the same time, this COTS tech has become cheaper and more widely ... Pacific region: China, Russia, and North Korea (Iran being the fourth). ..... Gonzales, Rand Blog, 17 December 2014, www.rand.org/blog/2014/12/preventing-cyber-.
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-03/cryptology-crossroads
Published on U.S. Naval Institute (http://www.usni.org) Home > Magazines > Proceedings Magazine - March 2015 Vol. 141/3/1,345 > Cryptology at the Crossroads
Cryptology at the Crossroads Print [1]
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Proceedings Magazine - March 2015 Vol. 141/3/1,345 [6] By Lieutenant Robert Bebber, U.S. Navy As the Navy trains its focus anew on the Pacific theater, it needs to recapture its once-vaunted signalsintelligence glory to keep up in a rapidly evolving techno-environment.
With a rebalance to Asia coming after more than a decade of land war, the U.S. Navy finds itself smaller and in certain respects weaker. One area that should be of great concern is the current and future practice of maritime cryptology, especially in the Indo-Pacific region.
Cryptology at sea proved decisive during World War II, beginning with the Battle at Midway and the breaking of the Japanese naval code JN25. 1 Equally important was Ultra, the Allied program that cracked the codes of Germany’s Enigma machines, especially those used by the German navy. Winston Churchill famously remarked to King George VI that “It was thanks to Ultra that we won the war.” 2 Throughout the Cold War, naval cryptology played a vital role in meeting national and tactical intelligence requirements. America gained deep insight and understanding of Soviet, Warsaw Pact, and Communist-allied naval operations in Asia and was able to obtain priceless strategic intelligence through collection missions operated by the U.S. Navy. The end of the Cold War was followed by strategic drift, drawdown, and a lull that was shattered by the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Yet even in the midst of a worldwide “Global War on Terror,” pressure remained to cut the naval force. Today, the U.S. Navy is at its smallest size since World War I. For the Navy to conduct its maritime-cryptology mission in support of the Asia-Pacific rebalance, it must have presence in the littorals, especially in key strategic areas of the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, while maintaining an enduring capability in the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, and elsewhere. A smaller Navy with fewer platforms means the Navy is not always where it needs to be, when it needs to be there. Tech-Heavy Populace = Cluttered Signals A number of factors have converged affecting the art and practice of maritime cryptology. Policymakers have rightly begun to shift America’s attention to the Indo-Pacific region, from “Bollywood to Hollywood.” This area covers 50 percent of the Earth’s surface and holds 60 percent of the population. It accounts for the more than half the world’s cellular-mobile population and nearly half the world’s total Internet-user population. 3 Among the world’s top ten most powerful militaries (excluding the United States), five are in Asia. 4 This is a maritime environment characterized by vast distances and dynamic competitors. Commercial off-the-shelf (or “COTS”) technology, communication infrastructure, and radars have advanced considerably, in some cases past the capabilities of military-grade technology. At the same time, this COTS tech has become cheaper and more widely available and is used by both the general public and militaries. In the maritime environment among the densely populated littorals of the Indo-Pacific region, targets are difficult to find as they are able to blend in with civilian and commercial traffic. The radio-frequency (RF) and electromagnetic (EM) environments have grown exponentially more complex. Tactical, strategic, and data-communication links are operating in all areas of the spectrum and often at frequencies with a very low probability of interception. Modern encryption techniques have evolved from mechanical electronics to the use of quantum mechanics. 5 Adversarial communications have become far more challenging to detect, exploit, and prosecute. Yet the EM environment is more than just a source of intelligence collection. Today, it has become the battlefield. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert has written that the “EM-cyber environment is now so fundamental to military operations and so critical to our national interests that we must start treating it as a warfighting domain on par with— or perhaps
even more important than —land, sea, air, and space [emphasis added].” 6 The U.S. Navy has embraced the EM-cyber realm as a core warfighting area, combining critical Navy communities in information warfare, intelligence, information professional, meteorology, oceanography, and space operations into an Information Dominance Corps. A series of policy statements and guiding documents have been recently published governing how the Navy will approach this new world, including the Information Dominance Roadmap (2013–2028) , the Navy Information Dominance Corps Human Capital Strategy (2012–2017) , and the Navy Strategy for Achieving Information Dominance (2013–2017) . These have been followed by the CNO’s Navigation Plan (2015–2019) , which identifies combat-maneuver capabilities in the EM-cyber domain as critical to the operating tenets of warfighting first, forward-operating, and readiness. 7 All these factors have converged at a time when U.S. defense spending has continued to decline. In 2013, military spending in the United States fell from $671 billion to $619 billion (in 2011 dollars), the largest drop since the end of the Cold War. This was an eight percent reduction, accounting for a two percent reduction in America’s share of total global military spending. At the same time, the rest of the world’s military spending increased two percent. 8 At a time when the EM-cyber environment has grown more complex and competitive and we have rebalanced to the largest region on Earth, we conduct the maritime cryptological mission with fewer resources. Growing Adversarial Capabilities Three of the four principal state adversaries to the United States operate or reside in the IndoPacific region: China, Russia, and North Korea (Iran being the fourth). Each state presents unique challenges to maritime cryptology and has advanced its military-communication capabilities considerably. China. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has made great strides in its command-and-control, especially focusing on joint operations with its navy and air force. It has watched with keen interest America’s operations worldwide, and in many ways has sought to emulate networkwarfare operations within its military. Most Chinese military installations have microwave communication equipment, and China has expressed interest in a dedicated mobile military cellular system. It has established a sophisticated satellite network that improves its secure communications and intelligence-gathering capabilities, as well as land-based facilities that enhance its electronic-detection, interception, direction-finding, and jamming capabilities. 9 Reportedly, China has made strides in quantum communications, which are believed to be both undetectable and unbreakable, possibly for use in strategic command-and-control of its submarine fleet, which now includes ballistic-missile submarines. 10 It has also devoted substantial resources into its own information-dominance corps, designed to fight in all areas of the EM spectrum and conduct cyber-warfare operations. By 2020, China will have completed its own indigenous 35-satellite navigation system, called “Compass,” so that it no longer need rely on Western and foreign GPS systems. These advanced communication, jamming, and navigation technologies will proliferate worldwide as China puts export versions on the market, further compromising our cryptologic and information-warfare capabilities. 11 Russia is investing heavily in a military modernization program. Among its most pressing priorities are advanced air defense, communication, command-and-control, intelligence and
reconnaissance systems. This also includes significant investments in cyberspace operations, and recent conflicts with Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014) show that cyberspace ops have been integrated into overall Russian military operations—a form of integrated fires. Russia is considered to have the strongest cyberspace capabilities. 12 It has a long, proud history in satellite technology and continues to launch advanced military communications, intelligence-collection, and navigation constellations. Russia is also one of the leading arms sellers in the world, and its advanced equipment and systems are being made available to arms markets. North Korea has a limited telecommunications capability that relies on fiber-optic networks. It also has a modern 3G nationwide cellular network called “Koryolink” with approximately 2 million subscribers. This network does not permit calls or Internet access outside North Korea. Access to these networks is strictly controlled. Until recently, North Korea was assessed to have a limited cyberspace-operations capability most likely targeted to intelligence collection and operations against South Korea. That is being reassessed after the recent North Korean cyberattack against Sony Pictures Entertainment in November of 2014. The North Korean military remains very disciplined in its use of operational-security, denial, and deception techniques. In many ways, North Korea presents a unique, difficult challenge to the entire cryptologic system since it has limited connectivity to any of the global information networks, yet has proven it can conduct cyberspace operations from outside North Korea. 13 The Navy’s Response Beginning in 2002, the U.S. Navy embarked on the “SeaPower 21” concept, which aimed to “gain efficiencies” through an operational concept called “ForceNet.” “ForceNet” sought to “integrat[e] warriors, sensors, command-and-control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed combat force.” 14 At a time when the nation was about to embark on major land wars, it made sense for the Navy to look for ways to realize savings and attempt to improve combat effectiveness through networked capabilities. The hope was that through force shaping, automation, and remote operations, maritime cryptology could continue to thrive in an ever more complex electromagnetic environment. However, the effects of decisions made then are taking their toll now on the tradecraft of maritime cryptology. Today’s junior sailors and officers have had their training time cut in order to meet the growing operational demands on a shrinking Navy. To be successful in the art of cryptology— and it is a practiced art —one must have a deep understanding of the fundamentals of radio-signal transmission as well as more than a passing familiarity with the collection equipment. A junior cryptologic technician and junior officer should be able to draw a basic transmitter-receiver diagram and trace a signal from its original state, such as voice or data, through the transmitter, across a medium, and into the collection gear and the operator’s ears. Foundational knowledge required that the basic operator have a working familiarity with the equipment and be able to perform diagnostic and troubleshooting tasks in the event of a malfunction. Finally, operators and junior officers must understand the process of signals-intelligence (SIGINT) reporting to the tactical unit at sea (indications and warning intelligence) as well as to the national SIGINT system. 15
At the same time, emerging cyberspace communication networks place entirely new pressures on maritime cryptology. Modern communication, command, control, and information sharing are a “network of networks,” an “Internet of things” that require new skill sets and new acquisition and exploitation technologies. Yet the complexity of data systems and volume of data being passed is growing exponentially, outpacing our acquisition and procurement capability. The Navy has tried to mitigate this by relying on COTS, but this entails its own set of problems. COTS technology must be compatible with legacy systems (some more than 20 years old and built on architecture and code from the late 1980s and early ’90s), and it relies on bandwidth levels that are not always available and reliable. We often find out the hard way that equipment that works well in the sterile lab environment is not up to the task of performing reliably at sea under arduous conditions. COTS technology is also easily acquired by our adversaries, who can not only use it to improve their own capabilities but also have an understanding of ours. Which Way to Go? The Navy has embarked on an aggressive technological upgrade to existing equipment capabilities within the entire electromagnetic spectrum for the purpose of SIGINT collection, analysis, communications, and electromagnetic and cyberspace warfare. While classification restrictions prevent a more thorough look at new Navy programs, some of the major cryptologic, communications, and electronic/cyber-warfare system upgrades and programs include: • SSQ-30 Ship Signal Exploitation Equipment (SSEE) Increment F : Will provide shipboard information-operations and electronic-warfare capabilities as well as autonomous signal acquisition, direction-finding and target geo-location. • Persistent Littoral Undersea Surveillance System (PLUS) : A network of mobile underwater unmanned vehicles (UUV) with sensors, UUV gliders, and remote-control stations designed for undersea surveillance of multiple quiet targets. • MQ-4C Triton Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) : Will provide multi-sensor, persistent maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) for joint and fleet commanders. • EP-3E ARIES II Spiral 3 : The Navy’s premier manned maritime ISR platform has been improved with Internet-protocol connectivity, imagery intelligence, and significant SIGINT equipment upgrades. • Consolidated Afloat Network Enterprise System (CANES) : Will replace existing afloat Navy tactical networks with a common architecture for unclassified, coalition, secret, and sensitive-compartmented-information systems on all Navy combatants (surface, subsurface, and air) and maritime-operations centers. 16 These new systems, and others, will improve existing cryptologic and information-operations capabilities. They leverage emerging tools and advances in automated and remote operations and take advantage of rapidly growing computer-processing power. These advances are not occurring in a vacuum, however, and our adversaries are also rapidly developing and fielding new
cryptologic, information-operations, and electronic-warfare capabilities. Our technological edge will only get us so far. For the Navy to survive and thrive in the modern electromagnetic environment and be able to conduct full-spectrum information operations and the cryptologic mission in the Indo-Pacific region, it will need to do the following: Revitalize the Navy’s role in the national SIGINT enterprise. The Navy has a unique capability to provide persistent presence in the littoral. Its air, surface, and subsurface platforms, both manned and unmanned, are often the only intelligence-collection platforms able to provide coverage against adversaries, especially China, North Korea, and Russia, during key events and crises. The strategic decision by policymakers to rebalance to the Indo-Pacific region requires an operational need to improve and expand the Navy’s cryptologic capabilities and its role in the SIGINT enterprise. And, as previously noted by Admiral Greenert, since the EM-cyber environment is a principle warfighting domain, the Navy will be at the leading edge of combat operations in the region. National SIGINT systems are likely vulnerable to disruption and deception, leaving tactical Fleet units left to conduct the mission, sometimes without communications capabilities back to higher headquarters. The Navy must become the leading advocate for cryptologic, electronic-warfare, and information-operations resources and capabilities because in a crisis, it may very well be the Navy that becomes the principal or only source of collection operations. Get back to basics. The Human Capital Strategy states that there are “some challenges to the assumption of job duties across communities, associated with sub-optimal training requirements” of members of the Information Dominance Corps (enlisted and officer). What was worrisome is that informal, on-the-job training (OJT) was considered “highly effective,” according to feedback. In some cases, for certain duties, OJT may indeed be adequate. However, junior sailors and officers are reporting to the Fleet lacking a basic understanding of the fundamentals of RF, SIGINT reporting, cyberspace operations, target knowledge, and equipment operation and maintenance. The Human Capital Strategy acknowledges that “current training requirements do not universally reflect [information dominance] objectives.” This is a welcome admission, and must be followed up with an investment of both time and resources into training, especially in the core functions. A familiar refrain is that in a resource-constrained environment, training and education are cut first. In fact, more important to conducting the maritime cryptologic mission are the skills and abilities of the operators and officers, not the new equipment. Fiscal trade-offs that continue to emphasize systems over personnel training only leave the Navy with systems that are being underutilized or mis-utilized, which does not go unnoticed in the national SIGINT enterprise. Develop a strategic cadre. The Human Capital Strategy identifies as its fourth goal to “Create a Warfighting Culture,” which is certainly admirable and necessary. This goal is supported by two objectives: orient the “total Navy workforce to the IDC mission” and “leverage kill chain concepts (integrated fires) to depict and communicate the process through which the [information dominance] discipline contributes to the delivery of warfighting effects.” But to truly develop a warfighting culture, the information-dominance community must have a strategic cadre that develops tactics, operational concepts, and strategies that blend kinetic and non-kinetic
effects meeting combatant-commander objectives. To become a strategic thinker, one must practice the art of strategy. Traditionally, this does not become a focus in the Navy until the more senior officer and enlisted ranks, but we must rethink strategic education, embedding it into the entire professional-development spectrum. 17 Maritime cryptology stands at a crossroads, and for it to succeed in the Indo-Pacific region, it will have to adapt and change. The Navy is making investments in new technology and systems, but will also need to reinvigorate its training and development of sailors and officers. The Navy’s unique access to the littoral provides the intelligence community and warfighters with capabilities that may not be available from other national systems during times of crisis. The Navy has recognized some of the shortfalls and critical needs facing the cryptologic/informationoperations community, but more must be done.
1. www.navy.mil/midway/how.html [7] . 2. www.history.co.uk/study-topics/history-of-ww2/code-breaking [8] . 3. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for the Asia-Pacific, “Asia Pacific Development 2012: Did You Know?” www.unescap.org/stat/data/syb2012/did-you-know.asp [9] . 4. Jeremy Bender, “The 11 Most Powerful Militaries in the World,” Business Insider , 23 April 2014, www.businessinsider.com/11-most-powerful-militaries-in-the-world-2014-4 [10] . 5. http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/2012/11/20/quantum-crypto... [11] . 6. ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, USN, “Imminent Domain,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , vol. 138, no. 12 (December 2012) 16–21. 7. www.idcsync.org/documents [12] . www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=82851 [13] . Adapted from “Developing a Strategic Cadre in the Information Dominance Corps,” Center for International Maritime Security, http://cimsec.org/developing-strategic-cadre-informationdominance-corps... [14] . 8. Dinah Walker, “Trends in U.S. Military Spending,” Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2014, www.cfr.org/defense-budget/trends-us-military-spending/p28855 [15] . 9. Christopher H. Sterling and Chris Lord, “People’s Republic of China,” in Military Communications: From Ancient Times to the 21st Century , Christopher H. Sterling, ed. (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2008), 79–81. 10. Christopher Shay, “China’s Great (Quantum) Leap Forward,” Time , 9 September 2010, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2016687,00.html [16] .
11. Brendon Koener, “Inside the New Arms Race to Control Bandwidth on the Battlefield,” Wired , 18 February 2014, www.wired.com/2014/02/spectrum-warfare/ [17] . 12. Ariel Cohen, “A U.S. Response to Russia’s Military Modernization,” Heritage Foundation, 29 May 2014, www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/05/a-us-response-to-russias-milit... [18] . 13. http://deadline.com/2014/12/sony-hack-timeline-any-pascal-the-interview-... [19] . Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013), www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf [20] . Daniel Gonzales, Rand Blog, 17 December 2014, www.rand.org/blog/2014/12/preventing-cyberattacks-sharing-information-a... [21] . 14. ADM Vern Clark, USN, “Sea Power 21,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , vol. 128, no. 10 (October 2002), 32–41. 15. Adapted from “Maritime Cryptology at the Crossroads,” Center for International Maritime Security, http://cimsec.org/maritime-cryptology-crossroads/12013 [22] . 16. U.S. Navy Program Guide 2014 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2014), www.navy.mil/navydata/policy/seapower/npg14/top-npg14.pdf [23] . 17. Adapted from “Developing a Strategic Cadre in the Information Dominance Corps,” Center for International Maritime Security, http://cimsec.org/developing-strategic-cadre-informationdominance-corps... [14] . Lieutenant Bebber is an information-warfare officer assigned to the staff of Commander, U.S. Cyber Command. He holds a PhD in public policy from the University of Central Florida.
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