Africa Review, 2013 Vol. 5, No. 1, 61–72, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09744053.2013.832067
Continuity and change in the foreign policies of South Africa’s De Klerk and Mandela governments, 1989–1999 Chris Landsberga,b* a
National Chair: African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy; bSchool of Leadership, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa
The issue of continuity and change in foreign-policy analysis is one that receives scant scholarly attention, and South Africa is no exception. Even though the country is now almost two decades past the transitional period, and a good 14 years since Nelson Mandela stepped down as the first democratically elected President of South Africa, important lessons could still be drawn from the foreign-policy trends of this era. The foreign policies of South Africa’s two governments during the transition, from 1989 to 1999, show features of both continuity and change, protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. Continuity and change often co-exist as a mixture or as dialectical opposites, making prediction of the future very uncertain. Continuity is often at play when it is least expected; and change can occur in the most unexpected of contexts. Keywords: continuity and change; De Klerk government; global isolation; good global citizenship; human rights-driven posture; Mandela administration; New Africa Diplomacy; rules-based multilateral global order; universality.
During the transitional decade from 1989 to 1999, South Africa experienced a major transformation not only in its overall body politic as it changed from apartheid to democracy, but also in terms of its foreign-policy trajectory. However, old practices persisted, and after the April 1994 universal franchise elections the new Nelson Mandela-led administration found itself having to build on the inheritances of the F.W. de Klerk and preceding apartheid regimes. In terms of the concepts ‘continuity’ and ‘change’, Costa Georghiou (interview conducted in Johannesburg on 11 July 2011) reminds us that such ideas are often false dichotomies; that ‘persistence and change co-exist uneasily’. Continuity and change is not an either/or process; the two, typically, co-exist. Using grounded theory, textual analysis and an explanatory approach to foreign-policy analysis, this article goes back in recent times as we seek to understand the paradox inherent in South Africa’s foreign policy during the tumultuous post-cold war years. There is, indeed, a desperate need to get a grasp on what has actually happened in South Africa’s foreign policy, the motive forces which underscored diplomatic approaches, and to steer clear from the so-called critical analyses, being told what is wrong with South African foreign policy before explaining what this foreign policy actually entails. This article is, therefore, unapologetic in adopting explanatory and interpretive approaches as it examines the avowed macro-agendas of the F.W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela governments within a world which was increasingly realigning itself in powerful economic groupings. It is a
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given that statements made by policy-makers may assume different forms when delivered to different audiences (for example, for the consumption of domestic voters, or for the global media), yet it is precisely this schizophrenia, the legacy of decades of hounding by a vehemently critical world, that has informed the new South Africa’s political discourse during its first years. Thus, it makes sense to assess the direction taken by De Klerk as his government set out to break free from international quarantine and banishment that had resulted from decades of apartheid and white minority domination. Following an assessment of the De Klerk transitional years, we proceed with an analysis of the Nelson Mandela period to establish whether the immediate post-settlement period did bring about real change (discontinuities), or whether continuities in foreign policy stubbornly persisted. 1989–1994: forced, yet fundamental change De Klerk became head of state on a platform of ‘change’, but scepticism was the order of the day as many doubted his commitment to the agenda that was put forward (De Klerk 1989). While, initially, he seemed to have acted rather grudgingly and reluctantly, he did ultimately become the first white leader to address not simply the symptoms of the country’s international isolation but also, more challengingly, the root causes of South Africa’s pariah status (Geldenhuys 1990). Doing so, De Klerk parted ways with decades of white minority domination and confrontational diplomacy. Whereas P.W. Botha’s government was bent on reinforcing apartheid and repression, De Klerk was left in little doubt that only the removal of apartheid and an end to white domination could restore South Africa’s standing in the international community. By the time he became head of state, De Klerk had to contend with a South Africa that was ‘uniquely isolated in the modern world’ (Geldenhuys 1989). He was determined to stop digging this hole even deeper, and in his much celebrated Inaugural Address on 20 September 1989 turned his back on the previous belligerent stance and faced up to his enemies by introducing a more conciliatory diplomacy. He would ‘escape from a corner where everything had stagnated in[to] confrontation’ (Barber 1999, 274); and key to this was a foreign-policy approach for South Africa ‘to restore its pride and to lift itself out of the doldrums of growing isolation, economic decline and increasing polarisation’ (Geldenhuys 1994, 286). Far from being just fanciful rhetoric, this summed up in rather stark terms the impact international sanctions were having, also containing a warning that international actors would intensify punitive measures unless significant change were introduced. For South Africa, as a mineral-rich country, trade and business relations were vital. The United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations estimated that some 605 enterprises had disinvested from South Africa in the period between August 1985 and August 1989 (Geldenhuys 1994, 286). One analyst observed that ‘gross fixed investment had plummeted from 26 per cent of gross domestic product in 1983 to 16 per cent in 1991’. On an economic level alone, President De Klerk himself conceded that sanctions had ‘made people realise that we were in a dead-end street’ (Geldenhuys 1994, 286). And, according to Minister of Foreign Affairs R.F. (Pik) Botha, it was an explicit foreign-policy objective of the De Klerk government ‘… to open doors for South Africa that had remained obstinately shut’ (Papenfus 2010, 650). De Klerk realised that he would have to pay a heavy political price domestically, if he was to attain his goal of returning South Africa to the international fold: he and his government had to address the root causes of the country’s international isolation, namely the obdurate and offensive system of apartheid and white minority domination. He started off by introducing major reforms designed not only to win the trust of the Western powers, but also that of the international community (Landsberg 2011, 234). On the military, the President signalled that he was going to sever the link between the armed forces and politics, and he also restored the primary role of the
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governing party caucus in decision-making, including in matters of foreign policy and diplomacy. This was a far cry from the P.W. Botha years of a militarised foreign policy; and, indeed, even before his formal inauguration as head of state, he moved away from his predecessor’s securocratic and hawkish style of government, and restored the role of civilian bodies in decisionmaking. As Deon Geldenhuys (1994, 289) quite pointedly observe, ‘… shortly after taking office, De Klerk began restructuring Botha’s vast national security management system’, in the process restoring the role of the cabinet as the foremost decision-making body over that of P. W. Botha and John Vorster’s State Security Council. He also populated important ministries with civilian ‘doves’, including the crucial ministries of Finance and of Constitutional Development, together with Foreign Affairs (Landsberg 2011, 234). The start of negotiations between the National Party (NP) government and other parliamentary groups, on the one hand, and the state’s liberation movement adversaries, on the other, had serious implications for the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) as it ‘led to a complete overhaul of the top structure of all branches of the Department’, effective from October 1991 (De Beer 2005a, 593). One of the goals of the reconstituted DFA was that of meeting ‘the demands to which … [it] would have to respond, as South Africa returned to its place in the family of nations and … [come] to terms with the need to expand its representation abroad at an almost exponential rate’ (De Beer 2005b, 653). The mandate given to diplomats was to go abroad ‘and show the flag’, doing all in their power to open new missions, especially in hitherto ‘no-go areas’ (Gerrit Olivier, interview conducted in Pretoria on 12 March 2008). So, while the Verwoerd, Vorster and Botha governments had desperately sought to counter isolation through entrenchment, the De Klerk government was determined to end it, once and for all, by opening up to the world. However, convincing the world of his sincerity was, arguably, the easy part; De Klerk also had to look over his shoulder to his domestic constituency. Since the first rumours surfaced that Nelson Mandela was to be released from incarceration, the African National Congress (ANC) was manoeuvring for power. On 2 February 1990, De Klerk responded with an epoch-making speech in Parliament, announcing major reforms that would irrevocably reshape South Africa’s domestic politics towards democratisation. This was not only in direct response to demands and threats by the international community, but also part of a cunning strategy to try and wrong-foot the ANC and its majority black supporters. He vowed that his ultimate goal was a ‘new and just constitutional dispensation’, in which South Africans ‘would enjoy equal rights, treatment and opportunity in every sphere of endeavour — constitutional, social, and economic’ (De Klerk 1990). He further announced that ‘the season of violence is over’; proceeded to lift the ban on the ANC, the Pan-Africanist Congress, the South African Communist Party (SACP), and other political movements; removed restrictions on the activities of 33 other organisations; and suspended capital punishment, repealed certain emergency regulations (including those restricting the media), and withdrew banning orders on individuals. If there were still any doubts that De Klerk were merely tinkering with some peripheral matters at the edges of the real problem, these evaporated later in February 1990 with the release of Nelson Mandela from his 27-year-long incarceration. Major steps in his domestic reform drive were the lifting of a nationwide state of emergency which had been in force since 1986, with the exception of Natal and the homeland of KwaZulu, and an announcement that legislation would be submitted to repeal some of the key pillars of apartheid, including the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, the Population Registration Act of 1950, the Group Areas Act of 1966, and the Development of Black Communities Act of 1984. These acts were subsequently repealed in June 1991, followed by Parliament voting to restore citizenship to residents of the ‘homelands’ of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei, and Venda in 1993 (United Nations 1996). However, the reform process experienced many ‘ups and downs’ during the four-and-a-half-year period in
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which he pledged to dismantle apartheid. Nevertheless, a Negotiating Council was set up and reached agreement on a set of ‘transitional arrangements’, which finally led to democratic elections in 1994 (Commonwealth Secretariat 1994, 7) and the adoption of a new Constitution in 1996. Strengthened by his domestic reforms, De Klerk was determined to ward off further boycotts and economic punishment (sanctions) as he embarked on exploratory negotiations with Western powers. He wished to be rewarded by the easing of economic restrictions for taking political risks at home (Landsberg 2010, 234). And Foreign Minister Pik Botha observed that there was a clear rationale behind domestic reforms: ‘… the object of all these moves … [was] to have economic and financial sanctions lifted, as well as to have the many measures removed that were designed to isolate white-dominated South Africa’ (quoted in Papenfus 2010, 651). Therefore, confident that its domestic gamble had paid dividends, the government boldly articulated a ‘New Africa Diplomacy’ that aimed to boost South Africa’s image as an indispensible actor on the continent. The end of the 1980s was also the time when the very concept of the nation-state was undergoing profound examination. The European Union was seeking to strengthen its political institutions in line with greater economic integration, in a move that would challenge members to pool sovereignty in the interest of a more federalising future. The USA had established the North American Free Trade Area with Mexico and Canada, and the Soviet Union was weakening its ideological grip on the developing world, through Mikhael Gorbachev’s reforms of glasnost and perestroika, in an attempt to bring greater freedom to its own people and to end its own particular global isolation (see Landsberg 1994, 279–281). All the major Western powers reached out to De Klerk and his government, and urged him to seize the initiative by ‘taking the wind out of the liberation movements’ sails and to embrace negotiations’ (Landsberg 1994, 281). Against this background, De Klerk called on the international community to ‘re-evaluate its position and to adopt a positive attitude towards the dynamic evolution which is taking place in South Africa’; he also conceded that ‘without contact and co-operation with the rest of the world … [South Africa] cannot promote the wellbeing and security of … [its] citizens’ (De Klerk 1989). Almost in passing, he suggested that his own actions were in line with changing global, regional and continental dynamics when linking his reform gamble at home to the economic survival of the African continent. And, in support of this assertion, the then Director-General of Foreign Affairs Neil van Heerden proclaimed that the De Klerk reforms had given South Africa a real ‘head-start’. As De Klerk became more willing to gamble with domestic reform, the strategy on the international front was to get the backing of powerful Western leaders, including British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and American President George Bush, Sr. De Klerk saw their role as partly that of pressurising the ANC and other adversaries into negotiating with the NP government for a mutually beneficial political settlement, and he was largely successful in realising the objective of ending the international community’s diplomacy of coercion and banishment. He had sought a diplomatic relationship characterised by co-operation — and this much he achieved. Ultimately, he succeeded in achieving two goals: first, support for his reforms; and second, recognition of these changes. But the question is whether these reforms were not, in fact, designed to dilute the country’s sovereignty, political if not economic, ahead of an inevitable ceding of power to the black majority. The history of the world is littered with nation-states bent on playing hegemonic roles and carving out spheres of influence. Perhaps, cognisant of such power-seeking, De Klerk’s ‘New Africa Diplomacy’ was at pains to cloak its designs in rhetoric, such as when Foreign Affairs Minister R.F. (Pik) Botha asserted that South Africa ‘remain[s] economically strong’ and its ‘relative strength as a regional power subtly filters through …. Africa and southern Africa [had to] take note that without South Africa, there is no solution to the problems of this region’ (Botha
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1989, 47–48). Another government minister punted the idea of South Africa as ‘the launching pad’ into Africa, with an inherent ability to ‘literally be the catalyst for an economic aboutturn in southern Africa’ (Wessels 1991, 3, 5). Pretoria even toyed with a ‘regions-of-influence plan’ in which four economic power houses, or ‘growth pole’ countries, would dominate African affairs (Davies 1996, 167): Egypt in North Africa, Nigeria in West Africa, Kenya in East Africa, and South Africa in southern Africa. This new Africa diplomacy was different from, but built on P.W. Botha’s 1979–1980 idea of a Constellation of Southern African States (Consas), which was envisaged as a counter-constellation to the Frontline States and the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference, both of which were founded as anti-apartheid alliances. De Klerk represented Afrikaner industrial capital, which was sensitive to the sanctions and punitive measures applied by the international community, and the negative repercussions they had — also for the development of Africa as a whole. It is important to appreciate that Washington and other Western capitals were firmly pushing the idea of the so-called ‘anchor’ states in international affairs, Africa included; they actively toyed with the idea that certain regional powers in Africa should take responsibility for peace and security on the continent, and for policing their respective sub-regions. The paradox, of course, was that inherent in any federalising project, the pooling of sovereignty with neighbours may increase influence over a wider area, but it also weakens control at home. Functioning federations, such as Germany, Australia and Canada, have largely resolved this paradox by delineating sovereignty along the lines of competencies, whereby powers are devolved (where appropriate) to regions, provinces, cities, and centralised (where appropriate) to states (the constituent units) and the federal government. A further complicating factor, however, is popular perception, and while attempts are made by federalists to placate reluctant populations with such tangible advantages as peace, economic benefits, and a broader range of representation, South Africa’s peculiarly divided, yet universally parochial, history prevented De Klerk from speaking too precisely about how any similar structure might bring about a concretisation of his vision. Nevertheless, in foreign relations at least, it appeared as though South Africa was ready to end its banishment from the international community. In order to achieve this foreign-policy objective, De Klerk had been compelled to address the root causes of South Africa’s isolation, namely removing apartheid and ending white minority domination. In doing so, he had broken ranks with his apartheid predecessors and embarked on a course of fundamental reform that would not only change the system but, to some extent, the role of subsequent governments entering that system. 1994–1999: change and continuity amid turbulence No doubt, wrapped up in the emotion of the overwhelming election victory of April 1994, and sufficiently equipped with the vocabulary of any incoming political leadership the world over, the new Mandela-led government made known its intention to pursue a foreign policy that would be characterised by ‘change’ (Mandela 1994). The Mandela government was not only eager to find its feet in a fast changing world, but the new President was quick to observe that ‘the irony about South Africa’s late entry into international affairs is that we can reap the fruits of a world redefining itself’ (quoted in Landsberg 2012, 3). It was believed that South Africa possessed the wherewithal and capacity to exploit the positives associated with the tumultuous changes in world affairs. Ironically, the theme of ‘change’ was one that had been evoked by De Klerk during his inaugural speech in September 1989. The newly liberated South Africa would be characterised by fundamental change, both in domestic and foreign policy. The Mandela government was not only determined, but also desperate to prove that they were ‘good world citizens’, as opposed to
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their apartheid predecessors who were seen as destabilising aggressors (Landsberg 2010, 95). The new foreign-policy elite signalled that ‘policy and execution of policy represent a break with the past’ (DFA 2006, 15), and President Mandela set out to introduce change at home by tinkering with the apartheid legacy and ensuring that South Africa becomes a ‘respected world citizen’ — a status which rode the crest of his own increasingly revered image (DFA 2006, 8). Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (2004, xi) argued in this regard that ‘South Africa has taken its responsibilities as a global citizen seriously. Both globally and on the continent, in bilateral and multilateral forums, it has sought to punch above its weight’. Geldenhuys (2006, 93) also opined that: … since its democratic rebirth, South Africa has been more than an exemplary upholder of major codes of good state conduct; it has also assigned itself the task of actively promoting such standards abroad, and has become a prominent norm formulator in multilateral forums.
Thus, a commitment to a rules-based multilateral global order featured prominently in the new South Africa’s foreign-policy matrix. Carlsnaes and Nel (2006, 21) argued that ‘a central dimension of South Africa’s normative role has been its promotion of rules-based multilateralism as the appropriate institutional form for conducting international affairs in what Mandela called “an interdependent world” ’. If the apartheid governments had been scorned for being serial flouters of values of good global citizenship, the new post-settlement government was committed to becoming ‘a full and respected member of the family of nations’ and, to this high-minded end, vowed that it would see to it that its ‘diplomacy conforms to the institutionalised and accepted practices derived from international law and diplomatic conventions’ (DFA 1996, 38). However, if De Klerk’s band of followers thought that the new government would carve out a neo-colonial role for itself (one of the first moves Mandela made was to rejoin the Commonwealth), they were to be disillusioned. Rather than simply exchanging the confrontational and defensive foreign policy of previous apartheid governments for one of friendly co-operation with all-comers, the new government gave notice (soon after assuming power in May 1994) that it was not interested in pursuing a ‘reactive’ foreign policy, but rather to pursue a ‘pro-active approach’ (DFA 1996, 20). Its interpretation of the world order as ‘relatively insecure, flexible and still evolving’ was read by the new foreign-policy executive as an opportunity to adopt a more assertive foreign-policy posture (DFA 2006, 14). However, besides the rhetoric: what was left to be changed in foreign policy and how could it be accomplished? It was one thing for the Mandela government to articulate bold new foreignpolicy goals, quite another to achieve them. The ‘honeymoon’ that the new government experienced was soon over. From the very outset, South Africa’s re-entry into the world community had created tensions in its diplomacy, arising both from opportunities and challenges, and characterised both by synergies and contradictions (Landsberg 2010, 118). Now the government was articulating another sub-goal in its agenda: a foreign policy driven by key domestic objectives as articulated in the Reconstruction and Development Programme, namely job-creation, addressing inequalities, and accelerating economic growth. However, this domestic dimension fell short of an explicit national-interest paradigm in foreign policy. Instead, foreign-policy decisionmakers identified a challenge for foreign affairs officials and cadres representing the country abroad, in particular that they had to be ‘fully acquainted with the policies and strategies of domestic departments in order to pursue the national interest in all spheres’ (Nzo 1995a). Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo was equally unforthcoming about detail in his address to ambassadors in September 1995, saying only that ‘Foreign Affairs will play a co-ordinating and facilitating role to further that single most basic goal of helping to create a better life for South Africa’s people’ (Nzo 1995b).
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The post-apartheid government was searching for a role and identity that was contrary to that of its apartheid predecessors, but how could it go any further than its central tenet of striving to be ‘a responsible global citizen’, and being in the forefront of norm and value-creation globally and in Africa? The major preoccupation with ‘a break with the past’ and ‘promoting the security and welfare of South Africa’s citizens’ was still being driven largely by domestic policy, but if a way could be found to make human rights and their promotion feature more prominently as a foreignpolicy consideration then a new niche could be carved out. In his now famous 1993 article in Foreign Affairs, ‘South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy’, Mandela (1993, 86–94) declared: ‘Human rights will be the light that guides our foreign policy’. The president-in-waiting vowed that, upon the restoration of democracy, ‘South Africa will immediately become a fullfledged member of the family of nations who holds human rights issues central to foreign policy’ (Mandela 1993, 87). Nor did Mandela’s article in Foreign Affairs shirk from setting out dominant principles, again putting forward evidence that any incoming ANC government would put the pariah status and poor world citizenship associated with the apartheid era firmly behind it. These principles were (Mandela 1993, 91): . . . .
. .
The safeguarding of human rights — a belief in, and preoccupation with, human rights which extended beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and environmental. The promotion of democracy — a belief that just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only come through the promotion of democracy worldwide. A belief that justice and international law should guide the conduct of and relations between nations. A belief that international peace is the goal to which all nations should strive and where this broke down, internationally agreed peaceful mechanisms to resolve conflicts should be resorted to. A belief that South African foreign policy should reflect the interests of the continent of Africa. And, a belief that South Africa’s economic development depended on growing regional and international economic co-operation in an interdependent world.
Geldenhuys (2012, 32) reminds us that the Mandela government vowed to ‘canonise human rights in our international relations’ and identified a special role for South Africa in a ‘worldwide human rights campaign’. In 1998, too, Mandela told his African counterparts during an Organisation of African Unity summit that ‘we must all accept that we cannot abuse the concept of national sovereignty to deny the rest of the continent the right and duty to intervene, when behind those sovereign boundaries people are being slaughtered to protect tyranny’ (quoted in Geldenhuys 2012, 32). Monyae (2006, 132) echoed these moralistic sentiments when he argued that ‘the founding leaders of post-apartheid South Africa’s democracy, enthusiastically seized the opportunity of promoting a culture of constitutionalism at home and abroad’. Articulating a human rights-driven posture in foreign relations looked fine on paper; in practice, however, a principle-driven foreign policy revealed many problems. Translating principles and ethics into concrete policies was not easy, and principles proved to be a weak substitute for a robust foreign-policy strategy. It certainly did not make South Africa’s foreign policy more predictable, as Nzo had promised it would, nor served the role of a ‘codified foreignpolicy doctrine’, as he had hoped. If anything, in practice it served to complicate South Africa’s foreign-policy strategy and execution; for example, arms-sales policy approved deals with countries with poor human rights records, such as Indonesia, Turkey and Algeria, as well as with countries in the grip of civil war. The Mandela government sometimes learned the
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hard way that propagating moral values did not guarantee that its target states would follow its ‘moralistic diplomatic gospel’. Indeed, the pursuit of self-interest is what led to the controversial arms deal of 1998, which subsequently came to be associated with massive fraud and corruption, and claimed many casualties, including the removal of Jacob Zuma as Deputy President in 2005. It should be added here that it was the Mandela government which introduced, as part of the postapartheid foreign-policy lexicon, the idea of ‘quiet diplomacy’ which was vigorously pursued in 1995 and 1996 vis-à-vis the military junta of Sani Abacha in Nigeria. South Africa’s diplomatic foray was, indeed, a real baptism of fire. A Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR 2012, 1) policy seminar report reminds us that relations between Abuja and Pretoria ‘… reached a nadir after Nigeria’s autocrat leader, General Sani Abacha, ignored Mandela’s pleas and ordered the hanging of Ken Saro Wiwa and eight other Ogoni human rights activists in November 1995’, and goes further to assert that (CCR 2012, 1): South Africa called for a boycott of Nigerian oil exports and the country’s suspension from the Commonwealth. However, Mandela’s stand failed to win broad support among African countries. Following General Abacha’s death in 1998, relations between Nigeria and South Africa improved dramatically. Mandela’s successor as president in 1999, Thabo Mbeki, worked closely with Nigeria’s new civilian president Olusegun Obasanjo, to manage African conflicts and to promote norms of democratic governance through new continental institutions.
While President Mandela was at pains to stress that South Africa was pursuing an ethical, ‘human rights first policy’, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aziz Pahad took a more pragmatic approach when he asserted in 1995 that ‘… [w]hether we like it or not, foreign policy is driven by economics’ (quoted by Geldenhuys 2006, 100). Economic considerations then emerged as understandable priorities for the new administration, given its goal of redressing the skewed distribution of wealth that was the legacy of apartheid. Eschewing any Marxist sentiments in its ranks, the ANC government openly ‘supported the global free market system’ and elevated economic goals as vital to both its bilateral and multilateral relations (Geldenhuys 2006, 100). The more specific objective was to achieve ‘sustainable economic growth’, and all government departments and agencies were expected to work towards this goal; moreover, it was essential that they worked towards ‘an integrated economic foreign policy’, meaning one that linked growth, trade, and aid to market access. In reinforcing the idea that the country would need significant economic interactions and largesse, Nzo (1994b) stated in Parliament on 8 August 1994 that ‘without international interaction such as trade, scientific and technological exchange, and cultural exchange, South Africans and South Africa would be much the poorer’. By that time, South Africa was exchanging (Nzo 1994a): … the equivalent of 64 per cent of its GNP [gross national product] with the outside world … and … it follows from our broad national interests and governmental policy that the emphasis with all European countries, should fall upon economic, technological and scientific co-operation.
At times, the policy reads like one of ‘investment first’ — and it clashed with the stated ethical foreign policy, as government struggled to reconcile these two objectives in practice. In terms of promised change, this economic posture was not very far removed from the free market, fundamentalist position adopted by the De Klerk government. Though it may not have said so openly, the new government was learning (and learning very fast) what most new governments have to acknowledge, that changing a system is not as simple as campaign slogans tend to promise prior to coming into power. Despite public perceptions that the Mandela government could focus solely on domestic policy in order to redress the existing imbalances, the sub-region and the wider continent were
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consuming a growing amount of its energy. In an address to the Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committee in Parliament, Nzo (1995a) stated that ‘in terms of foreign policy, Africa is clearly to be a priority in the years ahead’; and he continued to say that: … [the] promotion of economic development of the southern African region is of paramount importance as the economies of the countries in the region are intertwined to such an extent that, for South Africa to believe that it could enter a prosperous future in isolation without taking neighbouring countries with her, would be unrealistic and hazardous.
Stated policy was that South Africa should be in the forefront of efforts to transform southern African states and its premier integration body, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), into a significant regional bloc. However, policy advisors cautioned that this strategy should not seek ‘confrontation with other blocs, but rather … develop mutually beneficial relationships’ (DFA 1996, 12). Aware of the tensions surrounding federalism and its structures, they warned that ‘threat and opportunity are inherent in the trend towards bloc formation’, and ‘when policies are formulated in South Africa, role-players should consider the manner in which particular issues present an opportunity for South Africa to promote [the] interests of the SADC region or the African continent’ (DFA 1996, 12). Policy rhetoric suggested that interaction with the international community in the economic realm should automatically inspire South African role-players to consider and pursue the benefits such actions could have for the African continent. Government did not even see the need to persuade its electorate that national self-interest was linked to wider regional well-being. The overwhelming electoral majority given the ANC throughout its first two decades in power has virtually ensured that it can side-step such considerations with impunity. It was much easier and palatable for the electorate to invoke the spectre of the apartheid past than to address more precisely how new relationships with former anti-apartheid allies would translate into concrete benefits. This was more a case of the ‘politics of solidarity’ being draped in the cloak of national interest. South Africa also came to adopt a very eclectic posture in foreign policy. Pretoria believed that South Africa ‘… occupied a unique position in the new North-South configuration, somewhere between the industrialised nations and the underdeveloped regions of the world’ (Landsberg 2012, 3). South Africa, therefore, adopted a wide-ranging and assorted approach to foreign policy. Just such an invocation, inherent in the foreign-policy discourses of the Mandela administration, was that post-apartheid South Africa would come to adopt ‘a non-aligned’ foreignpolicy posture and subscribe to ‘the philosophy of non-alignment in world politics’ (DFA 1996, 30). During his first attendance of a Non-Aligned Movement summit, the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki (1995) was at pains to highlight the historical significance of the moment by pointing out that this was ‘truly a momentous occasion for us as South Africans, as it is the first time we attend the Summit Meeting of Non-Aligned Countries as a full member’. But it was also history that prevailed, as he declared that the ANC government was ‘especially pleased to discharge this responsibility because of the critical role this movement and its members played in the struggle to defeat the evil system of apartheid, and secure the liberation of all the people of our country’. As if these ideas were not plentiful and contradictory enough, South Africa furthermore subscribed to a ‘doctrine of universality’ — that is, to conduct ‘friendly, constructive relations with all nations’ (Landsberg 2010, 102). In applying this principle, policy held that ‘South Africa, as a sovereign state, should consider its national interests when conducting relations with other states’ (quoted in Landsberg 2010, 102). A senior foreign affairs official explained universality to mean ‘… [recognising] all countries, without implying support for their internal or external policies’ (Evans 1995). Whatever images of reconciliation and co-operation with the West were
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being conjured up, Mandela’s ‘bridge-building’ was underpinned by a sincere wish that the industrialised countries of the North would recognise the problems experienced by the countries of the South (DFA 1996, 34). In summary: the foreign-policy discourses of the Mandela government were manifold and varied, but largely contradictory. South Africa saw itself pursuing an ethical, though national interest-driven foreign policy; being a good world citizen, but putting Africa at the centre of its foreign policy; and subscribing to a ‘non-aligned’ posture in foreign policy, while simultaneously playing a bridging role between North and South. South Africa’s foreign policy during the Mandela years did indeed show that government had set a new course in which ethical considerations loomed large, putting it apart from its apartheid predecessors which were serial offenders of cosmopolitan values. But there were also many contradictory impulses at play, and various tenets of the new government’s foreign-policy posture were at odds or in conflict with each other. In this regard, Ntasano (2009, 175) correctly observed that: … the emerging South Africa[n] foreign policy apparatus embodied a normative tension between a ‘Northern’, social-democratic approach to world affairs anchored in the country’s long and close relationship with the Nordic countries, and a more Southern emphasis on anti-imperialism and South-South co-operation anchored in its apartheid past and identity as an African state.
He went on to assert that (Ntasano 2009, 175): … the general Africanist/globalist (not to say, Western) tension inherent in the country’s bifocal foreign policy emphases on human rights and African integration is also evident in the country’s particular approach to human rights, highlighting the pervasiveness of the dichotomous nature of the identities and discourses that constructed the overall foreign policy ambivalence.
This analysis shows that the Mandela government pursued a rather eclectic, salad-bowl approach to foreign policy, as it tried to adapt to the new post-apartheid, post-cold war, and increasingly fluid global order. While few could accuse South Africa of pursuing a foreignpolicy reminiscent of the decades characterised by apartheid and white minority domination, it is clear that the post-apartheid ANC government struggled to find its place in the unfolding new world order. From the outset, the Mandela government’s foreign policy revealed many tensions and contradictions as it was slowly put into practice. Conclusion: the change of continuity The transitional years (1989–1999) of South Africa’s foreign policy has been a story of promised change but general continuity, with continuity at times trumping change when least expected, and change prevailing when the assumption was that continuity would be the order of the day. When F.W. de Klerk became head of state in 1989, it was expected by many observers that he would continue with the hard-line domestic and foreign-policy positions of President P.W. Botha and other white predecessors. However, De Klerk was determined to break the mould of international quarantine and to address both the domestic and international sources of South Africa’s enforced pariah status. He was duly rewarded by the international community for his domestic and foreign-policy reforms. International punitive measures were eased and South Africa’s diplomatic relations gradually restored. As sanctions and isolationist measures fell by the wayside, De Klerk garnered increased support for the negotiations process at home. Thus, during the period of transition, he and his government had played a key role in disentangling South Africa from its domestic crisis. Following the transition from apartheid to democracy, there was no turning back to a self-interested isolationist stance, either at home or abroad. But
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countries that had opposed apartheid were not about to embrace its replacement willy-nilly, simply because it promised universal franchise. For South Africa it was welcome to the world of hard-nosed economics. In terms of the impact of the Nelson Mandela period, as South Africa entered the age of democracy, the common assumption was that domestic and foreign policy would be characterised by radical change (by discontinuities), and that foreign policy would be changed beyond recognition. While it cannot be denied just how much South Africa’s foreign policy changed, or how the Mandela government came to introduce a new ethos in foreign policy and the country’s international relations, there is equally a tendency to underestimate the extent to which continuities between the De Klerk and Mandela governments have persisted, and just how difficult it was for the new post-apartheid administration to embark on a radical new course. Whilst there was a radical faction of Marxists and/or Socialists in the ANC and SACP, the majority government knew very well that it had to deal with largely capitalist economies in a post-cold war world. It could not expect economic engagement with such powers if it allowed itself to be dictated to in domestic policy by the same radical groups who had been most vociferous and active in ending apartheid. While South Africa’s international rehabilitation was completed during the Mandela years after 1994, it started during the De Klerk presidency as a sea-change in domestic affairs was accompanied by a transition in foreign relations. Mandela did try to embark on a fundamentally new course in foreign policy by articulating a ‘good world citizen’ policy, based on the tenets of an ethical foreign policy and a cosmopolitan set of values, including adherence to human rights in foreign policy, the promotion of democracy, respect for international law, and the peaceful settlements of disputes (Landsberg 2010, 95–96). In practice, however, Mandela and his government struggled with the operationalisation of these new policies, and ethical principles often clashed with economic dictates and the doctrine of universality, which declared that South Africa wished to have relations with as many countries as possible. So, while Mandela was bent on making a fundamental break with the past, managing such change proved to be a very taxing exercise in practice. Notes on contributor Chris Landsberg is Professor and National Chair: African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, and Senior Associate, School of Leadership, University of Johannesburg.
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