Consociational Democracy and Corporatism in ...

Consociational Democracy and Corporatism in Switzerland Gerhard Lehmbruch Universitdt Konstanz

The Swiss concept o/Konkordanzdemokratie (consociational democracy) is examined in this article. The author traces the development of this practice from its earliest origins to its current manifestation, focusing especially on the role that religion and linguistic differences have played. The influence of the emerging "political market" is also examined as is the disappearance of traditional political cleavages. The article concludes with the author's speculation on the future relationship between Swiss "consociational democracy" and the European Community.

'Erich Gruner (Bern) and Leonhard Neidhart (Ziirich/Konstanz) kindly commented on a draft of this article. Responsibility for eventual errors of facts or judgment is, of course, entirely mine.

Publius: The Journal of Federalism 23 (Spring 1993)

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In a constitutional referendum on 6 December 1992, a majority of both the Swiss national electorate and the cantons rejected the accession of Switzerland to the European Economic Area (EEA). This outcome was remarkable because the amendment was supported by the overwhelming majority of the political and economic elite, including organized labor. The prospect of a positive vote was perceived as a first step toward integration in the European Community (EC).' The vote was unusual because of the high turnout; opinion surveys indicated that a large proportion of apathetic voters had been mobilized. The actual vote, therefore, had all aspects of a populist revolt against the political establishment. However, the vote also indicated a growing fissure in the relations between the two main linguistic communities of the country, with the French Swiss supporting European integration, and a large majority of the German Swiss apparently hostile to integration. Opinion polls taken after the vote pointed to strong feelings of ambiguity and insecurity aroused by the profound changes in the international environment of Switzerland. Can the Swiss polity continue to function as it has done since the late nineteenth century, as Switzerland finds itself exposed to the challenge of integration? What, among other things, will be the future of its traditional style of governance?

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Publius/Spring 1993 SWISS KONKORDANZDEMOKRATIE AND THE CONSOCIATIONAL "MODEL"

Segmented Pluralism and the Emergence of Consociational Democracy The growth of "consociational democracy" was essentially an institutional response, since the late nineteenth century, to the challenges that industrialization and social mobilization constituted for the political organization of culturally segmented societies, mostly in smaller European countries. The underlying social changes have been described as the growth of "segmented pluralism."4 By this term, we mean that minority groups (be they linguistic, religious, or ideological) developed a complex organizational structure that coalesced into cohesive, vertically segmented Lager (camps) or zuilen (pillars), to use the Dutch term. Typically, these segments consisted of networks including (normally one) political parties, youth organizations, and professional (labor, agricultural, and eventually employer) organizations, all held together by an "interlocking directorate" of the

'This term, derived from the same Latin root as concord, might be translated as "democracy of mutual agreement." This was the central theoretical argument of my Proporzdemokratie: Politisches System und politische Kultur in der Schweiz, und in Osterreich (Proportional Democracy: Political System and Political Culture in Switzerland and in Austria) (Tubingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1967). Arend Lijphart's version of the theory was first published in his "Typologies of Democratic Systems," Comparative Political Studies 1 (April 1968): 3-44. For a reconsideration of the theory, see my "Das konkordanzdemokratische Modell in der vergleichenden Analyse politischer Systeme" (The Consociational Democratic Model in the Comparative Analysis of Political Systems), Politischer Wandel in konkordanzdemokratischen Systemen (Political Change in Consociational Democratic Systems), ed. Helga Michalsky (Vaduz: Verlag der Liechtensteinischen Akademischen Gesellschaft, 1991). 4 Val R. Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies," Comparative Politics 3 (January 1971): 141-175.


Konkordanzdemokratie2 is the term by which the Swiss designate their peculiar system of government based on the participation in the executive of all major political parties, and the accompanying preference for decisionmaking by broadly based compromises. Among German-speaking political scientists, this term has been taken up to serve as an equivalent to the term "consociational democracy" coined by Arend Lijphart (following David Apter). Switzerland is generally considered an important example of this pattern of policymaking and governing, which was, for a long time, characteristic of a plurality of smaller European countries. Swiss "consociationalism" is, however, a special case in several respects. The central institutional pattern of an ideal type consociational democracy is the settlement of major social conflicts not by majority decisions but through bargaining processes between organized groups.3 Since the late nineteenth century this meant, in particular, the inclusion of the major political parties in bargained conflict settlement, often institutionalized by the participation of all these parties in the executive. Later, typically, these large coalitions were reinforced by "corporatist" bargaining systems, including the dominant associations of organized producer interests. These elements are characteristic of the Swiss case too.

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Communal Origins of Swiss Consociationalism Consociationalism, as an institutional response to the challenges of segmented pluralism, was not so much the product of deliberate "social engineering" but of a process of social learning in which earlier institutional experiences were probably helpful. In Switzerland, with its historical record as a political organization based on cities, communes, and federations of peasant communities, this was the particular experience of traditional communal government and the acid test which these institutions successfully passed in the religious conflicts of the Reformation period.7 This fragmentation of the Swiss party system is emphasized by Erich Gruner, Die Parteien in der Schweiz (Political Parties in Switzerland) (Bern: Francke, 1977), pp. 29-30. A rich description of the diversity of cantonal political traditions is found in Fritz Ren6 Allemann, 25 mal die Schweiz (Switzerland 25 Times) (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1965). T h e leader of the Catholic "League," Konstantin Siegwart from Lucerne, aimed at a confederal reorganization of Switzerland into two coherent religious blocs of cantons with equal strength. 7 The organizational predecessors of the cantons in the old (pre-1798) Swiss confederation were called Orte (literally, places, localities). The One of inner Switzerland were indeed free peasant communities organized as small confederacies. In the ancien regime, larger Orte like Bern or Zurich controlled territories of considerable extension; most of the countryside was "subject land" governed by the patrician oligarchies of the cities. The term "Kanton" goes back to the Napoleonic reorganization of Switzerland that brought about the equality of urban and rural Switzerland.


sociopolitical elites of the respective minority group formed through the widespread cumulation of leadership positions in different organizations. Consociational democracy emerged when these vertical segments were coopted into the governmental structure. This did not, however, happen automatically and mechanically. Consociational cooptation can be interpreted as the rational strategic response of former majority political elites to the growth of "segmented pluralism" in a specific institutional setting where it was difficult for the former governing majorities to continue governing against the opposition of henceforth strongly organized minorities. The standard examples of segmented pluralism and consociationalism were Austria, The Netherlands, and Belgium. The Swiss case is peculiar insofar as the segmented organizational networks of the minority groups (Catholics and Socialists) were in turn horizontally fragmented by regional and linguistic cleavages that are institutionally entrenched in the cantonal organization of the Swiss federal system. The low cohesion of contemporary Swiss political parties in the "confederal" arena is a significant expression of this fragmentation.5 Given that most of the cantons were religiously homogeneous from the beginning of modern Switzerland, federalism was an important modifying structural factor in the Swiss variety of cultural segmentation. After the Sonderbundskrieg (War of Secession) in 18471848 in which the Protestant and liberal cantons crushed the rebellion of the Catholic and conservative cantons of inner Switzerland, religion was the first cultural cleavage confronting the modernized and democratized political system of Switzerland.6 However, as will be demonstrated, the Catholic minority discovered remarkable institutional resources when it strove to restore its political equality. The uniquely Swiss variety of consociationalism, which emerged on the federal level with the integration of the Catholic party, was the result of a set of constraints constituted by the institutions of federalism and direct democracy.

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'Erich Gruner pointed this out in a personal conversation. I owe him also the example of Appenzell. 'A numerical majority of One remained Catholic, but Protestant Zurich and Bern were the most powerful. "This distant past is conserved in their constitutional status. As Halbkantone (half-cantons), they are entitled to only one councillor each in the Standerat (thefirstchamber of the federal Parliament modeled after the U.S. Senate) instead of two. "The adoption of ParitSt in Glarus was due to pressure from the neighboring Catholic One. The system included even the military organization: there was a Protestant and a Catholic powder magazine. For the postal system, the Protestants were allotted the privilege for northward communications, and the Catholics controlled communications with the South. 12 This principle was also adopted in Switzerland. In Germany, it was mostly absolutist princes who decided the religion of their subjects, whereas in Switzerland this was the privilege of the ruling (often bourgeois) elites of the autonomous Orte.


Under the ancien regime, a typical feature of communal government was the practice of participation of all regimentsfahige Geschlechter (patrician families "fit for rule") in the councils of the commune. When, in 1712, in Appenzell AuBerRhoden (a small canton in Eastern Switzerland) the ruling family clan of the Zellweger was ousted from government by the opposition led by the Wetter family, this was an exceptional event that confirmed the rule.8 Since the Reformation, the institutional practice of accommodative communal government was put to a strong test by the religious cleavage. In the long run, however, it successfully contributed to the management of these conflicts. When, under the leadership of Ulrich Zwingli and John Calvin, the reformed creed was accepted in large parts of the old Swiss confederation, the Catholics maintained enough strongholds so that both religions finally found themselves in a situation of unstable equilibrium.9 Therefore, the first confederal peace treaty of 1529 established the principle of religious autonomy of the Orte (cantons). To be sure, in most One, religious homogeneity prevailed: They either remained Catholic, became Protestant, or returned to the old creed in the course of the "counter-Reformation." However, in some rural Orte, only part of the townships adopted the reformed-or returned to the Catholic-creed, and because neither religion was large enough to dominate the other, they had to choose between two institutional solutions: separation or Paritat (parity), that is, the corporative equality of religious groups. The first alternative was chosen in Appenzell. In 1597, after part of this mountainous canton had returned to the old religion, it split into Protestant AuBer-Rhoden and Catholic Inner-Rhoden.10 In Glarus, on the other hand, the territorial integrity of the canton was preserved by the introduction of Paritat. From 1683 to 1837, there were separate administrations for the Protestant and Catholic parts." Such patterns of local religious accommodation were undoubtedly facilitated by the practice of mutual accommodation among ruling communal oligarchies. The legal formula of Paritat was an invention from the German religious wars. It was first introduced by the religious peace treaty of Augsburg (1555) that settled the coexistence of Lutheran and Catholic territories and, as an exception to the principle of cuius regio eius religio (the right of territorial rulers to determine the religion of their subjects),12 established Paritat of denominations, that is, their equal representation in city government for some important South German cities. After the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) that tore Germany between the Catholic and the


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The Emergence of Cantonal Proporzregierung Between 1830 and 1848, many Swiss cantons experienced a process of political modernization leading to the demise of oligarchic rule by family clans and to the introduction of representative democratic government. An early exception, and an interesting parallel to the case of Appenzell two-and-a-half centuries earlier, was the canton of Basel. In 1830, against the stubborn resistance of the ruling urban oligarchy, the countryside rose in armed rebellion that was settled by separation into two Halbkantone (half-cantons).17 The majority of cantons, though, finally chose accommodative forms of conflict settlement more akin to the precedent of Glarus. "Fritz Reiner, "Die Entwicklung der Paritat in der Schweiz" (Development of Parity in Switzerland), Ausgewahlte Schriften und Reden (Selected Writings and Speeches) (Zurich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1941), pp. 81-100. 14 Josias Simler and Hans Jacob Leu, Von dem Regiment der Loblichen Eydgenofischafl: zwey Bticher (About the Regiment ofthe Laudable Confederation: Two Books) (2nd ed.; Zurich: GeBner, 1735), pp. 421-422; Johannes Dierauer, Geschichte der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft (The History of the Swiss Confederation), vol. 3 (2nd ed.; Gotha: Perthes, 1922), pp. 471-472. "Condominia were "subject lands" (see fn. 7) controlled by more than one Orte. In these mixed condominia, according to the first treaty of 1529, a majority decision of citizens could bind the religious minority in each parish. However, the treaty of 1722 confirmed the individual equality of Protestants and Catholics in these condominia; in mixed communes, even church buildings were to be used jointly by both religions according to detailed rules. To be sure, this was not tantamount to religious liberty; the exercise of religion outside these two established churches was not guaranteed. "Rudolf Stanz, Die Entwicklung der Paritat im Kanton Aargau (The Development of Parity in Aargau Canton) (Diss. Jur.: University of Zurich, 1936). "Therefore, the two half-cantons of Base\-Stadt and Basel-Land have a constitutional status similar to that of the two Appenzell. The aristocracy of the city (Baxl-Stadt) resisted democratization until 1875.


Protestant princes, the same formula was extended to the relations between the territories of the Reich. According to the Westphalian Treaties of 1648, the established denominations (now, Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists) were entitled to "paritary" representation in the institutions of the Reich. Decisions of the Imperial Diet (the Reichstag at Regensburg) in religious matters had to conform to the rule of amicabilis compositio (amicable settlement). They required the agreement of the representatives of both the corpus catholicorum and the corpus evangelicorum (the corporate representations of the Catholic and the Protestant territories, respectively) meeting in itio inpartes (separate assemblies). The Swiss, although increasingly separated from the Reich, adopted this technique for the settlement of their own religious disputes between Catholic and Protestant OrteP For the Eidgenossische Tagsatzung (Confederal Diet), both religious groups appointed their own Schreiber (secretaries), and a practice of separate conferences of the Protestant and the Catholic Orte, resembling the itio inpartes of the religious corpora of the Imperial Diet, developed alongside the Tagsatzung (Diet of the pre1798 Swiss Confederation).14 Moreover, after several armed conflicts, the fourth confederal peace treaty of 1722 confirmed the constitutional principle of Paritdt for the administration of the gemeine Herrschaften (condominia, common people) ruled jointly by Orte of different religions.15 Here, Paritdt was maintained even after the federal reorganization of Switzerland under Napoleon's Act of Mediation (1803), which gave these former condominia the status of autonomous cantons (Aargau, Thurgau, and St. Gallen).16

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The Development o/Konkordanzdemokratie in the Federal Arena The modern form of Konkordanzdemokratie is, above all, the consequence of institutional innovations dating from a second wave of democratization spreading through Switzerland since the mid-1860s. This was largely a popular rebellion against the new liberal entrepreneurial elites who, since 1830, had come to replace the traditional patrician oligarchies of the cities. In the cantons, the main institutional result of this new democratic movement was the superseding of representa-

"Examples of parties renouncing chances of electoral victory under a formally majoritarian system-in the spirit of "voluntary proportional governmenfj-are given in Jean Meynaud et al.. Etudes politiques vaudoises (Political Studies of Vaud) (Lausanne: Etudes de Science Politique, 1963), p. 298. "This was a reaction to the past practice of gerrymandering electoral districts. "This system was still flourishing when I was a student at the University of Basel in the early 1950s.


However, after the defeat of the conservative Catholic cantons in the War of Secession (1847-1948) and the transformation of the old confederation into a modern system of federal government by the Constitution of 1848, the progress of democracy first found its expression in the increasing intensity of party conflict. Conservatives and radicals often confronted each other bitterly. Significantly, an institutional accommodation of these disputes was soon sought for-undoubtedly in the tradition of communal accommodative practices inherited from the ancien regime. The formula of "fusion government" first appeared in 1850 in Schwyz, and then in 1854 in Bern where the conservative majority coopted the radical opposition to the cantonal executive. Gradually, it then spread to the other cantons, in particular after the adoption of direct popular election of the government as a consequence of a second wave of democratization in the 1860s. Although, in legal terms, majority election of the cantonal executive was the rule, it was increasingly modified by the adoption of "voluntary proportional government." Minority representatives are elected to the executive according to their respective electoral strength on the basis of Proporzregierung (proportional government), based on interparty understandings.18 When in 1890 the conflict of parties in the Canton of Ticino culminated in an armed rebellion of the liberal opposition, a military intervention of the federal government finally led to the imposition of proportional election of the cantonal executive and, as an important innovation, of proportional representation in Parliament.19 In some cantons, the accommodative style of conflict settlement was even extended to the organization of established (Protestant) churches as these became torn between liberals and fundamentalists. In Vaud and Neuchatel, to be sure, the evangelical current broke with the state church and chose separation. In Zurich, on the other hand, a "consociational" solution was informally agreed upon, with representation of the different church parties in the elected authorities of the state church. Finally, in Basel, the government imposed controlled separation. In each parish, the conservative and liberal church parties were allowed to choose their own ministers who alternated in the pulpit, and both organized their own associations of women, youth, and the like, under the legal umbrella of the same parish.20


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"Thus, Jakob Dubs (radical Bundesrat member from 1861 to 1872) argued in his Das Offentliche Recht der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft dargestellt fur das Volk (Public Law of the Swiss Confederation Presented for the People), vol. 1 (Zurich: Orell Fiissli, 1878), pp. 18Off, that in Swiss political thought the concept of opposition had never really taken root. 22 A detailed and colorful description of the election (and resignation) of federal councillors can be found in Christopher Hughes, The Parliament of Switzerland (London: Cassell, 1962), pp. 69-80. 23 In 1893, NumaDroz (federal councillor from 1872 to 1892)analyzed the composition of the federal executive over the past decades in terms of "left," "center," and "right" as "parties." "Le mode d'dlection du conseil fdderal" (The Method of Election of the Federal Council), Etudes et portraits politiques (Political Studies and Portraits) (Geneva and Paris, 1895), pp. 325-326.


tive (parliamentary) government by direct democracy. The principal innovations were direct popular election of the executive (mostly with voluntary Proporz, as mentioned above) and the widespread introduction of the popular initiative and the referendum for cantonal legislation and for important budgetary decisions. In the federal arena, the constitutional revision of 1874 retained the principle of representative parliamentarism (the popular initiative was restricted to constitutional revisions), but allowed the popular referendum against laws voted by Parliament (except when these were declared "urgent"). This innovation, however, led to unanticipated consequences. In the long run, it induced the governing coalition to coopt major minority parties into the federal executive, the collegial Bundesrat. After the introduction of the modern federal Constitution in 1848, the Bundesrat was controlled by the Liberal Radical party. The conservative Catholics, after their defeat in the War of Secession, remained outside the executive. To be sure, many contemporary writers agreed that Switzerland had no opposition as it was known in other parliamentary regimes.21 This was due to several interrelated causes. Given the religious, linguistic, and geographic fragmentation of Switzerland, the majority party was a broad alliance of cantonal parties; hence, the political diversity of the Bundesrat (Federal Council) was such that it resembled a coalition government rather than a homogeneous executive. This diversity was reinforced by the constitutional provisions and informal conventions for the representation of all regions: The Bundesrat is not responsible to the Parliament. Formal election is for the duration of the legislature, but the members of the executive are considered as magistrates who normally are reelected and retain office until they decide to retire. Hence, in practice, each federal councillor is chosen individually, and, for any individual election to the executive, complex bargains are necessary to maintain a subtle equilibrium not only of parties but also of languages and of regions. The Constitution limits the size of the Bundesrat to seven members, of which no more than one can be taken from one canton. Moreover, besides Zurich, Bern, and Vaud (almost regularly represented in the government), other regions have to be taken into consideration. The most important convention is that at least two federal councillors have to come from the French- and Italian-speaking cantons.22 Given this established practice, the cooption of minority parties was not a fundamental institutional rupture,23 although it was certainly a political watershed. After 1848, the Catholic party strongly resented its systematic exclusion from the

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"Leonhard Neidhart, Plebiszit und pluralitSre Demokratie: Eine Analyse der Funktion des schweizerischen Gesetzesreferendums (Plebiscite and Pluralist Democracy: An Analysis of the Function of Swiss Law Referenda) (Bern: Francke, 1970), pp. 75-77. "It included also some small business representatives and therefore took the name of Bauern-, Gewerbe- und Burgerpartei (Farmers, Small Business, and Bourgeois Party) (BGB). a In 1953, the Social Democratic councillor Max Weber resigned after his department's proposal for a finance reform had been rejected in a referendum.


executive, and under the revised constitution, it came to use the referendum in order to undermine the policies of the majority. In the fragmented political structure of Switzerland, this could be done by forging ad hoc coalitions of minority groups (e.g., from Catholic and French-speaking cantons which were equally inclined to oppose what they resented as the domination and the centralism of Protestant German-speaking Switzerland). In 1891, such a referendum coalition wrecked a first attempt at the nationalization of railways, and the responsible federal councillor (Emil Weld) reacted by resigning (in itself an unusual move in the Swiss system of a permanent executive). The Liberal majority then decided to elect as his successor the prominent Catholic deputy Josef Zemp. By this cooption of an influential minority leader to the Bundesrat, they gave the Catholics access to executive decisionmaking, with the intention of making thern abandon their systematic use of the referendum-a strategy that succeeded.24 After World War I, because of the introduction of proportional representation and the secession of a rather strong Peasant party25 from the Radical party, the latter lost its majority in the popular chamber of Parliament. In consequence, in 1919, a second Catholic was elected as federal councillor. Ten years later, the Peasant party also was coopted into the Bundesrat. The inclusion of the Social Democrats took some more time. Traditionally, the Swiss workers' movement had been moderate, but at the end of the nineteenth century, under the influence of German immigrants, Marxist ideas gained ground in the Social Democratic party. Although this was, to a large degree, mere verbal radicalism, it contributed to maintaining a strong barrier between bourgeois parties and the left. At the end of World War I, the hardships endured by the working class led to an intense conflict culminating in a general strike in November 1918. Large sectors of the traditional parties perceived this as an act of rebellion against the authority of the state. Although the large moderate majority of rank-and-file party members rejected the idea of joining the Communist Third International, for more than a decade the Social Democrats were perceived as a radical opposition outside the system. This changed with the victory of National Socialism in Germany. Against Adolph Hitler (and his Swiss sympathizers), the Social Democrats participated in the reflex for the defense of Swiss liberal democracy. Hand in hand with this, the younger generation of party leaders abandoned Marxist ideological topics in favor of reformist concepts, such as those professed by the Belgian Socialist Henri de Man. The outbreak of World War II contributed further to the reconciliation with the parties of the majority, and in 1943 the first Social Democrat was elected to the Bundesrat. After an interlude in the 1950s,26 the executive has included two Social


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Democrats since 1959. For more than three decades, then, the SPS, Radicals, and the Christian Democrats (the former Catholic-conservatives) have held the same number of seats, and the Swiss People's Party (the successor of the Peasant party) has held one. As the Zauberformel (magic formula) of 2:2:2:1 has continued to correspond roughly to the numerical strength of the parties in Parliament, it could never be seriously challenged. However, the cooption of the former minority parties into the Bundesrat is not necessarily tantamount to equality in the administration. The top level of the federal bureaucracy is politicized, but still in a rather asymmetric way. The Radical party is clearly overrepresented.27 Thus, in spite of the "magic formula," it still successfully defends part of the dominant position it had occupied in the Swiss polity since 1848.28

"Ulrich KISti, Die Chejbeamten der schweizerischen Bundesvenvaltung (Chief Civil Servants of the Swiss Federal Bureaucracy) (Bern: Francke, 1972) and Hanspeter Kriesi, Enlscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Schweizer Politik (Decision Structures and Decision Processes of Swiss Politics) (Frankfurt a Main, Germany: Campus, 1980), pp. 392-395. •"Similar examples of radical hegemony in the administration can be found in cantons, notably in Vaud. See Jean Meynaud, Les partis politiques vaudois (The Political Parties of Vaud) (Lausanne: fitudes de Science Politiques, 1966), pp. 141-142. M Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Consociational Democracy, Class Conflict and the New Corporatism" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Political Science Association, Round Table on Political Integration, Jerusalem, 1974). Reprinted in Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch, eds., Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation (London: Sage, 1979), pp. 53-62. "Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Sozialpartnerschaft in der vergleichenden Politikforschung" (Social Partnership in Comparative Political Research), Sozialpartnerschaft in der Krise: Leistungen und Grenzen des Neokorporatismus in Osterreich (Social Partnership in Crisis: Performance and Limits of Neo-Corporatism in Austria), eds. Peter Gerlich et al. (Wien: Bohlau, 1985), pp. 85-107.


Konkordanzdemokratie and the Intermediation of Organized Interests Since the late nineteenth century, in Switzerland as in other industrializing countries, a system of interest associations developed alongside the party arena and-in a process of structural differentiation-became increasingly important for the institutionalized resolution of economic and social conflicts. As in other countries characterized by "segmented pluralism," most of these associations are also closely linked to the political parties that occupy a central position in the consociational framework. Quite naturally, therefore, these associations, too, were integrated into the accommodative Swiss bargaining model. This led to the emergence of a second institutional layer of consociationalism that finally even appeared to eclipse the party system as an intermediating arena. The consociational model of policy formation strongly favored the emergence of "corporatist" patterns of interest intermediation.29 Austria, Belgium, and The Netherlands were probably the most salient examples of this "corporatist" extension of the consociational model. Much of the national bargaining process in economic and social policy takes place not in the political party arena but in a network of strong interest associations. There are, however, strong interorganizational links between parties and organized interests, among others a widespread cumulation of associational leadership positions with parliamentary mandates and even with governmental office.30 These links normally prevent the

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''Attempts at a "constitutionalization" of corporatist policymaking in the Swiss confederation were made during and after the 1930s, not least under the influence of the spread of corporatist doctrines at that time. But because of the political utilization of these doctrines by the fascist movements, they fell into disrepute after the defeat of the Axis powers. The "economic articles" of the Swiss Constitution voted in 1947 thus constitute a weaker version of corporatism than that introduced in contemporary Austria or The Netherlands. I2 The distinction of a "corporatist" and a "pluralist" pattern of the integration of organized interests into policy formation (as it was introduced to comparative politics by Philippe Schmitter in 1974) was made by Erich Gruner already fifteen years before; see his important article, "Der Einbau der organisierten Interessen in den Staat" (Incorporation of Organized Interests into the State), Schweizerische Zeitschrift fur Volkswirtschaft und Statistik (Swiss Review of Political Economy and Statistics) 95 (March 1959): 59-79 (in particular, 63). Cf. also by Gruner, "Wirtschaftsverbande und Staat: Das Problem der wirtschaftlichenlnteressenvertretung in historischerSicht" (Economic Interest Associations and the State: The Problem of Economic Interest Representation in Historical View), Schweizerische Zeitschrift fur Volkswirtschaft und Statistik90 (March 1954): l-27;andDie Wirtschaftsverbande in der Demokratie: Vom Wachstum der Wirtschaftsorganisationen im schweizerischen Staat (Economic Interest Associations in a Democracy: Of the Growth of Economic Organization in the Swiss State) (Erlenbach-Zurich: Eugen Rentsch, 1956). "Harry Eckstein, Pressure Group Politics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1960), pp. 15ff. "Gerhard Lehmbruch, "The Organization of Society, Administrative Strategies, and Policy Networks," Political Choice: Institutions, Rules, and the Limits of Rationality, eds. Roland M. Czada and Adrienne Windhoff-Hentier (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1991).


parliamentary and party-political arena, on one hand, and the arena of interest intermediation, on the other, from functioning at cross-purposes. Switzerland is, in several respects, distinguished from the aforementioned cases. Different from The Netherlands with their Socio-Economic Council, or of Austria with its "Paritary Commission," Switzerland did not develop similar central institutions for formalized interorganizational policy concentration.31 However, as Erich Gruner has shown, a remarkable preference for the "incorporation of organized interests into the state" and for corporatist policy formation through associational bargaining appears clearly since the last quarter of the nineteenth century.32 The formation of centralized interest associations is a significant instance of these developments. The strength of Swiss peak associations is remarkable, and it is generally acknowledged that the cohesion of Swiss interest associations is superior to that of Swiss political parties. This would certainly be counterintuitive if we followed Harry Eckstein's hypothesis that patterns of organized interest representation are a function of the institutionalized channels of access to political decisionmakers.33 Because of the federal fragmentation of Swiss policymaking, we should expect the emergence of fragmented and weakly organized associations if this hypothesis were valid under all circumstances. This was indeed true for much of the second half of the last century. Yet, as I have shown elsewhere, strong peak associations emerged in Switzerland as the consequence of government intervention into the system of interest intermediation.34 After the breakdown of the European free trade system in the 1870s, the Swiss executive found itself confronted with the need to collect information for international trade negotiations. The administrative resources of the federal government, however, were extremely weak and inadequate for this new task. Under these circumstances, it was natural for the authorities to draw on the services of business


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Konkordanzdemokratie as an Interorganizational Network In functional terms, these institutional developments can be interpreted as the emergence of a highly integrated decisionmaking structure to cope with the inputs from a complex and fragmented cleavage structure. While in the local arena and in rural cantons, politics may still be conducted through loose networks of traditional notables, the federal arena is dominated by organizations. The powerful individual leader, to be sure, was always alien to the political culture; hence, strong

"See Gruner, "Der Einbau der organisierten Interessen in den Staat." My interpretation follows closely Gruner's findings about the development of the Swiss system of interest intermediation. "The beneficiaries were the Schweizerische Handels- undlndustrieverein (Association for Commerce and Industry) and the Schweizerische Gewerbeverein (small business). "The post of labor secretary was filled by a prominent Socialist, at a time when the party was still considered as placing itself outside the system. "This process is analyzed in Neidhart. Plebiszit und pluralitare Demokratie.


associations, as it also happened in other European countries. At that time, however, Swiss business organization was still equally underdeveloped. Associations were highly decentralized, and they were administered by businessmen in a strictly honorary capacity. In this situation, the Bundesrat chose to subsidize interest associations so that they might employ "associational secretaries" to assist the authorities and collect the data needed for economic and social intervention. The condition on which these subsidies were given was the formation of peak associations with a representational monopoly.35 In the context of trade negotiations, this was first done in favor of the associations of industry and of small business.36 Significantly, however, the same organizational assistance was then granted to labor. On the condition that the rival Socialist and Christian unions form a national umbrella organization, an Arbeitersekretar (labor secretary) was employed to establish the statistical basis for social policy.37 Finally, a similar measure was decided for the organized peasantry. The government thus encouraged and, to a considerable degree, even created the corporate actors needed to form a national bargaining system for conflict management and policy formation, and it deliberately contributed to their bureaucratization. The institutional factors that contributed to the emergence of consociational democracy in the federal arena also played an important role in the gradual incorporation of organized interests in the policymaking structure. Political parties were not the only ones tempted to use the referendum to influence government policymaking. Interest associations, too, discovered the referendum as a potentially powerful political weapon. However, differing from political parties, organized interests could not be coopted into the executive. Therefore, the government and the parties reacted by integrating them into elaborate extraparliamentary consultative structures. In particular, these included consultation on Vernehmlassung (government bills) and participation in extra-parliamentary commissions.38 In 1947, this "corporatist" pattern received constitutional status in an amendment (the "economic articles" 31(2) to 31(5), 32, and 34(3)) which, among other things, made legislative consultation with interest groups mandatory.

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"The following is largely based on Hanspeter Kriesi' s careful empirical study, Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Schweizer Politik; see also his shorter resum£ of some of the essential findings in "The Structure of the Swiss Political System," Patterns ofCorporatist Policy-Making, eds. Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe C. Schmitter (London: Sage, 1982), pp. 133-162. Kriesi's sophisticated combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis confirms the interpretations of the Swiss polity in terms of a highly integrated (and not "pluralist") structure put forward by a certain number of more recent authors and disconfirms "pluralist" interpretations. *°On the individual level, the army is another important element of the linkage structure. Military rank is often an important condition for a career in the bourgeois political parties and in business corporations or organizations. "Concerning the Parliament, Hughes has rightly argued that, although "the decisive power is never in the hands of the plenum, and seldom in the hands of the institutions depending on the plenum," its "total power, in legislation, administration and finance, together with the total power its members can bring to bear, in VerbSnde (federations), at the polls, and in the cantons," is "very great" (The Parliament of Switzerland, p. 165). 42 Kriesi' s research is strongly inspired by the methodology of network analysis developed by Edward Laumann and others; hence, his findings might be usefully confronted with network analyses of the structure of American politics. Although the specific research design is not strictly comparable, apparently the "core structure" found by Kriesi is largely absent in the United States. See John P. Heinz et al., "Inner Circles or Hollow Cores?: Elite Networks in National Policy Systems," Journal of Politics 52 (May 1990): 356-390; John P. Heinz et al., Hollow Cores: Interest Representation in National PolicyMaking (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991); and Edward Laumann and David Knoke, The Organizational State: Social Choice in National Policy Domains (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987).


dominant personalities traditionally had little chance of being elected to the strictly collegial body of the Bundesrat. Now, however, even within this egalitarian framework, individual political actors normally need to be strongly anchored within one of the large national organizations if they want to exert political influence.39 Therefore, it is highly appropriate to analyze the pattern of Swiss politics in terms of interorganizational relations. In the central domains of economic and social policy, we find a network with a dominant core consisting of the large economic peak associations in close interconnections with the top level of the administration. In this highly integrated core, the Bundesrat and the parties of the Bundesrat majority play an important mediating role. Strategic leadership positions in the peak associations and in business enterprises are often cumulated with influential positions in parties and seats in Parliament.40 Therefore, the national Parliament, though its institutional position in the legislative process is rather weak, functions as a central switchboard of the sociopolitical system.41 To some degree, this includes linkages with cantonal leaders, for it is not uncommon for members of the Regierungsrdte (cantonal executives) to sit in one of the chambers of parliament, the Nationalrat or the Stdnderat.42 The cantons themselves, as institutionalized corporate actors, however, have no strong influence in federal policymaking-contrary to some preconceived ideas. They certainly play a role in decentralized issue areas, such as education policy, and through the mechanisms of role cumulation just described, cantonal actors may exert some influence in specific fields, such as territorial planning, but their role is relatively marginal to the central domains of economic and social policy. As pointed out above, the important political actors on the periphery have, in the past, been successfully coopted into the federal center. Thus, the periphery is no longer an autonomous element of the decisionmaking structure. The periphery and the


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43 The cantonal veto in constitutional votes (amendments need a majority both of the national electorates and of more than half of the cantonal electorates) is, of course, not exerted by the cantons as institutionalized corporate actors but by voters. "On this subject, see Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist Networks," Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, ed. John H. Goldthorpe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 60-80. "In Austria, for example, the peak associations of business and labor were also involved in the legislation on universities. 'This term was introduced by the "Austro-Marxist" Otto Bauer to characterize the power structure of Austria after World War I. "Peter Katzenstein, Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland, and the Politics of Industry (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 101. 48 This results from Kriesi's research findings mentioned above.


cantons today are still important as elements of the political cleavage structure, insofar as they can be considered as constraining rather than as formative elements of the decisionmaking structure.43 These characteristics of the federal network structure correspond closely to the linkage structure of corporatist systems on the elite level.44 However, different from other countries classified as "strongly corporatist" (e.g., Austria, Sweden, and The Netherlands) that used to be characterized by the strong organizational integration of the Lager or zuilen, in Switzerland the organization of the rank-and-file was always more fragmented along regional and linguistic lines. This structure left-and still leaves-more room for changing coalitions and political flexibility. Related to this is another significant difference between Switzerland and "corporatist" countries such as Austria or The Netherlands. After World War II, these countries, which traditionally have had a strong central government, developed formal peak institutions for national policy concertation. Switzerland lacks the tradition of strong bureaucratic government, and formal centralization continues to be resisted. Hence, national policy concertation involving the major groups can only be obtained as the outcome of discrete discursive and bargaining processes among organizational elites. Also, in Switzerland there are some sectoral policy networks with more specialized sets of actors (e.g., health policy, territorial planning, or traffic policy) that are not as closely integrated into the overarching national network structure as was once the case (e.g., in Austria).45 However, in these domains, peak associations closely linked to the administration play a central role. Finally, the influence of organized labor in the core network of economic and social policy was clearly stronger in Austria and in the Scandinavian countries than in Switzerland. The notion of "social partnership," so central to Austrian corporatism, has also been adopted as one of the key concepts of the Swiss policy network. The genesis of this integration of the labor unions into the national consensus of elites can again be traced back to the 1930s and was closely related to the cooption of the Socialist party into the federal government. However, whereas in neighboring Austria and in Sweden the power structure was characterized by an "equilibrium of class forces,"46 labor unions "occupy a subordinate position in Switzerland's social coalition."47 Moreover, in this structure, the position of the Social Democratic party is still clearly less central than that of the labor confederation.48

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49 This point was made by Ilja Scholten with reference to The Netherlands. See his "Does Consociationalism Exist?" Electoral Participation: A Comparative Analysis, ed. Richard Rose (London: Sage, 1980), pp. 329-354.


The Erosion of Segmented Pluralism: Toward a "Political Market"? The Swiss consociational model today seems endangered by internal as well as external developments. First, in Switzerland as well as in other smaller European countries, the consociational model in the classical sense-i.e., the pattern of conflict settlement through bargaining among the major political parties-seems subject to a process of gradual erosion. In The Netherlands and in Belgium, in the early 1980s, the corporatist basis of policymaking was severely challenged by the supply-side and market-oriented policies of neo-conservative governments. In Austria, the electoral basis of the "black-red" coalition is dwindling because of the formidable electoral progress made by the populist right-wing leader Jorg Haider. In Switzerland, to be sure, the situation seems less dramatic. However, almost persistently low rates of voter participation, recent electoral successes of single-issue protest parties like the Autopartei (Automobile party), and the above-mentioned failure of the political elites to rally the Swiss around the constitutional referendum on the EEA, all appear to indicate a widespread malaise with the consociational tradition and, in particular, with the "magic formula" in government formation. The question is whether this reflects a secular transnational trend, and whether, as a consequence, the consociational basis of the contemporary Swiss polity is not bound to disappear in the future. Such a hypothesis might seem plausible if we consider the conditions that gave rise to consociational democracy. As argued above, its emergence was linked to the development of "segmented pluralism." It was, therefore, premised on the organizational cohesion of the Lager or zuilen. The formation of these cohesive organizational networks was a characteristic variant of the process of political mobilization and, at the same time, structural differentiation of European societies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries-a process linked to industrialization as well as to political democratization. It was the strategy for minority groups (such as Catholics or Socialists) to defend their position in that secular process of mobilization through forming integrated sociopolitical networks of organizations to replace former community bonds. In some countries, this led first to renewed conflicts between the segmented subcultures. However, consociational democracies, thanks to peculiar institutional conditions, managed to transform these processes of organizational networkformation into overarching coalition-like arrangements. In the short run, consociationalism may even sometimes have been an instrument of the segtnental elites to keep the cleavages alive to sustain the basis of their political domination. Defense of minority interests in the consociational coalition was presented as the raison d'etre of their continuing exercise of political leadership based on an elite cartel.49 In the long run, however, this cohesion seems to have been paradoxically transitory. The cooption of minority groups helped to render the corresponding


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"This was the common starting point in Lijphart's (1967) and my own (1968) writings. As Almond put it, in the "Anglo-American political systems... the political system is saturated with the atmosphere of the market. Groups of electors and individual electors come to the political market with votes to sell in exchange for policies." In the continental European political systems, voters remained embedded in political subcultures, and therefore the "potentialities for 'political market' behavior were thwarted" ("Comparative Political Systems," JoumalofPoliticslS(Aogust 1956): 391-409). Given that the Swiss "magic formula" is still based on the electoral stability of the Bundesrat parties, one might say that this diagnosis, whatever its shortcomings, continues to apply to Switzerland.


cleavages less and less virulent. This raises the question of whether consociationalism is not bound to disappear by rendering itself superfluous. Indeed, since the 1960s, we observe in most European countries a gradual erosion of the organizational cohesion of minority subcultures-in particular the religious and ideological minorities, such as the Catholic or Socialist Lager. Religious practice as well as the socialist creed are on the decline, and the traditional segmental elites can less and less count on the compliance of their clientele. Similar disintegrative tendencies can be observed in other countries where strongly integrated interorganizational networks were found in the past. A close parallel apparently is the erosion of social democratic hegemony observed in particular in Scandinavia. Here too the first wave of mobilization had given rise to strongly cohesive organizational networks of the "workers movement," and they appear now to be subject to an equally strong loss of cohesion. To be sure, although many empirical observations indicate a trend toward erosion of such highly integrated networks or Lager, this is not due to a process of "demobilization." Rather, we are witnessing a second wave of mobilization where the emphasis is now much more on individual autonomy and, hence, the shaking off of those residual community-type bonds. To the degree that the Lager disintegrate, consociational democracy appears to lose its raison d'etre, namely, the balancing of organized minority groups. One might even speculati vely go one step further and relate the above-mentioned changes to the breakdown of the political design of "real socialism" in Eastern Europe. According to a now widespread perception, the end of socialism does at the same time signify the triumph of markets as the supreme mechanisms of social coordination, which eventually might be understood as a process of "modernization." As readers of the consociational literature may remember, its authors began by questioning the universal validity of the "political market" model as postulated, in particular, by Gabriel A. Almond.50 But twenty-five years later, the subcultures of segmented pluralism are tending to disintegrate, thus raising the question of whether the model of consociational democracy might perhaps be replaced by the model of the "political market" as represented by the English-speaking countries. Could it not be that consociational theory described (and, eventually, overrated) a deviating, transitory phenomenon, found in some peculiar countries during a limited historical period, that could not, in the long run, withstand the challenges of modernity?

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Publius/Spring 1993 THE EMERGENCE OF NEW CLEAVAGES AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL PERSISTENCE OF THE CONSOCIATIONAL NETWORK

5l An important reason for this estrangement is the recent widespread displacement, in the radio and television programs of German-speaking Switzerland, of High German in favor of the Alemanic dialect (which most Romands do not understand). !2 Neidhart has drawn my attention to these trends. "One of the most controversial issues between Switzerland and the EC is the problem of road transit with heavy-duty trucks across the Alps. The Swiss-under strong pressure from the mountain cantons and from environmentalists-prohibit trucks above a weight limit of 28 tons (the EC limit is 40 tons) and also refuse to build new motorways for the increasing traffic. Domestic polarization is also growing around this issue: Increasing environmentalists has, as a counter-reaction, led to the growth of the Autopartei, a single-issue party of motorists that has even elected deputies to the national Parliament.


Conjectures about the future of Konkordanzdemokratie will, of course, contain highly speculative elements. If we extrapolate from observations in other consociational or corporatist countries, we have to keep in mind the historical specificity of the Swiss experience. One of its important aspects is the salience of cultural cleavages linked to linguistic diversity. Although many observations in the Western European countries indicate the existence of pervasive trends toward erosion of traditional religious and ideological cleavages, the same is not true of language and of area. Among consociational and corporatist countries, Belgium is an outstanding example. Alternately, in Switzerland, the autonomy of language communities within a federal framework has been an established fact since the Napoleonic era. In the last decades, though, the "trench" between German- and French-speaking Switzerland apparently has become deeper-at least in the perception of many Romands (French-speakers).51 To the extent that this is merely a contrast in ways of life, its political salience may not be obvious. Yet recent votes-such as the referendum on the European Economic Area-indicate the existence of persistent strong differences in political attitudes. The new salience of the linguistic cleavage might be better understood if we consider that some of the important new political issues of the late twentieth century have a strong spatial impact and therefore tend to revive regional identities.52 This is true of environmental politics, of traffic politics,53 and of urban and regional development planning. At the same time, Switzerland is increasingly confronted with the costs of modernization. Growing unemployment, which can no longer be "exported" by reducing the number of foreign workers, and the serious economic crisis of traditional agriculture also help to resuscitate regional cleavages. Given this renewed importance of area and region, it is quite natural that linguistic identities are also re-valorized. Now the question is whetherthe established consociational system is still flexible enough to manage similar tensions. Doubts about this are spreading among the Swiss elites, but there is no consensus about serious alternatives. One important institutional difficulty in this context is constituted by the constitutional limitation of the Bundesrat to seven members. The present "magic formula" is based on a subtle equilibrium of the established "core network" of the traditional parties


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EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES OF CONSOCIATIONAL BARGAINING Hence, my conclusion is that Switzerland's consociational democracy is likely to survive the erosion of traditional organizational networks, all the more because the predominant bargaining style of policy formation has roots so strong in the institutional framework and in the political socialization of the elites that alternatives are difficult to imagine. A different question is the likely impact of an eventual insertion of S witzerland-in one form or another-into the structures of the European Community. If Switzerland wants to retain its position in the international economy, this seems difficult to avoid. For that reason, adhesion to the EEA was strongly supported by both business and organized labor. Among the powerful motives behind the opposition, however, were strong apprehensions that European integration might endanger the traditional Swiss institutions. These apprehensions are certainly justified insofar as the institutions of direct democracy are concerned. A popular veto against

'Today, a majority of the members of the popularly elected city government of Bern are women. "In March 1993, for the second time, the Parliament refused to elect to the Bundesrat a feminist deputy presented by the Socialist party; this led to a serious crisis of the "magic formula." Finally, the Federal Assembly ceded to the public uproar and elected an alternative feminist candidate of the socialists, Ruth DreifuB (who, incidentally, became also the first Jewish member of the Bundesrat). Since the disgraceful resignation of the radical Bundesrat member Elisabeth Kopp some years ago (who had used her office in favor of dubious business connections of her husband), no other woman has entered the national executive. "In the context of the abortive discussions in the 1970s about a new constitution, Raimund Germann pleaded for an institutional (notably electoral) reform aimed at introducing a "bipolar model." See his Politische Innovation und Verfassungsreform (Political Innovation and Reform of the Constitution) (Bern/Stuttgart: Paul Haupt, 1975).


represented in the executive, and they find it difficult to accommodate further claims to minority representation within that body. In particular, the claims of the women's movement to equal representation-claims which receive increasing support in urban Switzerland^-have so far not been taken into consideration.55 Given that the issues just mentioned-including those with a strong regional impact-are not simply traditional issues but part of the "new politics" that cut across the traditional cleavage structure, one might perhaps consider radical institutional alternatives as they were sometimes put forward by political scientists.56 However, it appears unlikely that strong corporate actors will be inclined to forego the guarantees of access in the established consociational framework in favor of the vicissitudes of a "political market." This applies, in particular, to the peak associations that are among the core actors in the federal political arena. The most plausible alternative to the present "magic formula" is, and always was, the retirement (or exclusion) of the socialists from the governing majority. However, given their subordinate position in the present power structure, this would not mean a fundamental change of consociational structures, for it cannot plausibly be expected that new coalitions will emerge to replace the traditional powerholders.

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"Some recent constitutional initiatives demanded the radical reduction of the number of foreign workers admitted to Switzerland. These initiatives were opposed by the parties of the majority, the business community, and organized labor because they would have made it extremely difficult to control immigration in accordance with changing requirements of the Swiss economy.


decisions to conform Swiss legislation to community rules would be difficult to reconcile with the integration of Switzerland into the European system. However, given that political elite misgivings about the recent use of the referendum appear to be quite common,57 one may expect that this aspect of a constitutional transformation in the context of integration will be accepted. Consociational democracy, to be sure, might not necessarily be incompatible with the emerging patterns of European politics. Although unanimous decisionmaking in the EC is now increasingly superseded by more efficient procedures, hierarchical and majoritarian decision processes will not become the dominant mark of a European polity. Instead, patterns of bargaining and accommodation will have to prevail; otherwise, the enormous heterogeneity of Europe will never be manageable. Thus, at least in principle, the European polity will have a "consociational" character, and one might ask whether this should not make it easier for a country with a strong consociational heritage and the corresponding experience of decisionmaking through bargaining and accommodation to join the EC. Even so, the structural affinity between Swiss Konkordanzdemokratie and the political system of the European Community appears at best limited. In the emerging European system, these accommodative processes take place between national bureaucracies rather than on the level of representatives of associations and parties which, as in Switzerland, still retain strong local and regional roots. Therefore, it is more plausible that the political structures of a Switzerland integrated into Europe will, in the long run, undergo considerable changes, and that its political style will have to adapt to such integration.