8

1283.6

Podlaskie

Pomorskie

1473.9

629.1 –166.6

Podkarpackie

795.7

198.0

1553.0

1355.0

Mazowieckie

673.2 –103.4

2377.7 –198.8

776.6

2576.5

Małopolskie

–9.4

8.6

21.1

–2.7

20.5

%

change

in thousand

1691.4 –175.5

2066.2

2124.2

Kujawsko-Pom.

2150.6

2016

1784.4

2007

Dolnośląskie

Voivodeship


Table 18. Main cereal crops by voivodeship in 2007 and 2016 (in thousand tonnes)

annex

40.9

40.5

29.4

55.2

32.7

27.8

43.6

37.8

28.5

28.6

29.6

31.3

25.4

45.2

30.2

25.8

35.2

32.7

28.2

32.7

34.3

33.6

31.6

Lubelskie

Lubuskie

Łódzkie

Małopolskie

Mazowieckie

Opolskie

Podkarpackie

Podlaskie

Pomorskie

Śląskie

Świętokrzyskie

Warmińsko-Maz.

Wielkopolskie

Zachodniopom.

Poland

6.2

10.0

4.7

4.5

1.6

7.3

4.5

2.0

2.5

10.0

4.0

4.3

2.0

11.9

12.4

3.5

11.1

dt

19.6

29.8

13.7

13.8

5.7

22.3

12.8

7.8

8.3

22.1

15.7

13.7

6.8

41.6

43.5

9.9

29.0

%

change

207

204

225

197

176

212

217

196

199

227

201

177

228

204

200

226

234

2007

287

340

294

260

258

285

304

221

252

358

289

236

300

318

300

310

275

2016

80.0

136.0

69.0

63.0

82.0

73.0

87.0

25.0

53.0

131.0

88.0

59.0

72.0

114.0

100.0

84.0

41.0

38.6

66.7

30.7

32.0

46.6

34.4

40.1

12.8

26.6

57.7

43.8

33.3

31.6

55.9

50.0

37.2

17.5

%

change dt

Potatoes

513

474

510

508

506

558

487

501

472

576

432

626

549

442

489

556

535

2007

665

799

700

599

741

635

743

663

788

706

688

702

565

698

629

629

588

2016

152.0

325.0

190.0

91.0

235.0

77.0

256.0

162.0

316.0

130.0

256.0

76.0

16.0

256.0

140.0

73.0

53.0

dt

29.6

68.6

37.3

17.9

46.4

13.8

52.6

32.3

66.9

22.6

59.3

12.1

2.9

57.9

28.6

13.1

9.9

%

change

Sugar beet

26.7

27.4

28.5

22.9

23.7

24.1

28.2

23.1

19.5

30.8

31.8

30.5

22.1

29.1

20.1

27.7

25.8

2007

27.0

24.3

27.3

23.1

25.2

30.3

28.3

25.8

24.9

31.9

21.7

31.0

24.3

27.4

25.6

25.3

30.4

2016

0.3

–3.1

–1.2

0.2

1.5

6.2

0.1

2.7

5.4

1.1

–10.1

0.5

2.2

–1.7

5.5

–2.4

4.6

dt

1.1

–11.3

–4.2

0.9

6.3

25.7

0.4

11.7

27.7

3.6

–31.8

1.6

10.0

–5.8

27.4

–8.7

17.8

%

change

Rape and agrimony


39.0

37.2

29.8

40.0

39.7

35.6

31.6

39.0

35.5

Kujawsko-Pom.

49.4

2016

38.3

2007

Dolnośląskie

Voivodeship


Table 19. Main crop yields by voivodeship in 2007 and 2016 (dt/ha) rural Poland 2018. the Report on the state of rural areas

245

246

372.6 –44.8

438.9 –26.2

186.1 –68.3

417.4

82.1

465.1

254.3

Lubelskie

Lubuskie

Łódzkie

Małopolskie

–6.6

125.3

452.0

200.7

132.5

200.4

432.4

805.6 1002.4 196.7

110.0

Pomorskie

Śląskie

Świętokrzyskie

Warmińsko-Maz.

Wielkopolskie

Zachodniopom.

–7.2

95.9

102.8

5855.4 5951.3

–7.2

4.5

89.0

1.6

–16.7

–5.4

2.2

10.6

37.0

11.4

44.8

43.2

34.7

31.6

26.3

74.9

22.2

22.8

49.7

38.4

42.6

17.1

27.0

41.8

12.7

41.0

12.1

59.3

43.4

34.1

34.1

28.3

84.7

16.2

23.8

56.8

33.4

45.7

20.0

26.1

46.7

11.8

2007 2016

41.3

284.0

203.3

57.8

46.2

71.1

433.1

51.7

43.5

491.9

88.8

184.2

30.6

140.9

155.9

42.3

2016 %

–4.7

6.7

7.7

9.9

9.0

–8.8 10.2

9.8

–1.3 39.3 39.6

8.8

8.5

–3.5

–14.5

3.8

11.8

–7.8

4.6

4.9

–4.8 16.6 16.8

1.9 19.9 19.5

–45.8 –44.2 18.0

–13.3 –22.3 14.2 12.6

–6.9

–5.6

–59.3 –53.4 15.6

–5.7 –11.6

–81.1 –14.2 26.4 25.6

–68.0 –43.4 23.7 15.9

–53.2 –22.4 21.8 19.2

–1.5

4.7

–6.5 16.0 15.1

5.4

2007 2016

–83.4 –37.2 14.5

–10.8

–8.9 –17.4

thous.

change

per 100 ha agricultural land in heads

523.6

5353.4

856.9

460.2

411.6

1001.7

733.8

419.9

682.1

1899.4

533.4

1462.8

225.3

1293.1

2212.5

442.6

2007

%

–244.9 –55.3

thous.

change

46.4

22.0

2007 2016


47.0

83.8

40.2

42.1

87.6

80.5

65.7

58.8

28.4

28.7

74.9

48.4

33.0

–396.8 –46.3

–243.3 –52.9

–171.3 –41.6

85.7

79.8

98.2

44.2

44.4

65.5

–273.7 –27.3 131.3 100.5

–423.2 –57.7

–252.1 –60.0

–300.7 –44.1 124.4

–970.9 –51.1

–349.6 –65.5

–402.0 –27.5 134.1 110.5

–64.6 –28.7

–692.2 –53.5

270.9

–252.8 –48.3

54.1

75.6

31.9

3911.5 –1441.8 –26.9 297.6 231.3

460.1

216.9

240.2

728.1

310.6

167.8

381.4

928.5

183.8

1060.8

160.7

600.8

1163.0 –1049.5 –47.4 211.8 112.9

197.7

2016

thousand heads

Pigs

2824.6 2366.9 –457.7 –16.2 17.8 16.3 18512.3 10982.8 –7529.5 –40.7 116.8

44.8

298.5

199.5

103.6

59.4

78.0

438.7

111.0

49.2

573.0

156.8

237.5

32.1

224.4

166.7

51.3

2007

thousand heads

incl. cows


Poland

4.5

24.4

205.1

166.9 –33.4

19.6

926.3

837.3

–3.1

–40.1

Podlaskie

–3.8

94.9 –63.6

121.3

158.5

1.2

125.1

12.9

–26.8

–5.6

–2.5

–10.7

10.1

Podkarpackie

1076.7 1089.6

–2.0

44.0

–11.8

%

Opolskie

Mazowieckie

480.4

436.4

Kujawsko-Pom.

80.1

106.6 –14.2

120.8

Dolnośląskie

thous.

2016

change

thousand heads

2007

Voivodeship


Total cattle

Table 20. Cattle and pig population in 2007 and 2016

annex

1883.5

1558.4

5405.5

4192.3

2072.8

6715.2 13525.2

2528.1

1033.8

1652.2

1359.4

2855.4

1861.3

1297.7

1530.4

2366.7

7820.1 14487.7

1940.1

Lubuskie

Łódzkie

Małopolskie

Mazowieckie

Opolskie

Podkarpackie

Podlaskie

Pomorskie

Śląskie

Świętokrzyskie

Warmińsko-Maz.

Wielkopolskie

Zachodniopom.

2007

2016 thous.

%

2007 2016

1046.5 53.9 1989.0 3512.0 1523.0 76.6 74.0 64.0

6667.6 85.3 4301.0 8563.0 4262.0 99.1 160.0 156.0

1987.2 84.0 2347.0 4256.0 1909.0 81.3 87.0 78.0

1079.2 70.5 2573.0 5316.0 2743.0 106.6 95.0 97.0

1043.1 80.4 2834.0 6347.0 3513.0 124.0 105.0 116.0

1578.9 84.8 2417.0 4747.0 2330.0 96.4 90.0 86.0

2550.1 89.3 2539.0 4941.0 2402.0 94.6 94.0 90.0

199.0 14.6 1771.0 2649.0 878.0 49.6 66.0 48.0

875.9 53.0 2961.0 4957.0 1996.0 67.4 110.0 90.0

6810.0 101.4 3060.0 7044.0 3984.0 130.2 114.0 128.0

451.9 21.8 2897.0 4514.0 1617.0 55.8 107.0 82.0

2163.9 51.6 3784.0 6610.0 2826.0 74.7 140.0 120.0

849.7 82.2 2129.0 4710.0 2581.0 121.2 79.0 86.0

2627.7 75.7 2207.0 4268.0 2061.0 93.4 82.0 78.0

2564.9 75.0 3238.0 5805.0 2567.0 79.3 120.0 106.0

2016 %

2007

2016 thous.

469.0 53.3 1812.0 3372.0 1560.0

133.3 13.5 1382.0 2006.0 624.0

70.0

82.0

83.0

84.0

72.0

45.2

62.0

50.0

67.9 114.0 105.0

86.1

57.7

936.0

249.7 36.4 894.0 1591.0 697.0

609.2 43.5 2512.0 3943.0 1431.0

577.2 34.3 1723.0 2656.0 933.0

6503.1 10773.0 4269.9 65.7 3576.0 6368.0 2792.0 1680.8 2258.0

93.3

98.0

40.0

98.0

53.0

85.0

78.0

66.0 80.9 100.0 100.0

54.1

78.1 161.0 158.0

89.0

63.0

91.0

76.0 110.0

49.9 107.0

537.1 76.4 1182.0 2526.0 1344.0 113.7

484.0 55.8 1896.0 3665.0 1769.0

2396.8 3646.0 1249.2 52.1 2377.0 3564.0 1187.0

702.9 1240.0

868.0 1352.0

40.0 59.0 112.0

78.0

57.0 113.0

1303.3 3190.0 1886.7 144.8 1692.0 4402.0 2710.0 160.2

2797.9 4329.0 1531.1 54.7 2488.0 3957.0 1469.0

686.3

1401.8 2011.0

4978.2 10493.0 5514.8 110.8 2268.0 5465.0 3197.0 141.0 102.0 136.0

988.7 1122.0

2798.2 4078.0 1279.8 45.7 2525.0 4240.0 1715.0

880.0 1349.0

2884.1 4134.0 1249.9 43.3 1835.0 2894.0 1059.0

91.0

2007 2016

Poland=100

64.1 133.0 120.0

39.5

%

change

579.2 29.4 2029.0 2830.0 801.0

thous.

zł

per ha of agricultural land

3110.7 4984.0 1873.3 60.2 2947.0 4836.0 1889.0

1970.8 2550.0

2007

change

million PLN

43613.5 79842.7 36229.2 83.1 2696.0 5490.0 2794.0 103.6 100.0 100.0 35951.6 58446.0 22494.4 62.6 2222.0 4019.0 1797.0

2986.6

4353.9

2609.6

2340.8

3440.2

2524.7

%

change

Poland=100

1304.3 59.8 2246.0 3868.0 1622.0 72.2 83.0 70.0

thous.

PLN

Purchasing

Source: prepared by the authors based on: Rolnictwo 2007, 2016; Rocznik Statystyczny Województw 2009; Rocznik Statystyczny Województw 2017.

Poland

6097.3

3469.6

Lubelskie

6356.2

5982.6

3417.7

3485.8

2181.5

2016

Kujawsko-Pom.

2007

change

thousand heads

Dolnośląskie

Voivodeship

per ha of agricultural land

Market-oriented production

Table 21. Market-oriented production and purchasing of agricultural produce in 2007 and 2016 rural Poland 2018. the Report on the state of rural areas

247