Contribution of Subsidies and Participatory

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Contribution of Subsidies and Participatory Governance to Fishers' Adaptive Capacity Article in The Journal of Environment & Development · December 2016 DOI: 10.1177/1070496516670448

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Article

Contribution of Subsidies and Participatory Governance to Fishers’ Adaptive Capacity

Journal of Environment & Development 2016, Vol. 25(4) 426–454 ! The Author(s) 2016 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1070496516670448 jed.sagepub.com

Mateja Nenadovic´1, Xavier Basurto1, and Amy Hudson Weaver2

Abstract The need for strengthening fishers’ adaptive capacity has been proposed in the literature as an important component of effective fisheries governance arrangements in the presence of rising numbers of external drivers of change. Within the context of small-scale fisheries, government subsidies have been the main tool used for increasing adaptive capacity. We examine the relationship among adaptive capacity, subsidy programs, and fishers’ participation in fisheries management, as a potentially important mediating factor affecting outcomes using a data set from two periods of a fishing community in Baja California Sur, Mexico. Our results show a correlation between those fishers with access to decision-making venues and their reception of subsidies, yet the effect of participation and subsidies on fishers’ adaptive capacity is limited. This appears to be due to the authorities’ lack of commitment to strengthening fishers’ adaptive capacity through subsidies programs, and fishers’ lack of trust in the governance processes. Keywords fisheries governance, participation, subsidies, small-scale fisheries, Mexico

A rising number of anthropogenic drivers of change has begun to challenge and undermine many of the existing governance arrangements that structure and organize use of common-pool resources such as fisheries (Dietz, Ostrom, & 1

Duke University Marine Laboratory, Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, Beaufort, NC, USA 2 Sociedad de Historia Natural Niparaja´ A.C., La Paz, BCS, Mexico Corresponding Author: Mateja Nenadovic´, Duke University Marine Laboratory, Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, Beaufort, NC 28516, USA. Email: [email protected]

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Stern, 2003). Those drivers, such as climate change (Allison et al., 2009), resource overexploitation (Jackson et al., 2001), regulatory constraints (Mascia & Claus, 2009), and market globalization (Perry et al., 2011) in direct or indirect ways, acting either individually or synergistically, have a tendency to reduce catches and, therefore, negatively affect livelihoods of the people who depend on them. This trend is particularly relevant for the small-scale fisheries sector given that it employs more than 90% of world’s fishers (Berkes, Mahon, McConney, Pollnac, & Pomeroy, 2001), contributes at least 50% of the global total catch (FAO, 2010), and provides a social safety net to a large number of its participants (Allison & Ellis, 2001). Since the majority of small-scale fisheries tend to be marginalized, illiterate, and impoverished (Berkes et al., 2001), it is difficult for them to adapt to or to recover from both short- and long-term changes (Beńe´, Macfadyen, & Allison, 2007). Therefore, there is a need to better understand institutional arrangements that can increase adaptive capacity of small-scale fisheries to the changing conditions of their social–ecological system. In this study, we explore how governmental subsidies programs, designed to improve fishers’ income generating activities have affected their adaptive capacity. We pay particular attention to how fishers access to and participation in decision-making venues and management activities related to small-scale fisheries acted as a potentially important mediating factor in their adaptive capacity. To our knowledge, this is the first study examining the effects of fishers’ participation and subsidies programs on small-scale fisheries. We analyze changes in the small-scale fishing fleet influenced by the Espiritu Santo Island National Park from La Paz, Baja California Sur, Mexico, over a course of a 6-year period. In the remainder of this section, we introduce our theoretical model and provide a theoretical background for our study. In the following section, we contextualize our study within the social, political, and ecological context of Mexican fisheries. Then, we describe the multimethod approach we used to collect data (i.e., standardized survey, informal interviews, and participant observation). Our main results show a very limited effect of subsidies on fishers’ adaptive capacity associated with low participation levels in decision-making processes. We discuss the processes that might be behind our findings and their relevance in the context of small-scale fisheries in Mexico and beyond.

Civic Participation as a Method to Foster Adaptive Capacity of Resource Users Recent research on adaptive capacity indicates various ways of conceptualizing this latent construct in relation to specific unit of analysis (individual, community, regional, and national) and to a source of a stressor (e.g., climate change, natural disasters, resource overexploitation; Lockwood, Raymond, Oczkowski, & Morrison, 2015; Maldonado, Moreno, & Sanchez, 2014). In this study, we

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refer to adaptive capacity as resource users’ ability to adequately adjust their livelihood activities in order to deal with potential or existing external drivers of stress and change related to the marine environment (Adger, 2003; McClanahan et al., 2008). We explicitly look at the relationship between resource users’ adaptive capacity and their participation in decision-making processes related to the governance of natural resources. Research in environmental governance and adaptive capacity points out that meaningful and effective participation of actors in decision-making processes enhances their capacity to adapt (Armitage & Plummer, 2010; Fabricius & Cundill, 2010). In addition, active participation of actors may lead to the development of adaptive capacities that are appropriate for the local context (Smit & Wandel, 2006). In general, participation of local actors in marine governance initiatives has been associated with improved community cooperation and enhanced compliance with rules (Dalton, Forrester, & Pollnac, 2012; Pollnac, Crawford, & Gorospe, 2001). Furthermore, studies have found that local participation in governance also promotes sustainable resource use and conservation practices and vice versa (Cudney-Bueno & Basurto, 2009; Guidetti & Claudet, 2010). These outcomes may improve and strengthen adaptive capacity of individuals or the community as a whole to external drivers of change. For example, as Adger, Brooks, Bentham, Agnew, and Eriksen (2004) suggested, those actors who actively participate in resource governance processes are generally more capable of adapting to changing conditions of their social–ecological systems. However, the outcomes of participatory processes do not only depend on the mere involvement of local actors but also on the nature and quality of their engagement with the process (Menzel, Buchecker, & Schulz, 2013). As Robinson and Berkes (2011) pointed out, deliberative participation that spans across multiple governance levels is necessary to stimulate and ensure the attainment of adaptive capacity. In this regard, we focus on participation in activities at two distinct governance levels: rule implementation through participation in resource monitoring activities and rule creation through engagement in decision-making bodies (Nenadovic & Epstein, 2016).

Government Subsidies as a Basis for Improving Adaptive Capacity Subsidies come in many forms and can generally be viewed as a direct or indirect form of payment, economic concession, or privilege which is granted by a government to private firms, individuals, households, or other governmental entities with a goal of fostering a particular public objective (FAO, 2014). Literature on fisheries policy and economics has of late illustrated the negative impacts of subsidies on the performance and viability of the fisheries sector as well as on the sustainability of fish stocks throughout the world (e.g., Sumaila, Teh, Watson, Tyedmers, & Pauly, 2008; Willman, Kelleher, Arnason, & Franz, 2009).

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The majority of subsidies are given to industrial fisheries sector in developed countries mostly to cover fuel costs or increase overcapacity by furnishing the sector with modern boats and equipment (Sumaila et al., 2008; Willman et al., 2009). In comparison, small-scale fisheries sector receives little government financing. For example, some rough estimates suggest that a small-scale fisher receives almost 200 times less fuel subsidies a year when compared with the average industrial fisher (Jacquet & Pauly, 2008). According to MondacaSchachermayer et al. (2011), the main focus of the subsidies in small-scale fisheries sector is to alleviate poverty and to improve both social and ecological sustainability of the fishery either through specific programs (e.g., sustainable livelihoods) or through general funding schemes (e.g., credits and loans). Some fishery subsidy programs have been specifically designed to strengthen fishers’ adaptive capacity and the social and ecological sustainability of their fisheries, in both developed and developing countries (Markus, 2010; Robles-Zavala, 2014). Our focus are subsidy programs for small-scale fisheries created by the Mexican government, which have sought to strengthen adaptive capacity of coastal communities and to conserve ecosystems by fostering sustainable resource use (Robles-Zavala, 2014). From both a theoretical and an empirical perspective, for such programs to be effective, they need to be developed with active and meaningful input from the actors who will use them (Larsen & Gunnarsson-O¨stling, 2009).

Resource Capture Through Participation Governance processes can be easily destabilized as a result of the relationships among its actors. On one hand, participatory arenas can be used as a pretext by centralized government entities to further their own goal and agenda masked as a democratic process (Berkes, 2007; Cooke & Kothari, 2001). On the other hand, those same arenas can be captured by particular user groups or individuals (Saito-Jensen, Nathan, & Treue, 2010; Singleton, 2000). Regardless of the case, such situations often lead to unequal distribution of benefits among the actors. For example, Beńe´ et al. (2009) showed how in the case of many subSaharan countries, new participatory spaces related to fishery governance that were created through various decentralization programs are mainly dominated by local leaders and other powerful entities at the expense of common fishers. Access to official decision-making groups permits participants to use new sources of resources for personal benefit, which can widen the sociopolitical gap among the actors and reinforce the existing power imbalances (Jentoft & Mikalsen, 1987; Singleton, 2000).

Hypotheses On the basis of the described theoretical constructs, we hypothesize (a) that there is a positive relationship between fishers’ participation in decision-making

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Figure 1. Diagrammatic representation of the relationships among the theoretical concepts analyzed in this study. Each arrow corresponds to a hypothesis we tested in this study.

processes and their reception of government subsidies, (b) that fishers’ participation in processes related to governance of marine resources (i.e., decision-making and consultative fora or monitoring and enforcement activities) is positively related to their adaptive capacity, and (c) that government subsidies are positively associated with small-scale fishers’ adaptive capacity (Figure 1). We examine these hypotheses in the context of Mexican small-scale fisheries, described next.

The Setting Civic Participation and Government Subsidies in Mexican Fisheries Participation through voting or through engagement in the creation and elaboration of development programs (e.g., subsidies) has been granted to every Mexican by their constitution (Mexican Constitution art. 26, § A; art. 35, § I). However, the quality of participatory processes and their outcomes have been historically stymied by the ability of government representatives to control political processes and policy discourses to keep themselves in power (Cook, Middlebrook, & Horcasitas, 1994). The importance of the historical context in shaping contemporary participatory processes was a prominent theme in our interviews with government officials, nongovernmental organizations (NGO) employees, and academics. They elucidated the fact that for the most part of the 20th century, government was largely paternalistic in nature without promoting any civic engagement in the matters of policy. Within such circumstances, according to one of the informants, many forms of participatory engagements became de facto eradicated from public life. Yet, in the late 1980s and 1990s, civic participation became a major theme in the central governments’ modernization and democratization effort, and civic participation was

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incorporated in every major federal statute. However, as Klesner (2007) pointed out, despite increased democratization and liberalization of the Mexican political process over the last two decades, levels of civic participation are thought to be considerably lower compared with more mature democracies. Government subsidy programs in Mexico are part of the national development plan enacted at the beginning of every presidential cycle. In the case of fisheries, once finalized and approved by the legislature, development programs are implemented by (a) the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food (SAGARPA, Food Production ministry herein), which through one of its commissions, the National Commission for Aquaculture and Fishing (CONAPESCA, Fisheries Commission herein), is charged with regulating and managing fisheries, and (b) the Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT, Environmental Ministry herein) charged with regulating and managing species listed under special protection (NOM-059-SEMARNAT-2010, 2010), some of which can be exploited commercially. Furthermore, a decentralized body of the Environmental Ministry, the National Commission of Natural Protected Areas (CONANP, Protected Area Commission herein), indirectly affects fishing activities through the creation of marine protected areas (MPAs). Our study encompasses a single national development plan issued by the government of Felipe Calderoń for the period from 2007 to 2012. To promote the development of the small-scale fisheries sector in particular, both the Environment and Food Production ministries in their respective sectorial strategic development agendas emphasized the need for promoting economic diversification, building value-added services into the production chain, and furthering access to competitive inputs of production through government programs and subsidies (‘‘Decreto por el que se . . .,’’ 2008a; ‘‘Decreto por el que se aprueba . . .,’’ 2008b). Overall, there were five government programs (i.e., subsidies) funded by the Fisheries Commission and two funded by the Protected Area Commission during our study for the state of Baja California Sur. Three of the five Fisheries Commission programs concentrated on providing subsidies for strategic investments in equipment and infrastructure (e.g., building fish processing plants, ice factories, rearing facilities) in order to carry out primary production activities and to increase production value. The other two programs focused on improving fishers’ efficiency by modernizing small-scale fisheries (i.e., subsidies for new engines, boats, fishing gear, and navigation and communication equipment). Access to fisheries subsidies is available to all fishers that have a valid fishing permit. The Protected Area Commission’s programs either focused on developing alternative economic opportunities (PROCODES) or on ensuring reliable income stream in the times of hardship (PET). While PROCODES allowed fishers to diversify their income portfolio, PET served as a safety net to prevent fishers from descending deeper into poverty during times of the year when income from fishing was low. Access to conservation subsidies is available

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to all fishers within an area impacted by conservation measures, such as protected areas. Onward, we refer to the Fisheries Commission subsidies as fishery subsidies and to Protected Area Commission as conservation subsidies, given their respective primary focus.

Description of the Study Area Historically, small-scale fisheries in the Mexican State of Baja California Sur have been very significant as both a subsistence activity and a commercial endeavor for a large number of people (Leoń-Portilla, 1995). In 2005, Baja California Sur was the most important State in the country in terms of revenue generated by the small-scale fisheries sector (23.5%; ‘‘Decreto por el que se . . .,’’ 2008a) where almost 2,758 boats (99% of the registered fishing fleet) belong to the it (Ortiz, Dı´ az, & Villa, 2006). Fishers within this sector operate in three ways: as members of fishing cooperatives; as individual permit holders (permisionarios); and as independent fishers (pescadores libres). Independent fishers either fish without a permit or under a permit of individual permit holders (or cooperative). Within Baja California Sur, our focal study area encompasses the fishing areas surrounding Espiritu Santo Island, which was declared a MPA since 2007 (DOF, 2007; Figure 2). Most of the MPA is open to fishing (47,998 ha) except for the three no-fishing zones that cover slightly more than 1% of the total area (666 ha). While the area completely banned to fishing is very small, the MPA changed how fishers conducted their activities because of the enactment of fishing restrictions in the areas where fishing was still permitted and the significant increase in monitoring and enforcement. Given the importance of these fishing ground to local fishers who mostly live in the city of La Paz (Anaya Reyna, Weaver, & Palmeros Rodrı´ guez, 2005), implementation of the Espiritu Santo MPA could be viewed as a stressor in the form of a new regulatory regime. At the same time, the new Espiritu Santo MPA provided opportunity to its users to apply for and access various government programs and subsidies through the Protected Areas Commission that otherwise would not be available to them.

Drivers of Change and Adaptation in the Study Area Small-scale fisheries are activities in the constant need to adapt to prominent forms of external drivers of change such as climatic variability, resource overexploitation, new regulatory regimes, and market pressures. Recent studies have shown that climate change and specifically El Ninõ Southern Oscillation events negatively affect multiple commercial fisheries on both the Pacific and Gulf of California coasts of Baja California Sur, although with varying temporal lags and intensities, which are mediated by the target species’ life histories and the biophysical context (Aburto-Oropeza, Paredes, Mascarenas-Osorio, & Sala,

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Figure 2. Location of the Espiritu Santo National Park in relation to La Paz. No-take zones are labeled in orange.

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2010; Micheli et al., 2012). Resource overexploitation is evident for many commercial species which decreased considerably in abundance over the last 50 years (Saenz-Arroyo, Roberts, Torre, Carinõ-Olivera, & EnrıquezAndrade, 2005; Sala, Aburto-Oropeza, Reza, Paredes, & Lopez-Lemus, 2004). To improve performance, currently, no new permits are being issued for almost any of the fish species, arthropods, and mollusks (‘‘Acuerdo por el que se da a conocer . . .,’’ 2012). A lack of new permits coupled with the increasing creation of MPAs puts limits to new fisheries entrants (at least legally) while existing fishers face shrinking fishing grounds (Cudney-Bueno et al., 2009). Finally, studies investigating market dynamics of Baja California Sur fisheries suggest that integration of local fisheries into regional and global markets affects fishers’ incentives and impacts the structure of local fishing institutions (Basurto, Bennett, Weaver, Rodriguez-Van Dyck, & Aceves-Bueno, 2013; Reddy et al., 2013).

Methods Data Collection We collected data using structured survey, interviews, and participant observation. All data collection protocols were approved by the Duke University Institutional Review Board (#B0259). Surveys. We conducted two surveys, one in 2006 (September–December, n ¼ 80) prior to the establishment of the Espiritu Santo MPA and one 5 years after the implementation in 2012 (July–September, n ¼ 73) with fishers who use the Espiritu Santo MPA as a fishing ground. In Mexico, official lists of registered fishers are incomplete since they do not take into account a large number of independent fishers who work for individual permit holders or without a permit. Given that we could not proceed with a random sampling, we decided to identify and survey all the active users in 2006 and all the active and inactive users of the Espiritu Santo marine region in 2012. This approach allowed us to take into account those fishers that left the fishery since the creation of the MPA. In 2006, we identified approximately 130 fishers and surveyed 62% of them (n ¼ 80). In 2012, we identified 161 fishers and surveyed 45% of them (n ¼ 73). The remaining 55% either did not want to participate in the survey (n ¼ 38) or were difficult to locate (n ¼ 50). We surveyed 15 fishers in 2012 that we also surveyed in 2006. Those individuals were dropped from the 2006 data set and kept in 2012 data set since the latter one had less cases overall. In this way, we maintained independent observations between the 2 years. Once we removed cases with missing values, the total sample size was 130 (65 from 2006 and 65 from 2012). Interviews. The first author conducted 20 in-depth interviews with fishers, government officials from a number of federal institutions that regulate fishing

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activities or manage protected areas (i.e., CONAPESCA, INAPESCA, CONANP, and PROFEPA), NGO staff that was active in the creation and implementation of the local MPA, and other key informants that were knowledgeable about present and historic fishing practices, fisheries governance, and the origins of the local MPA. All interviews were recorded but two. The first author and his assistants’ transcribed all the interviews prior to the analysis. Participant observation. During the two periods surveyed (2006 and 2012), each of the authors participated to some degree in fishing activities and assisted some of the discussions that the fishing sector had about the creation and management of the Espiritu Santo MPA. We cumulatively generated at least 10,000 hours of active engagement in such activities. This experience allowed us to gain in-depth knowledge about the local fishing community, to understand contextual information, and to establish rapport with fishers.

Variable Description Response variables. All the response variables were binary coded (Table 1). We obtained information on government subsidies by asking each fisher to list whether he received any type of government subsidy over the course of 5 years and divided them into fishery and conservation subsidies (administered by the Fisheries Commission and the Protected Area Commission, respectively). In regard to adaptive capacity, we measured it in two ways: users’ income diversification level and users’ relative income from fishing. These indicators of Table 1. Summary of Variables Used in the Study. Variable More than one employment Higher income from fishing Subsidy fishery Subsidy conservation Year Age Marital status Permit holder Fishing gear Participation in regulatory bodies Participation in enforcement activities

Measure

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Binary: Yes/No Binary: Yes/No Binary: Yes/No Binary: Yes/No Binary: 2006/2012 Continuous Binary: Single/Married Binary: Permit/No permit Binary: Hook and Line/Other Binary: Yes/No

0.25 0.41 0.35 0.28 0.50 47.06 0.66 0.51 0.52 0.22

0.44 0.49 0.48 0.45 0.50 15.06 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.42

0 0 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 0

1 1 1 1 1 84 1 1 1 1

0.21

0.41

0

1

Binary: Yes/No

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adaptive capacity largely fall within its capital or economic dimension, a very salient one according to Lockwood et al. (2015). We define income diversification as a strategy to reduce risk of financial collapse by distributing total income across more than one economic activity (Allison & Ellis, 2001). In the context of small-scale fisheries in the state of Baja California Sur, having alternative economic activities to fishing is an important strategy to maintain fishers’ income stream during times of bad weather or unexpected resource scarcity. We gathered information on income sources by asking each fisher to list all income-generating activities he was engaged in. In terms of income from fishing, we assumed that those fishers making a higher income was due to their ability to increase the value of their catch through incorporating basic primary processing to it (e.g., filetting and deboning; Mahon, Parker, Sinckler, Willoughby, & Johnson, 2007). Income seemed to be a good proxy given that fishers in our sample do not vary substantially in terms of gear used and species harvested. We obtained information on income by asking fishers to estimate their income during a good week of fishing. We adjusted 2006 income for inflation relative to 2012 income prior to the analysis. We converted income levels to a binary variable by comparing individual incomes to the sample mean. Explanatory variables. We included a total of seven explanatory variables in the model (Table 1). We assessed fishers’ participation in two types of engagements: (a) regulatory bodies and (b) monitoring and enforcement activities. The first type constitutes fishers’ access to various councils and committees that deal with fisheries issues. These bodies either propose the creation of new rules or suggest the modification of existing ones. The second type constitutes a voluntary activity that is available to all fishers through various paths. They can engage in monitoring other fishers through participation in cooperative programs, local monitoring groups, or in activities with a number of different federal entities. Every fisher could also submit a written or telephoned complaint to the appropriate authority if he witnessed a potential illegal activity. These two types of participation are associated with different governance levels (Nenadovic & Epstein, 2016) and have been related to improved governance of renewable resources (Chhatre & Agrawal, 2008; Dalton et al., 2012). We controlled for Year of the survey (2006–2012), Marital status (single vs. married), and a number of variables related to fishing practices. Age was a proxy for respondents’ experience as a fisher. Permit holder separated fishers based on their access to a fishing permit into those with and without a permit. Fishing gear divided fishers into two groups: those who use hook and line, which is a principal type of fishing gear in this region, and those that do not. Official subsidies data. We obtained information on fisheries and conservation subsidies programs awarded to the small-scale fishers in La Paz and Baja

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California Sur during the 2007 to 2012 from the Fisheries and Protected Area commissions.

Data Analysis Multivariate probit regression analysis of the surveys. We analyzed the relationships among participation, government subsidies, and adaptive capacity (Figure 1) using a three-equation recursive simultaneous multivariate probit model (mvprobit command in Stata 14.1). This approach concurrently estimates the influence of independent variables on the three dependent variables, which allows for the error terms to be correlated thus ensuring consistency of the estimated effects (Cappellari & Jenkins, 2003; Greene, 2003). We define the model in the following way: 0

Y1 ¼ x1 1 þ a1 Y2 þ a2 Y3 þ e1

Y1 ¼ 1 if Y1 4 0,0 otherwise ð1Þ

Y2 ¼ x2 2 þ e2

0

Y2 ¼ 1 if Y2 4 0,0 otherwise

ð2Þ

0

Y3 ¼ 1 if Y3 4 0,0 otherwise

ð3Þ

Y3 ¼ x3 3 þ e3

where Y1 represents the unobserved latent variable for adaptive capacity, Y2 for fishery subsidies, and Y3 for conservation subsidies. Variables Y2 and Y3 are included as endogenous variables in Equation 1. The rest of the terms include the following: x13 which are the regressor vectors (i.e., set of independent variables) of the three equations, 13 vectors of unknown coefficients to be estimated, and e13 error terms that are assumed to be identically distributed and follow the multivariate normal probability distribution with mean 0 and variance 1. The estimation of the correlation coefficient (r) of the variance– covariance matrix of the error terms was used to test for independence of individual equations. If the independence of individual equations could not be rejected (H0: r1,2 ¼ r1,3 ¼ r2,3 ¼ 0), we used univariate probit models to individually estimate Equations 1 to 3 (probit command in Stata 14.1). We also used univariate probit models to analyze the relationships between participation and government subsidies. Qualitative analysis of the interviews. We analyzed the interviews using the qualitative data analysis software NVivo (version 10, QSR International). Major themes explored for the purpose of this article relate to respondents’ (a) understanding, interpretation, and engagement in participatory fora; (b) opinion about the functioning of subsidies programs and their importance for fishers; and (c) views on the availability of alternative income-generating opportunities for the fishers in the La Paz region. We systematically coded for these themes across all interviews.

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Results Survey Analysis Table 2 provides summary of our findings in relation to the three hypotheses we tested. The results from multivariate probit analysis of having higher income from fishing are reported in Table 3. Given the error terms of the three equations related to having more than one employment were not significantly correlated (2 ¼ 6.94, DF ¼ 3, p ¼ .18; results not shown), we analyzed each of them separately using a univariate probit model (Table 4). All models are significant at 0.1 level based on a Wald’s 2 test. Correlation coefficients among equations related to higher income from fishing are statistically significant at 0.1 level, which

Table 2. Summary of Our Findings Based on the Results From Tables 3 and 4. Hypothesis H1

H2

H3

Relationship

Effect

Fisher’s participation in regulatory bodies is related to the reception of a fisheries subsidy Fisher’s participation in regulatory bodies is related to the reception of a conservation subsidy Fisher’s participation in enforcement activities is related to the reception of a fisheries subsidy Fisher’s participation in enforcement activities is related to the reception of conservation subsidy Fisher’s participation in regulatory bodies is related to greater income diversification Fisher’s participation in regulatory bodies is related to higher earnings from fishing Fisher’s participation in enforcement activities is related to greater income diversification Fisher’s participation in enforcement activities is related to higher earnings from fishing Fisher’s reception of a fishery subsidy is related to greater income diversification Fisher’s reception of a fishery subsidy is related to higher earnings from fishing Fisher’s reception of a conservation subsidy is related to greater income diversification Fisher’s reception of a conservation subsidy is related to higher earnings from fishing

" " – " – – " # – " – –

Note. Up arrow indicates positive relationship, down arrow indicates negative relationship, and horizontal line indicates no relationship.

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*p .10. **p .05. ***p .01.

Year [2012] Age Marital status [Married] Permit holder [Yes] Fishing gear [Hook and line] Participation in regulatory bodies [Yes] Participation in enforcement [Yes] Receiving fishery subsidy Receiving conservation subsidy Constant Correlation coefficients r1,2 r1,3 r2,3 H0: r1,2 ¼ r1,3 ¼ r2,3 ¼ 0 Model statistics N ¼ 114 DF ¼ 24

2 ¼ 131.28

1.47**

.74

2.89***

p value ¼ .00

p value ¼ .07

0.69**

1.13*** 0.01 0.03 0.86** 0.43 0.34

.37

.34 .01 .32 .32 .40 .40

Coef.

.58

.32

.35 .01 .31 .32 .43 .33

SE

Y3 ¼ Receiving conservation subsidy [Yes]

0.06

DF ¼ 3

.39 .74 .82 .57

0.69* 1.50** 0.40 0.83

1.32*** 0.02 0.00 1.12*** 0.39 0.99***

.63** .72** .43** 2 ¼ 6.94

.46 .01 .33 .37 .44 .43

1.77*** 0.01 0.08 0.53 0.60 0.70

SE

Coef.

SE

Variable

Coef.

Y2 ¼ Receiving fishery subsidy [Yes]

Y1 ¼ Higher income from fishing [Yes]

Table 3. Multivariate Probit Model of Having Higher Income From Fishing.

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*p .10. **p .05. ***p .01.

Year [2012] Age Marital status [Married] Permit holder [Yes] Fishing gear [Hook and line] Participation in regulatory bodies [Yes] Participation in enforcement [Yes] Receiving fishery subsidy Receiving conservation subsidy Constant Model statistics N 2 DF p value Pseudo R2

Variable

Coef.

123 15.37 9 .08 .11

0.01 0.00 0.51* 0.06 0.61 0.20 0.74** 0.16 0.24 0.36

(A) Having more than one employment [Yes]

.34 .01 .28 .30 .44 .40 .32 .37 .35 .46

SE

125 42.46 7 .00 .28

1.70***

.68

2.68*** 125 68.60 7 .00 .42

1.08*** 0.01 0.04 0.74** 0.30 0.59* 0.70**

Coef.

.33 .01 .32 .32 .40 .40 .38

SE

.58

.34 .01 .31 .31 .42 .34 .33

SE

(C) Reception of conservation subsidy [Yes]

1.41*** 0.01 0.04 0.99** 0.33 1.25** 0.05

Coef.

(B) Reception of fishery subsidy [Yes]

Table 4. Univariate Probit Models of (A) Having More Than One Employment, (B) Reception of Fishery Subsidies, and (C) Reception of Conservation Subsidies.

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confirms that the equations should be jointly determined (Table 3). Individual correlation coefficients among the higher income from fishing and fishery subsidies, on one hand (r1,2), and conservation subsidies, on the other (r1,3), are both negative, suggesting that unobserved variables for subsidies and unobserved variables for higher income from fishing are significantly negatively related. We find strong support for Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between fishers’ participation in government processes and their reception of government subsidies (Table 4, columns B and C). For example, participation in regulatory bodies increases reception of fishery subsidies from 0.29 to 0.61 (p < .003), while the participation in enforcement activities increases reception of conservation subsidies from 0.24 to 0.43 ((p < .041). With regard to other explanatory variables, having a fishing permit and year (2012) are positively related to the reception of government subsidies. We find mixed support for Hypothesis 2: Fishers’ participation in processes related to various forms of enforcement activities is positively related to income diversification but negatively related to fishers’ higher income from fishing relative to the sample mean (Table 3, column Y1; Table 4, column A). We find minimal support for Hypothesis 3 only in relation to higher income from fishing than the sample mean, where it is positively associated with the reception of a fishery subsidy (Table 3, column Y1). The likelihood that the fisher obtains higher income from fishing than the sample mean increases by a factor of 4 for fishers that received fisheries subsidies in comparison to those that did not receive such subsidies (Figure 3). The explanatory variable year (2012) was the only additional variable that was positively associated with the higher income from fishing (Table 3, column Y1), while being married was negatively correlated with having more than one employment (Table 4, column A). Our data reveal a substantial increase in total fishery and conservation subsidies received from 2006 to 2012 (Table 5). Majority of subsidies received by fishers were focused on maintaining income in the time of need and on increasing fishing efficiency. Analyses of the official government subsidy programs indicate that fishers from La Paz received US$627,000 in all subsidies combined during the 2007 to 2012 period (official data not shown). In terms of fisheries subsidies, fishers in La Paz received slightly less than half a million U.S. dollars in strategic investments funding, which is less than 10% of the entire amount disbursed in the state during this period. None of the fishers we surveyed received this type of funding. All of the subsidies that fishers reported in our survey belonged to the improvement of small-scale fisheries efficiency (summary subsidies data shown in Table 5). Official data on conservation subsidies indicate that fishers from La Paz received US$ 177,375 during the same period. Some 60% of these funds went into a program that focused on maintaining income in the time of need, which benefited slightly less than 280 people. The rest of the funds went into a program that focused on developing alternative production opportunities. Three such

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Figure 3. Predicted probability of having higher income from fishing than the sample mean as a function of fishers’ reception of fishery subsidies (p .05).

projects were funded during the 2006 to 2012, which benefited 50 people. While only one fisher from our study received funding from this program, qualitative analysis revealed that 10 out of the 19 fishers who reported having more than one income stream depended either directly or indirectly on conservation subsidies. Four of those 10 fishers directly derived part of their income from a subsidy through their involvement in ecotourism-related activities. The other six fishers benefited indirectly as they obtained part of their income providing services to entities that received a subsidy. For example, four of the fishers who got certified as biological monitoring divers through a subsidy awarded to a local NGO were able to obtain additional income by providing their services to other groups that needed to conduct biological monitoring. Biological monitoring projects of MPAs are one type of projects that get funding on a relatively continuous basis.

Interviews Analysis It is important to recognize that our quantitative results do not make any causal inferences, as we neither have panel data nor instrumental variables in our models to estimate such outcomes. Furthermore, a relatively small sample size

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1,100–8,000

Boat, boat motor

3 26

Equipment small

2 14

Navigation instruments, on-board storage units 90–500

Subsidy description

Equipment large

Fishery subsidies

0 0

Financing for construction of processing plants, storage facilities, etc. 68,000–166,000

Major infrastructure

Note. (A) Description and corresponding amounts of conservation and fishery subsidy programs available during the 2006–2012 period. PET is a temporary employment program focused on maintaining income in the time of need, while PROCODES is a sustainable development program focused on developing alternative production opportunities. (B) Number of recipients of conservation and fishery subsidies in our sample for 2006 and 2012.

80–340 15,000–35,000 Subsidy recipients 6 0 30 1

Amount range (US$) (B) Recipients 2006 Recipients 2012

Cash for specific purposes

PROCODES

Cash

PET

Description

Subsidy programs (A)

Conservation subsidies

Table 5. Government Subsidy Programs Available to Baja California Sur Fishers

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could have disguised significance of some of the weaker hypothesized relationships. Finally, measuring latent constructs, such as adaptive capacity, is challenging, as there is always a risk that chosen indicators failed to fully capture the particular construct. We tried to minimize these shortcomings by using rich qualitative data set obtained through interviews and participant observation. The use of a mixedmethods approach provided the context to our findings and some of the potential mechanisms behind the observed patterns. Therefore, we find most appropriate to present results and interpretation of qualitative analysis in the Discussion section.

Discussion Although fishers have a number of participatory fora available to them in relation to fisheries and conservation management, very few are using this opportunity despite the fact that fisher participation in such fora is positively correlated with reception of government subsidies. Furthermore, the stated goal of government subsidies to promote economic diversification and to build value-added services within the small-scale fishery sector (‘‘Decreto por el que se . . .,’’ 2008a; ‘‘Acuerdo por el que se da a conocer . . .,’’ 2012) does not seem to be fully accomplished in the case of La Paz fisheries.

Why There Might Be a Positive Relationship Between Fishers’ Participation in Decision-Making Venues and Their Receiving of Government Subsidies (H1)? In our interviews, we did not find evidence of a genuine interest of engagement between authorities and fishers about how to increase adaptive capacity within the fishery sector. On the contrary, fishers and authorities seem to share the view that the main function of subsidies is to provide fishers with a short-term economic benefit. While we see no evidence that authorities use these subsidies for electoral purposes as in other fund disbursement programs in Mexico (De la O, 2015), our own observations of the policy process as well as qualitative data suggest that those with access to decision-making venues too often become subsidies recipients themselves. As one of the government employees stated, You have to be very careful that [subsidies] get used in the spirit they were created in. Otherwise, you start having clientelism. There are people who know their way around and [how to get the subsidies]. (Government official, #13)

Those individuals seem to be mostly leaders of local fisheries organizations and those who have knowledge about governmental processes. According to some of

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our informants, a ‘‘lack of true representation’’ among fisheries representatives prevents subsidies from reaching the broader small-scale fishery sector: In reality, representatives of the fisheries sector are not their true representatives. Those are individuals who obtain government support and subsidies [for themselves]. (Government official, #27)

This is consistent with the practice of the creation of fishing cooperatives exclusively to access government programs and subsidies (Sievanen, 2014). The continued distribution of subsidies to the same group of individuals overtime reinforces the deeply rooted skepticism toward authorities and thus further undermine prospects of civic engagement (Morris & Klesner, 2010). Such a lack of true representation by fisheries leaders might further discourage fishers to trust that engagement in these types of fora can benefit them in any way. In addition, our review of the allocation of fisheries subsidies in the broader Baja California Sur region, based on the official data, suggests that during the 2007 to 2012 time period, fishers from La Paz received less than 10% of the total amount (US$ 500,000) allocated to such subsidies programs, while fishers from the northwestern part of the state, who are better organized and have developed close relationships with authorities at the national level, received considerably higher government support over the same period (CONAPESCA, 2015). Similar patterns of unequal access to government support have also been observed in other Latin American countries such as Chile (Mondaca-Schachermayer et al., 2011). Overall, despite government’s stated efforts in the last two decades to bolster natural resources users’ participation in governance, we find that government lacks incentives to increase access to decision-making fora, yet their mandate is to implement and disburse subsidies. Individuals close to the authorities find ways to become recipients and have no incentives to share benefits with broader population of fishers, partly because majority of those fishers do not believe that engaging in the process will benefit them in the long run, and thus chose not to get involved. This finding resonates with the study done by Eakin, Eriksen, Eikeland, and Øyen (2011), who suggest that government administrative operations in Latin America had not changed in practice, even though most of the countries went through considerable institutional reforms aimed at improving participation and transparency.

How Is Fisher’s Participation in Monitoring and Enforcement Activities Related to Adaptive Capacity (H2)? Mostly, monitoring and enforcement activities constitute a contract-based job providing participants with a relatively secure income alternative to fishing and in that way fosters fishers’ adaptive capacity to fluctuating catches or others

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drivers of change. However, regardless of the pay that is associated with monitoring activities, our qualitative data analysis suggests that fishers’ participation in monitoring is mainly done by individuals that are already part-time fishers. We believe it is possible that full-time fishers are less likely to risk severing their relationship with fellow fishers on which they depend on to sustain their social networks. As one of our informants pointed out, full-time fishers face social pressure against reporting their fellow peers of any rule breaking. Another key informant articulated it in the following way: [Nobody wants] to have enemies at the sea. At the sea we want to be a family. Even though they are not like me [respecting rules], I am with them because they are my friends and also because the fishery is their main source of income. (Fisher, #07)

The negative relationship of fisher’s participation in monitoring and enforcement activities to higher income from fishing further reinforces this interpretation of our results (Table 3, column Y1). The implication of having such distinct groups might have impacts not only on the fishers’ adaptive capacity but also on the long-term viability of fishery resources in the area. A number of studies in natural resource management point out that the active involvement of resource users in monitoring and enforcement activities is related to improved resources conditions (Chhatre & Agrawal, 2008; Coleman & Steed, 2009). Therefore, it seems important to find ways to engage full-time fishers in such activities. The situation within the fishing sector in La Paz suggests that the lack of full-time fishers’ engagement in monitoring and enforcement activities underscores fishers’ distrust toward governments’ motives and their resistance toward engagement in meaningful comanagement of MPAs and fisheries.

What Explains Such a Limited Association of Subsidies’ to Fishers’ Adaptive Capacity (H3)? Except for the positive association between fishery subsidies and higher earnings from fishing, we did not find any other correlations within this context. The positive relationship between fishery subsidies and fishers’ higher income overtime could be explained by the improvements in fishers’ efficiency through access to new engines, boasts, and fishing gear. Such increase in fleet capacity through its modernization could do little to foster sectors’ adaptive capacity, as it could result in negative impacts on both the ecosystem and on socioeconomic fabric of small-scale fishery communities (Pauly, 2006; Pauly et al. 2002). Interestingly, fishers in La Paz do not believe that increasing their harvesting efficiency will strengthen this sector’s adaptive capacity to better navigate

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present and future resource overexploitation, climate change, and market globalization pressures. Instead, fishers’ argue that a better vehicle to increase adaptive capacity rests in increasing their capacity for primary processing and changes to marketing and commercialization conditions. As one of the local fisheries leaders pointed out, What is necessary is to look for a way. . . to generate a [sustainable] income. In other words, look for a good marketing approach; look for a process [that can increase] the added value of the [harvested] product. In that way with less harvested product fishers can earn more. (Fisher, #09)

Despite the existent rhetoric about the importance of developing alternative income opportunities by Mexican conservation agencies, it was somewhat surprising that the model (Table 4) did not reveal a significant relationship between conservation subsidies and income diversification. Part of the issue might be that only one of the fishers from our sample received such conservation subsidy. It also might be that beyond promoting fishers to engage in ecotourism activities, there is no real understanding about what fishers’ needs and aspirations are, from which sound programs of alternative employment could be created. As suggested by one former government official, We spent three years on subsidies for projects that didn’t endure. Now I can clearly see that they were not created based on fishers’ needs. [We created] those projects which were accepted [by the fishers] but there was no true commitment to keep them running. (Ex-government official, #26)

Additional Barriers to Fostering Fishers’ Adaptive Capacity Access to potentially transformative subsidies, such as those that promote creation of value-added services and the development of alternative production opportunities, have not been readily available to fishers in La Paz (Table 5). Our interviews suggest that even if these subsidies were available, it is likely that fishers’ lack of knowledge related to administrative procedures would act as a barrier for their ability to benefit from these programs. Without appropriate training and transparent access mechanisms fishers will continue to fail to navigate complex bureaucratic systems and learn about, prepare, and submit application materials related to particular subsidy programs. This situation is not unique to the fisheries sector, however, suggesting the need to become a development national priority. For example, Saldanã-Zorrilla (2008) showed the limited impact of government programs aimed at increasing adaptive capacity of farmers to natural disasters in Chiapas due to resource users’ inability to access them easily.

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Local NGOs in some instances act as mediators between government and fishers to access governmental benefits to fishers. As one of the small-scale fishing leaders whose cooperative benefited from such collaboration explained, Some people like us [members of a particular fisheries cooperative – name omitted] were beneficiaries of the federal government programs with the help of a local NGO [name omitted]. They wrote the application for us and helped us get the funding we asked for . . . [Their assistance was instrumental] because we simply didn’t know how to request those subsidies. (Fisher 08)

Indeed, the role of NGOs in providing capacity building and supportive services to poor and marginalized segments of the population has been reported in various parts of the world, yet the outcomes have been of limited impact partly because creating enduring local capacity can be time and resource consuming (Bebbington, 2005; Biekart, 2008). For example, a documented experience in the formation of a viable cooperative specializing in live aquarium fish trade in the Gulf of California region, and the acquisition of the necessary infrastructure to support such activity took one local NGO more than 6 years and at least US$200,000 (Fernańdez-Rivera Melo, Hernańdez-Velasco, & Lejbowicz, 2013). While the engagement of civil society is very important, it is no replacement for having in place clear mechanisms through which fishers and other marginalized citizens can access governmental programs designed to foster their livelihoods.

Conclusion Our findings suggest a limited effect of subsidies and participation on building small-scale fishers’ adaptive capacity to external drivers of change in Mexico (Figure 1, Table 2). Although Mexico has been active in its decentralization efforts over the past 25 years, our study reminds us of the importance of users’ active participation in rule making and the effective support of higher level institutions to facilitate the design of equitable forms of participation in decision-making processes (Acheson, 1997; Ostrom, 1990). Government must now engage resource users in decision-making processes to disburse subsidies and comply with the law but continue to have no incentives to create clear and accountable guidelines on how, when, and which resource users can gain access to decision-making fora. Fishers’ representatives close to the government become recipients of benefits and have no interest to distribute them to the rest of the sector. Within such sociopolitical dynamics, most fishers have no incentives to believe engagement in these processes will benefit them. Together, all parties contribute to maintaining the status quo. Encouraging local participation in decision-making processes continues to be an enduring challenge for a number of Latin American countries (Eakin &

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Lemos, 2006; Kalikoski, Quevedo Neto, & Almudi, 2010), given citizens’ deep mistrust in governments’ motives, particularly in context where historically repressive regimes recently transitioned toward democratic ones. Although this situation creates a considerable barrier to promoting any form of adaptive capacity, investments to better understand what are fishers’ own views of potentially viable activities to generate adaptive capacity continue to be a pressing need and a good place to start. Acknowledgments The authors are grateful to all the fishers from La Paz who found time to participate in the survey as well as to CONANP for providing them with subsidies data. The authors also thank Martı´ n Almara´z, Edgardo Camacho, Francisco Go´mez, Jessica Navarro, Uriel Rubio, and Bernardo Sańchez for field assistance; Guillermo Ortunõ, Samantha Emmert, and Emily Mariano for data processing. The authors are especially thankful to Constanza Santa Ana for her work on this project and to Graham Epstein and Tyler Ransom for their assistance with the implementation of a statistical model.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Funding for the research was provided by the Walton Family Foundation, grant #2012668 to XB; WWF Fuller Fellowship, grant #15116080 to MN. IRB permit #B0259 obtained through Duke University.

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Author Biographies Mateja Nenadovic´ is a postdoctoral associate in the Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University. His research focuses on governance of marine social–ecological systems with the emphasis on adaptive comanagement and other forms of multilevel governance arrangements. Xavier Basurto is an associate professor of sustainability science in the Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University. He is interested in the fundamental question of how can social groups find ways to self-organize and engage in successful collective action. His work also pays attention to the interplay between the institutions that govern social behavior and the biophysical processes. Amy Hudson Weaver is a sustainable fisheries program coordinator in the Society for Natural History Niparaja´ from Baja California Sur, Mexico. She specializes in marine fisheries management and public participation, and most of her work has been focused on strengthening cooperative activities at the local level to enable sustainable use of marine resources.

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