Oct 2, 1998 - 3 Jack Spence, 'South Africa's foreign policy: vision and reality', in ... apartheid foreign policy: from reconciliation to revival?, Adelphi Paper no.
Consistency and inconsistencies in South African foreign policy
LAURIE NATHAN *
During the presidency of Nelson Mandela from 1994 to 1999, foreign diplomats noted wryly and South African commentators complained loudly that Pretoria did not have a coherent foreign policy. There were several reasons for the ad hoc and often haphazard approach. The new government was inexperienced and preoccupied with the domestic imperatives of national reconciliation and the transformation of state departments; the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo, was sorely lacking in dynamism and vision; and the apartheid-era officials who still dominated the Department of Foreign Affairs were dazzled by the light of democracy and an open world with high expectations of South Africa. Moreover, these officials repudiated the need for a comprehensive and systematic foreign policy. At a conference in Johannesburg in 1998 I heard one of them insist that whereas defence policy was like an ocean liner that should not change direction quickly and frequently, foreign policy was like a windsurfer that should be able to turn on its axis as the wind changed! A number of analysts believe that foreign policy under President Mbeki continues to lack coherence. Paul-Henri Bischoff characterizes the policy as ambiguous,1 and Paul Williams describes it as an ‘eclectic synthesis of neorealist and neo-liberal principles’.2 Jack Spence suggests that the government’s inclination to solve problems as they arise, rather than be guided by critical and principled perspectives, derives from the nature of international affairs: critics who look for coherence and consistency in a well-structured foreign policy underestimate contingent and unforeseen factors and the developments and forces that lie outside the control of even the most skilful bureaucracy and political class.3 Spence quotes James Mayall as saying that ‘most countries make * 1
This article is based on a paper presented at a Chatham House panel discussion on 10 Nov. 2004. Paul-Henri Bischoff, ‘External and domestic sources of foreign policy ambiguity: South African foreign policy and the projection of pluralist middle power’, Politikon 30: 2, Nov. 2003, pp. 183–201. 2 Paul Williams, ‘South African foreign policy: getting critical?’, Politikon 27: 1, May 2000, p. 73. 3 Jack Spence, ‘South Africa’s foreign policy: vision and reality’, in Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, ed., Apartheid past, renaissance future: South Africa’s foreign policy 1994–2004 (Johannesburg: South African Institute for International Relations, 2004), at pp. 36–41.
International Affairs 81, () ‒
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Laurie Nathan up their foreign policy as they go along, mainly because though their interests may remain consistent, the circumstances to which they must react are not’.4 By contrast, I argue that over the past five years Pretoria has consolidated its foreign policy, which is now entirely coherent.5 This is both a consequence of the general consolidation of government and a result of Thabo Mbeki’s orientation and ambitions as a foreign policy president. Nevertheless, there have been several significant contradictions, some of which have undermined the country’s credibility and at times overshadowed its considerable achievements. This article first outlines the main themes of South African foreign policy, with a particular focus on Africa and African security, and then identifies and attempts to explain the major inconsistencies. Policy coherence According to the Strategic Plan published by the Department of Foreign Affairs in 2004, the principles that underpin South Africa’s foreign policy include commitments to the promotion of human rights and democracy; to justice and international law in the conduct of relations between nations; to international peace and internationally agreed-upon mechanisms for resolving conflict; to promoting the interests of Africa in world affairs; and to economic development through regional and international cooperation in an interdependent and globalized world.6 The department’s priorities include the realization of the ‘African Renaissance’ by promoting the objectives of the African Union (AU) and its economic and social development programme, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD); regional integration in southern Africa; the promotion of international peace and security; and the promotion of sustainable development and an equitable global system.7 Given the political distance between 1994 and 2004, it is striking that the current principles are virtually identical to those formulated by the African National Congress (ANC) at the time it came to power.8 Critics who view South Africa’s foreign policy as essentially realist and as limited to the advancement of national interests are mistaken. While the policy is necessarily intended to further domestic interests, it also embraces an ambitious continental and global agenda that has idealist, internationalist and emancipatory tendencies. This orientation derives from and is framed by the liberation struggle, South Africa’s position in Africa, the nature and content of its negotiated settlement, and Mbeki’s personal convictions and critical analysis 4 5
Spence, ‘South Africa’s foreign policy’, n. 13. For a comprehensive review of the policy, see Chris Alden and Garth le Pere, South Africa’s postapartheid foreign policy: from reconciliation to revival?, Adelphi Paper no. 362 (London: Oxford University Press/IISS, Dec. 2003). 6 Department of Foreign Affairs, Strategic Plan, 2003–2005, March 2004, p. 14. This document can be viewed at www.dfa.gov.za, last accessed 25 Jan. 2005. 7 Ibid., pp. 16 and 28–33. 8 See African National Congress, ‘Foreign policy perspective in a democratic South Africa’, Dec. 1994, at www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/foreign.html, accessed 11 Jan. 2005.
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Consistency and inconsistencies in South African foreign policy of global political economy. In international affairs Mbeki is as much an ideologue as a pragmatist, his outlook rooted in three paradigms: democratic; Africanist; and anti-imperialist. The Africanist and anti-imperialist paradigms, which include a visceral anger at historical and contemporary manifestations of imperialism and racism,9 are seldom if ever in conflict with each other, but both are occasionally in conflict with the democratic paradigm. In these cases, as discussed in the following section, it is usually the democratic position that gives way. I outline below five of the well-developed themes that give the policy its coherence: Africa and the Africanist impulse; democracy, respect for human rights, and other aspects of good governance; a holistic understanding of security; a pacific approach to conflict resolution; and multilateralism. Other recurring themes, which are not considered in this article because of space constraints, include gender equity and the empowerment of African women; South–South cooperation and solidarity; the adoption by African countries of a neo-liberal economic agenda in order to make them more competitive and attract foreign investment; the pressing need to reform the UN, the IMF, the WTO and other international institutions in order to address global imbalances in wealth and power; and the eradication of underdevelopment and poverty in Africa and elsewhere in the South.10 Africa’s recovery is unambiguously the foreign policy priority of government and of the president, who projects an image that is simultaneously cosmopolitan and African as he seeks to lead that recovery and champion the cause of the continent in international forums. Mbeki’s Africanist perspective, spanning politics, social relations, culture and history, has the rhetorical and inspirational appeal of Steve Biko’s exhortations. The clarion call is the African Renaissance, the emergence of the continent from ‘a long period of darkness and fear into one of light and a dream fulfilled’, in which ‘through our persistent efforts we have redefined ourselves into something other than a place of suffering, a place of wars, a place of oppression, a place of hunger, disease, ignorance and backwardness’, and ‘succeeded to create a new world of peace, democracy, development and prosperity’.11 It is no longer tenable to claim that Mbeki’s idea of an African Renaissance is ‘abstruse’, ‘high on sentiment, low on substance’.12 The AU and NEPAD, which he has been instrumental in crafting and driving, flesh out the vision with elaborate policies, programmes and structures. 9
See e.g. Thabo Mbeki, ‘A new era for Africa in a globalizing world’, speech presented to UNESCO, Paris, 19 Nov. 2003; and Thabo Mbeki, ‘The people of Zimbabwe must decide their own future’, Letter from the President, ANC Today 3: 18, 9–15 May 2003. 10 These themes were distilled from a review of President Mbeki’s foreign policy speeches, which can be viewed on the website of the African National Congress at www.anc.org.za. 11 Thabo Mbeki, ‘Address to the joint sitting of the National Assembly and the National Council on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development’, Cape Town, 31 Oct. 2001. 12 Peter Vale and Sipho Maseko, ‘South Africa and the African Renaissance’, International Affairs 74: 2, April 1998, pp. 276–7; Williams, ‘South African foreign policy’, p. 86; and Bischoff, ‘External and domestic sources’, p. 191.
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Laurie Nathan A principled commitment to democracy and respect for human rights was the essence if not the totality of President Mandela’s foreign policy. Mbeki has retained this emphasis, placing democratic governance at the heart of the AU, NEPAD and the African peer review mechanism,13 although he often couches the argument in more strategic and analytical terms. The basic logic of NEPAD, for example, is that there will be no economic development on the continent in the absence of stability, and no stability in the absence of democracy. Mbeki, like Mandela, has not only promoted democratic principles but has also criticized one-party states, military dictators and corrupt elites in Africa that have looted national wealth and condemned their people to poverty.14 Such criticism is exceedingly rare among African presidents and would have been unthinkable in previous decades. Since 1994 the government has replaced the militarist security project of the apartheid regime with a holistic approach to security. The armed forces are no longer the favoured policy instrument and are no longer involved in state decision-making. The primary threats to security are not military and cannot be dealt with by military means. At the global level the overarching problem is the power imbalance between the North and the South, and the perpetuation of inequality by dominant states; the fundamental causes of insecurity and instability in Africa are bad governance and underdevelopment; and the primary threats to the security of South Africans are poverty, unemployment and crime.15 The security of people is the paramount concern and is multidimensional: ‘Security is an all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being.’16 Pretoria is convinced that pacific forms of conflict resolution are the most viable methods for achieving durable peace and stability in the context of civil wars and similar crises on the continent. This position stems from the success of South Africa’s negotiated settlement and from Mbeki’s personal style of politics. He prefers the art of persuasion, and negotiations that he can direct, to the blunt and unpredictable use of force. Mediation and facilitation of dialogue have become an arena of continuous and energetic engagement, most prominently in the cases of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan and Liberia. There is no blanket rejection 13
See Thabo Mbeki, ‘Speech at the launch of the African Union’, Durban, 9 July 2002; Mbeki, ‘Address to the joint sitting’; and the Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000. See Thabo Mbeki, ‘Speech at the launch of the African Renaissance Institute’, Pretoria, 11 Oct. 1999; Mbeki, ‘Speech at the launch of the African Union’; and Thabo Mbeki, ‘Address at the Pan African Parliament’, Midrand, 16 Sept. 2004. 15 Mbeki’s critique of the international system can be found in his address to the 58th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 23 Sept. 2003, and his address to the 59th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 22 Sept. 2004. On the government’s understanding of national and regional security, see Republic of South Africa, White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa: Defence in a Democracy, 1996, chs 1–3. 16 White Paper on National Defence, p. 7. 14
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Consistency and inconsistencies in South African foreign policy of the use of force. Rather, force is viewed as a limited tool, applicable only in exceptional situations, and then chiefly in order to provide space for state diplomacy and intrastate negotiations. The government strongly favours peacekeeping over peace enforcement, and insists that external military deployments require the approval of the UN Security Council.17 Ironically, the pacific foreign posture has been a source of much friction in southern Africa. In the 1990s the efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to set up a viable security regime failed because member states were polarized around incompatible pacific and militarist approaches. One camp, led by South Africa and supported by Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania, wanted a common security regime whose primary basis for multilateral cooperation and peacemaking would be political rather than military.18 The other camp, led by Zimbabwe and supported by Angola and Namibia, preferred a mutual defence pact and prioritized military cooperation and responses to conflict.19 In 1999 a Zimbabwean defence official claimed that Pretoria’s opposition to the use of armed force in peacemaking was the major reason for the impasse around the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.20 The war that commenced in the DRC in 1998 revealed the strategic import of this division, as the pacific group promoted a diplomatic solution while Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola deployed troops in support of President Kabila. The DRC imbroglio damaged relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe, crippled the Organ and gave rise to the notion of two SADCs.21 Multilateralism is both a primary goal and a primary strategy of South Africa’s foreign policy. It is consistent with the country’s negotiated settlement and pluralist politics, and with the emphasis in African state politics on unity and solidarity. Accordingly, and given the history of apartheid destabilization, South Africa is acutely sensitive to being perceived by other African countries as a bully. Mbeki is determined to build effective multilateral institutions on the continent in collaboration with strategic partners like Nigeria. The AU is the principal vehicle for multifaceted cooperation and NEPAD is intended to secure international partners and strengthen Africa’s voice in global fora. More generally, South Africa promotes multilateralism in the international system as the best means of maintaining global order, addressing global problems, mitigating the domination and unilateralism of powerful states, and empowering weaker countries.22 17 18 19 20 21
22
Ibid., p. 39. See Horst Brammer, ‘In search of an effective regional security mechanism for southern Africa’, Global Dialogue 4: 2, Aug. 1999, pp. 21–2. See Asher Walter Tapfumaneyi, ‘Regional security cooperation in southern Africa: a view from Zimbabwe’, Global Dialogue 4: 2, Aug. 1999, pp. 23–6. Ibid. For a discussion on the DRC and Organ disputes in SADC, see Laurie Nathan, ‘The absence of common values and failure of common security in southern Africa, 1992–2003’, Working Paper Series 1: 50, July 2004, Crisis States Programme, Development Research Centre, London School of Economics. See Department of Foreign Affairs, Strategic Plan, pp. 24–6. For a critical discussion, see Philip Nel, Ian Taylor and Janis van der Westhuizen, eds, South Africa’s multilateral diplomacy and global change: the limits of reformism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001).
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Laurie Nathan The five themes summarized above are mutually consistent and supportive. They have many conceptual and programmatic linkages, reinforcing the cohesion of South African foreign policy. As discussed below, however, the commitment to multilateralism in Africa is sometimes substantially at odds with the commitment to democracy and respect for human rights. Paradoxically, multilateralism, which is intended in part to overcome South Africa’s constraints of limited capacity and influence, is itself a significant constraint in the pursuit of its objectives. Contradictions and inconsistencies Although South Africa is fully involved in SADC, it has not driven the integration project as many observers expected it to do in light of its strength in the region. In the mid-1990s officials from SADC states complained that Pretoria devoted less attention to its relations in southern Africa than elsewhere.23 Since then, perceptions of neglect have persisted.24 According to Mwesiga Baregu, SADC members ‘wonder whether South Africa is a SADC team player or is driven purely by self-interest’.25 Pretoria has a coherent vision of common security but it does not have a comprehensive strategy, and its defence and foreign affairs staff often arrive at regional meetings without a ministerial directive.26 Mbeki champions integration and institution-building at the continental level, but devotes comparatively little attention to these processes at the regional level. The apparent neglect is attributable to a number of factors. South Africa is a developing country with a relatively small economy, a host of domestic challenges and limited capacity to contribute to external development. Pretoria might therefore believe that it has more to gain from economic and development cooperation with industrialized countries than from similar cooperation with its neighbours. In addition, South Africa is constrained by the deep political divisions within SADC that inhibit collective action and consensus on common policies.27 The government is extremely wary of being assertive in this situation because of regional fears of domination, heightened by Pretoria’s policy of destabilization in the 1980s. The legacy of apartheid and liberation politics has created a balance of power based more on history than on size and resources, enabling Zimbabwe to pose a rival source of influence. Nevertheless, South Africa’s cautiousness has become a substitute for strategy and leadership, resulting in inertia, and appears incongruous when juxtaposed with Mbeki’s continental profile and leadership. 23 24
25 26 27
See ‘African tensions against SA on the rise’, Southern African Report 15: 33, 15 Aug. 1997, pp. 3–4; and ‘Key countries and regions neglected in foreign affairs’, SouthScan 13: 20, 2 Oct. 1998, p. 157. See Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and powers: the structure of international security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), at pp. 235–8; and Mwesiga Baregu, ‘Economic and military security’, in Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg, eds, From Cape to Congo: southern Africa’s evolving security challenges (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp. 19–30. Baregu, ‘Economic and military security’, p. 21. Author’s discussions with South African government officials between 1996 and 2003. See Nathan, ‘The absence of common values’.
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Consistency and inconsistencies in South African foreign policy The most prominent inconsistency between South Africa’s actions and its declared commitment to democracy and respect for human rights has been its policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ in response to state repression and abrogation of the rule of law in Zimbabwe.28 The greatest problem is that the policy, which has included a clumsy mediation effort, has not in fact been quiet. On the contrary, it has entailed many expressions of support for President Mugabe and the ruling party, Zanu-PF. Mbeki has endorsed their efforts to tackle the colonial legacy of inequitable land distribution without questioning the illegal and violent manner in which this was done.29 He argues that his detractors are deluded if they believe that Zimbabwe’s leaders will meekly obey what he tells them.30 Yet his audiences are not limited to the Zimbabwean government. They include important domestic, continental and international constituencies that have been sorely disappointed. Mbeki’s critics include the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions,31 and his stance has damaged his own credibility and that of NEPAD internationally.32 Mbeki’s position flows in part from the constraints of regional politics. SADC generally refrains from critical comment and diplomatic engagement in intrastate conflict, treating violence and crises in governance as purely domestic affairs. States are keen to avoid adversarial relations that might jeopardize trade and functional cooperation, and governments that are not fully democratic are hardly likely to condemn those of their neighbours that engage in undemocratic practices. They are also determined to maintain a posture of unity and solidarity. Forged in the heat of the struggles against colonialism and apartheid, this posture militates against public criticism of each other. The imperative of solidarity is greatest when foreign powers raise concerns that are perceived as reflecting an imperialist agenda. These dynamics have been evident in extremis in the case of Zimbabwe. Here, far from remaining silent, SADC has repeatedly expressed solidarity with Harare and trivialized human rights concerns.33 In 2000 its Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) described the unlawful land seizures, which have impoverished farm workers and enriched the ruling elite, as an ‘agrarian reform programme aimed at addressing the problem of poverty’.34 At the 28
29 30 31 32 33
34
For a detailed analysis, see Maxi Schoeman and Chris Alden, ‘The hegemon that wasn’t: South Africa’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe’, Strategic Review for Southern Africa 25: 1, May 2003, pp. 1–28. On repression and state-sponsored violence in Zimbabwe, see the reports of the International Crisis Group at www.crisisweb.org, last accessed 10 Jan. 2005. See Mbeki, ‘The people of Zimbabwe’. Ibid. See Jaspreet Kindra, ‘SACP klaps [smacks] Mbeki and his Africanists’, Mail and Guardian, 28 June 2002; and Karima Brown, ‘Zimbabwe makes it on to alliance agenda’, Cape Times, 16 Dec. 2004. See e.g. Alden and le Pere, South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy, p. 51; and ‘South Africa’s odd president: Thabo Mbeki’s odd views irk his allies’, The Economist, 18 Dec. 2003. See SADC, ‘SADC heads of state and government support Zimbabwe’, Windhoek, 7 Aug. 2000; SADC, ‘Final communiqué. January 2002 SADC extra-ordinary summit of heads of state and government’, Blantyre, 14 Jan. 2002, para. 19; and SADC, ‘2003 SADC summit final communiqué’, Dar es Salaam, 26 Aug. 2003, paras 24 and 25. ISDSC, ‘Final communiqué. 23rd session of the Inter State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation’, Luanda, 9 Aug. 2002.
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Laurie Nathan SADC summit meeting in 2002 Mugabe was replaced as the deputy chair of the organization; this prevented him from assuming the chair the following year. However, at the AU’s summit meeting in 2003, Mugabe was elected to represent southern Africa as one of the Union’s five regional vice-chairpersons. Mondli Makhanya captures eloquently the fatal impediment to a consistently progressive response from SADC: SADC’s main problem is that it has not established its own platform of good governance on which to base peer judgements. In most countries in the region, democracy and respect for human rights play second fiddle to the comfort and power cravings of leaders. Angola’s Eduardo dos Santos is a ruthless despot presiding over a ruling elite of kleptocrats. Namibia’s Sam Nujoma manipulated the constitution to ensure he secured a third term of office and has strong-armed opponents and the media. Swaziland’s King Mswati dislikes democracy even more than Mugabe does and comes close to the Zimbabwean leader in his lack of tolerance for dissent. Many other leaders in the region are either unelected or treat elections and the countries’ democratic institutions as necessary irritations. With democrats like these, how could the world and Zimbabwe’s people expect the regional body to take the lead in disciplining Mugabe?35
Breaking ranks in these circumstances can lead to serious vilification. When Mbeki issued mild criticisms of Mugabe in late 2001, the state-owned newspaper in Harare, the Herald, claimed that he had betrayed Zanu-PF and joined the ‘neo-colonialist plot’ to overthrow it.36 When Mbeki raised concerns about arrangements for the presidential election in early 2002, the Herald accused him of ‘removing his gloves for a bare-knuckled fight with Zimbabwe’ and of mobilizing SADC states to ‘justify a regional and international onslaught’ against the country.37 Pretoria was also influenced by its experience in 1995 when Mandela called for sanctions to be imposed on the dictatorial regime in Nigeria and was soundly rebuffed by other African leaders. In 2001 a senior member of the ANC justified the ‘quiet diplomacy’ on Zimbabwe by arguing that South Africa would not repeat Mandela’s ‘terrible mistake’ when he acted as a ‘bully’ against the Nigerian dictatorship and ‘everyone stood aside and we were isolated’.38 The fear of isolation and the constraints of solidarity do not constitute the whole picture, however. Pretoria could have mitigated these problems by backing the Commonwealth’s continued suspension of Zimbabwe in 2003, which was agreed to by Nigeria, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya and other African states; instead, it led the SADC grouping that opposed the suspension.39 Mbeki’s 35 36 37 38 39
Mondli Makhanya, ‘Mugabe will not be swayed by the polite coaxing of despotic peers’, Sunday Times (South Africa), 20 Jan. 2002. See Pule Molebeledi, ‘Harare’s Herald swipes at Mbeki’, Business Day, 4 Dec. 2001. ‘President Thabo Mbeki given a lashing by Zimbabwe as he gets tough with Mugabe’, Southern Africa Report 19: 49, 7 Dec. 2001, pp. 1–2. Quoted in Jaspreet Kindra, ‘We won’t make the same mistake with Zim’, Mail and Guardian, 2 March 2001. See Iden Wetherell, ‘Mbeki’s smoke and mirrors’, Mail and Guardian, 5 Jan. 2004.
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Consistency and inconsistencies in South African foreign policy comments here and elsewhere on Zimbabwe were situated squarely within the Africanist and anti-imperialist paradigms,40 which proved incompatible with his support for democracy. Further, Pretoria appears to believe that the Zimbabwean opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change, would not constitute a viable government, and that the preferable solution to the Zimbabwe crisis lies in a reformed Zanu-PF or a government of national unity. South Africa’s position on Zimbabwe is also inconsistent with its emphasis on human security, appearing throughout to be more concerned with regime security than with the rights and dignity of the Zimbabwean people. Another dramatic contradiction has been Mbeki’s denialist position on HIV/AIDS, condemned by Archbishop Ndungane and others as a ‘crime against humanity’.41 In terms of fatalities and destructive social and economic impact, the pandemic is the most significant security problem at the domestic, regional and continental levels.42 It demands the massive effort and large-scale mobilization of resources that are typically afforded to grave security threats. Mbeki’s stance has nowhere been satisfactorily explained, but it might be explicable in terms of the ideological paradigms referred to above. In addition to supporting a dissident scientific view, he has argued his case on ideological grounds, portraying pharmaceutical companies, sections of the scientific community and the campaign against HIV/AIDS as racist and imperialist.43 On this issue too, the President’s judgement has undermined his international credibility and South African diplomacy.44 South Africa’s controversial arms acquisition programme, which entails the purchase of warships and aircraft at a cost estimated at R30 billion (US$5.2 billion) in 1998, is at odds with the holistic approach to security, the pacific foreign posture and the absence of any remotely foreseeable military threat. Cabinet ministers contend that opponents of the programme are wrong to cast the issue as one of ‘guns versus butter’ since the country needs both guns and butter. They miss the point, of course. The term ‘guns versus butter’ refers to economic opportunity costs, so that public funds spent on weaponry could otherwise have been spent on health and social services. The exorbitant expenditure deviated from the government’s pledge to contain military spending, enunciated in the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review of 1998.45 A number of factors account for the acquisition programme. At the parliamentary level, the military was able to convince politicians across the board that major weapons systems were fast becoming obsolete. Many parliamentarians 40
See e.g. Thabo Mbeki, ‘We will resist the upside-down view of Africa’, Letter from the President, ANC Today 3: 42, 12–18 Dec. 2003. ‘Inaction on Aids as bad as apartheid’, Mail and Guardian, 20 Sept. 2000. For a discussion on AIDS as a regional security problem, see Jacqui Ala, ‘AIDS as a new security threat’, in Baregu and Landsberg, From Cape to Congo, pp. 131–56. 43 See e.g. Drew Forrest and Barry Streek, ‘Mbeki in bizarre Aids outburst’, Mail and Guardian, 26 Oct. 2001; and Nic Dawes, ‘Mbeki’s new race tirade’, Mail and Guardian, 22 Oct. 2004. 44 See Alden and le Pere, South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy, p. 69; and ‘Deadly meddling: Thabo Mbeki shows no sign of giving up his misguided views on AIDS’, The Economist, 1 Nov. 2001. 45 See Laurie Nathan, ‘Parliamentary approval of original defence review was no mandate to buy weapons’, Sunday Independent (South Africa), 22 July 2001. 41 42
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Laurie Nathan supported the force design proposed by the military for the additional reason that they lacked the technical expertise to consider alternative models. At cabinet level, the minister of defence, Joe Modise, was an unabashed hawk; other ministers were captivated by the arms sellers’ promises of offsets amounting to R111 billion and the creation of 65,000 jobs; and the government appeared to believe that even if diplomacy was preferable to force, the retention of strong armed forces would add weight to its peacemaking endeavours in Africa. Never far from the surface was the realpolitik association of state, sovereignty and military power. It is also possible that the executive, like parliament, deferred to military planners because it did not have the expertise to evaluate their proposals properly.46 The military intervention by South Africa and Botswana in Lesotho in September 1998 was demonstrably inconsistent with Pretoria’s preference for pacific forms of conflict resolution. The deployment met with unanticipated resistance from sections of the Lesotho army, and eight South African soldiers and an estimated 58 Basotho soldiers were killed in battles over several days. Anarchy and public demonstrations against the intervention ensued, leading to the virtual sacking of the capital city, Maseru. The operation was riddled with strategic and tactical errors and was widely viewed as a military and political disaster.47 The intervention can be explained by the following factors: a coup seemed imminent when a group of junior officers deposed and imprisoned the commander and other senior members of the Lesotho Defence Force; the previous coup in Lesotho had led to the killing of the deputy prime minister; the OAU had recently taken a strong stand against coups; and South African military assistance had been formally requested by the head of a lawful government. It may also have been relevant that the decision to deploy troops was taken by Acting President Buthelezi while President Mandela and Deputy President Mbeki were abroad, although Pretoria subsequently insisted that Buthelezi had consulted them. In any event, the intervention was clearly anomalous and not indicative of South Africa’s foreign posture. Troop deployments in the DRC and Burundi, by contrast, are primarily peacekeeping missions and have the approval of the UN Security Council. The one major inconsistency with respect to the government’s emphasis on Africa and an Africanist approach occurs at the domestic level. There is widespread xenophobia in South Africa, targeted mainly at people from other African countries. The government does little to discourage the xenophobia, and little to support African refugees.48 Its immigration laws are very tough and they are stacked against Africans rather than against job-seekers from the 46
For a discussion on the arms procurement package, see Christopher Wrigley, The South African deal: a case study in the arms trade (London: Campaign Against the Arms Trade, 2003). 47 See e.g. ‘More questions than answers as smoke clears around Maseru’, SouthScan 13: 20, 2 Oct. 1998, pp. 153–4; and ‘Army top brass slam incursion into Lesotho’, Star, 1 Oct. 1998. 48 See Steven Friedman, ‘Solidarity begins at home’, Mail and Guardian, 3 Dec. 1999.
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Consistency and inconsistencies in South African foreign policy North. The treatment of African refugees and asylum seekers is shamefully reminiscent of the apartheid era.49 The economic rationale for the government’s position, relating to the high level of unemployment, is not an adequate explanation. Tanzania, which is vastly poorer than South Africa, has housed tens of thousands of refugees from Burundi and Rwanda for decades. It is unclear why South African leaders who were given sanctuary by neighbouring states at great cost during the liberation struggle do not make greater effort to offer reciprocal support. South Africa’s export of conventional armaments has been its foreign activity least consistent with stated policy. The cabinet resists transparency and parliamentary oversight, draws a spurious distinction between ‘sensitive’ and ‘nonsensitive’ military products, and reneges repeatedly on its promise to avoid arms transfers to ‘countries which systematically violate or suppress human rights and fundamental freedoms’.50 In the period 2000–01, the recipients of South African military equipment included China, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.51 Ministers claim that the exports stimulate employment, generate foreign revenue and help to maintain the viability of the domestic defence industry. Yet the persistent deviations from policy that has been approved by cabinet and parliament, and the argument that ‘if we don’t sell the weapons, someone else will’,52 suggest a cynical disregard for human rights.53 Conclusion Pretoria’s foreign policy has given rise to an extensive body of critical work by South African academics. This work does not always distinguish between policies that are truly incoherent and those that are coherent but not adhered to consistently. Nor does it always take account of the complexities of international affairs, distinguishing between the failures that are attributable to government and those that are due to forces beyond its control. In this article I have argued that South Africa has a coherent foreign policy, but that a number of striking inconsistencies have damaged its international standing and consequently undermined its foreign policy objectives. The problem may well lie more in the realm of strategy than that of policy. There appears to be greater clarity on goals than on the best means of achieving them. Notwithstanding its title, the Strategic Plan of the Department of Foreign Affairs does not grapple with the tensions and dilemmas that lie at the heart of 49
50 51 52 53
See Shyaka Kanuma, ‘The long wait for freedom’, Mail and Guardian, 22 March 2002; and South African Press Association, ‘Government criticised for treatment of detained foreigners’, Mail and Guardian, 2 Nov. 2004. White Paper on National Defence, p. 55. See ‘South African export statistics for conventional arms, 2000–2001’ on the website of the Department of Defence at http://www.mil.za/SecretaryforDefence/Frame/Frame.htm, accessed 12 Jan. 2005. See e.g. ‘We’ll sell to whom we want’, Cape Times, 14 Jan. 1997. See further Human Rights Watch, ‘South Africa. A question of principle: arms trade and human rights’, Human Rights Watch Report 12: 5(A), Oct. 2000.
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Laurie Nathan strategy and loom large in the wide-ranging and ambitious foreign policy of a country with limited capacity and influence. There are especially strong tensions between multilateralism in Africa and a commitment to democracy, and between securing western support for NEPAD and seeking to transform international power relations. These tensions are not contradictions, and they do not render the relevant objectives invalid or the foreign policy incoherent; but they do require much sophistication, finesse and focus at the strategic level.
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