Decision-making dynamics in the European ...

Journal of European Public Policy 15:8 December 2008: 1145–1163

Decision-making dynamics in the European Commission: partisan, national or sectoral?

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Arndt Wonka

ABSTRACT Its monopoly power to formulate policy proposals and set the European Union’s (EU’s) legislative agenda guarantees the European Commission considerable prominence in EU legislative studies. It is commonly conceptualized as a unitary actor, acting cohesively – often in its own supranational interest – in EU decision-making. Recent theoretical developments and empirical studies, however, cast doubt on this conceptualization. This paper takes up these matters and investigates the decision-making mechanisms and dynamics of the Commission’s executive politics. Two case studies show that the formal division of power along portfolios puts formally responsible Commissioners in a privileged position to influence the content of legislative proposals in internal decision-making. This influence, however, is circumscribed by the opposition of other Commissioners. At least in the cases studied here, Commissioners’ position-taking and conflict in internal decision-making follow a national and, to some extent, a sectoral rather than a partisan pattern. KEY WORDS Commissioner; European Commission; internal decision-making; legislative politics.

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INTRODUCTION1

Two conceptualizations of the Commission’s behaviour in European Union (EU) legislative politics dominate the literature. The first portrays the Commission as a non-majoritarian institution without politics and primarily concerned about efficient policy solutions (Moravcsik 1998: 67 –77; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002; Majone 2001). Commission legislative behaviour, therefore, is said to aim at some ‘optimal long-run policy’ (Majone 2001: 112). The second perspective, dominating EU policy-making and legislative decisionmaking studies, conceptualizes the Commission as a bureaucratic actor aiming at expanding its influence by pushing the expansion of the EU’s legislative scope. These aims, the argument runs, are at odds with member state governments (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997; Cram 1997: 154 –8; Pollack 2003: 36; Ho¨rl et al. 2005: 594, 598–9; Thomson et al. 2006). Building on these earlier studies, recent contributions deal explicitly with factors driving the European Commission’s behaviour in EU legislative politics (Ross 1995; Journal of European Public Policy ISSN 1350-1763 print; 1466-4429 online # 2008 Taylor & Francis http://www.informaworld.com/journals DOI: 10.1080/13501760802407656


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Thomson 2008; Wonka 2007; Egeberg 2006; Hug 2003; Crombez 1997; Do¨ring 2007). It is to this burgeoning literature that this article contributes. It does so by discussing legislative decision-making in the European Commission along four analytical scenarios. The analytical focus is on Commissioners and the motives driving their actions.2 This analytical focus constitutes a departure from a large part of the literature on the European Commission which focuses on the Commission’s administrative staff. That literature analyzes how national, partisan and organizational factors shape the attitudes of Commission administrators (Hooghe 2001) and behaviour on the Commission’s administrative level (cf. Michelmann 1978; Egeberg 1996; Christiansen 1997). While national and partisan factors are shown to be of prime importance in shaping Commission administrators’ attitudes (Hooghe 2005: 887 –8), their influence on administrators’ interaction patterns is mixed (cf. Michelmann 1978: 492– 4; cf. Egeberg 1996: 730 –1). From a rationalist neo-institutional perspective (Hall and Taylor 1996) the latter finding is not surprising. Formal institutional rules rather than culturally motivated self-selection determine who interacts with whom in policy formulation. Likewise, studies in this tradition do not explicitly discuss how administrators’ attitudes and their interactions relate to the Commission’s behaviour in EU legislative decision-making. This article’s discussion of internal decision-making puts Commissioners centre stage. This analytical simplification comes with the assumption that they, rather than Commission administrators, shape the Commission’s legislative behaviour. There are good reasons for making this assumption: Commissioners are political heads of the Directorates General (DGs) and formally take decisions in the College of Commissioners. Administrative staff therefore must win the active political support of a Commissioner for a proposal to successfully make it upwards through the Commission and into the EU’s legislative game (Spence 1997: 111– 17). Quite a number of systematic descriptions provide valuable information on the Commission’s internal institutional make-up and its decision-making rules (Nugent 2001; see the review by Tallberg 2007: 197). So far, however, Egeberg’s contribution is the only systematic discussion of decision-making dynamics inside the Commission (2006). I shall therefore discuss it in some detail below. 2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: FOUR SCENARIOS OF DECISION-MAKING DYNAMICS IN THE COMMISSION The factors that shape the Commission’s legislative behaviour can be analytically understood as two-dimensional: a horizontal dimension captures decision-making dynamics inside the Commission. These dynamics will be discussed below on the basis of four decision-making scenarios. A vertical dimension captures governments’ central role in the appointment of Commissioners and the political links established through appointment (Crombez 1997; Hug 2003; Do¨ring 2007; Wonka 2007). Since the Commission is a powerful


A. Wonka: Decision-making dynamics in the Commission

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actor in EU legislative decision-making, governments have an incentive to nominate individuals who share their policy preferences and whom they can trust to defend their political interests once appointed. Such an appointment strategy reduces the risk that Commission proposals will inflict political and material costs on governments and their constituencies. Empirical findings support this reasoning and demonstrate that governments employ their formal appointment powers to influence Commission behaviour in EU legislative politics (for discussion and empirics, see Wonka 2007): governments predominantly appoint Commissioners affiliated to a party represented in the appointing government. Appointees had also already proved themselves reliable in important political posts. National parties therefore play an important role in the political link between governments and Commissioners. Yet, how do these ‘vertical’ national partisan links between governments and Commissioners play out ‘horizontally’, i.e. regarding the dynamics of decisionmaking inside the Commission? I propose four decision-making scenarios to discuss this question: the ‘national party scenario’ (I), the ‘transnational party scenario’ (II), the ‘national agent scenario’ (III), and the ‘portfolio scenario’ (IV) (see Figure 1). Regarding their propositions about Commissioners’ behaviour, the ‘national agent scenario’ and the ‘portfolio scenario’ basically match the ‘portfolio role’ and ‘country role’ sketched by Egeberg (2006: 5– 6). While the ‘national agent scenario’ follows from the theoretical considerations on the vertical political link between governments and Commissioners, the ‘portfolio scenario’ represents the standard account in the literature (see below). Moreover, while Egeberg sketches a general ‘party role’, I distinguish between a ‘national’ and a ‘transnational party scenario’. They follow directly from the vertical party link between governments and Commissioners and tie in with the wider discussion on EU partisan politics (Marks and Wilson 2000; Hix et al. 2007). Finally, Egeberg conceives of institutions as a ‘normative (role) structure that imposes codified expectations as regards the decision behaviour of the various role incumbents’ (2006: 3). He therefore sees Commissioners primarily as proponents of their DG’s interests (2006: 5–6). In line with the rationalist version of neo-institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996), this paper analytically separates institutions from actors’ political motives. This analytical distinction allows us to conceptually differentiate between the factors considered relevant for the dynamics of decision-making and the setting in which these dynamics take place. The underlying theoretical reasoning for the four scenarios therefore differs significantly from Egeberg’s (2006). The respective mechanisms leading to different dynamics in the four scenarios are discussed along three analytical dimensions: the positions that Commissioners take, the rationale behind Commissioners’ position-taking and the resulting coalitions and conflicts, i.e. potentially observable dynamics in Commission decision-making (cf. Figure 1). The theoretical importance of national parties along the vertical dimension directly translates into the partisan dynamics of the two party scenarios.



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Figure 1. Four scenarios of decision-making in the European Commission

(I) National party scenario In the national party scenario Commissioners take their national parties’ positions in Commission decision-making. Commissioners may be induced to do so as national party leaders’ office distribution powers may threaten their career ambitions if they decide not to defend their national parties’ positions inside the Commission. The selective reappointment of Commissioners and



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their selective appointment to domestic political posts after they leave the Commission support this reasoning empirically (Wonka 2007: 183 –4). The national party leadership may have an incentive to mandate their Commissioners with a position for proposals relating to a party’s programmatic core concern and affecting its core constituencies. They can thus use Commission politics to score in domestic partisan politics. This may hold despite the relatively low salience of EU issues in election campaigns (Pennings 2006), because national parties may want to avoid public opposition from interest groups which are part of its core constituency. Finally, national parties and their Commissioners may want to introduce EU legislative proposals via the Commission in order to sidestep blockade by domestic opposition parties. If national party positions drive Commissioners’ actions, coalitions as well as conflicts in internal decision-making should change according to national party interests on a given subject. If Commissioners co-operate on a proposal, it is a result of the joint interests of their national parties rather than a result of transnational party family alliances. (II) Transnational party scenario In the transnational party scenario, Commissioners whose national parties belong to the same party family agree on a transnational party position and align along transnational partisan lines in internal decision-making. Commissioners may have an incentive to build stable coalitions to reap the policy benefits from such long-term co-operation. The ideological cohesiveness of national parties from the same party family (cf. Marks and Wilson 2000) may facilitate the alignment of Commissioners along partisan lines. At the same time, stable transnational party coalitions may force individual national parties to compromise their position in order to maintain stable transnational party alignment. To reap policy benefits more effectively, transnational party activities may even extend across EU institutions and include Members of the European Parliament (MEPs).3 If the transnational party scenario is a valid model of decision-making in the Commission, we should observe neither open conflict among Commissioners from the same party family nor coalitions changing within or between proposals and forming across party family lines. Rather, transnational party coalitions among Commissioners should most likely form in proposals that pit capital against workers’ interests and are thus of high salience to party families’ respective constituencies. (III) National agent scenario The national agent scenario postulates that Commissioners’ positions in Commission decision-making are in line with the preferences of broad domestic coalitions. These are made up of a member state’s governing and opposition parties and domestic interest groups which try to fend off legislative interventions which negatively affect their country’s economic competitive position


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vis-a`-vis other member states and third countries (Moravcsik 1993: 483 –96; He´ritier et al. 1996; Ho¨rl et al. 2005: 596 –7). For decisions with economic implications, such broad domestic coalitions may be politically opportune as leftist parties’ attempts to protect the interests of unions and their members may converge with those of conservative parties regarding employers’ interests. In addition, government and opposition parties may have strategic incentives to agree on a common position to increase their bargaining weight at the EU level (Putnam 1988). The fact that large member states – almost without exception – nominated a ‘grand coalition team’, i.e. one Commissioner from a governing party and one Commissioner from an opposition party (Wonka 2007: 179 –80), can be interpreted as an indication of national parties’ political effort to facilitate broad ‘national’ coalitions as stipulated in this scenario. Decision-making along these lines results in intergovernmental dynamics with Commissioners forming proposal-specific coalitions depending on domestic politico-economic interests in their member states. National parties are important in this scenario as they forge political bonds between governments and Commissioners. Yet, unlike in the national party scenario, Commissioners and their national parties in this scenario are part of a broad domestic coalition. They do not use Commission politics to score in domestic partisan politics.

(IV) Portfolio scenario The portfolio scenario sees Commissioners as advocates of their DG’s interests. Commissioners may decide to act that way because their success ‘is measured against their achievements as department heads’ or because of personal ambition to increase the competences of their portfolio (cf. for ministers Bergman et al. 2003: 179). These effects may be amplified by Commissioners’ identification with their field of responsibility (Egeberg 2006: 5) and the establishment of ‘policy networks’ between a DG and other private and public actors operating in the respective sector (Hooghe 2001: 26– 7). Note, however, that Commissioners in this scenario possibly need to defend their DG’s interests on a particular proposal vis-a`-vis their colleagues. DG administrative staff thus need to seek their Commissioner’s active support for any proposal. This renders ‘bureaucratic government’ (Laver and Shepsle 1994: 5 –6), in which the Commissioner is no more than a puppet on administrators’ strings, an unrealistic option. Conflicts between Commissioners in this scenario run along sectoral lines. They can occur for proposals which affect the portfolios of a number of Commissioners – and on which their interests diverge. Following from the above, the vertical party bonds between Commissioners and their governments and the horizontal partisan bonds between Commissioners do not affect the quality of politics inside the Commission in the portfolio scenario. The standard account in the literature of a Commission striving for ‘more Europe’ and opposing national governments’ interests is based on this scenario (Cram 1997: 154 –7; Pollack 2003; Ho¨rl et al. 2005).



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Note that decision-making in the Commission in this article is not expected to always be conflictual. For a substantial number of proposals Commissioners’ positions may not diverge. This seems to be the case in most legislative proposals formulated during the term of the Prodi Commission (1999 – 2004): Only 230 of 1,324 legislative proposals (17.4 per cent) made it to the College of Commissioners to be adopted through the oral procedure (Wonka 2008: 150, 138).4 Egeberg is thus mistaken in concluding ‘that the role most frequently evoked in the College is the “portfolio role”’ and that ‘Commissioners tend to champion the interests that are inherently linked to their respective briefs [portfolios]’ (Egeberg 2006: 11; my emphasis). Rather, the frequency that he reports, based on six interviews, most likely reflects the lion’s share of conflict-free proposals. In these cases Commissioners dutifully and routinely contribute to the Commission’s division of labour, which is institutionally divided between the different DGs. Non-conflictual cases, however, cannot tell us anything about the internal dynamics of decision-making. Only in those cases where Commissioners do have diverging positions leading to internal conflict is it possible to identify the factors driving these conflicts. Note that, in some situations, the mechanisms outlined in the scenarios may lead to observationally equivalent dynamics, thus preventing a clear-cut empirical assessment of the scenarios’ relative analytical leverage: across member states, national parties from the same party families may take the same positions. The resulting dynamics would then simultaneously fit those described in the national and the transnational party scenarios. Moreover, a Commissioner may take a position promoting his DG’s sectoral interests but at the same time corresponding to his party’s position or to the position taken by a broad domestic coalition in his country. In such a case, discrimination between the national party, the national agent and the portfolio scenarios is hardly possible. Whether these analytical ambiguities in the form of observational equivalence will materialize can only be established empirically. 3.

EMPIRICAL CASE STUDIES

The two cases studied below are legislative proposals formulated and adopted by the (Prodi) Commission between 1999 and 2004. Holding constant the individuals serving during the formulation and adoption of cases reduces the likelihood that possible differences in decision-making dynamics between the two will be caused by any idiosyncratic characteristics of individual Commissioners. The cases to be discussed are REACH (COM 2003(644-1)), which (re-)regulated EU chemicals legislation, and the Takeover Directive (COM 2002(534)), which laid down measures that firms and their owners may employ to fend off takeovers. Both proposals made it to the College of Commissioners and were adopted by oral procedure, indicating that their formulation and adoption caused conflicts during formulation and adoption in the Commission. Yet, the cases were not selected with any advance knowledge of a specific conflict pattern in internal decision-making. The selection of two proposals


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dealing with socioeconomic left –right issues makes them the most likely candidates for either of the two party scenarios. Thus, if partisan dynamics cannot be observed here, they will be unlikely to shed light on political dynamics inside the Commission. A good way of analysing internal Commission decision-making would be to acquire information on the positions taken by all Commissioners. Since protocols of internal debates and the (few) votes5 which Commissioners take are not publicly available, however, this option, which is standard practice for the European Parliament (EP) and Council, is precluded. Moreover, the usefulness of personal interviews is restricted by the relative need for secrecy and discretion by Commission officials when it comes to reporting internal position-taking and conflicts over policy decisions. This may explain why most studies focus on the general attitudes of Commission employees (cf. Hooghe 2001) or offer an assessment of Commissioners’ ‘frequent’ behaviour (cf. Egeberg 2006) rather than report on their behaviour in particular decisions. This secrecy and the non-availability of protocols and voting records may further explain why, unlike for the EP and Council, there is so little empirical information on decision-making dynamics in the Commission (for an exception, see Ross 1995). Yet information on conflict inside the Commission does leak out and is reported in the media. Newspaper articles were therefore used as empirical sources on position-taking and conflicts on the policy decisions analysed in this paper. Drawing on the British Financial Times (FT) and the German Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) helped to avoid national biases in the reports. The reliability of the information on actors’ positions taken from media reports is reinforced by drawing on official documents and official policy statements as the second main source for the relevant information. Reach The Commission’s proposal ‘concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency and amending Directive 1999/45/EC’ (Commission 2003) aimed at simplifying chemicals regulation in the EU by replacing 40 existing EU laws (Commission 2001: 5 –6; 2003). A second major ambition of REACH is to increase the level of protection for both consumers and the environment by stepping up control requirements for chemical substances before they enter the market. The political impetus for the reformulation of EU chemicals legislation did not come from an entrepreneurial environment Commissioner but from member state governments. In April 1998, at their informal Environment Council in Chester, environment ministers asked the Commission to develop ideas on a new chemicals policy. The Commission consequently issued a working document (Commission 1998), and staged a brainstorming session on EU chemicals legislation with 150 individuals representing private actors as well as representatives from member states (Council 1999). It also presented the White Paper ‘Strategy for a



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Future Chemicals Policy’ which outlined details of the planned regulation (Commission 2001). The Commission’s working papers were duly noted by member states and positively commented on by the (Environment) Council (Council 1998, 1999). The publication of the White Paper, however, triggered a huge lobbying campaign by environmental groups, on the one hand, and industry groups and unions, on the other (Wonka, in preparation). Consumer groups took an intermediate position (Lindgren and Persson 2008). Moreover, there was strong opposition from the governments of the UK, France and Germany – countries which are home to large chemical industries (Wonka, in preparation) – while the Scandinavian countries generally welcomed the new chemicals regulation (Nordic Council 2004). Not only did the governments of the former countries work together with the relevant industry associations and unions to come up with public position statements against REACH (Bundesregierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2002; UK Government 2002; Chemical Industry Association 2002), their heads of government – Blair (Labour), Chirac (Union for a Popular Movement) and Schro¨der (Social Democratic Party (SPD)) – wrote a common position paper to the then Commission President, Romano Prodi, asking for the proposal to be watered down. Specifically, they wanted the Commission to: ensure that the [REACH] proposals do not disadvantage legitimate EU business interests in the global market by imposing requirements which are not pertinent to protecting health and environment. (Tony Blair et al. 2003) To deal with this political opposition, the Commission staged two more stakeholder conferences with industry, the unions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as member state representatives, and carried out a large-scale internet consultation before submitting its proposal to the EP and the Council. On 29 October 2003 the Commissioners adopted the REACH proposal. On 18 December 2006 the decision-making process ended with the EP and the Council signing the regulation. The Commission’s extensive consultation with private and public actors makes it highly unlikely that executive dynamics in this case were affected by information asymmetries between responsible Commissioners, their fellow Commissioners and/or member state governments. Commissioners were sufficiently informed to be able to interfere. How then did the huge political controversy around REACH play out in Commission decision-making on REACH? The responsibility for both the formulation of the White Paper and the legislative proposal was shared by Swedish Environment Commissioner Wallstro¨m and Finnish Enterprise Commissioner Liikanen. Both were members of their country’s Social Democratic Parties. According to the national party scenario, we would expect Commissioners to represent their party’s position and use REACH to sharpen their national party’s profile vis-a`-vis national opposition


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parties. The transnational party scenario, on the other hand, predicts a close political alliance between the Social Democratic Commissioners responsible for drafting the proposal and political opposition from Christian Democratic and Conservative Commissioners. According to the national agent scenario, we would expect the Commissioners of those countries which most actively opposed REACH, i.e. the German, British and French Commissioners, to fight for their country’s interests in internal Commission decision-making without party politics playing a role. Finally, according to the portfolio scenario, executive politics inside the Commission should be marked by a struggle between Wallstro¨m and Liikanen, not least because their respective constituencies (environmental and consumer groups/industry groups and unions) mobilized heavily to influence the content of REACH. During the formulation of the legislative proposal the two Commissioners responsible for drafting it took opposing positions. While Wallstro¨m fought for comprehensive high-level standards as regards the protection of the environment as well as consumers, Liikanen took the industry position, mainly arguing for a watering-down of the proposal and moderate standards to safeguard the European chemical industry’s competitiveness vis-a`-vis its business rivals from the US and Japan. Pascal Lamy, the French Trade Commissioner, sided with Liikanen in internal decision-making, asking for a watering-down of the proposal with an eye to the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and transatlantic trade relations (FT London 2003c). Thus, conflicts inside the Commission took on a sectoral character and the pattern closely matches the dynamics outlined in the portfolio scenario. At the same time, however, ‘Mrs Wallstro¨m’s high-profile campaign to crack down on dangerous chemicals, for example, is heavily informed by the Swedish government’s line on the issue’ (FT London 2002). Moreover, Lamy’s critical position on REACH coincides with the argument that French President Chirac raised vis-a`-vis Commission President Prodi in the common position paper with Blair and Schro¨der. Lamy’s and Wallstro¨m’s behaviour is thus at the same time in line with the national agent scenario. This observational equivalence renders it impossible to attribute analytical superiority to the national agent scenario or the portfolio scenario in accounting for the dynamics during the formulation of REACH inside the Commission. The national agent scenario would further lead us to expect interventions from at least the German and British Commissioners. There are, however, no reports of such interventions by other Commissioners which could be interpreted as evidence against the explanatory power of the national agent scenario on REACH. However, Commissioners may have refrained from intervening because they could rally behind either Wallstro¨m or Liikanen, who had to agree on a position. Given the different positions taken by the competent Commissioners and their need to find a compromise proposal, other Commissioners may have considered their chances of demanding further changes as slim, and settled with taking sides with one of the competent Commissioners. Matters changed, however, with the new Barroso Commission. After Verheugen was appointed to the Enterprise and Industry portfolio he ‘inherited’



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co-responsibility for REACH. Before officially taking office, he stated that ‘he was ready to make adjustments in the draft legislation to ensure that companies, especially smaller ones, “do not collapse under the weight of REACH”’ (FT London 2004) – a position which is in line with the position of the German Chancellor. Two points follow from this: first, portfolio assignment is of fundamental importance for internal Commission politics, since it provides the Commissioner holding the respective portfolio with a formal say and the legitimacy to take the political lead on matters falling into his or her field of responsibility. Second, positions vary with Commissioners, showing that there are no structurally determined ‘institutional roles’ that Commissioners acquire on taking office in a specific portfolio. Moreover, the conflict between Social Democrats Wallstro¨m and Liikanen and the opposition to their proposal by German Social Democrat Verheugen show that horizontal party family bonds between Commissioners were not strong enough to allow agreement on a common position and prevent public disputes. Thus, the transnational party scenario provides no analytical leverage to shed light on the politics around REACH in the Commission. Finally, in Germany REACH led to domestic partisan conflict between Environment Minister Trittin (Greens), who published an open letter with Swedish Environment Minister Sommestad, demanding strict environmental and consumer protectionist standards in REACH (Frankfurter Rundschau 2004), and Chancellor Schro¨der (SPD). However, there are no reports of German Commissioner Schreyer (Greens) following Trittin’s line and thus extending national party politics into the Commission as depicted in the national party scenario. Takeover Directive Before the European Commissioners adopted the Takeover Directive (Commission 2002) on 2 October 2002, the decision was preceded by intense political controversies: already in 1996 the Santer Commission had submitted a directive ‘on company law concerning takeover bids’ (Commission 1995). After more than five years of intensive political struggles, the successful conciliation committee compromise negotiated by Council and EP representatives failed in the EP in June 2001. The vote was split with 273 Parliamentarians voting in favour and 273 against the directive. The failure in the EP was mainly because of heavy lobbying by the German government under Chancellor Schro¨der: 95 German MEPs voted against the directive and only one MEP voted in favour (Hix et al. 2007). After this defeat, Dutch Internal Market Commissioner Bolkestein was responsible for redrafting a proposal which was submitted to the Council and the EP in October 2002. At this point, the conflicting interests of all actors participating in the decision-making process were common knowledge. With respect to both the national party scenario and the national agent scenario, knowledge about other actors’ positions allowed national parties and governments to mandate their Commissioner to take their positions in the Commission. Thus, after


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their successful intervention in the final EP decision on the earlier version of the Takeover Directive, German parties and the German government could, according to these scenarios, be expected to intervene in the formulation of the directive through their Commissioners. Moreover, it allowed Commissioners sharing the same party affiliation to organize a common position and act accordingly in the internal formulation of the proposal – as stipulated by the transnational party scenario. Thus, Social Democratic Commissioners could have lined up to prevent an EU-wide liberalization of takeover regulation by their liberal Dutch internal market colleague Bolkestein. To meet earlier criticism, Bolkestein formed the so-called ‘Winter Group’, an expert group headed by the Dutch lawyer Jaap Winter. Their task was to come up with suggestions for an effective EU takeover law. Bolkestein did include some of the Winter Group’s suggestions in his proposal, yet still allowed exceptions such as ‘multiple voting rights’ and ‘golden shares’ which are important defensive measures, especially in France and the Scandinavian member states (Callaghan and Ho¨pner 2005: 310– 11). They allow public shareholders to block takeovers without holding majority ownership in the respective company. As a consequence, the German government under Schro¨der renewed its attacks on the Commission and on Bolkestein in particular, demanding the creation of a truly level playing field for takeover bids in the EU (Callaghan and Ho¨pner 2005: 310 –11). It saw its industry disadvantaged by the Bolkestein proposal, since defensive measures allowed by German company law would have been prohibited, while defensive measures applied in southern and northern European member states were to remain unaffected. In the run-up to the decision, German Commissioners Schreyer (Greens) and Verheugen (SPD) brought up their government’s concern in the Commission and tried to change the content of Bolkestein’s proposal (FAZ 2002: 13). On 2 October 2002, Verheugen and Schreyer, as well as the French Trade Commissioner Lamy, voted against Bolkestein’s proposed text in the College of Commissioners (EurActiv 2002). Yet, the proposal was adopted with minor changes which did not meet the German Commissioners’ criticism. The national party scenario does not provide analytical leverage to understanding the decision-making dynamics in this case since in Germany, the only country publicly opposing Bolkestein’s plans, parties were united in their opposition. The same is true for the portfolio scenario: at least for Schreyer and Verheugen, who held the Budget and the Enlargement portfolios, it is not plausible to argue that their interventions were driven by their portfolios’ interests. Moreover, the transnational party scenario can hardly account for the observed conflict pattern. If the transnational party scenario were a correct description, we would have observed the 11 Social Democratic Commissioners building an absolute majority in the Commission by that time, siding with Verheugen, Schreyer and Lamy in opposing the plan by their liberal adversary Bolkestein. Instead, the dynamics of internal decision-making on the takeover proposal closely match the national agent scenario. The political constellation in the Commission matched the situation in the Council, with German



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Commissioners being isolated in their opposition to Bolkestein’s proposal and lacking (absolute) majority support to force Bolkestein to make changes to his proposal. With respect to Bolkestein’s behaviour in this case, it would perhaps overstretch the argument to maintain that he acted as his country’s agent, not least because the original proposal was initiated by the Commission quite some time before he was appointed as Commissioner. His very active political support for the proposal is in line with the portfolio scenario. However, at the same time, Bolkestein’s position on the Takeover Directive is in line with the position of the Dutch government, since ‘[t]he Dutch government has always taken a non-protectionist stance when it comes to foreign control of Dutch listed companies. There are, in contrast to many other countries, virtually no restrictions based on public or national interest’ (International Financial Law Review 2004). Thus, Bolkestein’s possible ‘portfolio’ interests did not collide with possible ‘national’ interests. With respect to the political dynamics inside the Commission in the Takeover Directive, it is interesting to analyse the changes applied after the EP’s Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market proposed amendments to Bolkestein’s proposal. These changes provide further evidence in favour of the national agent scenario. The amendments proposed by the German MEP and rapporteur Klaus Lehne (Christian Democratic Union; CDU) aimed at creating a level playing field for company takeovers in the EU by rendering illegal defensive measures provided by company law in any member state (European Parliament 2003: 23). This is especially true for provisions effective in northern and southern member states, i.e. multiple voting securities and golden shares. These provisions, most likely to secure these countries’ votes in the Council were not touched on by Bolkestein’s proposal. Consequently, the EP’s amendments were opposed by governments of the southern and northern member states (Callaghan and Ho¨pner 2005: 310–11; FT London 2003a: 1). In the ‘common position’ adopted by the Council, governments accepted large parts of the EP’s amendments – but added one crucial paragraph that made the EP’s amendment on multiple voting rights ineffective, since member states could maintain their respective status quo in takeover regulation that provides companies with different legal means to fend off hostile takeovers. With Spain abstaining, the Council unanimously adopted its amended text. The approval of the EP finally led to the successful conclusion of the legislative procedure on takeover bids in the EU in April 2004. After the Council and the EP adopted the text, Bolkestein declared that he could not accept the Takeover Directive as adopted by the Council (Council 2003) since he considered it an ineffective instrument to liberalize takeover law in the EU (FAZ 2003: 12). He therefore wanted to withdraw the proposal. Yet in the meeting of the College of Commissioners in which his initiative was dealt with, Bolkestein lost the vote to withdraw the proposal (FAZ 2004: 11; FT London 2003b: 20). Bolkestein’s defeat is remarkable as it points to a decisive coalition shift among Commissioners during the two years that had passed from the adoption of the proposal in the Commission to the vote on its withdrawal: at

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the beginning, the two German Commissioners were isolated and unable to organize sufficient support against Bolkestein that would have allowed changes to the text of the proposal. At the end of this period Bolkestein himself failed to organize the support of a sufficient number of Commissioners that would have allowed him to withdraw the proposal. Again, this pattern reflects the political constellation in the Council and as described in the national agents scenario – but to the disadvantage of the Commissioner responsible for drafting the original proposal.6


4.

CONCLUSION

To understand the internal decision-making dynamics of the Commission, the national agent scenario and, to some extent, the portfolio scenario provide most analytical leverage. Based on the case studies above, the observation that Commissioners formally responsible for drafting a proposal act as agenda-setter(s) in internal decision-making supports the portfolio scenario. When drafting a proposal they may – but need not – take into account possible objections by colleagues.7 At the same time, the ‘shadow of a vote’, i.e. the threat to take a proposal to the College of Commissioners, allows other Commissioners to effectively restrict the political leeway of formally responsible Commissioners. Thus, Bolkestein did take into account his colleagues’ preferences to win absolute majority support when formulating the Takeover Directive. Moreover, the intervention by the German Commissioners in the Takeover Directive illustrates that Commissioners did not restrict their political activities to proposals which were within their area of responsibility or which affected their portfolio’s sectoral interests. Instead, their actions represented the interests of German industry and the consensus position among German political parties. This, together with the fact that responsible Commissioners’ political discretion to bring a proposal in line with the interests of their country’s party political e´lites and economic constituencies, limit the analytical purchase of the portfolio scenario, which posits that Commissioners restrict their political actions to furthering their DG’s sectoral interests, and instead support the national agent scenario. Consequently, the institutional environment in which a Commissioner is ‘embedded’, his DG, does not provide ‘roles’ or ‘norms’ sufficient to determine the way in which Commissioners exercise their portfolio competencies. Verheugen’s actions after ‘inheriting’ the REACH proposal from his predecessor Liikanen attest to this. Partisan politics, as illustrated in the national party scenario, did not play a role in the cases studied here. Moreover, conflicts in the cases analysed above cut across party (family) lines. In the case of the Takeover Directive, coalitions even changed during the passage of one single legislative proposal. Thus, the transnational party ties driving the transnational party scenario also do not provide analytical leverage in explaining the dynamics of the two decisions studied in this paper. Given that the cases deal with socioeconomic left –right issues, they constitute ‘most likely’ candidates for partisan



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politics. It therefore seems unlikely that partisan political dynamics play an important role in Commission decision-making. The empirical findings of this paper support the literature which questions the dominant conceptualization of the Commission in the legislative politics literature. Conventionally, and in line with the neo-functionalist integration literature, the Commission is presented as a cohesive unitary actor driven by a ‘supranational’ self-interest for further integration to increase its own competences. Rather, the national dynamics identified in the cases studied correspond to recent findings by Thomson (2008), who analysed the position of the Commission on 70 legislative proposals and found ‘that Commissioners’ country affiliations are an important guide to their behavior. This contrasts with the view of Commissioners as being insulated from national pressures’ (Thomson 2008: 188; see also Ross 1995: 58). Unfortunately, however, the Decision-making in the European Union (DEU) data used by Thomson (Thomson et al. 2006) does not allow taking internal decision-making dynamics into account. In addition, this study supports Egeberg’s (2006: 11) conclusion that Commissioners’ behaviour is driven by multiple factors, among which their formal responsibility and their nationality range prominently. Yet, as noted above, there is no support for Egeberg’s central finding that ‘Commissioners tend to champion the interests that are inherently linked to their respective briefs’ (2006: 11). Instead, how formally responsible Commissioners position themselves in internal Commission decision-making is itself a product of their national political ties and the intra- and inter-institutional political situation that they face rather than ‘role structures’ institutionally codified by DGs. We need more research to consolidate our knowledge of decision-making dynamics in the Commission and its effects on Commission behaviour in EU politics. Qualitative case studies are useful in improving analytical conceptualizations of internal decision-making dynamics to help us understand Commission behaviour in EU legislative politics. Thus, they can help in developing an analytical perspective on the Commission, taking into account both Commissioners and administrators, thereby closing this rather inhibiting gap in the existing literature. Case studies are also useful in further testing different decision-making mechanisms. In addition, we need quantitative studies to draw robust and generalizable inferences about the dynamics of internal decision-making. A promising methodology is illustrated by the DEU project (Thomson et al. 2006), which constitutes the most comprehensive effort so far to empirically investigate the dynamics of EU legislative decision-making. Researchers here relied on political experts to locate the positions that actors took in a considerable number of legislative issues. Problems such as Commission officials’ secrecy in reporting on internal conflicts may be overcome by asking interest group representatives involved in the decisions on Commissioners’ positions. To avoid bias and increase the reliability of results, a diverse set of interest groups should be asked for their assessment, and recent advances in computerized content analysis of newspaper articles to provide additional information on Commissioners’ behaviour should be

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made available. Since such a quantitative strategy is resource-intensive, collective research efforts and a collaborative research project is called for. Biographical note: Arndt Wonka is a post-doctoral researcher at the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences (BIGSSS) and affiliated as co-project leader to the Mannheim Centre for European Studies (MZES), Germany. Address for correspondence: Arndt Wonka, Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences (BIGSSS), PO Box 33 04 40, 28334, Bremen, Germany. email: [email protected]


NOTES 1 I would like to thank the reviewers, Simon Hix, Bjo¨rn Lindberg, Peter Mair, Bernhard Miller, Anne Rasmussen and Andreas Warntjen, for their excellent comments which helped to improve the paper. 2 Although an interesting topic in itself, this article does not address the Commission’s role and behaviour in the implementation of EU legislation (see, e.g., Franchino 2007). 3 Centre-right MEPs (European People’s Party) are reported to selectively meet the centre-right Commissioner responsible for drafting a particular proposal; all ‘left’ Commissioners, on the other hand, have monthly meetings with Socialist MEPs and representatives from their European Party Federation (Party of European Socialists; PES) to discuss specific proposals and general ideas on possible political initiatives. Information was obtained through email (European People’s Party – European Democrats) (17 and 18 December 2008) and telephone interview (PES) (19 December 2008) with the individuals co-ordinating legislative actions with the Commission for the EPP-ED and PES. 4 The application of the oral procedure is an indicator for internal conflict: ‘Where differences of opinion remain at the end of interservice consultation, the only way to obtain Commission approval of the document is by oral procedure’ (European Commission 2004: 10). 5 In an personal interview, a Commission employee of Unit SG/A/1 (Registry, Oral Procedures; preparation of Commission meetings) estimated that during the five year term of the Prodi Commission, Commissioners took around ten votes (Brussels, 28 September 2004). 6 While Hix et al. (2007: 204) refer to inter-institutional considerations to explain Bolkestein’s reluctance, my interpretation of the observed pattern is more in line with the report that ‘his [Bolkesteins] own officials backed a deal he denounced and the other 19 Commissioners did not agree that it was worth withdrawing the legislation and starting again from scratch’ (FT 2003a: 20), indicating that there was no cohesive ‘institutional’ reasoning. 7 According to the Commission’s Rules of Procedure, however, the Commission President can propose amendments (Art. 8).

REFERENCES Bergman, T., Mu¨ller, W.C., Strøm, K. and Blomgren, M. (2003) ‘Democratic delegation and accountability: cross-national patterns’, in K. Strøm, W.C. Mu¨ller



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and T. Bergman (eds), Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Callaghan, H. and Ho¨pner, M. (2005) ‘European integration and the clash of capitalisms: political cleavages over takeover liberalization’, Comparative European Politics 3: 307–32. Christiansen, T. (1997) ‘Tensions of European governance: politicized bureaucracy and multiple accountability in the European Commission’, Journal of European Public Policy 4(1): 73–90. Cram, L. (1997) Policy-making in the European Union, London: Routledge. Crombez, C. (1997) ‘Policy making and Commission appointment in the European Union’, Außenwirtschaft 52: 63–82. Do¨ring, H. (2007) ‘The composition of the College of Commissioners: patterns of delegation’, European Union Politics 8: 209–30. Egeberg, M. (1996) ‘Organization and nationality in the European Commission services’, Public Administration 74: 721–35. Egeberg, M. (2006) ‘Executive politics as usual: role behaviour and conflict dimensions in the College of European Commissioners’, Journal of European Public Policy 13(1): 1–15. Franchino, F. (2007) The Powers of the Union: Delegation in the EU, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hall, P.A. and Taylor, R.C.R. (1996) ‘Political science and the three new institutionalisms’, Political Studies XLIV: 936–57. He´ritier, A., Knill, C. and Mingers, S. (1996) Ringing the Changes in Europe. Regulatory Competition and the Redefinition of the State, Berlin: De Gruyter. Hix, S., Noury, A. and Roland, G. (2007) Democratic Politics in the European Parliament, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hooghe, L. (2001) The European Commission and the Integration of Europe: Images of Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hooghe, L. (2005) ‘Several roads lead to international norms, but few via international socialization: a case study of the European Commission’, International Organization 59: 861–98. Ho¨rl, B., Warntjen, A. and Wonka, A. (2005) ‘Built on quicksand? A decade of procedural spatial models on EU legislative decision-making’, Journal of European Public Policy 12(3): 592–606. Hug, S. (2003) ‘Endogenous preferences and delegation in the European Union’, Comparative Political Studies 36: 41–74. Laver, M. and Shepsle, K.A. (eds) (1994) Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lindgren, K.-O. and Persson, T. (2008) ‘The structure of conflict over EU chemicals policy’, European Union Politics 9: 31–58. Majone, G. (2001) ‘Two logics of delegation. Agency and fiduciary relations in EU governance’, European Union Politics 2: 103–22. Marks, G. and Wilson, C. (2000) ‘The past in the present: a cleavage theory of party response to European integration’, British Journal of Political Science 30: 433–59. Michelmann, H.J. (1978) ‘Multinational staffing and organizational functioning in the Commission of the European Communities’, International Organization 32: 477–96. Moravcsik, A. (1993) ‘Preferences and power in the European Community: a liberal intergovernmentalist approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies 31: 473–524. Moravcsik, A. (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Nugent, N. (2001) The European Commission, Basingstoke: Palgrave.


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Pennings, P. (2006) ‘An empirical analysis of the Europeanization of national party manifestos, 1960– 2003’, European Union Politics 7: 257–70. Pollack, M.A. (2003) The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Putnam, R.D. (1988) ‘Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games’, International Organization 42: 427–60. Ross, G. (1995) Jacques Delors and European Integration, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Spence, D. (1997) ‘Structure, functions and procedures in the Commission’, in G. Edwards and D. Spence (eds), The European Commission, London: Cartermill. Stone Sweet, A. and Sandholtz, W. (1997) ‘European integration and supranational governance’, Journal of European Public Policy 4(3): 297–317. Tallberg, J. (2007) ‘Executive politics’, in K.E. Jorgensen, M.A. Pollack and B. Rosamond (eds), Handbook of European Union Politics, London: Sage Publications. Thatcher, M. and Stone Sweet, A. (2002) ‘Theory and practice of delegation to nonmajoritarian institutions’, West European Politics 25: 1–22. Thomson, R. (2008) ‘National actors in international organizations. The case of the European Commission’, Comparative Political Studies 41: 169–92. Thomson, R., Stokman, F., Achen, C.H. and Ko¨nig, T. (eds) (2006) The European Union Decides, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wonka, A. (2007) ‘Technocratic and independent? The appointment of European Commissioners and its policy implications’, Journal of European Public Policy 14(2): 169–189. Wonka, A. (2008) Die Europa¨ische Kommission. Supranationale Bu¨rokratie oder Agent der Mitgliedstaaten? Baden-Baden: Nomos. Wonka, A. (in preparation) ‘Europeanized convergence? British and German business associations’ European lobbying strategies in the formulation of REACH’, in J.R. Grote, A. Lang and V. Schneider (eds), Organized Business Interests in Changing Environments. The Complexity of Adaptation, Basingstoke: Houndsmills, Palgrave Macmillan.

Non-academic sources (official documents, newspaper articles) Blair, T., Chirac, J., Schro¨der, G., Letter to European Commission President Romano Prodi, Berlin, 20 September 2003 Bundesregierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2002) Positionspapier mit VCI und IG Bergbau, Chemie, Energie, Berlin: Bundeskanzleram. Chemical Industry Association (2002) Guarded CIA Response to UK Government Position on EU Chemicals Policy, London: CIA. Council (1998). 2153rd Council meeting – Environment, Brussels, 20– 21 December, 1998, PRES/98/453. Council (1999) 2194. Sitzung des Rates – UMWELT – Luxembourg, den 24./25. Juni 1999, 9406/99 (Presse 203). Council (2003) 2556th Council meeting – Environment, Brussels, 22 December 2003, PRES/03/376. EurActiv (2002) Sharp German reactions to new takeover proposal. 2 October 2002; http://www.euractiv.com/en/competition/sharp-german-reactions-new-takeoverproposal/article-111911 (accessed 8 December 2007) European Commission (1995) Proposal for a 13th European Parliament and Council Directive on company law concerning takeover bids, Brussels: European Commission, (COM(1995)655).



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European Commission (1998) Commission Working Document – Report on the operation of Directive 67/548/EEC [. . .], Directive 88/379/EEC [. . .], Regulation (EEC) 793/93 [. . .], Directive 76/769/EEC [. . .], Brussels: European Commission, (SEC(1998)1986). European Commission (2001) White Paper: ‘Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy’, Brussels: European Commission, (COM(2001)88). European Commission (2002) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on takeover bids, Brussels: European Commission, (COM(2002)534). European Commission (2003) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency and amending Directive 1999/45/EC and Regulation (EC) [on Persistent Organic Pollutants], Brussels: European Commission, (COM(2003)644– 1. European Commission (2004) Manual of Operating Procedures of the Commission, Brussels: European Commission. European Parliament (2003) Report on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council directive on takeover bids (COM(2002) 534 – C5 – 0481/2002 – 2002/ 0240(COD)), Brussels: European Parliament, (FINAL A5– 0469/2003). Financial Times, London (2002) Europe’s green-fingered legislators: European Institutions Part VI: Environmental laws are refined by MEPs and member states, but lobbyists need to focus on the European Commission, 16 August, p. 11. Financial Times, and London (2003a) EU reaches takeover code compromise, 28 November, p. 1. Financial Times, and London (2003b) Watered-down EU takeover directive is a missed opportunity for open markets, 20 December, p. 20. Financial Times, and London (2003c) Proposals spark fierce controversy: European Chemical Regulations, 2. Financial Times, and London (2004) Chemical controls: the new Commission could be the catalyst for compromise, 4 October, p. 18. ¨ bernahmerecht entzweit Bru¨ssel und Berlin, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2002) U 30 September, p. 13. ¨ bernahmerichtlinie endgu¨ltig gebilligt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2003) U 23 December, p. 12. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2004) Ru¨ckzieher im Streit u¨ber das VW-Gesetz. EU-Kommission verschiebt das Verfahren auf unbestimmte Zeit, 28 January, p. 11. Frankfurter Rundschau (2004) Eine sichere Chemikalienpolitik fu¨r Europa; Die EU muss die Herstellung und Verwendung von Substanzen wirksam kontrollieren/ Von Ju¨rgen Trittin und Lena Sommestad, 26 June, p. 7. International Financial Law Review (2004) M&A: why Dutch targets can make for troublesome buying, February. Nordic Council (2004) REACH. A leap forward for industry. Nordic concerns and benefits. UK Government (2002) New EU Chemicals Strategy. Position Statement by the UK Government and the Devolved Administration, London: UK Governement.

JCMS 2008 Volume 46. Number 3. pp. 685–708

Bargaining Power in the European Council* JONAS TALLBERG Stockholm University

Abstract What grants influence in the European Council? Drawing on general theories of negotiation, this article isolates and illustrates three complementary sources of bargaining power in the European Council: state sources of power, institutional sources of power and individual sources of power. It reports the results of a unique series of elite interviews with European heads of state and government, foreign ministers and top-level civil servants. Elite testimonies suggest that the state dimension of power is the most fundamental, whereas the institutional and individual dimensions of power play a secondary role and mainly mediate the impact of structural power asymmetries.

Introduction The European Council constitutes the supreme political body in the European Union. Composed of the heads of government of the Member States and the * Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Tenth EUSA Biennial International Conference, Montreal, 17 to 19 May 2007, the Fourth ECPR General Conference, Pisa, 6 to 8 September 2007 and the Center for European Studies at Harvard University. The article draws on a more extensive report, presented to policy audiences at seminars arranged by the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, the Swedish Representation to the European Union and the European Institute in Washington DC. The research on which the article is based was funded by the Swedish Research Council. For insightful comments and suggestions, I wish to thank, in particular, Simon Bulmer, Magnus Jerneck, Pierpaolo Settembri, Maria Strömvik, Göran von Sydow and Helen Wallace, as well as the editors and anonymous reviewers of JCMS. © 2008 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

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president of the Commission, the European Council provides strategic guidelines for the development of the EU, serves as the ultimate decision-maker on issues too complex or contentious for the Council of Ministers to handle, shapes the EU’s collective foreign policy, co-ordinates Member State policy on socioeconomic issues, appoints senior officials of the EU institutions, initiates and concludes intergovernmental conferences that amend the treaties and effectively decides if and when the EU should welcome new members.1 Yet, despite its central political importance, the European Council has only been subject to limited research, most of which is dated, atheoretical and limited in empirical scope. Part of the explanation is the difficulties of conducting research on a political body that convenes behind closed doors, whose proceedings are undocumented and whose participants are unusually hard to gain access to. More specifically, existing research may be divided into three categories. The first consists of a set of monographs on the European Council, dating from the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s (Bulmer and Wessels, 1987; Donat, 1987; Werts, 1992; Taulègne, 1993; Johnston, 1994). The strength of these works is the description of the European Council’s early development and influence. Yet they make few attempts to draw on general theories in political science and they offer no guidance on developments beyond the early 1990s. The second category consists of individual chapters on the European Council in volumes on the Council of Ministers or the EU institutions generally (Westlake and Galloway, 2004; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006; Schoutheete, 2006). These chapters provide insightful and up-to-date overviews of the European Council, but cannot address the politically interesting aspects of this institution in any depth. The third category is composed of think-tank reports that either address the potential reform of the European Council (Grant, 2002; Schoutheete and Wallace, 2002), or provide accounts of individual meetings (Ludlow, 2002, 2004). These offer refreshing perspectives on the European Council and useful chronologies of negotiations, but do not qualify as theory-driven research. This article moves beyond existing research in three central respects. First, it explores the sources of bargaining power in the European Council, which so far have not been subject to systematic research. Second, it draws explicitly on general theories of negotiation in isolating, explicating and categorizing alternative sources of bargaining power. Third, it synthesizes and presents a unique set of elite testimonies on bargaining power in the European Council.

1

I use the terms ‘heads of government’ and ‘chief executives’ for purposes of simplification. The formally correct term is ‘heads of state and government.’

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Prevailing conceptions of bargaining power in the European Council tend to be either overly legalistic or prone to simplistic power distinctions. Formally speaking, all heads of government enjoy equal status in the European Council as a product of the principle of unanimity. However, even cursory knowledge of European affairs suggests that formal authority is one thing and influence over political outcomes another. Yet, when the legalistic perspective is surrendered for power-sensitive interpretations, these tend to present general claims about differences between large and small Member States, without specifying how differences in size matter and without recognizing alternative sources of bargaining power. As Andrew Moravcsik notes: ‘Intergovernmental explanations often speak of Germany, France, or Britain as “powerful” or “influential” in negotiations, but such claims are rarely demonstrated by specifying what resources convey “power” or which outcomes demonstrate that one country has been influential’ (1998, p. 53). The general argument of this article is that bargaining power in the European Council may be captured in three dimensions: state sources of power, institutional sources of power and individual sources of power. Bargaining power is defined as the capacity of the national executive to achieve a distributional outcome that as closely as possible reflects the preferences of the Member State he or she represents. The first dimension of bargaining power is the most fundamental. On most issues, differences between the Member States in structural power resources – economic strength, population size, military capabilities, political stability and administrative capacity – decisively shape bargaining outcomes. Yet differences in state sources of power do not provide the full picture. The dominance of Europe’s resourcerich states is mediated and sometimes even offset by the other two dimensions of bargaining power. Institutional features of the European Council – the access to the veto and the rotating Presidency – constitute additional sources of bargaining power, as do the personal qualities of the chief executives as negotiators – their personal authority and level of expertise. Coalitionbuilding, in this context, is conceived of as a strategy for pooling bargaining power, rather than an independent source of power. The article reports the results of a project specifically designed to overcome the data problems that have hampered previous research on the European Council. The core strategy is a unique series of elite interviews with acting or former presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers, as well as top-level officials of Member States and EU institutions.2 The list of interviewees includes, among others, nine heads of state or government, four ministers of foreign affairs, one president of the Commission and one 2

A complete list of interviewees is provided in the appendix.


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secretary general of the Council. The interviews were semi-structured and the interviewees appeared on record, but were granted anonymity where this was specifically requested. For purposes of minimizing potential methodological problems of elite interviewing, I have adopted a threefold strategy. First, interviewees have been selected to control for known political divides in EU politics, notably left–right, large–small, north–south and intergovernmentalist–federalist. Second, I have asked principled questions about experiences of bargaining power in the European Council, rather than questions about specific historical events, which are more prone to the problem of memory loss. Third, I have centred on general tendencies in the interview material, based on multiple interviews and I only draw on individual interviews when exemplifying general tendencies. I lay out the argument in three sections. The first section explains how bargaining power may be derived from a Member State’s aggregate structural power, as well as from its issue-specific power. In the second section, I specify how the institutional context of European Council negotiations generates additional sources of bargaining power. The third section specifies individual attributes that heads of government may profit from to varying degrees. The article ends with a conclusion that outlines the implications of this argument for research on EU politics and international bargaining generally. I. State Sources of Power Heads of government in the European Council represent a diverse set of Member States. How and to what extent do differences between Member States affect the bargaining power of their national executives? Drawing on the international relations (IR) literature on state power, I distinguish in this section between a Member State’s aggregate structural power and its issuespecific power, where the first refers to the overall capabilities of a state and the latter to its resources in a particular policy area. The testimonies from European Council participants suggest that both forms of state power loom large in summit bargaining. Despite the fact that co-operation in the EU is more institutionalized than in any other international organization and takes place between a relatively homogenous group of industrialized democracies, differences in state capabilities and resources are perceived to matter greatly. Aggregate Structural Power Aggregate structural power refers to a state’s total amount of resources and capabilities – its territory, population, economic strength, military © 2008 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd


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capabilities, technological development, political stability and administrative capacity. The notion that a state’s power is a reflection of its aggregate resources harks back to the age of great power conflict in Europe, but it also features in the modern analysis of world politics, where it constitutes a key component of realist theory (Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979). State capabilities, in this view, determine national power, which in turn determines the position of a state in relation to other states in the international system. The emphasis on aggregate resources signals the central assumption that capabilities can be added up, are measureable and in theory can be calculated into a national power score. When applied to the analysis of international negotiations, this perspective suggests that states of greater aggregate structural power will prevail, since they can use their superior resources to coax and cajole weaker parties into submission through threats and promises (Hampson with Hart, 1995, pp. 8–11; Hopmann, 1996, pp. 99–111; Drezner, 2007). The outcomes of international negotiations are likely to represent the interests of the most powerful states. The process of international negotiations is thus of limited importance, since outcomes in any case will reflect the distribution of structural power between states. Negotiation tactics and strategies only constitute a ‘transmission belt’, through which resources and capabilities are translated into instruments of power in interstate bargaining. European Council participants unanimously testify that differences in aggregate structural power matter significantly in this forum. Former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing speaks of how French and German dominance in the European Council during his time in office was only normal, since these two countries originally constituted the majority in every conceivable way – territory, population and GDP. Hubert Védrine, former French minister of foreign affairs, echoes this perspective: ‘What grants influence in the European Council is first and foremost the actual power of the country. A Member State’s actual power is decided by its economy, demography, geography, political system and diplomatic reach.’Yet also representatives of small states testify to the impact of structural power resources. As Jean-Claude Juncker, long-serving prime minister of Luxemburg, states: ‘Greater Member States have a greater say. We never admit it, of course, but one has to acknowledge that geography and demography are playing a role.’ JeanClaude Piris, director general of the Council’s Legal Service, is even more blunt: ‘The most important factor explaining bargaining power is state size – citizens and GDP.’ The notion of aggregate structural resources suggests that a state’s potential for influence will only be as large as the sum of its multiple capabilities. This helps to explain a frequently noted anomaly as regards the influence of © 2008 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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large Member States in European Council negotiations. Often mentioned is the inability of Italy to translate its potential power, grounded in structural resources, into political influence in the European Council. Despite a population and an economic strength at the level of France, Britain and Germany before unification, Italy is broadly seen as having suffered from the instability of its domestic political system. As one foreign minister states: ‘Italy has many of the general advantages – economy, demography, geography, founding state, etc. – but one important weakness in its political system: instability.’ Another long-term participant, representing a small Member State, offers a similar reflection, circumscribing the category of influential large states to France, Germany and Britain: ‘Today, Italy sometimes appears at the margin of a dossier. Italy is not one of the four great Member States. Spain is trying to replace Italy, but it is not successful and Poland will have to admit that it is not part of these great Member States, although being Poland.’ Yet how, exactly, do differences in aggregate structural power impact on European Council negotiations? In the age of great power rivalry, aggregate structural resources allowed the strong to back up negotiation demands with threats of military aggression or economic isolation. In Europe of today, gun-boat diplomacy is not an option and aggregate structural power affects negotiations in considerably more subtle ways. The interviews suggest that resources and capabilities rarely are actively deployed in the bargaining process. Rather, asymmetries in aggregate structural power matter indirectly, by affecting a state’s range of alternatives, the resources it can commit to an issue and the legitimacy of its claims to influence. A large home market makes a state more influential in economic negotiations, military capabilities enable a state to exercise leadership in the EU’s foreign and security policy and population size grants voice in an EU conceiving of itself as a democratic community. According to the interviewees, national executives representing structurally advantaged states are allowed greater latitude in the negotiations. Jean-Claude Juncker explains: ‘If you are representing a medium-sized country, you can never say “Denmark thinks . . .”. You can only say “I would submit to your considerations, if not . . .”. Those who are speaking for greater Member States, by opening their mouth and by referring to their national flag, they are immediately indicating that, behind their words, you have to accept size and demography. “La France pense que . . .” and “Deutschland denkt . . .” that is something different.’ Göran Persson, former prime minister of Sweden, points to a parallel dynamic: ‘If you are the prime minister of a country with five to ten million people, you simply cannot monopolize 20 per cent of the time devoted to the conclusions.’ Furthermore, differences in structural power are perceived to affect the legitimacy of wielding the veto. According to one prime minister, © 2008 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd


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it is a simple reality of politics that ‘Luxemburg can issue a veto once in a decade and Britain once per week.’ By the same token, the veto of large Member States is perceived to carry more weight than that of the small or medium-sized states, according to David O’Sullivan, former secretary general of the Commission: ‘The veto of Cyprus is not the same as the veto of Germany.’ Interviewees also testify that large Member States may get away with tactics that otherwise are considered inappropriate, such as exploiting the inadequate preparation of an issue to push through their own proposal, or launching entirely new initiatives at the negotiation table. As a result, the interests of the larger Member States tend to set the framework for European Council negotiations. Where the interests of France, Germany and the UK conflict, they nevertheless set the terms within which agreements must be sought. Where these states see eye-to-eye on an issue, or even have arrived at pre-agreements, it is extremely difficult to achieve outcomes that diverge from this position. Frequently cited examples in recent years of France, Germany and the UK dominating negotiations and outcomes in the European Council include the provisions on a semi-permanent president of the European Council in the 2004 Constitutional Treaty, the deal in December 2005 on the new financial perspective for 2007–13 and the political agreement in July 2007 on the subsequent Lisbon Treaty. Whereas the dominant expectation before the eastern enlargement was that the large Member States would suffer in influence, because of the accession of 12 small or medium-sized countries, the testimonies of European Council participants suggest otherwise. Paradoxically, the dominance of the large Member States may instead have been reinforced, as issues that previously were settled in the formal plenary sessions increasingly are resolved in informal and minilateral negotiations, managed by the Presidency and with participation by those parties most essential for reaching an agreement that subsequently can be extended to the broader membership. In practice, those parties have tended to be the EU’s large Member States, sometimes joined by small or medium-sized states with particular stakes in the issue. A case in point is the decision in December 2004 to commence membership negotiations with Turkey, which was achieved through the Dutch Presidency rallying the support of France, Germany and the UK in minilateral negotiations behind closed doors. One top-level official in the Council Secretariat observes: ‘There is a danger for the small and medium-sized countries in the new development. If you as President want to come to a deal, who will you consult? The main actors – Germany, France, the UK.’ Similarly, one small state representative concludes: ‘It is obviously the bigger countries [who are benefiting from a move from multilateral to bilateral negotiations]. Their relative weight is always bigger in any bilateral discussion.’ © 2008 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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The centrality of aggregate structural power for European Council negotiations is a constant theme in the interviews. Yet so are the exceptions to this pattern. Every single interviewee points to additional dimensions of power and can recite cases that support a more comprehensive picture of bargaining power in the European Council. The remainder of this article will be devoted to these other dimensions of bargaining power, of which the first is a more specified interpretation of when, where and how differences in state properties matter. Issue-Specific Power The notion of issue-specific power has developed into the favoured explanation in modern negotiation analysis for patterns of bargaining success that diverge from those predicted by the distribution of aggregate resources. According to this line of argument, resources and capabilities may not be deployed with equal effectiveness on all issues. Rather, it is the power balance in the issue-specific relationship that determines bargaining outcomes (even if aggregate resources may shape the issue-specific power balance). This helps to explain paradoxes of power, such as when structurally disadvantaged states nevertheless prevail in negotiations with structurally advantaged states (Odell, 1980; Bacharach and Lawler, 1981; Habeeb, 1988). Issue-specific power is defined by a state’s resources in a particular issue, its commitment to this issue and its alternatives to a negotiated agreement on this issue. The issue-specific nature of resources entails that a state’s bargaining power in economic affairs, for instance, will not be decided by its military capability, territory or population, but by its market power and GDP (Habeeb, 1988). The commitment of a state on a particular issue, sometimes referred to as its preference intensity, willpower, resolve, attention or stake, matters since states that care deeply about an issue will be more willing to devote scarce resources, negotiate with greater care, stay longer at the negotiation table and have higher aspirations, than states that are less committed (Mesquita and Stokman, 1994; Hopmann, 1996; Bailer, 2004). Finally, states with good alternatives to negotiated agreements will be less likely to compromise and more likely to shape the final outcome, than states desperately in need of an agreement (Fisher and Ury, 1981; Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Moravcsik, 1998). European Council participants testify that issue-specific aspects of power are prominent in negotiations. The relative weight of the Member States shifts as a product of the resources they can deploy, the national commitments to particular causes and the attractiveness of the status quo. However, it should be noted that the empirical establishment of such power is made © 2008 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd


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difficult by overlaps between issue-specific and aggregate structural power, giving rise to observational equivalence. For instance, it is difficult to determine whether the influence of German, French and British heads of government in negotiations on the internal market or the EU’s long-term budget is a product of these countries’ superior economic strength alone or their general advantages in terms of aggregate structural power. Still, it is possible to isolate a number of expressions of issue-specific power in European Council negotiations, by focusing on cases where aggregate and issuespecific resources diverge. A first expression of issue-specific power is the tendency of large Member States not to wield equal power on all issues. European Council participants most frequently point to the restricted role of Germany in the EU’s foreign and security policy, compared to France and the UK. As the EU’s greatest military powers, in possession of both extensive conventional capabilities and nuclear weapons and with permanent seats on the UN Security Council, France and the UK speak with considerable authority on issues of security policy. Even if Germany in recent years has become more willing to invest resources in military capabilities for international operations, its influence in the European Council on issues of foreign and security policy is not on par with that of France and the UK. Another often mentioned example is Italy’s loss of bargaining power on economic issues, despite a sizeable GDP, because of long-running budget deficits and a growing government debt. A second expression of issue-specific power noted by European Council participants is the tendency of small or medium-sized states to ‘punch above their weight’ – to exercise more power on specific issues than a mere assessment of their aggregate structural resources would suggest. Small and medium-sized states with specific regional interests often succeed in shaping the EU’s policy toward these areas, owing to extensive experience in dealing with the region, as well as great commitment to the development of EU policy vis-à-vis the region. Prominent examples are the engagement of Belgium in Central Africa, the Netherlands in Indonesia, Spain in the Mediterranean and the Nordics in the Baltic. European Council participants further testify to specific small state influence on issues where these countries present strong ambitions, extensive knowledge and national policies that may be exported to the European level, for instance, the Nordic states on employment policy and environmental policy. Finally, the combination of a strong commitment and an attractive status quo alternative has strengthened the hand of certain small Member States on specific dossiers, for instance, Greece on issues relating to Turkey and Luxemburg on issues pertaining to financial services and taxation. © 2008 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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II. Institutional Sources of Power Negotiations in the European Council take place in a specific institutional setting. How and to what extent do the properties of this institutional setting shape bargaining power and outcomes in the European Council? Drawing on a combination of negotiation theory and institutional theory, I identify two institutional factors with implications for bargaining power in the European Council: the veto and the chairmanship. The participation of supranational actors – the Commission and the Council Secretariat – constitutes a third institutional feature of the European Council. However, with the exception of Jacques Delors, supranational officials are not considered to have influenced European Council outcomes on a regular basis and when they have, the impact has not been to favour systematically some states rather than others. The Power of the Veto The most central institutional feature of any negotiation is the decision rule governing the adoption of agreements. Unanimity requires that all parties give their consent, or at least do not actively block an agreement. Majority voting entails that only a large subset of all parties needs to be on board for an agreement to be reached. Where decisions are taken through majority voting, as in the EU’s general legislative process, differentiation of voting power based on population or GDP grants those states that already enjoy structural power advantages in the formal decision-making system as well. By contrast, where decisions require unanimity, as in the European Council, this works to mediate or offset the impact of structural power differentials, by giving all parties equal formal right to block proposals through the veto. Studies of international negotiations find that veto provisions strengthen the bargaining position of parties or coalitions that do not enjoy structural power and constitute one of the principal sources of influence for weak states in competition with the strong (Zartman, 1971; Habeeb, 1988; Hampson with Hart, 1995, p. 32). Furthermore, existing research establishes that unanimity tends to generate processes of consensual decision-making, where recalcitrant parties are bought off through side-payments and favours are exchanged through package deals. The states expected to benefit the most from unanimity as decision principle are therefore those most pleased with the status quo, that is, those who would lose the least if an agreement could not be found (Scharpf, 1997; Meunier, 2000). European Council participants testify that the actual wielding of the veto is a relatively rare occurrence in summit negotiations, but very effective when used. When national executives walk into the European Council, they know © 2008 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd


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they will have to agree and if a state has strong objections on an issue, it will often prevail. As Erkki Tuomioja, former Finnish minister of foreign affairs, states: ‘At the end of the day, you can block. Moving forward at the European Council depends on consensus. In general there is still this kind of understanding, although no one talks about the Luxemburg compromise any longer [. . .] If a country’s vital national interests are at stake, this is respected.’ One EU ambassador underlines the same point in colourful language: ‘If you have the guts, you can use the veto with great effect. You’ve got everybody by their balls.’ Why, then, is the veto not wielded more frequently? European Council participants point to four reasons. First, the veto is a measure of last resort and skilful negotiators should be able to convey the importance they attach to an issue and secure others’ respect, without actually using the weapon. Second, it needs to be generally understood that the issues in question are of truly vital national importance for the state concerned, or else the use of the veto will have reputation repercussions. Third and related, the veto is only effective if it is not wielded too frequently. The use of the veto carries political costs in terms of credibility. As David O’Sullivan notes: ‘They cannot threaten to block all the time. Even if they might have three issues they would want to block, they only have one card each to play.’ Jean-Claude Juncker explains this logic in greater detail and emphasizes the political gains of abstaining from the veto: If a prime minister, sitting with his colleagues, is threatening with a veto time after time, he loses all kinds of influence. It is seen as a sign of weakness, because if you give the impression that you do not have free hands at home, you cannot really develop an influence in the European Council. But, if from time to time, you step away from a well-known national position, saying ‘OK, I will take it, but I will have great difficulties at home’ then you gradually build up a kind of aura that this is not only about words and lip-service, but that you are willing to undergo some difficulties at home.

Finally, the veto does not put an end to the political process. Conflicts must be solved and proposals adopted. As Finland’s president, Tarja Halonen, underlines: ‘[The veto may be used] when you really need it and you have a plan what to do after that. Because saying no, you do not stop the process. You just take time out.’ European Council participants testify that the veto is used more frequently on some issues than on others and more effectively by some Member States than by others. As regards issues, they specifically point to negotiations on the EU’s long-term budgets and to bargaining over treaty reform. These are © 2008 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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issues with such general political and economic implications that they bring vital national interests to the fore and legitimate the wielding of the veto. Examples frequently referred to by interviewees include Spain’s blocking of new budget agreements in the late 1980s and 1990s until it had secured continued regional funding, as well as the UK’s defence of its rebate in consecutive budget negotiations and its opposition to majority voting on issues of taxation and justice and home affairs. As regards Member States, interviewees frequently mention Spain as a country that has been particularly skilful in exploiting the power of the veto, not least in negotiations over the EU’s long-term budgets, where Felipe Gonzáles and José Maria Aznar are attributed extensive influence. As one chief executive states: ‘Spain is very good at getting results. [They achieve results by] being tough, being very tough. They are not impossible – you always know that there is a price to buy them. You can be impossible, so that the others know that you will say forever no. [But] if you negotiate a good result, [the Spanish] will say yes.’ The Power of the Chair Research on multilateral bargaining suggests that the chairmanship of international decision bodies constitutes a power platform, enabling the actors in control of this office to shape the outcomes of negotiations (Tallberg, 2006; but also Hampson with Hart, 1995; Odell, 2005). Negotiation chairs are typically granted the responsibility to manage the agenda, broker agreements and represent the decision body vis-à-vis third parties. In these functions, negotiation chairs benefit from privileged access to a set of power resources, notably asymmetric information and procedural control. Bilateral encounters at which governments offer negotiation chairs information about national resistance points provides chairmen with unique information about state preferences. Furthermore, international secretariats at the chairman’s special disposal endow negotiation chairs with expert information about the technical subject matter of the negotiations. The procedural power of negotiation chairs consists of control over decisions on the sequence of negotiations, the frequency of negotiation sessions, the format of negotiations and the method of negotiation. Moreover, as managers of individual negotiation sessions, chairmen open and conclude meetings, structure the meeting agenda, allot the right to speak, direct voting procedures and summarize the results. The legitimacy of the office, the trust acquired in previous negotiations and the capacity of chairmen to persuade others through the better argument may constitute additional resources. With very few exceptions, European Council participants underline the significance of the Presidency as a resource for the incumbent, lending © 2008 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd


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support to recent qualitative and quantitative research (Tallberg, 2006; Schalk et al., 2007). It is notable that representatives of small and medium-sized states tend to rank access to the Presidency as the most important source of power, particularly for themselves, since they cannot rely on advantages in structural power. As Finland’s Erkki Tuomioja asserts: ‘The Presidency is always in a strong position. Even small country Presidencies, if they are successful and do their homework, can have a lot of influence. The Presidency is always number one’. Similarly, former Swedish foreign minister Lena Hjelm-Wallén emphasizes: ‘The chairmanship is the most important power resource – you are holding the reins’, whereas Gunnar Lund, former Swedish EU ambassador, stresses: ‘It is obvious. The Presidency grants considerable influence, even for a small country. You are managing the entire process.’ More specifically, European Council participants point to the setting of the agenda and the engineering of compromises as the functions through which Presidencies exert influence. It is the Presidency that carries the responsibility of preparing the agenda of European Council meetings. Part of the agenda tends to be pre-determined, as an effect of the European Council’s growing tendency to pre-programme forthcoming meetings in order to achieve greater policy continuity. In addition, the European Council generally devotes part of its meetings to pressing EU or international matters that require its attention. Yet, even within these constraints, the Presidency can exercise influence by contributing its own pet issues to the agenda, attributing varying weight to the items on the agenda and keeping certain issues away from the agenda. It is frequently emphasized by European Council participants that the greatest influence over the agenda is exerted in the preparatory phase, when the Presidency structures and delimits the agenda, rather than in the meetings per se. Sweden’s Göran Persson offers the following reflection: As the chairman of a meeting, you are controlling the agenda. It is those who realize the potential to set the agenda that affect the development [of EU policy]. Then you need not dominate the meeting, but it is the issues that you yourself have put up on the agenda that are discussed. If you do not control the agenda as chairman – and there have been such Presidencies – then nothing will come of it. It has to be prepared and this is a truth that applies to local associations and the European Council alike. If you are to have any chance of governing the meeting, then you must decide the contents of the agenda.

Since several issues that require the European Council’s attention are difficult issues, where the Member States have been unable to reach agreement at lower levels, brokerage constitutes a central function for Presidencies. Typically, heads of government rely on two institutionalized practices for © 2008 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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sounding out state concerns and devising acceptable compromise agreements – the tour des capitales and the confessional. The Presidency either travels to or receives all other heads of government in the weeks preceding the summit. The format of the bilateral encounter enables heads of government to share information about their bottom lines with the Presidency, thus improving the chances of summit agreements on contentious issues. Confessionals serve the same purpose during the course of actual meetings. According to European Council members, both practices grant the Presidency a privileged position in the engineering of agreements. Frequently cited examples of successful Presidency brokerage in recent years include France’s finalization of the Nice Treaty in 2000, Denmark’s conclusion of the enlargement negotiations in 2002, Ireland’s brokerage of an agreement on the Constitutional Treaty in 2004 and the Netherlands’ engineering of a deal on accession negotiations with Turkey in 2004. III. Individual Sources of Power Negotiations in the European Council are conducted by individuals who represent their states. How and to what extent do differences in individual attributes affect the bargaining power of the national executives? Drawing on theories of negotiation and leadership, I discuss the potential impact of two categories of individual attributes: personal authority and expertise. European Council participants testify that variation within the group in these individual attributes affects the bargaining power of the respective states. A prominent explanation is the format of negotiations in the European Council, where the heads of government largely operate on their own, beyond the immediate control of national civil servants. A third individual source of power is proposed by two-level game theory, which submits that chief executives may benefit internationally from tough domestic political constraints. However, testimonies by European Council participants provide very limited support for this notion, referring instead to how domestically constrained leaders tend to be conceived of as weak and even become marginalized.3 Personal Authority The importance of individual personality traits, experiences and authority is an issue that has received extensive attention in the study of international negotiations and foreign policy decision-making. One line of inquiry 3

Frequently mentioned examples include UK prime minister John Major after the national elections in 1992, Jan Peter Balkenende after the Dutch ‘no’ vote to the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and Jacques Chirac after France’s ‘no’ vote to the same treaty.



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specifically addresses how the cognitive structures of leaders affect behaviour in bargaining (Jönsson, 1990), whereas another strand of analysis explores the influence of leadership style on foreign policy decision-making (Hermann et al., 2001). Two-level game theory conceives of heads of government as enjoying a certain level of autonomy, to the effect that personalities and personal preferences may impact on negotiation outcomes (Putnam, 1988; Evans et al., 1993). Finally, students of international negotiation propose that specific individuals may succeed in shaping how other participants perceive problems and solutions through ideas and visions, as well as through authority and trust earned in previous interactions (Young, 1991; Risse, 2000). The importance of personal relations and personal authority is a recurring theme in the participants’ own assessments of influence in the European Council. In particular, they underline the differences between individuals in terms of respect and trust, which are seen as attributes to be won and earned, rather than given by birth or appointment. The most prominent historical examples are Helmut Kohl and Jacques Delors, both of whom commanded great respect and earned considerable trust. One implication of this perspective on personal authority is that seniority in the club and earlier performance are perceived to matter. As Philippe Schoutheete, long-serving EU ambassador of Belgium, testifies: ‘Because participants are relatively few in number and personal relations important, the balance of power in the European Council is influenced by seniority. Newcomers will not be able to pull their full weight at first meetings. Heads of government of smaller Member States can expect to exert more influence after several years of being present, particularly after leading a successful presidency’ (2006, p. 46). This analysis is shared by leaders of small and medium-sized countries who frequently are mentioned as examples of growing personal influence over time. Jean-Claude Juncker, presently the longest serving head of government, stresses the importance of ‘personal experience, personal relations with leaders of other countries [and] the volume of confidence you have worked up. If you are there for a longer time, you become a reference point for others, mainly for the newcomers and they are inspired by what you are saying.’ Similarly, Göran Persson, who attended the European Council for a full decade, admits: ‘My own position in the European Council is obviously a product of having been there long. I have been able to welcome many, say goodbye to many and still remain myself.’ By contrast, several European Council participants testify that a high turn-over rate at the head of government level negatively affected the influence of Italy in the unstable political period after Giulio Andreotti, as well as the voice of the central and east European Member States since joining in 2004. © 2008 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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Inquiries into the importance of personalities invariably lead to comparisons between individual leaders. The observations by European Council participants are remarkably similar with respect to the role of five heads of state or government during the last decade: Jacques Chirac, Gerhard Schröder, Tony Blair, Silvio Berlusconi and Jean-Claude Juncker. Whereas Chirac and Juncker are perceived to have strengthened the bargaining hand of their countries because of their personal qualities, Schröder and Blair neither contributed positively nor negatively, whereas Berlusconi unanimously is presented as having been a liability for his country. Chirac is described as a political animal who was very clever and persistent, somewhat arrogant, capable of instilling fear in others through his temper and almost always very influential. Schröder, by contrast, is portrayed as surprisingly silent, without an interest in the political game, often detached from the debate and therefore dependent on others’ automatic respect for German interests, even if he was listened to when he spoke up. Blair’s influence is typically seen as less extensive than his spin-doctors made it seem and with the important exceptions of the Lisbon process and transatlantic issues, ‘he is not really in the game, although destroying the games of others’. Berlusconi is consistently portrayed as a maverick leader with a limited interest in EU issues, irratic negotiation behaviour and a self-assumed role as the comedian of the club. Juncker, finally, is described as the head of government who by himself commands the greatest respect and authority, because of his long time in the European Council, his extreme experience and competence, his capacity to put European interests before national (of which there are few) and his networking abilities and close relationship with especially German and French leaders. As one head of government put it: ‘How many times do you need to multiply Juncker’s weight because of his personal and human attributes? Juncker probably weighs more than countries with 12 to 14 million inhabitants.’ Expertise The advantages of possessing expertise and information in bargaining are widely acknowledged. Multilateral negotiations are characterized by high levels of complexity and uncertainty, because of the large number of parties, proposals and preferences (Winham, 1977; Zartman, 1994; Hampson with Hart, 1995). As a result, negotiators seldom have perfect knowledge of the many technical issues on the agenda, the legal procedures available and the preferences of other actors. However, some may be better informed than others and those parties that possess superior expertise are also better positioned to identify potential agreements and shape outcomes in their own © 2008 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd


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favour (Young, 1991; Tallberg, 2006). It is common in the literature to distinguish between three alternative forms of expertise: content expertise, process expertise and preference information (Wall and Lynn, 1993; Beach, 2005). Content expertise refers to technical knowledge of the issues under negotiation. Process expertise refers to knowledge of the institutional framework of negotiations, including legal provisions and procedures. Preference information, finally, refers to knowledge of other parties’ interests and domestic political constraints. European Council participants frequently highlight the importance of personal expertise in summit negotiations and testify to varying levels of content, process and preference expertise among the participants. Even if the heads of government ought to be well briefed when they arrive, there are sometimes glaring gaps in knowledge, with implications for the negotiations. One particular feature of European Council meetings merits special attention in this context, namely the deliberate separation of the national executives from the civil servants, in order to create an atmosphere more conducive to concessions and compromises. An important side-effect of this arrangement is that the national executives are largely on their own and that differences in the level of personal expertise therefore matter more than in the Council of Ministers or in other international negotiations, where the chief negotiations generally are accompanied by legions of specialists. Content expertise is deemed very important, indeed a prerequisite for influence, by European Council participants. Even if all parties profit from mastering the technical details of the dossiers, representatives of small and medium-sized states emphasize that issue expertise is particularly pivotal for them, since they cannot rely on structural power and that they therefore have greater incentives to be well informed. In this vein, Erkki Tuomioja observes: ‘Smaller countries tend to do their homework better. They cannot afford not to be knowledgeable about the issues.’ Jean-Claude Juncker makes a similar observation: ‘The knowledge of dossiers is essential. I have to say that my experience is that those representing smaller and mediumsized countries, they have the better knowledge of the dossier, because they have fewer people to prepare it, they have fewer speaking notes and transport mechanisms than the others. And if you have a broader knowledge than your colleagues, then you can give indications, you are able to introduce nuances, you can draw up broader perspectives, taking pieces from other meetings or other portfolios.’ Frequently mentioned examples of European Council participants who have benefited politically from intimate knowledge of the technical details of dossiers include Jacques Delors in budget and treaty negotiations, Jacques Chirac in negotiations on agriculture and Jean-Claude Juncker in negotiations on social, economic and financial © 2008 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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matters. In all three cases, experiences as portfolio ministers constituted a central source of knowledge. In the European Council, it is the Council Secretariat’s specific task to be well-versed in all the procedural and legal aspects of decision-making. Yet the Secretariat’s presence does not eliminate differences in process expertise and their implications for bargaining power. Some heads of government have developed considerable knowledge of the EU’s institutional system and its procedural idiosyncrasies, whereas others face significant shortages. Philippe de Schotheete (2006, p. 39) notes that not all national executives understand the formal procedures applicable in the European Council. One long-serving head of government confirms these deficits in process expertise and points specifically to the prime ministers from the new Member States, who only recently gained seats in the European Council, suffer from high turn-over rates and seldom have been portfolio ministers. Typical gaps in knowledge include the Commission’s monopoly on initiative in the first pillar and the European Parliament’s equal status to the Council of Ministers in the co-decision procedure – basic features of the EU political system. Information about other parties’ preferences is a prerequisite for building coalitions and negotiating agreements in the European Council. Generally, national executives perceive themselves to be well-briefed on the positions of the others. Yet there is a difference between knowing what the position is and understanding why this particular position is taken. According to European Council participants, there is sometimes a lack of understanding of the domestic political debate in other Member States that renders it difficult to arrive at compromise agreements acceptable to all parties. As one experienced prime minister concludes: ‘The real problem of the European Council is that the majority of the members [. . .] do not have the time or do not take the time to be totally informed in a way that, leaving behind their national interests, they can develop compromise formulas. What people say is seldom unreasonable, it is simply political.’ Conclusion The central message of this article is that bargaining power in the European Council is polymorphic. Testimonies from a broad sample of European Council participants suggest that bargaining power in this forum cannot be reduced to either a matter of formal equality or a question of great power dominance. Rather, the relative power of national executives is a product of the structural capabilities of the Member States they represent, their access to © 2008 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd


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institutional resources in the European Council and their own personal qualities as negotiators. Yet not all forms of bargaining power are equally prominent in shaping negotiation outcomes. European Council participants testify that differences in structural power are most fundamental, with the effect that France, Germany and the UK most often set the parameters of summit negotiations. Even if structural capabilities rarely are deployed directly in the negotiation process, they impact indirectly, by defining a state’s range of options, the resources it can commit to an issue and the legitimacy of its claim to shape joint decisions. The institutional and individual dimensions of power tend to be of secondary importance and mainly mediate the impact of structural power asymmetry. This article carries three sets of broader implications for the study of EU politics and international negotiations. First, the empirical results suggest that the European Council offers greater leeway for power politics than any other EU institution. Whereas the impact of structural power differentials in the EU’s general legislative process is softened by the involvement of the supranational institutions – the Commission, the Parliament and the Court – the European Council offers more limited institutional protection to small and medium-sized Member States. The formal equality of the Member States, as expressed in the principle of unanimity, is largely a procedural fiction that helps to legitimize the outcomes of European Council bargaining. Paradoxically, the eastern enlargement of the EU appears to have strengthened these qualities of the European Council, by increasingly moving negotiations away from the plenary meetings of the summits and into informal and minilateral sessions dominated by the large Member States. The unusual scope for power politics in the European Council further explains the opposition of the EU’s small and medium-sized states to the establishment of a semi-permanent president of the European Council through the Lisbon Treaty – a reform that will strip these states of an important recurring source of influence and further expand the room for power politics in the EU, by strengthening the European Council in relation to other EU institutions, especially the Commission. Second, this article demonstrates the usefulness of importing generic theories and concepts for purposes of better understanding politics in the European Council, but also suggests ways in which bargaining in this forum speaks to general IR theory. Whereas existing research on the European Council is best described as atheoretical, this article points to the merits of integrating insights from general political science theory. More specifically, it shows that theories on state, institutional and individual sources of power are highly useful in identifying, categorizing and illustrating the many faces of bargaining power in the European Council. At the same time, this article © 2008 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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speaks to ongoing concerns and debates in IR theory. Notably, it points to the limits of presenting dominant IR theories as competing in all instances. Rather, the inventory of bargaining power in the European Council underlines the complementarity of resources privileged by alternative theories of power: structural power (realism), the power of the veto (rational choice institutionalism) and the power of persuasion (constructivism). Generally, this article also answers to calls by IR theorists for more detailed empirical work on the resources that allow states to exercise power and the means through which alternative forms of power are exercised (Baldwin, 2002, p. 186). Third and most importantly, this article opens up a new area of research on bargaining in the European Council and summit politics generally. As the first focused exploration of bargaining power in the European Council, it constitutes an initial step toward a more advanced understanding, rather than the conclusive analysis. More specifically, it leaves four important issues unaddressed, all of which constitute promising areas for future research. First, while providing an inventory of multiple sources of power in summit negotiations, this article does not establish the conditions under which state, institutional and individual resources are likely to matter most. Carefully designed comparative case studies are likely to be particularly useful for exploring such conditional hypotheses. Second, this article presents a general picture of bargaining power in the European Council and leaves open the question of variation across time and issue areas (with the exception of the eastern enlargement). How have fundamental changes in the negotiation environment, such as the institutionalization of summit preparations and the successive enlargements, affected the relative prominence of alternative sources of bargaining power in the European Council? Third, this article centres on independent sources of bargaining power, but does not offer an analysis of how heads of government subsequently pool power through coalition building. Do national executives seek coalition partners primarily on the basis of power, shared interests, ideological affinities or cultural proximity? Initial research in this area points to the limits of party political mobilization in the European Council and the dominance of issue-specific coalitions driven by interest considerations (Tallberg and Johansson, 2008). Finally, this article invites comparisons between the European Council and summit negotiations in other international contexts, such as the Group of Eight (G-8). To what extent is the pattern of bargaining power observed in the European Council distinct for this forum, or applicable to the broader universe of summit negotiations? Summit politics is a topic that so far has received very limited attention and therefore constitutes a promising field of research (for a rare contribution, see Putnam and Bayne, 1987). © 2008 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd


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Correspondence: Jonas Tallberg Department of Political Science Stockholm University SE-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden email [email protected]

Appendix: Interview List The title or function of the interviewee is given as it was held at the time of the interview and in the capacity that he or she is relevant for the project. Frank Belfrage, former Permanent Representative to the EU, Sweden, 17 November 2005. Bernard Bot, Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands, 15 May 2005. Ingvar Carlsson, former Prime Minister, Sweden, 8 September 2004. Robert Cooper, Director General of DG E, General Secretariat of the Council, 3 February 2005. Lars Danielsson, State Secretary, Sweden, 8 September 2004. Kim Darroch, Head of the European Secretariat, Cabinet Office, United Kingdom, 29 November 2006. Jacques Delors, former President of the European Commission, 21 December 2006. David Galloway, Head of the Private Office of the Assistant Secretary General, General Secretariat of the Council, 3 November 2004. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, former President, France, 7 December 2005. Felipe Gonzáles, former Prime Minister, Spain, 17 May 2005. Tarja Halonen, President, Finland, 27 May 2005. Lena Hjelm-Wallén, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sweden, 28 October 2004. Jean-Claude Juncker, Prime Minister, Luxembourg, 8 December 2005. John Kerr, former Permanent Representative to the EU, United Kingdom, 28 November 2006. Neil Kinnock, former European Commissioner, United Kingdom, 29 November 2006. Claas D. Knoop, Minister at the Permanent Representation, Germany, 5 November 2004. Wim Kok, former Prime Minister, the Netherlands, 15 May 2005. Erkki Liikanen, former European Commissioner, Finland, 27 May 2005. Gunnar Lund, former Permanent Representative to the EU, Sweden, 7 September 2004. John Major, former Prime Minister, United Kingdom, 1 December 2006. Guy Milton, Adviser, General Secretariat of the Council, 3 February 2005. David O’Sullivan, Secretary General, European Commission, 2 February 2005. Göran Persson, Prime Minister, Sweden, 25 January 2005. Sven-Olof Petersson, Permanent Representative to the EU, Sweden, 24 September 2004. © 2008 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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Michel Petite, Director General of the Legal Service, European Commission, 3 November 2004. Jean-Claude Piris, Director General of the Legal Service, General Secretariat of the Council, 3 February 2005. Paolo Ponzano, Director of the Task Force on the Future of the EU and Institutional Questions, European Commission, 5 November 2004. Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, former Prime Minister, Denmark, 11 November 2005. Javier Solana, Secretary General of the General Secretariat of the Council, 12 December 2006. Erkki Tuomioja, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland, 27 May 2005. Hubert Védrine, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, France, 17 November 2005. Jerôme Vignon, former Director of the Forward Studies Unit, European Commission, 3 February 2005. Stephen Wall, former Permanent Representative to the EU, United Kingdom, 30 November 2006.

References Bacharach, S.B. and Lawler, E.J. (1981) Bargaining: Power, Tactics and Outcomes (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass). Bailer, S. (2004) ‘Bargaining Success in the European Union’. European Union Politics, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 99–123. Baldwin, D.A. (2002) ‘Power and International Relations’. In Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T. and Simmons, B.A. (eds) Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage). Beach, D. (2005) The Dynamics of European Integration: Why and When EU Institutions Matter (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan). Bulmer, S. and Wessels, W. (1987) The European Council: Decision-Making in European Politics (Houndmills: Macmillan). de Schoutheete, P. (2006) ‘The European Council’. In Peterson, J. and Shackleton, M. (eds) The Institutions of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press). de Schoutheete, P. and Wallace, H. (2002) The European Council (Paris: Notre Europe). Donat, M. von (1987) Das ist der Gipfel! Die EG-Regierungschefs unter sich (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft). Drezner, Daniel W. (2007) All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Outcomes (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Evans, P.B., Jacobson, H.K. and Putnam, R.D. (eds) (1993) Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press). Fisher, R. and Ury, W. (1981) Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (Boston: Houghton Mifflin). Grant, C. (2002) Restoring Leadership to the European Council (London: Centre for European Reform). © 2008 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd


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Habeeb, W.M. (1988) Power and Tactics in International Negotiation: How Weak Nations Bargain with Strong Nations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press). Hampson, F.O. with Hart, M. (1995) Multilateral Negotiations. Lessons from Arms Control, Trade and the Environment (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press). Hayes-Renshaw, F. and Wallace, H. (2006) The Council of Ministers (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Hermann, M.G., Preston, T., Korany, B. and Shaw, T.M. (2001) ‘Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals’. International Studies Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 83–131. Hopmann, P.T. (1996) The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press). Johnston, M.T. (1994) The European Council: Gatekeeper of the European Community (Boulder: Westview Press). Jönsson, C. (1990) Communication in International Bargaining (London: Pinter). Lax, D.A. and Sebenius, J.K. (1986) The Manager as Negotiator (New York: The Free Press). Ludlow, P. (2002) The Laeken Council (Brussels: EuroComment). Ludlow, P. (2004) The Making of the New Europe: The European Councils in Brussels and Copenhagen 2002 (Brussels: EuroComment). Mesquita, B.B. and de Stokman, F.N. (eds) (1994) European Community DecisionMaking: Models, Applications and Comparisons (New Haven: Yale University Press). Meunier, S. (2000) ‘What Single Voice? European Institutions and EU-US Trade Negotiations’. International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 103–35. Moravcsik, A. (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). Morgenthau, H. (1948) Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf). Odell, J.S. (1980) ‘Latin American Trade Negotiations with the United States’. International Organization, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 207–28. Odell, J.S. (2005) ‘Chairing a WTO Negotiation’. Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 425–48. Putnam, R.D. (1988) ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’. International Organization, Vol. 42, pp. 427–60. Putnam, R.D. and Bayne, N. (1987) Hanging Together: Co-operation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits (London: Sage). Risse, T. (2000) ‘ “Let’s Argue!” Communicative Action in World Politics’. International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 1–39. Schalk, J., Torenvlied, R., Weesie, J. and Stokman, F. (2007) ‘The Power of the Presidency in EU Council Decision-Making’. European Union Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 229–50. © 2008 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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Scharpf, F.W. (1997) Games Real Actors Play (Boulder: Westview Press). Tallberg, J. (2006) Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Tallberg, J. and Johansson, K.M. (2008) ‘Party Politics in the European Council’. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 15, No. 8. Taulègne, B. (1993) Le Conseil Européen (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France). Wall, J.A. and Lynn, A. (1993) ‘Mediation: A Current Overview’. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 160–94. Waltz, K.N. (1979) Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill). Werts, J. (1992) The European Council (Amsterdam: North-Holland). Westlake, M. and Galloway, D. with Digneffe, T. (2004) The Council of the European Union (London: John Harper Publishing). Winham, G.R. (1977) ‘Negotiation as a Management Process’. World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 87–114. Young, O.R. (1991) ‘Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society’. International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 281–308. Zartman, I.W. (1971) The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the European Economic Community (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Zartman, I.W. (1994) ‘Two’s Company and More’s a Crowd: The Complexities of Multilateral Negotiation’. In Zartman, I.W. (ed.) International Multilateral Negotiations (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass).


The Janus Face of Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision Making in the European Union Jeffrey Lewis

Abstract This article examines the European Union's Committee of Permanent Representatives, or COREPER, a group composed of the EU permanent representatives (permreps) and responsible for preparing upcoming ministerial meetings of the Council. As the heart of everyday decision making in the EU, COREPER is a key laboratory to test whether and how national officials become socialized into a Brusselsbased collective culture and what difference this makes for EU negotiations. The key scope conditions for COREPER socialization are high issue density/intensity and insulation from domestic politics. COREPER also displays a range of socialization mechanisms, including strategic calculation, role playing, and normative suasion. Based on extensive interview data and a detailed case study of negotiations for a controversial EU citizenship directive, this article documents a socialization pathway in COREPER marked by adherence to a set of norm-guided rules and principled beliefs in collectively legitimating arguments and making decisions. COREPER socialization does not indicate a pattern of national identities being replaced or subsumed; rather, the evidence points to a socialization process based on a "logic of appropriateness" and an expanded conception of the self.

Not many international institutional environments can match the density or robustness of collective decision-making norms found in the European Union (EU).' But there are surprisingly few empirical studies of how these collective norms operate in the EU. There is an even greater shortfall of research on the effects of this institutional environment on the basic actor properties of the national officials who participate in this system.^ How does the culture of decision making in the EU affect agents and their bargaining behavior? This article focuses on the Com-

For feedback on earlier versions, I am grateful to the project participants and especially Jeffrey Checkel, Matthew Evangelista, Iain Johnston, and Michael Ziirn. I thank the editors and two anonymous reviewers for comments that greatly improved the final product. I also acknowledge generous support from the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies and the American Political Science Association's Small Grant Program, which funded portions of field research associated with this project. 1. For a discussion of this point, see Kahler 1995, 82-89; and Wallace 1994, 41-50. 2. Recent exceptions include Trondal 2001 and 2002; Egeberg 2004 and 1999; Bgeberg, Schaefer, and Trondal 2003; and Joerges and Vos 1999. International Organization 59, Fall 2005, pp. 937-971 © 2005 by The IO Foundation.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020818305050320

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mittee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), a Brussels institution responsible for preparing upcoming ministerial meetings of the Council, and, as such, the heart of "everyday" ELF decision making.^ The members of COREPER, known as the EU permanent representatives, are exemplars of "state agents" given their prominence in articulating, arguing, and defending national interests across the gamut of EU affairs.'* COREPER is thus a key laboratory to test whether and how state agents become socialized into a Brussels-based culture of EU decision making. COREPER is the main preparatory body for the Council of the European Union, the legislative heart and unabashed defender of national interests in the EU. Composed of senior civil servants and career diplomats, COREPER members meet weekly and have evolved a style of decision making that is rooted in a collective culture with its own informal norms, rules, and discourse.^ Some permanent representatives even joke that this collective culture makes them unpopular with home ministries; for example, German Ambassador Dietrich von Kyaw claimed that back home he was known as the stiindiger Verrater (permanent traitor) instead of the stdndiger Vertreter (permanent representative).* The central question of this article is whether and how the context and quality of interaction among national representatives in COREPER can have transformative effects on basic actor properties. Unlike traditional rationalist accounts, which begin from the premise that institutional environments primarily affect strategy,' this article seeks to test constructivist claims that institutional environments can also affect cognition, attitudes, and identity. Rather than posing this as an "either/ or" question, to competitively test rationalism "versus" constructivism, this article asks whether the constructivist line of questioning can add value to baseline rationalist accounts. Based on an original data set of interviews with participants and case-study research of negotiation histories, this article documents how COREPER offers an unambiguous example of interstate negotiation in which state actors' range of motivations include a blend of appropriateness and consequentialist logics.^

3. Since 1962, COREPER has met weekly in two formats: CORBPER II is composed of the EU ambassadors and works primarily on the monthly meetings of the foreign ministers in the General Affairs Council (GAC); COREPER I is made up of the EU Deputies, and they preside over a wide range of so-called "technical" Councils such as the Environment, Fisheries, Employment and Social Policy, and so on. Thus, strictly speaking, COREPER consists of fifty members (twenty-five ambassadors, and twenty-five deputies) who are jointly referred to as the EU permanent representatives. For the more subtle differences in prestige and clout between COREPER I and II, see Lewis 2002; and Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997. 4. There are two substantive exceptions: the Agricultural Council (which is prepared by the Standing Committee on Agriculture [SCA]) and the Ecofin Council (prepared by the Economic and Finance Committee [EFC], which has its own vertical channels to the finance ministers, effectively bypassing COREPER). 5. See Lewis 2000; and Bostock 2002. 6. Dietrich von Kyaw was Germany's EU Ambassador from 1993-99. For a discussion of his Verrater quip, see Lionel Barber, "The Men Who Run Europe," The Financial Times, 11 March 1995, Sec. 2, I-II. See also Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997, 224-25; and Wallace 1973, 56. 7. For examples, see Eising 2002, 87; and Bjurulf and Elgstrom 2004. 8. March and Olsen 1998.

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Following Checkers definition of socialization as "a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community,"' this article tracks how COREPER participants exhibit a range of behavior and collectively legitimate arguments on the basis of a "reasoned consensus" that the logic of consequences by itself cannot explain. The outcome of socialization is the internalization of group-community standards by the EU permanent representatives (permreps), refiected in bargaining behavior and decision outcomes. Successful socialization, then, is evidenced by what Checkel calls "sustained compliance based on the internalization of . . . new norms and rules." '" Furthermore, fine-grained analysis of the EU local elections negotiations (as will be discussed in the fourth section) will allow more nuanced discrimination between Type I (role playing) and Type II (normative suasion) patterns of internalization." Joining the COREPER "club" involves more than behaviorial adaptation to institutional norms that alter incentives and strategies. EU permreps also internalize group-community standards that become part of an expanded conception of the self. This internalization includes a distinct epistemic value in the collective decisionmaking process itself.'^ The standards of appropriateness found in COREPER include norms ruling out certain instrumental behavior (such as "pushing for a vote" under conditions of qualified majority voting), obligations to practice mutual responsiveness and collectively legitimate arguments (including appropriateness standards for dropping arguments that fail to convince the group), and a duty to "find solutions" and keep the legislative agenda of the Council moving forward. However, this collective culture does not trigger shifts of loyalty or transfers of allegiance. Instead, one sees a more complex layering of national and European frames. The interview data consistently show that EU permreps do not perceive sharp tradeoffs between national and European allegiances. When discussing their job descriptions, permreps frequently refer to having dual personalities, performing multiple roles, wearing different hats, even having a "Janus face." '^ As former British Deputy Permanent Representative David Bostock explains: Members of COREPER describe themselves as being bound by a "dual loyalty." It is their responsibility faithfully to represent their Member States; but it is also their responsibility to reach agreement. The Roman god Janus, facing in two directions, is thus COREPER's patron saint, mascot, or role model.''* Thus the identity configuration of EU permreps appears, even at first glance, more subtle and complex than zero-sum notions of loyalty and allegiance. In COREPER,

9. Checkel. this volume. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. This is compatible with what Lax and Sebenius call the development of "process interests" or "intrinsic interests in the character of the negotiation process itself." Lax and Sebenius 1986, 72. 13. Author's interview, 20 February 1996. All interviews were conducted in Brussels unless noted otherwise. 14. Bostock 2002, 217.

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what one sees instead is the cognitive blurring of sharp definitional boundaries between the "national" and "European" frames, and a shared sense of responsibility to deliver both at home and collectively. As this article will show, the pattern of socialization found in COREPER does not lead to the creation of a new overarching supranational identity, but rather to a more complex configuration of identity than is typically acknowledged. The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section provides a concise summary of the theoretical argument. The second section details the pathway of socialization found in COREPER, with an emphasis on the scope conditions and mechanisms at work. The necessary scope conditions are high issue density/intensity and insulation from domestic politics, both of which imply that the socialization process in COREPER is forged by the "quality" of the link. The mechanisms explaining how socialization occurs in this institutional environment include strategic calculation, role playing, and normative suasion. Following this, the third section discusses methods and the strategy of empirical triangulation. Section four contains the empirical story, which traces the negotiations of a controversial EU citizenship directive that was quietly resolved by COREPER and sent to the ministers for formal adoption. Specifically, the case covers the 1994 local elections directive granting all EU citizens the right to vote and run for office in the local elections of their current residence (that is, granting nonnational EU citizens local voting and participation rights). Finally, a brief concluding section summarizes how the identity configuration of permreps muddies conventional distinctions between "national" and "supranational" agency.

Overview of the Theoretical Argument For rationalists, identities and interests are taken as preset and given, and the empirical focus is on the role of formal decision rules, relative power, and instrumental rationality in explaining bargaining outcomes.'^ State agents are motivated more by a "logic of anticipated consequences and prior preferences" '* than by notions of responsibility, obligation, or informal, "soft law" rules and norms. In the rationalists' strategic conception of rules, actors employ language and communication as rhetorical devices to pursue instrumental interests, manipulate incentive structures via social infiuence, and so on.'^ Normative compliance is the result of crafted, calculative reasoning and expected future benefits. While institutional environments have constraining and enabling effects on behavior by altering incentives, the impact of institutions on basic actor properties (attitudes, identities) is considered epiphenomenal. Constructivism relaxes the assumption of preset, given interests and identities, allowing for the possibility that institutional environments may have transforma-

15. Moravcsik 1998. 16. March and Olsen 1998, 949. 17. See Schimmelfennig 2000; and Schimmelfennig, this volume.


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tive effects on basic actor properties. Relative power brokering and instrumental rationality are accorded less primacy than in rationalism, and supplemented with attention to the deliberative aspects of negotiation, such as the role of discourse, persuasion, and the collective legitimation of arguments. According to the constructivist approach, EU institutions are hypothesized to have "thick" socializing effects on actors, which go beyond instrumental adaptation and strategic calculation to include the internalization of norms and rules into self-conceptions. In other words, the densities of institutional and normative environments are considered causal variables that, under the right background conditions, can have transformative effects on basic actor properties, including how individuals see themselves (conceptions of the self) and how they conceptualize their interests. In the case of successful socialization, then, the constructivist expects to see interests that "have been conditioned by a community standard that delimits the acceptable." '^ As the case evidence will show, one can further distinguish the internalized norms argument into Type I cases, where agents follow "socially expected behavior in a given setting or community," and Type II cases of accepting community norms as "the right thing to do." " The socialization story documented here does not disprove or contradict a rationalist reading,'^" but at the same time there is abundant support for a "soft" constructivist account that brings the collective culture and normative environment of Brussels-based decision making into the picture. Essentially, what one sees in the institutional environment of COREPER among the EU permreps is an expanded conception of the self that includes noninstrumental, pro-norm behavior without the threat of external sanctioning; it is based on the internalization of standards of appropriateness. This can be consistent with rationalism, but it is necessary to expand the baseline of "self-interest" beyond utility maximization to include a wider range of egoistic and other-regarding perspectives. As such, this study joins a growing number of researchers who see value in developing more nuanced models of rationality beyond the instrumental understanding embedded in nearly all forms of rational choice.^'

Alternative Explanations: Internalized Norms or Diplomacy 101? The alternative explanation for everyday EU decision making is standard negotiation theory and two-level games analysis.^^ The falsification test for the social-

18. Hurd 1999. 397. 19. Checkel, this volume. 20. See Ziirn and Checkel, for a thoughtful "double interpretation." 21. For a discussion of different "models of theoretical dialogue" between rationalism and constructivism, including the tricky issues of "paradigmatic privileging" and "first mover" advantages, see Jupille et al. 2003, 19-28. 22. The literature on negotiation theory is voluminous. Classic works include Lax and Sebenius 1986; Raiffa 1982; Ikl6 1964; Rapoport 1960; Pruitt 1981; Strauss 1978; Zartman and Berman 1982; and Walton and McKersie 1965. See also Jones 1994; Kramer and Messick 1995; and Rubin and Sander 1988. On two-level games, see Putnam 1988; and Evans 1993.

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ization story presented here is essentially: how does this differ from "diplomacy 101"? Using standard negotiation analysis, one would not be surprised to find, among the EU permreps, regularized practices of mutual understanding, moderating demands, and generalized reciprocity, especially given the scope conditions discussed in the next section. But according to this model, the motivations and incentive structures of the permreps would be firmly rooted in the consequentialist logic of an instrumental conception of the self and attendant interests. Against this default argument, I ask whether the empirical record shows an institutional context in which not just a logic of consequences is in play, but a distinct logic of appropriateness as well. Can one find evidence of an expanded conception of the self among national officials, and how would this differ from "normal" unsocialized bargaining in mixed-motive games? To illustrate such differences, one can hypothesize four measures that would support the appropriateness logic and cut against the grain of conventional bargaining and two-level games analysis wedded to a logic of consequences. 1. Noninstrumental self-restraint in demands and arguments. Unlike the instrumental cost-benefit logic implicit in negotiation theory, self-restraint is now motivated by a sense of responsibility or obligation (especially to protect what Lax and Sebenius call "process" and "relationship" interests).^^ Consistent with standard negotiation theory would be evidence of EU officials with an altered "feasibility calculus" ^'* for determining what strategies work, including when and how to make demands and to avoid being a demandeur too often. However, self-restraint as it is used here involves a noncalculative, noninstrumental rationale. Examples of self-restraint would include delegations who drop demands or reservations after failing to convince the group of an argument. Most relevant for the alternative-explanation test is whether one finds instances of self-restraint that do not follow from calculative reasoning (for example, "Do I have the votes?") or, especially, self-restraint where the option of veto or threat thereof exists. To the extent that one finds evidence supporting acts of self-restraint under such conditions, this would lend support to the internalized norms argument. 2. Self-enforcing adherence to informal decision-making norms without threats of external sanctioning. If standard negotiation theories were on the mark, one would expect to see a utilitarian conception of rule-following behavior, supplemented by evidence of regularized cost-benefit analysis. The reason, as Hurd explains, is because "any loyalty by actors toward the system or its rules is contingent on the system providing a positive stream of benefits . . .

23. See fn. 12 for their definition of "process" interests. "Relationship" interests are those in which negotiators "stress the value of their relationships," which can sometimes (under iterative bargaining) take on "an almost transcendent status." Lax and Sebenius 1986, 72. 24. Kerremans 1996, 232.


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actors do not value the relation itself, only the benefits accruing from it."^^ If the instrumental conception of rules fit here, one would also expect to see reliance on institutional enforcement mechanisms and formal rules governing acceptable bargaining behavior.^* In contrast, "sustained compliance" •^^ with informal norms in the absence of external sanctions and calculative reasoning would support the argument that state agents negotiate from shared understandings of appropriate community standards.^^ COREPER norms are informal and self-enforcing^' because adherence to them is considered the "right thing to do," as part of the permreps' principled commitment to collective decision making.-'" The reflex to make decisions by consensus is a classic example of this and a durable practice viewed by the EU permreps as the "right thing to do" regardless of the formal decision-rule. One ambassador claimed that the "consensus-seeking assumption . . . penetrates, in my mind, everything we do."-" The mode of social control in COREPER is compatible with Hurd's legitimacy model, in which it is "noncompliance that requires of the individual special consideration and psychic costs," and in which "the internalization of external standards can .. . defuse Olsonian problems of collective action by causing actors to interpret the mutually cooperative option as also being the individually rational one."-'^ Or as Wendt puts it, "external constraints become internal constraints, so that social control is achieved primarily through self-control."-'^ Evidence of self-enforced informal norms without the threat of external sanctions and constraints would support the noninstrumental appropriateness logic. 3. Empathy and other-regarding behavior not linked to calculative reasoning. The alternative explanation would expect to find empathic behavior linked

25. Hurd 1999, 387. 26. For example, one would expect to see wide recourse to formal rules such as the 1994 Ioannina Compromise, which holds that under conditions of qualified majority voting when a clear blocking minority does not exist (but at least twenty-three to twenty-five votes oppose), the Council will still "do all within its power" to find a "satisfactory solution." Dinan argues that the Ioannina Compromise was a "face-saving device" for "anti-EU" back-benchers in the British parliament and has "had no practical impact on EU decisionmaking." Dinan 1998, 299. For a similar argument—that the impact of the infamous 1966 Luxembourg Compromise to protect "vital national interests" has been highly exaggerated and largely unimportant for bargaining outcomes—see Golub 1999. 27. See Checkel, this volume. 28. Although it should be added here that evidence of this measure may be compatible with either Type I or Type II internalization. Additional tests are needed to measure the degree of "taken-forgrantedness." A useful index to operationalize the distinction used here is the discussion in Hurd 1999 of "habitual" versus "holistic" internalization. 29. See the "Socialization Mechanisms" section below. 30. See also Gheciu, this volume, in which she codes successful socialization as cases where norms are accepted because they are considered normal and "the right thing to do" is to comply with them; norms are not accepted just because they are directly linked to instrumental rewards. 31. Author's interview, 18 March 1997. 32. Hurd 1999,388-89. 33. Wendt 1999,361.

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to instrumental calculations, and in an issue-intensive, in-camera setting such as COREPER, this would be based on both longer time horizons (for example, "I may need help next week") and reputational concerns. But the internalized norms argument expects to see acts of empathy and other-regarding behavior based on a different kind of calculus. The difference from the consequentialist logic is that the internalized norms model expects such acts to be what Wendt calls "self-binding" or "unilateral initiatives with no expectation of specific reciprocity." ^'' Evidence supporting the internalized norms argument would include examples of empathy not linked to an instrumentalist conception of interests but seen as "the right thing to do." More specifically, evidence for Type II—internalized norms—socialization would include those cases in which national representatives worked to convince superiors back in the capitals to accept another delegation's plea or argument while dropping their own, even when veto options existed. This practice would be coded as normative suasion because actors who are persuaded by another's argument then defend the position to their authorities, seeking to convince those authorities to accept the reasoning while at the same time dropping their own unconvincing claim. In other words, these actors are successfully persuaded to change positions, and this carries potential costs to implement (that is, they risk the ire of the capital). Especially relevant for the collective community standards argument are those cases in which the group actively "plots" solutions to overcome domestic reserves, sometimes faking group outrage or artificially simulating a delegation's isolation on a position.^' But the empathy indicator is also clearly a case in which it is misleading to frame the question as "rationalism versus constructivism," as both schools offer similar predictions. Indeed, Keohane discusses several different ways that states can interpret self-interests "empathetically," some of which are consistent with standard bargaining (this would include other-regarding behavior he terms "instrumentally interdependent" and "situationally interdependent") and some of which are more akin to the internalized norm conception (for example, what he calls "empathetie interdependence").^* 4. Limits on instrumentalism through the collective legitimation of arguments. Such acts would be especially relevant—and contrary to standard negotiation predictions—where delegations drop demands after failing to convince the group, despite a theoretical recourse to the threat or use of veto under the unanimity decision-rule. Evidence that standards of appropriateness exist can be seen in cases where group outrage is used to signal that certain things are just not acceptable. One can further contextualize the internalized norms argument into Type I cases in which agents follow "socially expected behavior

34. Wendt 1999, 362. 35. For a discussion of "plotting" practices in COREPER, see the "Mechanisms" section below. 36. Keohane 1984, 120-25.


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in a given setting or community" and Type II cases of accepting community norms as "the right thing to do,"^^ a point returned to in the fourth section, below. But in general, both variants deviate from the alternative explanation of standard negotiation by their noninstrumental, noncalculative motivations.

The Pathway of Socialization in COREPER COREPER is "responsible for preparing the work of the Council and for carrying out the tasks assigned to it by the Council." ^^ From this austere legal basis, COREPER has evolved into a major player in the EU system. Among its "assigned tasks" is the remit to "coordinate the work of the various Council meetings and to endeavour to reach agreement at its level." •'' In essence, this means that COREPER holds responsibility for the performance of the Council as a whole. Permreps claim that this responsibility is an implicit part of the job description. As one ambassador put it, "there is a high collective interest in getting results and reaching solutions. This is in addition to representing the national interest."''" Another claimed to have an unwritten, global, permanent instruction to "find solutions.""' Whatever the case and as these quotes suggest, logics of appropriate behavior and socialization dynamics seem evident within COREPER. The analytic challenge is to establish their scope conditions and mechanisms of operation, tasks to which I now turn.

Scope Conditions Issue density/intensity. COREPER's structural placement imparts a coherence and continuity in the representation of interests that would otherwise be difficult to match. In terms of structural location, COREPER occupies a unique institutional vantage point in the EU system. Vertically placed between the experts and the ministers and horizontally situated with cross-sectoral policy responsibilities, the permreps have a general overview of the Council's work. Relative to the experts meeting in the working groups, they are political heavyweights; but compared to the ministers, they are both policy generalists and experts in the substantive questions of a file. Since the Council's work is based on a concept of sectoral differentiation, pursuing the "national interest" across its sixteen or so formations requires national systems of interest intermediation and interministerial coordination that are complex even for the smallest member states or those with the most centralized EU

37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

Checkel, this volume. Art. 207. Treaty on European Union. Council of the European Union 1997, 39. Author's interview, 12 July 1996. Author's interview, 20 February 1996.

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affairs machinery. It is here that the permreps in COREPER, with their crossCouncil negotiating mandates and intersectoral policy responsibilities, practice an essential aggregation function. A central feature of COREPER's institutional environment is the density of issues and issue-areas that are covered in the agendas of the weekly meetings. No other site of everyday EU decision making approximates the intensity of weekly COREPER negotiations (measured in terms of the number of weekly agenda items and the horizontal nature of these agendas). Thus the agendas of COREPER meetings are qualitatively different than the type encountered at the Council working group level. Unlike the "contact thesis" then, which equates socialization with the amount of interaction,"*^ the pattern discerned here is contingent on the density and quality of interactions. Not only is COREPER distinguished by the intensity of negotiations, but the permreps' involvement across the different domains of EU decision making is pervasive as well. In addition to the regular cycle of weekly meetings, the permreps sit beside their ministers during Council sessions, briefing them and offering tactical suggestions. Permreps attend European Council summits and can serve as behind-the-scenes consultants. The growth of codecision (now considered the EU's "ordinary" legislative procedure) has also created an intense negotiation forum between members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and the deputy permreps who represent the Council."^ Reinforcing the intensity of interactions, the EU permreps also accumulate a great deal of experience through long periods of participation.'*^ The average tenure is five years, slightly longer than the typical three- or four-year diplomatic rotation."*^ But some permreps remain in Brussels for much longer, upwards of a decade or beyond. Another reinforcement mechanism is the COREPER luncheon, held by COREPER II before the monthly General Affairs Council (GAC) and sometimes on a more topical, ad hoc basis. Lunches are frequently used to tackle the thorniest of problems, since attendance is heavily restricted, no notes are taken, and not even translators are present."** There are also informal COREPER trips, hosted by the presidency, that precede European Council summits. In sum, the first scope condition is COREPER's unique structural position in everyday EU decision making, with a brand of intensity that is generated by the density and scope of agendas and widespread participation in nearly all aspects of the Council's work; this is reinforced by extensive periods of interaction and numerous informal venues for negotiation. This scope condition can also be restated in hypothesis form:

42. See Checkel, this volume. 43. Bostock 2002. 44. See Checkel. this volume, for a discussion of the methodological problems in conflating the intensity and duration of interaction. 45. Lewis 1998, 111-13. 46. Butler 1986, 30.


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HI: The internalization of new role conceptions and conceptions of the self in line with group-community norms is more likely when individuals are in settings where contact is intense and sustained. Insulation. One of the central features of COREPER diplomacy is a high degree of insulation from the normal currents of domestic constituent pressures. The meetings themselves are treated with an air of confidentiality, and many sensitive national positions are ironed out in restricted sessions in which the permreps clear the room and can speak frankly and in confidence that what is said will not be reported to the capitals or the media. This often includes group discussion on how an agreement will be packaged and sold to the authorities back home. "At our level, publicity does not exist," an ambassador explained, "Our body is absolutely black; we can do deals."''^ The norms of insulation are so developed that national experts from the capitals are not allowed to attend COREPER meetings at all (one official referred to them as "spies," another called them "the watchdogs" who "are not allowed in the room")."*^ The role of insulation in COREPER diplomacy supports Checkel's hypothesis'" that persuasion and socialization are more likely in "less politicized and more insulated, in-camera settings." A structural feature of COREPER that often goes unnoticed is that insulation affords member states the capacity to reshape domestic constraints. As an ambassador put it, "COREPER is the only forum in the EU where representatives don't have a domestic turf to defend." Because of this, he went on to add, "it is often politically necessary to present a position knowing it is unrealistic. My minister of finance needs certain arguments to be presented. He has certain pressures from his constituencies. We have to make it look like we fought for this even though we both know it will lead nowhere. I will present it, and if it receives no support, I will drop it."^° Along with insulation comes a high degree of input ("voice") in the instruction process, including how arguments/interests are articulated and defended. The degree of voice that the permreps can obtain stems from COREPER's basic mission to find solutions and keep the work of the Council moving forward. One intriguing argument as to why states would choose to create such a highly insulated body comes from recent work by Stasavage. Using a rational choice framework, he shows how "open-door bargaining" and greater levels of transparency can increase "posturing" by negotiators, since they have built-in incentives to present unyielding positions "in order to demonstrate to their constituents that they are effective or committed bargainers."^'

47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

Author's interview, 23 May 2000. Author's interviews, 23 May 2000; and 18 April 1997. See Checkel, this volume. Author's interview, 15 May 2000. Stasavage 2004, 673.

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Domestic insulation has enabled the permreps to develop de facto decisionmaking capabilities.^^ The best empirical indicator of the weight of COREPER's decision-making role is the prolific "A-point" procedure. A-points are "agreed points" (that is, issues agreed to within COREPER) that are passed en bloc and without discussion by the ministers at the beginning of each Council session.^-' Even for files marked as B-points (that is, issues sent to the ministers that require further discussion), the input of COREPER should not be ruled out. In many cases, detailed negotiations have already taken place in COREPER (see the case study below for an example). It is remarkable, in fact, that COREPER's burgeoning de facto decision-making power has escaped every post-Maastricht "democratic deficit" revision unscathed, entirely on the rather thin reed that only ministers have juridical deeisional authority. To summarize, the second scope condition for COREPER socialization is insulated—from both domestic constituencies and dorhestic line ministries— negotiation, coupled with de facto (as opposed to juridical) decision-making authority. This can be restated as follows: H2: The internalization of new role conceptions and conceptions of the self in line with group-community norms is more likely when individuals are in private, incamera settings with a high degree of domestic insulation. Having identified the key conditions under which to expect socialization, I turn now to the major factors that explain how this process occurs and how it can lead to shared understandings of appropriateness—understandings that produce behaviors different from those based on instrumental and utilitarian calculations alone.^'' Socialization Mechanisms Strategic Catcutation and Role Playing: Adherence to Informal Norms. A distinctive feature of COREPER's institutional environment is a robust set of durable yet unwritten and purely informal decision-making norms. One of the most striking aspects of these informal norms is their seemingly "self-binding" nature (Wendt's term). Why do national representatives comply? The interview data strongly suggests that COREPER participants practice pro-norm behavior (in the absence of external sanctioning) because it leads to the acquisition of social influence and diffuse, intangible "social capital." ^^ As a mechanism of socialization.

52. The permanent representatives have no formal decision-making authority. Juridical decisionmaking authority is a power exclusively reserved for the ministers, and formal voting is expressly prohibited at any other level of the Council (compare Art. 7[l] of the Council's Rules of Procedure). 53. Recent studies of the Council have documented the growth and importance of the A-point procedure in the EU legislative process. See, for example, van Schendelen 1996; and Gomez and Peterson 2001. 54. I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this language. 55. For a discussion of "social capital," see Putnam 1993, 169-70.


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behaviorial adaptation to acquire social influence is what this volume would code as strategic calculation.^* The explanation does not end there, however. To get what you want in COREPER, you must also subscribe to socially accepted standards of behavior. Evidence of this pattern would support what this volume calls Type I internalization or role-playing socialization. These informal norms act as cognitive markers for newcomers to adapt to the group's accepted standards. As I will show below in the case of Austria's "opt-out" argument, the group can reject arguments with exaggerated ferocity to shame capitals and pressure a change in national demands. Group outrage is used to signal that certain behavior and justification for demands is simply not done or is not acceptable. Five informal norms stand out. First, there is a norm of diffuse reciprocity, or the diffuse balancing of concessions over an extended shadow of the future.^^ Diffuse reciprocity can take many forms, including concessions and derogations, or "going out on a limb" to persuade the capital for changes or a compromise. Dropping reserves or abstaining (rather than voting "no") are also political gestures that can be filed away and later returned in kind. Second, there is a norm of thick trust and the ability to speak frankly, which is reinforced by weekly meetings, trips, and lunches. Thick trust is especially important during endgame negotiations or restricted sessions when the "real knives come out on the table." ^^ Third, there is a norm of mutual responsiveness that is best described as a shared purpose to understand each other's problems. Knowing and understanding each other's interests and arguments is a key to "receiving understanding from the group." ^^ Mutual responsiveness is a form of collective legitimation, wherein arguments or pleas for special consideration are collectively accepted or rejected by the group. The fourth norm is a consensus-reflex. This is what Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace refer to as "the instinctive recourse to behave consensually." *° Although systematic empirical data is lacking because of the confidentiality of negotiations, participants claim that the overwhelming bulk of decisions are made consensually. Even under conditions of qualified majority voting (QMV), permreps often spend extra time to "bring everyone on board." Pushing for a vote is considered inappropriate in most cases, and the "consensus assumption" is a reflexive habit.*' Finally, there is a culture of compromise premised on a basic willingness to accommodate divergent interests and reinforced by the other norms listed above. This culture is facilitated by the "dynamic density" of COREPER's work and the

56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61.

See Checkel, this volume. See Keohane 1986 for the classic treatise on "diffuse reciprocity." Author's interview, 14 March 1996. On the concept of thick trust, see Putnam 1993, 167-71. Author's interview, 17 February 1997. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1995, 465. Author's interview, 18 March 1997.

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horizontal nature of agendas. The normative effects of this culture include a selfrestraint in the calculations and defense of interests, seen for example when delegations quietly drop reserves after failing to convince the others of their arguments. Taken together, these informal norms are widely practiced and firmly institutionalized in COREPER's organizational culture.^^ As the case study of local elections negotiations will show, adherence to these norms cannot be explained by either a pure incentive-based (consequentialist) or normative (appropriateness) logic, but instead represents a subtle blending of the two. That is, pro-norm behavior is rooted in a complex combination of both strategic calculation and role-playing socialization. Which came first, and how these normative scripts became institutionalized into COREPER routines, remains largely to be told. Normative suasion. COREPER has its own locution, with signals, key phrases, and unspoken meaning. There is also a certain element of theatricality, in manufacturing intrigue; how else could one sit through yet another round of fishing quotas, as one permrep alluded. All of this is the typical grammar of diplomats, to be expected in issue-intensive, insulated settings where negotiators develop long-term interpersonal relationships. Going further though, one also sees a wide range of discursive resources that permreps can use in presenting and collectively legitimating arguments. This real possibility for normative suasion is what separates COREPER from the altemative argument of "normal" interstate negotiation. For example, as the local election case study will show, COREPER is considered the EU's locus classicus for "opt-out" negotiations, since permreps use collective legitimation to determine who warrants special consideration backed by standards of fairness where persuasive justifications carry the day (rather than relative power, voting weights, or the decision-rule). Evidence of this pattem would tend to support Checkel's hypothesis*^ that socialization is more likely where agents do not "lecture or demand" but rather act on "principles of serious deliberative argument." Learning the derogation discourse is an important tool of the trade in COREPER, and senior permreps develop idiosyncratic methods for signaling when they need special dispensations. For many, this includes having a sense of humor when isolated or when national political sensitivities are being discussed. Normative suasion is an important socialization mechanism in COREPER, and unlike the mechanism of strategic calculation, it is sustained over time without respect to the stmcture of incentives or the existence of external sanctions. But argumentative resources are intertwined by consequentialist and appropriateness logics, and it is often difficult to tease the two motivations apart. Put differently, in COREPER, arguments matter. While a truism in almost any type of negotiation, there are no comparable sites within the Council where the

62. See Noel 1967; and Lewis 2003. 63. See Checkel, this volume.


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persuasive power of one's arguments weighs on outcomes.*'' Representatives claim that they come prepared to convince and be convinced by others, and many of the weekly meetings are geared toward reaching a "reasoned consensus" rather than a vote.*^ Arguing and persuasion are also seen in how the permreps signal that something is particularly important or request mutual understanding from the group (irrespective of the formal decision-rule). Participants claim that even in rare instances when they do vote, it is exceptional that this is done without the consent of the "no's."** In COREPER, the power of a good argument can be as compelling as a blocking minority or the shadow of the veto. The possibility of persuading others with a convincing argument and the norms of mutual responsiveness work as a great equalizer in COREPER negotiations. As a result, smaller member states who articulate sound arguments and/or clearly explain their positions can often punch above their weight. According to one participant, "If you convince others, it's with good arguments. Big or small makes no difference. In fact, the big member states often have higher burdens of proof in order to convince the others."*' Another example of normative suasion is how permreps engage in the collective "plotting" of agreements.*^ Plotting is a negotiation pattern in COREPER that demonstrates how a collective rationality can reformulate individual, instrumental rationality. The basic function of plotting is using the group to redefine a national position or to reshape domestic constraints.*' "To get new instructions we have to show [the capital] we have a black eye," an ambassador explained, "We can ask COREPER for help with this; it is one of our standard practices."™ According to another, "Sometimes I will deal with impossible instructions by saying, 'Mr. Chairman, can I report back the fierce opposition to this by the fourteen others?' And sometimes fierceness is exaggerated for effect."'" Exaggerating the fierceness of opposition is thus a group strategy to collectively legitimate or reject arguments. A clear illustration of this practice is seen below in the way the group handles Austria's claim for special treatment. In general, as standard negotiation theory explains, plotting and underlining opposition are tools of the trade to deal with recalcitrant bargaining positions. But in

64. But see Puetter's 2003 analysis of the Eurogroup Council as a deliberative process based on a "shared normative framework." 65. Although it is important to emphasize here that EU permreps, without exception, stress the importance of the decision-rule in contextualizing negotiations. It is a cliche in COREPER that qualified majority voting is the surest way to reach consensus. 66. Author's interviews, 15 May 2000; and 12 July 1996. 67. Author's interview, 29 May 2000. Based on survey data of 218 national officials in the EU, Egeberg, Schaefer, and Trondal find that infiuence on committees is considerably higher among those with demonstrable expertise than those from big states per se. Egeberg, Schaefer, and Trondal 2003, 28, tab. 11. 68. See Lewis 2002, 292, for an example. 69. Two-level games researchers call this "COG collusion." Evans 1993, 406-7. 70. Author's interview, 15 May 2000. 71. Author's interview, 26 May 2000.

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COREPER, this takes on an additional layer of collective legitimation as a framework of shared meaning within the standards of appropriateness. As Risse argues, in a "collective communicative process" actors are engaged in determining "whether norms of appropriate behavior can he justified, and which norms apply under given circumstances."^^ This is a hallmark of COREPER's role in the EU system, and viewed from the process level of everyday decision making, the stamp of collectively negotiated standards of appropriateness is unmistakahle. In the case of local elections (see helow), this can he seen in how the permreps deliberate derogation requests against a principled commitment for maximal interpretation of "equal treatment" standards in EU voting rights.

Methods and Data My research design follows a methodological strategy of "empirical triangulation" combining several qualitative and quantitative data sources: semi-structured interviews, archival documentation (Council documents such as the travaux preparatoires, press releases, agendas, and so on), and secondary sources. My primary data sources are semi-structured interviews with COREPER participants. To date, I have conducted 118 interviews at the permanent representations and with regular COREPER participants from the Commission and the Council General Secretariat (CGS).^'' Interviewing took place in four rounds over a seven-year period.^'' Controlling for Prior Exposure and Self-Selection Three methods were used to limit potential measurement problems, such as prior exposure to EU decision making. First, interview subjects were asked direct questions about their initial participation in COREPER negotiations, how they articulated their written instructions, and what, if any, changes occurred over time. Second, the interviews sampled "newcomers" at two levels: individual participants and new member states (both Nordic and Central/Eastern European newcomers are included in the sample). Third, I was able to re-interview some participants at a later date and compare their responses. Several generalizable patterns emerged. The interviews track similar learning curves for newcomers, even those with different backgrounds and from different national administrative cultures. Participants typically claim that when they began attending the Committee, they learned that defending instructions alone had lim-

72. Risse 2000, 7. 73. The sample includes: thirty-one permanent representatives (eighteen ambassadors and thirteen deputies), thirty-two top advisors to the permreps (known as the "Antici" [COREPER II] and "Mertens" [COREPER I] counselors), thirty policy specialists, nine legal advisors, ten officials in national capitals, and six others. 74. Specifically, February-July 1996, February-April 1997, May 2000, and May-June 2003.


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ited effectiveness.^^ This involves more than learning just strategy; effectiveness, according to participants, includes developing a sense of self-restraint and the ability to balance the specific instructions on a single file with more global instructions to keep the work of the Council moving forward. Another pattern is that newcomers initially tend to view their counterparts as rivals. "I saw my colleagues as opponents at first," one deputy commented.'"' Another claimed, "Early in our membership we acted tough and we had these positions, 'Others don't like it, too bad.' But the politicians back home learned fast to be prepared to compromise. Now we are known as a country others can turn to for a compromise."^' On balance, the evidence suggests that newcomers have relatively high levels of ingrained cognitive priors, which supports Checkel's hypothesis'^ that under such conditions there will be greater resistance to normative suasion. The COREPER novice who "treats colleagues as opponents" undergoes a period of social learning (and mimicry) during which they adopt new cognitive templates in order to operate in an unfamiliar environment. Some newcomers recall receiving extra patience and understanding from the group; a permrep from one of the newer EU member states commented, "They [COREPER] gave [us] and the new member states special patience, but now I think that's over." ™ In summary, while no guarantee against potential measurement bias, the built-in controls of triangulation, newcomer sampling, and re-interviewing help to minimize such effects. More importantly, they strengthen the case for the independent causal influence of socialization dynamics within COREPER. To directly test the four socialization measures spelled out in section two, the argument now shifts to an examination of the 1994 local elections directive, a controversial and politically unpopular extension of voting and participatory rights for EU citizens. With this directive, for the first time, the EU allowed citizens from any member state to vote and run for office in municipal elections based on wherever they resided in the EU.^"

Socialization in COREPER: The Case of the 1994 Local Elections Directive The EU foreign affairs ministers, meeting in the GAC, adopted a directive on the right to vote and run for municipal elections on 19 December 1994.^' The 75. One common response was that following written instructions alone (that is, just reading from them) was a sure way to be left out of the discussion. 76. Author's interview, 17 March 1996. 77. Author's interview, 14 March 1996. 78. See Checkel, this volume. 79. Author's interview, 14 March 1996. 80. Numerically, the directive enfranchised approximately 5.3 million EU citizens living in another EU-15 member state. Lewis 1998, tab. 5-2, 215. 81. Council Directive 94/80/EC. The full title is the directive "[Ljaying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals." Official Journal L 368/38, 31 December 1994.

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substance of this directive had already been agreed upon twelve days earlier in COREPER. Negotiations were intentionally kept out of the GAC and the ambassadors were encouraged to reach an agreement in COREPER that could then be formally rubber-stamped by the ministers. The local elections directive covered sensitive domestic political issues of electoral and citizenship laws, requiring the majority of member states to pass constitutional amendments to extend rights to "nonnational" EU citizens. The directive effectively established a principle of equal treatment between national and nonnational EU citizens. Moreover, the principle of equal treatment was agreed upon at a level of maximum coverage, with a minimalist interpretation of acceptable national "opt-outs." The principle of equal treatment agreed to in COREPER even went beyond earlier Commission proposals that considered minimum residency requirements a prerequisite for expanding local voting rights to Community nationals.*^ During negotiations, several delegations (including Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden) initially voiced preferences for maintaining residency requirements that already existed in national law (see Table 1). However, the final terms of the directive allowed minimum residency rules in Luxembourg and, on an extremely limited basis, in Belgium. It was a shared understanding among the EU permreps that "opt-outs" would have to meet high standards for justification because of the potential for derogations to water down the scope and application of local voting rights. From the earliest discussions in COREPER, there was an informal and sometimes shifting majority of members who defended the need for equal treatment between national and nonnational EU citizens. Counterfactually, the argument presented here is that minus socialization, the final outcome would have been very different—if agreement would have been reached at all.

Explaining the Local Elections Negotiations: Testing the Alternative Explanation This article contends that everyday EU decision making is not all about relative power, formal decision-rules, and instrumental interest calculations. If it were, the alternative argument is that bargaining behavior and everyday outcomes can be explained with standard negotiation theory and two-level games analysis. However, if the alternative explanation was correct, one would expect to see a very different sequence of bargaining behavior leading to a different kind of outcome than what occurred in this case. First, although at least four delegations (Denmark, France, Greece, and Austria) were interested in derogations and could have credibly linked such claims to the "shadow of the veto", none did. Moreover, after

82. The Commission's position was for minimum residence at least equal to the term of local office to vote, and double the term of office in order to stand for election. European Communities Bulletin 9-1986, 44. In effect, this would apply the Luxembourg derogation (see discussion below) to the entire EU.


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TABLE 1. National legislation governing municipal elections

Existing national legislation before the 1994 local elections directive

Member state

Basis for electoral rights

Ireland

Residence

All nonnational residents eighteen years and older, who have lived in Ireland for at least six months can vote and run for office in local elections (1973 Electoral Act, right to vote; 1974 Electoral Act, right to run for office).

Denmark

Residence

Since 1977, the right to vote and run for local office has been extended to nationals of the Nordic Union (Finland, Sweden, Iceland, Norway) who are eighteen years or older and have met minimum residency requirements (Law of 18 May 1977). In 1981, these rights were extended to all nonnationals (Law No. 143 of 30 March 1981 Amending the Law Governing Municipal Elections and by Decree of the Minister of the Interior No. 196 of 22 April 1981).

Netherlands

Residence

In 1983, Article 130 of the Constitution was amended to allow all nonnationals the right to vote and run for office in local elections, subject to a minimum residency requirements.

Britain

Residence and nationality

The right to vote and run for office in local elections is extended to Irish nationals and Commonwealth citizens who are over the age of eighteen (to vote) or twenty-one (to stand as candidate) and have met minimum residency requirements.

Spain

Nationality

Since 1985, the right to vote in local elections (but not to stand as a candidate) can be extended to nonnational residents by treaty or law on a reciprocal basis (Article 3 of the General Electoral Law of 19 July 1985).

Portugal

Nationality

Since 1982, nationals of a Portuguese-speaking country may be given the right to vote in local elections by treaty or by law on a reciprocal basis. Only one such agreement was reached, with Brazil, extending the right for Brazilian nationals to vote in local Portuguese elections after having lived in Portugal for five years.

Finland

Nationality

Since 1977, the right to vote and run for local office has been extended to nationals of the Nordic Union (Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, Norway) who are eighteen years or older, and have met minimum residency requirements.

Sweden

Nationality

Since 1977, the right to vote and run for local office has been extended to nationals of the Nordic Union (Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway) who are eighteen years or older, and have met minimum residency requirements.

France

Nationality

The rights to vote and run for office are constitutionally reserved for French nationals (Article 3). (continued)

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TABLE 1.

(CONTINUED)

Existing national legislation before the 1994 local elections directive

Member state

Basis for electoral rights

Germany

Nationality

The rights to vote and run for office are constitutionally reserved for German nationals (Article 20 and 28[1] of the Basic Law).

Italy

Nationality

The rights to vote and run for office are constitutionally reserved for Italian nationals (Articles 48 and 51).

Belgium

Nationality

The rights to vote and run for office are constitutionally reserved for Belgian nationals (Article 4).

Luxembourg

Nationality

Greece

Nationality

The rights to vote and run for office are ally reserved for Luxembourg nationals and 107). The rights to vote and run for office are ally reserved for Greek nationals (Article

Austria

Nationality

constitution(Articles 52 constitution51).

The rights to vote and run for office are constitutionally reserved for Austrian nationals.

failing to convince the group on the merits of their special circumstances, each reconsidered or dropped their demands. In the counterfactual "diplomacy 101" scenario, COREPER sans socialization, this behavior would remain anomalous. Second, the alternative explanation would not hypothesize a maximalist interpretation of Article 8(b) establishing the principle of equal treatment between national and nonnational EU citizens in municipal elections. Given the sensitive domestic political issues concerning electoral and citizenship laws,^^ as well as the unanimity decision-rule that applied here, one would expect a much wider acceptance of national derogation and exemption claims than resulted. In short, the "diplomacy 101" model would predict a tendency toward a least-common-denominator application of Article 8(b). But as I will show, explaining the bargaining behavior of the EU permreps as well as the (maximalist) outcome is not possible without reference to how standards of appropriateness and group-community norms to collectively legitimate arguments are an internalized part of COREPER's collective culture.

83. tn fact, Eurobarometer data from this era show no issue-area where EU citizens opposed EU action more. Eurobarometer, No. 39, EC, DG X, 1993. Cited in Eurostat 1996, 241. For example: 0 against 66 19 Common foreign policy toward countries outside the EU 52 38 A single currency should replace all the national currencies in the EU by 1999 Each citizen of a country in the EU should have the right to vote in the munici48 41 pal elections of the country in which he/she is resident


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Relevance of Scope Conditions The local elections case provides solid evidence for how scope conditions play a role in promoting socialization. The intensity dimension is seen in the complex linkages hetween local elections and the larger political stakes of implementing the necessary secondary legislation of the Maastricht Treaty on time. Specifically, the treaty set a 31 December 1994 deadline to reach agreement on the detailed implementation rules for local voting rights. There was a general perception of responsibility among the permreps to reach agreement on a directive that would become a key substantive component of the fledghng EU citizenship chapter agreed to at Maastricht. This sense of responsibility comes out clearly in content analysis of interviews with participants, who claimed there was a shared belief that if it was sent to the ministers they would either not reach agreement at all or would be unable to "contain" discussions for derogations. A protracted stalemate on local elections, a heated debate among the foreign ministers, or a substantively watered-down directive in the scope and terms of application were all scenarios that the EU permreps collectively wanted to avert. Within this context, negotiations were both intense and sustained, supporting Hypothesis 1 (that internalized group-community standards are more likely under such conditions). The local elections case also illustrates the importance of the second background condition: insulation. In this instance, many of the permreps were instructed by their capital to keep negotiations at their level and avoid the GAC. One official claimed his ambassador's instructions clearly signaled the need to "keep it away from the press, where it would have been politicized quickly."^'* Another explained, "We all knew that if the discussion was put a certain way we never would reach agreement. Because of the press, pressure from national populations, the idea that 'We will be run by foreigners.'"^^ This supports Stasavage's findings that insulated negotiations are a strategically rational institutional design where the risks of posturing run high.^* The high degree of insulation manufactured to help COREPER "find solutions" also clearly supports Hypothesis 2 (that internalized norms are more likely under such conditions). Indeed, insulation proved critical to the process of normative suasion, seen below in the use of "restricted" sessions to sort out whose pleas for special consideration warranted attention. The restricted ambassadors-only setting provided a degree of insulation for principled debate and deliberative argumentation that other Council bodies, especially the GAC, simply did not possess.

84. Author's interview, 10 May 1996. 85. Author's interview, 18 April 1997. 86. Stasavage 2004.

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Negotiating Derogations: Collective Legitimation and the Principle of Equal Treatment The most critical stage of negotiations centered on who would receive derogations from the scope and application of the directive. The entire agreement hinged on this issue, because it would define how extensive coverage was and whether the principle of equal treatment would be interpreted in a maximal or minimal sense. When the ambassadors began derogation discussions in the fall of 1994, nearly half were under instruction to seek special consideration, although the presentation of these "special problems" would only be played out over the next seven weeks. In particular, six member states would claim serious domestic political difficulties: Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Greece, Austria, and Belgium. See Table 2. Luxembourg received the earliest support for a derogation, and discussion reiterated why this was justified, given the high proportion of nonnational Community residents—nearly 30 percent of the total electorate.^^ There was also the precedent of the 1993 directive on the right to vote in European Parliament elections, where Luxembourg was allowed to set minimum residency requirements of five years for nonnational EU voters and ten years for candidates.^^ The agreed wording of the derogation covers a member state where nonnational EU citizens form more than 20 percent of the total electorate, effectively limiting the exemption to Luxembourg (that is, the 20-percent threshold is not applicable to individual municipalities within member states). But the Luxembourg exception did create a precedent that other delegations would try to extend to their own "special" problems in justifying a case for national derogations. Denmark, for example, already allowed all foreign nationals the right to vote in local elections after a minimum residency of three years. They therefore wanted to extend this residency requirement to nonnational EU citizens as a special clause to the directive. But few supported a fixed residency requirement, under the logic that Danish nationals were not subject to the same restriction and, it was argued, this would violate the principle of equal treatment between national and nonnational EU citizens.^' Group discussion led to a consensus that equal treatment should not be enforced by sliding scale, whereas justification in the case of Luxembourg could be extended by varying degrees to other domestic contexts.'" This cirgument carried considerable persuasive power, and there is no evidence that Denmark put up much of a struggle after failing to sell their case in COREPER. The Danish ambassador kept

87. In the other member states, the average proportion of nonnational EU residents to nationals varied from 0.1 percent (Finland) to 6 percent (Belgium) of the electorate. See Lewis 1998, tab. 5-3, 222. 88. Council Directive 93/109/EC. Official Journal L 329/34, 30 December 1993. Following adoption of the EP voting directive, a number of researchers predicted the local elections directive would be more controversial. See, for example, Koslowski 1994, 389; and Oliver 1996, 475, 489. 89. Author's interview, 21 May 1996. 90. Author's interviews, 21 May 1996; 18 April 1997; and 18 May 2000.


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TABLE 2. Derogation arguments for the 1994 local elections directive

Persuasive argument?

Collectively legitimated outcome

Member state

Nature of the problem

Luxembourg

30 percent of electorate are nonnational EU citizens.

Yes

Article 12(1). May establish minimum residency requirements for nonnational EU citizens, not to exceed the term length of the local office in question (to vote) and twice the term length to stand as candidate.

Denmark

All foreign nationals can vote in local elections after meeting a residency requirement of three years; Community nationals should still be required to meet this requirement.

No

Danish nationals are not subject to this requirement; would violate the principle of equal treatment between all EU citizens.

France

Certain local offices participate in the College des grands electeurs senatoriaux and have powers to elect delegates to the parliamentary assembly.

Yes

Article 5(4). Allows additional restrictions on local offices designating delegates who vote in or elect members to the parliamentary assembly.

In municipalities where more than 20 percent of voters are nonnational EU citizens, only 20 percent of the seats in the local assembly should be held by such nationals.

No

Violates the principle of equal treatment, and the restriction of posts to own nationals in Article 5(3).

Greece

Desired extension of the Luxembourg derogation to the local level.

No

Exemptions should be as restricted as possible and are not applicable to local government units; the Luxembourg derogation applies to the national level.

Austria

Desired extension of the Luxembourg derogation to the local level. Territorial division of electorate into linguistic communities.

No

Exemptions should be restricted as possible.

Yes

Article 12(2). May restrict application of directive to certain communes, a list of which must be published one year before elections are held.

Belgium

as

the reservation on the table until the 7 December session of COREPER, neither removing the request for a residency requirement nor pushing very hard for amendment. Unable to convince others, the Danish delegation dropped their reserve and accepted the directive as it stood. Standard bargaining theory would have expected something different here, either a tacit or explicit linkage to the "shadow of the

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Intertiational Orgatiization

veto," or at minimum, a more visible cost-benefit analysis weighing an agreement with no residency requirements against the political difficulty of reforming national electoral and citizenship legislation. "Diplomacy 101" would also expect to find an active campaign by Denmark to support other delegations with similar preferences (especially France, Belgium, and possibly Greece and Austria). France requested a derogation because of special problems in municipalities where mayors had authority to elect Senate delegates. Specifically, the French wished to exclude municipal offices with independent powers in Senate elections from the scope of the directive. Based on this argument, they received support and understanding in COREPER. The group's rationale for accepting the derogation was that Article 8b(l) of the Maastricht Treaty clearly delimits the scope of voting and participatory rights to the municipal level. In addition, the French made a second special request to restrict the directive's scope by limiting the number of local seats open to nonnational BU citizens in specific municipalities. In October, under pressure from Paris and the political signals being sent from the Senate, the French ambassador was instructed to argue for a clause limiting the number of seats open to other member states' citizens to 20 percent in municipalities where more than 20 percent of the electorate were nonnational EU citizens." The new French proposal suggested the following restriction: In the basic local government units where the number of voters within the scope of Article 3 represents more than 20% of national voters, the Member State of residence may limit to this proportion the number of elected representatives who are nationals of other Member States authorized to sit in the assemblies of such local authorities.'^ In practical terms, this would have extended the Luxembourg derogation to the local level. Greece showed early support for the idea, but the German, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, and British delegations placed the "gravest reservations" on the proposal as a violation of the principle of equal treatment.'-' In the course of discussing the "quota system" at several different meetings, a majority of ambassadors spoke in support of rejecting this argument, while others, including the French ambassador, remained silent. The ambassadors who found the French request unconvincing argued that the derogation would result in a patchy implementation of the directive and render the Treaty's objective of endowing EU citizenship with distinct rights a hollow shell. The French ambassador, under instruction, kept this reservation in place right up until the end, when it was dropped after the lunch session of COREPER on 7 December.''*

91. 92. 93. 94.

Author's interview, 10 March 1997. Council Document 8810/94, 7 September 1994, 8. Author's interviews, 4 and 18 March 1997. See discussion below.


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Why the French would drop this reserve requires a two-part explanation, of which neither part fits the standard negotiation story. First, the French ambassador became convinced that a maximal interpretation of equal treatment was essential and the quota system was incompatible with this concept.'^ Second and more tellingly, the French ambassador then went "out on a limb" to convince foreign ministry superiors (who were well aware of the bellwether position of the Senate on nonnational citizenship rights) that the quota argument was unconvincing and lacked justification.'* Going one step further, below I track how the change in French position and quiet removal of the quota proposal, coupled with acceptance of others' derogation claims, shows a clear instance of Type II normative suasion. Greece and Austria both experienced difficulties generating understanding for their special problems. Both arguments were rejected in COREPER, and each shows a dynamic of collective legitimation that the alternative explanation would miss because of the irreducible quality of communicative rationality involved. Nor can standard negotiation theory explain why the rejectees made no recourse to the "shadow of the veto." One rejection came informally and was essentially unspoken, while the other required a more dramatic technique. Raised initially at the working-group level and during informal bilateral talks, the Greek delegation voiced what one group member described as "their hypothetical concern that they could have the future obligation to give Turkish citizens the right to vote" should Turkey ever become an EU member state.'' But Greece never came out and made an argument for a derogation at the group level in COREPER. The Greeks, perhaps aware that their argument lacked persuasive power, quietly dropped their reserve. A similar hypothetical concern was raised by Austria, but this time the group relied on a more explicit rejection from the presidency, then held by Germany, to delegitimize and even "shame" Austria's claim for special understanding. "They were afraid of how the directive would be accepted internally," a group representative recalled, "They are afraid of extreme Right movements and they have a high standard of living, so it was not easy to explain to them the advantage of the directive." '^ The Austrian ambassador pressed for a special derogation twice at the level of COREPER. The first time, no one said anything in reply. "We just sat there and listened," a participant recalled: [German Ambassador] von Kyaw [as Chair] waited to see what would happen. But the second time Austria raised the issue, von Kyaw was very rough to the Austrian Permanent Representative. The Austrian Ambassador said in COREPER, "What is the logical argument why you cannot accept our case?" Von Kyaw replied very sharply, "We are here meeting very pragmatically, I

95. 96. 97. 98.

Author's Author's Author's Author's

interviews, 10 March 1997; 18 May 2000; and 23 May 2000. interview, 18 May 2000. interview, 17 February 1997. interview, 18 March 1997.

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don't have to explain the logical case to you." He said this very rough and it was the last we heard of the Austrian derogation.'' Interviews at Austria's permanent representation confirm that the group rejection was presented back in Vienna as a consensus among the other member states for a maximal interpretation of the directive's application, but that the group gave assurances that a review procedure would enable future reevaluation.'°° Austria's "black eye" in this case is consistent with the delegation's reputation early in their membership for delivering rigid instructions and inflexible policy positions in Brussels. It is plausible that differences between the Greek and Austrian appeals to the group were partly a function of the latter's noviceness (Austria joined the EU in January 1995). One large member state's ambassador with senior status among the group summarized Austria's behavior in this case as simply, "they were too new."'°' The pattern evidenced here also lends support to Checkel's hypothesis that socialization is more likely when agents have fewer ingrained cognitive priors and behefs that are inconsistent with the socializing agency's message.'"^ While it is important to avoid overstating the difference in tact by Greece and Austria, the internalized norms argument would account for the difference in argumentation by contrasting two delegations at very different stages of membership and degrees of intemalization.'"'' The noviceness argument is also relevant for relating the differential behavior of Greece and Austria to what this volume calls role-playing (Type I) socialization. As Checkel explains, role-playing socialization involves a process whereby an agent learns new roles, acquiring the knowledge to act upon them.'** In this instance, one can code Austrian bargaining behavior as too new to act the role, compared to Greece's more cautious and informal probing of group support for some form of limited exemption. A key question for Type I socialization is how does one know what is a socially expected role in a given community setting? Austria's bargaining approach shows how such a learning process among newcomers might work in COREPER, and it represents an important learning experience for them to acquire the knowledge to act on a new role. Whatever the case, the interviews consistently confirm that the group rejection of Austria's demand was a key delimiter in derogation negotiations. Indeed, from this point on, a maximal interpretation of equal treatment prevailed. For those who still had outstanding derogation claims—including Denmark, France, and Belgium, as well as Greece's hypothetical and as-yet informal request—the Austrian

99. Author's interview, 10 March 1997. 100. Author's interviews, 18 March 1996; and 10 May 1996. 101. Author's interview, by telephone to national capital, 22 April 2003. 102. See Checkel, this volume. 103. An irony here is that few EU specialists would code Greece as an exemplar at internalizing EU norms. For an argument that Greece is a laggard in adopting EU norms, see Marks 1997. 104. Checkel, this volume.


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rejection served as a marker for the standards by which derogation arguments would be measured. The final "special" problem was raised by Belgium, which proved to be the endgame of derogation talks. Because of cleavages between the French, Dutch, and German language communities in Belgium, the directive had the potential to alter linguistic majorities within municipalities.'*^^ Strategically, the Belgian delegation waited to present their case until the others' arguments had been heard. One ambassador recalled that the issue was "How to accept the Belgium problem without opening the Pandora's box of Treaty revision?" "We were able to do it in COREPER," he added, "but it would have been difficult to do in a crowded, mediacized General Affairs Council." '°* The Belgian ambassador requested a restricted session to clear the room and said, "We will need constitutional changes to transpose this directive and the Flemish Chamber will not accept it without a derogation." Unlike the other failed derogation arguments, the Belgian problem was justified with a persuasive argument, and one that genuinely convinced the others, even those who were initially skeptical. According to an ambassador from one of the large member states, "An example of persuasion and being convinced was the Belgian derogation on local elections. When I first read it, I thought, 'This is stupid.' But I became convinced they had a real problem there." ' ° ' The Belgian derogation was settled the following week over lunch (on 7 December), again in the restricted, ambassadors-only format. The terms of the derogation are included as an annex to the directive. Specifically: Belgium states that if it were to make use of the derogation provided for in Article 12(2) that derogation would be applied to only some of the local government units in which the number of voters within the scope of Article 3 exceeded 20% of all voters where the Belgian government regarded the specific situation as justifying an exceptional derogation of that kind.'"^ The 7 December lunch included a group discussion of how to explain the Belgian derogation to their capitals. As one participant explained, "we had a discussion of the type of arguments we could use back to our capitals to explain why this derogation was necessary."'"' The ambassadors from France and Denmark agreed to drop their requests for exemption. The Greek and Austrian delegates remained quiet. Portugal's ambassador also expressed confidence that Lisbon would agree to abstain, despite instructions to reject any derogation. Before restarting COREPER after lunch, the ambassadors each telephoned their foreign ministers to explain the agreement reached.

105. 106. 107. 108. 109.

de Wilde d'Estmael and Franck 1996, 40. Author's interview, 18 March 1997. Author's interview, 18 May 2000. Official Journal L 386/47, 31 December 1994. Ibid.

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The trickiest conversations were with Paris and Lisbon. The French ambassador used his considerable seniority to convince his foreign minister that the directive was acceptable. Likewise, the Portuguese ambassador sold the compromise reached in COREPER, but only after a lengthy conversation with his foreign minister. In this case, the minister and ambassador agreed that dissatisfaction with the extent of derogations did not warrant the use (or threat) of veto, but instead it was decided that Portugal would abstain."" Portugal's abstention, rather than use (or threat) of the veto, shows how informal norms such as diffuse reciprocity operate in the context of COREPER's institutional environment and how they can promote pro-norm behavior. Portugal's carefully weighted decision to abstain following detailed communications between the ambassador and foreign minister also displays evidence of what this volume calls strategic calculation. Specifically, the abstention was a creative solution to signal a difference of view while conforming to normative standards and the reasoned consensus, and in the process generating potential "social capital" for the future. Abstaining, in this framework of meaning, is a "self-binding" form of restraint that can contribute to one's social infiuence.

Alternative Explanations Revisited: Internalized Norms or Diplomacy 101? Critical to showing that this goes beyond simple negotiation theory, I found ample evidence of how group discussions collectively legitimated some arguments while rejecting others. The group actively persuaded delegations with derogation instructions to accept a strong interpretation of the principle of equal treatment. In some cases persuasion was informal and bilateral, in others it was via strategic interventions of the German presidency, and sometimes (as in the case of Austria), this persuasion was at the collective COREPER level. As negotiations reached their final stages, the issue of how to handle the Belgian argument was contained within COREPER's institutionalized remit to find solutions. This differs from the standard logic of two-level games analysis (that is, Belgium shows they have "tied hands" to gain a dispensation) because of the socialization component involved. Without the collective legitimation of derogation claims by group-community standards, one would have expected the principled commitment to equal treatment of national and nonnational EU citizens to unravel at this stage because of recourse to the veto and the capacity of veto threats to become credibly linked to the Belgian exception. If this were all about instrumental rationality, relative power, and the formal decision-rule, one would have expected a

110. As one of the largest "exporters" of EU citizens, Portugal preferred no derogations beyond the Luxembourg exception. As such, the Portuguese were skeptical of both the French concession regarding scope and the limited territorial application for Belgium. An official at Portugal's permrep explained that the abstention "was an elegant way to live with the text. It was a special way to avoid disagreement, but to make a political gesture." Author's interview, 10 March 1997.


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style of brinkmanship by Denmark, France, Greece, and Austria as the Belgian issue lurked in the background and the 31 December deadline loomed. In short, one would have seen a different outcome. As the participants saw it, the Belgian problem lurked in the background even before the Belgian ambassador asked for a partial, flexible derogation; the issue was more how to justify the Belgian exception without opening the Pandora's box of special dispensations for any member with sensitive national concerns. Reaching a normative consensus on acceptable derogations was based on group-community standards of fairness, and included obligations of appropriate self-restraint for those delegations who lacked persuasive arguments (which helps account for the complete lack of veto threats, even among "exporter" states such as Portugal). In the case of Austria's argument, the instrumental rationale ("Why can't the group explain the logical case to us") not only failed, but group norms were used to shame the Austrian position and delegitimize the argument as unacceptable. The Belgian ambassador, widely considered the doyen of COREPER during the late 1980s and 1990s, used his considerable argumentative resources to convince the others that the derogation would be of a closed nature, and used as sparingly as possible. The Belgian derogation unambiguously demonstrates the power of persuasion and role of argumentative rationality in everyday EU decision making: a small state with a "good" argument convinced the others, some of whom were initially skeptical, to accept their claim and in a few cases "go out on a limb" to sell the agreed results back home to the capital. The local elections example thus offers empirical support for the internalized norms argument, and the case evidence displays both Type I and Type II characteristics. Type I internalization—rule-following behavior based on socially expected standards'"—can be seen in the way those with unconvincing derogation claims dropped their demands. This includes Denmark, Greece, Austria, and France on quotas. Evidence of Type I internalization can also be seen in the nonaction of "exporter" states such as Portugal, who logically preferred no derogations at all, but displayed none of the instrumental calculative reasoning (including any hint of recourse to veto rights) that would be expected in the standard bargaining explanation. Portugal's abstention is more consistent with the logic of appropriateness and socially accepted standards to avoid blockage of the group's "reasoned consensus" around partial, limited exemption for Belgium, France (on mayoral candidates), and Luxembourg. Type II internalization—accepting group-community standards as "the right thing to do" "^—is evidenced by the "reasoned consensus" legitimating Belgium's plea for special consideration. The strongest evidence of Type II normative suasion can be seen in the actions of the French ambassador. Carefully triangulated interview histories support a characterization that he was genuinely persuaded by his Bel-

111. See Checkel, this volume. 112. Ibid.

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gian colleague's argument, after initial doubts, and then went on to convince his superiors in Paris to accept Belgium's partial exemption while at the same time dropping the French preference for a quota system. According to the key participants involved, this action was premised on becoming convinced that helping Belgium was the right thing to do. As one ambassador put it, "we found understanding in our capitals . . . in the end we persuaded our governments, we did it very much for Belgium."' '^ In summary, the local elections case offers evidence that COREPER socialization affects not only strategies, but also conceptions of the self Evidence of an expanded conception of the self, in which permreps practice internalized groupcommunity standards based on a noncalculative logic of appropriateness, can be seen in both the bargaining behavior and outcome of the local elections case. The interview and case-study data offer confirming evidence for the four socialization measures discussed in section two. First, I have shown noninstrumental selfrestraint among several delegations after they failed to convince the others of their argument (including Denmark, France, and Greece). Second, there were numerous examples of self-enforcing adherence to informal norms, such as the "self-control" of derogation claimants to not explicitly reference veto options or drop reserves based on favorable cost-benefit ratios. Third, evidence of empathy and otherregarding behavior not linked to calculative reasoning can be seen in the "reasoned consensus" to legitimate Belgium's derogation claim even though several ambassadors had to sell the validity of Belgium's case to their superiors while dropping their own claims. Fourth, and finally, this case illustrates the limits on instrumentalism through the collective legitimation of arguments. Restricted sessions were used to collectively accept and reject derogation claims (and "plot" ways to sell the Belgian derogation to ministers) around a shared understanding of maximal interpretation of equal treatment. As a result, the internalized norms argument can more fully account for the way in which Denmark, France, and Greece quietly dropped, or chose not to articulate, derogation claims than can "diplomacy 101." More dramatically, the group rejection of Austria's claim demonstrates how collective legitimation places limits on instrumental behavior by signaling that certain behavior is just not acceptable. In sum, the constructivist logic of internalized norms can better account for both the bargaining behavior and outcomes of the local elections case than the rationalist logic of consequences alone.

Conclusion: Blurring the National and the European COREPER's institutional architecture challenges the conventional dichotomy that sharply demarcates the national and European levels. As a collectivity of memberstate representatives, COREPER exemplifies the imagery of national and Euro-

113. Author's interview, by telephone to national capital, 22 April 2003.


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pean levels of governance becoming amalgamated."'' Accordingly, COREPER's Janus-like design is an anomaly for theorists who draw rigid distinctions between "national" and "supranational" agency. For example, in one prominent account of European integration, the corporate body of "supranational entrepreneurs" in the EU is effectively limited to European Commissioners."^ But the EU permreps belie such a straightforward pigeonhole. As Wallace puts it, "It would be a caricature of this intricate policy process to counterpose national actors and supranational entrepreneurs as separate elites, promoting opposed interests.""* The permreps who participate in weekly COREPER negotiations and share a collective responsibility to maintain the output of the Council as a whole, nicely illustrate how the logics of consequences and appropriateness can interface, which in turn suggests that national and supranational identifications can become complexly intertwined. According to March and Olsen, "Political actors . . . calculate consequences and follow rules, and the relationship between the two is often subtle.""^ Perhaps surprisingly, permreps do not self-reflectively see these as competitive or contradictory role/identity sets. My findings are somewhat at odds with others in this volume, such as Beyers and Hooghe, who offer clear-cut evidence of ranked "primary" and "secondary" allegiances among EU officials."^ A major difference, of course, is the point of reference: they are examining the administrative expert level of Council working groups and Commission officials, and both of these display qualitative differences from COREPER in scope conditions as well as what Egeberg refers to as "organizational characteristics." ' " The testimonies of the permreps interviewed for this project suggest that identities and role conceptions are not so clearly juxtaposed at this level of the EU system. Overall, the evidence points to a pattern of symbiosis between national and collective identities.'^° The EU permreps have operationalized the concept of "double-hatting." '^' Instead of limited notions of shifts and transfers of identity, or clearly juxtaposed primary and secondary affiliations, what one sees in COREPER is a cognitive blurring of the sharp definitional boundaries between the national and the European. None of this implies national identities are becoming marginalized; rather, what stands out is the interpenetration of the national

114. H. Wallace 2000, 7. 115. Moravcsik 1998,54-60,479-85. 116. W. Wallace 2000, 529-30. 117. March and Olsen 1998, 952. 118. See Beyers, this volume; and Hooghe, this volume. See also Egeberg 1999; and Egeberg, Schaefer, and Trondal 2003. 119. Egeberg 2004. 120. The symbiosis analogy is a trademark of some of the subtler findings (now often overlooked) in the early neofunctionalist literature on the ECSC and EEC. See Haas 1958, 526; and Lindberg and Scheingold 1970, 94-95. 121. See Laffan 2004, 90-94, for a conceptual discussion of "double hatting" among Council actors. I also thank the editors for suggesting this point.

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with the European and vice versa.'^^ The identity configuration of the EU permreps is compatible with what Risse suggestively describes as a "marble cake" concept of multiple identities, in which "the various components of an individual's identity cannot be neatly separated on different levels." '•^^ On this reading, an actor's "identity components influence each other" and "mesh and blend." '^"^ Nor does this in any way imply that socialization effects are homogenous.'^^ A more systematic study of socialization processes in COREPER would build controls into the model for variation caused by preexisting differences in member states' European policy, administrative culture, and policy styles.'^^ Finally, it is worth further consideration how the socialization effects identified in this article are potentially reversible. That is to say, the Brussels-based culture of decision making, endowed with dense informal norms and standards of appropriateness, could be undone. First, there is little, if any, evidence to support a "holistic" internalization thesis in which norm compliance becomes automatic.'^^ Rather, COREPER socialization is a process of incremental, partial internalization. This point is evidenced more clearly in my larger multiple-case-study project, where the British, for example, display a more a la carte adherence to informal norms when there are principled objections to EU policies (as in social policy).'^^ This study did find hard evidence of Type II internalization,''^' particularly in the way those with rejected derogation claims convinced their capitals and/or "went out on a limb" to secure the Belgian derogation once a "reasoned consensus" was reached in COREPER—contrary to what standard bargaining theory and instrumental cost-benefit predictions would have expected. But it does not necessarily follow that a switch from a logic of consequences is complete: just ask the British if they could find someone else's argument on fiscal federalism convincing, or the French if policy toward the Middle East is open to EU deliberation and collective legitimation norms. In other words, it would be inaccurate to characterize the internalization of group-community standards as "taken-for-granted" in a holistic sense, but the bargaining behavior and decisional outcomes documented in this article do consistently confirm instances of pro-norm behavior as the "right thing to do." Second, it is possible to imagine scenarios in which the scope conditions for this socialization story were fundamentally altered: either the density of issue coverage (for example, due to the increased fragmentation of preparatory authority

122. For a conceptualization of how "the European dimension is included in national selfconceptions," see Waever 1995, 412, 430. For a detailed case study on Germany, see Katzenstein 1997. 123. Risse 2004, 251. 124. Ibid., 251-52. 125. See Legro 1997 for a discussion of how pro-norm behavior may exist in "varying strengths" within a given community. 126. For a detailed analysis of how socialization is affected by domestic organizational embeddedness, see Beyers, this volume. 127. On "holistic" internalization, see Hurd 1999, 398. 128. Lewis 1998. 129. See Checkel, this volume.


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among rival committees) or insulation (for example, because of domestic political pressures to address the "democratic deficit" and increase transparency). Changing the scope conditions would likely alter what neofunctionalists called I'engrenage effects,'^° and it is quite possible that the standards of appropriateness would be altered as a result. Under altered background conditions or changes in the standards of appropriateness,'^' one would expect the identity configuration of EU permreps to revert to more egoistic and instrumental variants. Under such conditions, pro-norm behavior would become contingent on more explicit and regularized calculation, and agents might use voting weights and veto threats rather than appeals to fairness or principled debate that would, over time, affect the perceived legitimacy of the EU's collective decision-making culture.

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