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Democracies and Foreign Policy, Conflict or Cooperation? The Leadership/Institutions Nexus
David J. Plazek
Dissertation submitted to the College of Arts and Sciences at West Virginia University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
R. Scott Crichlow, Ph.D, Co-Chair Joe D. Hagan, Ph.D, Co-Chair Robert E. DiClerico, Ph.D Donley T. Studlar, Ph.D Jason Parker, Ph.D Department of Political Science
Morgantown, West Virginia 2006
Keywords: Democracy, Foreign Policy, Leadership, Institutions Copyright 2006, David J. Plazek
Abstract
Democracies and Foreign Policy, Conflict or Cooperation? The Leadership/Institutions Nexus David J. Plazek Democratic peace theory holds a homogenous view of democracy. Leadership studies and institutions literature have demonstrated that variation does exist across democracies, which suggests that democratic peace theory in underspecified. Taking a monadic approach to democratic peace, I examine the effect variations in leadership, institutional structures, and the interaction between leadership and institutions have on foreign policy outputs in democracies. The chapter on leadership reviews US administration belief sets from 1945-1992 to assess their effect on foreign policy decision-making. The findings are that belief sets do impact the conflictproneness of administrations and that beliefs often shift over time. The institutions chapter draws on Lijphart’s dichotomy of majoritarian and consensus democracies as measures of democratic institutional structures and finds that consensus democracies are less conflict-prone than majoritarian democracies. The third chapter explores the interactions between leadership and institutions through case studies of Great Britain, Italy, and Japan. Although multiple factors influence the foreign policy behaviors of the sample countries, evidence is found suggesting that institutional and procedural structures do affect leadership in the formulation of foreign policy. All of the findings indicate that democratic peace theory should incorporate a more heterogeneous view of democracy to gain insights into the conditions under which the expectations of the monadic and dyadic hypotheses will hold true. The conclusion offers a decision-making policy flowchart as a means of providing systematic direction to the comparative study of foreign policy decision-making in democracies.
Acknowledgements Although words are of limited use in expressing the appreciation I have for those who have contributed to the completion of this project, in this space I at least try to briefly acknowledge those that have helped me through the dissertation process. The guidance provided by my co-chairs, Scott Crichlow and Joe Hagan, has been instrumental in adding structure and direction to the work. Their feedback greatly enhanced and refined every part of the dissertation. The rest of my committee, Robert Diclerico, Donley Studlar, and Jason Parker, also provided valuable suggestions that improved the final product. Robert DiClerico and Donley Studlar were particularly helpful with the leadership and institutions chapters respectively. To the entire committee I say thank you for reading and rereading this work, which at times was significantly longer than the final product. In addition, my thanks go to Richard Brisbane for proof reading one of the later drafts of the institutions chapter. I would also like to thank Robert Dilger, Bob Duval, Larry Grossback, Allan Hammock, John Kilwien, Jamie Jacobs, and Jeff Worsham for their collegiality and support during my time at West Virginia University. I am especially indebted to Bob Duval for the time he provided for the numerous quantitative analyses connected to the project, of which only a portion made the final cut. I should also mention my graduate school colleagues who made earning a dissertation a much more enjoyable experience than it otherwise might have been. We spend many hours focused on scholarly endeavors, but we also shared many laughs. So I offer many thanks to Ibrahim Al-Nahas, Andrew Brown, Kyle Christensen, Vivien Exartier, Gayle Funt, Theresa Hutchins, Dale Kapla, Nami Kurita, Mark Lehman, Hadii Mamudu, Nat Markin, Noelle N’Diaye, Rachel Rudolph, Chaun Stores, Katie Stores, Howard Stern, Matt Sutton, and anyone else I may have failed to mention. To my parents, I simply do not know what to say except thank you for all the multiple forms of support, including financial, that you have provided over these years. Most of all, I would like to thank you for the encouragement you gave me, for that allowed me to become the person I am today. Finally, to my wife Tina, your quiet patience during periods of frustration lent balance to my life during many trying times. David J. Plazek July 13, 2006
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Table of Contents Chapter 1
Introduction................................................................................................1
2
Literature Review, Theoretical Framework, and Research Design .............................................................8
3
Who Leads Matters ...................................................................................82
4
Do Institutional Structures Affect the Foreign Policy of Democracies?..............................................................205
5
The Leadership/Institutions Nexus ..........................................................242
6
Conclusion ...............................................................................................314
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List of Tables Tables 2.1
Categorization of Sample Democracies Based on Lijphart’s Institutional Dimensions...........................................55
3.1
Administration Belief Sets and Belief Set Shifts According to Hagan’s Political Orientation Typology...............................................................................193
3.2
MID Data for Administration Belief Sets................................................195
3.3
MID Data for Administration Belief Set Shifts .......................................196
4.1
Categorization of Sample Democracies Based on Lijphart’s Institutional Dimensions..........................................216
4.2
MID Counts for Four Types of Democracy.............................................222
4.3
Time-Series-Cross-Section MID Analysis Containing Majoritarian Dummy Variable..............................................224
4.4
Time-Series-Cross-Section MID Analysis Containing Majoritarian Scale Variable ..................................................226
4.5
Dyadic Analysis of MID Data for Sample Democracies................................................................................229
4.6
Dyadic Logit Analysis of Dispute Instigation .........................................232
4.7
Average ODA as Percentage of GDP for Four Types of Democracy .......................................................................233
5.1
List of Italian Parties in Coalition Governments, 1945-1992.........................................................................270
5.2
MID Data Applied to British Prime Ministers.........................................302
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List of Figures Figures 2.1
Perceptions of Potential for International Cooperation According to Hagan’s Political Orientation Typology.................................................................................25
2.2
Leadership Sensitivity According to Hagan’s Political Orientation Typology ..................................................................25
3.1
Decision Rules for US Administration Belief Set Categorization ...........................................................................89
3.2
Representation of Belief Set Shift Process ................................................91
7.1
Foreign Policy Flowchart.........................................................................318
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Chapter 1 Introduction Democratic peace theory has spawned a lively debate in the international relations community. A great deal of evidence has been found suggesting that democracies rarely engage in direct, militarized disputes with other democracies. More recently researchers have begun to look at the nuances of what causes variation in conflict and cooperation in the foreign policies of democracies (see Risse-Kappen, 1991; Owen, 1994; Hermann and Kegley, 1996; Braumoeller, 1997; Auerswald, 1999; Gaubatz, 1999; Palmer, London, and Regan, 2004). This process of specification has led to the inclusion of variables such as threat perception, leadership style, political parties, institutional structures, oppositions, electoral cycles, decision-making processes and depth of liberal philosophy into the theoretical discourse. Although dyadic relations among democracies are not ignored by conflict and cooperation literature, the approach focuses more generally on why democracies pursue conflictual or cooperative foreign policies. In other words, monadic and dyadic relations are subject to examination. This research continues along this path by investigating the affect three variables, leadership, institutions, and leadership/institutions interactions, have on foreign policy in democracies. The overarching research questions of this study are as follows: Do democracies vary in foreign policy behavior? If this is the case, why do the foreign policies of democracies vary? What domestic factors contribute to the variation in conflict-proneness in the foreign policy of democracies? Although conflict and cooperation literature and democratic peace theory have sought to address this question (see Hagan 1993, Hagan, 1994, Owen, 1994; Gaubatz, 1999, Hermann, 2001), there is much yet to be understood about the causal relationships that produce foreign policy outcomes in democracies. Two areas of concern are how variation in leadership
and institutional structures affect foreign policy decision-making. When considering these variables, one must also bear in mind the interaction between leadership and institutions and whether such interaction influences foreign policy outcomes in democracies. Drawing on both comparative and international relations theory, the dissertation seeks to add to the growing body of literature on the variation of conflict and cooperation in democratic foreign policy as well as contribute to the specification of democratic peace theory. The role of both leadership and institutions are examined independently regarding their impact on the conflict-proneness of the foreign policy of democracies. The interactions between leadership and institutions are also investigated. The goal when examining these interactions is two-fold: (1) reveal which institutional pattern most significantly constrains conflict-prone leadership and (2) investigate the degree to which leaders can defy constraining institutional circumstances. Prior research frames the expectations of the research. The evidence suggests that variation in leadership’s perceptions of the potential for cooperation or conflict in the international environment affects policy preferences (see George, 1969; Hagan, 1994; Hermann & Kegley, 1995; Hermann & Hagan, 1998; Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998; Crichlow, 1998; Walker and Schafer, 2000; Schafer and Crichlow, 2000; Hermann et al, 2001). In other words, leaders who believe there is a great deal of potential for cooperation will be more likely to pursue cooperative foreign policies while leaders who are not as sanguine regarding international cooperation will be more likely to attempt to implement aggressive foreign policies. The expectations, accordingly, are that variations in leadership will affect the cooperative or conflictual tendencies of foreign policy within democracies. Democratically elected leaders do not operate in vacuums. They can face multiple constraints when attempting to implement their policy preferences. One such constraint is the
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institutional structure of the government. There are, however, wide variations in democratic institutions. Is the system unitary, federal, or confederal? Is representation based on proportionality or winner-take-all? Is the system presidential or parliamentary? These are but a sampling of the many potential differences among democratic systems. Variations in democracy have been a major theme in the comparative politics literature (Lijphart, 1977; Luebbert, 1986: Baylis, 1989; Hagan, 1993; Castles, 1994; Lijphart, 1999; Siaroff, 1999). Lijphart (1999) creates a dichotomous typology of democracies based on ten dimensions of democracy. The two ideal types he details are consensus and majoritarian democracies. He finds evidence that suggests that while both consensus and majoritarian democracies possess relatively equal potential for effective decision-making, consensus democracies are inherently more democratic (i.e. more likely to have extensive welfare states, protect the environment more effectively, put fewer people in prison, be more generous in giving aid to developing countries, have less corruption, have less disparity between the classes, provide a fuller complement of women’s rights, and focus more generally on equality). Considering that institutional structures affect domestic policy so dramatically, there is reason to believe that such structures can also affect foreign policy. The expectation of this research, as discussed below, is that majoritarian democracies will be more likely to pursue more conflictual foreign policies than consensus democracies. The final focus of the dissertation is the interaction between leadership and institutional structures. This exploratory chapter examines the degree to which institutions constrain leadership and whether leaders can overcome these constraints. The investigation of the leadership/institutions nexus reveals that the level of institutional constraints within which leaders must operate does affect foreign policy outputs
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To lay the groundwork for this research, chapter 2 reviews prior research examining democratic peace theory, leadership, and institutions, hence providing the theoretical backdrop for the substantive chapters of the dissertation. The literature review is followed by a discussion of the theoretical framework. The section defines the relevant terms, reviews the research questions, and provides the hypotheses, all while clearly outlining the theoretical expectations of the research. The research design section reviews the analytic methods that are employed to test the hypotheses. The substantive chapters follow the introductory portion of the dissertation. Chapter 3, the leadership chapter, examines US presidents from Truman to Bush I and finds that leadership variation contributes to variation in foreign policy outputs during the Cold War. Chapter 4 examines democratic institutions and demonstrates that democratic consensualism is associated with more pacific foreign policies. Chapter 5 explores the interactions between leadership and institutions in Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The evidence suggests that the leadership/institutions nexus not only varies, but also contributes to foreign policy outputs. The conclusion, chapter 6, provides a policy flow chart incorporating leadership’s political orientation, institutional and procedural constraints, and international and domestic obstacles to the pursuit of foreign policy preferences. The flow chart includes a feedback loop that offers expectations of how conceptual complexity affects leadership’s interpretations of foreign policy outcomes. This process demonstrates that in the realm of democratic foreign policy, the leadership/institutions nexus matters. References Auerswald, David P. (1999). “Inward Bound: Domestic Institutions and Military Conflicts”. International Organization 53, 3: 469-504. Auerswald, David P. (2000). Disarmed Democracies: Domestic Institutions and the Use of
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Force. Ann Arbor, Mich: University of Michigan Press. Baylis, Thomas (1989). Governing by Committee: Collegial Leadership in Advanced Societies. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Braumoeller, Bear F. (1997). “Deadly Doves: Liberal Nationalism and the Democratic Peace in the Soviet Successor States”. International Studies Quarterly 41, 3: 375-402. Castles, Francis G. (ed.) (1993). Families of Nations. Brookfield, NH: Dartmouth. Crichlow, Scott (1998). “Idealism or Pragmatism? An Operational Code Analysis of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres”. Political Psychology 19, 4: 683-706. Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor (1999). Elections and War: The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics of War and Peace. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. George, Alexander (1969). “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making”. International Studies Quarterly 13: 190-222. Hagan, Joe D. (1993). Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Hagan, Joe D. (1994). “Reflection, Evaluation, Integration: Domestic Political Systems and War Proneness”. Mershon International Studies Review 38: 183-207. Hermann, Margaret G. (2001). “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework”. Mershon International Studies Review 3, 2: 47-81. Hermann, Margaret G. and Joe D. Hagan (1998). “International Decision Making: Leadership Matters”. Foreign Policy 110 (Spring). Hermann, Margaret G. and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (1995). “Rethinking Democracy and International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology”. International Studies Quarterly 39: 511-533.
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Hermann, M. G., Thomas Preston, Baghat Korany, and Timothy M. Shaw (2001). “Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals”. International Studies Review 3, 2: 83-131. Lijphart, Arend (1977). Democracy in Plural Societies. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press. Lijphart, Arend (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in ThirtySix Countries. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press. Luebbert, Gregory (1986). Comparative Democracy: Policymaking and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Owen, John M. (1994). “How Liberalism Produces the Democratic Peace”. In Debating the Democratic Peace, edited by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (2001). Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press. 116-154. Palmer, Glenn, Tamar R. London, and Patrick M. Regan (2004). “What’s Stopping You?: The Sources of Political Constraint on International Conflict Behavior in Parliamentary Democracies”. Taylor and Francis 30, 1: 1-24. Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1991). “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies”. World Politics 43, 4: 479-512. Schafer, Mark and Scott Crichlow (2000). “Bill Clinton’s Operational Code: Assessing Source Bias”. Political Psychology 21, 3: 559-571. Siaroff, Alan (1999). “Corporatism in 24 Industrial Democracies: Meaning and measurement”. European Journal of Political Research 36: 175-205. Walker, Stephen G., Mark Schafer, and Michael D. Young (1998). “Operational Codes and Role Identities: Measuring and Modeling Jimmy Carter’s Operational Code”. International Studies Quarterly 42: 173-188.
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Walker, Steven G. and Mark Schafer (2000). “The Political Universe of Lyndon B. Johnson and His Advisors: Diagnostic and Strategic Propensities in Their Operational Code”. Political Psychology 21, 3: 529-543.
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Chapter 2 Literature Review, Theoretical Framework, and Research Design Literature Review Democracy and International Conflict In the field of international relations, democratic peace theory has stirred debate and driven much research over the last few decades. The theory consists of two basic propositions: the monadic and dyadic hypotheses. The monadic thesis is based on the notion that democracies are inherently more peaceful than countries with other governmental systems. The dyadic argument revolves around the idea that democracies are less prone towards conflict with other democracies. The thought that democracies are more pacific than other systems (i.e. the monadic hypothesis) has a long history in the United States. From Wilson to Bush, presidents have espoused liberal rhetoric suggesting that the march towards democracy will lead to a more peaceful world. 1 This conventional wisdom was dealt a blow when Singer and Small (1976) found strong evidence suggesting that democracies are just as war-prone as other regime types. Using the Correlates of War dataset (COW) 2 , Singer and Small found that the monadic hypothesis is not supported by systematic data. In other words, democracies are involved in as many wars as non-democracies. Although some dispute this finding (see Benoit, 1996), others suggest that democracies are targets of aggression and, in addition, that democracies are more likely to come to the aid of their allies (see Leeds and Davis, 1997; Gowa, 1998), all of which would indicate that perhaps democracies are not as war-prone as the data suggests, the evidence
1
For discussion of the codification of liberal assumptions in a systematic manner, see Moravcsik, 1997. The COW data consists of cases of direct military conflict. Disputes that are resolved short of war are not included in the dataset. 2
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for the monadic hypothesis is, at best, mixed (for further discussion of the limitations of the monadic hypothesis, see Gates, Knutsen, and Moses, 1996; Chan, 1997). Despite the lack of support for the monadic hypothesis, Singer and Small did find significant statistical evidence suggesting that democracies do not become involved in wars with other democracies. Building on these findings and drawing on the theoretical inspiration of Immanuel Kant, Doyle (1983 and 1986) develops a theoretical logic to explain the dyadic hypothesis. In “Perpetual Peace” 3 , Kant argues that as democracy spreads, the chances for peaceful relations among states increases. His position is more dyadic in nature in that he believed a “zone of peace” could be formed among democracies. Doyle suggests that two explanations exist for why democratic dyads are more peaceful. The first explanation, the normative or cultural argument, is that cultural norms within democracies are, by nature, more pacific than those of nondemocracies. The beliefs in freedom from arbitrary justice, social and economic rights, and democratic participation and representation combine to form a normative philosophy that is simply less war prone. Moreover, the fact that the public has to pay the price for international conflicts and that they influence governmental decision-making through democratic mechanisms, also contributes to the development of pacific cultural norms. 4 These inculcated beliefs, in turn, act as filters for interpreting threat in the international environment. States that are perceived to hold similar values, i.e. other democracies, are not seen as dangerous. On the other hand, states that are seen as adhering to alternative value systems based on their governmental structures, i.e. non-democracies, are normatively perceived as
3
Kant’s positions are drawn from Michael W. Doyle (1983). Mousseau (2000) argues that democratic values are actually the result of the “norms of contract” inherent in developed market economies. 4
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dangerous. Hence, democracies are more likely to engage in international disputes with nondemocracies than with other democracies. The second explanation, referred to as the structural or institutional argument, is that institutional constraints restrict the ability of leadership to pursue aggressive foreign policies. These constraints include judicial equality, freedom of religion and the press, rule by representative legislatures, support for private property, and market driven economies. These factors limit the potential for the development of conflictual foreign policy in that there are forces that benefit from peace and these forces have avenues for applying political pressure, and that democratic institutions, in general, allow time for cooler heads to prevail. Accordingly, these institutional mechanisms are more likely to lead to pacific outcomes when both interacting states are democracies than in cases when one state is a democracy and the other is a nondemocracy. So why do democracies fight non-democracies? Doyle, as discussed above, argues that the answer to this question lies in the normative explanation. Both elites and the public, having been shaped by the cultural norms of democratic societies, are more likely to view those states that do not respect such liberal values as aggressive, dangerous, and worthy of confronting. Hence, because non-democracies are more likely to be seen as potential enemies, it is easier to develop a consensus for war in a democracy when the opponent is not a democracy. As democratic peace theory moved into the 1990s, robust theoretical and empirical support began to build. Russett (1993a) finds evidence suggesting that the norm against war in democracies became ingrained in the late 19th century. Maoz and Russett (1993), in addition to adding conceptual clarity by delineating assumptions for both the normative and structural
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models 5 , expanded statistical backing for the dyadic hypothesis by using the Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset (MID) and found that “democracy, in and of itself, has a consistent and robust negative effect on the likelihood of conflict and escalation in a dyad”. 6 The fact that they controlled for economic development, alliances, and geographic contiguity in their statistical model adds strength the their analysis and hence the dyadic hypothesis. Russett (1993b) argues that it has been a mistake to concentrate on one or the other of Doyle’s explanations. He suggests that the best course of action is to combine both the normative and structural explanations. Maoz and Russett find the data supports both explanations, yet note that the evidence for the normative/cultural model is “more robust and consistent”. Moreover, Dixon (1994) finds that democratic states have a higher probability of settlement in conflictual situations because they are “better equipped”, both culturally and institutionally, to resolve disputes. Critiques of the Democratic Peace Not all are convinced the evidence found in support of the democratic peace has been compelling. Considering the strength of the realist paradigm and the according axiom that what goes on inside the “black box” ultimately does not matter, this should come as no surprise. Some of the early critiques include Layne (1994) who cites four cases of near conflict between 5
Normative Assumption 1: States, to the extent possible, externalize the norms of behavior that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and institutions. Normative Assumption 2: The anarchic nature of international politics implies that a clash between democratic and nondemocratic norms is dominated by the latter, rather than the former. Structural Assumption 1: International challenges require political leaders to mobilize domestic support for their policies. Such support must be mobilized from those groups that provide the leadership the kind of legitimacy that is required for international action. Structural Assumption 2: Shortcuts to political mobilization of relevant political support can be accomplished only in situations that can appropriately be described as emergencies (pp. 625-626). 6 Maoz and Russett 1993, 624. It should be mentioned that the MID dataset includes both wars and militarized conflicts short of war. Maoz and Russett’s findings using the MID dataset strengthen Singer and Small’s findings not only because they confirmed Small and Singer’s findings by using a different dataset, but also because the MID data has a larger universe of cases than the COW data. The increased number of cases is due to the inclusion disputes that did not lead to war. Disputes are categorized through the “Hostility Level” variable that consists of a scale of 1 to 5. The scale is coded in the following manner: 1 = No militarized actions, 2 = Threat to use force, 3 = Display of force, 4 = Use of force, 5 = War.
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democracies that, he argues, provide evidence that democracies can be aggressive towards one another. His findings indicate that political culture within democracies may not be as liberal and/or pacific as democratic theory suggests. In addition, Layne (1997) suggests that relations between France and England in the 19th century remained hostile despite the realization that both states were becoming more democratic and liberal. Rock (1997) argues that geopolitical factors provide a great deal of explanation for Anglo-U.S. peace in the 20th century. He also suggests that racial and cultural affinities contributed to this peace in a manner that extended far beyond similarities in democratic institutions. Ganguly (1997) argues that in the case of India and Pakistan, peace has been maintained due to a change in the balance of military capabilities rather than democratization. Farber and Gowa (1994) argue that peace between democracies has been primarily the result of the Cold War. 7 In a somewhat similar vein, Thompson (1996) argues that peaceful conditions enable the development of democracy rather than the other way around. Spiro (1994) argues that the findings that democratic dyads do not go to war is statistically insignificant due to the low number (i.e. small n) of democratic dyads throughout history. Moreover, he suggests that definitional changes have made the dyadic hypothesis seem more convincing than it would otherwise be the case. Hagan (1994), on the other hand, argues that what goes inside the “black box” not only matters, but what goes inside democracies can profoundly influence whether they are conflictprone or not. In particular, he suggests that we need to consider the nature of the political opposition as well as the political orientation of leadership, both of which vary widely across democracies, in order to assess the conflict-proneness of democracies. Morgan and Campbell
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It is worth noting that Cederman and Rao (2001) develop a framework featuring time-varying parameters and find that the democratic peace is not due to Cold War effects.
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(1991) focus specifically on leadership constraints and opportunities to go to war and find that the major powers with higher decisional constraints had a lower probability of being involved in conflicts that escalate to war, suggesting that domestic constraints are more relevant than democracy in and of itself. Elman (1997), citing the case of Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, argues that the policy preferences of coalitions affect the potential for the use of force. He suggests that democracies will not choose a peaceful path if the ruling coalition favors the use of force to solve conflicts. Kegley and Hermann (1995) look at the impact social identity theory (i.e. the us-group/them-group dichotomy) has on the perceptions of leaders and incorporate leadership sensitivity to their environments, suggesting that the causal relationship behind international conflict is far more complex than adherents to democratic peace theory imply. Kacowicz (1997) examines two democratic/nondemocratic dyads (Peru & Columbia; Senegal vs. Maurutania) involved in conflicts that were settled short of war. He argues that “shared common cultural frameworks” help explain the avoidance of war in these cases, which suggests that the normative hypothesis can be applied to democratic/nondemocratic dyads. Owen (1994) sides with the cultural explanation by arguing that ideological liberalism provides the basis for the democratic peace. Only when liberal ideology is prevalent and citizens have leverage over decision-makers will democracies become less likely to pursue militarized foreign policies with other democracies. Leadership in illiberal democracies (i.e. democracies that limit participation and civil rights and lack institutions that promote equality), on the other hand, is not as restrained by cultural liberalism or institutional constraints and is therefore more likely to pursue conflictual foreign policies. In addition, Owen focuses on the perceptions of leadership in democracies. He argues that leadership in liberal democracies is more likely to perceive illiberal democracies as they would non-democracies and see them as aggressive,
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dangerous and worthy of confronting. From a similar perspective, Peceny (1997) argues that, in the case of the Spanish-American War, the perception of illiberalism constructed by the press and members of Congress greatly contributed to war between democracies. Interestingly, Owen (1997) finds that Spanish elites also perceived the U.S. as increasingly illiberal as the conflict began to approach. 8 Another grouping of critiques of democratic peace theory is the democratization and nonliberal democracies literature. Along with the arguments against the very existence of the democratic peace and those disputing the causal relationships involved, Mansfield and Snyder (1995) offer an alternative negative approach to democratic peace theory by suggesting that states in the process of democratization are particularly war-prone. They argue that, due to short time horizons, the difficulty of the transition, and the rise of polarizing politics and nationalistic sentiment, leadership in states making the transition to democracy (i.e. anocracies) are especially war-prone for international conflict can be a means of diverting attention away from problems at home. Matthews (1997) argues that democratization contributed to the escalation of conflict between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Tucker and Thompson (1997) investigated Mansfield and Snyder’s expectation and did not find support for the claim. Tucker and Thompson, however, suggest that anocracies may make good targets since they are in a period of instability.9 Gleditsch and Ward (1997) also tested the hypothesis and found that moves towards democracy lessen the war-proneness of states while any backslide away from democracy makes states more conflict-prone. Mansfield and Snyder maintain that the evidence supports their claims and note that anocracies are initiators as well as targets. The debate continues, but it is worth noting that
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Owen also finds that Mexican liberals in the 1830s and 1840s began to see the U.S. as illiberal, suggesting similar dynamics in the build up to the Mexican-American War. 9 Interestingly, Gelpi and Grieco (2001) find that democracies in general are more likely to be targets of militarized challenges.
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an entire sub-field of literature has developed around the notion that promoting democracy through foreign policy initiatives in the hopes of spreading peace may actually lead to paradoxical results. Some also argue that nondemocratic institutions are not as nefarious as others suggest. Malin (1997) argues that in the case of Iran and Iraq, the absence of institutional constraints allowed the countries to transcend their differences and establish a robust peace. Matthews (1997) suggests that non-democratic institutions can be a condition for peace, particularly when authoritarianism keeps nationalism in check. After reviewing the deescalation between Greece and Turkey, he suggests that had the two countries been democracies, they would have gone to war. Similarly, Ganguly (1997) finds that escalations between India and Pakistan can be tied to democracy in that aggressive, nationalistic passions of mass publics became infused into the debate. Dassel (1997) argues that in nondemocratic states, in this case Indonesia in the 1960s, military intervention in the decision-making process can increase the likelihood of interstate peace. Disaggregating Democracies in Explaining Peace As the debates raged throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s about whether the democratic peace exists, the causal arguments behind democratic peace theory, and whether democratization is a good or bad development, another body of literature has developed that disaggregates the democratic peace by examining variance in levels of democratic peace. This body of research has turned back to the monadic hypothesis in hopes of honing in on the causal mechanisms behind the foreign policies of democratic states. As Elman (1997, 39) notes, democratic peace theory has given “too much attention (to) democratic dyads”. Moravcsvik (1997), for instance, sees promise in liberal peace theory. He believes that states can positively
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impact the international order. However, he argues that this essentially neoliberal argument needs to clarify the causal mechanisms for the effects claimed by adherents of democratic peace theory. In addition, Risse-Kappen (1995) argues that democratic peace theory may prove true, but views causation from the perspective of social identity theory based on “in-groups” and “outgroups”. 10 Simply put, countries will be on better terms with those perceived to be from the “ingroup” category (i.e. other democracies). Moreover, he argues that historical experience can impact the likelihood of aversion to war, such as in the case of post-WWII Europe. The bottom line is that even some with optimistic appraisals of the potential for democratic peace are not entirely convinced of the causal arguments. Elman (1997) argues that part of the problems with democratic peace theory is that the approach neglects important domestic level variables. He suggests that the theory ignores the role of leaders, underemphasizes norms that are not associated with domestic political ideology, obscures the role of political parties, and discounts how civil-military relations can concentrate or disperse war powers. 11 Many have argued that these issues have risen because democratic peace theory neglects variations in democracy (see Kaarbo, 1997; Auerswald, 1999; Gaubatz, 1999; Lijphart, 1999; Prins and Sprecher, 1999; Auerswald, 2000; Elman, 2000; Palmer, London, and Regan, 2004;). In other words, democratic peace theory is under-specified. To deal with these shortcomings, this body of literature addresses leadership, electoral cycles, political oppositions, domestic institutions, leadership and institutions interactions, and belief structures.
10 11
For further discussion on in-group/out-group dynamics, see Hermann and Kegley, 1995; Peterson, 1996. Elman 2001, 483.
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Leadership Elman (1997, 36) notes that democratic peace theory essentially means, “it matters little who rules”. 12 Many do not agree that leadership does not matter. For instance, Kaarbo (1997) develops a framework for the study of prime minister leadership styles and finds that leadership style significantly affects the decision-making process, hence indirectly affecting foreign policy outcomes. Considering that a general agreement has developed that parliamentary democracies are becoming increasingly prime ministerial, this finding may have growing significance. 13 Leadership has also been incorporated as a significant variable in domestic theoretical frameworks (see Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Peterson, 1996; Auerswald, 1999; Gaubatz, 1999; Auerswald, 2000; Elman, 2000; Palmer, London, and Regan, 2000). For example, Gaubatz (1999) and Auerswald (1999) see leaders as important players within institutional structures. Electoral Cycles Electoral cycles have also been investigated as a variable that affects leadership. 14 Brace and Hinckley (1992) note that the evidence indicates that all U.S. presidents face declining poll ratings in the first and second terms from the first to third year and argue that this pattern significantly influences how and when presidents pursue their policy preferences. Gaubatz (1991) find that in the past 200 years, democracies tend to get involved in more wars early in the election cycle than late in the election cycle. He suggests that this pattern may actually make democracies more war-prone in the long run due to this periodic effect regarding conflictproneness. Smith (1996) tests Gaubatz’s conclusions and finds evidence that confirms his hypotheses. He also finds that the effect of electoral cycles is larger when an election appears to
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The irony, of course, is that this essentially liberal argument is defending the realist proposition that it does not matter who leads. 13 For discussion see Kaarbo 1997, 599. 14 For a discussion of possible affects of the electoral cycle on U.S. foreign policy, see Quandt, 1999.
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be close rather than in cases where reelection is assured or there is little, if any, prospect for reelection. Interestingly, he finds that institutional constraints reduce this effect. Oppositions Hagan (1994) makes the explicit case that when considering foreign policy outcomes, one should assess the political orientation of leadership and the nature of the political opposition. Hagan (1993, 3) cites three reasons why oppositions must be considered: “(1) foreign policy decision-making is inherently political, (2) domestic politics has substantively important effects on foreign policy behavior, and (3) political opposition is a pervasive phenomenon across nations with diverse political systems”. Gaubatz (1999) suggests that his findings regarding electoral cycles are a product of the interaction between three domestic inputs that affect national security policy, namely governmental leaders, oppositional elites, and mass publics. Similarly, Prins and Sprecher (1999) find evidence suggesting politically polarized parliamentary governments constrain the probability of dispute reciprocation. Institutional Structures and Variable Interactions A wide variety of theoretical frameworks have been developed that focus on the interactions between institutional structures and other intervening variables that may potentially affect foreign policy and suggest, despite Gowa’s (1998) assertions, that politics does not stop at the water’s edge. Kaarbo (1996) finds that in the cases of Germany and Israel, even junior coalition partners can have a significant impact on foreign policy. Prins and Sprecher’s (1999) findings include evidence suggesting that although a general pattern does exist that democracies tend to reciprocate disputes initiated by non-democracies, variation exists based on the type of government in power. They find that coalition governments are more likely than single-party governments not only to reciprocate disputes in general, but are also more likely to use military
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force when doing so. Peterson (1996), on the other hand, suggests that the strategic beliefs of leaders are constrained or empowered by institutional structures. These interactions, she argues, significantly influenced foreign policy outcomes. Morgan and Campbell (1991) argue that the degree of decisional constraint inherent in domestic structures significantly influences the decisions of leaders, hence, like Peterson, adding conditionality as to when leadership matters. Auerswald (1999) notes that whether an executive is domestically strong or weak depends on a state’s domestic institutional structure. In other words, the more the legislature can influence foreign policy, the more constrained (i.e. weak) executives are in pursuing their policy preferences. He finds that the domestic strength of the executive significantly affects the potential for the use of force in international disputes. As Auerswald (1999, 470) notes, “domestically strong presidents are more likely to use force than weaker presidents or premiers in parliamentary governments, who in turn are more likely to use force than premiers in coalition parliamentary governments”. Elman (2000) argues that the failure to acknowledge the differences between majoritarian and non-majoritarian democracies limits the effectiveness of democratic peace theory. He finds that the interactions between the executive and the legislative are profoundly influenced by variation in the hawkish or dovish tendencies of both branches. These interactions, in turn, affect the conflict-proneness of the state in question. Lijphart and Bowman (1999) argue that similar dynamics affect foreign aid and find that consensus democracies are more generous than majoritarian democracies in giving foreign aid; a measure which, as they note, is an indirect measure of democratic peace theory. Gaubatz (1999) sees the structure and workings of domestic institutions as mediating the link between the domestic inputs of governmental leaders, opposition elites, and mass publics and foreign policy choices. It is through this contingent framework that he explains his findings
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regarding the affect electoral cycles have on foreign policy. The model attempts to capture the impact of belief structures on foreign policy. Braumoeller (1997), also examining belief structures, finds that a 19th century, European, nationalistic type of liberalism has taken root in the Soviet successor states, hence suggesting a less sanguine appraisal for the potential for democratic peace in the region. 15 Palmer, London, and Regan (2004) examine the affect right/left politics and the vulnerability of leadership have on the propensity of a state to pursue international conflict and find that governments that lean right are more likely to use force (i.e. they are less likely to pay an electoral price for doing so), yet governments that lean left are more likely to see the disputes in which they are involved escalate. All of this suggests that, despite the claims of realists, what goes on inside the “black box” can significantly affect foreign policy in democracies. Moreover, the evidence indicates that democratic peace theorists have indeed overstated the generality of their case. A greater focus is required concerning the monadic hypothesis and variation in foreign policy behavior of democratic states. This work, in turn, will enhance the causal arguments of democratic peace theory (i.e. get us closer to truth) by adding specification and, hence, conditionality. The research presented below will contribute to this literature. Theoretical Framework As can be seen, a wide range of opinion exists regarding the causal arguments behind democratic peace theory. A potentially critical variable that is often absent in the debate is leadership. Owen (1994) correctly notes the importance of ideology regarding the likelihood of liberal democracies using force. Moravcsik’s (1997) suggestion that clarity must be added to the causal mechanisms for democratic peace is also on the mark. Variation in conflict-proneness may prove to be related to liberal cultural values, but only if leadership interprets the values as 15
See Russett (1993a) and Layne (1997) regarding democratic peace theory and the 19th century.
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adherents to democratic peace theory expect. Accordingly, a fundamental flaw in democratic peace theory is the neglecting of leadership variation. A similar flaw can be found in the institutional explanation, namely that democratic institutions are viewed as essentially the same. Yet comparativists, such as Lijphart (1999), find a great deal of variation among democratic institutions. In short, democratic peace theory lacks specification in the areas of leadership and institutions. This research seeks to address these issues. The above literature review reveals areas within democratic peace theory and conflict and cooperation literature that require further investigation. The lack of acknowledgement of variation in democratic systems and leadership lessens the explanatory value of the theory. Moreover, although conflict and cooperation literature has addressed leadership and institutional structures in various manners, the theoretical framework presented here based on the constellation of leadership and institutions and the according interactions between the two variables, although connected to the literature, is original. The theory presented here attempts to fill some of the gaps and answer some of the questions posed by previous research. Before moving forward, it is first necessary to define how this research views leadership and institutions. Leadership is referred to here as the decision-makers and political actors who affect the foreign policy decision-making process and therefore, foreign policy outputs. The primary focus of leadership for this study is individual leaders, yet special consideration is given to the advisory, political, and international context in which leaders find themselves. I am specifically concerned with what Hermann (2001), among others, refer to as the authoritative decision unit (see also Hermann, Hermann, and Hagan, 1987; Hermann and Hermann, 1989). Hermann argues that decision-making outcomes are profoundly affected by whether the decision unit is an individual, a single group, or a coalition. This research draws upon this strategy in two
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manners: first by examining the effect of US administration belief sets on foreign policy during the Cold War and, secondly, by suggesting that majoritarian and consensual democracies have tendencies towards particular types of decision units and decision-making procedures. Although this research focuses on leadership, the institutional/political context may dictate what type of decision-making system/authoritative decision unit is employed. For instance, consensus democracies are more likely to have coalition governments. In such a situation, it would be expected that individual leaders would be constrained from choosing certain policy options that are unacceptable to the leadership of other parties contained in the coalition. Institutions are defined here as governmental and political organizations that can affect the policymaking process. Examples of governmental institutions are legislatures, courts, and executive offices while examples of political institutions are political parties and interest groups. When I speak of institutional structures, I am referring to the constellation of institutions that make up a state’s governmental/political system. Of particular interest for this research is Lijphart’s construct of majoritarian and consensus democratic systems. An underlying assumption is that institutional frameworks provide the environment in which leadership must operate and therefore influence the policymaking process. Prior to elucidating the questions this research attempts to address, it is first appropriate to review prior work to provide the theoretical background for the three areas of concentration of this research, leadership, institutions, and leadership/institutions interaction. Leadership Theory Inherent in leadership theory is the notion that what goes on inside states affects foreign policy behavior. More importantly, leadership studies are implicitly statist approaches in that they view governmental actors as central factors in policy outcomes. As Hermann and Hagan
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(1998) put it, “Leadership Matters”. Not all agree with this conclusion. Waltz (1979) argues that such domestic concerns are secondary matters for foreign policy is determined by the universal need of all states for national security. Hegemonic stability theory posits that hegemons, regardless of who is in charge, will pursue similar policy outcomes, namely the establishment of open trading and capital regimes. 16 Yet despite the claims of systemic theorists and their hopes for parsimony, I would argue that it is counterintuitive to view leadership as homogenous. In some cases, policy outcomes may balance solely upon the leader themselves. 17 It is argued here that, as Putnam and Moravcsik observe, leaders are “central strategic actors”. 18 How leaders perceive the world affects the actions they take. Hermann and Hagan (1998) note that, “Leaders’ interpretations arise out of their experiences, goals, beliefs about the world, and sensitivity to the political context”. These factors combine to create orientations or operational codes 19 of individual leaders and their administrations. 20 Holsti and Rosenau (1979) found, when examining the impact of the Vietnam War on American leaders’ belief systems, that divisions among elites “appear to be embedded within and sustained by well-defined clusters of supporting beliefs that extend from conceptions of the international system to the most effective means by which the United States should pursue its foreign policy goals”. 21 In other words, political orientations vary across leaders and such orientations affect the propensity to use force to solve international disputes. Simply put, political orientations affect a leader’s policy
16
For a review of hegemonic stability theory, see Stephen D. Krasner, (1976). “As Abraham Lincoln is reported to have said to his cabinet: ‘Gentlemen, the vote is 11 to 1 and the 1 has it’”. Quoted by Hermann et al, 2001(p. 84). 18 Quoted in Hermann & Hagan, (1998). 19 For discussion about operational codes, see Alexander George, (1969); John Lewis Gaddis, (pp. viii-ix, 1982); Young & Schafer, 1998). 20 The implication is that leaders tend to select advisors with at least some degree of similarity in worldviews. The extreme version of this phenomenon is what Irving Janis refers to as groupthink. 21 Ole Holsti and James Rosenau (1979). Vietnam, Consensus, and the Belief Systems of American Leaders. World Politics, 32 (October), p. 56. Quoted in Charles A. Kupchan (1994). The Vulberability of Empire. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 43. 17
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preferences. Noting such orientations, as Hagan (1994, 198) states, “provides an understanding of the national interests as defined by the leadership group currently in power”. Accordingly, how leaders view the world influences their proneness towards conflictual foreign policies. Gaddis (1982; 2005) demonstrates how the strategy of containment varied across administrations from Truman to Carter largely based on the worldviews of the key actors within administrations. Moreover, his study reveals the impact of strategic advisors within leadership, such as George F. Kennan, Robert McNamara, and Henry Kissinger. On the other hand, Dixon (1994) finds that Cold War beliefs and practices showed signs of continuity. Vasquez (1993) examines the distinctions between hardliners and accomodationists and the domestic circumstances that allow for the political success of one or the other political elite type. In particular, he sees the outcomes of the last war a country was involved in (whether they lost or won and the human and financial costs) as creating an impetus for public support or resistance to a new war. Hermann (2001) explores when and how leaders become “the authoritative decision unit”. The premise of her argument is that strong leaders can be the primary variable when examining international relations. Moreover, Hermann argues that the sensitivity of leadership towards the political context of given situations can significantly increase the impact of leadership on policy. If they are sensitive to the political environment, they are more likely to consider other viewpoints before acting. Those that are less sensitive, the archetype being referred to as crusaders, are more likely to significantly restrict informational input and see opposition as an obstacle to overcome. Hagan (1994), coming from a similar perspective, creates a leadership typology based on political orientations. He classifies four categories of leadership orientations: moderates, pragmatists, militants, and radicals. Where the ideal types stand in terms of the potential for
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Moderate Orientation
Pragmatic Orientation
Militant Orientation
Radical Orientation
High
Low Leadership Perception’s towards the Potential for Cooperation
Figure 2.1. Hagan’s political orientations displayed on a continuum regarding leadership’s perception of the potential for international cooperation. Moderate Orientation
Pragmatic Orientation
Militant Orientation
Radical Orientation
Sensitivity
Leadership Sensitivity towards Political Contexts and Dissonant Information Figure 2.2. Hagan’s political orientations displayed on a continuum regarding leadership’s sensitivity to political contexts and new and potentially dissonant information. Degree of sensitivity decreases as we move from the sensitivity center represented by the circle under the pragmatic orientation. conflict and cooperation in international relations is represented in Figure 2.1. The degree of sensitivity to new and potentially dissonant information for the categories is displayed in Figure 2.2. Moderates hold an optimistic view of the international environment. They do not see the world as inherently dangerous and believe in flexible policies that promote cooperation. The focus on the potential for cooperation implies sensitivity towards information that confirms their cooperative tendencies yet there is a potential for resistance to data suggesting a harder line should be pursued. Pragmatists perceive a greater level of danger in the international environment, yet “they still have relatively restrained and complex views of the nature of the threats”. 22 They do not write off the possibility of bargaining, compromise, and cooperation. Accordingly, pragmatists are the most sensitive of the ideal types for they are likely to be open to
22
Hagan 1994, 200.
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information that may suggest an aggressive, hard-line response is in order as well as input that indicates a cooperative approach is most appropriate. Militants perceive the world to be full of danger with many countries having “evil” motivations. Leadership with this orientation tends to be less sensitive to the political context and dissonant information during decision-making (i.e. more likely to be crusaders). Bargaining and compromise are seen as naïve to the nefarious ways of enemy countries. Accordingly, militants are more likely to resort to war and other aggressive policies because the “stick”, not the carrot, is the only thing to which threatening states will respond. Radicals go one step further by viewing adversaries as an even greater threat than militants do. They see the entire international status quo as an evil that must be altered by force and those that support it should therefore be aggressively and violently confronted. This level of ideological rigidity clearly suggests that radicals are highly resistant (i.e. insensitive) towards information that does not fit within their worldview. This research draws upon Hagan’s typology as well as Hermann’s leadership categorizations for four main reasons. First, although many leadership typologies exist, there is not one typology that is considered the “best”. Simply by selecting categorization schemes, the research seeks to frame the concepts and avoid potential confusion. Second, the both Hagan and Hermann focus on foreign policy decision-making. Thirdly, the centrality of sensitivity or openness to dissonant information is captured within the typological construct. As one moves to the left or right of pragmatism, the expectation is that there is a greater potential for ideological rigidity based on lower levels of sensitivity or conceptual complexity. Finally, and most importantly, both typologies incorporate personality variables, such as operational codes, sensitivity, and conceptual complexity, which have fundamental significance when considering
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the policy preferences of leadership. In other words, the typologies provide guidance regarding the effect that international and domestic environments have on leadership decision-making. A fundamental question throughout the discussion above is why do democracies go to war? Two questions arise out of this larger question. One is what effect does leadership orientation have on the conflict-proneness of foreign policy in democracies? The above literature suggests that leadership does matter. A primary goal of this research is to add to this literature by investigating if leadership variation affects foreign policy outcomes (hence confirming earlier findings) and, more importantly, specifying under what institutional conditions we would expect leadership to be a significant variable. A second question is do democratic institutional structures constrain leaders with conflict-prone political orientations? To address this question, this research draws upon comparative and international relations literature to examine variation in institutions across democracies and investigates whether different institutional structures contribute to dissimilar foreign policy outcomes. Institutions Theory As discussed in the literature review, despite the assertions of the proponents of democratic peace theory, a consensus of agreement has yet to develop. The disagreements and opposing findings suggest that we must still investigate the causal relationship between peace and democracy. It is argued here that one reason for this great debate relates to how democracies are viewed by adherents of democratic peace theory. By viewing all democracies as institutionally similar, institutional variation that could affect foreign policy outcomes is ignored. In other words, as mentioned above, democratic peace theory is underspecified. Owen (1994), I believe, provides some guidance for addressing this theoretical shortcoming. He argues that democracies should be dichotomized as liberal and illiberal democracies. Liberal democracies
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are defined as states where institutions are set up so that the public has some influence over foreign policy outputs, peace is a necessary condition for freedom, and all individuals should have freedom are predominant. Illiberal democracies are states that have representative forms of government but lack a dominant liberal ideology. 23 Owen suggests that liberal democracies are likely to have pacific foreign policies while illiberal democracies are likely to have more aggressive foreign policies. So how does this research distinguish between liberal and illiberal democracies? Comparative theory has found that patterns of variation exist among advanced, industrialized democracies. For instance, Obinger and Wagschal (2001) examine Castles’ four families of nations (i.e. English-speaking, Continental, Scandinavian, and Southern) with respect to public policy-making and find that, “For two policy fields—social and economic—the hypothesized families of nations can be shown to exist, and they are robust and stable over time”. 24 Blondel and Müller-Rommel (1988), through descriptive analysis, demonstrate that although parliamentary or cabinet government is a fundamental characteristic of Western European governments, wide variation exists across these governments. 25 Skocpol and Weir (1985) find that state structures affected the potential for Keynesian responses to the Great Depression in Great Britain, Sweden, and the United States. Siaroff (1999) develops a measure of corporatism based on the degree of economic integration between the private and public sectors that successfully categorizes states in a manner “which is clearly linear and has no problem cases”. 26 Findings such as these suggest that variation does exist among advanced democracies. Employing a comparative approach, Arend Lijphart (1999) develops a 23
Some examples would include pre-apartheid South Africa, Spain at the turn of the 20th century, and current day Egypt. 24 Obinger and Wagschal 2001, 99. 25 For discussion of variation in coalition governments in Western Europe, see Bogdanor (1983). 26 Siaroff 1999, 175.
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dichotomous typology of democracies. The two ideal democratic models are majoritarian (Westminster) and consensus (consociational) democracies. The categorical devices he utilizes are what he refers to as the executive-parties and federal-unitary dimensions. Five differences exist on the executive-parties dimension (for all five, traits of majoritarian democracy are listed first): 1. Concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets versus executive power-sharing in broad multiparty coalitions. 2. Executive-legislative relationships in which the executive is dominant versus executivelegislative balance of power. 3. Two-party versus multiparty systems. 4. Majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems versus proportional representation. 5. Pluralist interest group systems with a free-for-all competition among groups versus coordinated and “corporatist” interest group systems aimed at compromise and concertation. Five measures also exist on the federal-unitary dimension (once again, majoritarian traits are listed first): 1. Unitary and centralized government versus federal and decentralized governments. 2. Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature versus division of legislative power between two equally strong but differently constituted houses. 3. Flexible constitutions that can be amended by simple majorities versus rigid constitutions that can be changed only by extraordinary majorities.
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4. Systems in which legislatures have the final word on the constitutionality of their own legislation versus systems in which laws are subject to a judicial review of their constitutionality by supreme or constitutional courts. 5. Central banks are dependent on the executive versus independent central banks. 27 Lijphart finds evidence that suggests that while both consensus and majoritarian democracies possess relatively equal potential for effective decision-making, consensus democracies are inherently more democratic (i.e. liberal). Lijphart finds that consensus democracies are more likely to have extensive welfare states, protect the environment more effectively, put fewer people in prison, be more generous in giving aid to developing countries, have less corruption, have less disparity between the classes, provide a fuller complement of women’s rights, and be more generally focused on equality. Others have found that institutional structures positively affect economic outcomes. Bogdanor (1983) finds that governments with strong mechanisms for social consensus sustained by proportional representation, such as Norway and Austria, have been best able to withstand the effects of recession. Crepaz (1996, 4) also finds that consensus institutions “have favorable effects on unemployment, inflation, and the number of working days lost, whereas economic growth remains unaffected”. This is further evidence suggesting institutional structures matter. In general, Lijphart finds that consensus democracies are characterized by inclusiveness, bargaining, and compromise. The majoritarian model of democracy, on the other hand, is exclusive, competitive, and adversarial. These traits suggest that majoritarian democracies may be more likely to be illiberal (i.e. try to stifle rather than accommodate the opposition) and therefore are more prone to pursue aggressive foreign policies. Hence, in order to answer the question of how to distinguish liberal and illiberal democracies, this research grafts Lijphart and 27
Lijphart 1999, 3-4.
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Owen together and suggests that consensus democracies are more likely to be liberal and majoritarian systems are more likely to be illiberal. Upon closer examination, it becomes clear that the concentration of power, lack of veto points, and competitive/adversarial approach inherent in majoritarian systems lend themselves to the potential abuse of power based on the narrow concerns of the executive. Mayer (1969) argues that domestic politics can be a source of war. Elites may choose to pursue aggressive foreign policies and/or war as a means to limit political resistance at home. As he notes “(The) decision (to go to war) is made by political actors and classes who at critical moments look at the dual field of domestic and international politics”. 28 Ostrom and Job (1986) find that in the case of the U.S., “political leadership factors appear to play a very prominent role in establishing the propensity to use force” (also see James and Oneal, 1991; Brace and Hinckley, 1992). Auerswald (1999) finds evidence suggesting that institutionally strong executives, i.e. institutional structures that limit legislative influence, are more likely to use force than domestically weak presidents and premiers and leadership in coalition parliamentary governments. Morgan and Campbell (1991) also find that a negative relationship exists between decisional constraints on executives and the probability that conflicts will escalate to war. Hagan (1994) explores the link between regime structure and war proneness and suggests that domestic political constraints are a “highly variable phenomenon” for democracies as well as other regime types. Moreover, he argues that leadership varies and how leaders view the international environment affects the policies they pursue. So the evidence suggests that variation exists in democracy, political constraints, and leadership. As discussed above, consensus democracies appear to constrain leadership more than majoritarian systems. Hence, if leaders rise to power in majoritarian systems that view the 28
Mayer 1969, 291.
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international environment as inescapably dangerous and are experiencing political turmoil at home, they will be more likely to implement aggressive foreign policies than in similar cases in consensus democracies. Lijphart also suggests that consensus institutions help develop political cultures that are kinder and gentler and this could affect foreign policy as well. In fact, Lijphart suggests that this could be the case and deserves investigation. Tying his expectations to democratic peace theory, he notes that, “If (the democratic peace) explanation (i.e. compromiseoriented political culture and institutional checks contributing to more pacific foreign policies) is correct, one should expect consensus democracies to be even more peace-loving than majoritarian democracies”. 29 The above discussion suggests that the interaction between leadership and the institutional environment affects foreign policy outcomes. The next step, therefore, is to review leadership/institution nexus. The Leadership/Institution Nexus Consensus democracies, due to proportional representation and multiparty systems, are more likely than majoritarian democracies to have coalition governments. Majoritarian systems, on the other hand, are designed to produce one-party governments. In coalition situations, it is more difficult for one party to dominate the policymaking process.30 Consensual political norms are intuitively logical in coalition settings for, as Luebbert (1986) notes, consensus building is when opposition parties 31 participate in decision-making. Similarly, Hagan (1993) observes that domestic political influence on policy is more likely in consensual systems because they are 29
Lijphart 1999, 298. Following up on this suggestion, Lijphart and Bowman (1999) found that consensus democracies are associated with generosity in foreign aid. 30 Ansolabehere, Snyder, Straus, and Ting (2005) do find evidence suggesting that parties that form coalition governments (formateurs) do receive “a substantial ‘bonus’ relative to (their) voting weight(s)” (p. 550) in parliamentary voting in comparison to parties that join rather than form a coalition government. 31 In coalitions, such parties are, of course, not the opposition. However, in coalition settings, parties that may traditionally clash on certain issues have to work together in a consensual manner.
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much less likely to have one party rule. Kaarbo (1996) finds evidence that junior coalition partners can significantly influence policy when unity exists in the coalition and effective strategies of influence are employed. Even when one party does dominate, as Baylis notes, the party may actually be factionalized, such as in the cases of the LDP in Japan and the OVP in Austria, suggesting that the expectations of coalition theory apply in these situations as well. When examining coalition governments, one must also consider questions regarding the type of coalition in power. Is the coalition a minority government, minimal-winning coalition, or surplus majority government? Do these variations in the nature of the coalition affect policy outcomes? Are variations in leadership associated with the different types of coalitions? Minority governments are coalitions that do not control a majority of seats in the legislature. Gallagher, Laver, and Mair (2001) suggest that such governments may be formed based on a focus on policy rather than office-seeking. In other words, parties will forgo joining a coalition and accept a minority government based on the ability of the opposition to affect policy. Strom (1990) finds that states with stronger committee systems, which allow the opposition to influence policy, are more likely to have minority governments. Laver and Hunt (1992) find that the higher the potential for the opposition to affect policy in general, the greater the likelihood that minority governments will come to power. Gallagher, Laver, and Mair also suggest that minority governments may be the result of the inability of opposition parties to agree on a replacement. This is particularly the case, as Laver and Shepsle (1996) note, when the minority government is centrist. In such a situation, the minority party/parties would most likely be a part of any potential coalition and hence can legitimately demand to govern alone. Minimal winning coalitions are based on the logic that ruling parties will want to create a coalition with as few parties as possible so as to capture the largest share of the spoils of office
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(see Riker, 1962). The logic is based more on office-seeking and power rather than influencing policy. Although few politicians would admit to it, there can be strong motivations for power, fame, and the perks of office (the “smell of the leather” of the ministerial car). Although a clear, dichotomous distinction between office-seeking and policy-oriented politicians does not exist, the minimal winning approach leans towards office-seeking incentives on a continuum between the two ideal types. As Gallagher, Laver, and Mair (2001) explain, “If politicians are driven by nothing but the desire to affect public policy when they set out to bargain their way into government, then the logic of the minimal winning coalition is eroded”. 32 Surplus majority or “oversized” governments, on the other hand, may seek large coalitions as a means to obtain policy objectives. Developing national stability was the primary objective of the mostly short-lived “national unity” governments (governments that contain all or nearly all political parties). In the more typical surplus majority coalition, as Luebbert (1986) notes, a dominant party may contain smaller, weaker partners in the government so that no other single party has power critical to the government majority. In addition, constitutional requirements, such as rules requiring the government to command at least 50 percent or twothirds of the legislature, for example, may also contribute to the formation of surplus majority governments. 33 Finally, Laver and Shepsle (1996) suggest certain parties may be vital to a coalition as a means of sending signals about government policy that will contribute to governmental stability rather than contributing to its parliamentary majority. Why do these variations matter? The answer is that with each type of coalition government comes a set of expectations. When examining minority governments one must be aware of the potentially greater impact the opposition has on policy. Moreover, one would 32
Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2001, 344. Belgium’s requirement that laws that affect relations between language communities achieve 50 percent majority and two-thirds of the legislators support overall is an example of this dynamic. 33
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expect a stable minority government to have a non-radical, centrist orientation. The logic of minimal winning coalitions suggests that leadership will focus more on obtaining and maintaining power. This may indicate that politicians in such coalitions will be more inclined to see international disputes as a means of holding power through the “rally ‘round the flag effect”. Surplus majority governments may provide opportunities for dominant parties to seek ideological policy goals. All of the above suggest that variations in coalitions may matter and therefore should be considered during qualitative analysis. Despite these variations, Laver and Shepsle (1996) find that European coalition systems are most likely to produce governments that implement median policies. This suggests that European institutional structures limit the potential of radical foreign policies. Baylis (1989) finds that when no party dominates a coalition, collegial leadership is a possibility. He defines collegial leadership as, “the operation of a set of continuing political leadership structures and practices through which significant decisions are taken in common by a small, face-to-face body with no single member dominating their initiation or determination”. 34 In other words, there are more heads are at the table when policy is being considered and therefore more perspectives must be considered during the decision-making process. On the other hand, when monocratic/presidential leadership is the norm, the opposite of collegial systems, decision-making is much more centralized in a single political actor. This differentiation can affect the decision-making process. When coalitions endure, Baylis argues, elite socialization leads to the development of collegial habits. Groennings (1970, 459) suggests that in coalition settings, “successful leaders are those who facilitate compromises and who cultivate the role of broker”. Such methods, he argues, lead to the creation of a “political culture of accommodation”. Underlying the reasoning 34
Baylis 1989, 7.
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is the notion, suggested by March and Olsen (1989), that institutions transmit to members a “logic of appropriateness” in regard to political interactions and the decision-making process. Baylis also notes that in coalition settings, even when decision-making is not collegial, it is often decentralized and departmentalized. Baylis suggests that departmentalizing policy de-politicizes the policy process, hence allowing for more rational deliberation by experts. On the other hand, coalitions, by definition, involve power sharing or fragmentation 35 among the political parties. If the parties are polarized, such fragmentation may lead to a less than accommodative culture. Accordingly, polarization and fragmentation are issues that have to be considered. An interesting point, especially for this research, is that in polarized conditions, we would expect the level of party discord to washout the affect of leadership. This suggests that even in polarized coalition settings, leadership will be less significant than in one-party rule majoritarian systems. The net result of these factors is there are, in general, reasons to believe that in consensus systems, the decision-making process is group-oriented, cautious, and incremental in nature, is focused on consensus rather than majoritarian decisions, and allows for multiple advocacy. A greater range of information and a larger number of options are apt to be considered in the group’s deliberations and the decisions reached may be more widely accepted and efficiently executed. In majoritarian systems, leadership variation will be more significant because the decision-making process is more focused on a single leader and his/her advising group. 36 Decision-making based on political considerations may be more likely because compromise and consensus building are not as necessary, if necessary at all (i.e. suggesting there could be a greater potential for the political use of force). Moreover, the possibility of rash, conflictual, foreign policy decisions based on emotion are more likely because decision-making is less
35 36
For discussion, see Hagan, 1993. In cases of minority governments, however, one would expect this dynamic to be less significant.
36
deliberate and time consuming (i.e. less time for cooler heads to prevail). Luebbert (1986) notes that for coalition governments, on the other hand, “it will always be in the leadership’s interest to take a hard line in government negotiations only on policy preferences that will have widespread support among legislators and activists”. 37 These restraints are not as significant when one party rules. Another factor worthy of consideration is whether the government system includes presidential or parliamentary institutions. Although there are a series of differences between both systems, as noted by Lijphart (1992), the most significant difference for this research is that presidents may not be from the governmental assemblies’ majority party while prime ministers are always drawn from majority parties or parties included in coalitions. This suggests that presidents in power during divided government may be constrained from pursuing policy preferences in a manner that prime ministers are not. Although such differences are not central to this research (i.e. presidential vs. parliamentary systems are not included in Lijpharts ten dimensions), issues of divided government must be considered when examining leadership decision-making. Returning to authoritative decision units, Hermann (2001) argues that not only does the type of decision unit affect foreign policy outcomes, variation exists within each type of decision unit. As Hagan et al (2001) note, coalitions become the authoritative decision unit when decision-making is dispersed among multiple actors. As discussed above, norms of power sharing are to be expected in consensus democracies. In majoritarian democracies, on the other hand, the authoritative decision unit is more likely to be the prominent leader or single group. In
37
Luebbert 1986, 48. Prins and Sprecher’s (1999) finding that coalition governments are much more likely to reciprocate militarized disputes against nondemocratic states than single-party governments may indicate that widespread support for hard line positions in coalition settings during such disputes coalesces around shared liberal norms, hence supporting the notion that normative values can contribute to the perception of opponent states.
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either case, the locus of decision-making power is more centralized than in conditions of coalitions. In such situations, Hermann et al’s (2001) suggestion that variation in leadership affects foreign policy becomes a more significant factor. With all this in mind, the expectation inherent in this theoretical framework is that “who leads” will be a more significant variable in majoritarian democracies than in consensus democracies. Research Questions One task of this research is to tease out the importance of democratic leadership in foreign policy conflict proneness. Clearly leadership could conceivably affect foreign policy outputs. As suggested in the literature review, how individuals perceive the international environment in terms of the potential for cooperation or conflict affects which policies they prefer. This would apply to individuals, but also to groups of like-minded thinkers (and leaders often surround themselves with advisors with similar worldviews). Moreover, national security interests may be defined by, as Halperin (1974, 11) notes, “a set of widely shared images”. Such shared views may constrain leadership and limit a leader’s independence of action. They may also suggest who is a potential enemy. With these considerations in mind, the first group of research questions, which are based on leadership, are as follows: •
Does leadership affect the conflict-proneness of democracies?
•
Does leadership affect the level of cooperation and conflict between democracies?
•
Does leadership similarly affect the level of cooperation and conflict between democracies and all countries?
This research also investigates the impact institutional and procedural structures have on foreign policy outputs. Lijphart finds evidence suggesting that majoritarian and consensus institutional structures contribute to variation in domestic policy. He also notes that there may be
38
reason to believe that consensus democracies will have more pacific foreign policies than majoritarian democracies. Democratic peace theory, on the other hand, argues that what matters is not so much a state’s institutional structure, but rather the political/governmental orientation of the potential adversary state (i.e. Are they a democracy or a non-democracy?). Considering that this research investigates the impact of institutional structures on foreign policy, the second group of research questions is as follows: •
Do democratic institutional structures affect the conflict-proneness of democratic foreign policy?
•
Do democratic institutional structures affect the level of cooperation and conflict between democracies?
•
Do democratic institutional structures similarly affect the level of cooperation and conflict between democracies with all countries?
The final set of questions involves the interaction between institutions and leadership. The first two substantive chapters assess if and when leadership and institutions matter in influencing whether democratic foreign policy is more cooperative or conflictual. Prior research suggests that consensus democracies are inherently more likely than majoritarian democracies to have political constraints that can limit an individual leader’s policy independence. Moreover, coalition governments, which are much more likely in consensus democracies, tend towards the coalition decision unit model where the significance of individual leaders is lessened. Simply put, power is more dispersed in consensus systems. Yet would we expect all leaders to react to such constraints in a similar manner? Hermann et al (2001) argues that leadership sensitivity towards the political and international environment affects how leaders respond to political constraints. As they note, “Leaders who are more sensitive to the context have been found to be
39
more (1) empathetic to their surroundings, (2) interested in how relevant constituencies are viewing events and in seeking their support, (3) open to bargaining, trade-offs, and compromises, and (4) focused on events on a case-by-case basis”. 38 Less sensitive leaders, on the other hand, are belief- rather than information-driven and are therefore more likely to see constraints as obstacles to overcome. With the third substantive chapter focusing on the leadership/institutions nexus, the third group of research questions is as follows: •
Do the interactions of leadership and institutions affect the conflict-proneness of democracies?
•
Do institutional structures influence what type of leaders rise to positions of political power?
•
What patterns/combinations of leadership and institutions contribute to less aggressive foreign policies?
•
What patterns/combinations of leadership and institutions contribute to more conflictual foreign policies?
•
Can leadership defy institutionally constraining governmental structures? Hypotheses
Now that the literature has been examined, the concepts have been defined, and the research questions listed, the theoretical expectations of this research can be reviewed. To complete this task, I discuss the topics individually and offer hypotheses for the substantive chapters of the dissertation.
38
Hermann et al 2001, 91.
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Leadership This research investigates if leadership matters. The primary reason for this focus is the evidence suggests that leadership variation does exist in and across democracies. As discussed above, Hagan (1994) finds that leadership varies in all governmental systems, including democracies. One dimension of the variation, drawing on the work of George (1969), relates to whether leaders view the international environment as inherently conflict-prone and dangerous or an arena where the potential for cooperation is significant. The degree to which individuals view the international environment as dangerous increases as we move from accommodationists/moderates to radicals on Hagan’s typological scale. Such perceptions can influence policy preferences. The research here confirms earlier findings that leaders who view the world in conflictual terms will be more likely to pursue conflict-prone foreign policies (see George, 1969; Walker, 1977; Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998; Walker and Schafer, 2000; Schafer and Crichlow, 2000). Accordingly, one variable considered here is the conflictproneness of leadership. Hermann (2001) suggests that leadership sensitivity to the political environment affects the decision making process and hence policy outcomes. She argues that insensitive leaders, whom she terms crusaders, see political opposition as an obstacle rather than input that should be considered when making decisions. She suggests that crusaders are cognitive misers to such an extent that wide informational searches, such as receiving input from political oppositions, are seen as generally unnecessary. More sensitive leaders, on the other hand, are more likely to be open to wider ranges of advice, including input from political oppositions, and compromise. The theoretical expectations are that less sensitive leaders will be more likely to pursue conflict-prone
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foreign policies. With all this in mind, the general hypotheses for the leadership chapter are as follows: •
Hypothesis 1: Leadership does affect the conflict-proneness of democracies.
•
Hypothesis 2: Leaders who view the world in conflictual terms will be more likely to pursue conflict-prone foreign policies.
•
Hypothesis 3: Less sensitive leaders are more likely to pursue conflict-prone foreign policies.
Institutions Owen (1994) dichotomizes democracies as liberal and illiberal and argues that liberal democracies will be more likely than illiberal democracies to pursue pacific foreign policies. In other words, he suggests that democratic peace theory would be more aptly termed as liberal peace theory. Lijphart (1999) creates a dichotomous typology of democracies based on institutional structure and finds that consensus democracies have more democratic and liberal domestic policies than majoritarian democracies. This research combines both perspectives by arguing that consensus democracies are more likely than majoritarian democracies to pursue pacific foreign policies. Moreover, mixed democracies (democracies that lean consensus on either the executive-parties dimension or federal-unitary dimension and majoritarian on the other; such configurations are discussed in detail below) that lean majoritarian on the executiveparties dimension are expected to be more conflict-prone than mixed democracies that lean consensus on the executive party dimension due to the greater institutional power inherent in the executive. The expectation is, however, that the divergence will not be as large, due to the mixed nature of the systems, as the differences between majoritarian and consensus democracies. Accordingly, the hypotheses for the institutions chapter are as follows:
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•
Hypothesis 4: Democratic institutional structures affect the conflict-proneness of democratic foreign policy.
•
Hypothesis 5: Majoritarian democracies will pursue more conflictual foreign policies than consensus democracies.
•
Hypothesis 6: Majoritarian democracies are more likely to be involved in militarized interstate disputes than consensus democracies.
•
Hypothesis 7: Consensus democracies will devote a larger percentage of their state revenues towards non-military, foreign aid than majoritarian democracies.
•
Hypothesis 8: The expectations are that the association between democracy types and the MID data will be ranked (1) consensus democracies, (2) mixed democracies (EP-Con), (3) mixed democracies (EP-Maj), (4) majoritarian democracies.
The Leadership/Institutions Nexus As argued immediately above, the theoretical expectations are that leadership variation exists regarding foreign policy conflict-proneness. Moreover, the institutional structures of majoritarian democracies lessen the potential for oppositional input and create an environment and political culture that is more conducive to conflict-prone foreign policies. Majoritarian democracies, therefore, not only provide an easier institutional path for conflict-prone leaders to pursue conflictual foreign policies, the political culture is more likely to produce conflict-prone leaders. Consensus democracies, on the other hand, have an institutional structure that constrains leaders from pursuing conflictual policies. In addition, the political culture, what is termed by Groennings as a culture of accommodation, is more likely to produce moderate leaders. This does not mean, however, that consensus democracies will never have conflict-prone leadership
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or that majoritarian democracies cannot produce moderate leaders. What is does suggest is that conflict-prone leadership within consensual systems will be more constrained from pursuing aggressive foreign policies than in majoritarian systems. With all this in mind, the leadership/institutions interaction chapter will investigate the following hypotheses: •
Hypothesis 9: The interactions of leadership and institutions affect the conflict proneness of democracies.
•
Hypothesis 10: Consensus democracies will be more likely to produce moderate leaders.
•
Hypothesis 11: Majoritarian democracies will be more likely to produce conflictprone leaders.
•
Hypothesis 12: Conflict-prone leadership within consensus democracies will attempt to defy institutional and political constraints and pursue conflictual foreign policies. Research Design
As discussed above, recent literature has begun to investigate the nuances within democracies that affect foreign policy in terms of conflict and cooperation. These efforts seek to detail the causal relationships among domestic variables that contribute to foreign policy outcomes. This work is essential for, as Gaubatz (1999) warns us, it is not enough to state global generalizations about pacific relations among democracies. Although parsimonious, such assertions do not detail the causal relationships behind the grand conclusion and therefore do not stand up to the rigorous demands of science. Supporters of democratic peace theory, to their credit, have sought to address causation through the cultural and institutional explanations.
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Specification problems, definitional inconsistencies, and statistical issues, however, have hamstrung these efforts. These problems with determining causal relationships in democratic peace theory suggest that conflict and cooperation literature, with its focus on variation within and across democracies, can provide guidance for understanding why and when a democracy’s foreign policy is or is not pacific. The question is straightforward, “What factors within the black box affect whether a democracy pursues conflictual or cooperative foreign policies? This research addresses this question by examining three variables, leadership, institutions, and leadership/institutions interactions, to try to determine their effect on democracies’ foreign policies. The focus on leadership may lead one to conclude that what is being espoused here is an elite-driven approach. Although true to certain extent, it should also be mentioned that the conceptual model includes constraints and opportunities as intervening variables. In other words, leaders cannot be viewed as existing within a vacuum. For instance, Risse-Kappen (1991) finds that although leadership is not always limited by public opinion in pursuing foreign policy goals based on their world views, leaders tend not to push agendas that are wildly unpopular. Moreover, he finds that public opinion can influence the coalition-building process, hence affecting foreign policy outcomes. Yet world views of leaders are important. This is especially the case when considering the cultural explanation of democratic peace theory. If leaders do not have political orientations conducive to liberal values and they pursue policies, whenever possible, based on their own world views, liberal cultural values will not be a contributing factor to foreign policy outcomes. In fact, according to Canes-Wrone (2006, 6),
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public opinion “does not pervasively alter executive decision-making”. 39 This, of course, undermines expectations based on the cultural hypothesis. In other words, both leadership and the context in which leaders operate need to be considered. Although there are strong theoretical reasons for focusing on leadership, this research does not neglect the context within leadership operations. To underscore this point, this study also examines the effect that variation in democratic institutional structures has on foreign policy. Lijphart’s dichotomy of consensus and majoritarian provides a template for Owen’s conceptualization of liberal and illiberal democracies. Lijphart demonstrates that variation in domestic policy is associated with institutional structure. This suggests that institutional structures may also affect foreign policy. Not only does this underscore the necessity of examining institutional variation across democracies, it also adds specificity to the institutional explanation of democratic peace theory. Finally, leadership/institutions interaction addresses both the normative and institutional explanations for such interactions are where the rubber meets the road. This is why this research examines whether conflict-prone leaders can overcome institutional constraints. If institutions trump leadership in such situations, then evidence will be found in support of the institutional hypothesis. If leadership overcomes institutional restraints, then both the cultural and institutional explanation will be undermined. In short, this exploratory step helps specify the conditions under which leadership, institutions and liberal cultural values matter in regard to the conflict-proneness of democracies. With all this in mind, this research contributes to the literature by providing three analyses, focusing on leadership, institutions, and leadership/institutions interactions, with descriptive and quantitative components. 39
Canes-Wrone argues that variations in presidential popularity and the proximity of elections can affect whether a president “goes public”, but presidents tend to make public appeals for popular policies only when they converge with his/her policy preferences.
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Leadership The first substantive chapter of the dissertation is devoted to leadership. This section centers on U.S. presidential administrations from Truman to Bush I and their actions during the Cold War. The analysis includes in-depth, descriptive analysis of presidents and their key advisors based on presidential literature. The analysis categorizes initial administration belief sets according to Hagan’s typology of political orientation and examines how these beliefs influenced policy. This research is also interested in the stability of beliefs over time. To address belief set shifts, the effects of international focusing events, domestic political pressures, and advisory system changes are examined to assess whether beliefs are amplified and diminished. The examination of individual administration belief sets is followed by militarized interstate disputes (MID) analyses to see if variation in conflict-proneness occurs across initial administration belief sets and administration belief set shifts. The MID analysis consists of two analyses: (1) the number MIDs and instigated MIDs with all states (i.e. the monadic hypothesis) and (2) the number of MIDs and instigated MIDs with democracies (i.e. testing dyadic hypothesis). The U.S. is the focus of examination because it is a middle/mixed case in Lijphart’s typology. Accordingly, findings here have implications for both majoritarian and consensus democracy and therefore provides a benchmark for comparison with other countries, in particular the sample countries for leadership/institutions chapter. Moreover, the U.S. falls on the majoritarian side of the executive-party dimension, which suggests that individual leaders should have a greater impact on the foreign policy decision-making process. A caveat that must be mentioned is that the U.S. is not be a typical case because of its position of power on the international stage. If it can be demonstrated, however, that variation in leadership exists in this
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case, then evidence will be provided suggesting leadership matters. In addition, focusing on the U.S. provides an opportunity to test hegemonic stability theory. If wide variations are found, this would undermine the suggestion that hegemons act in a uniform manner across administrations. The findings suggest that leadership does indeed matter in the case of the US and that hegemons over time do not act in singular manner. The choice of the U.S. also allows for organizing prior research on U.S. leadership in a coherent and accessible fashion. This process also allows for gaps in the literature to be filled by this research. Finally, the constellation of variables put forth in this research is original, thus this step adds another example of a systematic, case study approach to the field. The dependent variable for this chapter is conflict-proneness of U.S. foreign policy. The variables that contribute to the conflict-proneness of U.S. foreign policy (i.e. the independent variables) are (1) US administration belief sets, (2) international constraints/opportunities, and (3) domestic political constraints/opportunities. In total, these variables provide guidance to the propensity of U.S. leadership to implement aggressive foreign policies. My understanding of the political orientation of leadership is based on Hagan’s leadership typology. Inherent in Hagan’s typology is how leaders view the world, their levels of conceptual complexity, and the sensitivity they have towards domestic and international political contexts. Overall, these orientations are found to be relatively stable. 40 As Herman et al (2001, 98) note, “Although certain leaders have the facility to move between…orientations, most feel more comfortable emphasizing one (type)”. 41 Employing Hagan’s typology in the manner presented here builds on earlier work based on the familiar case of the U.S. These earlier works obviously do not use Hagan’s conceptual framework of political orientation, but they do speak to 40
Peterson refers to such stability as the “stickiness” of belief systems. Although Hermann et al are referring to only two orientations based on sensitivity towards political contexts, the quote is generally applicable to Hagan’s typology. 41
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the effect the perceptions, preferences, and world views of leadership have on foreign policy outcomes. Yergin (1978) investigates the development of post-World War II security policy in the U.S. and finds that the national security state was not a foregone conclusion at the end of World War II. This outcome, he argues, was a result a clash of competing visions of the Soviet Union, termed the Riga and Yalta axioms, and the ultimate success of the Riga perspective. One factor that contributed to the failure of the Yalta axioms was the death of the leading proponent of the approach, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, suggesting that leadership does indeed matter. Gaddis (1982) examines how variation in the fundamental political world views of presidents and their administrations affected national security policy during the Cold War. His findings provide strong evidence that containment policy was, in fact, variable. Barber (1985) examines why presidential personality matters. He suggests that personality can be used as a means of predicting the general decision-making patterns of presidents. Such psychologically-oriented predictions are based on a president’s character (how a president enduringly orients him/herself towards life), worldview (which consists of his/her primary political beliefs, particularly his/her conception of social causality, human nature, and the central moral conflicts of the time), and style (the president’s habitual ways of performing his/her three roles: rhetorical, personal relations and homework or how he/she goes about doing the job). Barber argues that a president’s personality shapes presidential behavior on nontrivial matters, presidential personality is patterned (see character, worldview, and style), and that presidential personality interacts with the power situations he/she faces and the national “climate of expectations”. Hermann et al (2001) add specification as to the conditions of when we would expect leadership to be the predominant variable or authoritative decision unit. These conditions are
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“(1) they have a general, active interest in, as well as involvement with, foreign and defense issues; (2) the immediate foreign policy problem is perceived by the regime leadership to be critical to the well-being of the regime—it is perceived to be a crisis; (3) the current situation involves high-level diplomacy (a state visit, a summit meeting, international negotiations); or (4) the issue under consideration is of special interest or concern to the leader”. 42 Hermann et al also provide guidance as to how leadership can affect decision-making and hence policy outcomes. Whether a leader is experienced, respects or challenges the political constraints of their environment, how open they are to incoming information (do they selectively use information or are they open to information directing their response), and what motivates a leader to action (are they driven by an internal focus, i.e. goal-driven, or by responses from salient constituents) provide cues as to the actions leaders will take. In other words, leaders who are sensitive or responsive to their environments will exhibit greater decision-making flexibility while those that interpret the environment through a lens of structured beliefs, attitudes, motives, and passions (i.e. crusaders, ideologues) will hold more rigidly to their perceptions of the ‘the way things are’. Young and Schafer (1998) and Schafer (2000), building on the earlier work of Leites (1951) and George (1969), discuss how operational codes analysis can help researchers estimate how leaders perceive “the way things are”. Operational codes are based on two sets of beliefs: philosophical and instrumental. 43 Philosophical beliefs, as Schafer notes, “pertain to the way the leader views various elements of the political universe and other actors in the political universe”. 44 Instrumental beliefs are views of how to act in the international arena. In other
42
Hermann et al 2001, 85. For listing of question sets for determining philosophical and instrumental beliefs, see appendix. Included after listing all of George’s questions are the five primary questions that are examined in this research. 44 Schafer 2000, 519. 43
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words, philosophical beliefs are leadership’s perceptions of “the way it is” and instrumental beliefs are leadership’s perceptions of what is the best course of action in view of “the way it is”. This research draws upon two of George’s (1969) operational code questions to classify administration belief sets. The first question consists of two related inquiries: What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? These questions clearly address how a leader perceives the international environment and hence suggests where they would fit in Hagan’s typology. Such perceptions contribute to policy preferences during the decision-making process. Those that view the political universe as essentially harmonious/cooperative are classified as moderates. If administration belief sets are not moderate regarding the political universe, this research uses decision rules largely based on the second of George’s question used here: What is the fundamental character of one’s political opposition? Three “threat” questions are posed for the remaining administration belief sets. The first is how do administrations judge the ideological threat posed by the Soviet Union and international communism? If the ideological threat is seen as nefarious, requires dealing with communism as a unified force, and the very survival of the US is a stake, a belief set is interpreted as militant in terms of this threat. The second inquiry involves the global threat of communism: Do communist countries want to dominate the world? Belief sets that view communism as bent on taking over the world are seen as militant. Finally, the military threat is determined by whether negotiations are seen as useful in dealing with the Soviet Union and international communism. If negotiations are seen as insignificant or are designed to asymmetrically favor the US, administrations are deemed militant. Accordingly, administrations that hold beliefs that the ideological threat is limited, the
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global threat is not zero-sum, and the military threat does not preclude negotiations based on peaceful coexistence are interpreted here as pragmatic. If administration belief sets do not uniformly fit all the expectations for pragmatism or militancy, the decision rule is that the modal answer determines the classification. As important as administration belief sets are, leadership must also contend with international and domestic developments. International or domestic/political constraints can limit the ability of leadership to pursue their preferred policies. They can even contribute to belief set shifts. Developments at both levels of analysis, however, may also provide opportunities for the pursuit of policy preferences. Accordingly, the theoretical model represented in the policy flow chart includes external and internal constraints/opportunities as intervening variables. Domestic political considerations, such as opposition from the legislative branch, may limit the ability of leadership to implement their preferred policies. Public opinion can also constrain leadership, especially in democracies. Vasquez argues that the outcome of the last war (i.e. who won and the costs) largely determine whether hardliners or accomodationists rise to power. Risse-Kappen (1995) suggests that the costs of World War II, and World War I shortly before, led to greater aversion to war in the European public. However, developments in the body politic may also enable (i.e. provide opportunities) for the pursuit of preferred policies. Such was the case with GW Bush administration following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The lessening of domestic political restraints following the event enabled the administration to pursue a war in Iraq. International factors or focusing events can also provide constraints or opportunities for the pursuit of policy preferences. Meernik (1994) finds that international conditions have a
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greater impact on presidential decision-making regarding the use of force than do domestic conditions. International power issues can undermine the pursuit of goals based on leadership’s political orientation. A classic example of this can be seen in the case of China. China may not be able to globally project its power, but it is a significant regional power. Accordingly, American administrations, even those with militant political orientations, tend to shy away from direct military conflicts with China despite long-standing divisions based on Taiwan and ideological differences between the countries. However, developments in the international arena may open the door to policy preferences. Such was the case in the first Persian Gulf War when the weakened state of Russia and international outrage at the invasion of Kuwait lessened the chances of Russian intervention on the side of the Iraqis. Moreover, Meernik finds that the “opportunity to use force” by U.S. presidents is significantly affected by the level of threat to national overseas defense commitments. It must be determined, however, if these opportunities were preceded by American foreign policy decisions that contributed to the dilemma. The bottom line, however, is that the international environment can affect the decision-making of leadership. With all this in mind, the conceptual model for this substantive chapter is as follows: •
Conflict proneness of U.S. foreign policy = US administration belief sets + external (international) constraints/opportunities internal + internal (domestic) constraints/opportunities
Institutions This chapter involves fairly straightforward quantitative analyses of the conflict proneness of majoritarian, consensus, and mixed democracies. The sample consists of 23 countries that are advanced industrialized states with established democracies. The selection of
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economically advanced nations limits some potential traveling problems. Moreover, these states are more likely to have the resources necessary to be involved in militarized interstate disputes. The analyses consist of counts and averages of MIDs, time-series-cross-section analysis, dyadic analyses, and logit analysis of dispute instigation. The first two tests for assessing conflict proneness examine two time periods, 1950-1992 and 1977-1992. This step is a direct measure of conflict-proneness. This analysis is followed by a brief examination of the levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA) of the 23 sample countries for 2000-2003 to confirm Bowman and Lijphart’s (1999) findings regarding the relationship between consensualism and generosity of foreign aid. The sample countries are divided into four sub-groups: majoritarian democracies, consensus democracies, mixed democracies that lean majoritarian on the executive-party dimension and consensus on the federal-unitary dimension 45 , and mixed democracies that lean consensus on the executive-party dimension and majoritarian on the federal-unitary dimension 46 . The executive-party dimension is selected here as the basis for categorization because of the focus on leadership. Moreover, the centrality of the executive in foreign policy decision-making suggests this dimension is more likely to affect foreign policy outcomes than the federal-unitary dimension 47 . Drawing upon Lijphart’s findings, the majoritarian democracies are France, Greece, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom; the consensus democracies are Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Switzerland; the mixed democracies (EPMaj) are Australia, Canada, Spain, and the United States; and the mixed democracies (EP-Con) are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Israel, Norway, Portugal, Ireland, and Sweden. The divisions of
45
This variable is identified as Mixed Democracy (EP-Maj). This variable is identified as Mixed Democracy (EP-Con). 47 For discussion of the case of the U.S., see Lindsay (1994). 46
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Consensus Traits: Federal-Unitary Dimension
Majoritarian Traits: Federal-Unitary Dimension
Mixed Democracies (EP-Maj) Australia Canada Spain United States Majoritarian Democracies France Greece New Zealand United Kingdom
Majoritarian Traits: Executive-Parties Dimension
Consensus Democracies Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Switzerland
Mixed Democracies (EP-Con) Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Norway, Portugal, Sweden
Consensus Traits: Executive-Parties Dimension
Table 2.1. Categorization of democracies based on Lijphart’s federal-unitary and executive-party dimensions. the sample are in table 2.1. The sample does not include Luxembourg simply because the size and location of the state significantly limit the potential of Luxembourg being involved in militarized interstate disputes. A caveat that should be mentioned is that these categories represent ideal types. Although states may not perfectly match the characteristics of the category in which they are placed, they do tend to have the qualities associated with each ideal type. For the sake of consistency, state placement in the typology is identical to the Lijphart’s selections. Majoritarian Democracies When considering the executives-parties dimension in Lijphart’s construct, majoritarian democracies have the following characteristics: concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets, executive dominance in executive-legislative relationships, two party systems, majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems, and pluralist interest group systems with freefor-all competition among groups. Majoritarian characteristics for the federal-unitary dimension
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are unitary and centralized governments, concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature, flexible constitutions that can be amended by simple majorities, systems in which legislatures have the final word on the constitutionality of their own legislation, and central banks that are dependent on the executive. Lijphart views the traditional United Kingdom system the original example of majoritarianism. 48 This is why he also refers to majoritarian institutional arrangements as the Westminster model. Majoritarian schemes tend to institutionally concentrate power in the hands of winning political parties, even if they hold a bare majority or just a plurality. This institutional structure, because of the all-or-nothing nature of political spoils, contributes to the creation of a political culture that is, as Lijphart phrases it, exclusive, competitive, and adversarial. Although one may argue that there is a chicken-or-the-egg problem when determining the causal relationships that determine political culture (i.e. do institutions create the culture or does the existing political culture determine the shape of a state’s institutions), at the very least it can be argued that institutions help maintain political cultures. Even if institutional structures only maintain culture, however, the fact that they add stability to what could otherwise be a dynamic phenomenon (i.e. norms based on the demands of the public) suggests that majoritarian institutions are significant variables when considering political culture. Because political culture in majoritarian democracies tends to be highly conflictual by nature, the expectations are that majoritarian democracies will produce more conflict-prone leaders. Moreover, the concentration of power inherent in this institutional structure creates conditions that allow for greater freedom of the executive when developing foreign policy. Consensus Democracies
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Lijphart actually sees New Zealand as a purer form of majoritarianism, at least until the electoral changes of 1996 (i.e. the move towards proportional representation).
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The characteristics of consensus democracies on the executives-parties dimension are executive power-sharing in broad multiparty coalitions, executive-legislative balance of power, multiparty systems, proportional representation, and “corporatist” interest group systems aimed at compromise and concertation. The characteristics of consensus democracies on the federalunitary dimension are as follows: federal and decentralized governments, division of legislative power between two equally strong but differently constituted house, rigid constitutions that can be changed only by extraordinary majorities, systems in which laws are subject to a judicial review of their constitutionality by supreme or constitutional courts, and independent central banks. Power is much more dispersed in consensus systems in comparison to majoritarian systems. This suggests that the policy-formation process requires coordination among multiple actors, with consideration being given to demands of multiple interests involved in the process. In other words, cooperation has a greater utility in consensus systems than in majoritarian systems. The extreme version of this can be found in collegial systems. With these things in mind, Lijphart suggests that the consensus model is inclusive and functions through bargaining and compromise. The expectations here are that consensus systems will produce more cooperative-oriented leaders than in majoritarian systems. In order to succeed in such an institutional framework, rather than mobilizing support within a single party, one must be able to work with various interests and power-holding political actors to achieve policy goals. In other words, those who rise to the top will tend to be more likely to consider the demands of other international actors as rational and therefore, less conflict-prone. Mixed Democracies (EP-Maj)
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Mixed democracies (EP-Maj) are systems that lean majoritarian on the executives-parties dimension and consensus on the federal-unitary dimension. They have concentrated executive power in single-party majority cabinets, executive dominance in executive-legislative relations, two-party systems, majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems, and pluralist interest group systems with free-for-all competition among groups. Along the federal-unitary dimension, however, they have federal and decentralized governments, two equally strong but differently constituted houses, rigid constitutions that can be changed only with extraordinary majorities, judicial review, and independent central banks. In this framework, power is concentrated in the executive yet the legislature, judiciary, and governmental subunits (ex. provincial governments) do hold significant powers suggesting a greater degree of power diffusion than in a purely majoritarian system. Because the executive is powerful and the electoral system is winner-take-all, the expectations are that such a framework will produce more conflict-prone leaders. The greater diffusion of power in regard to the federal-unitary dimension, however, suggests that such leaders may have a more difficult time pursuing conflictual foreign policies. The expectations, therefore, are that the results for mixed democracies (EP-Maj) will rest in between majoritarian and consensus democracies in terms of general conflict-proneness. Because the executive-parties dimension is more crucial than the federal-unitary dimension in the formulation of foreign policy, the anticipation is that mixed democracies (EP-Maj) but be involved in more conflicts than mixed democracies (EP-Con). Mixed Democracies (EP-Con) Mixed democracies (EP-Con), as can be deduced, lean consensus on the executive-parties dimension and majoritarian on the federal-unitary dimension. This means that they have executive power-sharing in broad multiparty coalitions, executive legislative balance of power,
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multiparty systems, proportional representation, and corporatist, compromise-oriented interest group systems. Their federal-unitary characteristics include unitary and centralized governments, unicameral legislatures, flexible constitutions that can be amended with simple majorities, systems where the legislature has the final word on the constitutionality of their own legislation, and central banks that are dependent on the executive. The greater dispersion of power suggests that mixed democracies (EP-Con) will be a middle case in comparison with majoritarian and consensus systems. Because the executive exhibits consensual characteristics, this suggests that leadership in this framework will be more collegial and therefore less conflict-prone than in mixed democracies (EP-Maj). The executive, however, is not as constrained on the federal-unitary dimension suggesting that fewer legislative, judicial, and financial roadblocks will be in the way if leaders choose to pursue conflictual foreign policies. Yet electoral, interest group practices, and political party relations require leaders that compromise and focus on concertations of efforts rather than single-minded, damnthe-torpedoes approaches to dealing with other political actors. In other words, the institutional structure is likely to reward less conflictual, more cooperative leaders. Hence, the expectation is that leadership in mixed democracies (EP-Con) will be less inclined towards militarized solutions to international disputes than leadership in mixed democracies (EP-Maj). Both, however, would rest in between states that are closer to the majoritarian and consensus poles of the democratic institutional continuum. The Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset (MID) is used for analyzing the four ideal types described above. The data set provides disputes that range from threat, to posturing, to allout war. Because it includes wars and militarized disputes (conflicts that involve the threat of military action), this data set provides a larger universe of cases than are contained in the
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Correlates of War (COW) data set, which only contains wars. Moreover, the propensity to resort to the military option, even in cases short of war, does provide a good indication of foreign policy aggressiveness. The time period that will be examined is 1950-1992. I begin with 1950 because most of the countries that were involved in World War II were beginning to recover and consolidate their democratic institutions. Although there are some issues with institutional evolutions during this period, on the whole, these countries have moved towards stable institutional arrangements. Moreover, the time period captures the post-WW II world, hence diminishing the potential of pre-WW II intervening variables confounding the results. Despite this, I accept that there are some issues regarding this periodization, at least for some of the sample countries. To address this problem, the count and time-series-cross-section analyses include a second test for 19771992. During this period, the sample countries had, for the most part, consolidated their democratic institutional structures (see Lijphart, 1999). Not only will this allow for comparisons between the two tests, the Cold War can be judged to be less of a factor in affecting the results. The tests for both periods, however, will involve identical statistical techniques. The first analysis consists of MID counts for democracy types. This provides a first swipe at the expectations of this research. This step is followed by more advanced statistical analysis. For the time-series-cross-section analyses, five variables are included to control for their effect on foreign policy, namely state size, population, GDP, geographic contiguity, and alliances. The geographic size of a state could affect the propensity to choose militarized answers to international problems simply because larger states have a greater capacity for projecting force. Moreover, state size can be the result of expansionist tendencies of states; hence policy legacies may influence a state’s behavior in the international environment.
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In addition to state size, state power can also be influenced by the size of the population. Accordingly, this variable must be included in the model. GDP is included, for wealthier states have more resources for pursuing aggressive foreign policies. Economic interdependence literature, however, suggests that economic globalization inhibits conflict (see Oneal et al, 1996; Oneal and Russett, 1999). 49 Accordingly, the inclusion of the variable is a test of whether such expectations hold true. Geographic contiguity (the geographic proximity of the states involved in the conflict) must also be addressed. Simply put, the closer states are to one another, the greater the potential that they will be involved in disputes. 50 Finally, alliances have to be considered. This step, as mentioned above, can help address the bipolar conditions established during the Cold War. Interestingly, Jones et al (1996, 163) found that “most disputes begin and end as one-on-one confrontations, and this tendency is stronger in the current period than in the past”. This finding suggests that alliances may not be as problematic as one might think. Despite this, alliances are included in the model. Because the research is interested in the effect the Cold War had on foreign policy, one measure for alliances is a dummy variable regarding inclusion in NATO. A second measure is the number of alliances to which a country belongs. This additional variable captures whether alliance-membership in itself contributes to greater participation in international disputes. The time-series-cross-section analysis consists of two groups of four tests. The first group measures democracy by collapsing majoritarian democracies and mixed democracies (EP-
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For contrasting views, see Barbieri, 1996; Barbieri and Schneider, 1999. This variable is based on whether states involved in a dispute share borders or are separated by a body of water 200 miles wide or less. The distance of 200 miles is selected because this is the distance some have argued should be seen as a state’s economic territorial waters. Moreover, including the 200 miles of water as a demarcation allows for the inclusion of island states in the measure such as the United Kingdom and Japan. Overall, the intuition is that contiguity is a factor in disputes between states that are separated by bodies of water of 200 miles or less. 50
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Maj) into one variable based on majoritarianism. Similarly, consensus democracies are combined with mixed democracies (EP-Con) to create a consensus variable. Because of the above-mentioned association between executives and foreign policy, this makes theoretical sense. The majoritarian dummy is then added to the model to test if majoritarianism is statistically related to conflict-proneness for both time periods. The statistical model for these analyses is as follows: 51 •
Pr (militarized interstate disputes) = β0 + β1(majoritarianism) + β2(population) + β3(size/sq.km.) + β4(GDP) + β5(number of alliances) + β6(NATO) + β7(geographic contiguity)
The model is tested a second time for both time periods with the addition of dummy variables for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel. The decision is based on the United States and the United Kingdom’s role as great powers in international affairs. Israel is added because of its uniquely conflictual position in the Middle East. This step helps control for the influence of these outlier states. The second group of four analyses includes an ordinal democratic variable (majoritarian scale) that ranges from consensus democracies, mixed democracies (EP-Con), mixed democracies (EP-Maj), and majoritarian democracies. The model for two of these tests includes the control variables and is as follows: •
Pr (militarized interstate disputes) = β0 + β1(majoritarian scale) + β2(population) + β3(size/sq.km.) + β4(GDP) + β5(number of alliances) + β6(NATO) + β7(geographic contiguity)
The other two tests of this group of four include the dummy variables for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel for the reasons discussed above. 51
This same model will be applied to both democracy/democracy interactions as well as democracies interaction with all states.
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The MID counts and time-series-cross-section analysis is followed by examination of MID dyads. This analysis includes counts and averages for total MID dyads, the total of instigated MIDs, the counts and averages for MID dyads including other democracies, the totals of MIDs instigated with other democracies, and the percentage of total MIDs instigated that involve other democracies. The inclusion of MID dyads allows for the investigation of instigation. Instigated MIDs are a clearer indication of foreign policy aggressiveness than counts, thus their inclusion strengthens this research. Moreover, MID dyad analysis enables measurement of MIDs with other democracies, hence allowing the testing of the dyadic hypothesis. The findings for all the analyses largely confirm the hypotheses. They support the argument that majoritarianism contributes to foreign policy aggressiveness and these findings hold for interactions with democracies and non-democracies alike. Logit analysis of MID instigation follows. The findings suggest that democracy, in general, is a pacifying influence on foreign policy, but that this relationship is strongest for consensus democracies. This, of course, confirms the expectation of the research. In addition, anocracies, as Mansfield and Snyder suggest, are found to be associated with dispute instigation. Finally, generosity in foreign aid is examined as a measure of cooperation and liberalism at the international level. Lijphart and Bowman (1999) refer to such methods as an indirect test of democratic peace theory. In order to confirm their findings, this chapter ends by examining the percentage of state GDP devoted to ODA for the sample countries. The findings support the suggestion that consensualism is associated with foreign aid generosity. The Leadership/Institutions Nexus This chapter includes in-depth descriptive analysis of the institutional context of the executive in three sample countries: the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan. These countries are
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selected for several reasons. First, all have been involved in some militarized interstate disputes that at least involved the threat of military involvement hence addressing the “no n” problem (i.e. no variation). Second, as we move from the United Kingdom to Italy and finally to Japan, we are moving away from the ideal majoritarian model towards the consensual model. This sample range has several advantages. First, by including the inspiration for the Westminster model, we can focus on whether conflict-prone leaders are in power when conflicts occur. This helps answer hypothesis 9 as well as suggest if institutions or leadership is the most significant variable in their interactions. In addition, the electoral system in the United Kingdom virtually always leads to one party rule. Including the United Kingdom also allows for comparison with parliamentary systems that tend towards coalition governments. 52 Japan provides an institutional structure that approaches consensualism, hence providing an end to a three-country scale. Including Japan addresses hypothesis 10 regarding whether conflict-prone leaders attempt to defy constraining institutional structures. The pacific nature of Japanese foreign policy also allows for investigation of the level of economic cooperation and conflict. Japan also provides an example of factionalized, one party rule, which allows for comparison with non-factionalized single party rule and outright coalition governments. Finally, Italy provides a middle case for this three-country scale, hence offering insights regarding both majoritarian and consensual democracies. In addition, Italy often confronts polarized and fragmented party relations, which suggests this case will provide insights into the effect these variables have on leadership. Italy also has a consistent history of coalition governments. Moreover, this history includes tendencies towards both minority and surplus majority governments (both of which are more likely to be oriented towards policy rather than 52
Interestingly Flinders (2005) employs Lijphart’s ten dimensions of democracy to see if the UK’s New Labour government has shifted to a more consensus-oriented systems through constitutional reform. He finds that although New Labour supports such a shift in principle, in practice the reforms have not led to a constitutional sea change.
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office-seeking through minimal winning coalitions); hence inclusion of Italy allows for comparisons of different coalition types with the other sample countries. Moreover, the inclusion of Italy and Japan allow for examination of their involvement in the current Iraqi war as a means of testing aggressive leadership in consensual systems. Both premiers Berlesconi and Koizumi joined in the action despite a lack of popular support. Teasing out the peculiarities of each country regarding this decision provides the opportunity to investigate leadership that pursues conflictual foreign policies in consensual systems. The time period under investigation is 1945-present. The chapter draws upon the findings of the first two substantive chapters to assist in addressing the hypotheses. The evidence will already be at hand to begin assessing if the interaction between leadership and institutions does matter and what pairings of leadership and institutions will tend towards more or less conflictual foreign policies. The analysis consists of three exploratory comparative case studies to examine the manner in which institutions constrain leadership. 53 Evaluation of the leadership/institutions nexus enables an evaluation of the degree to which leadership is constrained by institutional and procedural constraints. The analyses also examine the effect international factors and historic legacies have on foreign policy outputs. The fact that Italy and Japan were defeated in World War II and both states have maintained largely pacific foreign policies requires the consideration of these factors. Indeed, international systems (i.e. the bipolar Cold War structure) and the legacy of defeat in war are found to be factors in foreign policy outputs. The evidence suggests, however, that consensualism has contributed to these outcomes. Interestingly, Berlesconi’s Italy provides a test of leadership defying consensual structures and public opinion. His electoral
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MID data is brought in for the case of the UK. The limited involvement in instigated MIDs by Japan and Italy limits the utility of the data in those cases.
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defeat in April 2006 potentially suggests that consensualism provides greater opportunities to restrain leadership. The centralized power of the British system, on the other hand, has, to a certain extent, insulated Blair from similar restraint. It is important to note that the three case studies are exploratory in nature and in many cases may raise as many questions as they answer. There are, as always, the ubiquitous traveling problems when comparing countries. Variations in historical experience, culture, and economic development across countries, for example, can act as confounding variables. Yet just because it is difficult does not mean we should abandon such pursuits. To do so would neglect the goals of parsimony and generalizability. In fact, if we are to move forward in our understanding of institutional and leadership variations, this is avenue that must be traveled. These exploratory case studies allow for investigating if leaders in constrained institutional circumstances try to defy constraints to pursue conflictual foreign policies. These case studies also address an ancillary question underlying the entire project: Do institutional structures contribute to the development of political cultures that, in turn, affect the type of leadership which rises to the top? In other words, do compromise-oriented consensus systems produce compromise-oriented leadership and do adversarial-oriented majoritarian systems produce exclusive, competitive, and adversarial-oriented leadership? The primary issues, however, revolve around the nexus of leadership and institutions. This chapter moves beyond simply addressing if leadership and institutions matter individually. By pitting leadership against institutional constraints, we can begin to tease out the conditions under which leadership will significantly affect foreign policy and when leadership will not, above and beyond what the existing literature has already discovered. Similarly, this research
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provides illumination as to when we should consider institutions and/or leadership as primary variables. Conclusion The dissertation presented here contributes to international relations theory in seven primary ways. First, the research adds to the specification of democratic peace theory. The fact that democratic peace literature is a vibrant and growing area of international relations theory and that decision-makers have been influenced by the approach suggests that the clarification of the causal relationships is a significant contribution. Second, this project adds to the conflict and cooperation literature. Third, the incorporation of both international relations and comparative theory brings the state and international levels of analysis together in a manner that can breed future research projects in both fields. Fourth, the research provides guidance as to the impact of leadership personality on foreign policy in democracies. This step contributes to our understanding of how the first level of analysis impacts the second and third levels of analysis. The fifth contribution of the research is that evidence suggests that institutional structures do affect the conflict proneness of democratic foreign policy. Six, exploring the leadership/institutions nexus adds to our understanding of how interactions between the two variables affect foreign policy outcomes. This investigation finds that leadership personality can be a primary variable in foreign policy decision-making even in constraining institutional structures. Finally, the flow chart provided in the conclusion offers a policy path regarding the decision-making process that is evolutionary in nature. It contains the constraints that leaders face when pursuing their policy preferences. Whether leaders learn, however, is profoundly affected by their understanding of the political universe. It is my hope that these findings add to
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our understanding of all three levels of analysis, both individually and interactively, in regard to how leadership and institutions affect foreign policy outcomes. Appendix The following are George’s (1969) 10 questions used to assess the operational codes of U.S. presidents: Five philosophical questions: 1. What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? 2. What is the fundamental character of one’s political opposition? 3. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic on this score? 4. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent? 5. How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical developments? What is one’s role in moving and shaping history in the desired direction? In other words, what is the role of “chance” in human affairs and historical development? Five instrumental questions: 1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action? 2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively? 3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted? 4. What is the best “timing” for action to advance one’s interests? 5. What is the utility and role of different means or tactics for advancing one’s interests?
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Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett (1999). “Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict”. Journal of Peace Research 36, 4: 423-442. Oren, Ido (1995). “The Subjectivity of the ‘Democratic’ Peace: Changing U.S. Perceptions of Imperial Germany”. In Debating the Democratic Peace, edited by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (2001). Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press. 263-300. Ostrom, Charles W. and Brian L. Job (1986). “The President and the Political Use of Force”. American Political Science Review 80, 2: 541-566. Owen, John M. (1994). “How Liberalism Produces the Democratic Peace”. In Debating the Democratic Peace, edited by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (2001). Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press. 116-154. Owen, John M. (1997). “Perceptions and the Limits of Liberal Peace: The Mexican-American and Spanish-American Wars”. In Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer, edited by Miriam Fendius Elman (1997). Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 153-190. Palmer, Glenn, Tamar R. London, and Patrick M. Regan (2004). “What’s Stopping You?: The Sources of Political Constraint on International Conflict Behavior in Parliamentary Democracies”. Taylor and Francis 30, 1: 1-24. Peceny, Mark (1997). “A Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Peace: The Ambiguous Case of the Spanish-American War”. Journal of Peace Research 34, 4: 415-430. Peters, B. Guy (1998). Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods. New York, NY: New York University Press. Peterson, Susan (1996). Crisis Bargaining and the State: The Domestic Politics of International Conflict. Ann Arbor, Mich: University of Michigan Press. Prins, Brandon C. and Christopher Sprecher (1999). “Institutional Constraints, Political
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Chapter 3 Who Leads Matters Does leadership affect the foreign policy outputs of democracies? The case of the United States provides an excellent opportunity to address this question. If Roosevelt had lived longer, would relations with the Soviets have deteriorated to the extent they did? Would the US have acted as it did during the Cuban missile crisis if Nixon was president? Would the US have escalated the military intervention in Vietnam if Kennedy was not assassinated and won the 1964 presidential election? Had Ford been president, would the US have intervened militarily to support the Shah of Iran? Would the US have invaded Grenada if Carter were president? Would the US have invaded Iraq if Al Gore had won the disputed 2000 presidential election? Counterfactuals such as these can lead to heated debates. They do, however, illustrate the possible effect individuals in the White House can have on US foreign policy. Democratic peace theory suggests that the foreign policy of democracies is profoundly affected by the fact that their governmental structures are democratic. From this perspective, ‘who leads’ can be seen as of limited importance. Structural theorists, by focusing on state capacities, also downplay the significance of leadership. Prior research indicates, however, that leadership is a variable phenomenon and such variations can shape foreign policy outputs in democracies and non-democracies alike (Hagan, 1994; Hermann and Kegley, 1995; Walker, Shafer, and Young, 1998; Walker and Schafer, 2000; Hermann et al, 2001). This research seeks to confirm these findings by investigating the US as a test case of leadership, examining US administrations from Truman to Bush I. The case of the US provides the opportunity for assessing the effect of leadership on foreign policy. If power were the sole determinant of state behavior, then the US would solely
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seek relative gains to maximize its power. If democratic governance essentially conditions foreign policy, then we would expect the US to consistently have cooperative relations with democracies and conflictual interactions with autocracies. If, however, strong variations in US foreign policy exist across presidencies, then the evidence would suggest that leadership can affect foreign policy in a country that is in the best position to impose its will on the world. In other words, leadership would influence how power is used. This is not to say that power differentials or alterations in other states over time do not influence international relations. They can. How leaders interpret such developments, however, can be crucial factors in the formation of foreign policy. If relations between the US and the Soviet Union and international communism during the Cold War vary from one administration to the next based on pre-existing beliefs, then the findings would indicate that leadership in democracies contributes to the understanding of threats and interests and, therefore, foreign policy outputs. Put differently, ‘who leads’ would matter. Conceptual Framework and Research Design The unit of analysis for this research is US administration belief sets. 54 Belief sets are the representation of pre-existing beliefs within a world view framework or operational code (discussed below). This analysis seeks to determine the factors that contribute to executive belief sets and then how such belief sets affect US foreign policy. The first component of administration belief sets is the presidents themselves. Drawing upon historical literature, this research assesses the pre-existing or initial world views of presidents as they enter office to get at their administration’s original belief set. Such pre-existing belief sets are determined based on prior commentary regarding international relations, statements from the early stages an US
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Prior research has referred to administration belief set configurations as “political regimes” (see Salmore and Salmore, 1978; Hagan, 1986a; Hagan 1986b; Hagan, 1994).
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administration, and significant policy statements. The traditional expectation is that original belief sets would often endure. As Kearns (1976, 258) states, “Worldviews, once formed, are difficult to change, especially for politicians”. George (1980) argues that a president’s characteristics shape the decision-making processes of an administration in an enduring fashion. This study, therefore, investigates variation in the core beliefs of leadership as it relates to variations in US foreign policy across administrations. As an administration’s belief set may change over time, this research is interested belief shifts that occur during an administration’s time in office. One aspect that can affect variation in a president’s influence on an administration’s belief set, and the persistence of the belief set that first defines an administration, is the degree to which they contribute to the decision-making process. Hermann et al (2001, 85) examine when leaders are the “authoritative decision unit” and suggest the following factors contribute to such an outcome: “(1) they have a general, active interest in, as well as involvement with, foreign and defense issues; (2) the immediate foreign policy problem is perceived by the regime leadership to be critical to the well-being of the regime—it is perceived to be a crisis; (3) the current situation involves high-level diplomacy (a state visit, a summit meeting, international negotiations); or (4) the issue under consideration is of special interest or concern to the leader”. The answers to these questions vary and such variations can affect the relative influence that presidents and their advisors have on foreign policy outputs. Leaders have advisors who contribute to their understanding of international relations. I argue it is usually impossible to discuss an administration’s belief set without mentioning the most important of these advisors. One cannot know Nixon or (especially) Ford without Kissinger, Carter without Brzezinski and Vance, or Truman without Acheson. The study of
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leadership necessitates the inclusion of influential advisors. Yet presidents oversee the process by which their advisors are appointed. Therefore, the president, as the ultimate decision-maker, deserves the lion’s-share of attention. But key advisors do influence policy and must be included in any appraisal of foreign policy outputs. Accordingly, it is essential to understand the role of presidential advisors and advisory systems when studying administrations belief sets. George’s Questions and Hagan’s Typology To assess US presidents and their advisors, this research draws on the work of George (1969) and Hagan (1994). George developed a list of ten questions to determine the operational codes of leaders. Operational codes are defined as, “a set of general beliefs about fundamental issues of history and central questions of politics as these bear, in turn, on the problem of action”. They are, “a prism that influences the actor’s perceptions and diagnoses…(and) provide norms, standards, and guidelines that influence the actor’s choice of strategy and tactics, his (/her) structuring and weighing of alternative courses of action”. 55 This research interprets operational codes as belief structures that contribute to administration belief sets. In particular, two of George’s questions capture fundamental world views as they pertain relations with the Soviet Union and international communism and, therefore, are selected here for the purpose of assessing the administration belief sets. They are as follows: •
Question 1: What is the “essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? (Political Universe)
•
Question 2: What is the fundamental character of one’s political opposition? (Political Opposition) The questions are applied to presidents and their key advisors regarding their beliefs
towards the nature of threats and interests during the Cold War. A primary focus is on belief 55
George 1969, 191.
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structures and how they are represented in policy statements. Foreign policy outputs are used to exemplify the beliefs, but they remain the dependent variable. The independent variable is the belief systems as encapsulated in Hagan’s political orientations. Hagan (1994) developed a leadership typology that incorporates the dimensions of these questions and therefore provides a means of categorization for administration belief sets. The four ideal types of Hagan’s leadership taxonomy are moderates, pragmatists, militants, and radicals. The moderate sees the political universe as harmonious and interprets political opposition as motivated by real and legitimate concerns. Pragmatists view the political universe as containing the potential for both harmony and conflict and determine the nature of the political opposition on a case-by-case basis seeking information regarding the intentions of potential opponents. Militants interpret the political universe as based on conflict and see their political opposition is seen as evil and wicked by nature and therefore tend to view threat in an amplified fashion. Finally, radicals see the political universe as requiring conflict and view the entire international system as evil and in need of removal. Of the four types, radicalism is the least likely to apply, for the US is the status quo power and is therefore antithetical to international revisionism. Moderates, pragmatists, and militants, on the other hand, all have a chance to rise to power in the US. Research Questions and Hypotheses Accepting that leadership is a variable phenomenon across US administrations, this research seeks to analyze the interactions between presidents and their advisors as to their effect on executive belief sets. One question, therefore, is what factors contribute to the formation of a US administration belief set? Another point of interest is the degree to which administration’s
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views, once established, hold steady over time. In terms of individuals, although some beliefs will remain static, other beliefs may change based on experience. If individuals experience a significant belief change that affects an administration’s operational beliefs prior to policy action, a belief set shift will have occurred. In terms of small decision-making groups, shifts may occur with the removal or addition of advisors or when advisors lose or gain influence. Accordingly, this research also seeks to investigate whether individual US administration belief sets remain stable or change over time. Moreover, what causes US administration belief sets to change or to remain static? Does the experience of leaders affect the degree to which they rely on their advisors? This can affect the first of Hermann at al’s conditions for leaders becoming the authoritative decision unit. Regarding Hermann et al’s fourth condition, are leaders interested in the issue at hand? Could other issues or interests be more pressing? To address other factors external to administrations that could contribute to alterations in belief structures, this research also considers environmental stimuli. How do leaders and their advisors respond to dramatic world events? Do focusing events alter administration belief sets? Under what conditions do political and social pressures influence executive belief sets? 56 The expectations of this research are that leadership is a variable phenomenon and that this variation affects foreign policy outputs. The variations of interest are contained in the following hypotheses: •
Hypothesis 1: The interactions of leaders and their key advisors shape administration belief sets.
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Shifts in policy due to political or social pressures do not constitute belief shifts. If, however, it can be demonstrated that such pressures shape the beliefs of leaders based on their public statements or personal writings or the public statements or writings of their advisors regarding issue domains prior to policy actions, a belief shift can be said to have occurred within that domain. The domain of interest for this study, of course, is foreign policy.
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•
Hypothesis 2: The influence of advisors on the development of administration belief sets varies depending on the degree of foreign policy experience of the president.
•
Hypothesis 3: Focusing events and domestic political pressures influence administration belief sets contributing to belief set shifts over time.
•
Hypothesis 4: Focusing events and domestic political pressures are more likely to shape administration belief sets when the president lacks foreign policy experience.
•
Hypothesis 5: Belief sets, as encapsulated by Hagan’s typology, will rank in conflictproneness in the following order: (1) moderate, (2) pragmatic, (3) militant.
•
Hypothesis 6: Belief set shifts will rank in conflict proneness in the following order: (1) Moderate+, (2) Moderate-, (3) Pragmatic, (4) Militant-, (5) Militant+.
Research Design A four-step process is taken here to address the hypotheses. The first step is taken to determine the initial belief sets of administrations as based on the interactions between presidents and their advisors. As discussed above, world views/operation codes and conceptual complexity are determined through in-depth, descriptive analysis of historical literature. In addition, assessment of conceptual complexity draws upon at-a-distance literature. These findings provide explanation as to how administrations would address the two questions from George’s list cited above. The answers provide the decision rules for the placement of administrations within Hagan’s typology. The first question is what is the essential nature of the political universe, one of cooperation or one of conflict? If the evidence indicates that an administration views world politics as fundamentally cooperative, then the administration is categorized as moderate. To determine whether administration belief sets are pragmatic or militant, the remaining
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Figure 3.1. Decision rules for placement of US administration belief sets within Hagan’s typology 1. The Nature of the Political Universe?
Cooperative
Moderate Belief Set
Conflictual
2. Political Opposition? (Ideological, Global, and Military threat)
No
Yes
Pragmatic Belief Set Militant Belief Set administrations are then subject to the second of George’s selected questions, what is the fundamental nature of one’s political opposition? Because the period under investigation is the Cold War, political opposition refers to the Soviet Union and its role within international communism. To address this question, three interrelated sub-questions are asked regarding administration belief sets. The decision tree is visually represented in figure 3.1. The first question is what is the nature of the ideological threat posed by the Soviet Union? Is communist ideology seen as so evil that the US should not deal with communist countries other than the Soviet Union? Is the very survival of the US at stake? If the administration is disinclined to deal with all communist countries and believes that US survival is at stake, the administration belief set is classified as militant regarding the ideological threat of the Soviet Union. If, on the other hand, an administration views interactions with communist countries as productive and the US position within the balance of power as relatively stable, then
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the administration is seen as viewing the ideological threat pragmatically. The second question is what is the nature of the global threat posed by the Soviet Union? In other words, is the goal of the Soviet Union seen as world domination? Administrations that expound the view that the Soviet Union wants to dominate the world are classified as militant in terms of the global threat. Those that suggest the Soviet Union is interested in parity or possesses primary goals that are short of world domination are categorized as pragmatic. The final question is what is the nature of the military threat posed by the Soviet Union? If the threat is seen as so dangerous that administrations do not see value in serious negotiations with the Soviet Union, then the US administration’s belief set is seen as militant. Belief sets that include negotiations as important are classified as pragmatic. These three related questions provide the guidelines as to how administrations are classified within Hagan’s typology. 57 Moreover, this discussion reveals whether the outcomes fit with the expectations of Hypotheses 1 and 2. The second part of this research links US administrations belief sets to militarized international disputes (MIDs) and significant international developments that occur after the development of belief sets. Although not a complete rendering of events during the individual belief sets, the selected disputes and developments illustrate the implementation of policy based on pre-existing beliefs. It should be noted, therefore, that the belief structures are justified before the MIDs occur to establish that the cause precedes the effect. This process also allows for investigation of the effect international focusing events and domestic political pressures have on belief sets and how beliefs shape MID behavior.
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In cases when belief sets lead to both yes and no answers, the modal answer for the three questions provides the determination as to whether an administration’s belief set is pragmatic or militant.
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Figure 3.2. Representation of belief set shift process. Initial Administration Belief Set
Experience: International Focusing Events Domestic Political Pressures
Belief Set Shift
Because this research is interested in how belief sets change over time, the third segment of the analysis reviews how advisory systems and environmental features impacted the beliefs of administrations over time. The process is represented in Figure 3.2. This method assists in assessing the expectations of Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4. The discussion determines what caused belief sets to shift in cases when the same administration moves from one of Hagan’s categories to another. In addition, the review assesses the degree to which administration belief sets amplify or diminish due to international or domestic developments, even when this change does not constitute a move from one of Hagan’s categories to another. 58 To note these subtler shifts in the direction of belief sets, plus or minus symbols are ascribed to the administration’s category. The findings are that 11 US administration belief sets existed across the 9 presidents of this study. They are Truman I, Truman II, Truman III, Eisenhower, Kennedy/Johnson, Nixon/Ford, Carter I, Carter II, Reagan I, Reagan II, and Bush. The direction of belief sets over time tends to drift towards pragmatism, however, environmental features are sometimes found to move belief sets towards greater militancy. These findings are significant because they illustrate that administration belief sets tend to change over time. This runs counter to traditional approaches that view leadership beliefs as static. Moreover, the discussions provide explanation as to how and why US administration belief sets either shift and/or diminish or amplify.
58
Hagan (1986b) takes a similar approach to subtler shifts in political regimes.
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The case for each of the US administration belief sets is made below in the body of the research. Hypotheses 5 and 6, on the other hand, requires further investigation, so I turn to the MID dataset for quantitative analysis. MID Data Analysis Having categorized US administration belief sets Hagan’s typology in the above analysis, the administrations are collapsed into Hagan’s three categories: moderates, pragmatists, and militants. The MID dataset is used to provide the number of MIDs and the average number of MIDs per year for interactions for each of the categories to test the conflict proneness of each type of political orientation. Because dispute instigation is a measure of foreign policy aggressiveness, the number and average of instigated MIDs is also included. The primary focus of these measures is monadic in nature as a means to assess the general conflict-proneness of US foreign policy across US administration belief sets. Democratic peace theory’s dyadic hypothesis is also addressed. The data include interactions with all states and a subset focusing on the interactions with democracies as determined by the Polity III dataset. 59 The addition of democracies allows for analysis of democratic peace theory’s expectation of pacific relations between democracies. The MID dataset is also used to provide the number of disputes instigated with democracies by US administrations. The scant number of MIDs with other democracies generally confirms the expectations of the dyadic hypothesis. Additional testing of the MID data is also completed on the five-category range developed after assessing the direction of belief sets: Moderate+, Moderate-, Pragmatic, Militant, and Militant+. The methods are identical to those performed for the above three-category range
59
Democracies are states that fit between the range of 7-10 on the democracy scale provided in the Polity III dataset.
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and, therefore, address the same issues. This analysis focuses on whether amplified or diminished belief sets correlate with the expectations of Hypotheses 5 and 6. This test not only provides another opportunity to investigate the effect of leadership on foreign policy outputs, it allows for honing in on the relevance of subtle belief shifts. The results are then discussed and conclusions are drawn. The primary conclusion, however, can be boiled down to two words: Leadership matters. US Administration Belief Sets Truman I Belief Set 60 The first of the US administration beliefs sets, Truman I, which lasted from 1945 to 1946, is categorized as demonstrating a moderate political orientation. 61 This determination is based on the belief set’s cooperative view of the political universe regarding interactions with the Soviet Union. The period is highlighted by Truman’s inexperience and according reliance on key advisors held over from the Roosevelt administration, particularly Averell Harriman. His new Secretary of State, James Byrnes, also lacking foreign policy experience, had a background in negotiating compromises and therefore held beliefs consistent with existing policy. The approach relied on accommodation of the Soviet Union and efforts to exact reciprocal 60
The analysis of Truman are based on the following literature: Seyom Brown (1994), The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton; Robert J. Donovan (1977), Crisis and Conflict: The Presidency of Harry S Truman, 1945-1948; Robert J. Donovan (1982), Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S Truman, 1949-1953; John Lewis Gaddis (2005), Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of National Security Policy During the Cold War; Fred I. Greestein (2001), The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton; Alonzo L. Hamby (1995), Man of the People: A Life of Harry S Truman; Walter LaFeber (1997), America, Russia, and the Cold War; Deborah Larson (1985), Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation; Allen J. Matusow (1967), Farm Policies in the Truman Years; David McCullough (1992), Truman; Richard E. Neustadt (1990), Presidential Power and the Modern President: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan; Mark Schafer (1998), “Explaining Groupthink: Do the Psychological Characteristics of the Leader Matter?, International Interactions. 61 Some will argue that the decision to use the bomb undermines this assessment, yet the decision was made as a means to end the war with Japan and save US soldier’s lives. Moreover, inertia had already developed regarding its use (see Donovan 1977, 48 and 98). I would also argue that debates about the use of the atomic bomb often neglect the morality of the bombing campaigns of World War II. For instance, the fire bombing of Tokyo took more lives than either of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In other words, this is a complex topic that cannot be used to color all decision-making during Truman I.
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concessions during diplomatic interactions. Both domestic political pressures and significant international events contributed to the shift towards Truman II in 1947. These findings support the expectations for Hypotheses 1-4. Administration Belief Set Harry Truman came to the Office of the Presidency when the Second World War was winding down and a new era in international relations was about to begin. After a scant 83 days as vice-president, he replaced a president who was a political giant. He had survived business failures and politics in “the Darwinian world of Jackson County (Missouri)”. 62 Elected to the Senate in 1934, he gained prominence chairing the Truman committee charged with the task of investigating defense contracting and profiteering. 63 As a senator, he “was an operational New Deal liberal” yet “most fundamentally, he was a shrewd, pragmatic player of interest group politics”. 64 His experiences with Kansas City’s political machine and Tom Pendergast laid the groundwork for this approach towards politics. Having been selected as vice-president, a result of political wrangling at the 1944 Democratic Convention, he met with Franklin Delano Roosevelt only twice before his death (March 8 & 19) and “neither time was anything of consequence discussed”.65 After Roosevelt’s passing, Truman, a “highly insecure man” 66 because of a lack of education and experience, stated, “I’m not big enough. I’m not big enough for this job”. 67 When he became president, aware of the
62
Hamby 1995, 101. His work, which led to the January 15, 1942 report blasting big business and labor for a “cost-plus” approach towards governmental monies, gained him the reputation of an honest broker (McCullough 1992, 261). 64 Ibid, 213. 65 McCullough 1992, 339. 66 LaFeber 1997, 15. 67 Donovan 1977, 15 63
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long shadow of Roosevelt and the scope of international change, Truman conveyed his emotions by noting, “I feel like I have been struck by a lightning bolt”. 68 Truman, despite his insecurities, came to office with a set of political skills, but the orientation of these skills were domestic in nature. As Donovan (1982, 14) suggests, “Truman had come to office well grounded in domestic issues but entirely lacking in experience…in foreign affairs. Ironically, throughout his entire presidency foreign affairs were the dominant problem before the nation”. Truman made a minor splash in foreign affairs in 1941 after Nazi Germany had invaded Russia by suggesting, “If we see that Germany is winning the war we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany and in that way let them kill as many as possible”. 69 Aside from demonstrating a distain for totalitarianism in general, Truman’s time in office offered little else regarding his orientation towards foreign policy. 70 This inexperience greatly contributed to his reliance on key advisors. This dependence on advisors in the face of frequent turnover goes a long way in explaining why the Truman administration’s beliefs exhibited the widest variance of all the sample administrations. Greenstein (2001, 41) points to this conclusion when he suggests that Truman was “fundamentally reactivist”. The hallmark of Truman I was the continuation of Roosevelt’s policy towards the Soviet Union as envisioned by Roosevelt’s advisors. As Gaddis (2005, 15) notes, “Truman, totally unbriefed as to what Roosevelt had been trying to do, consulted the late president’s advisors”. Gaddis and Larson (1985) suggest that Averell Harriman, who was experienced in Soviet Affairs, was particularly influential. Although Harriman had been trying to persuade Roosevelt
68
Hamby 1995, 293. Gaddis 2005, 4. 70 Larson (1985), among others, note his affinity for believing great men shape history. She also suggests that Truman relied on schema-based “stock characters” when interpreting the behavior of individuals. 69
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to take a firmer approach to the USSR 71 , he was in agreement with Roosevelt’s plan to integrate the Soviets into the world as a means to address Soviet insecurities. Their differences were over what Gaddis calls the quid pro quo approach. Roosevelt, believing his personal powers of persuasion could bring tangible results, wanted to wait until after the war to demand reciprocation in negotiations. Harriman, on the other hand, thought the Soviet’s need for supplies offered leverage enough to include returns in favors or kind during the war. Despite these differences, Roosevelt still included quid pro quo in his approach to the Soviets. Gaddis (2005, 15) suggests Truman accepted quid pro quo and attempted to demonstrate the approach in his notorious lecturing of Molotov during their April 22-23, 1945 meeting, yet his methods, lacking the ambiguities and elusiveness of Roosevelt, gave the Soviets the impression that US policy had changed. Nonetheless, Truman sent Harry Hopkins to Moscow in May 1945 to continue the process of accommodation. At Potsdam, in July 1945, Truman stated, “I can deal with Stalin. He is honest—but smart as hell”. 72 He saw political boss Tom Pendergast, a hard driving, corrupt power broker who at least kept his word, as a model for Stalin. 73 “Stalin”, Truman noted, “was as near Tom Pendergast as any man I know”. 74 Although Truman did not hold an overly sanguine view of relations with Russia, he believed hard bargaining could lead to positive results. During this period, the administration tried to use world public opinion, atomic power, and lend-lease as leverage in dealings with the Soviets.
71
There is evidence that Roosevelt was beginning to move towards Harriman’s point of view when he complained on March 23, 1945, “Averell is right. We can’t do business with Stalin. He has broken every one of the promises made at Yalta” (Gaddis 2005, 13). 72 Donovan 1977. 73 Hamby 1995, 314. Donovan (1977, 75) suggested that Truman also saw Stalin as similar to Tammany Hall’s political boss William Marcy Tweed. For a discussion of Truman’s inclinations towards interpreting political actors through the schematic lens of stock characters, see Larson (1985). 74 McCullough 1992, 451.
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Contributing to these policy efforts was new Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, who replaced Edward Stettinius shortly after taking office. 75 Byrnes, however, like Truman, had little diplomatic experience. Gaddis (2005, 16) argues that Byrnes’s experience in negotiated political compromise fit well with the quid pro quo strategy and he, therefore, bolstered the existing approach. Despite the administration’s efforts, the Truman I belief set did not lead to tangible results. The nadir of the strategy occurred during the December 1945 Moscow foreign minister’s conference when Byrnes agreements for token concessions by the Soviets in Bulgaria and Romania, which were viewed as appeasement at home. 76 In other words, domestic political pressures were building against continuation of the current policies towards the Soviet Union. In answering George’s question regarding the essential nature of the political universe, the administration’s belief set demonstrated tendencies towards belief in the potential of cooperation. The approach towards the Soviet Union was based on accommodating the Soviet Union regarding its integration into cooperative international efforts. Cooperative quid pro quo bargaining was the primary tool for dealing with the Soviet Union. According to the decision rules, therefore, Truman I is classified as moderate in its political orientation. Foreign Policy Actions and Events As discussed above, the foreign policy actions of Truman I focused on accommodation of the Soviet Union while attempting to promote national interests through bargaining. The Soviet Union role in post-war Germany was codified and it was given a seat on the United Nations Security Council. The reaction of the administration to a series of focusing events, however, contributed to unraveling Truman I. In Poland, the Soviets continued to development a communist puppet state despite agreements at Yalta to add democratic procedures. The Soviets
75 76
Larson (1985) argues that Byrnes significantly influenced Truman. Gaddis 2005, 16-17.
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were also making similar moves throughout Eastern Europe. In Iran, the Soviets remained in country in spite of agreements that they would leave six months after the war was over. The Soviets were also making territorial demands in Turkey. By 1946, these developments had hardened Truman’s views and led to utterances such as “I’m tired of babying the Soviets” 77 , “I do not think we should play compromise any longer” 78 , and “Force is the only thing the Russians understand” 79 . In other words, the evidence suggests that Truman experienced an individual belief set shift. The watershed event that organized a new administration belief set, Truman II, was George Kennan’s “long telegram” of February 1946. Belief Set Shift The evidence powerfully suggests that international events contributed to diminishing faith in the moderate approach to the Soviet Union. Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe, Iran, and Turkey clearly affected Truman’s belief that quid pro quo bargaining could bring tangible results. Domestic political pressures also added to the shift by suggesting the limits of public toleration of accommodation. The dreaded word “appeasement” became a part of the political ether regarding the administration’s approach towards relations with the USSR. Moreover, Republican success in the 1946 elections meant that they assumed leadership positions in a Republican Congress. Finally, Kennan had a significant influence on what Neustadt (1990) calls the “Washingtonian” community. 80 Belief sets are affected by what is possible. In this domestic climate, accommodation was no longer much of a political possibility. All these developments, which contributed to the development of a new belief set, indicate that the Truman I belief set
77
Brown 1994, 21; Hamby 1995, 339. Hamby 1995, 345. 79 Brown 1994, 19. 80 This term is analogous to “beltway” thinking. Accordingly, Neustadt also uses the phrase the “executive officialdom”. 78
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diminished during 1945-1946, hence, the change in the political orientation of the administration is denoted as moderate-. Truman II Belief Set The Truman II belief set, which occurred from early 1947-1949, is based on the development of a pragmatic approach to international relations. The political universe was now seen as conflictual, but the threat of the Soviet Union and international communism was not viewed as requiring symmetrical responses to all potential provocations. Truman’s inexperience continued to lead to significant advisory influence, particularly regarding the nuanced perspective of containment of George Kennan Gaddis termed “patience and firmness”. The addition of General George C. Marshall as Secretary of State in early 1947 is a critical development of the Truman II belief set. The departure of key advisors, most importantly George C. Marshall and Kennan, at the end of this period contributed to the shift to a new belief set. Moreover, focusing events and growing domestic political pressures significantly influence the demise of Truman II and the onset of Truman III. Hypotheses 1-4 are supported by these developments. Administration Belief Set As Truman’s quotes at the end of Truman I indicate, he had reached a point of frustration regarding the moderate approaches of Truman I. Although Kennan only met Truman once or twice 81 , his influence through the wide acceptance of the strategies contained in the long telegram and the “Mr. X” article in Foreign Affairs by the foreign policy community, and through them, Truman, make him a key advisor during Truman II. The acceptance of the new
81
Gaddis 2005, 53. Kennan suggests that Truman probably did not read his work and states that, “Certainly I don’t think he grasped my position”.
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approach was made possible, according to Gaddis (2005, 18), by the “realization of (Soviet) impermeability”. Containment policy, as elucidated by Kennan, still focused on the bargaining relationship between resources and objectives. 82 Kennan believed that the Soviets could not be bargained with as Roosevelt had hoped. Accordingly, the US had to take a firm stance with the USSR. Kennan, however, argued, “complete security or perfection of the international environment will never be achieved”. 83 The US, therefore, should focus on ensuring that the five power centers (where real threats could be developed), the US, the United Kingdom, Germany and Central Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan, do not come under Soviet domination. 84 The US, therefore, should focus on “strongpoint defense” and avoid periphery confrontations. Kennan did not see communist ideology as a threat for he viewed ideology as a product and not determinant of political reality. 85 Moreover, he argued that communist states would not tolerate Russian dominance, hence he argued that the US should look to exploit fissures in the communist world. Ultimately, Kennan believed communism would collapse under its own weight. For these reasons, Gaddis calls this approach to containment “patience and firmness”. Truman’s inexperience, compounded by the breathe of the change occurring in the world, continued to contribute to his reliance on his advisors. Averell Harriman forwarded a copy of the long telegram to Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal who then, being in total agreement with the dark assessment of the Soviet Union, sent copies of the telegram across Washington. An environment was being created in Washington of acceptance of this new approach to the 82
The strategy was put forth at a time of extensive US military de-escalation. US armed forces consisted of 12 million personnel at the end of the war and dropped to 1.6 million by 1947. Defense expenditures dropped during the same period from $83 billion to $12.8 billion. 83 Gaddis 2005, 26. 84 Obviously the USSR possessed one of the five, but the other four could still be contested. It should be noted that Kennan did not believe that the US should dominate these regions, but that it should prevent the Soviet Union from doing so (see Gaddis 2005, 63). 85 Gaddis 2005, 33.
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Soviets. 86 Forrestal pushed for Kennan to become the “deputy of foreign affairs” at the new National War College in Washington and in this position, he drew the attention of General George C. Marshall, who became Truman’s new Secretary of State in Early 1947. Marshall selected him to become the head of the State Department Policy Planning Staff. Moreover, Forrestal became the first Secretary of Defense. This advisory system essentially followed the prescriptions of Kennan and, Gaddis (2005, ix) argues, largely turned his vision into policy during 1947-1949. The view of the nature of the “political universe” of the Truman II belief set is conflictual rather than cooperative, hence Truman II cannot be classified as moderate. The next step, according to the framework discussed above, is to estimate the perspective of the belief set regarding the fundamental character of the political opposition, the Soviet Union and its role in international communism. The ideological threat of the Soviet Union was not perceived as significant. Moreover, dealing with other communist states was seen as practical in light of the expectation that divisions would develop between them and Moscow. In terms of the global threat, the Soviet Union was seen as exhausted by war and therefore lacking in the ability to seek world domination. Finally, ‘patience and firmness’ did not rule out negotiations, it simply meant that traditional diplomatic bargaining would not be effective. Ultimately, the belief was that in the long run this approach could yield more promising negotiations and results. These views of threat indicate that the Truman II belief set was pragmatic. Foreign Policy Actions and Events The policy of firmness began to reveal itself in 1946 in Iran (the Soviets left), withdrawal of Soviet rights on Turkey, involvement in Greece, continued resistance to Soviet calls for a role
86
For discussion regarding the death of the “Yalta axioms” and the success of the so-called “Riga axioms”, and hence the development of the national security state, see Yergin 1978.
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in the occupation of Japan, resolution in Germany, and support for Italian territorial claims. 87 The big sign that US policy had shifted was when Truman announced on March 12, 1947 that, “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities and outside pressures (emphasis added)”. 88 The speech led to aid to Greece and Turkey and established what is known as the Truman Doctrine. It should be noted that the commitment was meant to match rather than overwhelm communist activity. In addition to the Truman Doctrine, the administration sought to rehabilitate Germany and Japan to stabilize these vital power centers. The administration also established the Marshall Plan, officially implemented in January 1949 89 , to contribute to the development of robust European economies as a bulwark against communist influence. Truman called the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, “two halves of the same walnut”. 90 On June 24, 1948, the Soviets tried to up the ante by closing off Berlin to Western access, hence threatening one of the five power centers. Truman demonstrated a restrained approach and decided not to send in an armored column to relieve Berlin or to close ports and the Panama Canal to Russian ships. Donovan (1977, 367) states, “Truman reacted cautiously and quietly and firmly. He refused to withdraw. He supported expansion of the airlift. He sought a diplomatic rather than a military solution”. 1948 also saw the split between Tito and Stalin. The US sought to take advantage of the fissure to help divide the communist world. In addition, US efforts to develop a European strongpoint came to fruition when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was signed on October 1949.
87 88 89 90
Gaddis 2005, 22. Ibid, 22. Ad hoc US foreign assistance to Europe had commenced during the winter of 1945-46. LaFeber 1997, 62
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These actions, as Gaddis (2005) suggests, fit the designs of Kennan’s conceptualization of containment. A portent of what was to come, however, was revealed when on November 23, 1948, Truman approved NSC-20/4, which stated that the “ultimate objective of the leaders of the USSR is the domination of the world”. 91 This report was developed, in part, in response to the Berlin Blockade and the Soviet seizure of Czechoslovakia. Moreover, Gaddis (2005, 81) suggests that the “strength” component of Kennan’s strategy, by 1949, had become an end in and of itself. Yet the two most significant focusing events, which brought usual political pressures that contributed to the end of Truman II, occurred in 1949, namely the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb and the victory of the communists over the nationalists in the Chinese civil war. During the Chinese civil war, Truman maintained a restrained approach to the conflict. The collapse of the Chiang regime in China, however, had serious repercussion for Truman. Despite the efforts of the China lobby, which sought military intervention, Truman found it hard to support Chiang Kai-shek. He believed the “Chiang regime was cruel, corrupt, reactionary, inept, undemocratic, and unpopular”. 92 Domestic political pressure did lead to Truman to continue providing military assistance to the nationalists despite his reservations. When the nationalists lost, despite the fact that he declared the Chiang regime on May 15, 1945, “the only legal government of China” 93 , he was willing to let them go to Formosa 94 and go the way of the do-do bird. 95 In an August 12, 1950 memorandum, Truman suggested that, “we…bet on a bad horse”. To the China lobby and excited Republicans, he had “lost China”. Such political pressure, LaFeber (1997, 88) suggests, contributed to Truman’s refusal to recognize communist China, despite Mao’s overtures. 91 92 93 94 95
Donovan 1982, 28. Donovan 1982, 67. He also called the nationalist administration “corrupt bloodsuckers” (Hamby 1995, 519). Ibid, 71. Formosa, the Portuguese name for the island, is used here as it was called at the time. See Hamby 1995, 520 for press conference remarks.
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Truman also lost advisors that were central to this initial conception of containment. Louis Johnson replaced Forrestal, who had committed suicide, as Secretary of Defense. Although Johnson was not a source of great influence, the loss of Forrestal did affect the belief structure of the administration. More significantly, Marshall left the post of Secretary of State at the beginning of 1949. Dean Acheson replaced him. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, George Kennan left his post as head of the State Department Policy Planning Staff at the end of 1949. His successor was Paul Nitze. Coincidentally, in response to the shocks of 1949 96 , as Gaddis (2005, 88) notes, “President Truman, early in 1950,…authorize(d) just the sort of study Kennan had resisted: a single, comprehensive statement of interests, threats, and feasible responses, capable of being communicated throughout the bureaucracy. But Kennan was not there to oversee it”. The resulting document was NSC-68, the policy statement that established Truman III. Belief Set Shift Once again, international focusing events contributed to movement in beliefs. The explosion of a Soviet atomic bomb and communist victory in China heightened fears about shifts in the balance of power. These developments also increased the degree of domestic political pressure from the China Lobby. Moreover, these developments occurred as McCarthyism became more prominent within the political landscape. The administration had also lost the leading proponents of the pragmatic Truman II belief set, Marshall and Kennan. Although pragmatism remained in place until 1950, there is building evidence of a shift towards militancy.
96
Gaddis (2005, 88) includes “persistent inter-service debates over strategy” and “the dilemma of how to meet expanding responsibilities with what appeared to be limited resources” in addition to the “loss” of China and the Soviet atomic bomb.
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Truman III Belief Set The Truman III belief set, lasting from 1950-1952, was militant in its political orientation, for not only was the political universe viewed in conflictual terms, the ideological, global, and military threats were seen as so great that all disputes with the Soviet Union and international communism were interpreted in zero-sum terms. The shocks of 1949 contributed to the formation of this new belief set. Truman’s foreign policy inexperience during this unprecedented period of US internationalism contributed to significant advisory influence. The key advisors during this period were Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze. Both brought perspectives that differed from their predecessors and contributed to a more militant approach towards international communism. The embodiment of the new administration belief set was NSC-68, a document profoundly shaped by Nitze. Many of the approaches advocated in NSC-68 were implemented during the Korean War. The evidence, therefore, supports Hypotheses 1-4. Administration Belief Set NSC-68 was developed by a small, ad-hoc committee of State and Defense Department representatives, whose most notable member was Kennan’s replacement as head of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, Paul Nitze. Nitze viewed the crises facing the US in a straightforward and globally encompassing manner. In holding such views, Nitze varied significantly from Kennan. In NSC-68, as Hamby (1995, 527) states, “Nitze produced a document that eschewed the complexity, literary elegance, and nuance employed by Nitze’s predecessor, George Kennan. It depicted a world divided between forces of freedom and totalitarianism”. Such a portrayal found a receptive audience in Truman who held non-complex views of totalitarianism as demonstrated by his 1941 statement regarding Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union.
105
Rather than focusing on strong points as Kennan had, NSC-68 suggested the balance of power was so delicate and the forces arrayed against the US were growing so powerful that “any substantial further extension of the area under domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled”. 97 The emphasis of containing communism, therefore, should be the perimeter. In the words of the policy statement, “The assault on free institutions is worldwide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere”. 98 Because of the fragility of the balance of power, psychological aspects were now raised to a similar significance as economic maneuvers and military action. From this perspective, “intimidation, humiliation, or loss of credibility” could upset global balance. 99 To meet the new challenges, NSC-68 advocated increased defense budgets, which would be funded by the economic stimulus brought on by increased governmental spending 100 , would add flexibility to the US’s ability to respond to crises. NSC-68 recommended increased ground and air forces to avoid reliance on nuclear weapons. 101 The focus on the perimeter and increased conventional forces would enable the US to fight proxy wars and avoid global conflagrations. NSC-68 determined that the world was in a crisis similar to World Wars I and II and therefore the situation “rendered all interests vital, all means affordable, all methods justifiable”. 102 Lost in this presentation is the fact that increased means for fighting communism would be wholly offset by the expanded range of interests brought on by the inclusion of the perimeter. 97
Ibid, 89. Ibid. 99 Ibid, 90. 100 Gaddis (2005, 91-92) suggests that the most influential voice behind this Keynesian approach to increasing productivity was Leon Keyserling who soon would become the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors. 101 Ibid, 98. Reliance on nuclear weapons meant there was “no better choice than to capitulate or precipitate a global war”. 102 Ibid, 93. 98
106
NSC-68 took an uncomplicated view of the Soviet Union and suggested that the USSR was guided “by the simple consideration of weakening the world power position of the US”. 103 The document omitted Kennan’s idea of working to fragment international communism, which, in consideration of the expressed threat of “the Kremlin”, implied that international communism was monolithic rather than diverse. 104 The negotiating position advocated for dealing with communism, therefore, was to uncompromisingly argue for a change in the Soviet system. With all this in mind, NSC-68, with its focus on expanded conflict in a battle of good against evil, is a profoundly militant document. The committee that produced NSC-68 by-passed normal bureaucratic reviews by going straight to the desk of Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson 105 and then onto the president who read and endorsed it with alacrity. Only then did it go on to the National Security Council.106 Although much of the document remained classified, the general premises became public knowledge as advocates, chief among them Dean Acheson, lobbied for its approval. Interestingly, Acheson was interested in the breeches in international communism and favored asymmetrical defense of Europe. 107 Yet Acheson was “instrumental” in framing the Truman Doctrine as part of a struggle between “democracy” and “totalitarianism”. NSC-68 simplified this to “free” and “slave”. 108 Moreover, Gaddis (2005, 123) suggests that Acheson had “a general proclivity for action almost as an end in itself, and his corresponding tendency to avoid 103
Ibid, 90. Yet Acheson had already suggested the importance of promoting divisions in international communism such as between the USSR and China (see Ibid, 100). 105 Johnson was budget-conscious and was in favor of maintaining a restricted defense budget. Gaddis (2005, 105) suggests that NSC-68 was “forced on” Johnson “as a virtual fait accompli”, which indicates that Johnson was not influential in the development of the approaches advocated by NSC-68. 106 Gaddis 2005, 105. 107 In May 1950, Acheson stated to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “We cannot scatter our shots equally all over the world. We just haven’t got enough shots to do that…If anything happens in Western Europe the whole business goes to pieces, and therefore our principal effort must be on building up the defenses, building the economic strength of Western Europe” (Gaddis 2005, 112). 108 Gaddis 2005, 106. 104
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reconsiderations, second thoughts, and above all self doubt”. These traits, Gaddis suggests, were one of the reasons he and Truman got along so well. Truman, as a man of action, low conceptual complexity, and limited foreign policy experience during perhaps the most eventful and significant period in US foreign policy history, accepted the reasoning of his advisors. The approach represented by NSC-68 is conflictual in nature and therefore rules out the potential that the Truman III belief set was moderate in its orientation to the nature of the political universe. This indicates that an appraisal of threat in necessary. The ideological threat posed by the Soviet Union is now seen as significant. Soviet influence over other communist states was seen as so prevalent that the NSC-68 did not recommend dealing with other communist states. Moreover, the position of the US in world affairs, and therefore its survival, was at stake. Accordingly, the global threat was interpreted through the belief in a fragile balance of power. The conclusion was that defense of the perimeter was now crucial to the defense of the core. The military threat was such that the negotiating stance of the US should be based on the intransigent position that the USSR should alter its political system. With all three “threat” questions being answered in the affirmative, the political orientation of the Truman III belief set is militant. Foreign Policy Actions and Events The release of the unclassified parts of NSC-68 coincided with the North Korean invasion of South Korea on June 24, 1950. Truman immediately took the issue to the UN. The administration also acted unilaterally in the sending of the 7th Fleet to protect the Formosa Straits despite the concerns of US allies. On June 30, ground forces were sent in without Congressional approval (he did confer with Congressional leaders privately). 109 The Korean War, as Gaddis (2005, 107), “appeared to validate several of NSC-68’s most important conclusions”. The ideas 109
For discussion, see Donovan 1982, 222-223.
108
that all interest are equally vital, the USSR might resort to war by proxy, and US forces were inadequate to the challenge before them were reinforced by the developments in Korea. Truman officially signed NSC-68, the heart of the Truman III belief set, on September 30, 1950. After slowing the North Korean advancement, the successful amphibious assault at Inchon led to the collapse of the North Korean excursion in South Korea. The question then became, ‘Should forces cross the 38th parallel?’ Truman approved the move with the support of the US public. “‘It would have taken a superhuman effort to say no’, recalled Harriman, ‘Psychologically, it was almost impossible not to go ahead and complete the job’”. 110 Interestingly, George Kennan was one of the few voices opposing crossing the 38th parallel. 111 By November, MacArthur began what he called the “final” offensive. Despite growing evidence of Chinese intervention 112 , no authorities in Washington sought to stop MacArthur’s move. On November 25, with the 8th and 10th armies strategically separated, the Chinese launch a counterattack with 300,000 Chinese soldiers. As the UN forces hastily retreated, Truman was asked at a press conference if it was up to the UN to decide to bomb Manchuria. Truman replied, “Yes, entirely”. 113 He did leave open the possibility of using the bomb. Truman did, however, withstand pressure to use atomic bombs in Korea. 114 Gaddis (2005, 108) suggests, “American strategy in Korea was consistent with the spirit of NSC-68. The US avoided a larger war 115 , contained a war by proxy, and negotiated uncompromisingly. In addition, the defense budget for 1951 ballooned from an initial request
110
Ibid, 271. Ibid, 277. 112 For an extensive discussion of evidence of the likelihood of Chinese intervention, see Lebow 1981. 113 Donovan 1982, 308. 114 See McCullough 1992, 791. 115 Maintenance of this policy led to the dismissal of General MacArthur, who was openly advocated expanding the war by including targets in China and bringing Chinese nationalist forces into the battle. 111
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for $13.5 billion to a final $48.2 billion. 116 A sign of the depth of the Truman III belief set was that negotiations continued at the Panmunjom truce tent even as the Truman administration left office. Belief Set Shift The primary international event that confirmed the beliefs of Truman III was the Korean War. The Soviets were seen as behind the decision to invade South Korea and the Chinese participated in the action. The domestic political environment contributed to these affirmations, as the administration did not want to be seen as “losing Korea”. Moreover, McCarthyism continued unabated. Truman did go against public opinion when he fired General McArthur 117 , but the decision was based on the administration’s strategic beliefs. A stable core of advisors bolstered these beliefs during this period. The net result of the environmental stimuli and advisory stability was the amplification of the beliefs of Truman III. Accordingly, the belief set shift is categorized as militant+. Eisenhower Belief Set 118
116
Gaddis 2005, 111. MacArthur was continually pushed for a wider war. The culmination of his efforts occurred when Republican House leader Joseph Martin read a letter from MacArthur on the House floor arguing for a larger conflagration. Truman saw this as “rank insubordination” (Donovan 1982, 362). On April 7, Truman’s advisors unanimously decided MacArthur had to be relieved of his duties and the next day the JCS concurred. Regarding domestic political pressure, Truman said to his staffers, “Everybody seems to think I don’t have the courage to do it. We’ll let’em think so, then we’ll announce it” (Donovan 1982, 355). Truman did do it despite outrageous public outcries against the action. The fact that McArthur held such a hard line view and was interested in an all out war with China and even the Soviet Union suggest that his political orientation was radical. 118 The analysis of the Eisenhower belief set is based on the following literature: Stephen E. Ambrose (1984), Eisenhower: The President; Seyom Brown (1994), The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton; John Burke and Fred Greenstein (1989), How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions, 1954 and 1965; John Lewis Gaddis (2005), Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of National Security Policy During the Cold War; Fred I. Greenstein (1982), The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader; Fred I. Greenstein (2001), The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton; Walter LaFeber (1997), America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1996; Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers (1987), Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s; Richard E. Neustadt (1990), Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan; Mark Schafer (1998), “Explaining Groupthink: Do the Psychological Characteristics of the Leader Matter?”, International Interaction. 117
110
The Eisenhower belief set lasted during the entire eight years of the administration and was militant in political orientation. This assessment is based on the belief set’s conflictual view of the political universe and its interpretation of threat in a zero-sum fashion. Eisenhower’s experience empowered him to develop strategy largely based on his own pre-existing beliefs. Of these beliefs, fiscal conservatism has the most profound effect on policy. The most influential advisor, John Foster Dulles, who did contribute to the administration belief set’s virulent anticommunism, clearly took his lead from the president. The policy of the New Look embodied the administration’s belief set and was fully implemented, with varying degrees of success, during Eisenhower’s tenure. The policy remained in place and was not significantly affected by international focusing events or domestic pressures. The expectations of Hypothesis 1, 2 and 4 are supported by these findings. The evidence does not support Hypothesis 3. Administration Belief Set General Dwight D. Eisenhower rose to prominence as the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe during World War II. In this position, he demonstrated exceptional diplomatic and managerial abilities in keeping the unruly coalition together and, in the process, gained worldwide and domestic prestige. Interestingly, Eisenhower was one of the few voices raised against the use of the atomic bomb on Japan believing Japan was already defeated. 119 After the war, Eisenhower was Chief of staff of the Army, a Pentagon advisor, and eventually became the Supreme Commander of NATO. He also became prominent in domestic politics. At the 1948 Democratic convention, Americans for Democratic Action, founded by Leon Henderson, moved to dump Truman from the ticket in favor of Eisenhower. 120 In fact, Truman suggested he would step down and support Eisenhower for the Democratic presidential
119 120
See McCullough 1992, 428. See Donovan 1982, 18.
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nomination. Eisenhower, as we know, declined the offer. 121 Eisenhower, for his part, grew to dislike Truman. He even suggested to Carleton Kent of the Chicago Sun-Times that he ran to prevent the continuation of Truman in office and if he knew he would have been facing Governor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois in the 1952 election, he would not have run. 122 On the other hand, Gaddis (2005, 125) suggests Eisenhower ran to keep the Republican nomination out of the hands of isolationist Robert Taft. 123 In any event, Eisenhower successfully ran for the office of the Presidency. He brought with him a wealth of experience that made him the clear decision-making force within his administration. As Ambrose (1984, 10) states, “Eisenhower, not Charlie Wilson, made defense policy. Eisenhower, not John Foster Dulles, made foreign policy”. In other words, Eisenhower himself was the primary determinant of the Eisenhower administration belief set. Greenstein (2001, 55) notes that, “No other chief executive has entered the White House with his organizational experience, and none has put comparable effort into structuring his presidency”. Although Eisenhower brought his longtime aid, Andrew J. Goodpaster, to the White House as a confidant, he did not pick a single old friend for his cabinet or White House staff. 124 He was interested in expertise when constructing his cabinet. In order to remain at the hub of decision-making, Eisenhower coordinated agencies involved in foreign policy in the Executive Office of the President. 125 Moreover, he created the first White House Chief of Staff, the first Congressional Relations Office, and the first Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs (a position that would become the National Security Advisor). Eisenhower regularly
121 122 123 124 125
See Ibid, 258. See Ibid, 393-394. Greenstein (2001, 47) concurs with Gaddis. Ambrose 1984, 20. Greenstein, 1982, 16.
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attended NSC meetings as well. He presided over 339 of the 366 NSC meetings that occurred during his presidency. 126 Eisenhower has been criticized for holding too firmly to formalistic advisory procedures 127 , yet Greenstein (1982, 126-127) argues that he encouraged vigorous debate while he quietly listened during cabinet and NSC meetings. He wanted to hear the full gamut of policy options before he committed to a policy position. After hearing the arguments on a full range of options, Eisenhower would make the final decision. The most significant advisor during the Eisenhower years, until his death in 1959, was Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Gaddis (2005, 127) argues that Dulles, “primarily determined the nature of administration strategy—the selection of responses with which to counter threats. But the president possessed the keener sense of strategy of the two—of how responses were to be correlated with fundamental interests”. Gaddis continues by noting that despite Dulles’s role, Eisenhower “carefully retained ultimate authority, not hesitating to override his Secretary of State when he thought it appropriate to do so”. 128 Dulles is often portrayed as the ideological bell-weather of the administration. Yet, despite his rather obvious philosophical predilections, Dulles was actually more of a conduit, often deferring his preferences for Eisenhower’s. As Ambrose (1984, 21) notes, “(Dulles) would always do as Eisenhower wished”. 129 Dulles did apparently influence Eisenhower in terms of his vision of the Soviet Union. Dulles was of the belief that the objective of Soviet communism was world domination through “one world of state socialism”. 130 Gaddis (2005, 136) calls Eisenhower an “apt pupil” of Dulles 126
He presided over 51 in the first year (the old record was 34) (Greenstein 1982, 124). See Greenstein 1982, 126, footnote 33. 128 Gaddis compares Dulles to Acheson and notes, “Dulles never enjoyed the virtual free hand that Truman had accorded Acheson after 1949”. 129 Ambrose suggests that he may have been acquiescent to Eisenhower based on family experience. His Uncle Robert Lansing had attempted to follow his own direction under President Woodrow Wilson and was fired. 130 Gaddis 2005, 135. 127
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regarding such ideological perspectives. Despite earlier statements indicating a less severe view of Soviet communism 131 , in 1953 Eisenhower publicly stated “anyone who doesn’t recognize that the great struggle of our time is an ideological one…(is) not looking this question squarely in the face”. 132 This belief came to the fore repeatedly during the administration as “the president was particularly prone to see the diligent but subtle hand of the Kremlin at work in a variety of otherwise unrelated incidents around the world”. 133 The Eisenhower belief set, therefore, was disposed to focus more on intentions than capacities. 134 Eisenhower’s most significant domestic pre-existing belief was a firm conviction in the principles of fiscal conservatism. Gaddis (2005, 125) suggests that Dulles’s proclamations regarding the possibility of greater effectiveness at less cost appealed to Eisenhower prior to selecting him as Secretary of State. Eisenhower believed that balanced budgets and avoidance of excessive taxation were the paths to economic prosperity. He was convinced that deficit spending, even to bolster the military, would undermine the US economy. 135 These beliefs led him to designate the secretary of the treasury and director of the Bureau of the Budget as NSC members. 136 In essence, he brought the budget into NSC meetings. These beliefs in fiscal conservatism ran counter to NSC-68’s Keynesian mechanisms for funding expanded military spending. Yet Eisenhower was of the belief, in part due to Dulles’s influence and in accordance with NSC-68, that the perimeter was significant in the balance of power. 137 To rectify these
131
See ibid, 136. Ibid. 133 Ibid, 138. Gaddis suggests this dynamic occurred regarding Korea, Huk activities in the Philippines, Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Iran, Trieste, and Guatemala. 134 Ibid, 139. 135 For discussion, see Gaddis 2005, 131-134; Greenstein 1982, 48-49. 136 Greenstein 1982, 127. 137 This view only grew in strength as is made clear in NSC-5501, approved by Eisenhower on January 1955, which contained the line: “As the lines between the communist bloc and the Western coalition have become more clearly drawn over the last few years, a situation has arisen in which any further territorial gain would have an unfavorable 132
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apparently conflicting goals, the administration developed the “New Look” strategy for US foreign policy. 138 The New Look consisted of five planks: (1) nuclear deterrence, (2) alliances, (3) psychological warfare, (4) covert action, and (5) negotiations. 139 The most controversial of the policies was the manner in which the administration employed nuclear deterrence, which came to be known, drawing from Dulles’s phrase “instant massive retaliation” in his May 19, 1953 interview in Life magazine, as massive retaliation. As a means of lowering defense costs based on the disposition towards fiscal conservatism, the administration’s vision was to cut the most costly aspect of the military budget, ground forces, and rely on the threat of using expanded nuclear forces as a deterrent.140 Defense policy would now concentrate on airpower and nuclear weapons and, as Brown (1994, 52) puts it, “all other capacities were subsidiary”.141 Eisenhower, who thought nuclear wars were un-winnable 142 and had reservations about Dulles’s doctrine of retaliation, apparently was swayed by his fiscal conservatism to accept deterrence on the cheap. Eisenhower stumped for the policy by arguing, “It has been coldly calculated by the Soviet leaders…by their military threat to force upon America and the free world an unbearable security burden leading to economic disaster”. 143 Massive retaliation ran counter to NSC-68’s flexible response and led to criticisms that US foreign policy could take the world to the brink of destruction over minor international impact within the free world that might be out of all proportion to the strategic or economic significance of the territory lost” (Gaddis 2005, 129). 138 The phrase “New Look” was derived from a women’s clothing fashion in the post-World War II years (Greenstein 1982, 47). 139 Gaddis 2005, 159. 140 As a result, nuclear stockpiles doubled from 1953-55 and tripled from 1958-60 (LaFeber 1997). 141 Gaddis (2005, 169) states, “There is no question that the new strategy achieved economics”. Truman’s budget for fiscal year 1954 asked for $41.2 billion. Eisenhower reduced it to $35.8 billion and he only sought $30.9 billion in 1955. Most of the cost reductions came from the US army which shrank from 1.6 million in 1953 to 1 million in 1955. 142 Greenstein 1982, 48. 143 Brown 1994, 55.
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disputes. 144 Yet the policy was at least secretly asymmetrical in nature for the response was designed for war with the Soviet Union or China, not for minor skirmishes. Only in these situations, as noted in the top-secret statement of New Look strategy, NSC-162/2, approved by Eisenhower in October 1953, when “the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions”. 145 The strategic goal, of course, was to cajole the Soviets or the Chinese to pull back before the cataclysm. The tactical component for limited local aggressions relied on mobile convention forces with greater emphasis on allied participation. In other words, conventional forces’ primary purpose was to put out brushfires. The net effect of the New Look would be savings by, as Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Eisenhower’s Head of the JCS, suggested, “more efficient deployment and use of the technologies of atomic age warfare”. 146 As suggested by the approach to local aggressions, the second plank of the New Look was the development of alliances to protect the perimeter. To address US budgetary distress, an alliance building strategy to spread the burden would be developed through the Middle East and Indochina as a means of connecting the core power centers of Japan and Europe. In this way, the burden could be shared. Greenstein (1982, 47) suggests this approach best falls under the rubric of collective security in that Eisenhower was interested in “welding a sturdy coalition of Western and other non-communist nations. This coalition, he was convinced, could not merely be military. It needed a solid political, economic, and ideological framework. 147
144
The term brinksmanship became a part of the political lexicon. The term is once again tied to a Dulles and an article in Life magazine (late 1955) known as the “Brink of War” interview (Brown 1994, 68). 145 Gaddis 2005, 147. This statement does, however, make clear that Eisenhower was willing to use nuclear weaponry. 146 Brown 1994, 53. 147 The Middle East component, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), was a short-lived creature based on the Baghdad Pact of 1955. Although Turkey and Pakistan were receptive, other states were not, and, with the fall of the implanted Hashemite dynasty in Iraq in 1958, CENTO effectively ceased to exist. The Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), established in September 1954, which was ultimately undone by events in Indochina in the
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The third component of the New Look, psychological warfare, was essentially rhetorical in nature. As Gaddis (2005, 152) states, “psychological warfare meant simply a robust faith in the efficacy of public posture: the belief that merely making pronouncements and striking poses, the United States could increase the difficulties under which its adversaries operated”. Covert actions, the fourth component of the New Look, were, again, a way of fighting international communism on the cheap. Moreover, such methods allowed for deniability. Finally, negotiations rounded out the New Look strategy. Critics may scoff at this plank, yet, as Gaddis (2005, 157) notes, Eisenhower was more willing than Truman to attempt negotiations with the Soviet Union and China. The administration’s view of the Soviet Union and international communism, however, meant negotiations would focus on asymmetrical outcomes favoring the US in a “zero-sum” manner. Negotiations, therefore, were more apt to be part of “psychological warfare” rather than efforts at open and honest diplomacy. The Eisenhower administration’s ideological rigid anti-communism suggests a low level of conceptual complexity. The same could be said of the consistency of the influence of fiscal conservatism as an approach to national defense. As Brown (1994, 51) points out, the Korean War simplified US foreign policy and Eisenhower simplified it further by selecting one of the competing doctrines. Perhaps this indicates that Gaddis (2005, 196) is correct in suggesting that, “Contrary to the claims of ‘revisionist’ historians…Eisenhower was something less than a ‘genius’”. Yet Eisenhower did possess an enormous degree of emotional reserve. As Ambrose (1984, 511) states, “A major characteristic of (Eisenhower’s) diplomacy was his openness, his willingness to be conciliatory, his refusal to treat the situation as a crisis, and most of all his exercise of
1960s and 1970s, completed the “wide arc” of defense surrounding the “communist Eurasian heartland” (Brown 1994, 60).
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command and power. He would not be stampeded, despite…intense pressure”. Hence, the Eisenhower belief set was consistent in both style and substance for the entire administration. The continuation of the view of the conflictual nature of international relations indicates that the Eisenhower administration’s belief set regarding the nature of the political universe cannot be classified as moderate. Turning to the questions of threat, the ideological threat of the Soviet Union and international communism was taken seriously. Both Eisenhower and Dulles made repeated public statements suggesting that the ultimate goals of communism were nefarious in nature. 148 Consistent belief that international communism was under the direction of “the Kremlin” underscored these beliefs. The global threat was seen as equally dangerous. The administration believed that the goals of the Soviet Union, and therefore international communism, were “elimination of the US as a competing power center” and “the spread of communism throughout the world”. 149 This meant the perimeter was essential. Such thinking was behind the administration’s alliance strategy. The military threat, accordingly, was also seen as significant. Negotiations were seen only as a tool to undermine the Soviet Union rather than methods to foster satisfactory coexistence. With all this in mind, the views of the Eisenhower belief set demonstrated a militant political orientation. Foreign Policy Actions and Events Eisenhower made up his mind that he wanted to end the Korean War before he came to office. 150 In office, he rescinded the order that put the US 7th fleet between Mainland China and Formosa. To appease domestic critics, he said the action would “unleash Chiang Kai-Shek”. 151 The suggestion, however, was actually a disguise for the fundamental decision not to seek an all-
148 149 150 151
See Gaddis 2005, 136-137 Ibid, 140. Ambrose 1984, 31. Ibid, 47.
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out victory in Korea. Eisenhower considered using an atomic bomb on Kaesong where the Chinese were amassing forces at a time when the peace talks had floundered. In actuality, however, he was trying to pressure the Chinese into concluding. The hostilities in Korea finally came to an end in stalemate with the signing of the armistice on July 26, 1953. Consistent with the Eisenhower administration belief set as represented in the New Look, Eisenhower believed discreet warnings of the possible use of nuclear weapons brought the Chinese to more serious negotiations to end the war. 152 Developments in Iran provided the opportunity to employ covert operations. Eisenhower was acutely aware of the strategic significance of the Middle East in the Cold War. As he noted, “The Middle East. That’s half of the oil resources. We can’t let it go to Russia”.153 The rise to power of left-leaning Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran gave consternation to the Eisenhower administration. Eisenhower feared that Mossadegh would ‘turn communist’. Yet his fundamental belief was that, “nuclear war was unimaginable, limited conventional war unwinnable, and stalemate unacceptable”. 154 This left covert operations as the only option. When Mossadegh nationalized Iranian oilfields, the die was cast. Accordingly, Eisenhower approved the CIA’s Operation Ajax, a plan designed to bribe army officers and moderates in Tehran to overthrow Mossadegh and replace him with the Shah. The goal of the operation was achieved and new oil deals were made with the West. The success of Operation Ajax was a portent of what was to come regarding the CIA. As CIA Head Allen Dulles noted, “The size and scope of the CIA’s activities increased dramatically in the 1950s”. 155
152 153 154 155
Greenstein 1982, 62. Ambrose 1984, 109. Ibid, 111. Ibid.
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In Latin America, the election of left-leaning Guzman Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala led to action by the administration in 1954. Inspired by the success of Operation Ajax, the CIA developed, and Eisenhower approved, a plan to drive Arbenz from power and replace him with someone more amendable to American interests. Despite support for Arbenz from France and Britain 156 , the plan, which involved the invasion of Guatemala by Castillo Armas and a 1000 man army and bombing raids by US planes flown by CIA operatives 157 , was put into action and Arbenz fell from power. The eroding position of the French in Vietnam posed another problem for Eisenhower, especially in lieu of rabid, anti-communism at home in the forms of the China Lobby and McCarthyism. The residual effects of China and Korea led Eisenhower to believe that he could not afford to be seen as the guy who “lost Vietnam”. Accordingly, he agreed to increase military and economic aid to Vietnam. With the loss of the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 to the Viet Minh, Eisenhower was faced with the question of military intervention. Burke and Greenstein (1989) argue that Eisenhower’s advisory system, which included regular meetings and debates that focused sharply on alternatives, greatly contributed to the decision not to intervene militarily. 158 Clearly Eisenhower examined the potential negative ramifications of such an action as revealed in his 1963 memoirs: The jungles of Indonesia…would have swallowed up division after division of United States troops, who, unaccustomed to this kind of warfare, would have sustained heavy casualties…Furthermore, the presence of ever more numbers of white men in uniform would probably have aggravated rather than assuaged Asiatic resentments. 159
156
As a result of their stance, Henry Cabot Lodge threatened that this put Egypt and North Africa on the table (i.e. a backdrop to the Suez Crisis). 157 See Ambrose 1984, 192; Brown 1994, 106. 158 Greenstein (2001, 52) notes that JCS chairman Radford and Vice President Nixon were strong proponents for military intervention while Treasury Secretary George Humphreys led the opposition. Considering Eisenhower’s fiscal conservatism, it is not surprising he sided with the Treasury Secretary. 159 Ambrose 1984, 176. Eisenhower deleted the passage from his memoirs when published a year later because the US was getting involved and he did not want to be critical of the president.
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Aware of CIA estimates that Ho Chi Minh would receive as much as 80% of the vote 160 , Eisenhower refused to hold elections after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. The result was the UN brokered division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel. Another crisis arose in Asia when the Chinese communists started shelling the nationalist held islands of Quemoy and Matsu. The Chinese communists expanded the confrontation when they began bombing the Tachen Islands on January 10, 1955 and captured Ichiang Island, seven miles from the Tachens. Although Formosa was not a part of SEATO, the belief set of the administration lent itself to a response. In a presage to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Congress passed a resolution giving the president greater leeway to engage in war. Geneva talks were held and the bombing stopped by mid May. Interestingly, Eisenhower was advised five times by experts, including Admiral Radford, to use atomic weaponry against Mainland China and five times he said no. August 1958 saw the Quemoy/Matsu issue rise again. Although two aircraft carriers were sent from the 6th Fleet to join the 7th Fleet, once again, a wider conflagration was avoided. Gaddis (2005, 167) suggests that these crises were the closest Eisenhower came to using nuclear weapons. Consistent with the New Look strategy, the conflict involved communist China. Negotiations played a largely symbolic role in US/USSR relations. The spring of 1955 saw agreement with the Soviet Union for mutual withdrawal from and establishment of a neutral and demilitarized Austria. This result fit with the New Look’s aversion to the spread of communism. In addition, at the 1955 Geneva Summit, Eisenhower proposed the “Open Skies” initiative as a means of inspection of nuclear developments in both countries. Despite the talks
160
Ibid, 210.
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and the fact that “we even shook hands with some communists” 161 , the Soviets flatly rejected the proposal and the arms race continued. At the beginning of 1956, Eisenhower tried to revive “Atoms for Peace” 162 . It should be noted, however, that the US had the lead in the arms race and Eisenhower was aware that his tying of inspections to any treaty would lead to strong resistance from the Soviets. Moreover, the U2 over flights of the USSR began in 1956, with the president personally involved in micromanagement of the policy, that demonstrated the US was significantly ahead of the Soviet Union in the development of strategic nuclear weaponry. Hence, despite the overtures, the Eisenhower spoke his heart when he said, “The Soviets are the real enemy of the Western world” 163 . These efforts demonstrate the implementation of the negotiations plank of the New Look while illustrating the dark view of the Soviet Union on the Eisenhower belief set. Finally, with the escalating arms race in the background, a development occurred that would eventually lead to a crisis that nearly brought a nuclear exchange, namely Fidel Castro’s overthrow of Cuban President Fulgencio Batista on January 1, 1959. Aware of Castro’s popularity, Eisenhower refused to send in the Marines. The US recognized the new regime and sought normal relations. By mid-January, however, the communist party was made legal and anti-Americanism began to grow. Eisenhower’s response was to approve a CIA plan on March 17, 1960 to train Cuban exiles in Guatemala for what eventually became the Bay of Pigs invasion. This response of economy-minded covert action, as with the cases of Iran and Guatemala, fit with the Eisenhower belief set. 161
Gaddis 2005, 155. After the Soviets detonated their first hydrogen bomb in August 1953, Eisenhower sought a way to increase international cooperation and decrease the potential for global thermonuclear war. In a move to build “mutual trust” (Brown 1994, 73), he proposed the “Atoms for Peace” initiative in his December 8, 1953 UN speech. The idea was that the great powers would donate fissionable materials (US-1000 kilos, USSR-200 kilos, UK-40 kilos) for scientific research. The Russians stalled, yet the plan did eventually yield (no pun intended) the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957. 163 Ambrose 1984, 373. 162
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Belief Set Shift These developments during the Eisenhower years match the expectations of action of the Eisenhower belief set. The belief set, on the whole, is militant in its political orientation. Gaddis, in offering a concluding assessment of the implementation of the New Look, makes note of the continued influence of Eisenhower and the focus on fiscal responsibility. He states, “(Eisenhower’s) strategy was coherent, bearing signs of his influence at every level, careful, for the most part, in its relation of ends to means (emphasis added), and on the whole, more consistent with than detrimental to the national interest”. Eisenhower’s recognized experience meant he came to office with, in Neustadt’s (1990) terms, enormous reservoirs of public prestige. He maintained his prestige throughout his presidency, averaging 64 percent public approval. 164 Greenstein (1982) suggests he also developed his ‘professional reputation’ in what he calls the “hidden hand” strategy by publicly remaining above the political fray while secretly operating behind the scenes to achieve his political and policy objectives. Eisenhower’s experience, therefore, enabled him to avoid or successfully contain domestic social or political pressures that could contribute to belief shifts. These findings make the Eisenhower administration belief set a difficult case for assigning a belief set shift value. It is clear, however, that belief in the New Look did not diminish. Moreover, the continuation of implementing covert operations in the shape of the operation that would be known as the Bay of Pigs, U-2 operations over the Soviet Union, and considerations of the use of the nuclear option in the 1958 Quemoy and Matsu dispute, and Eisenhower’s suggestions to Kennedy that US force may be required in Southeast Asia (discussed below) are indications of a strengthening of existing beliefs over time. For this reason, the Eisenhower administration’s belief set shift is classified as militant+. 164
Greenstein 1982, 4.
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Kennedy/Johnson Belief Set 165 The Kennedy/Johnson belief set lasted the entire time the presidents were in office and was militant in orientation. Like the Eisenhower administration’s belief set, the political universe continued to be seen as conflictual and the threats posed by the Soviet Union and international communism were seen as so significant that they required symmetrical responses. Foreign policy advisors, especially after the shift towards reliance on a close network of advisors after the Bay of Pigs, shaped and reinforced Kennedy’s views during the formation of the Flexible Response strategy and influenced both men due to their inexperience in foreign policy through the stability of the advisory system. The administrations, like the Eisenhower administration, viewed the balance of power as a zero-sum game and believed in symmetrical responses to threat. Acceptance of Keynesian economics and views that the US had to expand its ability to respond to limited conflicts, however, diverged from the Eisenhower administration belief set and led to development of Flexible Response, a strategy close in its formulation to NSC-68. Focusing events are found to have moderate effect in shaping beliefs, but fears of and actual domestic political pressures profoundly affected the administrations belief sets. These 165
The analysis of the Kennedy/Johnson belief set is based on the following literature: Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999), Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis; Seyom Brown (1994), The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton; John Burke and Fred Greenstein (1989), How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions, 1954 and 1965; Robert Dallek (1998), Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973; Daniel W. Drezner (2000), “Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy”, American Journal of Political Science; John Lewis Gaddis (2005), Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of National Security Policy During the Cold War; Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts (1979), The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked; William C. Gibbons (1989), United States Government and Vietnam, Part II: 1961-1964; Fred I. Greenstein (2001), The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton; Stanley Karnow (1983), Vietnam, A History: The First Complete Account of Vietnam at War; Walter LaFeber (1997), America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1996; Gregory Marfleet (2000), “The Operational Code of John F. Kennedy During the Cuban Missile Crisis: A comparison of Public and Private Rhetoric”, Political Psychology; Richard E. Neustadt (1990), Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan; William B. Quandt (1993), Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Israeli Conflict since 1967; Richard Reeves (1993), President Kennedy: Profile of Power; Mark Schafer (1998), “Explaining Groupthink: Do the Psychological Characteristics of the Leader Matter?”, International Interaction; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (1965), A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House; Theodore C. Sorensen (1965), Kennedy; Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer (2000), “The Political Universe of Lyndon B. Johnson: Diagnostic and Strategic Propensities in Their Operational Codes”, Political Psychology. .
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findings offer strong support for Hypothesis 1 and moderate support for Hypothesis 2. The experiential Hypotheses, 3 and 4, are powerfully confirmed in the realm of domestic political pressures, but moderately supported regarding focusing events. Administration Belief Set Although John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson came from divergent backgrounds and their personalities varied considerably, their beliefs about the Soviet Union and international communism were remarkably similar. Kennedy and Johnson served during the development of the Cold War and the national security state. Both men observed the influence of McCarthyism and the fall out from the China lobby’s charges that Truman “lost China”. Fear of these domestic political pressures contributed to political insecurities that influenced them to take a hard line on international issues. In addition, they were wary of the New Look’s reliance on the nuclear option and believed the US required greater flexibility in its ability to respond to communist threats abroad. Greenstein (2001, 65) suggests that, “Despite his public use of anti-communist rhetoric, Kennedy’s private beliefs about the Soviet Union were dispassionate”. 166 Yet Kennedy’s inexperience lessened the affect of this personality trait. Greenstein argues that misunderstandings led to Kennedy developing a harsher view of Soviet intentions. He cites the influence Khruschev’s January 1961 “wars of liberation” speech on Kennedy as a result of Kennedy’s misunderstanding that the speech was directed at Chinese criticisms of Khruschev’s moderate domestic and global policies. It is debatable whether this was the case, but what is clear is that the speech profoundly affected Kennedy’s views of Soviet intentions in the Third World (see Brown 1994, 119; Gaddis 2005, 206-207). The perimeter, therefore, was crucial in 166
In an interview with biographer James McGregor, “Kennedy compared the United States and the Soviet Union to be a pair of individuals ‘who are both of good will, but neither of whom can communicate because of a different language’” (Greenstein 2001, 65).
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what Kennedy saw as a “global civil war”. 167 When questioned about US interventions abroad, Kennedy replied, “I would like to stay out of some of these fights, but it is a luxury we can’t afford”. 168 With the perimeter central to the battle against communism, the balance of power was seen as a fragile “zero-sum” game, a continuation of the views of Eisenhower, Truman III, and NSC-68. Although the administration was interested in supporting “progressive”, nationalist movements 169 and therefore did not maintain the Eisenhower belief set’s negative view of all leftist, nationalist movements 170 , the administration believed that perceptions of the international balance of power were as important as “hardware, position, and will”. 171 So despite the fact that the administrations were aware of the Sino-Soviet split and much less likely to use the nuclear option, there was “no change in the official perceptions of undifferentiated interests”. 172 As Kennedy stated, “We are opposed around the world by a monolithic and ruthless conspiracy that relies primarily on covert means for expanding its spheres of influence”. 173 The threat of international communism, therefore, required symmetrical response. Kennedy’s advisory system reinforced these beliefs. During the transition from Eisenhower, Kennedy met with Eisenhower for advise and even included C. Douglas Dillon, Eisenhower’s Undersecretary of State, in his cabinet as Secretary of the Treasury. 174 He believed that the meeting with Eisenhower and the inclusion of Republicans were necessary because the 1960 presidential election had been so close. 175 The meetings with Eisenhower
167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175
This phrase was included in Kennedy’s January 11, 1962 State of the Union address (Reeves 1993, 275). Reeves 1993, 220. See Gaddis 2005, 201-202; Schlesinger 1965, 609-610; Sorensen 1965, 510. This belief is an indication of Kennedy’s conceptual complexity. Gaddis 2005, 200. Ibid, 210. Ibid, 207. Reeves 1993, 27. Ibid, 28.
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included two significant discussions. The first was an exchange regarding Southeast Asia, and in particular Laos, when Eisenhower stated, “This is one of the problems I am leaving you that I’m not happy about…we may have to fight”. The second was regarding the impending CIA operation against Cuba that was to become known as the Bay of Pigs. Kennedy’s inexperience in the face of the advice he received in support of the operation contributed to his approval, if somewhat half-hearted, of the endeavor. The failure of the operation led Kennedy to the conclusion that he could not trust the advise of the so-called “experts”, so he would now focus on receiving advise from “his men” in an ad hoc fashion so he was the “hub” of decision-making. 176 Kennedy spurned Eisenhower’s recommendation of maintaining a formalistic advisory system, which Kennedy saw as cumbersome. He saw NSC meetings as a waste of time and preferred small decision-making groups. 177 The shift after the Bay of Pigs led to influence gravitating to his White House staff. Of these advisors, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, personal advisor the president on military affairs and then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Maxwell Taylor, and Attorney General Robert Kennedy, were of particular significance. Interestingly, Paul Nitze was assigned the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense. Kennedy also sought advise from advice from State Department officials who held similar views to himself. 178 The key point regarding this list is that they were individuals who held congruent views. The advice he received, therefore, tended to reinforce his own dispositions.
176
Ibid 104; Gaddis 2005, 198. Ibid, 53. 178 Gaddis 2005, 1998. Gaddis lists State Department advisors that could be called or become members of ad hoc committees as follows: Charles E. Bohlen and Llewellyn Thomson on Soviet Affairs, George Ball on NATO and Western European affairs, Rogers Hillsman on East Asia and counterinsurgency, Richard Goodwin on Latin America, and Averell Harriman on everything. Reeves (1993, 19) also suggests that the event brought Theodore Sorensen into the foreign policy decision-making fold. 177
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Kennedy and his advisors were in agreement that relying on nuclear deterrence as the primary method for securing US national interests was poor strategy. Moreover, the administration saw Keynesian economics as a way to support expanded military spending. To address these beliefs, the Kennedy administration’s “whiz kids”, with McNamara most prominent among them, formulated the defense doctrine of “Flexible Response”. 179 The doctrine was based on three fundamental premises: (1) a general disgust with the notion of ‘massive retaliation’, (2) a desire to improve US abilities for fighting “limited wars”, and (3) a Keynesian approach to governmental and deficit spending. The Kennedy administration saw reliance on brinkmanship as the primary tool for dealing with conflict as an inherently dangerous way to promote national security in the nuclear age. They were interested in increasing US capacity for dealing with medium or low-level conflicts by expanding conventional capabilities as a means of avoiding nuclear confrontation over less significant international issues. Moreover, the administration believed, as Kennedy stated to Congress, that, “Limited wars should be seen as our primary overseas mission”. 180 McNamara defended flexible response by arguing that larger conventional forces would help deter the Soviets from “certain low-scale forms of political and military aggression which they might be tempted to carry out”. 181 McNamara also argued that conflicts with conventional forces allow time for decision-makers to weigh their options and avoid nuclear confrontations. The idea of expanding conventional forces was positively met by Congressional and defense department supporters whom Eisenhower had resisted for so long. The strategic shift under the Kennedy administration from massive retaliation to flexible response meant that, as Brown (1994, 128) states, “US capacities for 179
For coverage of the eight guidelines to flexible response as presented during the Special Presidential Message to Congress on March 28, 1961, see Sorensen 1965, 604-605. For discussion of the philosophical underpinnings of flexible response, see Gaddis 2005, 197-234. 180 Brown 1994, 128. 181 Ibid, 145.
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limited war were to be expanded considerably. US nuclear capacity was to be seen primarily, if not exclusively, as a last resort, as an instrument of retaliation for a direct attack on the United States”. The continued emphasis on zero-sum analysis, symmetrical response and the new focus on conventional weapons and Keynesian economics were a clear return to NSC-68. Accordingly, Kennedy initiated a significant military build-up. 182 This belief set remained consistent through Kennedy’s entire time in office as exemplified by his statement two months before his death that, “Every time a country, regardless of how far away it may be from our borders…passes behind the Iron Curtain the security of the United States is threatened”. 183 The basic assumptions of the flexible response strategy remained in place when Lyndon Johnson became president. 184 Johnson came to office, despite a world tour as vice-president, largely lacking in foreign policy experience. He therefore was reliant on his advisors. Part of the consistency of foreign policy strategy across the two administrations can be explained by the fact that Johnson kept most of Kennedy’s top advisors, including McNamara, Bundy, Taylor, and Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. Even when Bundy resigned in 1966, he was replaced by Walt Rostow, who as Head of the State Department’s Policy Planning staff (Kennan’s former position) under Kennedy, provided the “most comprehensive guide to what the (Kennedy) administration thought it was trying to do in world affairs”. 185
182
The number of army divisions was increased from 14 to 16; the number of ICBMs was increased by 1000; and the administration promoted the idea of establishing “police academies” to teach police and paramilitary members to fight subversion under the supervision of the FBI (Reeves 1993, 135). 183 Gaddis 2005, 210. 184 Ibid, 199. 185 Gaddis 2005, 199. The document was a 285-page draft statement of Basic National Security Policy (BNSP).
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In conjunction with advisory stability, Johnson held beliefs similar to Kennedy regarding the threat posed by international communism. Yet other factors appear to help explain why his conviction to these beliefs was most likely more powerful than Kennedy’s. Dallek (1998, 91) suggests that, “The Munich analogy was central to LBJ’s thinking about challenges abroad”. These cognitions came to the fore in what was the defining foreign policy issue of Johnson’s time, Vietnam. “Everything I know about history”, he exclaimed to biographer Doris Kearns, “told me that if I got out of Vietnam and let Ho Chi Minh run through the streets of Saigon, then I’d be doing exactly what Chamberlain did in World War II”. 186 Johnson was also focused on the negative political ramifications of failure in Vietnam. As Johnson stated, “We do not want another China in Vietnam”. 187 He expressed to Kearns that he believed losing China led to the rise of McCarthy and “losing Vietnam” would lead to even worse domestic circumstances. 188 In other words, as Gaddis (2005) stresses regarding the pre-Détente period of the Cold War, Vietnam was crucial on psychological grounds with failure being seen as damaging at home and abroad. Not holding to our commitments to SEATO would undermine US prestige. Gaddis (2005, 211) notes the congruent fears of Kennedy and Johnson by stating, “What the Kennedy and Johnson administrations feared most (was) the threat of embarrassment, of humiliation”. As Johnson stated in his April 7, 1965 speech at Johns Hopkins University, failure to honor pledges of support would mean confidence in American commitment would be shaken “from Berlin to Thailand”. 189
186 187 188 189
Kearns 1976, 252. Dallek, 1998, 102. Kearns 1976, 252. Brown 1994, 191.
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Johnson was not alone in these beliefs. Dean Acheson, Allen Dulles, Dean Rusk, and McGeorge Bundy all held similar views. 190 Johnson succinctly surmised these congruent views when he stated, “Surrender anywhere threatens defeat everywhere”. In short, NSC-68 was a living document during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. In terms of the nature of the political universe, the Kennedy/Johnson belief set clearly was not moderate. Kennedy’s dispassionate views were undermined by Khruschev’s “war of liberations” speech. Johnson was influenced by the existing belief sets of his advisors. After all, he saw himself as carrying the torch for Kennedy. 191 For both administrations, therefore, relations with the Soviet Union and international communism were clearly conflictual. The ideological threat, as seen by Kennedy, was more nuanced that Eisenhower’s regarding progressive nationalist movements, but was still real and profoundly affected US national interests. Johnson, despite overtures to Eastern Europe, also saw the threat as substantial, as evidenced by his references to Munich. Both presidents saw the global threat posed by communism as significant, believing the goal of the “communist monolith” was to constantly seek ever-increasing spheres of influence. The military threat was seen as so great, negotiations had to be taken from a position of strength and the goals should be asymmetrically balance in the favor of the US. The answers to these questions regarding the essential nature of the Soviet Union and international communism indicate that the Kennedy/Johnson belief set was militant. Foreign Policy Actions and Events 190
See Kearns 1976, 253-56. Moreover, Johnson had personal doubts. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Johnson supported the air strike option and was against the naval blockade. He believed that “the blockade would be ineffective because we in effect are ‘locking the barn after the horse is gone’” (Dallek 1998, 87). Having missed the mark in this assessment undermined his confidence and contributed to a greater reliance on his advisors at the being of his presidency, a presidency that began sharply on November 22, 1963 with the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Eisenhower thought Johnson to be the best democrat for the job of promoting and managing national interests (Dallek 1998, 85). He doubted that the rest of the United States shared that assessment. As Johnson expressed, “I took the oath. I became President. But for millions of Americans I was still illegitimate, a naked man with no presidential covering, a pretender to the throne, an illegal usurper” (Kearns 1976, 170).
191
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Reeves (1993, 19) notes, “There was an astonishing density of events during the Kennedy years”. The first months of the administration saw a wide range of international disputes and events that affected US interests. Among the disputes and events were communist advances in Laos and Vietnam, a nationalist uprising in Angola, continuing Soviet resistance to test ban inspections at Geneva, the Soviets putting the first human in orbit in space, the assassination of Trujillo in the Dominican Republic and the ensuing chaos and unrest, confrontations at Vienna over access to West Berlin, fighting breaking out between France and Tunisia over a French base on Tunisian soils at Bizerte, a constitutional crisis in Brazil after the resignation of president Quadros, the Soviet announcement of the end of a three year moratorium on nuclear testing, and the beginning of fighting in the Congo brought on by Belgian withdrawal. Along with all these events, the Kennedy administration suffered the debacle of the Bay of Pigs. During the Eisenhower administration, the CIA hatched a plan to use Cuban exiles to overthrow Castro. Eisenhower approved the plan and training of the exiles began at bases in Guatemala. With preparations almost completed, CIA officials and other defense experts lobbied the new president to approve the plan arguing that the plan would tap wells of Cuban disenchantment and lead to the overthrow of Castro. Despite apprehensions, Kennedy approved the plan but made it clear that he would not support US intervention. After the operation began on April 17, 1961, it soon became obvious that things were going horribly wrong for the 1,400 Cuban exiles landed on the beach. Although not publicly acknowledged, the CIA strafed airfields with B-26 bombers. 192 Moreover, the administration continued to develop a decision-making group known as “Special Group (Augmented)”, which focused on plans to assassinate Castro that ultimately came to be
192
Reeves 1993, 90.
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known as operation Mongoose. 193 Gaddis (2005, 235) suggests that this operation was, in fact, an expression of Flexible Response. Failure during the Bay of Pigs, as noted above, led to Kennedy developing a more insular advisory system. Moreover, he was aware that political pressures would grow if his administration failed again. These concerns manifested themselves at the Vienna conference and the ensuing Berlin Crisis. Kennedy met with Khruschev in Vienna on June 3-4, 1961 to discuss Berlin. The discussions were of a confrontational nature as Khrushchev threatened that allied access to West Berlin would end before the year was out. Kennedy listened to former Secretary of State under Truman, Dean Acheson, and received hard line advice. He advised Acheson and his staff to develop a political plank to Acheson’s all-or-nothing, dichotomous view of negotiations or conflict. For Kennedy, with his focus on the fragile balance of power, Berlin was of vital importance. Moreover, his apparent defeat at Vienna, coupled with the Bay of Pigs, increased his fears of domestic political repercussions. In a July 25 televised speech to the nation, Kennedy argued that Berlin had become, “the greatest testing place of Western courage and will, a focal point where our solemn commitments…and Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confrontation”. 194 Khruschev, not pleased with the speech, ordered the construction of the Berlin Wall to begin on August 13, 1961. Kennedy responded by sent a US battle group down the Autobahn. The Soviets also resumed nuclear testing, making the announcement at Geneva on August 30, hence throwing the talks in Geneva into confusion and consternation. In response, Kennedy
193
As a sign of how serious this undertaking was, the operation cost more than $100 million a year, involved more than four hundred Americans and two thousand Cubans, a fleet of small boats, and airplanes operating from Florida Air Force bases (Reeves 1993, 336). 194 Brown 1994, 177.
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approved the resumption of US testing. 195 Both of these policy replies are expressions of a “zero-sum” approach to a fragile balance of power affected by perceptions as much as by hardware. Developments in Southeast Asia, as Eisenhower suggested, were of central significance to the Kennedy administration. The domestic political residue of “Who lost China?” contributed to the significance of Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand. Gelb (1979, 73) argues that, “Vietnam policy debates from the beginning of the administration centered on how to save Vietnam, not whether save it”. After the Vienna meeting, Kennedy told the New York Times James Reston that, “We have to confront them. The only place we can do it is in Vietnam. We have to send more people there”. 196 Such actions were already underway. Kennedy had already broken the Geneva Accords by increasing the number of US personnel about the limit of 685. 197 By the end of 1961, over 2,067 US military advisors were in Vietnam. 198 He had also approved the use of napalm and defoliants in Vietnam as well as counterinsurgency in Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand. 199 The broken ceasefire in Laos in May 1962 provided another opportunity to apply Flexible Response. Kennedy sent the 7th Fleet into the Gulf of Thailand and 3,000 US troops to the Thai side of the Laotian border before the threat subsided. Finally in August 1963, Kennedy’s last significant act in Vietnam was to approve the overthrow of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. The overthrow of Diem meant the US would not leave South Vietnam at least until the new regime was established and the “counter insurgency effort (was) back on track”. 200 It
195 196 197 198 199 200
For discussion, see Sorensen 1965, 619-623; Schlesinger 1965, 851. Reeves 1993, 173. Ibid, 117. Ibid, 262. Ibid, 280-282. Brown 1994, 184.
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should be noted, however, that in addition to these aggressive maneuvers, the Kennedy administration also included political, economic, and social planks to Vietnamese policy. During the Cuban Missile Crisis 201 , Kennedy’s decisions were affected by the importance of perceptions. The actual missiles would have some tactical value, but not enough to tilt the balance of power against the United States. The administration did believe the world’s perceptions of the development, however, could affect the balance of power to such a degree that a potential exchange of nuclear missiles was risked. Brown (1994, 165) explains that Kennedy believed allowing the missiles to remain in place, “would have politically changed the balance of power (i.e. the Soviets having a nuclear deterrent in the Western hemisphere). It would have appeared to, and appearances contribute to reality”. In short, the administration’s belief set contributed to the nature of the confrontation. One lesson that Kennedy and his closest advisors learned from this experience was that they could effectively negotiate with Khruschev through back channels. 202 As a confirmation of this lesson, public negotiations with the Soviets finally began to bear fruit by 1963. These included minor agreements such as the installing of the Moscow-Washington “hot-line”, joint support for the UN resolution opposing the placement of nuclear weapons in space, and the sale of $250 million of surplus wheat to the Russians. 203 More significantly, the US and the Soviets agreed to a test ban treaty on July 25, 1963. With 80 percent approval ratings for the treaty, the Senate passed it on September 24, 1963. Sorensen (1965, 74) suggests that to Kennedy, “No other single accomplishment ever gave him greater satisfaction”. It should be mentioned that
201
The Cuban Missile Crisis, the move to place Russian missiles in Cuba and the ensuing confrontation, may be the most investigated event of the 20th century, with perhaps Allison’s (1999) Essence of Decision being the most renowned, so the dispute is not be fully revisited here. 202 Robert Kennedy had secretly negotiated with Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin as they acted as go-betweens for their respective leaders. 203 Gaddis 2005, 228.
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Kennedy was informed that a missile gap did not exist at least by February 1961, so he was aware that the deal asymmetrically benefited the United States. For Johnson, it was the Vietnam War that consumed most of the administration’s time and energy in international affairs. Johnson adhered to the tenets of flexible response. As Gaddis (2005, 236) notes, “Johnson followed the strategy of flexible response faithfully in Vietnam, perhaps more so than Kennedy himself would have done”. In the spring of 1964, Johnson moved forward in an incremental and covert manner. 204 Although he left most of the planning to McNamara, he did approve National Security Memorandum 288 to prepare for a quick response to Vietnam. In addition, on McNamara’s recommendation, he approved Operations Plan 34-A, a covert operation to harass the North Vietnamese with small-scale raids as a means of demonstrating the seriousness of US intentions to the North Vietnamese and reassuring the South Vietnamese. Following such a raid on two islands in the Gulf of Tonkin on July 30-31, the North Vietnamese responded by attacking the destroyer USS Maddox on August 2. The administration thought the destroyers would be a deterrent, but the North Vietnamese saw then as targets of opportunity to demonstrate their resolve. The reaction of the administration was to push for greater freedom for the executive to use US forces in defense of national interests under the guise of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. On August 7, 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed by Congress, 88-2 in the Senate and 416-0 in the House. 205 After the landslide victory in the 1964 presidential elections, the administration began to deliberate about the direction of US policy in Vietnam. Burke and Greenstein (1989) argue that Johnson’s advisory system, involving infrequent meetings and limited review of policy options, contributed to the administration walking into a trap that 204
At the time, two-thirds of American said they paid little or no attention to Vietnam and Johnson wanted to keep it that way. Ibid, 198. 205 Brown 1994, 185.
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Eisenhower had avoided. The end result was, in the words of historian William C. Gibbons (1989, 366), “The planning process in November was action-oriented—not whether to act, but what to do”. The domestic political context provided the opportunity to pursue action for although 75% of Americans favored a negotiated settlement, there were ample indicators that the public supported defense of South Vietnam. 206 Issues of both the ideological threat posed by international communism and political ramification affected Johnson’s views. “You see”, Johnson stated, “the communists want to rule the world, and if we don’t stand up to them, they will do it”. 207 Unaware that the Vietnam was fundamentally weakening McCarthyistic approaches to the Cold War, he feared that a lack of resolve would tap dormant McCarthyism and lead to a “right-wing stampede”. 208 Democratic losses in the House only served to confirm his suspicions. 209 Moreover, by 1965, military force had become the primary tool for fighting communism in Vietnam. Conventional military escalations continued in Vietnam over the next few years without noticeable progress other than “body counts”. As the situation deteriorated, Johnson closed himself off to dissonant information and “stayed-the-course”. Johnson developed what Kearns calls an “anticipatory feedback system” to discourage opposing points of view. As she notes, by “screening out options, facts, and ideas, Lyndon Johnson’s personality operated to distort the truth” until he was “a prisoner of his own propaganda”. 210 Not until the Tet Offensive in January
206
68% thought the North Vietnamese would violate a negotiated ceasefire; 83% favored bombing North Vietnam; 79% saw US withdrawal leading to a communist takeover; 79% thought it was very important to prevent a communist takeover; 48% supported sending a large contingent of US troops; 60% gave the president positive marks for his handling of the Vietnam crisis (Dallek 1998, 153-54). 207 Kearns 1976, 316. 208 Ibid, 282. Gaddis (2005, 240) discusses the fears of the negative domestic political forces that would be unleashed if the Vietnam was “lost”, such as attackes on the administration and the emboldening of extremists. 209 1964 election results: 295-140 Democrats in the House; 68-32 Democrats in the Senate. 1966 elections: 248-187 Democrats in the House; 64-36 Democrats in the Senate. 210 Kearns 1976, 322.
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1968, the event that ultimately undermined Flexible Response, did the Johnson accept the greater reality of the situation. Belief Set Shift Kennedy clearly was affected by Khruschev’s “wars of liberation” speech. This event contributed to the administration’s belief in confronting international communism in a symmetrical manner. In addition, Khruschev’s behavior at the June 1961 Vienna conference appears to have influenced Kennedy into taking a harder line with the Soviet Union. The most significant focusing event during the Kennedy and Johnson years was the Cuban Missile Crisis. The negotiations that resolved the confrontation contributed to increased contacts with the Soviet Union, yet the goals sought in these diplomatic efforts were balanced in the favor of the US. The fall of Khruschev and the rise of Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin, however, nullified this apparent softening of Soviet leadership. What appears to have had the greatest influence on the hardening of beliefs, however, were both administration’s fears negative domestic political repercussions if they did not act firmly regarding the Soviet Union. The failure of the Bay of Pigs and the nature of the Vienna conference amplified Kennedy’s militancy, which was already revealing itself with Operation Mongoose and in Vietnam. Despite a subtle period of relaxation of tensions, or détente, during 1963 with the Soviet Union, Kennedy maintained aggressive policies in Vietnam, even to the point of overthrowing Diem who was seen as undermining their efforts in this symmetrical response. Johnson was also fearful of being seen as the one who “lost Vietnam” and his beliefs were amplified by Democratic losses in the 1966 elections. Moreover, the public initially supported efforts to combat the spread of communism in Vietnam. The net effect of these
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developments was an amplification of the Kennedy/Johnson administration belief set, hence the belief set shift is classified as Militant+. Nixon/Ford Belief Set 211 The Nixon/Ford belief set remained in place for the tenure of both administrations and was pragmatic in orientation. Although the political universe was seen in conflictual terms, threats were interpreted in a much more narrow fashion than was the case for the preceding three administration belief sets. The critical foreign policy advisor throughout was Henry Kissinger. Nixon and Kissinger largely shared the same beliefs regarding the nature of the threat posed by the Soviet Union and international communism. Ford’s inexperience led him to rely extensively on Kissinger, which led to the continuation of the policies established under Nixon. The belief set was based on convictions that military pressure and incentive based on mutual interests could be used to tame Soviet ambitions. The hope was that patterns of restraint and cooperation could be developed that could lead to peaceful co-existence. Although conceptualized in realpolitik terms, the ultimate goal was détente. Part of the pressure was built on the premise that the SinoSoviet split provided the opportunity to develop relations with China as a means of balancing against the USSR. By envisioning the international structure as a multipolar rather than bipolar
211
The analysis of the Nixon/Ford belief set is based on the following literature: Fawn M. Brodie (1981), Richard Nixon: The Shaping of His Character; Seyom Brown (1994), The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton; John J. Casserly (1977), The Ford White House: The Diary of a Speechwriter; John Lewis Gaddis (2005), Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of National Security Policy During the Cold War; Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts (1979), The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked; Fred I. Greenstein (2001), The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton; Richard E. Neustadt (1990), Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan; Raymond Price (1977), With Nixon; William B. Quandt (1993), Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Israeli Conflict since 1967; Jerel A. Rosati (1981), “Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective”, World Politics; William Safire (1975), Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White House; Mark Schafer (1998), “Explaining Groupthink: Do the Psychological Characteristics of the Leader Matter?”, International Interaction; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (1973), The Imperial Presidency; J. Spears (1984), Presidents and the Press.
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system, threats were seen more narrowly and flexibly and the focus turned from a zero-sum to positive-sum game. The focusing event that shaped these beliefs occurred in 1969 when fighting broke on the Russia/Chinese border between the communist states. Developments in Vietnam during Nixon’s first term also led to significant reductions in the administration’s demands required from the North Vietnamese for a treaty to end the fighting. Domestic political pressures were extensive and did contribute to the negotiated outcome in Vietnam. In other foreign policy domains, and even with Vietnam in many ways, the administration resisted domestic political pressures by multiple means, some of which were criminal. These findings support Hypothesis 1. Kissinger’s influence on foreign policy under Ford due to his inexperience confirms Hypothesis 2. The focusing event of the Sino-Soviet split did significantly affect the administration belief set. Domestic political pressure, on the other hand, only mildly influenced the administration’s beliefs. The consistency of the belief set suggests that focusing events and political pressures were not related to Ford’s inexperience. Accordingly, Hypothesis 3 is partially confirmed, but the evidence does not support hypothesis 4. Administration Belief Set As with Kennedy and Johnson, the similarities in strategic beliefs between Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford are congruent to the point that their combined administrations constitute one belief set. The primary reason for the parallel views was the advisory influence of Henry Kissinger, who was initially Nixon’s National Security advisor and later became Secretary of State for both Nixon and Ford. Nixon, who had significant experience in foreign affairs as Eisenhower’s vice-president, and Kissinger had developed foreign policy beliefs sets that
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roughly matched and they coordinated their efforts to achieve their policy goals. 212 As Watergate began to fill Nixon’s time, Kissinger continued implementing foreign policy along the established lines. Ford largely deferred to Kissinger when he came to office because of his inexperience and, by 1976, his quest to win the 1976 presidential elections. The net result was that continuity in foreign policy reigned across the administrations. The militant consensus that lasted from Truman III to Kennedy/Johnson was ended by failure in Vietnam. 213 The zero-sum game and symmetrical responses required by NSC-68 and the New Look were undermined by developments in Southeast Asia. Nixon, who had advocated sending in troops and using nuclear weaponry in response to French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 214 and offered advice to Kennedy as the Bay of Pigs operation was falling apart that, “I would find a proper legal cover and go in” 215 , had moderated his views by the end of the 1960s. Not only was he aware that the Soviets were approaching parity in long-range missiles 216 , his suspicions that a Sino-Soviet breech might occur were confirmed when fighting broke out between the Chinese and the Soviets along the Ussuri River in March 1969. 217 In his estimation, these developments changed the nature of the struggle against the Soviet Union and international
212
As Safire (1975, 161) makes clear, “Nothing by passed (Kissinger) on the way to the president”. Safire even suggests the relationship was essentially symbiotic. They reinforced each other’s ‘always realpolitik, sometimes pragmatic’ approaches to international affairs. 213 Gelb (1979, 363) states that, “considerable evidence suggests that on the basis of intuitive cost-benefit analysis and moral values, most of the American people, foreign policy professionals, the politicians, and the foreign leaders concluded that the Vietnam War was a mistake long before it was over”. 214 Brodie 1981, 324. After briefing Nixon on the hydrogen bomb, Robert Oppenheimer told a friend, “I have just come from a meeting with the most dangerous man I ever met” (Ibid, 322). 215 Reeves 1993, 99. 216 “By the end of 1970, the Russians were expected to have 1,290 ICBMs and 300 SLBM, as compared to 1,054 and 656 for the United States” (Gaddis 2005, 284). 217 Ibid, 294.
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communism. 218 To Nixon, the Sino-Soviet split meant that, “International communist unity ha(d) been shattered”. 219 Kissinger, an academic and politician long acquainted with the realist school of thought towards international relations and, in Gaddis’s (2005, 306) words, “had a sense of strategy—an insistence on the importance of establishing coherent relations between means and ends”, agreed with Nixon’s assessment. 220 Kissinger believed that the “multi-dimensional nature of power” 221 meant that the international environment was no longer a zero-sum game. Interests, therefore, were flexible and not fixed. Accordingly, as Gaddis (2005, 281) notes, “Threats came to be perceived more narrowly”. In other words, responses should be asymmetrical in nature. The new approach towards dealing with the communist threat, therefore, should focus on “geopolitics over ideology”. 222 As Kissinger stated in December 1969, “We have no permanent enemies, we will judge other countries, including communist countries…on the basis of their action and not on the basis of their domestic ideology”. 223 Both Nixon and Kissinger believe that the balance of power lead to stability. Instability was created when one power became too strong. 224 This is why Kissinger advocated, and Nixon eventually concurred, that the US should seek sufficiency in nuclear capacity rather than supremacy. 225 In addition, both men saw multipolarity as more stable than bipolar systems, for 218
Safire (1975, 102) suggests, “On big decisions, Nixon was remarkably consistent in the way he made up his mind; the ‘big play’ as he called it, was usually an end-around or reversal of field”. With a keen eye towards politics, one of his basic guidelines was, “When circumstances change, change your policy”. 219 He comment is in Nixon’s first Annual Policy Report (Gaddis 2005, 282). 220 Both Nixon and Kissinger had come to this conclusion by 1969 (Ibid, 280). 221 Ibid, 275. 222 Ibid, 295. 223 Ibid, 282. 224 (Nixon) “Those who scoff at ‘balance-of-power’ diplomacy on the world scene should recognize that the only (emphasis added) alternative to a balance of power is an imbalance of power—and history shows us that nothing (emphasis added) so drastically escalates the danger of war as such an imbalance” (Price 1977, 109). 225 Consensus existed in the administration that nuclear stockpiles should be greater than what was necessary to guarantee Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Disagreement existed regarding how large the stockpiles should be. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird argued that all parts of the strategic triad (bombers, submarines, and land-based
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bipolar structures are by nature zero-sum. In July 1971, Nixon suggested that five power centers existed in the world: the United States, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan. Balancing power across these power centers would add greater stability in the international system. The multipolar system could exist with power centers varying in capacity. The US, therefore, would still have to apply pressure in a “realpolitik” fashion as a means of leverage in dealing with threats. 226 China should be engaged, therefore, as a means to triangulate with China against Russia. 227 With power being seen as “multi-dimensional” and zero-sum assumptions as unrepresentative of the international system, Kissinger believed that mutual interests could exist between the US and the USSR and such interests could be used to US advantage. The idea was that pressure or incentives could be applied in one issue area to bring about change in another issue area. By linking issues, hence the descriptive term of “linkage”, the US could prod the Soviet Union in ways that would benefit both the US and the USSR. The goal of linkage was to shape Soviet interests in such a manner that they would eventually avoid foreign policy adventurism for fear of ending positive international interactions from which they benefited. Through these methods, the two superpowers could learn to develop structures of “peaceful coexistence”. In effect, this would amount to a revival of détente. To Kissinger, détente served US national interests by developing “habits of mutual restraint, coexistence, and, ultimately, cooperation”. 228 Realpolitik was a crucial ingredient in the strategy. As Nixon stated, “Unless the United States has not only the military strength but ICBMs) should be able to maintain ‘society destroying’ capacity after a first strike. Kissinger argued for a somewhat smaller stockpile under the rubric of what he called “sufficiency”. Kissinger’s more limited approach of maintaining a stockpile beyond MAD of sufficiency was the policy that Nixon ultimately adopted for SALT I (for discussion of these developments, see Brown, 235-239). 226 For a discussion of the Nixon administration’s propensities, see Brown 1994. 227 See Gaddis 2005, 278-280. 228 Ibid, 280-281.
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also leadership that makes us respected and credible, they (the Soviet Union and China) wouldn’t be interested in talking to us”. 229 In other words, the expression that behind diplomacy is a rattling sword describes in large measure the Nixon administration’s realpolitik approach to détente with the Soviet Union and China. Power was, therefore, a critical ingredient in reigning in Soviet ambition and achieving peaceful co-existence. As Price (1977, 374) notes, “The Nixon détente was not a substitute for containment. It was a means of containment—a means created for the new strategic environment, in which the United States could no longer rely on the massive nuclear superiority it had enjoyed a decade earlier”. Hence, détente was about containing the Soviet Union, but rather than relying purely on force, the approach sought to convince the Soviets that it was in their benefit to be contained.230 As realists would suggest, however, détente, with its carrots and sticks, was a tool for dealing with great powers. Lesser powers, at least those that were not in the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe (i.e. the Soviet Union was proximate), in accordance with realpolitik, should still primarily be subject to the stick. The final component of the administration belief set was the Nixon Doctrine. In order to fit means with ends, the Nixon Doctrine was a series of policies designed to phase down global commitments. The plan was to keep to all treaty commitments, but look for ways for countries to defend themselves as well. Primarily applied in Asia, the hope was to develop positive relations with non-communist Asian countries and shift some of the economic and military burdens to Asian states. The delicate balancing act of linkage and détente necessitated tight control at the highest levels. This approach fit well with Nixon’s lack of trust of the bureaucracy and paranoia and
229 230
Price 1977, 112. Gaddis 2005, 287.
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contributed to extensive centralization of decision-making and power in the White House. Ultimately, the White House abused this “imperial” power and Nixon resigned as a result of the Watergate scandal. Kissinger stayed on as Secretary of State, a position he accepted in 1973, when Ford assumed the presidency in August 1974. Ford’s foreign policy inexperience and focus on the 1976 presidential election led him to defer to Kissinger during his brief presidency, which, in turn, contributed to foreign policy that was largely a continuance of the former administration. 231 Hence, beliefs in détente for great powers and realpolitik for lesser powers remained relatively fixed. Following the decision rules, the realpolitik foundation for détente, despite the fact that the goal was greater cooperation, suggests a conflictual rather than cooperative view of the political universe, so the administration belief set cannot be categorized as moderate. Moving to the questions of threat, ideology is clearly seen as less significant than geopolitical concerns. Beliefs in the potential for peaceful coexistence and the utility of negotiating with China underscore this point. These beliefs also indicate that the global threat was seen in pragmatic terms as well. Finally, the acceptance of parity and the attitudes towards the use of negotiation indicate that the military threat was not seen as consuming. The answers to the threat questions, therefore, indicate that the Nixon/Ford administration belief set was pragmatic. Foreign Policy Actions and Events Like Johnson, both Nixon and Kissinger thought US credibility was at stake in Vietnam. Kissinger fended off criticisms by exclaiming, “For what is involved now is the confidence in American promises. However fashionable it is to ridicule the terms ‘credibility’ or ‘prestige’, they are not empty phrases; other nations can gear their actions to ours only if they can count on
231
Speechwriter John J. Casserly wrote in his Monday, February 10, 1975, diary entry: “Foreign policy, despite the rumors to the contrary, remains firmly in the hands of Henry Kissinger”.
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our steadiness”. 232 Brown (1994) argues that both Nixon and Kissinger were aware before taking office that the Vietnam War was un-winnable and the US was losing standing in the international community by pursuing the venture. The key to “peace with honor”, as Kissinger saw it, was to get out like DeGaulle did from Algeria, as a matter of policy, not collapse. The way to do this, they believed, was through Vietnamization, a corollary of the Nixon doctrine based on shifting responsibility for fighting over to the South Vietnamese, and negotiated settlement with the North Vietnamese. There were essentially two planks to Nixon and Kissinger’s plan: (1) remove troops but show “less squeamishness” about bombing sites in North Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos and (2) push the Soviets and the Chinese to pressure the North Vietnamese to allow the US to withdraw with honor. 233 To disrupt North Vietnamese tactics and punish them as a means of bringing about a settlement, the US pressured Prince Sihanouk to allow bombing and US incursions into Cambodia. 234 The bombing began in March 1969 and the invasion of Cambodia started on April 28, 1970. The administration tried to keep the bombing a secret. The story was broke in May 1969 by William Beecher of the New York Times but the administration did not acknowledge the Cambodian sorties until after the invasion. 235 The adventures in Cambodia led to widespread demonstrations in the US, most notably on the campus of Kent State University where four students were shot and killed by the US National Guard. To Nixon and Kissinger: “Opposition…to the Cambodian invasion was a typical expression of the naïveté and
232
Brown 1994, 214. Brown 1994, 215-16. 234 See Safire (1975, 182) and Brown (1994, 218). Safire suggests that the North Vietnamese also pressured Prince Sihanouk into allowing the NV to use Cambodian territory to conduct military operations and supply the Viet Cong. The irony of the US incursions is that they helped undermine the Prince and strengthen the position of the Cambodian communists known as the Khmer Rouge. 235 Brown 1994, 218-20. 233
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spinelessness of the liberal establishment”. 236 They believed the incursion was successful. Yet the North Vietnamese did not respond as hoped. They did not move towards negotiations when hit for they were not interested in giving the US an easy way out. An expression of Vietnamization and “less squeamishness” of the US occurred in February and early March of 1971 when South Vietnamese regulars with US air support invaded Laos. As a sign of realpolitik linkage, Haiphong harbor was mined as a means of turning the screws on the Soviets (their ships would be in danger) to pressure the North Vietnamese towards negotiations. A North Vietnamese offensive in March 1972 led to reprisal bombings in North Vietnam. Brown (1994, 223) suggests that the offensive also led to Kissinger trimming US demands down to (1) an international ceasefire to allow time for withdrawal, and (2) the release of US prisoners. On the eve of the November presidential elections, the administration thought they had an accord yet South Vietnamese President Thieu refused to be party to the agreement. Finally, on January 23, 1973, an agreement was made that ended the direct military engagements between the US and North Vietnam. Although détente and linkage played a minor role in Vietnam, they were significant factors in arms control and economic negotiations with the Soviet Union. Nixon’s disposition towards centralizing power meant that, as Rosati (1981, 242) notes, “The White House became actively involved in the Strategic Limitations Talks”. 237 Although Nixon and Kissinger were not enthusiasts for arms control, new strategic realities (i.e. the expansion of Soviet nuclear power) pushed them in that direction. Because of the eroding belief that the US could defeat the Soviets
236
Brown 1994, 218. Rosati suggests that Nixon’s hands-on approach, a departure from Johnson’s style of relying on the State Department’s bureaucracy, largely contributed to the accords which were not finalized until the last day of the May 1972 summit. “The direct participation of President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev was necessary before the first Strategic Arms Limitations agreements could officially be signed” (245).
237
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in a major war, “New means for affecting Soviet behavior were required to supplement military deterrence”. 238 The May 1972 Moscow summit between Nixon and Brezhnev yielded agreements on the ‘First Phase of US-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitations’ or SALT I. The two primary agreements were the ABM treaty, the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems to two city-sized projects for each side, and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Strategic Systems, a MAD-based approach to ICBMs. 239 The numerical imbalance of the Interim Agreement led Senator Henry Jackson to push for a Senate resolution, which was passed and accepted by the administration, that future agreements would not leave the US with numerical inferiority. The administration, however, had accepted the agreement with an understanding that the US Missiles were more accurate and could be adjusted for Multiple Reentry Vehicles (MIRV) 240 , and that the US would pursue “next generation” weapons in the form of B-1 bombers and cruise missiles. 241 In addition to the SALT I agreements, on May 29, 1972, Nixon and Brezhnev also signed “Basic Principles”, an agreement that confirmed the importance of US and USSR commercial and economic ties. The Trade Reform Act of 1974, despite Congressional opposition, furthered this approach. 242 The administration also sought to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet split as a means of enhancing the position of the US. The opportunity became apparent when the Chinese forcefully condemned Soviet repression in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and when the Chinese and Soviets had border clashes in 1969-70. Nixon began the new approach when one of his first moves in office
238
Brown 1994, 235. The numbers for the five year interim agreement: US—1,054 ICBMs, USSR—1618 ICBMs; US—44 nuclear submarines, USSR—62 nuclear submarines; US—710 SLBMs, USSR—950 SLBMs. 240 Multiple warheads on the same missile. 241 Gaddis (2005, 322) also suggests that SALT I was to the advantage of the US. 242 The administration had fought and defeated two amendments to the Act: the Jackson-Vanik amendment stating that MFN and credits should be linked to increased Jewish immigration and the Stevenson amendment which would put a $300 million limit in import-export bank credits (See Brown 1994, 253). 239
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was to consult DeGaulle about opening China. 243 Safire (1975, 371) describes Nixon’s strategy through 1970 as a “bit-by-bit relaxation of economic restrictions, little flatteries, and probes through the Pakistanis and the Romanians”. During the summer 1969, many travel restrictions that had been in place since the 1950s were relaxed. In November 1969, the US stopped naval patrols of the Taiwan Straits that had been deployed since the 1950s. The big breakthrough came on April 27, 1971 when the Pakistani ambassador to the US delivered a handwritten note from Beijing with no signature inviting as American envoy. 244 Nixon secretly sent Kissinger in July 1971. In October, the US accepted “with regret” the expulsion of Taiwan from the UN. In prelude to Nixon’s 1972 visit to China, the administration approved export license liberalizations. As a sign of the improved relations, the US and China both gave ground in a cautiously worded official communiqué suggesting that there is one China. In response to critics of what is termed here as the Nixon administration ‘always realpolitik, sometimes pragmatic’ approach regarding Cold War foreign policy, he charged that, “I’m convinced that as a result of what we have done (i.e. the Moscow summit and opening China), the chance of having a more peaceful world fifty years from now are substantially increased. But this would not have been done with woolly-headed idealism”. 245 As US foreign policy behavior in Vietnam suggests, détente did not significantly affect relations with lesser powers. In such instances, the administration had ideological tendencies to view developments though what Brown (1994) refers to as “conservative realpolitik”. During the establishment of Bangledesh, the administration sided with Pakistan over India, due to India’s ties to the Soviet Union, despite “the humanitarian and moral implications of Pakistani President Yahya Khan’s brutal suppression of the Bangladesh independence movement of 243 244 245
Safire (1975, 121). Brown 1994, 247. Price 1977, 115.
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1971”. 246 The US went so far as to send the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal as a symbolic show of force. In Chile, the administration authorized covert CIA support of Chilean opponents of left-leaning, democratically elected Salvadore Allende. 247 The Nixon Doctrine led to support of the Shah of Iran despite the abuses of his notorious SAVAK secret policy. 248 Kissinger also politically quarantined Portugal following a reformist coup in April 1974 for 17 months because of fears of “Eurocommunism”. Accordingly, Kissinger was also openly distrustful of communists in Spain, Italy, and France. Under Ford, with Kissinger at the helm, US foreign policy exhibited continuity. During Ford’s 1974 meeting with Brezhnev, the 1974 Vladivostok Accords were signed freezing ICBM arsenals at 2,400, of which only 1320 could employ MIRVs, for each side. 249 In September 1975, Ford resisted political pressures calling for the lifting of the suspension of grain sales to the USSR. The Ford administration also continued to engage China as Ford made a visit to Beijing at the end of 1975. Once again, détente did not apply to less significant powers. In July 1975, the administration approved covert CIA aid to anti-communists in Angola. The administration, in response to communist advances in Southeast Asia, also requested of Congress $722 million in military aid for anti-communists and US troop commitments to assist in evacuations in Vietnam. 250 Although Ford acknowledged the Vietnam War was over, the administration remained interested in demonstrating US resolve in the region. A situation soon presented itself for the use of US force in the post-Vietnam era. On Friday, May 16, 1975, Cambodian Naval units seized the freighter Mayagüez and 40 American 246
Brown 1994, 285. See Brown 1994, 285. 248 Ultimately, Iran received a third of all US military sales between 1973-77. In Kissinger’s words, “Iran, under the Shah…was one of America’s best, most important, and most loyal friends in the world” (Brown 1994, 352). 249 The Jackson Amendment was followed and the agreement did not lead to US numerical inferiority. 250 The requests were made in Ford’s April 1975 “State of the World Speech”, as speech written by Kissinger. The requests were not approved. 247
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crewmembers claiming a violation of their territorial waters. In response the administration sent a contingent of US helicopters and US Marines to Tang Island and brief but fierce fighting ensued. The crewmen were released, Ford received a boost in his poll numbers, and by July 9, 1975, the New York Times was suggesting that the incident “reassured the nation”. Yet time would tell that the US acted without giving diplomacy or the UN a chance to resolve the dispute. It turns out that the Cambodians had already decided to release the crew before the Marine and air assault. 251 As Brown (1994, 287) suggests, “By seizing the Mayagüez, Cambodia provided (Ford and Kissinger) with an opportunity for a show of the old machismo without the risk of major war”. Belief Set Shift The stability of the advisor system under Nixon and Ford contributed to continuity on the administration belief set. International focusing events influenced beliefs prior to the beginning of the administrations in the form of Soviet and Chinese border clashes in the late 1960s. Once in office, the administration belief set maintained a pragmatic approach to both the Soviets and Chinese, which revealed itself in détente and linkage. The administrations also managed to connect means and ends by decreasing the total percentage of government spending devoted to the military. 252 The approach to lesser powers, however, was consistently realist in orientation with conservative ideological overtones. In spite of this consistency, domestic political pressures did hamstring the administration’s ability to implement its beliefs through policy. In Vietnam, such pressures contributed to the acceptance of a diminished set of conditions for the brokering of a peace treaty. Moreover, when communists were making advances throughout Southeast Asia, Congress did not approve additional aid or the commitment 251
See Brown 1994. In fiscal 1970, military spending accounted for 41.8% of the budget. By fiscal 1977, it had dropped to 23.8% (see Gaddis 2005, 320).
252
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of US troops. The Jackson amendment also limited the leeway Ford had in the 1974 Vladivostok Accords. The Watergate scandal contributed to criticisms of the centralizing of power in the White House that negatively affected the ability of the administration to coordinate different issue domains as linkage required. 253 The stability of beliefs and policy proposals suggest that the administration belief set maintained continuity and that domestic political pressures were seen more as obstacles to overcome rather than points of contentions that deserved accommodation. This indicates that, despite elements of militancy in dealing with less significant powers, in the realm of foreign policy involving the Soviet Union and international communism, shifts in beliefs did not occur and the administration belief set was consistently pragmatic. Carter I Belief Set 254 The Carter I belief set, which lasted from 1977 to 1979, held views that were moderate in political orientation. The classification is based on the administration belief set’s sanguine views of the political universe. Carter’s inexperience and desire to add a moral component to US foreign policy led to a tilt in the balance of advisory influence towards Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Strategy, therefore, focused on developing more cooperative international structures in
253
For discussion of the domestic limitations on the coordination of sticks and carrots, see Gaddis 2005, 312-314. The analysis for both Carter belief sets is based on the following literature: Seyom Brown (1994), The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign policy from Truman to Clinton; Brian Dille and Michael D. Young (2000), “The Conceptual Complexity of Presidents Carter and Clinton: An Automated Content Analysis of Temporal Stability and Source Bias”, Political Psychology; Daniel W. Drezner (2000), “Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy”, American Journal of Political Science; John Lewis Gaddis (2005), Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of National Security Policy During the Cold War; Fred I. Greenstein (2001), The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton; Richard E. Neustadt (1990), Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan; William B. Quandt (1993), Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Israeli Conflict since 1967; Jerel A. Rosati (1987), The Carter Administration’s Quest for a Global Community: Beliefs and their Impact on Behavior; Gary Sick (1985), All Fall Down: America’s Fragile Encounter with Iran; Gaddis Smith (1986), Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy During the Carter Years; Stephen G. Walker, Mark Schafer, and Michael D. Young (1998), “Systemic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis: Measuring and Modeling Jimmy Carter’s Operational Code”, International Studies Quarterly.
254
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what was viewed as an increasingly complex world. Focusing events in Africa, Latin America and Yemen led Carter to side with the National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski’s more negative appraisal of the Soviet Union by 1979. The most significant event that crystallized the shift was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These findings support the expectations for Hypotheses 1 and 2. Because domestic political pressure does not appear to have significantly affected administration beliefs, Hypotheses 3 and 4 are only partially confirmed by the evidence. Administration Belief Set Carter came to office without foreign policy experience, but like many Americans, he had developed views observing events in Vietnam and the apparent loss of moral compass in the White House that culminated in the Watergate scandal. With deep religious convictions, Carter campaigned on a platform of moral values. Smith (1987, 16) suggests his views were drawn from the Wilsonian perspective that, “Whatever is sinful for a person is sinful for a nation”. Carter pledged he would not lie. 255 Carter promised during the campaign not to use the CIA in an illegal fashion 256 and to curb the proliferation and reduce the number of nuclear weapons. He also pledged to cut defense spending. Running after the failures in Vietnam, a fact that many believe contributed to his success in the 1976 presidential elections 257 , Carter campaigned by arguing that, “This country must have a coherent foreign policy that matches needs with deeds”. 258 Carter’s pre-existing focus on individual morality led to divergence in US Cold War policy. Rosati (1987, 5) finds that the first two years of the Carter administration represented a “major break” from containment policy. He suggests, “The Carter administration was not pre255
Brown (1994, 315) suggests the pledge contributed to his much-ridiculed, candid interview by Robert Scheer in the November 1976 issue of Playboy magazine. 256 He chose former Kennedy advisor Theodore Sorensen to head the CIA. 257 See Smith 1986, 6. 258 Rosati 1987, 7.
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occupied with maintaining global security but rather wanted to promote a global community based on an idealistic image of the international environment”. Yet the complexity and compartmentalization of Carter’s views did not add clarity to US foreign policy. Because of this personality trait, Gaddis (1982, 146) suggests that Carter lacked a coherent foreign policy. One Carter speech writer states, “I came to think Jimmy Carter believes in fifty things, but no one thing…values that others would find contradictory compliment one another in his mind”. 259 Carter began firmly committed to an optimistic appraisal of the international environment. Intoning shades of Wilsonianism, Carter pronounced, “It is a new world that calls for a new American foreign policy—a policy based on constant decency in its values and an optimism in our historic vision”. 260 At the 1977 University of Notre Dame commencements, Carter declared, “I believe we can have a foreign policy that is democratic, that is based on fundamental values, and that uses power and influence, which we have, for humane purposes…because we know that democracy works, we can reject the arguments of those rulers who deny human rights to their people”. 261 Accordingly, human rights where of considerable value to Carter and were central to his philosophical inclinations during his term. As Carter wrote in 1977, “The basic thrust of human affairs points toward a more universal demand for fundamental human rights”. 262 In rejection of the realpolitik approach employed in Vietnam, he announced at Notre Dame that, “We have fought fire with fire, never thinking that fire is better quenched with water”. 263 Carter also began his administration with a focus on global change in an increasingly complex international system. Because of the increasing complexities of the world, which Carter 259 260 261 262 263
Brown 1994, 319. Rosati 1987, 43-44. Brown 1994, 312. Rosati 1987, 45. Ibid, 42-43; Brown 1994, 312.
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believed opened the door for a more peaceful and cooperative world, he suggested that the US needed to develop a more expansive and altruistic approach to international relations. In 1977, Carter wrote, “As Americans we cannot overlook the way that our fate is bound to that of other nations…It’s a new world in which we cannot afford to be narrow in our vision, limited in our foresight, or selfish in our purpose”. 264 In Carter’s inaugural address, he exclaimed, “The United States will meet its obligations to help create a stable, just, and peaceful world order”. Carter’s complex views and interest in detail, in conjunction with his foreign policy inexperience, created space for advisory influence. Of particular importance were National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. The views of Brzezinski and Vance complemented different parts of Carter’s complex belief structures. Vance held to a perspective of the world as increasingly interconnected and complex and was guided by a commitment to principles based on the notions of economic development and the avoidance of the use of force as means to enhance international cooperation and harmony. Brzezinski, on the other hand, tended to view international developments through the lens of the Cold War. The appointment of progressive Andrew Young as US ambassador to the UN provided Vance an ally while Brzezinski could usually find support for his positions from Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. As Carter’s public statements while campaigning and early in his administration suggest, his views where in alignment Vance’s in shaping the administration’s initial belief set. Based on this perspective, the world was no longer bipolar, but rather, “a new mosaic of global, regional, and bilateral relations”. 265 This meant, as Carter suggested in his 1977 Notre
264 265
Rosati 1987, 40. Ibid.
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Dame speech, “We are now free of that inordinate fear of communism”. 266 Even Brzezinski was on board, if less emphatically so. As he stated, “We have witnessed perhaps, the end of a phase in our own foreign policy, shaped largely since 1945, in which preoccupation particularly with the Cold War as a dominant [concern] of US foreign policy, no longer seems warranted by the complex realities in which we operate”. 267 Carter believed that human rights, in the long run, could be a vehicle for improving international relations. There were three basic, broad goals at the beginning of his term as defined by Vance during a major speech at the University of Georgia School of Law: (1) Freedom from governmental violation of the integrity of the person (torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or imprisonment); (2) The right to vital needs being met (food, healthcare, shelter, and education); (3) Civil and political liberties (freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and press). 268 Such were the visions of the administration at the beginning. As can be surmised, the administration’s initial belief set saw the political universe in cooperative, not conflictual, terms. Accordingly, the Carter administration belief set began with a moderate political orientation. Foreign Policy Actions and Events To address human rights, the administration created an interagency group of Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, called the Christopher Committee after its head Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, which included the Defense, Treasury, Commerce, Labor, and
266
Ibid. Yet Carter was realistic about the potential for a more just and peaceful world. When necessary, he would support unsavory characters if necessary. Moreover, as he stated in 1977, “The disagreements that we face are deeply rooted, and they often raise difficult philosophical as well as territorial issues. They will not be solved easily. They will not be solved quickly”. (Rosati, 43). 267 Ibid, 41. 268 Ibid, 45-46.
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Agriculture Departments as well as the NSC. As a result of the actions of the Christopher Committee, aid was lowered for Afghanistan, Argentina, Central African Empire, Chile, El Salvador, Guinea, Nicaragua, and Paraguay and increased for Botswana, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Gambia, India, Peru, and Sri Lanka. These decisions demonstrated that the call for making human rights a part of foreign policy did indeed have some teeth. Moreover, Brown (1994, 328) suggests that Carter administration’s efforts contributed to the release of a substantial number of political prisoners in Bangladesh, Sudan, Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, Brazil, Nepal, and Cuba and progressions from military to civilian rule in Ghana, Nigeria, and Thailand. The administration also sought to improve relations with Latin America. The phrase “Monroe Doctrine” was never uttered in public by the administration. 269 More significantly, the administration met with Panamanian officials to plan for the handing over of the Panama Canal to the Panamanians. The Panama Canal treaties, signed on September 7, 1977 gave the US control of the canal for 25 years, after which time it would be transferred to Panama. 270 The administration belief set’s view of the need to operate in an increasingly complex world was also applied to the Middle East. The administration wanted to bring a “true peace” in the Middle East for, in Carter’s words, “It is in the interest of the entire world”. 271 The conviction of Jimmy Carter for this cause cannot be understated. As Quandt (1993, 329) states, “Jimmy Carter was unique among American presidents in the depth of his concern to find a peaceful solution of the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors”. On September 17, 1978, in what Brown (1994) refers to as “Carter’s finest hour”, the Camp David accords were announced. 269 270 271
Smith 1986, 109. The Senate approved the treaties in March-April, 1978. Rosati 1987, 48.
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Interestingly, the administration had initially sought to include the Soviet Union in the Middle East peace process. The administration’s moderate beliefs revealed themselves in other areas involving the Soviet Union and international communism. The administration announced the removal of troops from South Korea. The administration also worked on SALT II in part because of Carter’s view that arms races as “morally despicable”. 272 He wanted to move past arms control with the ultimate goal of “the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the Earth”. 273 The administration cancelled the B-1 bomber program suggesting a desire to develop a nextgeneration “stealth” bomber, but the decision was also in part due to anti-nuclear hopes. Rosati (1987, 52-53) argues that such moves could be made because the administration did see the USSR as overly threatening, but rather, “perceived Soviet intentions to be primarily cooperative in nature”. Instead of being bent on expansionism, Rosati argues, the administration believed the USSR could contribute to promoting a global community. Efforts were also made to develop positive relations with other communist states as well. The Carter administration continued to improve relations with China and took advantage of the rise to power of the pragmatic Deng Xiaoping, leading ultimately to diplomatic recognition. 274 Carter also visited Poland to establish better relations. Overtures were even sent towards Cuba and Vietnam for similar reasons. Events in Africa in 1978 involving Soviets and Cubans, Rosati (1987, 58) argues, led to a split in the administration. These developments strengthened Brzezinski’s more negative image of the Soviet Union as interventionist. In particular, the Somali invasion of Ethiopia and attack on the city of Ogaden, led by Somali President Siad Muhammed Barre, which led to a full-scale
272
Ibid, 47. Brown 1994, 312. 274 Relations were normalized on December 15, 1978. Relations with Taiwan were terminated on January 1, 1979. Deng even visited the US in 1979. 273
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war, was a divisive issue. To Brzezinski, the Somalis deserved US assistance for the Ethiopians were being supported by Cuban and Soviet advisors and equipment. To Carter and Vance, the Somalis had started the war. Moreover, Carter and Vance still believed that, as Rosati (61) states, “A reliance on military instruments of foreign policy would be counterproductive to this quest (bringing about peaceful democratic transitions and economic development in Africa) in the long run”. Accordingly, Carter did not strongly support the Somalis in the war. 275 Yet evidence was growing that Brzezinski’s influence was increasing during 1978. Carter delivered two speeches in 1978 expressing a harder line than normal at Wake Forest on March 17 and at the Naval Academy’s commencements on June 7. At Annapolis, Carter stated, “The Soviet Union can choose either confrontation or cooperation. The United States is prepared for both”. 276 These were not idle words. Carter had reversed his campaign pledge to cut defense spending by pledging to increase spending by three percent every year. Moreover, he persuaded most of the NATO countries to do the same. The administration began a program through NATO to increase conventional and tactical nuclear forces (ultimately these would be in the form of Pershing II and cruise missiles) to balance the Soviets. Approval was given for the Defense Department to reduce the vulnerability of US ICBMs (leading to the emphasis on the MX missile program) and improve ICBM accuracy. The administration also ordered the military to develop a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) to deal with crises in places other than Western Europe. Rosati (1987) argues that 1979 was a year where Carter vacillated between the consistent Vance and Brzezinski position; Vance being optimistic about a new world order and Brzezinski seeing an unstable international system leaving openings for which the Soviets could take
275 276
Brzezinski came to believe that Carter lost Congress by not acting in this case. Brown 1994, 379-80.
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advantage. Brown (1994) suggests that the vacillations did occur, but that they had begun before 1979. Carter was becoming less sanguine about the international environment. As he noted: “One thing has not changed as much as I had hoped. It is still a world of danger, a world in which democracy and freedom are still challenged, a world in which peace must be rewon day by day”. 277 Carter’s fluctuations were revealed in administration foreign policy decisions. In June, Carter and Brezhnev signed the SALT II agreement in Vienna. On the other hand, the US announced the development of the MX missile in the same month. The US also agreed with NATO in 1979 to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe. Events were occurring in 1979 that pushed Carter towards such moves. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia was interpreted as expansionism. China’s attack on Vietnam was tacitly supported by Carter so as to not damage relations with the Chinese. This ended any chance of rapprochement with Vietnam. Crisis between North Yemen and Sovietbacked South Yemen led to the sale of $400 million worth of jets, tanks, and anti-tank missiles to North Yemen. In June, the decisive uprising that pushed Nicaragua’s Somoza from power began. Smith (1986, 10) points out that Carter was happy to see him go, but not too thrilled by the Sandinistas. 278 The Iranian Revolution continued and there were concerns of the role the Iranian communist party, the Tudeh, would have in the new order. All of the events invariably pushed Carter towards his realpolitik side and towards Brzezinski. Vance lost an ally when Andrew Young was fired in August for having unauthorized discussions with Yasir Arafat, head of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Smith (1986, 10) suggests a growing clash of philosophies was behind the move. Of all 277
Rosati 1987, 76. As a sign of the increasingly combative approach to foreign policy of the administration, by 1980, Carter had cut off all aid to the Sandinistas. This move was precipitated by the Soviets placement of a brigade in Cuba.
278
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the events that occurred in 1979, two events at the end of the year had the most profound effect on Carter: the storming of the US embassy in Tehran and the seizure of US hostages and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Smith, in commenting on Carter’s tenure, notes that, “Brzezinski and Vance held fast to their philosophies, but President Carter wandered and then moved into Brzezinski’s camp”. 279 It was these two events, more than anything, which caused this to occur. On November 4, radical students stormed the US embassy in Iran. Carter tried to determine how to respond. “I listened to every proposal, no matter how preposterous”, Carter recalled, “All the way from delivering the Shah for trial as the revolutionaries demanded to dropping an atomic bomb”. 280 He decided early on not to use force so as to avoid the killing of the hostages. Some actions taken November 7-14 were the prohibition of US companies from buying oil or other imports and the restriction of exports to Iran. The most significant action, however, was the freezing of some $112 billion in Iranian assets in US banks at home and abroad. The use of Yasir Arafat, an idea floated by Ramsey Clark, apparently led to the release of 13 hostages, all the women and Blacks, on November 19-20. 281 Efforts were also made by Vance in the UN, with the assistance of General Secretary Kurt Waldeim, in mid-November to end the crisis but ended in failure. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December led Carter to discard any illusions that the USSR could contribute to a more harmonious future. In short, by the end of 1979, Carter had shifted towards a more pessimistic appraisal of the international environment. Belief Set Shift
279 280 281
Smith 1986, 47. Brown 1994, 366. Ibid, 368.
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Focusing events clearly affected the administration’s belief set. Developments in Africa, Yemen, Nicaragua, and Vietnam contributed to a darker view of the Soviet Union. The most important event regarding this belief shift, however, was the invasion of Afghanistan. In addition, the Iranian hostage crisis shook the idealistic foundations of the Carter I belief set. The administration clearly no longer viewed the world in such sanguine terms. After a brief honeymoon, the media was generally hostile to the Carter administration. 282 The Iranian hostage crisis further exasperated the situation as Walter Cronkite chronicled each passing day. Carter’s lack of interest in media strategies suggests that such developments had a limited effect on his beliefs. Focusing events, on the other hand, clearly impacted Carter’s views and pushed him into Brzezinski’s camp. In effect, the administration’s moderation was diminished. With this in mind, the shift in the Carter I belief set is categorized as moderate-. Carter II Belief Set The Carter I belief set occurred during 1980 and was militant in orientation. Although the militancy is of a rather mild brand in comparison with other administrations, the administration did view the Soviet Union as a global threat and saw negotiations with the Soviet Union as lacking value. These beliefs were strengthened by the ascendancy of Brzezinski within the advisory system. The Carter Doctrine codified these new sets of beliefs for the Middle East region, as did the more aggressive actions for confronting the Soviet Union. Focusing events, especially the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, were an essential part of the shift towards Carter
282
One factor that contributed to this treatment was Carter’s inheritance of a media still scorned from the Vietnam era (for discussion, see Patterson, 1994). This situation was exasperated by the fact that Carter was disinterested in media strategies. He saw them as a sign of weakness and dishonesty (Rozelle, 1991). Gary Sick (1985, 223), a member of Carter’s NSC staff suggests that, “He seemed unwilling to devote the same degree of care and attention to the atmospherics and public relations aspects of public presentation as he did to the decision itself. Fundamentally, he seemed to believe that if a decision was correct it would sell itself”. Lacking a coherent press strategy in a hostile media atmosphere meant that, as Rosati (1987, 4) states, “Disagreements between high level officials, especially Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Council advisor Brzezinski, dominated the political commentary of the time”.
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II. Moreover, domestic political pressures amplified the Carter II belief set once it was in place. These findings, when also considering Carter’s lack of foreign policy experience prior to becoming president, confirm Hypotheses 1-4. Administration Belief Set By 1980, Carter was in full agreement with Brzezinski regarding the Soviet Union. The visions of a pluralistic, complex world moving towards ever increasing cooperation were now gone. As Carter stated, “The reality of the world today is that Moscow exploits unrest—not to address the discontent that underlies that unrest, not to overcome the inequalities that give rise to unrest, but to expand its own dominion and satisfy its imperial objectives”. 283 The invasion of Afghanistan was the lynch pin in the belief shift. In an interview with ABC’s Frank Reynolds, Carter stated, “This action of the Soviets has made a more dramatic change in my opinion of what the Soviets ultimate goals are than anything they’ve done in the previous time I’ve been in office”. 284 This belief shift within Carter led to increased congruence with Brzezinski. Military interventions were now seen as more appropriate for the world was now seen as more dangerous. The new beliefs were applied to the Middle East, a return in many ways to the Eisenhower Doctrine, in what was called the Carter Doctrine. As Carter stated in his January 23, 1980 speech, “Any attempt by any outside forces to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by use of any measure necessary, including military force”. 285 The Carter administration had come full circle. As Brown (1994, 384) states, “Human rights, global economic development, reducing arms sales, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, even the Soviet-American strategic arms agreements, were all subordinated to the imperative of preventing the Soviet Union from gaining 283 284 285
Rosati 1987, 84. Ibid, 105. Smith 1986, 230.
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global dominance”. Vance’s world view, therefore, had little affect on the Carter II belief set. George Kennan, commenting on Carter’s last year in office, said, “Never since World War II has there been so far-reaching a militarization of thought and discourse in the capital”. 286 The Carter II belief set clearly viewed the political universe in conflictual terms. The decision rules, therefore, dictate moving on to the series of threat questions. The ideological threat was not viewed as so excessive that negotiations with other communist countries could not continue. It was the Soviet Union itself that was seen as the threat. The global threat of the Soviet Union was critical as it was seen as bent on world domination. The military threat was such that negotiations with the Soviet Union, based on the appraisal of their ultimate aims, were no longer seen as important. The results for the three threat questions, accordingly, end with two affirmative responses and one negative response. In such situations, the modal category determines placement within Hagan’s typology. With this in mind, the Carter II belief set is categorized as militant in its political orientation. Foreign policy Actions and Events The more aggressive approach to the Middle East as annunciated in the Carter Doctrine was applied to the Iranian hostage crisis. In April 1980, the US broke off diplomatic relations with Iran, banned all exports, and the government seized all the Iranian assets in US banks. The administration also pushed the European Economic Community towards voting for sanctions against Iran by suggesting without such an action, the US would resort to force. As it turns out, the administration decided during an April 11 NSC meeting, a meeting which coincidently did not include Vance who was in Florida, decided on a rescue mission to get the hostages. Houghton (1996) argues that the analogy of the Israeli raid in Entebbe, Uganda in 1976 to free hostages on a hijacked plane was a powerful tool employed by both Brzezinski and Defense 286
Ibid, 247.
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Secretary Harold Brown to convince Carter that a similar effort could work in Iran. The mission was attempted on April 26 and failed when a helicopter collided with a transport plane at the rendezvous point in the Iranian desert. Three days later, Vance resigned in protest of the decision. 287 Brown (1994, 320) suggests the departure of Young and Vance tilted the field in favor of Brzezinski, yet considers the focusing events of the hostage crisis and Afghanistan as the most significant influences. 288 The administration did not respond with direct force in Afghanistan. They realized that it was not a prize worth fighting for. Carter did, however, authorize overt and covert aid to antiSoviet in Afghanistan. Similar actions were taken in Africa and Nicaragua. Other actions were taken as well. Prior to the invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration was not pleased with the junta ruling Pakistan who came to power by assassinating Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He did not support their obvious pursuit of nuclear weaponry. After the invasion of Afghanistan, Carter courted President Zia to accept US military aid. Carter also shelved SALT II and sped up US efforts to establish naval facilities in Oman, Somalia, and Egypt to strengthen its position in the Indian Ocean. The administration also placed an embargo of the sale of wheat to the Soviet Union, suspended licensing for the sale of technology to the Soviet Union, curtailed fishing privileges for Russian ships, and decided that the US would not attend the Olympics, which happened to be in Moscow that year. The administration also cut all aid to Nicaragua,
287
Vance stuck to his guns after retiring. During his 1980 Harvard commencement speech he said: “Whatever value (a single-strategy—a master plan) may have had in a bipolar world, it now serves us badly. The world has become pluralistic, exposing the inadequacy of the single strategy, the grand design, where facts are forced to fit theory” (Brown 1994, 320). 288 Developments occurred that would lead to the eventual release of all of the hostages. The Shah died of cancer on July 27. Iraq attacked Iran on September 22, increasing Iran’s need for their frozen assets. Reagan was elected in the November elections, giving Carter the ‘bad cop’ to play the good cop-bad-cop routine with the Iranians. With Algerian assistance, $3 billion dollars in cash was released to the Iranians and they released the hostages. They returned home on January 20, 1981, at 12:30, a half an hour after Reagan had concluded his inauguration speech.
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believing the Sandinistas were too close to the Soviet Union. Finally, Carter continued to cultivate good relations with China to maintain triangulation against the Soviet Union. Belief Set Shift As discussed above, focusing events were at the heart of the administrations shift from Carter I to Carter II. Domestic political pressure during Carter II amplified the move towards militancy. 1980 was a presidential election year and Carter faced an avowed Cold Warrior in Ronald Reagan. Moreover, by July, in large part because of the Iranian hostage crisis, Carter’s public approval reached an all-time low for presidents of 21 percent. 289 These pressures furthered Carter’s lurch towards militancy. This shift continued despite congressional resistance to the new hard line positions. 290 Reliance on Brzezinski amplified this militancy. The process of classifying Carter as militant based on the threat questions did not lead to unanimity in response. In addition, belief in the importance of human rights remained consistent. 291 This suggests that Carter II’s militancy was lesser in degree than Truman III, Eisenhower, and Kennedy/Johnson. Yet the administration’s shift occurred after Nixon/Ford’s pragmatic détente and Carter I’s moderation, which suggest that the move was indeed significant. Moreover, the political pressures and reliance on Brzezinski did further the administration’s militancy. The conclusion, therefore, is that the belief shift during Carter II is categorized as militant+. Reagan I Belief Set 292
289
Greenstein 2001, 139. For discussion of such resistance, see Gaddis 2005, 349. 291 Carter did not relinquish parts of his worldview that were more dominant in the early years. “We will continue to work as we have for peace in the Middle East and Southern Africa”, Carter declared, “We will continue to build our ties with developing nations, respecting and helping to strengthen their national independence, which they have struggled hard to achieve. And we will continue to support the growth of democracy and protection of human rights” (Rosati, 1987, 83). 292 The analysis for Reagan I and Reagan II is based on the following literature: Seyom Brown (1994), The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign policy from Truman to Clinton; Brian Dille (2000), “The 290
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The Reagan I belief set occurred during 1981-1982 and was militant in its orientation. The militancy of the belief set is based on a conflictual view of the political universe and threats being interpreted in a zero-sum fashion. Reagan’s inexperience and lack of support among his advisors for a more idealistic goal of eliminating nuclear weapons contributed to the maintenance of a Cold Warrior, hard line approach. The Reagan Doctrine saw the international struggle with communism as one of good against evil that required symmetrical responses to all communist threat. The focusing event, which contributed to the diminishing of militancy, was the death of Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev in November 1982. Domestic political pressure was managed by the administration by impressively coordinated press strategies. 293 The situation was also aided by a docile press, which had receded from its post-Vietnam aggression. 294 The appointment of George Shultz as Secretary of State in June 1982 provided Reagan with an ally to combat hard line pressures from within the administration and was a bell
Prepared and Spontaneous Remarks of Presidents Reagan and Bush: A Validity Comparison for At-a-Distance Measurements”, Political Psychology; Daniel W. Drezner (2000), “Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy”, American Journal of Political Science; Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry (1992), “Who Won the Cold War”, Foreign Policy; John Lewis Gaddis (2005), Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of National Security Policy During the Cold War; Fred I. Greenstein (2001), The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton; Christopher Hemmer (1999), “Historical Analogies and the Definition of Interests: The Iranian Hostage Crisis and Ronald Reagan’s Policy Towards the Hostages in Lebanon”, Political Psychology; Mark Hertsgaard (1988), On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency; Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (1994), “How Did the Cold War Die?”, Mershon International Studies Review; Richard E. Neustadt (1990), Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan; Barry R. Posen and Stephen W. Van Evera (1984), “Reagan Administration Defense Policy: Departure from Containment”, in Eagle Resurgent? The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy; William B. Quandt (1993), Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Israeli Conflict since 1967; Donald T. Regan (1988), For the Record: From Wall Street to Washington; George P. Shultz (1993), Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State; Strobe Talbot (1985), Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control. 293 The administration’s policies were enabled by strict attention to a media strategy, which Hertsgaard (1988) terms “manipulation by inundation”. Unlike Carter who was disinterested in press strategies, the Reagan administration was obsessed with creating a positive image of Reagan through the media. Regan (1988, 6), in fact, argues, “No government in history can have been more sensitive to the media, or more driven by the printed words and the television image, than the Reagan administration”. They were meticulous in crafting pseudo- and actual events in a manner that put the most positive light on Reagan. As Regan states, “every moment of every public appearance was scheduled, every word was scripted, every place Reagan was supposed to stand was chalked with marks” (Rozell 1991, 82). The strategies were largely successful in framing the discussion and facilitating the pursuit of foreign policy in ‘made-for-television’, black and white terms. 294 See Hertsgaard 1988.
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weather signal of an evolution in foreign policy. These developments provide moderate support for Hypotheses 1-4. Administration Belief Set The Reagan I belief set’s approach to foreign policy was profoundly affected by a black and white portrayal of the Cold War struggle. The ghost of NSC 68, which was ascending again in Carter’s last year in office, took center stage in shaping US relations with the world. The vision was encapsulated in the tenets of the Reagan Doctrine: •
The US was the global leader of the forces of good against the forces of evil.
•
On every continent and in virtually every country this struggle was manifest in the post World War II contest between the supporters of democratic capitalism and the supporters of Marxist-Leninist state socialism.
•
The vital interests of the United States worldwide lay in strengthening governments and anti-government forces on the side of democratic capitalism and weakening governments and anti-government forces on the side of Marxism-Leninism. 295 This worldview naturally lent itself to an increased proportionality of means necessary to
achieve the ultimate ends of defeating the evil forces of communism. Accordingly, increased defense spending was seen as necessary. The primary goal was, in Gaddis’s (2005, 376) words, “changing rather than containing” the Soviet Union. With this as the basis of negotiations, there was little incentive to offer any incentives through linkage so as to not prolong the existence of the Soviet system. As Gaddis (359) notes, “Reagan never ruled out the possibility of negotiating with Moscow, as long as they could be geared towards ending, not perpetuating, the Cold War”. Accordingly, “détente was dead”. 296 The Reagan Doctrine also saw the nature of the threat from international communism as symmetrical in nature. Communism had to be confronted everywhere. There was a rejuvenation 295 296
Brown 1994, 402. Gaddis 2005, 349.
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of emphasis on CIA covert operations. Less than two months into the administration, CIA head William Casey laid out plans for interventions in Afghanistan, Cuba, Laos, Libya, and Nicaragua that, for the most part, were pursued by Reagan. The administration held the view that the US economy was much better prepared to absorb the spending necessary to apply symmetrical pressure than the Soviet economy’s ability to meet such a challenge. Supply-side economics, which was not concerned with budget deficits, could meet the financial requirements for the military build-up. The approach also fit the administration’s goal of cutting social spending in that deficits could be used to justify reductions in such programs. Yet Reagan had long held negative views of nuclear weapons. Reagan, after seeing the projected casualty numbers if a nuclear war was to occur, suggested, “My dream…became a world free of nuclear weapons”. 297 He, therefore, was interested in reducing rather than limiting the superpowers nuclear stockpiles, hence the switch from Strategic Arms Limitations to Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). Reagan’s inexperience, coupled with the fact that his initial advisory network was powerfully Cold Warrior in composition, however, meant that the administration during Reagan I did not seriously pursue this goal. As future Secretary of State George Shultz observed, ““President Reagan was consistently committed to his personal view of a world without nuclear weapons; his advisors were determined to turn him away from this course”. Gaddis (2005, 353-354) makes note of the fact that during the Reagan I years, Reagan did not have one advisor who held more weight than others. There was, however, a consistency in opinion from a hawkish, hard line perspective from advisors such as Secretary of State
297
Brown 1994, 396.
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Alexander Haig and Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. 298 Talbot (1985, 7) argues that under the belief that the USSR had a margin of superiority, “Reagan and his administration came to office not really wanting to pursue arms control at all”. It is also quite clear that Reagan’s advisors were not interested in reductions as well. In terms of the political universe, the Reagan I belief set was conflictual in orientation, so classification as moderates is ruled out. The ideological threat posed by the Soviet Union and international communism was clear, communism was evil and there was no use in dealing with communists throughout the world. The global threat was also seen as serious in this battle of good against evil. The Soviet Union was seen as intent on world domination. The military threat was such that negotiations had to based on changing the Soviet Union rather than any form of accommodation. With all three questions answered in the affirmative, the Reagan I belief set provides another example of a militant political orientation. Foreign Policy Actions and Events As a part of the economic plank of the Reagan Doctrine, the US sought to undermine the construction of the Siberian oil pipeline to Europe, despite the complaints of the Europeans. In response to the Polish/Soviet crackdown on Solidarity in December 1981, the US expanded upon their diplomatic efforts by ordering all US companies to break ties with Siberian pipeline contracts. On June 18, 1982, the administration expanded the order to include all European firms operating under US license and all US subsidiaries in Europe. 299 Relations with China initially chilled as the administration was ideologically inclined towards Taiwan. Tensions never ran particularly high for the Soviet Union, not China, was seen as the ultimate enemy and China could be utilized in the struggle against Russia. Moreover, the 298
Negotiator Richard Perle held similar positions. For a thorough rendering of the machinations of negotiations during the first years of the Reagan administration, see Strobe Talbott’s Deadly Gambits (1985). 299 Shultz 1993, 5.
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July 1982 Chinese decision to stop insisting that the US cease arming Taiwan relaxed relations further. 300 To combat Soviet dominion in Indochina, the administration backed “pro-Chinese” rebels in Cambodia, including the bloody Khmer Rouge, against the Soviet-backed Vietnamese occupation. The US also covertly and overtly supported the mujaheddin in Afghanistan in their fight against Soviet occupation. The worldwide fight against communism included Africa as the CIA covertly funneled money to UNITA, the Angolan rebels led by Jonas Savimbi. The administration applied the same approach to the western hemisphere. A socialist coup in Suriname brought consternation to the administration, but they could not act because Suriname was a self-governing territory of the Netherlands and, therefore, an associate member of the EU. Shultz (1993, 344) suggests the inability to do anything about Suriname contributed to the administrations response to the October 19, 1983 Grenadan coup led by General Hudson Austin. The decision to act was made quickly and the US invaded Grenada on October 25. The administration supported anti-communist regimes, including the authoritarian regimes US Ambassador to the UN Jeane Kirkpatrick thought were worthy of US support. 301 The US was favorably disposed to the Argentinean junta until the Falklands War. Reagan was also disposed to support the corrupt and repressive Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines. He saw Marcos as an anti-communist ally and a friend. Having been incensed at the US ‘turning its back’ on the Shah; Reagan was determined not to turn his back on this friend. Relations with the Arab world were also colored by a Cold War orientation. As Brown (1994, 422) states, “The Middle East…was high on the list of arenas in which to stand tall
300
Reagan eventually met with Premier Zhoa Ziyang, January 10-13, 1984. Interestingly, Kirkpatrick defended such methods by drawing distinctions between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes (see Brown 1994, 402).
301
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against the Soviets”. 302 Secretary of State Alexander Haig believed and tried to convince Reagan that terrorism was “a global Marxist conspiracy masterminded by the Kremlin”. 303 Condemnation of the Israeli bombing of the Osirak nuclear plant in Iraq at the UN was part of the campaign to prevent Arab states from embracing the USSR, as was the sale of AWACs to Saudi Arabia. Of course the strategic necessity of oil in the struggle against communism contributed to such moves. Little progress was made in the START talks during Reagan I. Some on the US side, such as Richard Perle, remained doggedly opposed to arms controls. 304 Reagan, on the other hand, did develop an interested in the complete elimination of Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) or the so-called ‘zero-option’; a position, by the way, that those opposed to arms control embraced believing the Soviets would never agree to such reductions. After all, the Soviets had put a significant amount of effort into developing the new, intermediate range SS-20 and had defense concerns in Europe and Asia. Paul Nitze’s efforts to broker a deal with the “Walk in the Woods”, which would have allowed the Soviets to deploy INF positions in Asia, was not supported by the administration which stood firmly behind the zero-option. In response to the Soviet development of the SS-20, the US made clear that they would deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe believing that this would nudge the Soviets towards serious negotiations. 305 This caused the Soviets to suspend START talks and decline to set a date for the resumption of conventional arms reductions talks (MBFR). As Shultz (1993, 5) describes the situation as he assumed the position
302
Quandt (1993) also sees the Reagan administration’s policy towards the Middle East as based on Cold War considerations. 303 Brown 1994, 440-41. 304 For a thorough rendering of the machinations of negotiations during the first years of the Reagan administration, see Strobe Talbott’s Deadly Gambits (1985). 305 Deployment of Pershing II missiles began on November 22, 1983.
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of Secretary of State in 1982, “Relations between the two superpowers were not simply bad, they were virtually nonexistent”. Two events contributed to a shift in the administration’s beliefs: the appointment of George Shultz as Secretary of State and the death of Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev on November 10, 1982. The appointment of Shultz meant that Reagan now had a high level compatriot truly interested in reducing nuclear stockpiles and bringing an end to the Cold War. It should be mentioned that Shultz faced resistance from existing advisors and, hence, carryover exists initially during Reagan II such as with the invasion of Grenada. 306 By the beginning of 1983, many in the government were opposed to improving relations with the Soviets including Bill Clark and the NSC staff, Casper Weinberger and others at the DoD, and Bill Casey and others at the CIA. 307 The death of Brezhnev was seen as potentially opening a door towards more fruitful diplomacy to end the Cold War. Reagan, based on his inclinations against nuclear weapons, told Shultz on February 12 that, “if Andropov is willing to do business, so am I”. 308 Resistance within the administration to such efforts revealed themselves as sentences were dropped from letters from Reagan to Andropov that neutered his message regarding his openness to negotiations. Belief Set Shift
306
The justifications for the action were largely spurious. The rationale of freeing US medical students did not hold up under scrutiny for neither the students nor their parents believed they were under any threat. The idea that the newly constructed airport was built to receive Cuban and Soviet shipments neglected the fact that the Canadians and British had financed the airstrip for the purposes of tourism. The request for action by four members of the OECOS cited by the administration was actually spurred on by the request of the Reagan administration and ignored the protocol that all members of the OECOS must approve military intervention. The dubious rationales for action in Grenada, in actuality, point to an administration bent on a crusade against evil communism. The fact that the British, French, and other Europeans did not support US actions in Grenada speak to the lengths the administration was prepared to go to fight its ideological battle (see Brown 1994, 467-68). 307 Shultz 1993, 159. 308 Ibid, 164.
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The primary focusing event that contributed to Reagan’s increasing emphasis on the “zero option” was the death of Brezhnev. His interest in engaging Andropov fit his dispositions that advisors tried to stifle. He faced resistance from within from stubbornly hard line advisors who had managed to suppress Reagan’s intentions in his first two years in office. Such political pressures were lessened by the appointment of Shultz who Gaddis (2005, 353-354) views as the most significant advisor in the Reagan years. The net effect of these developments was a diminishing of the militancy of Reagan I. According to the decision rules, therefore, the belief set shift of Reagan I is categorized as militant-. Reagan II Belief Set The Reagan II belief set lasted from 1983 to 1988 and was pragmatic in orientation. The political universe was still seen as conflictual, but the threats posed by the Soviet Union and international communism were not viewed as pessimistically as during the Reagan I belief set. Reagan and Shultz, in the face of extensive pressures from other administration advisors, sought negotiations with the Soviet Union to reduce nuclear stockpiles and develop better relations. NSDD-75 outlined the approach in January 1983. The key focusing event, which amplified the new pragmatism, was the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as Soviet premier in 1985. Domestic political pressures were largely resisted, even during the Iran-Contra affair. Moreover, Reagan’s inexperience can no longer be considered a factor in the development of foreign policy. In fact, with the aid of Shultz, Reagan was the driving force behind relations with the Soviets. Elements of militancy, however, persisted for some time in Nicaragua, yet diminished as time passed. These findings offer only mild support for Hypothesis 1 and do not support Hypothesis 2. Focusing events were significant in the case of Gorbachev, yet domestic political pressures do not appear to have affected beliefs or even beliefs in what was possible. This suggests partial
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confirmation of Hypothesis 3. The fact that Reagan’s inexperience is not deemed a significant factor indicates that the evidence does not support Hypothesis 4. Administration Belief Set Gaddis (2005, 354) argues that Reagan was “his own chief strategist”. The evidence does not support this suggestion during Reagan I. With Shultz as an ally, however, Reagan did assume this position in Reagan II. Reagan now wanted to take a more hands on approach towards dealing with the Soviet Union. As Gaddis (359) states, “He made it clear, in a quiet meeting with Secretary of State Shultz in February 1983—before the ‘evil empire’ and Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) speeches—that he wanted to begin talking to the Russians, despite the reservations of his staff”. 309 Shultz was also interested in more honest negotiations with the Soviet Union. In fact, Weinberger and Casey tried to get Shultz fired for wanting to reopen negotiations with the Russians. In response, Reagan strongly backed Shultz. 310 NSDD-75, which outlined major US strategic objectives and was approved by Reagan in January 1983, demonstrates the shift from Reagan I to Reagan II. It stated that a key goal was, “to engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt to reach agreements which protect and enhance US interests and are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest”. 311 NSDD-75 concluded, “the US must demonstrate credibility that its policy is not a blueprint for an open-ended, sterile confrontation with Moscow, but a serious search for a stable and constructive long-term basis for US-Soviet relations”. 312 Reagan long held beliefs in Anti-Ballistic Missile systems (ABM) lent confusion to the new approach. He abhorred MAD and saw ABMs in the form of the Strategic Defense Initiative 309
In March 1983, at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals, Reagan stated that the USSR was in fact an ‘evil empire’. 310 See Gaddis 2005, 361. 311 Ibid, 359. 312 Ibid, 363.
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(SDI) as a way out. 313 To Reagan, SDI would be a move from “a policy of assured destruction to one of assured survival”. 314 Shultz was against SDI and argued that the approach would tell our allies we were pursuing a policy of fortress America, would break the ABM treaty, could not provide an impenetrable shield, and could not defend against cruise missiles. Reagan was not swayed by the arguments and remained committed to SDI. On March 23, 1983, in an address to the nation, Reagan announced SDI, which was soon dubbed “Star Wars” by the New York Times on March 27, 1983. Shultz was eventually to come to believe that Star Wars provided significant leverage in negotiations with the Soviet Union. Reagan and Shultz were of the belief that the Soviet Union’s economy was destined to fail. They saw expanded US defense expenditures, and the expected matching efforts of the Soviet Union, as a means of accelerating the decline of the Soviet economy. 315 In fact, few weapons systems hit the chopping block during the Reagan years. What both men required, however, was Soviet leadership that interpreted matters in a similar manner. The political universe, as seen by the Reagan II belief set, was still conflictual in nature. Yet the thought that the Soviet Union could be brought to its senses in the face of US economic power indicates that the ideological threat was not viewed nefariously as the ‘evil empire’ speech would suggest. The understanding that the Soviet economy was teetering on disaster suggests that the Global threat was not seen as significant as the rhetoric indicated. Finally, the new openness to negotiating was a sign that the military threat of the Soviet Union was seen as less hazardous than was the case in Reagan I. These results indicate that the Reagan II belief set was pragmatic in orientation.
313
See Shultz 1993, 246; Brown 1994, 396. Reagan’s beliefs in ABMs went as far back as 1967 when, as Governor of California, he had his first of many meetings with ABM advocate Edward Teller (Brown 1994, 398). 315 Kegley (1994) notes that the Soviets did not expand their resource allocations to match the US build-up. 314
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Foreign Policy Actions and Events At the May 1983 G-7 summit, German Chancellor Kohl and Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone joined French President Mitterand, who had endorsed the approach in an earlier speech to the Bundestag, in expressing interest in the zero-option. In November 1983, the same month that Pershing II missiles were being deployed in Europe, Reagan declared in a speech to the Japanese Diet, “I say our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the earth…we want significant reductions and we’re willing to compromise”. This was the beginning of signs that Reagan was prepared to move on the issue even prior to the rise of Gorbachev. Andropov, for his part, did not hold similar views. Gaddis (2005, 360) points out that he believed the Reagan administration was interested in a nuclear first-strike against the USSR. Accordingly, Andropov interpreted a major military exercise held in November 1983 called “Able Archer 83” as cover for a first-strike and prepared for an attack by readying Soviet forces. The near conflagration “badly shook Reagan”. 316 Gaddis suggests that Reagan’s viewing of the movie The Day After, which was about life in the immediate aftermath of a nuclear exchange, also had an impact on his perspectives. Shortly after these events, Gaddis continues, he received his first full briefing of American strategy for nuclear war and commented “There are still some people at the Pentagon who claimed a nuclear war was ‘winnable’. I thought they were crazy”. On January 16, 1984, in what Brown (1994, 484) terms an “uncharacteristically conciliatory speech”, Reagan suggested three goals of the administration: (1) reduction of the use of force in regional conflicts; (2) reduced nuclear arsenals; (3) establishing better working relations with the Soviet Union. In his January 24 State of the Union address, Reagan stated, “A
316
He had learned of the Soviet reaction from the British who had garnered the information from their spy in Moscow, Oleg Gordievsky (Gaddis 2005, 360).
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nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”. 317 Reagan started corresponding with Konstantin Chernenko after the death of Andropov on February 2. Although the Soviets and their allies decided against attending the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles over “security concerns”, July 1984 saw the modernization of the Hot line, the rescinding of the ban on Soviet fishing in US waters, and the continuation of negotiations between US and Soviet trade officials which were under way to find ways to normalize commercial relations. During his September 24 speech to the UN General Assembly, Reagan called for a “new beginning” with the Soviets and met with Gromyko in the Oval Office the following day. 318 The biggest development in improving relations with the Soviets, however, did not occur in the United States. Chernenko died on March 8, 1985 and was soon replaced by a new reformist named Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. Gaddis (2005, 362) suggests, “Gorbachev was indeed the Kremlin leader for whom Reagan—and strategists of containment as far back as Kennan—had been waiting”. Casper Weinberger and the hardliners were resistant to Reagan meeting Gorbachev. 319 In early July, in what proved to be a fortuitous development, Eduard Shevardnadze replaced Gromyko as Soviet Foreign Minister. Greenstein (1998) argues that the constellation of Reagan, Shultz, Gorbachev, and Shevardnadze were vital to improved relations, the INF treaty, and the eventual end of the Cold War. Shultz met Shevardnadze at the July30August 1 Foreign Ministers meeting to celebrate the 10th anniversary of Helsinki Final Act and quickly developed rapport. At the November 1985, Geneva summit, Reagan and Gorbachev met face to face and began to develop a fruitful relationship. In describing their interactions, Shultz (1993, 606) suggests, “The personal chemistry was apparent. The easy and relaxed attitude toward each 317 318 319
Brown 1994, 485. It is worth noting that Reagan was running for reelection in 1984. Ibid, 486. Shultz 1993, 535.
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other, the smiles, the sense of purpose, all showed through”. The summit did not lead to any substantive breakthroughs, but they did agree to meet again. 320 To Regan (1988, 317), “What really mattered was the intangible: Reagan and Gorbachev had discovered they could talk to each other even when they could not yet agree”.321 The next meeting, held at Reykjavik in November 1986, which Gaddis (2005, 365-366) calls “the most astonishing (superpower summit) of the postwar era”, both leaders came close to a profound settlement only to have the grandiose plans scuttled by Reagan’s insistence on SDI “outside the laboratory”. During the meeting Gorbachev suggested ever more expansive cuts in nuclear weapons as long as they were tied to limiting SDI. Reagan refused to budge. Richard Perle was behind a suggestion to eliminate all strategic weapons within ten years, believing the Soviets would refuse and Reagan could save face for his adherence to SDI. To everyone’s surprise, Gorbachev accepted the proposal but tied it to SDI. This did not please Reagan and led to the end of the summit. 322 Some progress was made, especially concerning INF, but the breakthrough evaded both leaders at Reykjavik. 323 Despite the false hopes, Gorbachev nonetheless called the meeting “a kind of intellectual breakthrough”. 324 In June 1987, Reagan gave a speech in Berlin demanding, “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall”. Atmospherics aside, arms control progress continued. The leaders moved closer to the INF agreement at the October summit in Moscow. Shevardnadze and Shultz ironed out the
320
Shultz (601) cites the following advancements at Geneva: (1) agreement to reciprocal visits in Moscow and Washington; (2) 50% reduction in strategic arms; (3) the possibility of an interim INF agreement; (4) cultural exchanges. 321 Gaddis (2005, 367-368) suggests that, beginning in December 1985, Shultz started giving Gorbachev “tutorials” about the coming information age and the Soviet Union’s need to change economic policy to adapt to the new circumstances. 322 See Brown 1994, 492-93. 323 Shultz (1993, 776) lists the following agreements: (1) first step towards 50% reduction in strategic nuclear forces over a five year period; (2) drastic cuts in INF (for Soviets from 1400 to 100, the 100 for Asia); (3) human rights now recognized as part of the agenda. 324 Ibid, 996.
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last issues with INF in a November 24 meeting. Despite opposition from conservative Senators, Reagan moved forward at the December 7-10 Washington summit. 325 On December 8, 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev announced the signing of the INF treaty banning all intermediate ranged missiles. Although no progress was made on SDI, the zero-option finally came to pass. Finally, Reagan visited Moscow in May 1988 and against the advice of his “image-makers” decided to tour Red Square. The visit saw a flurry of activity as agreements were made regarding arms control, cooperative nuclear research, transportation, maritime affairs, and student exchanges. 326 Reagan II, as suggested above, did contain some elements of holdover from Reagan I. Reagan I’s black and white interpretation of communism certainly applied to Latin America as discussed above regarding Suriname and Grenada. In February 1982, Reagan referred to Cuba, Grenada, and Nicaragua as the “totalitarian left”. 327 The administration saw a Cuban-style government in the Sandinistas and argued that both countries were promoting civil war in El Salvador and Guatemala. 328 In regards to the anti-Sandinista group known as the Contras, Reagan once quipped, “If you are not for the Contras, you are for the communists”. 329 On March 9, 1981, Reagan signed a secret Finding authorizing CIA operations against “Marxists” in Central America. On November 17, 1981, Reagan issued national security directive 17 authorizing covert support for the Contras. Aware of such developments and in response to growing violence in the region, Congress passed what came to be known as the Boland I amendment (after Representative Edward Boland) in December 1982 restricting aid to anti-Sandinistas. Despite overt support for the Contadora process, an effort to seek regional
325
December 4, Senators, Malcolm Wallop, Jesse Helms, Steve Symms, Larry Pressler, and Dan Quayle announced their opposition to an INF treaty. 326 Brown 1994, 498. 327 Shultz (1993), 130. 328 Shultz 1993, 291; Brown 1994, 460. 329 Regan 1988, 54.
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solutions to Central America’s problems minus the inclusion of the US and Cuba, in April 1984, the CIA mined Corinto and Sandino harbors in Nicaragua. The damage done to shipping soon revealed to Congress what had occurred and Boland II was passed in 1985, which banned all funding and support for the Contras. Casey and North nonetheless continued to direct the operations through the NSC and sought other sources of funding, one being the Iran-Contra Affair. 330 They also used what was called “the enterprise”, a privately funded group run by Casey and North that hired mercenaries and veteran covert operations pilots to continue to aid the Contras. One of their planes was shot down and the secret was out. Reagan said the US government was not involved even though the NSC was running “the enterprise”. The administration, at a minimum, had clearly skirted the law, distorted the facts, and went against the will of Congress, all to harass a rag-tag group of communists based on their obsession with a worldwide, communist conspiracy. Interestingly, Reagan, in November 1987, approved a meeting between Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega and Shultz and, in the process, infuriated the hard line sycophants. The move, once again, suggests that Reagan had shifted emphases during his tenure, even if some elements of Reagan I persisted in Reagan II. Belief Set Shift The rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev to power was the most significant international development during the Reagan II era. The positive personal relations they cultivated greatly 330
Brown 1994, 475-76. The Iran-Contra affair was a scandal that involved trading arms with Iran in order to get the Iranians to pressure hostage-takers to release American hostages. The proceeds from the sale of the arms where funneled to the Contras through the NSC by Admiral John Pointdexter and Colonel Oliver North, both of whom were found guilty of lying to Congress about the matter. Dealing with terrorists went against the stated US policy of not negotiating with terrorists. More significantly, the aid to the Contras violated two congressional amendments, Boland I and Boland II. Shultz argues that Reagan somehow believed he was not authorizing a swap of arms for hostages. Throughout the affair, however, Reagan believed in what had transpired. In describing Reagan’s continuing belief that arms were not swapped for hostages, Shultz (1993, 868) suggests, “The president has completely buffaloed himself about the matter”.
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reinforced the beliefs behind the shift to pragmatism. Although the primary features that contributed to the end of the Cold War were centered in the Soviet Union, i.e. the growing discontent with Soviet system of governance unleashed by perestroika and glasnost, the administration’s belief structures were receptive to the tectonic shifts in Russia. The recalcitrant anti-communism of Reagan I, however, was carried over in the shape of continued aid to the Contras, even in the face of congressional resistance. Yet even in this policy domain, rigid anticommunism diminished during Regan’s second term. Reagan’s single-minded purpose was maintained even during the Iran-Contra scandal, which suggests that domestic political pressures did not have a significant influence on administration beliefs. On balance, therefore, in spite of elements of militancy, the Reagan II belief set’s remained pragmatic. In fact, the evidence suggests that, in terms of relations with the Soviet Union, this pragmatism strengthened over time. Bush Belief Set 331 The Bush administration belief set lasted the entire time the administration was in office and was pragmatic in orientation. The administration clearly viewed the political universe from a ‘balance-of-power’ perspective, but also saw the threat of the Soviet Union, however cautiously, as limited to the extent that interactions between the superpowers could potentially lead to a positive-sum game. Bush came to office with a significant degree of foreign policy experience and hence, did not rely excessively upon his advisors. His advisors did, however, reinforce his cautiousness towards the extent of change in the Soviet Union. Over time, Bush 331
The analysis for the Bush belief set is based on the following literature: Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbot (1993), At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War; Seyom Brown (1994), The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign policy from Truman to Clinton; Brian Dille (2000), “The Prepared and Spontaneous Remarks of Presidents Reagan and Bush: A Validity Comparison for At-a-Distance Measurement”, Political Psychology; John Lewis Gaddis (2005), Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of National Security Policy During the Cold War; William B. Quandt (1993), Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Israeli Conflict since 1967.
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began to believe that real change was underway, and found support in this belief from Secretary of State James Baker. Focusing events, particularly those in Eastern Europe, greatly contributed to the amplification of pragmatism. Moreover, the friendship Bush developed with Gorbachev, beginning at the Malta summit, also reinforced such beliefs. Domestic political pressures are also found to have led to a shift in Bush’s approach to the Soviet Union. Finally, Bush’s actual approach towards the post-Cold War world, despite his moderate rhetoric about a new world order, provides further expression of a continued pragmatism. These findings provide moderate support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. The effect of international developments and domestic political pressure offer stronger confirmation of Hypothesis 3. The fact that the administration did not move to moderation suggests that Bush’s experience helped limit the administration’s belief set shift, hence supporting Hypothesis 4. Administration Belief Set George Bush had extensive foreign policy experience prior to his presidency. He had a stint as head of the CIA and was Reagan’s vice-president for both terms. Through this experience, he developed the belief that great power balancing can contribute to international stability. So unlike Reagan, he supported MAD and was not a fan of START. He was not a big supporter of SDI, but realized he had to continue to espouse the program, as ABMs had become a conservative litmus test. 332 Bush, however, was interested in continuing dialogue with Gorbachev, even if in a more cautious manner than Reagan. On December 10, 1987, at the close of the Washington summit, he told Gorbachev, “There’s a good chance that I’m going to win the presidential election next year…You should understand that I want to improve our relations”. 333
332 333
Beschloss and Talbot 1993, 114-15. Beschloss and Talbot 1993, 3.
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He said he would say things to win the election that Gorbachev should ignore. He also suggested to Gorbachev that he was more moderate than Reagan. In his inaugural address, Bush stated: “We know how to secure a more just and prosperous life for man on earth—through free markets, free speech, free elections, and the exercise of free will unhampered by the state”. 334 At the start of his term, however, the word to describe Bush’s approach to foreign policy was cautious. 335 Despite Bush’s claims about being more moderate than Reagan, early talk during the administration indicated a more skeptical view of Gorbachev. Bush suggested to his aides that Gorbachev may be a “historically formidable person”, but in the final analysis, he was “still a Russian and a communist, which counts for more”. 336 Beschloss and Talbot (1993, 11) suggest that Bush and Secretary of State James Baker were cautious, and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft as even more cautious. One of Scowcroft’s favorite maxims was, “Judge your enemy by his capacities, not his intentions”. 337 On January 22, 1989, Scowcroft told David Brinkley that Gorbachev seemed, “interested in making trouble with the western alliance…Until we have better evidence to the contrary, we ought to operate on that expectation (that the USSR was stalling for time to rearm and restart the communist march for world domination)…I think the Cold War is not over”. 338 Many in the Bush administration believed that Reagan’s last years in office was a demonstration of “soft-headedness” towards the Soviets. Baker thought Shultz was a “flabby negotiator” in his last year while others suggested that he was the “worst Secretary of State since
334 335 336 337 338
Ibid, 17. Without a doubt, Bush would prefer the word ‘prudent’. Beschloss and Talbot 1993, 21. Ibid, 272. The maxim was also a favorite of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. Ibid, 17-18.
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Stettinius”. 339 Bush wanted to demonstrate his firmness. Gorbachev’s proposal to eliminate short-range nuclear forces (SNF), a policy that did not please NATO, provided the opportunity. How he dealt with the issue would put the “softheads of Western Europe and the Republican right on notice that they were going to be tough”. 340 Bush’s dealings with the Soviets were indeed going to be the most important development during the administration’s time in office. The administration received NSR 3, a national security report put together by Robert Blackwell, which argued that the chance of the Soviets backtracking was small and that the US should work to make sure the Soviets did not turn back. The report stated, “Perestroika was in our interests”. 341 The report was disappointing to Bush and Scowcroft. Scowcroft’s deputy, Robert Gates, maintained a dark assessment of the reforms under Gorbachev. Baker and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, on the other hand, were coming to the conclusion that real change was underway. For the Bush administration, the political universe was interpreted in conflictual terms, so they cannot be classified as moderate. Although obviously concerned with the ideological threat, the administration tended to view the Soviet Union as a great power rather than an evil empire. They also did not rule out dealing with other communist states. Regarding the global threat posed by the Soviet Union and international communism, although cautious, the administration was aware of the weaknesses of the Soviet Union. Moreover, as Brown (1994) notes, the Bush administration held to realpolitik views of international relations and therefore saw balance of power issues as relevant in dealing with the Soviet Union. Finally, the military threat of the Soviet Union was not seen as so great that negotiations were off the board. In fact, the approach was somewhat of a return to Nixon’s détente and a move away from basing negotiations on the 339 340 341
Ibid, 27-32. Ibid, 36. Ibid, 43-44.
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ending of Soviet rule in Russia. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, Bush feared, could add to international instability. The answers to the threat questions, therefore, indicate that the Bush administration belief set was pragmatic in its political orientation. Foreign Policy Actions and Events In his December 7, 1988 speech at the UN, Gorbachev pushed for new international relations not based on the use of force and, as a sign of the seriousness of his intentions, he announced a 500,000 troop reduction for the Soviet army and the disbanding of six tank divisions in Eastern Europe. “Bush instinctively held back”. 342 As Scowcroft stated, “There may be …light at the end of the tunnel. But I think it depends on whether the light is the sun or an oncoming locomotive”. 343 Accordingly, the administration cautiously (or prudently) waited during the first few months to decide a course of action. The pause, or pauza as Gorbachev and Shevardnadze called it, did not please the Soviets. Outside pressure began to mount for the administration to begin serious engagements with the Soviets. On April 5, George Kennan testified before the Senate Foreign Relations committee and argued that Bush was “unresponsive” to “encouraging initiatives and suggestions from the Soviet side”. Reagan was even telling friends he was uneasy about Bush’s “foreign policy indecisiveness”. 344 Bush and Baker took a restrained approach to the outbreak of violence in Georgia on April 9. 345 The response to the crisis revealed a Kissingerian theme that would be quite consistent under the administration, namely a comfort with state sovereignty stability and slow, gradual change. Bush’s response to Poland’s peaceful transformation was telling. As Beschloss and Talbot (1993, 87) state, “Bush’s sympathy for Jaruzelski and his misgivings about 342
Brown 1994, 504. Ibid, 506. 344 Ibid, 50. 345 Vice President Dan Quayle, on the other hand, during his visit to the Far East was repeatedly announcing the unverified charge that the Soviets were using poison gas to repel the rioters (Ibid, 52). 343
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Walesa suggested an almost emotional preference for familiar processes and gradual orderly change, even at the sacrifice of democratic ideas. It was wholly consonant with his increasing desire to form a tacit alliance with Mikhail Gorbachev against Boris Yeltsin who seemed to be extremist in the context of Soviet politics”. In fact, it could be argued that Bush continued to support Gorbachev far too long because of his concerns about Yeltsin. 346 The administration did bring change to Central American policy. Bush and Baker shifted from relying on the Contras to emphasis on the Central American peace process underway since 1987. The Sandinistas had promised to hold elections in 1991 and even moved them up to 1990. 347 The administration saw Central America as a “test” of how serious Gorbachev was, a word to which Gorbachev and Shevardnadze took umbrage. They had reason to feel that way. The Soviet had pressured the Sandinistas to hold elections. Moreover, the Soviets were working to get the Cubans out of Angola by brokering a deal for Namibian independence and ceasing to subsidize the Cuba’s economy. Bush outlined his approach to the Soviets “earning” a new relationship during his May 12, 1989 speech at Texas A&M University. What the Soviets had to do included: (1) reducing their armed forces “in proportion to their legitimate security needs”; (2) self-determination for Eastern and Central Europe; (3) working for diplomatic solutions to regional conflicts; (4) creating “lasting political pluralism” within Russia; (5) help to address global problems like drugs and the environment; (6) initiating a new “open skies” policy. 348 Bush’s attempt to demonstrate ‘vision’ ended up being a laundry list of rehashed generalities. Bush’s reserve could 346
A similar phenomenon occurred with Hungary. After meeting with the opposition leaders and hearing their serious contentions regarding the communist government, Bush advised a slow, ‘prudent’ course of working with the communists. After the meeting, Bush told Baker, “These guys aren’t the right guys to be running this place. At least not yet. They’re just not ready” (Beschloss and Talbot 1993, 92). 347 The elections led to defeat for the Sandinistas and an end to their rule. 348 Brown 1994, 508. The open skies initiative made little sense for both countries possessed satellites that essentially performed the identical function.
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only be matched by Gorbachev’s dynamism. The frustration of the situation revealed itself in Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwaters’s comment that Gorbachev was, “throwing out in a kind of drug store cowboy fashion one arms control proposal after another”. 349 Bush proposed sweeping, asymmetrical arms reductions in conventional weapons or Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), knowing full well that the Soviets would have to eliminate the lion’s share of the weaponry. Gorbachev surprised the administration by accepting. Bush then sent a similarly disproportionate suggestion, aware that the Soviets were invested in land-based ICBMs, for large cuts in heavy ICBMs and relatively minor cuts in SLBMs and cruise missiles with no concession on SDI. Although angered, Gorbachev agreed. 350 Gates was still cautioning Bush about Gorbachev by suggesting that he could be replaced. Yet the acceptance of his proposals and the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe began to make an impact on Bush’s appraisal of Gorbachev. When Yeltsin visited the White House, Bush was reluctant to meet him so as not to offend Gorbachev. 351 The penchant for what was comfortable and orderly appeared once again as the nationalist movement in Lithuania was interpreted as moving too quickly. After meeting with Shevardnadze at the White House on September 21, Bush said to Scowcroft, “It’s tempting to say, ‘wouldn’t it be great if the Soviet empire broke up? But that’s not really practical or smart, is it?”. 352 Yet the dramatic developments in Eastern Europe were making an impact on Bush’s beliefs. In regards to developments in East Germany, Bush intimated to aides, “If the Soviets are going to let communists fall in East Germany, they’ve got to be really serious—more serious 349
Ibid, 510; Beschloss and Talbot 1993, 73. Bush complained to Scowcroft, he was “sick and tired of being beat up day after day for having no vision or letting Gorbachev run the show” (Brown 1994, 510). 350 See Brown 1994, 510-512. 351 A meeting did take place, but they it only lasted for 15 minutes as Yeltsin was skirted in the backdoor. Baker, after meeting Yeltsin, exclaimed, “What a flake! He sure makes Gorbachev look good by comparison, doesn’t he?” (Beschloss and Talbot 1993, 102-03) 352 Ibid, 109.
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than I thought”. 353 Bush finally met with Gorbachev as president at Malta on December 2-3, 1989. 354 Against his advisors desires, he offered observer status at GATT without strings attached. He also agreed to act with restraint regarding the Baltic States as long as the tanks do not roll into the streets. They both agreed not to push for German reunification. Most importantly, at Malta, as Reagan found at Geneva, Bush was impressed with and liked Gorbachev. Bush now began to cooperate in earnest, if still prudently. Cooperation through the 2 plus 4 approach (negotiations involving the two Germanys and the four post World War II in Europe powers: Britain, France, the US, and the USSR) led to the reunification on October 3, 1990. November saw the signing of the CFE treaty in Paris, which required the Soviets to reduce the number of tanks, artillery pieces, and armored combat vehicles by 70%. 355 Signs in Moscow, however, were beginning to indicate that the hard liners were in the ascendancy. Shevardnadze resigned in protest of the growing influence of the hard liners bent on preventing the disintegration of the USSR. The administration remained quiet regarding the growing unrest and bloody Soviet crackdowns in the Baltic States because they knew they needed Gorbachev’s support during the Gulf War. After the war had commenced, however, Bush wrote Gorbachev a letter threatening to cut off all American assistance if things did not improve. Yet despite the move to the right and his meddling during the Gulf crisis, Bush still “thought Gorbachev was the best available leader in the Soviet Union”. 356 When he met Yeltsin again, he urged him to cooperate with Gorbachev. In June, a coup was attempted in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev remained as the Soviet leader and Bush continued to deal with him. At the 353
Ibid, 132. It was known as the “seasick summit” because they met on warships from both navies during quite stormy weather. 355 Prior to the agreement, the Soviets moved 16,000 tanks east of the Urals (Ibid, 288). 356 Ibid, 341. 354
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July-August Moscow summit, both leaders signed the START treaty. Afterwards, Bush went to Kiev and spoke to the Ukrainian Parliament and despite eye witnessing anti-Gorbachev and proindependence protests, Bush urged Ukraine to stay in the Soviet federation. On August 18, 1991, while Gorbachev was at his Black Sea retreat, the August Coup occurred. While Gorbachev was kept at the retreat, Yeltsin defiantly stood against those behind the coup and the army units that supported them. The coup failed and propelled Yeltsin towards national prominence. After giving Gorbachev time and reading the tealeaves, Bush finally recognized the Baltic States. With the secessionists emboldened by the coup attempt, Bush continued to try to slow the disintegration of the Soviet Union believing the central government was necessary for controlling Russia nuclear stockpiles. On December 17, 1991, Gorbachev announced that at the end of the year, the Soviet Union would cease to exist. On December 20-21, the former republics of the USSR formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Gorbachev retired on Christmas day and at the turn of the year, the CIS assumed control of the government in Moscow. Bush’s last action involving Russian was the signing of START II, a 75% reduction of US and Russian nuclear warheads from their totals at the beginning of 1990 by January 1, 2003. Bush proclaimed, “Today, the Cold War is over”. 357 The Bush administration also proceeded pragmatically with China. In response to the Chinese crackdown on June 1, 1989, Bush offered a short list of military sanctions. The sanctions were no weapons sales, no technology transfers, or no high-level official meetings for China. When asked why there were not economic sanctions, Bush defended his actions by arguing that US economic ties to China were vital and should not be disrupted. Moreover, realpolitik tactics were used as Bush secretly sent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State 357
Brown 1994, 577.
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Lawrence Eagleburger to China in July and Scowcroft in December to reassure the Chinese, despite the sanction against high-level official meetings. In short, the administration was prepared to deal with the Chinese communists. The end of the Cold War led Bush to claim that a new world order was upon us. Sticking with his penchant for generalities, he exclaimed what this new world would be: A world in which there is a very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a world in which ‘the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong’. A world where the United Nations—freed from cold war stalemate—is poised to fulfill its historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights finds a home among all nations. The Gulf war put this world to its first test. And my fellow Americans, we passed the test. 358 Yet actions taken during the administration belie this expression of the new world order. The Gulf War was largely fought for geo-strategic reasons. The invasion of Panama can also be seen as an expression of ‘might makes right’ in that the US militarily imposed its will in a Monroe Doctrine fashion on a much less powerful state. Brown (1994) argues that the new world order was actually a return to the old world order with state sovereignty and power being the currency of international relations. As he suggests, the “new” pattern was “and elitist order run, as ever, by and for the great powers”. 359 On the other hand, the actions in Somalia and the fact that the Gulf War was conducted with UN approval suggest that the administration’s belief set saw value, when deemed appropriate, in international cooperation. Such perspectives are classic hallmarks of pragmatism. Pragmatists are cognizant that conflict is a real possibility in international relations, but apply such approaches on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, a hard line may not always be the best method for dealing with all potential disputes. Moreover, the limited reaction to Tiananmen
358 359
Brown 1994, 562. Ibid, 563.
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Square suggests an awareness of the potential for overstretch. In other words, the Bush administration’s belief set can be said to have been cautiously pragmatic. Belief Set Shift Although it is argued here that the Bush administration maintained pragmatic beliefs, developments did occur that strengthened and amplified such pragmatism. After the cautious “pause”, Bush, like Reagan, came to develop a positive relationship with Gorbachev. The fall of the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe confirmed Bush’s belief in dealing with Gorbachev. Moreover, domestic political pressure during the administration’s initial period of caution helped move the administration towards engaging the Soviets. The restraint towards Eastern European reformers, Soviet internal crackdowns, and Tiananmen Square suggest that the administration did not fully embrace its own call for a more moderate, new world order. In short, developments during the administration’s tenure did increase the degree to which the administration would apply a pragmatic approach towards international relations, but the shift was not so great as to amount to a reclassification of the administration as moderate. Analysis and Discussion The review of administration belief sets illustrates how variations in leadership contributed to divergent approaches for dealing with the Soviet Union and international communism during the Cold War. Administration belief sets were constructed based on the views of the president and their key advisors and the degree of advisory influence was often negatively related to the foreign policy experience of the president. Each belief set began with pre-existing assumptions of about the nature of the political universe and the nature of threat inherent in the international system. Such beliefs defined the very nature of national interests. The evidence suggests, however, that beliefs were not a stable as traditional views suppose. In
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Table 3.1: Administration belief sets and belief set shifts based on Hagan’s typology. Administration Belief Set Truman I Truman II Truman III Eisenhower Kennedy/Johnson Nixon/Ford Carter I Carter II Reagan I Reagan II Bush
Initial Administration Belief Set Moderate Pragmatic Militant Militant Militant Pragmatic Moderate Militant Militant Pragmatic Pragmatic
Belief Set Shift ModeratePragmatic Militant+ Militant+ Militant+ Pragmatic ModerateMilitant+ MilitantPragmatic Pragmatic
fact, some administrations are found to experience such significant shifts in beliefs that the administration’s belief set had to be reclassified. The categorizations of administration belief sets are contained in Table 3.1. The first obvious factor that contributed to belief set shifts is changes in the advisory system. This can occur with advisor turnover, as in the case of the Truman administration belief sets, or with a shifting of influence among existing advisors, as with the Carter and Reagan administration belief sets. On the other hand, stable advisory systems contributed to more enduring beliefs, such as during the transitions from Kennedy to Johnson and Nixon to Ford. Yet significant international focusing events and domestic political pressures affected even the most stable belief sets. These factors were so significant for Carter, in the shape of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the political fall-out of the Iranian hostage crisis, that he moved from moderation to militancy. In most cases, however, focusing events and political pressure contributed to less significant belief set shifts as outlined in Table 3.1. Although variations existed across administration belief sets, the findings tended to provide support for Hypotheses 1-4.
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MID Data Analysis The investigation to this point has focused on the constellation of beliefs held by individual administration belief sets. The findings suggest generalizable expectations regarding presidential experience, advisory system influence, belief stability, and the influence of belief sets on foreign policy outputs. The results, however, tend to be idiosyncratic rather than parsimonious in nature. Because of this, I now turn to a more parsimonious approach to assessing administration belief sets/political orientations and their affect on foreign policy outputs. The above analyses of administration belief sets utilizes Hagan’s leadership typology as a means of categorization and ties such political orientations to ensuing foreign policy decisionmaking. By focusing on views of the Soviet Union and international communism, however, the reviews omitted other foreign policy actions. The MID dataset provides the opportunity to quantitatively investigate whether such belief sets applied more universally to foreign policy behavior. Moreover, such analysis allows for a test of the expectations of Hypothesis 5 and 6 regarding conflict-proneness of both initial belief sets and belief set shifts. 360 The analysis consists of counts and yearly averages of total MIDs and instigated MIDs for interactions with all states and for interactions with other democracies. These steps allows for the investigation of democratic peace theory’s monadic and dyadic hypotheses. The results for Hypothesis 5 and 6 are in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 respectively. The findings regarding general conflict-proneness or the monadic hypothesis confirm the expectations of Hypothesis 5. Moderates averaged 2.6 MIDs a year, pragmatists 3.43, and
360
Hypothesis 5: Belief sets will rank in order of conflict-proneness in the following order: (1) moderates, (2) pragmatists, (3) militants. Hypothesis 6: Belief set shifts will rank in conflict proneness in the following order: (1) Moderate+, (2) Moderate-, (3) Pragmatic, (4) Militant-, (5) Militant+.
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Table 3.2: MID data for initial administration belief set categories. Length of administration belief sets: Moderate 5 years, Pragmatic 21 years, Militant 22 years. Initial Total Number of Number of MIDs Number of Administration Number of Instigated with other Instigated MIDs Belief Set MID/ MID/ Democracies/ with Other Average per Average per Average per Year Democracies/ Year Year Average per Year Moderate 13 / 2.6 3 / 0.6 1 / 0.20 0/0 Pragmatic
72 / 3.43
32 / 1.52
7 / 0.33
5 / 0.24
Militant
96 / 4.36
40 / 1.82
3 / 0.14
3 / 0.14
militants 4.36. Moreover, instigated MIDs also rank from moderates to militants in yearly averages. These findings indicate that the political orientation of administration belief sets fit Hagan’s expectations and contributed to variation in foreign policy behavior. The evidence only partially supports the expectations for interactions with other democracies, but the limited sample does not allow even minor conjectures. What this does suggest, however, is that democracies, in this case the US, tend to avoid militarized international disputes with other democracies, which confirms democratic peace theory’s dyadic hypothesis. The findings in Table 3.3 largely support the expectations regarding belief set shifts contained in Hypothesis 6. The average number of MIDs and instigated MIDs rank as expected from moderate+ to militant+, with the exception of militant-. It should be noted, however, that Reagan I, a particularly aggressive example of militancy, was the only case of militant-, and as argued in the above review, the militancy of Reagan I was so noteworthy that it spilled over into Reagan II, such as in the case of the invasion of Grenada. 361 Despite this discrepancy, the MID data analysis generally match the data and offer support for Hypotheses 5 and 6. 361
1982 was selected because that was the year that George Shultz joined the administration as Secretary of State, yet it was not until the end of 1983 that Reagan experienced The Day After and the covert feedback regarding the Able Archer 83 military exercise. The congruence of beliefs, therefore, did not reveal itself until 1984 when election year pressures contributed to Reagan toning down his rhetoric and, especially, in 1985 when Gorbachev and
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Table 3.3: MID data for belief set shifts. Length of administration belief set shifts: Moderate+ 0 years, Moderate- 5 years, Pragmatic 21 years, Militant- 2 years, Militant+ 20 years. Administration Total Number of Number of MIDs Number of Belief Set Shift Number of Instigated with other Instigated MIDs MIDs/ MIDs/ Democracies/ with Other Average per Average per Average per Year Democracies/ Year Year Average per Year Moderate+ 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 Moderate-
13 / 2.6
3 / 0.6
1 / 0.20
0/0
Pragmatic
72 / 3.43
32 / 1.52
7 / 0.33
5 / 0.24
Militant-
12 / 6
7 / 3.5
0/0
0/0
Militant+
84 / 4.2
33 / 1.65
3 / 0.14
3 / 0.14
Conclusion This research provides support for the notion that leadership matters in foreign policy decision-making. This runs counter to the assumption of neorealism that the ordering principle should lead to homogeneity in foreign policy decision-making across administrations and democratic peace theory’s monadic hypothesis suggestion that democratic governance primarily conditions foreign policy outputs. The evidence indicates, however, that administration belief sets do affect US foreign policy behavior. Moreover, beliefs can and do shift over time in relation to international focusing events, domestic political pressures, and advisory system alterations. In other words, environmental factors affect leadership beliefs. One democratic state level variable that cannot be examined in one country is institutional variation, unless significant institutional variation occurs. The case of the US reveals that the increasing power of the presidency led to abuses under Nixon based on characteristics of the belief set. This suggests
Shevardnadze became Regan and Shultz’s counterparts. So as to not act loosely with the framework utilized here, I stuck with 1982, even though it could be argued that 1984 or 1985 could be better selections for distinguishing between Regan I and Reagan II.
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that the institutional powers of the executive can impact the ability of leaders to implement their policy preferences. Comparative politics has long examined the affect of democratic institutional variation on policy outputs. Of particular interest, in light of this research, is the degree of institutional power held by the executive branch. Lijphart (1999) finds that executive power concentrations can affect domestic policy in significant ways. The question becomes to what degree do institutional variations across democracies influence foreign policy outputs? This is the question to which this research now turns. Appendix Appendix Table 3.1: MID data for individual administration belief sets. Initial Total Number of Number of MID Administration Number of Instigated Dyads with other Belief Sets MID dyads/ MID dyads/ Democracies/ Average per Average per Average per Year Year Year Truman I 2/1 1 / .5 0/0 Truman II 3/1 0/0 0/0 Truman III 5 / 1.67 1 / 0.33 0/0 Eisenhower 35 / 4.38 14 / 1.75 3 / 0.38 Kennedy/Johnson 41 / 5.13 16 / 2 0/0 Nixon/Ford 27 / 3.38 13 / 1.63 4 / 0.50 Carter I 11 / 3.67 2 / 0.67 1 / 0.33 Carter II 3/3 2/2 0/0 Reagan I 12 / 6 7 / 3.5 0/0 Reagan II 31 / 5.17 13 / 2.17 1 / 0.17 Bush 11 / 2.75 6 / 1.5 2 / 0.50
Number of Instigated MIDs with Other Democracies/ Average per Year 0/0 0/0 0/0 3 / 0.38 0/0 3 / 0.38 0/0 0/0 0/0 1 / 0.17 1 / 0.25
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Chapter 4 Do Institutional Structures Affect the Foreign Policy of Democracies? Much has been written regarding whether democracies are inherently more pacific than other governmental systems. Although supporters of democratic peace theory acknowledge that democracies can be aggressive towards non-democracies, they argue that the evidence suggests that democracies do not fight one another (Singer and Small, 1976; Doyle, 1983; Moaz and Russett, 1993; Russett, 1993). Others are less certain. Their arguments include (1) crisis situations demonstrate that democracies can be aggressive towards other democracies (Layne, 1994), (2) the statistical methods of supporters of democratic peace are flawed (Spiro, 1994), (3) the reason why democracies may not fight each other is because of shared social identity rather than the inherent traits of democratic systems (Risse Kappen, 1995; Hermann and Kegley, 1995), (4) young democracies are inherently unstable and therefore are more prone to aggressive foreign policies (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995), and (5) cases of democracies fighting one another do exist but are hidden by a narrow definition of democracy such as in the War of 1812, the Spanish-American War, or Imperial Germany and World War I (Oren, 1995; Peceny, 1997). To address the definitional criticism, Owen (1994) suggests that it is not democracy that prevents wars between democracies, but rather liberalism within democracies. In other words, it is cultural liberalism that helps prevent aggressive foreign policies, not just simply democratic procedures. From this point of view, illiberal democracies (i.e. democracies that limit participation and civil rights and lack institutions that promote equality) can be more prone to militarized interstate disputes. Moreover, from a theoretical perspective, Owen is suggesting that rather than focusing on interactions between democracies, we need to look inside the “black box”.
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This research looks inside the black box and focuses on procedural democracy and its effect on foreign policy outcomes. Procedural democracy refers to the institutional structures and procedural norms of democracies. As we know, the style and form of democracy varies from state to state. Although liberal cultural values may impact institutions and processes, the objective here is to investigate if variation in democratic institutional structures contributes to variation in foreign policy outputs. In fact, there are theoretically intriguing reasons to believe procedural democracy influences policy rather than simply being representative of liberal cultural values. Lijphart, in Patterns of Democracy (1999), suggests that there are two ideal types of democracies: consensus and majoritarian. He finds evidence that suggests that while both consensus and majoritarian democracies possess relatively equal potential for effective decisionmaking, consensus democracies are inherently more democratic (i.e. liberal in a current rather than classical sense). Lijphart finds that consensus democracies are more likely to have extensive welfare states, protect the environment more effectively, put fewer people in prison, be more generous in giving aid to developing countries, have less corruption, have less disparity between the classes, provide a fuller complement of women’s rights, and be more generally focused on equality. Consensual democracies are characterized by inclusiveness, bargaining, and compromise. 362 The majoritarian model of democracy, on the other hand, is exclusive, competitive, and adversarial. 363 These traits suggest that majoritarian democracies may be more likely to be illiberal (i.e. try to stifle rather than accommodate opposition) and therefore, according to Owen, more prone to pursue aggressive foreign policies. With all this in mind, the
362 363
Lijphart 1999, 2. Ibid, 2.
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primary question of this research is the following: Are majoritarian democracies more prone to interstate conflict than consensus democracies? Democratic peace theory has had, on the whole, an implicit tendency to neglect institutional variation within democracies. The research here seeks to address this shortcoming by applying a monadic approach to understanding the foreign policy of democracies. More specifically, this effort tests to see if the institutional structures of democracies as dichotomized by Lijphart affect foreign policy outcomes. The evidence indicates that consensus democracies are less prone to militarized interstate disputes than majoritarian democracies, which suggests that institutional structures do indeed affect foreign policy outcomes. To make this case, several steps are taken. The first section reveals how this project fits into a larger theoretical framework regarding democratic peace and political institutions. Accordingly, the discussion lays out the theoretical background of this research. The second section states the hypotheses under investigation and discusses the research methods that are employed. The third section reviews the statistical results, which generally support the hypotheses. These findings suggest that institutions do constrain foreign policy decision-making which, in turn, leads to less conflictual outputs. Why does this research matter? To begin, the research endeavors to add to the theoretical debate regarding democratic peace theory. The evidence provided here suggests the conditions under which democracies are more likely to pursue cooperative foreign policies. In other words, adding democratic institutional structures and procedures to the equation adds specification and conditionality to democratic peace theory. The findings also indicate that institutions contribute to cultural liberalism, suggesting both work in tandem to contribute to the pacific qualities of
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states. In addition, the research incorporates both international relations and comparative theory in a manner that brings these separate but related fields of study together in an original and concise manner. It is hoped that this analysis will help spawn new research that contributes to the growing body of conflict and cooperation literature which addresses all three levels of analysis (see Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Risse-Kappen, 1991; Owen, 1994; Hermann and Kegley, 1996; Braumoeller, 1997; Auerswald, 1999; Gaubatz, 1999; Palmer, London, and Regan, 2004). Finally, the research has implications for the post-Cold War era in which we have witnessed the spread of democracy. The move towards democracy during this period is not necessarily a one-way street. The ebbs and flows of establishing democracy can lead to both successes and setbacks. For instance, Mansfield and Snyder (1994) find that incipient democracies are particularly prone to militarized interstate disputes. The findings here suggest potential institutional remedies for states experiencing difficulties in the transformation to democracy. Moreover, considering one of the foreign policy objectives of the U.S. is the Wilsonian goal of promoting democracy abroad, this contribution cannot be understated. To understand this, one need look no further than the current situations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 364 The findings provide evidence that supports the proposition that if the goal of US foreign policy is to establish a peaceful international environment by promoting democracy, new and newly forming democracies would best be served by the establishment of consensual democratic institutions and procedures.
364
The fact that Iraq has such sharp and distinct social cleavages suggests that, based on this research and Lijphart’s findings, Iraq is a case where consensual institutions should be developed
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Theoretical Framework A great deal of debate revolves around democratic peace theory and, despite the contentions of supporters, a consensus about the theory’s propositions has yet to develop in the academic community. The disagreements and opposing findings suggest that we must still investigate the causal relationship between peace and democracy. Inherent in the propositions of democratic peace theory is that the characteristics of democracies are homogenous. Palmer, London, and Regan (2004) among others (see Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Risse-Kappen, 1991; Owen, 1994; Hermann and Kegley, 1996; Braumoeller, 1997; Auerswald, 1999; Gaubatz, 1999), however, demonstrate that democracies are quite heterogeneous. Mansfield and Snyder (1995) also find variations in democracies and argue that the age of a democracy can affect foreign policy. They suggest that although older, more stable democracies may tend to have more peaceful relations with other democracies, younger democracies or states in the process of democratic transition (i.e. anocracies) may actually be more prone to war because of latent domestic circumstances or as a means of distracting the public from the problems associated with establishing democratic institutions. Others, such as Oren (1995) and Peceny (1997), examine definitional problems with democratic peace theory. Oren suggests that our estimation of democracy is too ethnocentric in that U.S. democracy is the standard to which all other states are compared. Peceny argues that in the case of the Spanish-American War, the image constructed by policy makers and the press of Spain as an imperialistic, despotic force rather than a semi-democratic state contributed to U.S. foreign policy. In other words, Oren and Peceny make note of the fact that the very meaning of democracy is contested and is flexible and permanently open to interpretation. As Chan (1997,
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65) notes, “The various rating schemes that have been used to assess democracy have been criticized for being subjective, ethnocentric, inconsistent, incomplete, and biased”. It is argued here that one of the reasons for this great debate relates to how democracies are viewed by adherents to democratic peace theory. By viewing all democracies as institutionally and procedurally similar, institutional variations that could affect foreign policy outcomes are ignored. In short, democratic peace theory is underspecified. Owen (1994), I believe, provides some guidance for address this theoretical shortcoming. He argues that democracies should be dichotomized as liberal and illiberal democracies. Owen suggests that liberal democracies are more likely to have pacific foreign policies while illiberal democracies are more likely to pursue aggressive foreign policies. So how do we distinguish between liberal and illiberal democracies? The answer is that we have to take a second look at the monadic hypothesis and peer inside the black box. Comparative theory has found that patterns of variation exist among advanced, industrialized democracies. For instance, Obinger and Wagschal (2001) examine Castles’ four families of nations (i.e. English-speaking, Continental, Scandinavian, and Southern Europe) with respect to public policy-making and find that, “For two policy fields—social and economic—the hypothesized families of nations can be shown to exist, and they are robust and stable over time”. 365 Siaroff (1999) develops a measure of corporatism based on the degree of economic integration between the private and public sectors that successfully categorizes states in a manner “which is clearly linear and has no problem cases”. 366 Findings such as these suggest that variation does exist among advanced democracies. Employing a comparative approach, Arend Lijphart (1999) develops a dichotomous typology of democracies. The two ideal democratic
365 366
Obinger and Wagschal 2001, 99. Siaroff 1999, 175.
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models are majoritarian (Westminster) and consensus (consociational) democracies. The primary categorical devices he utilizes are the executive-party and federal-unitary dimensions. Five differences exist on the executive-party dimension (for all five, traits of majoritarian democracies are listed first): 1. Concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets versus executive power-sharing in broad multiparty coalitions. 2. Executive-legislative relationships in which the executive is dominant versus executivelegislative balance of power. 3. Two-party versus multiparty systems. 4. Majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems versus proportional representation. 5. Pluralist interest group systems with a free-for-all competition among groups versus coordinated and “corporatist” interest group systems aimed at compromise and concertation. Five measures also exist on the federal-unitary dimension (once again, majoritarian traits are listed first): 6. Unitary and centralized government versus federal and decentralized governments. 7. Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature versus division of legislative power between two equally strong but differently constituted houses. 8. Flexible constitutions that can be amended by simple majorities versus rigid constitutions that can be changed only by extraordinary majorities. 9. Systems in which legislatures have the final word on the constitutionality of their own legislation versus systems in which laws are subject to a judicial review of their constitutionality by supreme or constitutional courts.
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10. Central banks are dependent on the executive versus independent central banks. 367 He finds that general patterns do exist across democracies based on institutional and procedural structures. In general “the majoritarian model of democracy is exclusive, competitive, and adversarial, whereas the consensus model is characterized by inclusiveness, bargaining, and compromise”. 368 Lijphart finds that not only are consensus democracies the equal of majoritarian democracies regarding decision-making (an oft-cited criticism of consensus democracies), they are also more likely to develop policies that adhere to the democratic principles of equality in outcomes and justice for all. Lijphart’s work has spawned research and debate regarding the relationship between institutional and procedural structures and domestic outcomes. Crepaz (1996, 4) finds that consensus institutions “have favorable effects on unemployment, inflation, and the number of working days lost, whereas economic growth remains unaffected”. Armingeon (2002) agrees with Crepaz’s findings, but disputes Lijphart’s argument that consensus democracies are ‘better, gentler and kinder’ than Westminster democracies. He finds the two systems to be rough equivalents, but does suggest that the economic benefits and the expansive reach of the welfare state lends credence to the notion that majoritarian systems should not be forced upon fledgling democracies. Lijphart (2002) responded to Armingeon’s critique by noting that corporatism and consociationalism can be viewed as similar, hence undermining Armingeon’s argument, and that, at the end of the day, they are not as far apart as Armingeon suggests. Lijphart’s typology, as is
367 368
Lijphart 1999, 3-4. Ibid, 2.
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the case with all typologies, is based on ideal types. Yet he does successfully groups 36 states for the purpose of empirically examining policy outcomes. 369 Why would we expect internal procedures to matter? The answer, I suggest, relies on two interrelated factors that determine the distribution of power consistent with institutional structures and procedure, namely, electoral processes and the nature of the executive. Multiparty electoral systems with proportional representation often result in coalition governments that, by nature, lead to wider dispersions of power within the executive. In two-party, winnertake-all systems, however, power is structurally more concentrated in the executive. Lijphart (1999, 2) makes note of these conditions when he states that, “The majoritarian model concentrates power in the hands of a bare majority—and often even merely a plurality instead of a majority…whereas the consensus model tries to share, disperse, and limit power in a variety of ways”. Upon closer examination, it becomes clear that the concentration of power, lack of veto points, and competitive/adversarial nature of majoritarian systems can contribute to potential abuse of power based on the narrow concerns of the executive. In other words, majoritarian systems may create conditions that allow for the first level of analysis to significantly affect foreign policy outputs. This situation, in turn, can affect foreign policy outputs. Mayer (1969) argues that domestic politics can be a source of war. Elites may choose to pursue aggressive foreign policies and/or war as a means to limit political resistance at home. As he notes “(The) decision (to go to war) is made by political actors and classes who at critical moments look at the dual field of domestic and international politics”. 370 Hagan (1994) explores the link between
369
Interestingly, Flinders 2005 uses Lijphart’s typology as a basis to assess constitutional reform in Britain under the Labour Party from 1997-2005 and finds that despite minor moves towards consensualism, the British system remains majoritarian. 370 Mayer 1969, 291.
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regime structure and war proneness and suggests that domestic political constraints are a “highly variable phenomenon” for democracies as well as other regime types. Moreover, he argues that leadership varies and how leaders view the international environment affects the policies they pursue. So it is fairly clear that variation exists in democracy, political constraints, and leadership. As discussed above, consensus institutional structures appear to constrain leadership more than majoritarian structures. Hence, if leaders rise to power in majoritarian systems that view the international environment as inescapably dangerous and are experiencing political turmoil at home, they will be more likely to implement aggressive foreign policies than in similar cases in consensus democracies. Lijphart also suggests that consensus institutions help develop political cultures that are kinder and gentler and this could affect foreign policy as well. As he states, “In the field of foreign policy, one might plausibly expect the kind and gentle characteristics of consensus democracy to be manifested by generosity in foreign aid and a reluctance to rely on military power”. 371 With all this in mind, there are reasons to believe that consensus democracies are more likely to be what Owen’s calls liberal democracies while majoritarian democracies are more likely to tend towards being illiberal. Hypotheses and Methods As suggested by Lijphart, two measures for determining the aggressiveness of state policy is the propensity to use military force and generosity in foreign aid. The most obvious measure of foreign policy aggressiveness is the propensity to use military force. Majoritarian systems concentrate power in the executive and therefore provide a greater opportunity for leaders to implement militarized foreign policies. Consensual systems, on the other hand,
371
Lijphart 1999, 298.
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provide institutional constraints that limit executive independence. Accordingly, the first hypothesis for this research design is as follows: •
Hypothesis 1: Majoritarian democracies and majoritarianism on the executive-parties dimension are more likely to be related to involvement in militarized interstate disputes than consensus democracies and consensualism on the executive-parties dimension. The sample countries include 23 of the 36 countries used by Lijphart. 372 The countries
were selected in part because of their level of economic development in order to limit potential traveling problems based on economic performance, hence the focus on OECD countries. Moreover, the selection process was also based on the potential of states to be involved in militarized disputes. Therefore, states that have tendencies to avoid disputes, often territorially smaller states, were omitted from the sample. 373 In addition, the data used here provides enough cases for the sample countries, which also addresses the small n problem. The data utilized here is the Militarized Interstates Disputes (MID) data (Bremer, 1996). Because it includes wars and militarized disputes (conflicts that involve the threat of military action), this data set provides a larger universe of cases than are contained in the Correlates of War (COW) data set which only contains wars. Moreover, the propensity to resort to the military option, even in cases short of war, does provide a good indication of foreign policy aggressiveness. The sample countries are divided into four categories based on Lijphart’s findings: majoritarian democracies, consensus democracies, mixed systems that are majoritarian on the executive parliamentary-dimension (Mixed EP-Maj), and mixed systems that are consensus on the executive-parliamentary dimension (Mixed EP-Con). Table 4.1 shows where the countries
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Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 373 For an additional factor that contributed to the sample selection, see footnote 8.
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Table 4.1. Categorization of democracy based on Lijphart’s executive-parties and federal-unitary dimensions.
Consensus Traits: Federal-Unitary Dimension
Majoritarian Traits: Federal-Unitary Dimension
Mixed Democracies (EP-Maj)
Consensus Democracies
Australia Canada Spain United States
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Switzerland
Majoritarian Democracies
Mixed Democracies (EP-Con)
France Greece New Zealand United Kingdom
Majoritarian Traits: Executive-Parties Dimension
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Norway, Portugal, Sweden
Consensus Traits: Executive-Parties Dimension
fit in the categorization strategy. Of Lijphart’s two dimensions, because it contains the executive branch which tends to be a critical element in foreign policy decision-making, the executiveparties is most associated with foreign policy. The theoretical prospects for both mixed systems, therefore, are based on the concentration of power in the executive, which explains why I focus on the executive-parties dimension. In other words, the executive-parliamentary dimension has a much more significant role in foreign policy outputs than the federal-unitary dimension. Yet the inclusion of the mixed systems allows for comparisons of these unique institutional systems with each other and majoritarian and consensus states. The expectations are that executive power and conflict-proneness are positively related, therefore, when executive-parliamentary power sharing is tilted in favor of the executive (i.e. EPMaj), conflictual foreign policies are more likely. Moreover, since both mixed systems contain some majoritarian and consensus structures, it is also expected that the results for the mixed
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systems will rest between majoritarianism and consensualism in an ordinal fashion. In short, both mixed systems will be less likely to be involved in militarized disputes than majoritarian systems and more likely than consensus systems. Hence, Hypotheses 2 and 3 are as follows: •
Hypothesis 2: Mixed democracies (EP-Maj) are more likely than mixed democracies (EP-Con) to be involved in militarized interstate disputes.
•
Hypothesis 3: The expectations are that the association between democracy types and the MID data will be ranked (1) consensus democracies, (2) mixed democracies (EP-Con), (3) mixed democracies (EP-Maj), (4) majoritarian democracies. Two time periods are tested. The first period is from 1950-1992. Yet, during this period
some states had yet to establish democratic institutions. Therefore, additional analyses are added for a second time period, 1977-1992. During this period, all the sample countries are classified as full democracies. Not only will this allow for comparisons between the two tests, the Cold War can be judged to be less of a factor in affecting the results due to extended periods of détente and the recognition that divisions existed among communist countries. The research includes simple counts of disputes as well as time-series-cross-section analysis to test the hypotheses. Because of the potential influence of intervening variables, counts simply are not enough to confirm the hypotheses. Accordingly, time-series-cross-section analysis is included in this research to control for the effect of such variables. The statistical tests for both periods, however, involve identical methodological techniques. The model contains potential intervening variables that may affect foreign policy, namely state size, population, gross domestic product (GDP), geographic contiguity, and alliances. 374 The geographic size of a state could affect the propensity to choose militarized answers to international problems simply because larger states have a greater capacity for projecting force. 374
See Appendix II for construction of variables.
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This factor was taken into consideration when selecting the sample to avoid aberrations brought on by smaller states included in Lijphart’s sample. Moreover, state size can be the result of expansionist tendencies of states. Hence, policy legacies may influence a state’s behavior in the international environment. Population can also be a resource of the strong, hence influencing foreign policy behavior. Economic resources may affect the ability to engage in interstate conflicts, therefore, GDP is included in the model. Geographic contiguity must also be addressed. Simply put, the closer states are to one another, the greater the potential that they will be involved in disputes. Accordingly, geographic proximity is included in the model. In order to address island states, this variable is based on conflicts where states share borders as well as conflicts between states where a body of water of less than two hundred miles rests between the countries. 375 Finally, alliances have to be considered. This step can help address the bipolar conditions established during the Cold War. Interestingly, Jones et al (1996, 163) finds that “most disputes begin and end as one-on-one confrontations, and this tendency is stronger in the current period than in the past”. This finding suggests that alliances may not be as problematic as one might think. Despite this, alliances are included in the model and controlled through two variables. The first is a dummy variable based on whether a state did or did not belong to NATO. The second variable is the number of military alliances to which a state is party. The time-series-cross-section analysis consists of two groups of four tests. The first group measures democracy by collapsing majoritarian democracies and mixed democracies (EPMaj) into one variable based on majoritarianism. Similarly, consensus democracies are 375
Two hundred miles is selected as the distance based on the contention that states often consider waters two hundred miles from their shores to be their economic territorial waters. One exception is included in the dataset, namely the disputes between Britain and Iceland. The reasoning for their inclusion is that although the two countries are more than two hundred miles apart, their disputes over use of the North Atlantic are clearly based on their proximity to one another.
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combined with mixed democracies (EP-Con) to create a consensus variable. Because of the above-mentioned association between executives and foreign policy, this makes theoretical sense. The majoritarian dummy is then added to the model to test if majoritarianism is statistically related to conflict-proneness for both time periods. The statistical model for these analyses, which tests Hypothesis 1, is as follows: •
Pr (militarized interstate disputes) = β0 + β1(majoritarianism) + β2(population) + β3(size/sq.km.) + β4(GDP) + β5(number of alliances) + β6(NATO) + β7(geographic contiguity) The model is tested a second time for both time periods with the addition of dummy
variables for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel. The decision is based on the United States and the United Kingdoms role as great powers in international affairs. Israel is added because of its uniquely conflictual position in the Middle East. This step helps control for the influence of these outlier states. The second group of four analyses includes an ordinal democratic variable (majoritarian scale) is constructed according to the expectations of Hypothesis 3. The model for two of these tests includes the control variables elaborated on earlier and is as follows: •
Pr (militarized interstate disputes) = β0 + β1(majoritarian scale) + β2(population) + β3(size/sq.km.) + β4(GDP) + β5(number of alliances) + β6(NATO) + β7(geographic contiguity) The other two tests of this group of four include the dummy variables for the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Israel for the reasons discussed above. Association with MIDs, however, is only one measure of conflict-proneness. Additional methods, therefore, are added to complement the above analyses to further investigate the
219
hypotheses. To understand more fully how aggressive the foreign policies of democracies are, we need to know the direction of the disputes. In other words, who is starting the MIDs involving democracies? If democracies are merely responding to the hostile actions of other states, then their involvement in disputes is more likely to be defensive rather than aggressive in nature. To address the issue, this research utilizes dyadic analyses of MIDs for 1950-1992 that allow for counts of MIDs instigated with both democracies and non-democracies and logit analysis to assess dispute instigation. Therefore, examining dyads enables a second swipe at the above hypotheses from the perspective of dispute instigation and democratic peace theory’s dyadic hypothesis. Additionally, the logit analysis includes a variable for anocracy and, hence provides a brief test of anocratic theory. 376 Finally, generosity in foreign aid is a measure of cooperation at the international level. As mentioned above, Lijphart and Bowman (1999), when examining foreign assistance as an indirect test of democratic peace theory, find that consensualism and foreign aid are positively related. This research seeks further confirmation of this finding with a brief analysis of recent developments in state generosity. Hypothesis 4 outlines the expectations. •
Hypothesis 4: Consensus democracies will devote a larger percentage of state GDP to Official Development Assistance than majoritarian democracies. The sample countries are 21 of the same 23 examined above (Israel and Iceland are
omitted from OECD data). In order to investigate foreign aid as a measure of the pacific tendencies of states, military aid should not be included. 377 The measure of foreign aid used here
376
Although full investigation of the anocratic perspectives is not performed here so as to not divert from the primary research questions, some statistical evidence is provided that does confirm the expectations of this literature. 377 An interesting idea for future research would be to test if majoritarian democracies are more likely to devote a larger percentage of state revenue towards military aid than consensus democracies. The disproportionate level of investment in the development of arms, however, would hamstring such an approach. Simply put, a very few number of states produces the vast majority of weaponry (with the U.S. being by far the largest investor in arms).
220
is Official Development Assistance (ODA) obtained from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) data. 378 These data exclude military aid. It is important to note that the ODA measure utilized here is based on the percentage of state GDP rather than actual dollar figures. This step will help prevent aberrations based on total dollars. Very wealthy countries may donate large amounts of funding that is only a tiny fraction of state productivity while less wealthy countries may donate a relatively small amount in aid in actual dollars, but this amount may be a proportionally greater amount of GDP. In short, the percentage of state GDP devoted to ODA is a better measure than total dollars. In sum, the four hypotheses presented here fit neatly into the theoretical framework presented above and the statistical models developed for investigating the hypotheses are appropriate matches for the nature of the data. Results MID Counts To begin, I first turn to counts of militarized interstate disputes for the sample countries based on the MID data. The tallies are presented in Table 4.2. The results provide the opportunity for an initial discussion of the hypotheses. The data, based on total number of MIDs, support the expectations of Hypothesis 1. Majoritarian democracies have been involved in more militarized interstate disputes than consensus democracies for both time periods. For 1950-1992, majoritarian democracies averaged 36 MIDs while consensus democracies averaged only 16.29. Majoritarian democracies were also more likely to be involved in militarized interstate disputes during the 1977-1992 period. Even when the modes are dropped, majoritarian
378
The sample for all the analyses was affected by this measure because of availability of data, or lack thereof, and the fact that the remaining 13 states tended not to have the resources to contribute ODA during the period under investigation. This factor was taken into consideration during the selection of the sample in order to maintain as consistent a sample as possible for the entire study.
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Table 4.2. Listing of MID counts for four types of democracy. 1950-1992
Total MIDs
Average # MIDs
Number of States
Mode
Average # of Disputes Minus Mode 10.83
Consensus 114 16.29 7 Japan = 49 Democracies Majoritarian 144 36 4 UK = 76 22.67 Democracies Mixed 170 21.25 8 Israel = 104 9.43 Democracies (EP-Con) Mixed 215 53.85 4 US = 176 13 Democracies (EP-Maj) 1977-1992 XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXX X Consensus 43 6.14 7 Japan = 14 4.83 Democracies Majoritarian 57 14.25 4 France = 24 11 Democracies Mixed 40 5 8 Israel = 20 2.86 Democracies (EP-Con) Mixed 89 22.25 4 US = 68 7 Democracies (EP-Maj) democracies are still more likely to be involved in international disputes than consensus democracies.
Hypothesis 2 is also supported by the data. For 1950-1992, mixed democracies (EP-Maj) averaged 53.85 MIDs in comparison to the mixed democracies (EP-Con) average of 21.29 while for the period of 1977-1992 mixed democracies (EP-Maj) averaged over four times as many MIDs as mixed democracies (EP-Con). These findings provide preliminary evidence that leadership can affect the level of interstate conflict in that power is more concentrated in the executive in mixed democracies (EP-Maj) institutional structures.
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The results do not fully support Hypothesis 3. Except for mixed democracies (EP-Con) during 1950-1992, the findings for both mixed systems do not rest in between the totals for consensus and majoritarian democracy. One might suspect that Israel and the United States are outliers due to their unique positions in the world, yet when the mode countries for each type of democracy are dropped, mixed democracies (EP-Con) still remain outside of the range between consensus and majoritarian democracies. This suggests two things. First, the fact that dropping the United States allows for mixed democracies (EP-Maj) to fall within the expected range between majoritarian and consensus democracies suggests that the uniquely powerful status of the United States skews the results for this ideal type of democracy. One could argue, however, that it is theoretically plausible to drop the United States as an outlier because of its unique position during the Cold War. If this assumption is accepted, then it could be argued the results do support Hypothesis 3. Second, although the average for mixed democracies (EP-Con) does rest in between the totals for the entire time period (1950-1992), the averages are below for 1977-1992 and for both periods when the modes are subtracted. While this does not support the exact specifications of Hypothesis 3, it does suggest that executive-parliamentary/leadership consensualism might indeed be a significant factor in reducing interstate conflict. After all, consensus democracies and mixed democracies (EP-Con) are clearly involved in fewer MIDs than both majoritarian democracies and mixed democracies (EP-Maj). This finding supports the most significant theoretical expectations of the framework presented here, namely that consensus democracies are more pacific than majoritarian democracies and concentration of power in the executive increases the potential for conflictual foreign policies.
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Table 4.3. Effects on militarized interstate disputes. Dependent variable is the total number of disputes per year, which includes new and continuing disputes. Democracy dichotomized with majoritarian dummy variable. *p < .05; **p > .01; ***p < .001 Variables
1950-1992 Coefficient (z value) 0.32 (1.42)
1950-1992 Coefficient (z value) 0.26** (2.63)
1977-1992 Coefficient (z value) 0.46* (2.27)
1977-1992 Coefficient (z value) 0.65*** (3.98)
Population
0.02*** (7.69)
0.01*** (3.61)
0.02*** (7.00)
0.01*** (3.93)
Size sq. km.
0.03 (0.73)
-0.02 (1.33)
0.03 (0.78)
-0.03 (-1.15)
-0.00* (-2.34)
-0.00* (-2.51)
-0.00** (-3.01)
-0.45** (-2.69)
-0.65*** (-4.00)
Majoritarianism
GDP
-0.00*** (-4.56)
Alliance #
0.02 (0.20)
0.08 (1.20)
NATO
0.40* (2.34)
0.20* (2.28)
0.81*** (3.82)
0.89*** (5.04)
0.92*** (25.09)
0.88*** (22.75)
1.04*** (11.89)
0.96*** (10.62)
USA dummy
---------------------
3.78*** (10.91)
---------------------
4.09*** (6.69)
UK dummy
---------------------
1.24*** (6.45)
---------------------
0.25 (0.80)
Israel dummy
---------------------
0.55* (2.27)
---------------------
0.34 (1.03)
0.03 (0.14)
-0.01 (-0.20)
0.13 (0.61)
-0.05 (-0.48)
0.70
0.77
0.65
0.73
.18778669
.01273294
.15185294
.06582166
Contiguity
Constant Overall R-sq rho
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Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis The findings for the first group of four tests, which includes the dummy variable for majoritarianism, are in Table 4.3. The results for the test of 1950-1992 without the dummy variables for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel only offers weak support for Hypothesis 1. The direction of the relationship between MID involvement and majoritarianism is in the expected direction, but is not statistically significant. In the second test of this time period, which includes the controls for the effects of the outlier states of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel (all of which are statistically related to MIDs) 379 , majoritarianism is associated with a greater likelihood of MID involvement. This finding provides stronger support for Hypothesis 1. The tests for 1977-1992, which is a better test of the effect of democracy on foreign policy since all the states are full democracies, confirm the expectations of Hypothesis 1. Without the state dummy variables, majoritarianism is statistically related to MID involvement at a .05 level of confidence. When the dummy variables are added, the relationship is even stronger with a .001 level of confidence. The analyses also reveal strong relationships between population size and geographic contiguity and MID involvement, particularly geographic contiguity. This comes as no surprise as proximity intuitively figures to be connected to militarized disputes. The finding regarding population suggests that state power affects state behavior. NATO membership is also related to MID involvement and the relationship becomes stronger during 1977-1992. The finding that NATO membership is associated with interstate conflicts does not come as a surprise, for NATO
379
Interestingly, the United Kingdom and Israel cease to be statistically related to MIDs during 1977-1992. This finding for the United Kingdom mirrors its diminishing role as a great power. As for Israel, one likely explanation is length of statehood. In other words, by 1977, Israel had successfully defended itself from states that sought its elimination.
225
Table 4.4. Effects on militarized interstate disputes. Dependent variable is the total number of disputes per year, which includes new and continuing disputes. Ordinal measure of democracy in majoritarian scale variable (consensus democracy = 1; mixed democracies EP-Con = 2; mixed democracies EP-Maj = 3; majoritarian democracies = 4). *p < .05; **p > .01; ***p < .001 Variables
1950-1992 Coefficient (z value) 0.21* (2.30)
1950-1992 Coefficient (z value) 0.11** (2.87)
1977-1992 Coefficient (z value) 0.25*** (3.25)
1977-1992 Coefficient (z value) 0.25*** (3.88)
Population
0.02*** (7.90)
0.01*** (4.33)
0.02*** (7.37)
0.01*** (4.58)
Size sq. km.
0.03 (0.92)
-0.01 (-0.78)
0.04 (1.19)
-0.00 (-0.15)
-0.00* (-2.49)
-0.00* (-2.53)
-0.00** (-3.15)
-0.46** (-2.75)
-0.63*** (-3.91)
Majoritarian Scale
GDP
-0.00*** (-4.74)
Alliance #
-0.00 (-0.06)
0.08 (1.32)
0.39* (2.31)
0.18* (2.18)
0.78*** (3.82)
0.87*** (4.92)
0.91*** (25.08)
0.87*** (22.64)
1.03*** (11.88)
0.96*** (10.53)
USA dummy
---------------------
3.62*** (11.31)
---------------------
3.68*** (6.03)
UK dummy
---------------------
1.20*** (6.56)
---------------------
0.18 (0.55)
Israel dummy
---------------------
0.52* (2.24)
---------------------
0.25 (0.75)
-0.65** (-2.86)
-0.18* (-1.97)
-0.73*** (-3.86)
-0.47** (-2.79)
0.71
0.77
0.67
0.73
.18972846
.00818472
.13306104
.06822177
NATO Contiguity
Constant Overall R-sq rho
226
was the counterbalance to the Warsaw Pact in the Cold War. As for why the relationship becomes stronger over time is the subject for future research, but two potential explanations could be the reactions of member democracies to the fits of the dying Soviet Union and more aggressive US leadership of NATO. The number of alliances to which democracies belong is not statistically significant for the entire time period, but is negatively related to MID involvement during 1977-1992. This suggests that alliance membership can, but not always, act as a deterrent. GDP, on the other hand, is consistently negatively related to MID involvement. This indicates that prosperous states may be inclined to avoid the negative economic ramifications associated with international conflicts. 380 I briefly discuss these findings for the control variables because they deserve mention, but full elaboration as to the results for the variables is beyond the scope of this study. The critical point is that they are included in the statistical model and majoritarianism is still related to involvement in MIDs. This, of course, supports the expectations of Hypothesis 1. The findings for the second set of four tests that include the ordinal majoritarian variable are in Table 4.4. 381 The majoritarian scale is found to be significant for all the tests. These results confirm Hypothesis 1, 2 and 3, especially Hypothesis 3 for which this test was designed. The findings suggest that moves towards consensualism are associated with more pacific foreign policy outcomes. Conversely, shifts toward majoritarianism are related to more conflictual foreign policies.
380
Other explanations might be that rich states can afford stronger armed forces and therefore wealth is a form of deterrent or that wealthier states are content with the international status quo. 381 The results for the control variables obviously are nearly identical to the first four analyses, hence they require no further discussion.
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Dyadic Analysis, Direction of Dispute, and Democratic Peace Theory’s Dyadic Hypothesis Having reviewed the results for the two time periods above, I now turn to dyadic analysis of the entire period (1950-1992) to determine the direction of disputes and assess the theoretical assertions of democratic peace theory and anocratic studies within the framework of this research. Accordingly, Hypotheses 1-3 remain the primary foci of discussion. Dyadic analysis captures MID dimensions that allow for further investigation. It enables an examination of counts and direction of all MID dyads and MID dyads involving other democracies. The process provides the opportunity to test the hypotheses as well as address issues involving democratic peace theory’s dyadic thesis. The results for the analysis are in Table 4.5. The findings for total number of MID dyads support Hypothesis 1. Majoritarian democracies averaged over twice as many MID dyads as consensus democracies. Moreover, when comparing total MIDs from Table 1 and total number of MID dyads, we find that consensus democracies have 11 more dyads than straight counts of MIDs while majoritarian democracies have 33 more dyads. This indicates that MIDs involving majoritarian democracies are more likely to be broader in scope than those involving consensus democracies. Hypothesis 2 is also supported by the results. Mixed democracies (EP-Maj) were a part of well over twice as many MID dyads as mixed democracies (EP-Con). In addition, when comparing total MIDs from Table 1 and total number of MID dyads, mixed democracies (EPMaj) have 45 more dyads than counts in comparison to 24 more dyads for mixed democracies (EP-Con) indicating that MIDs including mixed democracies (EP-Maj) are likely to involve more states than those including mixed democracies (EP-Con). This suggests that the
228
Table 4.5. Dyadic analysis of MID data assessing the number and direction of disputes and the dyadic hypothesis Democracy Type
Total number of MID dyads / Average per sample country
Number of instigated MIDs / Average per sample country
Consensus Democracies Majoritarian Democracies Mixed Democracies EP-Con Mixed Democracies EP-Maj
125 / 17.86
19 / 2.71
Number of MID dyads with other democracies / Average per sample country 44 / 6.29
Number of Percentage instigated of MIDs as MIDs with instigator other with other democracies / democracy Average per sample country 8 / 1.29 21%
177 / 44.25
62 / 15.5
55 / 13.75
20 / 5
36%
194 / 24.25
83 / 10.38
55 / 6.88
29 / 3.63
53%
260 / 65
104 / 26
82 / 20.5
38 / 9.5
46%
institutional structure of the executive affect foreign policy outcomes and that leadership, within these structures, can play a powerful role in determining state behavior. Hypothesis 3, on the other hand, is only partially confirmed through examination of total MID dyads. The results for mixed democracies (EP-Con) do rest between majoritarian and consensus democracies. The totals for mixed democracies (EP-Maj), however, were the largest of all democracy types. Once again, the extraordinary role of the United States in world affairs apparently affects these outcomes. Yet this also suggests that concentrated power within the executive can contribute to more aggressive foreign policies. The analyses to this point have only looked at involvement in MIDs or MID dyads. The obvious next question becomes, ‘What is the direction of the dispute?’. Certainly a state cannot be viewed as excessively dispute-prone if they do not instigate the disputes. Clearly it is relevant to know which side is the aggressor. Examination of the direction of the disputes provides evidence, once again, supporting Hypothesis 1. Majoritarian democracies instigated over five 229
times as many MIDs as consensus democracies. Hypothesis 2 is also supported with mixed democracies (EP-Maj) instigating well over twice as many MIDs as mixed democracies (EPCon). Hypothesis 3, yet again, is only partially supported by the evidence. The number of instigated disputes for mixed democracies (EP-Con) do rest between majoritarian and consensus democracies while mixed democracies (EP-Maj) do not. As discussed directly above, the explanations most likely rest on the role of the United States and concentration of power in the executive. Turning to democratic peace theory’s dyadic hypothesis, it can be seen that democracies do become involved in MIDs with other democracies. This demonstrates Russett’s (1993) wisdom in noting that it is best to argue that democracies rarely, rather than never, engage in wars with other democracies. In fact, it could be suggested that ‘less often’ might even be more appropriate than ‘rarely’, at least in the case of MIDs. 382 The numbers provide support for Hypothesis 1, with majoritarian democracies averaging 13.75 MIDs with other democracies in comparison to 6.29 for consensus democracies. The same holds true for Hypothesis 2, with mixed democracies (EP-Maj) averaging 20.5 MIDs and mixed democracies (EP-Con) averaging only 6.88. The evidence, however, only partially supports Hypothesis 3. Mixed democracies (EPCon) do rest between majoritarian and consensus democracies while mixed democracies (EPMaj) do not. As has been consistently the case, mixed democracies (EP-Maj) continue to average the most MIDs. Although this does not completely support Hypothesis 3, this, in conjunction with the findings for consensus democracies, does suggest that constrained executive institutional structures can contribute to better relations with other democracies hence provide support for to Doyle’s institutional explanation for the democratic peace. 382
Russett was referring to wars, not MIDs, when he suggested the use of the word ‘rarely’.
230
A review of the number of instigated MIDs with other democracies provided additional confirmation of Hypothesis 1. Majoritarian democracies averaged five instigated disputes with other democracies (36% of all disputes with democracies) while consensus democracies averaged only 1.29 (21% of all MIDs with democracies). The evidence also largely supports Hypothesis 2, with mixed democracies (EP-Maj) averaging 9.5 instigated MIDs with other democracies (46% of all MIDs with democracies) in comparison to 3.63 (53% of all MIDs with other democracies) for mixed democracies (EP-Con). Interestingly, mixed democracies (EPCon) initiate over half of the MIDs involving other democracies. Although this does go against expectations, the fact that they are involved in far fewer MIDs with other democracies than mixed democracies (EP-Maj) indicates a degree of support for Hypothesis 2. The general pattern for Hypothesis 3 appears again as we find that the data for mixed democracies (EP-Con) fitting between and mixed democracies (EP-Maj) resting above the range provided by majoritarian and consensus democracies, at least in terms of averages per sample country. The same culprits come to mind of course, namely the United States and concentrated executive power. The final test is a logit analysis of the direction of dispute to assess the association of governmental institutional structures and dispute instigation. The results are in table 4.6. The relationship between consensus democracy and instigation is powerful and in the expected direction. Majoritarian democracies are also negatively associated with instigation, but this relationship is not as strong, hence providing support for hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 is not confirmed, but the results for mixed democracies (EP-Con) are only approaching significance, which suggests we are limited in ascribing too much value to this finding. Doing so runs the obvious risk of a false negative. Accordingly, not much can be said of Hypothesis 2. In addition, all that can be said of Hypothesis 3 is that mixed democracies (EP-Maj) fall outside of
231
Table 4.6: Dyadic logit analysis of dispute instigators. Classification system based on Polity III dataset and research sample; disputes drawn from MID dataset. *Autocracies: = or < -7 on polity scale. *Anocracies: = or >-6 and = or < 6 on polity scale. Dispute Instigator Autocracies Anocracies Consensus Democracies Majoritarian Democracies Mixed Democracies EP-Con Mixed Democracies EP-Maj
z
P> z
1.49 4.27 -6.44 -3.32 -1.58 -2.50
0.135 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.113 0.012
the range between majoritarian and consensus democracies, a result that, considering the earlier analyses, comes as no surprise. Interestingly, however, the analysis does indicate that anocracies are positively associated with instigation of MIDs, and the relationship is statistically significant. This supports Mansfield and Snyder’s (1995) assertion that anocracies are particularly likely to start conflicts. The association between autocracies and instigation is in the right direction, but is not statistically significant. Although the findings do not allow for any strong conclusions to be made of autocracies, clearly democracies are associated with a lack of instigating MIDs providing evidence, if somewhat limited, in support of the monadic hypothesis. Foreign Aid Foreign aid, as mentioned above, is an indication of liberal internationalism and attitudes towards cooperation. Accordingly, measures of foreign aid address Owen’s expectations for liberal and illiberal democracies as well as the political orientation of leadership within a state towards international cooperation. Table 7 contains the averages of Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a percentage of GNP for 2000-2003. This cursory glance at ODA supports the expectations of Hypothesis 4. Consensus democracies, on average, do provide more
232
Table 4.7. Average Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a percentage of state GNP for 2000-2003 for four democracy types. Appendix contains numbers for individual countries. Israel and Iceland omitted. *Averages based on OECD data. Democracy Type Consensus Democracies Majoritarian Democracies Mixed Democracies (EP-Con) Mixed Democracies (EP-Maj)
Average ODA as Percentage of GNP, 20002003 0.357 0.281 0.587 0.222
generous contributions for developmental assistance than majoritarian democracies. Moreover, consensus democracies and mixed democracies (EP-Con) average a higher percentage of GNP for ODA that majoritarian democracies and mixed democracies (EP-Maj). This provides evidence in support of the notion that leadership and executive institutional structures can be central factors in the determination of state foreign policy. It is worth mentioning the fact that the highest average belongs to mixed democracies (EP-Con) for an additional theoretical reason. As noted under the table, Israel and Iceland are not included in the data, hence giving mixed democracies (EP-Con) a strong Scandinavian flavor. This suggests that Castles (1993) is on to something regarding the Scandinavian family of nations and that the numbers most likely would drop somewhat with the inclusion of the missing sample countries. Discussion As suggested earlier, there are reasons to believe the internal procedures of democracies matter. The analyses above suggest that the institutional structures of democracies can affect foreign policy outcomes. The evidence consistently indicates that consensus democracies are more pacific than majoritarian democracies. They are less likely to be involved in MIDs with both democracies and non-democracies alike. Moreover, consensus democracies are less likely than majoritarian democracies to instigate MIDs with democracies and non-democracies as well.
233
Consensualism on the executive-parliamentary dimension, the dimension most involved with foreign policy, is also associated with less aggressive foreign policies. In addition, the brief analysis of ODA numbers confirms Lijphart and Bowman’s (1999) finding that consensualism contributes to greater generosity in foreign aid. All of the above strongly indicate that institutions matter. The evidence also suggests that institutionally constrained executives do not start or become involved in as many disputes as less restrained leaders. This can be seen the analyses of majoritarianism and consensualism. The finding is further demonstrated through individual comparisons between majoritarian democracies and consensus democracies and the mixed democracies types. This suggests that leadership does matter and indicates the conditions in which we can expect leadership to matter the most. Systemic variables are also found to affect state behavior. Population, NATO membership, and proximity are significantly related to militarized interstate disputes. Moreover, impact of United States on the results for mixed democracies (EP-Maj) further demonstrates that state power can affect state behavior. The findings regarding GDP support the argument that economic development contributes to peaceful relations, suggesting that economics are ‘high politics’ after all. That such variables are significant is not a surprise. It was never contended here that systemic or economic variables do not matter. The contention put forth here is that domestic institutional structures and procedures and, to a lesser extent, leadership can have profound effects on what we would all agree is in the realm of high politics, international conflict. The findings of this research demonstrate institutions do affect international conflict and cooperation and therefore must be included within the pantheon of variables associated with high politics.
234
Implications The implications of the research are threefold. First, the project contributes to the ongoing debate about democratic peace theory. The research provides evidence that variation in internal political institutions and procedures of democracies affects foreign policy, hence adding specification to democratic peace theory and conditionality as to when the theory is most likely to apply. Second, the project serves as a bridge between the fields of international relations and comparative studies. The successful outcomes of this work suggest that future research should look to combine appropriately matched theories from both fields for each area of study can enhance the other. Lastly, the findings indicate that in order to develop a peaceful international environment, incipient democracies should be encouraged to build consensual democratic institutions. Considering the dramatic and bloody attempts to establish democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the findings here do present a normative blueprint for guidance in institution building. The evidence even suggests that established democracies should consider following the lead of New Zealand and, to a lesser extent, Britain and move towards consensualism. In short, the research has implications for both the academic and real worlds. Having found that variations in leadership and institutional and procedural structures in democracies can matter, the question arises as to how these two variables interact in different settings. The next chapter explores this question as it examines developments in three countries included in the above sample: Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Appendix Appendix Table 4.1: Matrix of dyad counts for disputes for 1950-1992. Classification system based on Polity III dataset and research sample; disputes drawn from MID dataset. *Autoc (autocracies): = or < -7 on polity scale. *Anoc (anocracies): = or > -6 and = or < 6 on polity scale.
235
*Democ (democracies): = or > 7 on polity scale. *Con Democ (consensus democracies), Maj Democ (majoritarian democracies), Mixed Democ EP-Con (mixed democracies EP-Con), and Mixed Democ EP-Maj (mixed democracies EP-Maj) represent the 23 sample countries. Political Institutions
Autoc
Anoc
Democ
Con Democ
Maj Democ 90 32 38 0 2 9
Mixed Democ EP-Con 106 33 37 1 9 4
Mixed Democ EP-Maj 140 38 59 3 6 4
Autoc Anoc Democ Con Democ Maj Democ Mixed Democ EPCon Mixed Democ EPMaj
526 255 180 45 90 106
255 114 95 36 32 33
180 95 114 38 38 37
45 36 38 2 0 1
140
38
59
3
6
4
10
Appendix Table 4.2: Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a percentage of GNP. Average country effort 0.41 percent. OECD data. Iceland and Israel omitted. Note: The U.N. ODA agreed target is 0.7 percent of GNP. Most nations do not meet that target. Country Denmark Norway Netherlands Sweden Belgium Ireland France Switzerland Finland United Kingdom Germany Spain Canada Australia New Zealand Portugal Austria Japan Greece Italy United States
2000 1.06 0.8 0.82 0.81 0.36 0.3 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.19 0.13 0.1
2001 1.01 0.83 0.82 0.76 0.37 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.27 0.3 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.19 0.14 0.11
2002 0.96 0.91 0.82 0.74 0.42 0.41 0.36 0.32 0.35 0.3 0.27 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.2 0.12 236
2003 0.84 0.92 0.81 0.7 0.61 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.34 0.34 0.28 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.2 0.2 0.21 0.16 0.14
Average 0.968 0.865 0.818 0.753 0.440 0.363 0.360 0.345 0.333 0.318 0.273 0.260 0.255 0.255 0.243 0.240 0.233 0.233 0.203 0.158 0.118
Appendix II Variables for time-series-cross-section analysis: population source, UN Demographic Yearbook; territorial size source, CIA World Factbook; GDP source, Penn World Tables Version 6.1 (GDP per capita x population). References Armingeon, Klaus (2002). “The Effects of Negotiation Democracy: A Comparative Analysis”. European Journal of Political Research 41: 81-105. Auerswald, David P. (1999). “Inward Bound: Domestic Institutions and Military Conflicts”. International Organization 53, 3: 469-504. Beck, Nathaniel, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker (1998). “Taking Time Seriously: TimeSeries-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable”. American Journal of Political Science 42, 4: 1260-1288. Benoit, Kenneth (1996). “Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General): Reexamining Regime Type and War Involvement”. Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, 4: 636-657. Braumoeller, Bear F. (1997). “Deadly Doves: Liberal Nationalism and the Democratic Peace in the Soviet Successor States”. International Studies Quarterly 41, 3: 375-402. Bremer, Stuart A. (1996). Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset. Castles, Francis G. (ed.) (1993). Families of Nations. Brookfield, NH: Dartmouth. Chan, Steve (1997). “In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise”. Mershon International Studies Review 41: 59-91. CIA World Factbook. www.cia.gov Crepaz, Markus M. L. (1996). “Consensus versus Majoritarian Democracy: Political Institutions and Their Impact on Macroeconomic Performance and Industrial Disputes”. Comparative
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Political Studies 29, 1: 4-26. Doyle, Michael W. (1983). “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs”. In Debating the Democratic Peace, edited by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (2001). Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press. 3-57. Farber, Henry S. and Joanne Gowa (1995). “Polities and Peace”. In Debating the Democratic Peace, edited by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (2001). Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press. 239-262. Flinders, Matthew (2005). “Majoritarian Democracy in Britain: New Labor and the Constitution”. West European Politics 28, 1: 62-94. Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver and Peter Mair (2001). Representative Government in Modern Europe (Third Edition). Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill Higher Education. Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor (1999). Elections and War: The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics of War and Peace. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Gowa, Joanne (1998). “Politics at the Water’s Edge: Parties, Voters, and the Use of Force Abroad”. International Organization 52, 2: 307-324. Hagan, Joe D. (1994). “Reflection, Evaluation, Integration: Domestic Political Systems and War Proneness”. Mershon International Studies Review 38: 183-207. Hermann, Margaret G. and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (1995). “Rethinking Democracy and International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology”. International Studies Quarterly 39: 511-533. Heston, Alan, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten (2002). Penn World Table Version 6.1. Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania. International Peace Research Institute. Polity IIId dataset. Oslo, Norway.
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Jones, Daniel M., Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer (1996). “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns”. Conflict Management and Peace Science 15, 2: 163-212. Leeds, Brett Ashley and David R. Davis (1997). “Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes”. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, 6: 814-834. Lijphart, Arend (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in ThirtySix Countries. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press. Lijphart, Arend (2002). “Negotiation Democracy versus Consensus Democracy: Parallel Conclusions and Recommendations”. European Journal of Political Research 41: 107113. Lijphart, Arend and Peter J. Bowman (1999). “Types of Democracy and Generosity with Foreign Aid: An Indirect Test of the Democratic Peace Proposition”. In Elites, Parties, and Democracy: Festschrift for Professor Mogens N. Pederson, edited by Erik Beukel, Kurt Klaudi Klausen, and Poul Erik Mouritzen. Odense University Press. Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack Snyder (1994). “Democratization and the Danger of War”. In Debating the Democratic Peace, edited by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (2001). Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press. 58-81. 202-238. Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett (1993). “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace”. American Political Science Review 87, 3: 624-638. Mayer, Arno J. (1969). “Internal Causes and Purposes of War in Europe, 1870-1956: A Research Assignment”. Journal of Modern History 41, 3: 291-303. Moravcsik, Andrew (1997). “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics”. International Organization: 513-553.
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Obinger, Herbert and Uwe Wagschal (2001). “Families of Nations and Public Policy”. West European Politics 24, 1: 99-114. Oneal, John R., Frances H. Oneal, Zeev Maoz, and Bruce Russett (1996). “The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-85”. Journal of Peace Research 33, 1: 11-28. Owen, John M. (1994). “How Liberalism Produces the Democratic Peace”. In Debating the Democratic Peace, edited by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (2001). Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press. 116-154. Palmer, Glenn, Tamar R. London, and Patrick M. Regan (2004). “What’s Stopping You?: The Sources of Political Constraint on International Conflict Behavior in Parliamentary Democracies”. Taylor and Francis 30, 1: 1-24. Peceny, Mark (1997). “A Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Peace: The Ambiguous Case of the Spanish-American War”. Journal of Peace Research 34, 4: 415-430. Peters, B. Guy (1998). Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods. New York, NY: New York University Press. Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1991). “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies”. World Politics 43, 4: 479-512. Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1995). “Democratic Peace—Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument”. European Journal of International Relations 1(4): 491-517. Russet, Bruce (1993a). “The Fact of Democratic Peace”. In Debating the Democratic Peace, edited by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (2001). Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press. 58-81.
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Siaroff, Alan (1999). “Corporatism in 24 Industrial Democracies: Meaning and measurement”. European Journal of Political Research 36: 175-205. Singer, J. David and Melvin Small (1976). “The War-proneness of Democratic Regimes, 18161965”. Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1: 50-69. Spiro, David E. (1994). “The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace”. In Debating the Democratic Peace, edited by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (2001). Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press. 202-238. Thompson, William R. (1996). “Democracy and Peace: Putting the Cart Before the Horse?”. International Organization 50, 1: 141-174. UN Demographic Yearbook (2002). www.unstats.un.gov Ward, Michael D. and Kristain S, Gleditsch (1998). “Democratizing for Peace”. American Political Science Review 92, 1: 51-61.
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Chapter 5 The Leadership/Institutions Nexus A growing body of literature has begun to demonstrate that variations in democratic institutional structures affect foreign policy decision-making of leadership in democracies (Kaarbo, 1997; Gaubatz, 1999; Prins and Sprecher, 1999; Auerswald, 2000; Palmer, London, and Regan, 2004). This line of inquiry has confronted head-on divergence in foreign policy behavior across democracies. Peterson (1996), among others, finds that institutional structures constrain or empower leadership’s strategic beliefs. In other words, whether leaders can pursue their policy preferences is influenced by the roadblocks, or lack there of, constructed by governmental institutions. Variables of interest, therefore, include executive-legislative relations, single-party rule vs. coalitional governance, party politics, the degree of factionalism, electoral structures, formal delineation of constitutional powers, and informal patterns of political behavior that affect government policy. One broad, underlying research question when considering these variables is how do the interactions between institutional and procedural structures and leadership influence foreign policy outputs? A critical issue, accordingly, is to what degree is power concentrated in the executive? Intuitively, greater concentrations of power enable greater freedom of choice for the executive. In such situations, leaders who hold conflictual views of the international environment will be better able to pursue more aggressive and militarized foreign policies. Lijphart’s (1999) dichotomization of democracy as majoritarian and consensus democracies captures variations in institutional constraints and concentrations of executive power and hence provides direction in the sample countries selected here. This research seeks to explore through in-depth descriptive analysis the leadership/institutions nexus by examining leadership,
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governmental structures, and foreign policy outputs in Japan, Italy, and the United Kingdom. These countries are instructive examples for as we move from Japan, to Italy and to the United Kingdom, we also move from consensualism to majoritarianism. To investigate these dynamics in the sample countries, a brief pre-World War II history is provided to outline important institutional factors that can affect post-war leadership and governmental structures. This is followed by analysis of institutional variables such as the formal powers of the constitution, executive-legislative relations, the powers of the cabinet, party politics, the degree of factionalism, informal procedures, social patterns, and electoral practices. The executive, in these cases prime ministers, are then examined to see how they operate within their institutional environments. This discussion includes issues of power concentration and, when appropriate, variations in leadership style. The focus of the discussions of institutions and leadership is from 1945-1992 to establish a benchmark from which we can assess the direction of institutional development in the post-1992 period. Accordingly, historic developments for 1945-1992 are reviewed to investigate both domestic and international evolutions and their influence of foreign policy behavior. The post1992 period is reviewed to note institutional and international developments and their according roles shaping foreign policy outputs. It is important to note that leadership and institutions do not exist in a vacuum and that international power and economic issues can shape the direction of a state’s international behavior. International constraints are therefore considered during the historic reviews. Moreover, all three sample countries have historic legacies that have influenced the direction of domestic politics and governance and the nature of their international relations. Japan and Italy’s defeat in World War II and Britain’s history of imperialism clearly have affected their current international station and domestic affairs. Therefore, when examining
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institutions, leadership, and historic developments, historic legacies are interpreted here as domestic and/or international constraints. The conclusion assesses the influence of institutions and procedures on foreign policy outputs during the post-World War II period. The evidence suggests that the interactions between leadership and institutions, the leadership/institutions nexus, do influence the foreign policy behavior of the sample countries. The findings do not trump realist or economic interdependence theory but rather compliment them by providing additional explanations for variance in state behavior. Moreover, democratic peace theory is further specified as this research joins the literature that adds heterogeneity to this homogenous approach to the study of democracy. The prospects for each country are then reviewed based on the direction of institutional evolution. 383 Japan Commodore Perry’s opening of Japan in the mid-nineteenth century ended a period of relative isolation that had lasted for over 300 years and began Japan’s modern era. During the Meiji Restoration, Japan chose to learn from the West while maintaining their cultural heritage. Military success against China and Russia contributed to a growing sense of Japan as a powerful player on the world stage. Economic growth followed a unique pattern of cooperation between the state and powerful economic conglomerates known as the zaibatsu. As Japanese imperialism became the basis for foreign policy, this relationship developed a growing tendency towards the production of military goods. 383
MID data are not provided for Italy and Japan due to the fact that their involvement in MIDs is so limited. Italy was involved in slightly more than a dozen MID and only one was instigated by Italy. Japan was involved in significantly more MIDs, but as with Italy, instigated only one of these MIDs. The vast majority of these MIDs involved either Japan’s alliance with the US or reactions to territorial claims by China or the Soviet Union. The issues involving territorial claims, however, appear to have become more significant issues under the executive leadership of Koizumi. The numbers for Britain, however, are examined as Britain is involved in significantly more instigated MIDs.
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The Washington Naval treaty of 1922 enabled the Japanese navy to play catch up with the two most powerful naval powers, the British and the US. The ancient code of the samurai, bushido, became increasingly powerful within the military by the 1930s. Ambitious officers in Manchuria staged a railway explosion as part of a fait accompli to seize the territory. Japan’s aggressions in Asia brought rebuke from the League of Nations, yet Japan simply walked out of the League. Japanese expansion continued in China after the July 7, 1937, Marco Polo Bridge incident with one victory after another against both Nationalist and Communist Chinese forces. Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoko coined the phrase the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as a rhetorical means to disguise imperialism as a new regional regime of economic cooperation. Japan became a member of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy on September 27, 1940. With Japan moving into Indochina, the US froze Japanese funds and assets in the USA and was soon followed by Britain and the Netherlands. This meant that resourcescarce Japan lacked the hard currency to buy necessary oil and raw materials and hence set the stage for the attack on Pearl Harbor. After a series of victories, the Japanese navy was dealt a setback in the battle of Midway from which it would never recover. Japan ultimately surrendered with the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the opening of a Russian offensive in Asia. This period of failed militarism exhibited cultural tendencies towards public agreement. Those that held more pacific views of foreign policy gradually fell silent as militarism became the dominant force in Japanese politics. As Yosiyuki (1988, 191) notes, “In Japan, there is a strong expectation that a dispute should not and will not arise; even when one does occur, it is to solved by mutual understanding. Thus, there is no raison d’être for the majority rule that is so widespread in other modern states; instead, the principles of rule by consensus prevails”.
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With Japan a defeated nation and militarism discredited, a foreign policy consensus developed in the post-war era that sought economic national growth through export-oriented strategies. Critics argued, however, that Japanese economic policy, derided as Japan Inc. 384 , was essentially mercantilistic. In other words, as Drifte (1996, 75) sardonically quips, “Why attack Pearl Harbor if we can buy it?” On the other hand, others argue economic success led to a growing internationalism based on global economic interdependence and cooperation. How one interprets such developments colors how one views post-World War II foreign policy in Japan. This research seeks to analyze Japanese foreign policy through the lens of both institutions and leadership. Initially the discussion focuses on the period of 1945-1992. The analysis examines the role of state institutions with special attention being paid to how they act as constraints to aggressive foreign policies. How governmental ministries contribute to foreign policy are crucial elements in unraveling Japanese behavior during this period. This section includes a review of business and political parties and how they operate within the Japanese institutional context. The importance of networks within the cultural environment is also examined as these patterns profoundly affect Japanese social, political, and international behavior. The ensuing section investigates the office of the prime minister. The evidence powerfully suggests that prime ministers are constrained by the dispersion of power, technocratic expertise of the bureaucracy, and patterns of cooperation among bureaucracy, business, and politicians. A review of historic developments during the 1945-1992 period follows, with special attention paid to international constraints and Japanese behavior within such an environment. This period highlights a shift, the degree to which is debatable, from national economic development to economic internationalism. 384
See Hatch and Yamamura 1996, 116.
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Developments in the post-1992 era are then examined and prospects for the future are considered. The evidence indicates that dispersed power within the executive and the growing influence of political factions along with international constraints, consensus in favor of international interdependence, and pacific foreign policy legacies most likely will continue to limit the potential for the rise of confrontational, aggressive, and militaristic approaches to foreign policy. In other words, although systemic variables influence Japanese foreign policy behavior, consensual institutional structures have, and will continue to contribute to pacific foreign policy outputs. Institutions The US-imposed Japanese constitution famously renounced military solutions to international problems and limited Japanese defense expenditures to less than one percent of GNP. Japanese-US defense cooperation during the Cold War period further bolstered these constitutional commitments. Accordingly, the lion’s-share of Japanese foreign policy revolves around economics. The Japanese parliament, the Diet, consists of an upper and lower house. For the majority of the 1945-1992 period, however, it was the powerful executive ministries that influenced national economic development through Japanese government’s extralegal powers pf “administrative guidance” (gyōsei shidō). 385 These powers enabled the Japanese government to develop an industrial policy. Industrial policy is a “geo-strategic or goal-oriented approach” to economic development established by executive bureaucracies to influence which industries to promote and which to discard. 386 Some of the policy instruments used by the bureaucracy to develop industrial policy include tax breaks, loan strategies, and government-sponsored research and development
385 386
Ibid, 4. Johnson 1988, 216.
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consortium. Chalmers Johnson (1988, 215) suggests that the Japanese approach to economics is best seen as planned rationality rather than planned ideological as in command economies. He suggests that state involvement in such economic strategies is necessary in cases of late industrialization. This strategy has led to the top talent going to bureaucracies involved in economic policy, the most important being the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Agriculture and Forestry, Construction, Transportation, and the Economic Planning Agency. Johnson argues that the bureaucratic state, in particular MITI, is the dominant actor, more so than the legislature and business, in developing industrial policy. According to Okimoto (1988, 180), the success of MITI and the bureaucracy had led the dominant political party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), to be “content to let MITI run the industrial economy because it has demonstrated exceptional competence”. Takashi (1988) argues that although bureaucrats were the dominant economic actors until the 1960s, influence had shifted by the late 1980s to politicians. When surveying politicians and bureaucrats regarding levels of influential, he found that 46.1 percent saw LDP politicians as the most significant actors, in comparison with 42.9 percent for the bureaucracy. On the other hand, Krauss and Michio (1988, 208) suggest that the bureaucracy continues to be the “pivot of the policy making process” and Hatch and Yamamura (1996, 63) argue, “Japan’s bureaucrats continue to wield far more influence than their counterparts in Washington, London, Bonn, or even Paris”. Keiretsu Industrial policy, as alluded to above, also involves cooperation with the private sector, and in particular, Japanese business industrial groups known as Keiretsu. These business
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enterprises involve widespread networks of financial entities, industries and subsidiaries that are organized in cooperative fashions. Keiretsu, or more specifically specialized arms of the industrial groups, work with and are financially encouraged by MITI and MOF to develop technologies and then compete amongst themselves to gain domestic and international market share. Hatch and Yamamura (1996, 75) describe this “cooperative system” as a three-part relationship structure between (1) government and business, (2) business and business, and (3) management and labor. Political Parties To fully understand variation in power centers, however, one must also consider political parties, especially the LDP. 387 As Okimoto and Rohlen (1988, 171) note, “In no other large industrial nation has a single political party dominated both houses of parliament for virtually the entire post-war period”. 388 The stability of the party has been astonishing. Okimoto (1988, 175) states, “(The LDP) has survived profound changes in demographic composition, industrial structure, and occupational distribution as well as business cycles, external shocks, and the transformation of the international system”. The LDP’s continued relevance is based in part on the fact that it represents a broad spectrum of interests that in Okimoto’s view amount to a ‘grand coalition’ that includes, “the young and old, labor and capital, intensive industries, primary and manufacturing sectors, rural and urban, big and small business, management and labor”. 389 Accordingly, Yakusuke (1988, 203) calls the LDP an “interest-oriented catchall party”.
387
The LDP was formed after the merger of the Liberal and Democratic parties. Other significant political parties include the Japan Socialist, Kōmeitō (clean government), Democratic-Socialist, and Japan Communist. 389 Okimoto argues that the electoral system is weighted in favor of the agricultural sector (agriculture represents 20% of the population and 30% of the Diet) and the LDP and Japan Socialist party (JSP) work to keep it as such because of the electoral benefits they receive. Frost (1987), on the other hand, argues that the shift towards suburbs and provincial towns in rural areas means that the LDP is no longer as reliant on rural districts. 388
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This arrangement, as one can surmise, provides conditions for the formation of factions. In fact, Okimoto (1988, 183) suggests that,“(The LDP’s) power derives from a complex of factional interests”. Japan’s multicandidacy system contributes to factionalism in that LDP candidates invariably end up running against one another. The situation, as Okimoto states, “cannot help but foster fierce intra-party competition”. Moreover, the lack of centralized financial power of the LDP has created dynamics that foster factions. Because the LDP does not have the resources to significantly fund candidates 390 , LDP Diet representatives mobilize voters through their own organizations called kōenkai. Therefore, their careers depend on representing parochial and factional interests.391 Hatch and Yamamura (1996, 116) argue that those that focus on ‘Japan, Inc.’ miss the impact of zoku (policy tribes), “The groups of Liberal Democratic party members of the Diet that emerged as independent power centers to address the concerns of those competing interest groups”. LDP factions compete in an orderly way, however, for they are not divided along ideological lines. Moreover, there can be multiple networks in play for the LDP has had a pattern of attracting more former bureaucrats than any other party. 392 Some, such as Okimoto (1988), argue that factionalism within the LDP helps disperse power in positive manner. As he states, “Functioning within a consensual system, free from ideological cleavages, LDP factions have infused the party with a healthy dose of pluralism, which has helped the party escape the extremes of iron-handed rule of stultifying stagnancy”. Japanese Culture When considering all the power centers involved in industrial policy, Pempel (1978, 139) concludes that the economic miracle in Japan was fostered by a “corporatist pattern among 390 391 392
For example, in 1988 the LDP had only 2.57 million dues paying members (Okimoto 1988, 183). In 1983, six factions existed that ranged in Diet membership from 107 to 13 (Ibid). Ibid, 187.
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business, bureaucracy, and LDP”. With all the talk about corporatism, consensualism, and cooperation, however, one factor that must be incorporated in the final equation is the Japanese cultural context. The Western concept of a “right” was introduced to Japan during the Meiji period. 393 A longer standing tradition is the emphasis on “wa” or harmony as a means of societal organization. This tradition has contributed to, as Drifte (1996, 7) notes, “a general preference for the notions of harmony and consensus”. Within this cultural environment, social relationships and extra-institutional structures provide the basis for social and political interactions. The cultural background of Japan, therefore, contributes to consensualism and informal cooperation in a manner that shapes governmental interactions. Okimoto and Rohlen (1988, 173) state, “(Political power) emerges more out of a complex network of relationships and voluntary arrangements and less out of a framework of legal authority or the threat of coercive sanctions”. Of course culture cannot explain or predict all behaviors, yet governance or economic policy in Japan cannot be fully understood without it. Accordingly, Okimoto (1988, 211) notes, “The Japanese state should be seen in terms of its central position within a societal network”. Hatch and Yamamura (1996, 63) suggest that such patterns of ‘alliance’ or ‘network’ capitalism apply to international Japanese political economy. In other words, economic ventures beyond Japan’s borders maintain economic and social networks similar to those at home. In sum, the institutional and social frameworks of Japan have not lent themselves to the pursuit of aggressive foreign policies because the many “consensual” sides to Japanese politics means that moving policy requires agreement among an unusual number of actors. The constitution is fundamentally pacific, technological economic expertise trumps ideology, power is dispersed across bureaucracies and industrial policy relationships, factions act as power 393
Takeyoshi and Yosiyuki 1988, 191.
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centers within the LDP, and cultural and social patterns of networks constrain individuals from amassing power. These factors provide the backdrop within which prime ministers find themselves and help explain prime ministerial behavior and limitations. Leadership: The Prime Minister With all the constraints on prime ministerial prerogative, it comes as no surprise that van Wolferen (1989, 121) argues that the Japanese prime minister’s power “is less than that of any other head of government in the West or East”. Several factors contribute to this phenomenon. To begin, in order to become a prime minister, a politician usually has to be a leader of powerful faction. 394 The pluralism and dispersion of power associated with Japanese factionalism inherently weakens a prime minister that rises to power through this path. As Drifte (1996, 21) states, “Usually…the prime minister is not a strong figure because he is the outcome of factional politics”. Drifte (1996) also notes that office of the prime minister is small and strapped by frequent staff turnover. In the face of powerful and talented bureaucracies, therefore, the prime minister’s office is undermanned. Ministers are changed twice a year to limit concentrations of power, but, as Drifte argues, this actually weakens the prime minister as he tries to keep factional balance. Moreover, prime ministers tend to be former bureaucrats which tests network bonds. 395 Although Drifte notes as a major exception prime minister Kakuei Tanaka (1972-74), a leader who was not an ex-bureaucrat and had built a strong position of power that lasted even after he was out of office, he lists three forces that militate against powerful leaders: (1) a strong bureaucracy, (2) powerful coalition factions, and (3) cultural patterns based on harmony,
394 395
Okimoto 1984, 184. See ibid, 188.
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conformity, groupism, and conflict-avoidance that do not promote individual leaders.396 He goes so far as to question whether Japan has leadership without leaders. As a result, prime ministers tend to facilitate rather than direct policy. In Nishihara Masashi words, “Japanese leaders tend to follow public opinion rather than lead it. They are responsive to public opinion rather than being responsible for it”. 397 Although Tanaka and Nakasone did hold public support, with the later often using the media to go straight to the public 398 , they are exceptions rather than the rule. When faced with serious problems, prime ministers often rely on the formation of small decision-making groups of factional leaders and elder statesmen to enable quick decisions. Okimoto (1988, 184) notes that in such circumstances, “The concentration of power is an advantage if it expedites the sometimes unwieldy and always time-consuming process of building a consensus within the LDP”. The process may help lead to quicker policy outputs, but it also demonstrates an underlying weakness in the executive’s leadership powers. A bureaucracy with divergent goals and variations in power further complicates foreign policy decision-making. The powerful economic ministries, MITI and MOF, often seek policies that are at odds with the weaker Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For instance, when the foreign minister promised financial assistance for the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, the finance minister challenged the amount. The process, as Hatch and Yamamura (1996, 116) explain, sent “a nervous prime minister scurrying between the two ministries to try and resolve the impasse”. Drifte (1996) argues that this example demonstrates difficulties in dealing with foreign policy crises. Although this point can be debated, the evidence does suggest that Drifte is on the mark
396 397 398
One Japanese saying Drifte (28) cites is, “Hammer down the nail that sticks out”. Quoted in ibid, 29. Nakasone’s position was apparently enhanced by his close relationship with US president Ronald Reagan.
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when he exclaims, “Nowhere is the limited role of politicians more obvious than in Japan’s foreign policy”. 399 History, 1945-1992 The US occupied Japan after its surrender on the decks of the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay until 1952. During this period, the emperor was de-mystified as he toured the country and spoke with the masses, even once being referred to as “empy” by a mineworker. Democratic governance was reestablished and the pacific constitution became the law of the land. Okimoto (1988, 213) cites the legacy of allied occupation as contributing to the distinct historical characteristics of Japan. He also notes that a broad national consensus developed in supporting industrial “catch-up” as a means of economic development. Although the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) held power briefly in 1947 as leader of a coalition government, the LDP assumed power and supported this economic goal. From 1950-1973, government and business used multiple instruments to pursue an industrial policy based on export-oriented, industrial catch-up. Hatch and Yamamura (1996, 6467) cite the examples of loan availability for strategic industries by the MOF and MITI’s efforts to subsidize strategic industries and guide the keiretsu to invest proportionally to market share. Investments relied heavily on bank loans in comparison to venture capitalist investment and such loans often came from within the financial arm of the Keiretsu, hence insulating Japan from market shocks. During this period, Japan, with the efforts of one of the few prime ministers that significantly influenced Japanese foreign policy, Yoshida Shigeru 400 , found security within the Cold War structure as part of the US-Asian defense perimeter. Accordingly, Japan was involved
399 400
Drifte 1996, 18. Ibid, 18.
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in supporting allied forces during the Korean War. The 1952 Peace Treaty with the US codified this new relationship. Japan also returned to the international stage when joining the UN in 1956. Japan played an auxiliary role during the Vietnam War. Japan followed the US lead in China, recognizing mainland China in 1973. US failures in Vietnam, however, contributed to Japanese reassessment of their regional strategies. In response to the Middle East oil embargo, communism spreading in Indochina, and Southeast Asian students demonstrating against ‘economic imperialism’, note Hatch and Yamamura (1996, 117), a “Comprehensive National Security” policy review ensued that “measured the nation’s vulnerability in economic—not purely strategic grounds”. Accordingly, a new strategic “trinity” (sammi-ittai) was established based on Official Development Assistance (ODA), foreign direct investment, and trade. Because of the established bureaucratic economic culture, regional policy instruments mirrored much of what was industrial policy in Japan and amounted to the promotion of national interests in the AsianPacific region. 401 Drifte (1996, 87-88) argues that this nationalistic approach applied globally to both developed and developing countries alike. Yet to solely ascribe Japanese foreign policy to economic nationalism misses domestic and international developments that complicate the picture. Hatch and Yamamura suggest that the liberalization of financial markets stripped MOF of its ability to strategically allocate capital and the increasing politicization of the budgeting process cut into MITI’s prerogatives. Although they argue that industrial policy was “retooled” and bureaucrats maintain significant clout, these evolutions become increasingly significant domestically and even internationally. Although Japan continued to focus on national economic benefit through the 1970s and 1980s, Hatch and Yamamura (1996, ix) note that involvement in Asia, “is all part of a chain of 401
For a listing of policy instruments, see Hatch and Yamamura 1996, 122-123.
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unintended benevolence in which Japanese production begets Japanese economic growth, which begets overseas production in Asia, which begets technological transfer, which begets local economic growth”. The growing shift in trade in Asia is exemplified by the fact that Japanese trading in Asia was only half of the amount of trade with the US in 1970 while by 1990 trade had surpassed the levels of Japan-US trade. 402 Despite these benefits, as Hook and Zhang (1998, 1054-55) note, Japanese aid focused on lending with governmental guidance rather than aid and on economic infrastructure rather than political or civil infrastructure, with results that benefited autocratic governments such as the Marcos regime in the Philippines. Hatch and Yamamura (1996, 4) note that the Keiretsus approach to integrating Asia relied on networks of subsidiaries rather than local entrepreneurs and followed the domestic patterns of industrial policy of relationships based on government-business, business-business, and management-labor cooperation. Multinational Corporations (MNC) based in Japan do not become localized like European or US MNCs and, therefore, “are more Japanese than multinational”. 403 In fact, Hatch and Yamamura (23) question whether MITI’s views of Newly Industrializing Countries (NIC) and the ASEAN-4 as “a single market from which to pursue a global corporate strategy” is not in some ways a revisit to the Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. They conclude that, “Willing or not, the ASEAN economies have become an integral part of a production structure that is emerging in the Pacific region, with Japan at its core”. 404 Japanese export-oriented strategy for growth, in conjunction with non-tariff trade barriers, led to friction between the Japan and the US in the 1980s. The situation ironically had 402
Ibid, x. Asian states have been grouped into two categories: the Four Dragons—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, all of which have developed economies, and the ASEAN-4 or Four Little Dragons—Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, developing countries that Japan traditionally applies the trinity (sammiittai) approach. 403 Ibid, 17. 404 In many ways, the transformation is akin to Japanese economist Akamatsu Kaname’s “flying geese” theory of economic development with Japan as the lead goose (see ibid, 27).
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‘market fundamentalist’, President Ronald Reagan sign an agreement to limit the importation of Japanese automobiles into the US. The growing trade imbalance between Japan in the US in the 1980s, however, was based on more than cars. Accordingly, the Plaza Accord, signed in 1985 by US Secretary of Treasury James Baker and the Ministers of Finance in Japan, Germany, Great Britain, and France, sought to address America’s trade deficit through “an orderly appreciation of the main non-dollar currencies against the dollar”.405 The results, called endaka, were that, from the summer of 1985 to the summer of 1986, currency valuation shifted from 250 yen to 150 yen to the dollar. Despite this, largely as a result of the national focus of Japan’s industrial policy, Japanese exports did not decrease. 406 Some other developments during the end of the 1945-1992 period are worth noting. Japan became the leading donor of ODA (the nature of the ODA remained in question) for the first time even though the average of GDP devoted to ODA remained low in comparison to other OECD states. 407 Based on concerns of regional economic troubles, Japan was unenthusiastic about joining sanctions against China following the June 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre.408 Japan opted out of the sanction in 1990 and Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki became the first leader of a developed state to visit China in August 1991. 409 As discussed above, Japan provided $13 billion in assistance for the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, even if the aid came somewhat late. 410 The practice of zaitech or “financial engineering” created the bubble economy that burst in the early 1990s and hence faced Japan with its most severe economic crisis since the OPEC oil embargo. Despite the bubble, Asia’s trade deficit with Japan grew from 1985-1993 from $9.3
405 406 407 408 409 410
Ibid, 20-21. Ibid. Hook and Zhang 1998, 1051. It should be noted that the same held true for the US Bush administration. See Drifte 1996, 57 and Hook and Zhang 1998, 1063. Drifte 1996, 135.
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billion to $54.2 billion. 411 Moreover, Japan’s approach to foreign assistance in Asia advanced unabated as 63.3 percent of all ODA yen were loans and the aid continued to be directed towards communication and transportation infrastructure in a manner designed to benefit Japanese firms. 412 Interestingly as a sign of an increased internationalist perspective, the Diet passed the International Peace Cooperation Law in June 1992, which allowed for financial backing of UN peacekeeping as well as the sending of Japanese peacekeepers abroad. 413 William Dudley (1989, 13) suggests that, “Since its defeat in 1945, Japan’s world reputation is an economic not a military one”. The evidence is undeniable. Yet the end of the Cold War, in conjunction with the growing role of Japanese politicians, shifting embrace of Japan as an international leader, and eroding success rates of the economic bureaucracy created an environment that may have weakened Japan’s embrace of economic nationalism. Post 1992 In a development roughly analogous to changes in Italy, the Japanese Diet enacted electoral reforms in 1993 designed to address corruption such as the 1970s Lockheed Scandal. The changes include public financing of elections and a shift towards single-seat constituencies. Although the changes contributed to a split in the LDP involving a runaway faction (Japan Renewal Party), the LDP formed a coalition with the Social Democrats in 1993 in an election that saw the Social Democrats lose heavily. This factor, in conjunction with the fact that the Renewal Party can be added to the LDP, indicated that conservative forces remain of primary significance in Japanese politics and that the LDP continued to remain the most important party in Japan. 414 The new electoral laws did, however, strengthen parochialism based on the need to
411 412 413 414
Hatch and Yamamura 1996, 175. Drifte 1996, 111 and 115. Ibid, 134. See Drifte 1996, 17-18.
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win the single-seat constituencies. Although Drifte (1996) does not rule out the possibility that “flamboyant” politicians may capitalize on foreign policy by politicizing issues, he argues that the greater parochialism brought on by the 1993 electoral reforms means there is less of a chance of the rise of foreign policy-minded prime ministers. In other words, the reforms strengthened the validity of Tip O’Neil’s famous dictum, ‘All politics are local’. As a signal of growing internationalism, Japan has embraced the 1992 International Peace Cooperation Law and has had peacekeeping involvements in Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador, and the Golan Heights. 415 Yasutomo (1995) argues that Japan’s foreign policy has become more multilateral and diversified. In other words, Japan is varying from the former national focus. As a sign of international restraint, Japan waited out the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) when they occupied the Japanese embassy from December 18, 1996—April 23, 1997 even though they remained aloof regarding former Peruvian president Fujimoro’s status in Japan. 416 Japan has also become heavily involved in developing international environmental regimes. Japan has been the world’s largest exporter of environmental equipment. 417 Moreover, Japan hosted the conference in December 1997 that developed the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gases and global warming. Although Japan has little choice because of its paucity of natural resources, Japanese national and local governments have pursued conservation in a dynamic fashion in the face of the current energy crisis, including the lowering heating and cooling levels in public buildings. 418 The fall of the Thai Baht in 1997 provided a lesson for Japan on deepening interdependence and accelerating globalization. The response to the crisis was, “A New
415 416 417 418
Diplomatic Bluebook 1998, 71. Ibid, 46. Drifte 1996, 119. See Anthony Faiola, Washington Post, February 16, 2006, A01.
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Framework for Enhanced Asian Cooperation to Promote Financial Stability” (the Manila Framework). 419 The goal of regional stability, although still within national interests, is a step away from economic nationalism and towards multilateralism. Yet Hook and Zhang (1998, 1058) find that despite the proclaimed new social and political focuses with aid, foreign aid is still geographically centered in Asia, the distribution of ODA has shifted towards more affluent countries and remains designed to develop economic infrastructure, and loans are still the largest form of bilateral ODA. They also find that MITI, a champion of geo-strategic economic growth, remains the predominant bureaucracy in comparison with the MFA, which is more likely to focus on political and social factors. Perhaps an example of Drifte’s “flamboyant” politician, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi assumed office in 2001 and there he remains. Drawing a page from Nakasone, he has skillfully utilized the media. In order to deal with uncertain economic times, he has used nationalism as a means to maintain support. This includes visits to the Yasukuni Shrine which commemorates the war dead, including war criminals (as did Nakasone in 1985 420 ), continued support for educational texts that gloss over wartime atrocities, and proposals to reform the constitution to allow Japan to more readily pursue military action beyond its borders. These actions have inflamed Chinese opinion (the victims of many of the war crimes) and heightened the Sino-Japanese strategic rivalry at a time of growing Chinese power. Conclusions and Prospects for the Future Drifte (1996, 4) suggests that, “Looming behind the question of Japan’s future is often the assumption that big economic power leads sooner or later to political power and eventually military power”. Is this what we are seeing with Koizumi? Worries do exist regarding a post-
419 420
Diplomatic Bluebook 1998, 5-7. Frost 1989, 116.
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Cold War power vacuum leading to the rise of a regional hegemon in China. 421 As Drifte (55) notes, “The future of China is probably the most difficult challenge for Japan’s foreign and security policy”. A simmering conflict has existed between China over the Senkaku/Jiaoyutai islands off Okinawa since China passed a February 1992 law proclaiming sovereignty over all islands in the South China Sea. Recent posturing has heated the dilemma. Moreover, Japan has yet to apologize for wartime atrocities. Former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt suggested, “If I were Japan, my top priority would be establishing friendly relations by learning to say I’m sorry. They never have”. 422 The North Korean missile test of 1998, in addition to the ongoing confrontations with North Korea, indicates yet another local threat. Moreover, Drifte (19960 and Kawashima (2003) note the importance of balancing South Korean sensitivities and North Korean posturing. Japan continues to dispute with Russia the ownership of the Kurile Islands or “Northern territories”, seized by the USSR at the end of World War II. Japan’s extensive roots in economic nationalism also contribute to antagonisms both regionally and internationally. Although not the instigator and most often as a result of its alliance with the US, Japan has been involved in MIDs with all the above countries. In spite of the above, Kawashima (2003), the former vice-minister of foreign affairs (1991-2001) argues that Japan’s interests would best be served within international frameworks. Even though criticisms exist regarding US unilateralism in Iraq 423 , he still maintains that Japan should continue to work with the US to stop nuclear proliferation, fight terrorism, and maintain a deterrent to prevent hostilities at the world’s “flashpoints”. Sato (2002, 199) summarizes Japan’s
421
Rosecrance (2006), however, argues that will not lead to China developing a militarily aggressive foreign policy. Quoted in Eliot House 1989, 33. 423 The Koizumi government sent 600 Japanese military construction personnel to Iraq for “non-combat” roles (Chan and Safran 2006, 153). 422
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limitations, both internationally and domestically, by suggesting “Japan…pursues its own interests within the given room of maneuvering, and that both global-system and domestic factors determine the available maneuvering space”. Drifte (1996, 25-27) finds seven factors that contribute to Japanese pacifism: (1) the long period of seclusion during the Tokugawa period, (2) the defeat in 1945 leading to doubts about the utility of military power (reinforced by the Vietnam War), (3) the US-Japanese security alliance, (4) growing self-confidence in their economic power, (5) although not sufficiently recognized, an undercurrent that what Japan did to other countries in World War II was wrong, (6) Japan as a valuable international asset to other countries, and (7) the system of the peace constitution. To this list, I would add institutional constraints that prevent the massing of power in executive leadership that could force a shift in foreign policy, a culture adverse to individualism that contributes to the former phenomenon, growing political and economic internationalism both globally and domestically in the perceptions of policy makers, and international power constraints (after all, China is in the passing lane whether Japan likes it or not). The possibility does exist that a consensus could develop that merges economic and political nationalism and produce a militarized foreign policy. This, however, is unlikely. Prime ministers are too weak and institutionally constrained and many in the bureaucracy and Diet are well aware of the influences, both historical and current, that militate against an aggressive approach, such as defeated militarism, the pacific constitution, economic success, and effective military alliances, to allow that to happen above and beyond the notion that where they stand is where they sit. Consensualism in Japan, therefore, contributes to inhibiting the pursuit of militarized foreign policies.
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Italy The history of modern Italy begins with the proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy on March 17, 1861, at the Piedmontese capital of Turin. This outcome, the result of the process of Risorgimento (the organization of the Italian state), was achieved by a small minority of upperclass liberals of the House of Savoy, the ruling house of Piedmont and the Island of Sardinia. 424 Although unification was not complete until Italian troops marched on Rome in 1870, this organization of the Italian state brought together peoples that were socially fragmented along regional, class, ideological, urban-rural, and industrial-agricultural lines. Accordingly, at the time of proclamation, one statesman said, “We have made Italy, we must now make Italians”. 425 After unification, the Piedmontese Constitution of 1848 (Statuto Albertino) was transferred to the Italian state. The Statuto established a constitutional monarchy designed so that the executive branch’s responsibility would be to the king. The cabinet, however, soon became the primary arm of the executive branch. 426 . The liberal elites that succeeded in unifying Italy were members of the historic right (Destra). As political conservatives, as Kogan (1962, 3) states, “They believed in the economic doctrines of the nineteenth-century bourgeois world: private enterprise, balanced budgets, and sound credit”. The historic left (Sinistra), in part due to the Pope’s order for the faithful to abstain from political participation, assumed power in 1876 and stayed in office until World War I. The Sinistra sought to expand electoral eligibility, sought compulsory public education, and were generally more likely to employ the state in promoting Italian development. They were also interested in an expansive foreign policy and unsuccessfully tried to join the other European powers in colonial adventurism.
424 425 426
Kogan 1962, 1. Ibid, 1. Ibid, 3.
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The limited gains and high costs of World War I led to a tumultuous political environment that contributed to the ascension of Benito Mussolini to power in 1922 and the death of democratic governance. Under the banner of “believe, obey, fight”, Mussolini centralized the government and sought Italian glory through foreign occupation. His military and economic failures undermined what support Mussolini had and the invasion of Sicily and the Italian mainland by the Allied forces led to his removal from office. 427 Following the war, a plebiscite was held on June 2, 1946 that ended the monarchy and elected delegates to a Constitutional Assembly. On January 1, 1948, the new constitution went into effect. As Kogan (1962, 20), “An uneasy mixture of liberal, Marxist, and Catholic doctrine, it provides the shaky underpinnings for today’s government in Italy”. As this ‘uneasy mixture’ suggests, ‘Italians’ were not ‘made’ as some liberal statesmen had envisioned. Social fragmentation continued and contributed to political fragmentation within the framework of the constitution. These divisions have led to what many outsiders consider disarray to the point where many, such as Allum (1973), suggest that Italy is a “Republic without a government”. As Pridham (1983, 2000) notes, “It is commonplace to say that Italy ‘has no government’ or that it is perpetually, even unashamedly, ‘ineffective’”. Within this political culture and context, goal-driven politics often takes a backseat to politician’s desire to “smell the leather (of the ministerial car)”. 428 In other words, political elites are not readily interested in bridging fragmentation. In such an environment, as Giuseppe Di Palma (1977, 252) notes, “…politics thus becomes a pure game of power, mostly concerned with sottogoverno
427
When the German army occupied Northern Italy to continue the fight against the Allies, Mussolini was installed as the head of a puppet government known as the Salo Republic. He was eventually captured and killed by an Italian mob and hung upside-down in a public square. 428 Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2001, 342.
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(patronage), log-rolling, minute compromises, reciprocal non-interference. It is more difficult and not necessary to govern; it is easier and sufficient to sit in government”. To the outsider, and even the student of Italian politics, comprehending the system can be a rather mind-boggling exercise. It has been said that, “Italian governmental politics are a bizarre and Byzantine game”. 429 The task here is to add order to this apparent chaos. More importantly, this research seeks to assess the role interactions between executive leadership (the prime minister) and political institutions and the effect they have on foreign policy. Lijphart (1999) places Italy as a consensus democracy within his dichotomous typology of democracies. The expectations are that the dispersion of power within such systems will make it less likely for leadership to pursue aggressive foreign policies. After all, militarized foreign adventures, at a minimum, intuitively require majority support within democratic governments. Several steps are taken here to tease out the relationship between leadership and governmental institutions. This process begins with descriptive analysis of the institutional structures of government as established by the 1947 constitution for the period of 1948-1992. Examination of the formal and informal procedural rules and norms, due to inherent political fragmentation, inevitably leads to discussion of party politics. Because informal governance is so significant in the Italian model, parties are considered here as part of the institutional structures in their own right. This step is followed by a discussion of the primary position of formal institutional leadership, the prime minister. After reviewing the powers of the prime minister, or lack thereof, the research turns to domestic and external constraints on Italian foreign policy. As inferred, the prime minister has a myriad of domestic hurdles to jump when constructing foreign policy if he/she is so inclined. Moreover, Italy’s historic legacy of defeat in World War II and the development of the Cold War have had a profound effect Italian foreign policy. Italy did, however, have room to 429
The Times May 7, 1982.
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maneuver regarding European integration; hence inquiries into the subject can reveal the patterns of governmental behavior. A historic review of Italian foreign policy for 1945-1992 follows to assess the direction of Italian foreign policy during the Cold War. Developments in the post-1992 period are then examined to view evolutions in the less-constrained, post-Cold War period. The electoral changes of 1993 brought on by the scandals of the Christian Democratic Party (DC) appear to have altered the nature of party politics, governmental procedures and norms, and the role of the prime minister. After reviewing the electoral changes and the developing debates regarding Italian foreign policy, conclusions are drawn and prospects for the future are considered. The findings indicate that the prime minister, in this less constrained, post-Cold War international environment, is still hamstrung by institutional constraints, which now include the European Union. There may be reason to believe that a potential trajectory has been established that could increase the power of the prime minister rather dramatically within the Italian context, hence indicating a greater possibility of a more aggressive Italian foreign policy in the future. Domestic and international institutional constraints (the latter being EU institutions), in conjunction with Italy’s limited military potential and pattern of cooperation with its allies, however, make such a possibility unlikely. Institutions The Constitution of 1947 established a head of state in a presidency, an executive in the Council of Ministers (the cabinet) under the direction of the President of the Council of Ministers (prime minister), and a legislature consisting of two houses: the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, elected for five year terms by proportional representation.430 The Italian president, according to the constitution, has no particular political role. Both houses of parliament elect the 430
Pridham 1983, 204.
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president to a 7-year term of office in a plenary session. Presidents tend to play an intermediary rather than advisory role. An inverse-power relationship with the cabinet exists as cabinet instability strengthens the president’s hand. This is the case because the president acts as an “active midwife” in government formation. The president does have the power to veto legislation and dissolve parliament, but if he/she try to show muscle, they eventually run up against party factions. Therefore, presidents tend to be overseers of government rather than active participants. 431 The legislature has a powerful role in the formation and dissolution of governments. Both chambers must give a vote of confidence to bring a cabinet to power while only one chamber is required for a vote of no confidence. As Cotta (1988, 121) points out, “These provisions point in the direction of strong dependence of government on parliament”. Since World War II, however, governments have tended to resign when coalition agreements breakdown before a vote of no confidence. In the post-World War II period, every government has been a coalition. Because multiple parties are included in the cabinet, the executive is characterized by the dispersal of power and an administration that is “heterogeneous and sluggish”. 432 In other words, Italy’s political institutions are weak. According to the constitution, the prime minister and cabinet members are ‘on the same level’. For this reason, Criscitiello (1994, 189) calls the Italian executive “government by ministries”. Individual ministers often stay in government and can act “very autonomously as both policy-making centers and channels for extensive patronage (Sottogoverno or Clientelismo)”. 433
431 432 433
The discussion of the president draws extensively from Pridham 1983, 209-10. Ibid, 204. Ibid, 205.
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Mershon (1996) suggests that the limited turnover in cabinet positions adds stability in senior personnel in the executive, due to the necessity of certain parties being a part of coalitions, that can be missed by those who focus solely on the individual governments themselves. Cotta (1988, 133) even suggests that the maintenance of incumbent ministers has “fostered the growth of a strong ministerial oligarchy”. The constitution contributes to the power of ministers as each is an “autonomous constitutional body” and has “executive powers within his(/her) own jurisdiction”. 434 Ministers are, however, responsible to Parliament for actions of their ministry and are technically, according to the constitution, required to act collegially. Over time there has been a growth in the number of ministries to roughly 25-30 and the number of ministers has increased from 44 in the late 1940s to 87 in the early 1970s. 435 Cotta (1988, 130) suggests, “A major factor responsible for this growth has been the necessity to accommodate the requests of the many parties involved in coalitions”. Within governments, the largest coalition party usually holds the most important ministries; particularly significant for this study are the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. External relations, however, are often fragmented into more than one ministry such as Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Economic Affairs. Undersecretaries, introduced by law in 1888, also serve in the individual ministries. Although not an official part of the government, they are still politically important positions and therefore doled out to party faithful. In effect, this creates a two-tiered cabinet structure. Finally, a “VicePremier”, usually from the second largest party in the coalition, is frequently appointed to oversee and maintain coalitions. 436
434 435 436
Criscitiello 1994, 189. See Cotta (1988, 129-130) and Criscitiello (1994, 190). Discussion of cabinet and coalition positions drawn from Cotta (1988, 128-30).
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Although ministerial positions are powerful within the context of formal institutional structures, cabinets are not necessarily the focal point of decision-making. 437 As Pridham (1983, 204) notes, “(in general) a substantial gap exists between formal structures and ‘real’ government”. This is due to the informal importance of parties. Instability in governments exists because coalitions exist within the government itself. In fact, from 1945-1998, the mean length of government longevity was 331 days, the lowest in Europe during that period. 438 Cotta (1988, 128) suggests that short duration of governments is a sign of “high levels of conflict within government coalitions”. He argues that it is party heterogeneity of coalitions that is the source of such conflict. 439 Because cabinet positions are dispersed to all coalition members and each position is an executive body unto itself, Criscitiello (1994, 190) argues that governments are “fragmented” by the autonomy of ministers. The net effect is the lessening of collegiality within cabinets. Political Parties Despite the constitution’s vague promotion of collegiality, there is a general absence of collegiality or collective responsibility. Therefore, in a rather circular fashion, one’s primary loyalty is to party. 440 Table 5.1 lists of the parties that participated in coalitions government between 1945-1992. Laver and Hunt (1992) queried experts about the impact of parties on governments in Europe and found that Italy was highest on their scale. Pridham (1983, 207) suggests that, “Given that Italy’s state institutions are weak, the parties’ role must be seen as more crucial”. In other words, the student of Italian politics must look at more than formal
437
Pridham (1983, 205). Pridham cites two periods of activism: De Gasperi’s premiership in the later 1940s and the early center-right alliance when the Socialists (PSI) joined the Christian Democrats (DC) in government in the 1960s. 438 Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2001, 365. 439 Cotta 1988, 133. 440 Pridham 1983, 205.
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Table 5.1: A list of parties that participated in coalition governments, 1945-1992. • DC - Christian Democratic Party (largest party) • PCI - Italian Communist Party • PLI - Right Wing Liberals • PRI - Republican Party • PSDI - Social Democrats • PSI - Socialist Party (second largest party) institutions. One must also look at informal party activity out of parliament, which Pridham (201) refers to the “steady and ubiquitous party system”. This is why Italy is often called a partitocrazia (party-ocracy or party-state). Pridham (211) argues that, “‘Real’ government, therefore, revolves around the political parties acting individually or, more often, together whether through informal procedures or formal structures”. With the expulsion of the Communist party (PCI) from the coalition system in 1947 (largely due to their ideological recalcitrance at a time when the Cold War was hot) and its failure to align with the Socialist party in the 1950s following the repression of the Hungarian uprising, hence the eliminating it as a potential rival, the Christian Democratic party (DC) became a dominant party in Italian politics. From 1945-1992, the DC was a part of every coalition as the number one or two (usually number one) party of the coalition. With such a position of political prominence, the DC, much like the Liberal Democratic party of Japan, became factionalized within itself (the factions being referred to as correnti). As Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2001, 339-40) note, “The Italian Christian Democratic party…divided into factions before it broke up in the early 1990s…Each DC faction within government was typically rewarded with a very precise share of cabinet portfolios, almost as if it had been a distinct party in its own right”. This, of course, further fragmented an already fragmented political system.
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More dispersion of power can be seen by the fact that the party actors with the greatest influence “invariably are not members of the cabinet”. 441 Because governmental institutions are weak and parties are strong, less formal politicking outside of government is seen as a more powerful avenue for achieving political goals (i.e. helping from outside). With all this in mind, Pridham (1983, 211-219) sees five broad patterns in party behavior. The first is that governments are coalitions. Aside from the DC in 1948, no party has acquired an absolute majority. Even in 1948, however, the DC formed a coalition with three smaller parties. An underlying reason for this is that the electoral system was based on proportional representation and hence maintains a multi-party system. The coalitions also tend to be heterogeneous for the parties represent social fragmentation. The second pattern is the absence of alternation. The DC, as a large center party, has been in all governments. With the PCI banished from influence until the 1970s, there has been no alternative to the DC. Third, there has been variety and informality in alliance relationships. In fact, prime ministers have often returned to office with different coalitions. Fourth, powerful international constraints have existed in the form of the US and the Cold War. There have been powerful ideological and strategic reasons for working with the US. In fact, the CIA has had a strong presence in Italy and has covertly financed selected parties, primarily the DC. Only after the PCI had moderated its stance on the EU and NATO and distanced itself from Moscow did the PCI become an option for coalition governance in the 1970s. Even then, however, in 1976, Kissinger warned Italy that it would incur “serious consequences” if the PCI were included in government. 442
441 442
Pridham 1983, 207; see also Cotta 1988, 136. Pridham 1983, 219.
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Pridham’s fifth and final pattern is that each political party had its own base due to social fragmentation. For example, the DC was the anti-communist party and therefore had to be careful about pragmatically working with the PCI and offending its base. Cotta (1988, 123) adds a significant sixth pattern by noting that the duration of governments has typically been short. Finally, I would add the growing internationalization of Italian foreign policy by its continued and consistent commitment to European integration. These patterns during the period of 19451992 of short-lived governance, weak governmental institutions, coalition governments, powerful external influences, growing commitment to the EEC, and social and political fragmentation created a domestic situation where power was extensively dispersed among a manifold of actors. It is in this environment in which the prime minister operated. Leadership: The Prime Minister The Palazzo Chigi, the seat of the prime minister’s office, does not have a commanding view. The position is relatively weak, especially in comparisons with prime ministerial positions in other countries such as Britain or Germany. The main role of the prime minister during the 1945-1992 period has been to settle conflicts in coalitions and therefore the position involves more mediation than innovation. As Cotta (1988) states, “The prime minister’s role is to manage the government’s affairs by promoting and coordinating the activity of the ministers”. Moreover, prime ministers are not always seen as particularly powerful within the coalition or even their own party, the DC (all prime ministers during this time period, except for Spadolini in 1981-81, were from the DC) 443 . Pridham (1983, 206) suggests, “More often than not, heads of government have owed their appointments to their positions as faction chiefs rather than
443
Perhaps a portent of the future, the DC P2 scandal of the early 1980s led to the selection of Republican Spadolini for a brief period even though the Republicans received only 3% of the vote
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authoritative leaders of their own parties, so that their survival in office depended on their continuing alliance with other correnti but also, significantly, on other coalition parties”. Parties also maintained their powerful position by the fact that the most powerful leaders were often outside of government. This combination of an institutionally weak prime minister within the context of powerful parties is encapsulated by Pridham (1983, 211) when he states, “The prime minister’s limited constitutional position does not allow him(/her) to act ‘above party’—or for that matter, ‘above faction’”. 444 Prime ministers also had limited roles in selecting cabinet ministers being hamstrung by the demands of coalitional governance. Moreover, they do not have any real powers to dismiss them. 445 Once in office, the prime minister often had to contend with oligarchic, often autonomous ministers that in their own actions fragmented the government. In addition, the prime minister does not have a “comparable supporting bureaucracy” to ministers. 446 In the realm of foreign affairs, DC prime ministers often had fellow DC ministers in key positions, but foreign policy was often divided among multiple ministries and his potential ministerial allies may belong to a different correnti. Italian foreign policy has a tradition of prime ministerial primacy, yet prime ministers must also contend with “societal penetration of government institutions”. 447 The net result was that foreign policy decision-making required long consultations. It is little wonder that Spadolini described the role of prime minister as “a permanent obstacle race”. 448 The prime minister does have an undersecretary attached to his/her office, the most important of all undersecretaries. They take on the role of secretary during the Council of 444
The major exception was Prime Minister De Gasperi who owed his ability to be ‘above party’ to the unique historical confluence of being in office when the republic was initiated under the eye of conquering powers who could possibly intervene at a time when the Cold War was initiating. 445 See Cotta 1988, 131 and Criscitiello 1994, 189. 446 Cotta 1988, 132. 447 Chan and Safran 2006, 144. 448 Pridham 1983, 206. Pridham does cite three examples of stronger leadership from prime ministers in De Gasperi, Fanfani, and Moro.
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Ministers, yet they do not have formal voting power. 449 Over time, in order to increase the efficiency of the decision-making, the bureaucratic powers of the prime minister have increased to combat fragmentation. By the early 1980s, the prime minister’s authority had increased because of changes in the 1970s, “owing to administrative upgrade of the office and greater recognition of the need for an “institutional center to give the system a degree of coherence”.450 Criscitiello (1994) argues that two historical phases have existed in the Italian cabinet. The first, from 1946 to the mid-1960s, was a period of high ministerial autonomy and strong parliaments. The second period, from the mid-1960s to 1993, consisted of stronger-albeit ‘restricted’ collegiality within the cabinet and the development of what he terms a ‘monocratic’ prime minister. One factor he argues contributed to the trend in growth of prime ministerial power and leadership was the increasing usage of Majority Summits (Vertici di Maggioranza). Although not a formal constitutional procedure, these meetings, 70 percent of which occur in the prime minister’s offices, coordinate and increase collegiality in the cabinet. He calls the summits the “efficient secret” of the Italian governmental model. A second reason for the shift was the rise of the inner cabinet of key ministers, first used by the Craxi government in 1983. The inner cabinet was formally established in August 1988. The inner cabinet has played an important role in foreign affairs in the cases of relations between Italy and Libya, the Lebanon issue, and the crisis in the Gulf of Suez. In should be mentioned, however, that the inner cabinet must contain a member from each party in the coalition. A third strand of Criscitiello’s argument is that modifications in 1988 to parliamentary regulations and Law 400 of 1988 concerning the prime minister have led to a phase of “directing government, ratifying parliament”. He suggests that the prime minister can no longer be seen as
449 450
Ibid, 129. Ibid 207.
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coordinator between ministries. The final factor contributing to greater power of the prime minister has been the advent of new bodies at the end of the 1970s called “informal subgroups” (which just so happen to play a role in security). As he notes (196), “In these restricted decisionmaking bodies, the prime minister took on an unquestioned role of pre-eminence”. Yet despite his argument, Criscitiello acknowledges, “Nonetheless, although the prime minister’s powers within the cabinet have increased, they remain limited by the need for coalitional bargaining, and by the power of party leaders”. The period of 1945-1992, therefore, was one of continuity and change. The trends towards greater authority in the prime minister will be revisited when the post-1992 period is considered. Before that discussion can begin, however, the domestic and external constraints faced by Italy in the pre-1993 period should be reviewed along with the course of Italian foreign policy. This process will provide description and explanation for Italy’s international behaviors. Establishing this foundation for comparison will then enable exploration of the post-Cold War period. Domestic and External Constraints The discussion above displays the myriad of obstacles and roadblocks existent within the domestic context that inhibit the policy-making process for prime ministers and cabinets. These barriers include weak governmental institutions, coalition governments, the dominance of party and faction politics, and the short duration of governments, all of which operate within and are influenced by social fragmentation. Moreover, foreign policy often requires extensive consultation among multiple ministries to create outputs. As Lijphart (1999) and Chan and Safran (2006) suggest, such coalitional environments tend to limit the potential for extreme policy positions and encourage drift towards the center.
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This phenomenon is furthered by, as Pridham (1983) states, “the need for social consensus”. Furthermore, historical experience has conditioned the populace towards cabinet governance within coalitions and away from power concentrations and nationalistic adventurism in foreign policy. In short, the context of Italian politics from 1945-1992 encouraged moderation and international cooperation in foreign policy outputs. Externally, as discussed above, Italy was powerfully constrained by the US within the context of the Cold War. This contributed to the declined relevance of the PCI as well as bolstering the significance of the DC. Although Italy benefited in many ways from these arrangements 451 , foreign policy was inevitably constrained. In addition, through this period, efforts to work with the European Economic Community (EEC) and ultimately the European Union (EU) after the Maastricht treaty of 1992 increasingly influenced Italian behavior in the economic and political realms. Although EEC influence in defense issues and foreign affairs beyond European borders has been limited, extreme deviations in foreign policy could cause problems with fellow EEC members. Therefore, the EEC, and even more so the EU, can be seen as a growing constraint on Italian foreign policy. The above factors, accordingly, must be considered when assessing the affect prime ministers have on Italian foreign policy. History, 1945-1992 The period begins, of course, with Italy as a defeated country. Although they joined the Allies after the 1943 Armistice, Italy for all intents and purposes was a vanquished country. The victorious allies closely monitored Italian political developments, hence a powerful incentive existed to liberalize and re-democratize the country. 1946 saw the end of the monarchy, and 1948 began a new era under a new constitution. At the time, Italy had a range of foreign policy
451
Alibon and Greco (1996, 45) suggest that “Italy was allowed to enjoy a kind of rentier status as a result of its geopolitical position.
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issues with which to contend, as Andreotti (1994, 533) makes plain: “the fate of Trieste and Venezia-Gulia, Trent and the Italian South Tyrol, the borders with France, and war reparations”. The conditions of the time, as he notes, meant, “Italy could no longer go it alone”. 452 With the world crystallizing into a bipolar structure, the 1948 elections were critical. The strong support for the DC and prime minister Alcide De Gasperi, a victory obtaining an absolute majority, indicated the direction Italy would go. As Andreotti (1994, 534) notes, a vote for De Gasperi was a vote for the “Western option”. With strong electoral backing and significant international developments as direction, De Gasperi’s time in office was a period of prime ministerial activism. Italy became an original member of NATO in 1949. 453 One month after joining NATO, Italy was admitted to the Council of Europe. A powerful domestic factor during this period was the existence of the PCI, the largest Communist party in Europe. In 1944, PCI membership was 10,000; in 1945 membership had grown to 100,000; and by 1946, membership was over a million. 454 Kogan (1962, 171) states, “the major objective of Italian foreign policy (was) the defense of the existing socio-political system from internal attack. This attack (was) usually defined as coming from the Italian Communist party”. Accordingly, there has been an enduring mistrust of the Communist party. The communists were kicked out of government in 1947 and were not a part of government until 1979. 455 Another determinant in the direction of Italian foreign policy involved emigration. Between 1876-1976, 26 million Italians emigrated all over the world to find work. 456 Hence De
452
Andreotti 1994, 533 The vote to join NATO in parliament was 342-170, with 19 abstentions. This occurred in the country with the largest Communist party in Europe (Andreotti 1994, 534). 454 Kogan 1962, 19. 455 Pridham 1983, 201. 456 Andreotti 1994, 530-31. 453
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Gasperi not only argued for membership in NATO to assure continued economic aid, but also “to guarantee the continued possibility for Italians to emigrate”. 457 The benefits of the ‘Western option’ began to yield direct results. On September 26, 1951, the US, UK and France “announced that they would no longer insist on the performance of the political clause of the peace treaty”. 458 In October 1954, thanks to Anglo-American mediation, the “Memorandum of Understanding” was signed in London and Trieste was returned to Italy. 459 The same month, Italy joined the Western European Union (WEU) defensive military alliance. In 1955, Italy was admitted to the UN. Differences between the PCI and the Italian Socialist party (PSI) over the 1956 Soviet repression of the Hungarian uprising further strengthened the move towards the West. 460 Through the 1950s, Italy continued to join European cooperative efforts. Italy was a member of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Rather fittingly, the agreements that established the EEC and Euratom were signed in Italy in the form of the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Andreotti (1994, 536) rather convincingly argues, “(Integration) has become a constant feature in Italy’s foreign policy on which the legal country and the real country are united”. This direction in foreign policy has strong pragmatic roots of national interest. Kogan (1962, 173) elucidates this point succinctly in the following passage: There is a tremendous desire to be a member of all conceivable international organizations and to participate in every possible international conference. Within these organizations the Italians have pushed claims for the equality of all members, opposing any international hierarchies, not because Italy opposes the hierarchical principle, but because it was not included within the inner group at the top of the hierarchy.
457
Kogan 1962, 167. Andreotti 1994, 534. This lead to greater internal political independence, but it should be mentioned that the US maintained its presence by supporting the DC. 459 Ibid, 535. 460 Ibid, 535. 458
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The 1960s and 1970s saw what Andreotti (1994, 536) calls the “Italy’s economic miracle” which led to membership in the G-7. Italy had also developed a measured approach to international crises involving its interests. Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi’s 1970 coup d’état in Libya led to the expulsion of Italians and the expropriation of all of their properties. Italy did not respond aggressively but rather “preferred to leave open the path of negotiations”. 461 The 1970s also saw an interesting domestic development, namely the inclusion of the PCI in Andreotti’s National Solidarity government at the end of the decade. This “depolarization of elites” occurred largely because the PCI decided to abandon the policy of trying to obtain 51 percent of the vote, distance itself from Moscow, and accept membership in the EEC and NATO. The PCI continued not to function well in this coalition, a pattern continued from the past when they couldn’t even form an alliance with the PSI. This development did, however, have theoretical significance regarding consensualism. As Pridham (1983, 203) states, “The ‘consociational’ theorists have obviously been drawn to the Italian case with the rapproachment between Christian Democrats and Communists in the 1970s as an interesting example of possible accommodation among elites in a fragmented society”. During 1970s and 1980s, Italy continued down the path of European integration in line with widespread consensus among the public and the parties alike. 462 In both the 1979 and 1984 European elections, as Andreotti (1994, 537) states, “more Italians voted than in any other European country”. Italy also became involved in peacekeeping missions in the Sinai (1981), Lebanon (1982-84), Somalia (1992), and Mozambique (1992). In addition, Italy helped broker an end to the dispute over Malta at the end of the 1980s between Libya, Malta, and the UK. Italy began to develop independence in foreign policy from US influence at this time, which was
461 462
Ibid, 536. Aliboni and Greco 1996, 47-48.
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exemplified by its lack of participation in the 1986 US bombing raids in Libya. Staying true to its growing roots in the European community, Italy did join in EEC sanction against Libya. Italy also tried to persuade the US to accept Ivan Primakov’s peace plan to prevent the conflagration with Iraq in 1991 out of fears that the US would attack before all political solutions were exhausted. 463 At the end of the 1945-1992 period, broad support existed for internationalism from the Italian public and political parties. In fact, with the shift in the PCI’s position, all parties had supported integration since the 1970s. During the period, Italy’s foreign policy was neutralist in orientation as they were involved in only 14 militarized interstate disputes while instigating only two of these disputes. Prime ministerial adventurism was not a significant factor as the MID data suggests. Five reasons can help explain this pattern. First, Italy was a defeated power at the end of World War II, which demonstrating the limitations of nationalistic strategies, and therefore chose the direction of international cooperation and integration as a path to seek its national interests. Secondly, prime ministers were profoundly constrained by coalition governance. In fact, not once did elections yield single party majority government. 464 The third rather obvious factor was that the prime minister in Italy is in an institutionally weak position. The fact that prime ministers are considered simply an equal to cabinet is but one example highlighting this fact. A fourth reason was that Italy, as an ally to the west with moderate military means, was constrained by the Cold War and US pressure both diplomatically and domestically with CIA involvement in Italian electioneering. Lastly, both the prime ministers and the public they represented continuously supported internationalization rather than a return to nationalistic approaches to foreign policy.
463 464
Beschloss and Talbot 1993, 274. De Gasperi’s 1948 government, as mentioned above, included three other small parties.
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There is evidence, as highlighted by Criscitiello (1994), that towards the end of this period the power of the prime minister was increasing. Developments in the post-1992 period suggest that this trajectory may continue, with the aid of happen stance, towards centralizing power within the prime minister. Post-1992 Up until 1992, the DC had never been out of government. In 1993, however, DC scandals led to the fall from grace of the DC and the development of a new electoral system. In the new system, 75 percent of all seats were allocated in single-seat constituencies on a first-pastthe-post basis. 465 This has led to the formation of cartels of the left and right, harkening back to the days of Destra and Sinistra, as a means to coordinate efforts to obtain seats. A center cartel formed for the 1994 elections known as the centrist Pact for Italy, but it has yet to make an impact. This cartel strategy helps eliminate the problem of parties on either side of the spectrum from canceling each other out in the single-seat constituencies. The cartel of the center-right, known as the Polo della Libertá (The Freedom Pole), has been led by newcomer, media mogul Silvio Berlusconi, founder of the new party Forza Italia, and includes the National Alliance, which roots that trace back to Italy’s wartime fascists, and the Northern League. The center-left cartel is known as the l’Ulivio (the Olive Tree) and consists of parties of the left, including the Reformed Italian Communist party (RC). 466 A clear pattern developed by 2005 with alternations between cartels of the right and the left taking turns in power. 467 Moreover, the new electoral system has led to increased cabinet turnover. 468 This
465 466 467 468
Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2001, 354. Ibid, 341. Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2005. Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2001, 368.
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development has, at least on its face, weaked the bargaining position of the cabinet with the prime minister as the former oligarchical pattern diminishes. Berlusconi’s cartel won the 1994 elections, but his government fell apart with the withdrawal of the Northern League. In the 1996 elections, Berlusconi was supplanted by the l’Ulivio led by Lamberto Dini. The 2001 elections only included the Freedom Pole and the Olive Tree, with Berlusconi’s center-right cartel achieving the right to form the government. By including additional, “surplus” parties, he prevented a repeat of the 1995 because the withdrawal of the Northern League could no longer bring down the government. In fact, Berlusconi remains in power until April 2006, becoming the longest-lasting government in the post-World War II era. 469 These developments have altered the face of Italian politics in a manner that can be described as at least a moderate sea change. Along with these developments, with Italy no longer hamstrung by the Cold War, a debate in Italian foreign policy has emerged between the re-nationalization of foreign policy versus continued internationalization. The reemergence of Hobbesianism has been championed by Euroskeptics and others on the right while the left continues to support transnationalism. In fact, Berlusconi’s 1994-95 Foreign Minister Antonio Martino openly criticized the Maastricht Treaty (even though this did not become part of government policy). 470 The neo-nationalists fear that the choice to internationalize foreign policy has ended “a sense of belonging to a national community” and that too much power has been ceded to the EU bureaucracy. 471 Moreover, Berlusconi committed 3000 troops to the current war in Iraq. The lack of casualties served as a buttress against majority public opinion against the war. 472 The shooting of an Italian security
469 470 471 472
Ibid. Alibon and Greco 1996, 48. Ibid, 45-48. Chan and Safran 2006, 144.
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officer by US soldiers in March 2005 prefaced the loss in 12 of 14 regional electoral contests in April 2005 to the center-left opposition led by Romano Prodi, led to the formation of a new cabinet to address mounting criticism, and contributed to Berlusconi’s announcement that he would consider withdrawing troops by September 2006. 473 Berlusconi did not make it to September 2006 for his Forza Italia was defeated by the center-left coalition headed by Prodi in April 2006. With issues such as the future of the EU, the enlargement of NATO, the “Eastern question” (developments in the former Yugoslavia), Italy’s proximity to unstable regimes, and terrorism, the electoral changes, and expanded debate regarding the direction of foreign policy encapsulated within the left and right cartels, these developments could have far reaching consequences. 474 A potential does exist for a move away from internationalism and neutralism, as exemplified by Italian participation in the Iraqi War. And it is certainly theoretically interesting that these developments correlate with a drift from consensualism. Conclusion and Prospects for the Future During the period of 1945-1992, the role of the prime minister was diminished by the historic legacy of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, coalitional governance, feeble institutional powers, international constraints, and broad support for internationalization. Over time, the prime minister gained mild powers, but foreign policy remained neutral throughout. This traditional pattern of consensus governance and foreign policy cannot be discounted as we move into the future. The electoral changes of 1993 have brought about significant changes in the nature of electoral politics, the power of cabinet ministers, and the potential duration of governments.
473 474
Ibid, 150. For discussion of these issues, see Ibid, 44 and Filippo 2001.
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These changes have increased the power of the prime minister while at the same time increasing the attractiveness of the position. Moreover, nationalism has reared its head once again. Will these changes lead to a more aggressive foreign policy? Will politicians who see the world in more conflictual terms be more likely to seek the office of prime minister? Will Italy become entangled in regional conflicts because of the growing support for Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa at a time when many are calling for re-nationalization and greater independence of foreign policy? Will Italy become a more combative member of the EU? Has the success of the right determined this will by the direction in which Italy will move? Will Italy continue its departure from consensualism and develop a majoritarian system? In the short to medium term, significant changes in foreign policy seem unlikely. Both cartels are still coalitions and therefore inter-party bargaining is still the norm. Moreover, because both cartels contain center elements, it is unlikely that an aggressive renegade could commandeer the office of the prime minister and remain in power. Government may have seen changes, but Italy remains a socially fragmented country and a democracy so the expectations have to be that the government will continue to politically fragmented along party lines as the parties represent the cleavages in society. Although neo-nationalism now has a voice, the longstanding traditions of internationalism and the profound economic benefits they entail, especially within the EU, will not easily, if at all, be dissuaded. Simply put, Italy has deep roots in European integration. Although Italy has maintained a continental European approach to terrorism, Berlusconi did commit 3000 troops to the US-led invasion of Iraq, the fourth largest contingent in the “coalition of the willing”. The position of prime minister, however, has yet to acquire enough power to be considered monocratic. Prodi’s position regarding the withdrawal of troops and his subsequent
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victory in the April 2006 elections suggest limitations in the power of the prime minister in the realm of foreign policy. Berlusconi’s electoral loss potentially points in this direction. Moreover, the system is still fragmented, although in a more orderly fashion, and consensus is a necessary condition in Italian politics for extensive revision of foreign policy. As Alibon and Greco (1996, 47) note, “widespread national consensus” is a prerequisite for a “truly bipartisan foreign policy”. Consensualism remains a part of the fabric of Italian politics and a requirement in foreign policy. The United Kingdom The United Kingdom has a long history of dispersing power from a centrally powerful actor, the monarch, dating back to Magna Carta. From the 18th to the 20th century, Britain developed an extensive empire through colonial expansion and imperialism and developed an international system some refer to as Pax Britannica or the British peace. The system was, of course, far from peaceful as it led to numerous wars and required the subjugation of indigenous peoples and colonialists ranging from American colonials to the Zulus, Boers, and Mau-Mau. The perspective of the sun never setting on the British empire lasted until the 20th century and contributed to the failed attempt to reestablish the gold standard after the first of the great wars. 475 At home, dramatic change occurred in British social dynamics far too expansive to cover in this study. In terms of governance, however, a few developments deserve mention. The position of prime minister slowly evolved in power and scope from the time of Sir Robert Walpole (1721-1742), whom many historians count as the first prime minister. 476 The 19th century saw power transferred from the monarch and parliament to the cabinet selected and
475 476
For analysis of the attempt to return to the gold standard, see Polanyi 2001. Norton 1991, 200.
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headed by the prime minister. Interestingly, the position of prime minister was not even referred to in a statute until the 20th century. 477 The modern period of party behavior dates back to the 1884 Representation of the People Act, which enfranchised the working class and created the conditions for the formation of parties to mobilize these new voters. Moreover, the “all or nothing” spoils of the electoral system led to elections being contested primarily between two parties. 478 In the evolving constellation of government order, as Norton notes, “The government was dominant…the role of the parliament became largely but not wholly one of legitimizing the measures put before it”. With the success of the party determined by the government, the pattern of party cohesiveness was established which continues to this day. Cases of coalition governance did occur, however, prior to World War II. During the First World War, Lloyd George, aided by the split in the Liberals, formed a wartime coalition government to help confront the circumstances at hand. With the gold standard stunted and the Great Depression wrecking global economic damage, Britain sought cohesion with governments of National Unity in the 1930s. The world, of course, spiraled into a second great war and Britain, along with Europe and much of the world, was decimated. Britain was on the victorious side of that conflagration, yet ended weakened at home and abroad. This research seeks to investigate the role the interactions between institutions and leadership have had on foreign policy outputs in the post-World War II period. The expectation is that the United Kingdom, as a majoritarian system, is less institutionally equipped to prevent adventuresome leadership from pursuing aggressive foreign policies. To investigate the case of Great Britain, several steps are taken. I begin by examining the nature of governmental
477 478
Ibid. Ibid, 50-51.
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institutions, including the constitution, parliament, the cabinet, and political parties, to assess the degree to which prime ministers are structurally constrained. The powers of the prime minister are then examined within the institutional framework. The evidence indicates that the prime minister in the UK does indeed hold wide latitude and power in the direction of governmental initiatives, especially foreign policy. The following section reviews historical developments during the 1945-1992 period, with close attention to external constraints on British foreign policy behavior. In many ways, British leadership’s perceptions do not match the reality of their position during this period of a declining empire. The post-1992 era is then considered as both foreign policy and institutional reforms are examined. This leads to the conclusion and assessments of the prospects for the future. Of particular interest in the future will be the degree to which the United Kingdom leans either towards Europe or the United States. A move towards Europe would increase the already substantial constraints the EU places on British foreign policy. The power of the British prime minister does suggest, however, that those who hold the position will have significant influence on how this basic dilemma is resolved. Institutions Britain does not have a written, codified constitution. The government, therefore, lacks unambiguous rules “setting out the structure of government and the powers, rights and obligations of those who work within it”. 479 Although not codified, sources do exist that provide guidelines to this unwritten constitution. Norton (1991, 73-76) cites four sources: (1) statute law (acts of Parliament), (2) common law (rules and customs established by precedence), (3) conventions (rules of behavior that are considered binding), and (4) works of authority (scholarly works that have “persuasive”, not binding, authority). Parliament, which enacts statue law, 479
Burch 1988, 17.
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consists of two houses, the House of Lords and the House of Commons. Based on the evolution of power being directed away from the aristocracy and towards the general populace, the House of Commons is the more significant of the two bodies. In the context of the British system, however, as Norton (197) states, “Parliament is essentially a policy ratifying rather than policymaking body”. The government, drawn from the majority party in Parliament, is the primary source of policy. The cabinet, therefore, can have a significant role in the formation of policy. “In practice”, Burch (1988, 17) notes, “the cabinet is not always as substantial as the conventional wisdom suggests…the importance of the cabinet varies according to its complexion, the circumstances in which it operates and the style of leadership (i.e. the prime minister) to which it is subject”. At times, ministers are powerful enough to have an important role in policy. King (1994, 203) cites two examples: Colonial Secretary Iain MacCleod who in the 1950s “greatly accelerated the movement toward colonial independence in Africa” and Margaret Thatcher’s first Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, who “almost single-handedly achieved the Lancaster House agreement that brought an end to the civil war in Rhodesia”. The cabinet, as Burch (1988, 17) suggests, is guided by three important conventions or accepted ways of doing things. The first is the convention of collegial or collective responsibility, which requires that once a decision is made, all members of the cabinet must support it. If they do not, dissenters should resign. The second convention is that individual ministers are responsible to parliament. Lastly is the convention of confidentiality. This norm
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obliges cabinet members to keep private the business of the cabinet. As is readily apparent, the first and third conventions add power to the executive. 480 Prior to World War II, coalition governments were the exception. Since the war, even though two minority governments did come to power (1974 and 1976-79), not a single government has been a coalition. The implication of single-party rule is that all cabinet ministers come from one party. Moreover, factionalism is not a significant phenomenon in Britain. Hence, since very few factional leaders are in the parties, there is no pressing need to put them in the cabinet. 481 These two factors structurally contribute to greater cabinet cohesion than is seen in most European countries. The number of cabinet members, aside from a slight increase in the 1960s, has remained roughly numbered at twenty positions. The number of other ministers, however, has increased somewhat. 482 In times of international crisis, Britain has a tradition of having small wartime cabinets to facilitate decision-making. 483 This pattern, therefore, leads to a convergence of power during periods of significant foreign policy decision-making within fewer hands, particularly the prime minister. Aside from crisis situations, the cabinet actually functions “in the context of a wider set of institutions, especially its committees and secretariat”. 484 This is referred to as the cabinet system. The secretariat coordinates cabinet operations and therefore works closely with the prime minister. Committees come in two forms: standing or permanent committees and ad-hoc or temporary committees. The number and composition of committees are a closely guarded secret 480
It should be noted that there is a blurring of the distinction between the legislative and executive branches in the British system. Because the government is the center of policy-making and Parliament, for the most part, simply approves the measures based on party cohesion, I feel confident in referring to the executive as a separate entity. 481 King 2004, 209-10. 482 Atlee had 66 ministers while Thatcher had 85 (Burch 1988, 19). 483 Baylis 1989, 50. 484 Burch 1988, 19.
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hence concentrating power in the executive by shielding these governmental activities from the public. Committees have the power to make decisions without reference to the cabinet. Interestingly this pattern of dispersing authority can contribute to the focusing power within central points within the committee system. 485 Because the committee system, the cabinet, and parliament are based on single-party rule, it is necessary to devote some space to the political parties. Political Parties The two most significant parties are the Conservative party and the Labour party. The conservatives have held to reigns of power for the majority of the post-war era, but Labour has also ruled for a significant amount of time. The Liberal party, later the SDP/Liberal alliance and now the Liberal Democrats, can play the role of spoiler or, in rare cases such in the LiberalLabour pact from early 1977 to autumn 1978, participate in governance with one of the major parties. 486 As mentioned above, one party rule remains the norm. As Norton (1991, 125) explains, “A unitary and parliamentary form of government has favored the development of centralized and cohesive parties geared to offering a programmatic choice to the electors and to carrying out that program once the all-or-nothing spoils of general election have been gained”. In fact, most political leaders remain hostile to the notion of coalition governance. 487 The electoral and governing system therefore leaves little power in the hands of the opposition. In a survey of experts regarding the impact of opposition parties on government policy performed by Laver and Hunt (1992), Britain is tied with Spain for the opposition party having the least influence over policy. The electoral and party system, therefore, contribute to
485
Discussions regarding committees draws from Burch 1988, 26. The Scottish National Party, which typically receives a little over 1 percent of the votes, did play a significant role in the devolution of power to Scottish governance. 487 See Mellors 1983, 231. 486
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the centralization of power in the executive. British governments also have a significant amount of time in office to pursue their policy goals. The average length of governments in the United Kingdom from 1945-1998 was 995 days, the second longest average duration in Europe behind Luxembourg. 488 For all the power concentrated in the government and despite the party system, no government has received a majority of the popular vote nationwide (the closest being the conservatives in 1955 with 49.7 percent). This has not affected party unity. As discussed above, party cohesion dates back to the 1884 Representation of the People Act. Beer (1969) finds that prior to 1970, party cohesion was nearly 100 percent. 489 Although a slight decline in party discipline has occurred, Rose (1983) finds that MPs follow the party line well above 90 percent of the time, still a significant figure. Norton (1991, 289) notes that internal pressures exist that elicit conformity. Local parties do not like MPs resisting national party interests because it can hurt them in their electoral pursuits. One final point worth mentioning is that the Conservative party outside of parliament, unlike Labour, has no formal role in the shaping of policy or the selection of personnel. 490 This suggests that the Conservative party structurally centralizes power. The implication is that such tendencies could influence the shape of policy when the conservatives are in power. Leadership: The Prime Minister The tone of the discussion to this point is that the executive has a high degree of power in the British system. The prime minister, as chief minister, is the focal point of this power. Baylis (1989, 45) cites Crossman and MacKintosh’s argument from the early 1960s for the prime ministerial government thesis. From the perspective, the prime minister is becoming 488 489 490
Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2001, 365. Cited in Norton 1991, 307. Burch 1988, 24.
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increasingly powerful. Not all agree with this assessment. 491 There is no doubt that prime ministers do have to deal with weighty ministerial figures at times. Although prime ministers naturally do not want to upset powerful department ministers, variations exist regarding prime ministerial intervention in cabinet workings. Burch (1988, 28) notes the divergence in leadership styles between Callaghan’s chairman-style approach and Thatcher’s methods of assuming more of a leading role. Regarding foreign policy, Coles (2000) suggests, “Much has depended on the predilections of the particular prime minister in office and his or her relationship with, in particular, the foreign secretary”. Baylis addresses such variations in the following manner: The diversity of prime ministerial behavior, varying as it does with the personality of the incumbent, the circumstance of the time, and the strengths or weaknesses of his or her cabinet colleagues, suggests that a great deal of flexibility is to be found in the operation of British executive institutions—not surprising, perhaps, in a country with an “unwritten” constitution. 492 Baylis (1989, 46-48) provides four arguments for why British governance could be considered an example of prime ministerial government: (1) the specific powers over the cabinet, (2) the success of the party hinges on the success of the prime minister, (3) the prime minister’s “control” over the civil service, and (4) the prime minister as the focus of media attention. The first argument is particularly powerful. The prime minister, and not the cabinet, Parliament, or other parties, controls, as Burch (1988) states, “the composition, structure, and procedures of the cabinet”. The prime minister selects their cabinet and appoints junior ministers. Interestingly, the tradition is not to select specialists for cabinet positions. In fact, ministers seek to advance their careers by moving up the ministerial ladder and therefore tend to become what King (1994, 204) refers to as “generalists par excellence”.
491 492
For a review of opposing arguments, see Baylis 46. Baylis 1989, 50.
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This increases prime ministerial power in two ways. First, relying on generalists rather than specialists keeps policy direction in the political rather than technocratic realm, hence structurally filtering dissonant perspectives. Secondly, ministers need to please the prime minister if they are going to move up the ministerial ladder and improve their portfolios. Moreover, this creates incentives to avoid advancing policy initiatives. King (1994, 206) makes these dynamics clear when he states, “Most British ministers get along by going along. They are not, and do not aspire to be, major policy actors in their own right”. To stress the essential authority of the prime minister within this compositional and procedural framework, Peter Walker, who spent 11 ½ years in the Thatcher’s cabinet, argues, “The politician who keeps in favor is not being unprincipled. He or she has to recognize that the prime minister will decide”. 493 King suggests that this “is the British norm”. Even when great discord does arise in cabinet meetings, if the prime minister has a couple of powerful ministerial allies, he or she will control the policy debate. As Baylis (1989, 59) states, “(In cabinet meetings) numerical majorities are unlikely to carry the day against the prime minister, chancellor, and foreign and/or home secretary; indeed, they are unlikely to arise”. Add to this the fact that serious international crises lead to the creation of small wartime cabinets, and the dynamics favor the prime minister even further. Structurally, the prime minister can make or unmake cabinet ministries (although clearly important ministries are secure) and, more often, committees. Procedurally, the prime minister decides how often they meet with the cabinet. Burch (1988, 21) notes that the number of meetings has decreased from twice a week to once a week and Thatcher averaged an all time low of 40-45 a year. The prime minister also determines who speaks and when meetings are held. The prime minister has tools at his or her disposal in working with the cabinet. Norton (1991, 493
King 1994, 205.
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202) states, “the prime minister, as chairman of the cabinet, has at her disposal the secretary of the cabinet (who is usually head of the civil service), the cabinet secretariat (which records and monitors cabinet decisions), and a policy unit (first brought in by Labour in the 1970s, this is a group of experts that are politically committed individuals)”. The secretariat, which works closely with the prime minister, controls the circulation of cabinet committee memorandum, which “can also serve to strengthen the center against the departments”. 494 The secretariat also makes sure the ministers are following up on “Cabinet Conclusions” (i.e. resolutions of cabinet meetings). 495 In addition to these powers, the prime minister can also use personal contacts and smaller meetings outside of the cabinet in manners that can lead to policy. 496 Finally, the prime minister can simply make decisions by themselves and it becomes a fait accompli such as the case of Eden during the Suez Crisis. 497 Baylis’s mention of media focus upon the prime minister is important because the significance of media relations has grown. 498 Coles (2000, 10), a career diplomat of 37 years who was private secretary to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, argues that the importance of management and presentation (to the Parliament, public, and media) has surpassed that of policy analysis. Yet Baylis’s list does not fully represent all the powers of the prime minister. For instance, it is important to note the conventions of collegial responsibility, which inherently conceals dissent, and confidentiality, with inherent attributes of keeping information from the public, structurally empower the government in a democratic society. More significant is the role of the prime minister as party leader.
494 495 496 497 498
Burch 1988, 29. Ibid, 30. Ibid, 32. Baylis 1989, 46. See Norton 1991.
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Not only does the success of the party depend on the success of the prime minister, directing policy under the conditions of extensive party cohesion naturally extends the power of the prime minister within the party. Moreover, this power extends to Parliament as the prime minister appoints a chief whip and 12 or 13 other whips in the House of Commons and 5 or 6 other whips in the House of Lords. 499 The power as party leader is even more expansive for the Conservatives. The party leader not only “is the fount of all party policy”, but also “appoints heads of the Conservative Central Office”. 500 Norton (1991, 203) notes that Thatcher demonstrated that this power “can sometimes constitute a radical departure”. In this situation, the odds of success are comparatively good. Baylis (1989, 57) notes, “Cases in which the prime minister is unambiguously defeated on an important issue are relatively rare”. Furthermore, prime ministerial independence is more pronounced in foreign policy. As Baylis states, “Prime ministers appear to have acted unilaterally most often in matters of foreign policy—Munich, Suez, and, Under Wilson, in Rhodesia”. He does note, however, that foreign policy is “most subject to external constraint”. Baylis (1989, 60) concludes that, “The British executive…is characterized by a mixture of collegial decision-making with monocratic leadership”. I would add that in the case of foreign policy, especially those involving wartime cabinets, monocratic leadership is even more pronounced. Because foreign policy is the focus here, in addition to the omissions in Baylis’s list of prime ministerial power, I would argue that King (1994, 210) provides a more exhaustive list of the powers of the office. The list of powers are (1) leader of the majority party, (2) the historic prestige of the office, (3) chair of the cabinet and its major committees, (4) control of the structure of
499 500
Ibid, 210. Ibid, 203.
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government, (5) control over ministerial departments, and (6) prime minister as being “universally identified with the government of the day” (i.e. it is “his” or “her” government). The list could also include secrecy and length of time in office to further underscore the point. 501 With all this in mind, I concur with King when he states, “The British prime minister is…one of the most powerful heads of government in the Western world, far more powerful than most prime ministers in Europe”. History, 1945-1992 Although victorious in World War II, the United Kingdom was in precarious economic straits. A series of US aid measures, culminating with the Marshall Plan, assisted Britain in confronting these difficulties. Britain faced a protracted period of de-colonization beginning with independence for the jewel of the British empire, India, in 1947. British withdrawal from its colonies colored much of British foreign policy in decades that followed. The ubiquitous problem of Ireland, which this research does not have the space to examine, has also led to problems which existed throughout the entire time period. Britain’s waning power played a considerable role in the initial stages of the Cold War as US filled power vacuums left by the British in Iran, Greece, Turkey, and Israel. Britain naturally sided with the West in the bipolar world and took part in the Korean War. Britain’s goals, despite its weakened status, were to remain a great power. Doing so, as Sir Oliver Francis expressed, “is part of the habit and furniture of our minds”. 502 This historic legacy or aspect of national culture did not match reality. “That Britain had ideas above its economic and military station”, Coles (2000, 37) states, “is regarded by most historians as accurate enough”. 503 This
501 502 503
Length of time in office may also be a diminishing asset as recent events potentially indicate. Quoted in Coles 2000, 37. Coles describes the phenomenon as the “persistent pursuit of illusion rather than reality” (37).
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sustained identity or belief in the unattainable contributed to Britain’s continued involvement in international disputes. Winston Churchill gave conceptual direction to this pursuit of greatness by advancing the notion of “three circles”. The three circles in which Britain found its power, according to the argument, were its “special” relationship with the US, relations with Europe, and its position in the Commonwealth. 504 One critic, Young (1998), called the three circles “a biblical text for the justification of strategic indecision”. Despite the criticisms, the three circles framework remains a significant conceptual model for British foreign policy to this day. As with the concept of the three circles coming from a prime minister, Baylis (1989, 50) finds that the decisions in the 1950s to make the atomic bomb and intervene in the Suez crisis were “prime ministerial”. Suez, in particular, is a revealing case. After Nasser’s seizure of the Suez Canal, British public opinion had 27 percent in support of military intervention and 64 percent against. 505 Under pressure from the “Suez Group”, a Conservative bloc who were upset by his support of the Canal Treaty of 1954 (which would hand the canal over to Egypt in 1968), and over concerns of the threat to oil supplies, “British Prime Minister Anthony Eden ignored public preferences and intervened militarily”. 506 Aware of potential international constraints, Eden kept the plan secret from the US. He also avoided open debate in parliament and kept secret his negotiations with France and Israel. 507 Only when a run on silver would lead to devaluation of the pound did Eden agree to a ceasefire. He resigned amid public and
504 505 506 507
See ibid, 34 and Wallace 2005, 53. Auerswald 2000, 50. Ibid. Ibid, 56-57.
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parliamentary pressure in January 1957. 508 The case demonstrates not only the powers inherent in the office, but also the limitations, both domestic and international. In the aftermath, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan commissioned a post-Suez review of foreign policy. Such reviews of foreign policy have been very infrequent in the post-war period and may have contributed to reactive policies and consistent return to the three circles. This review, The Position of the United Kingdom in World Affairs (1958), in fact essentially restated the conceptual model by stating, “(Britain) could still exercise a substantial influence, given its special position as a link between Europe, the Commonwealth, and the United States”. Its two goals, prevent global war and defeat Russian and Chinese efforts to dominate, are the language of a great power. 509 Macmillan sought to carve out a role for the United Kingdom as mediator between the US and USSR, yet was unsuccessful. 510 The cancellation of the Skybolt missile, a US system that greatly interested Britain, not only demonstrated Britain’s position of inferiority in comparison to the US, it caused Macmillan to fall out of the European circle as he tried to hold onto America. 511 Accordingly, De Gaulle rejected Macmillan’s application to the Common Market in January 1963. Baylis (1989, 52-53) examines decisions made by Wilson to test if they were in fact “prime ministerial”. He argues that the devaluation of the pound involved Callaghan as Treasury Secretary in the decision-making process and the withdrawal of forces east of the Suez was the result of the decision-making triumvirate of Wilson, Callaghan, and Foreign Secretary Brown. He argues similarly regarding the decision to reapply to the Common Market.
508 509 510 511
Ibid, 65. References from the review are drawn from Coles 2000, 65. Bechloss and Talbot 1993, 30. Wallace 2005, 54.
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On the other hand, decision-making was still highly centralized and therefore was still based on concentrated power. Wallace (2005, 54) argues that Wilson managed to balance Europe and the US by reapplying to the European Community (EC) in 1967 and not committing troops to Vietnam. The liquidation of bases east of the Suez in 1972 was a tangible sign of a retreat from a role of global defense, yet Coles (2000, 38) suggests the “post-imperial great power syndrome persisted”. One event that demonstrated the UK’s less significant role in international events and clearly moved Britain closer to the European circle occurred on January 1, 1973, when Britain became a member of the EC. As Norton (1991, 198) notes, “The international constraints have become more pronounced as a consequence of membership in the European Community”. The Commonwealth was also becoming less of a source of power. Wallace (2005, 53) states, “(The Commonwealth) shifted from apparent asset to apparent burden in the course of the 1970s, when problems with Rhodesia/Zimbabwe loomed over British governments and the Caucus of African Governments within the Commonwealth replaced deference to Britain with demands on Britain”. The return of conservative rule under Thatcher at the end of the decade championed the cause of making “Great Britain great again”. 512 To do this, as Norton (1991, 63), “The Conservative government demonstrated a clear willingness to lead rather than arbitrate”. Moreover, based on Atlanticist predilections and personal and ideological concurrence with US President Reagan, the Thatcher government increased attention devoted to the special relationship. 513 When the Argentinean government seized the Falkland Islands, the Thatcher government had an opportunity to demonstrate its determination to lead. The decision to respond militarily, despite overtures designed to prevent war by US Secretary of State Alexander 512
Riddell 1991, 199. “(Reagan) saw (Thatcher) as an ideological soul-mate in their joint battle against socialism and communism” (Riddell, 1991).
513
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Haig, was decided by a war cabinet. 514 Thatcher also attempted to put ideological allies in key posts in the foreign office and as foreign secretary. 515 Riddell (1991, 188) suggests that despite these efforts, US-UK relations remained decidedly unbalanced in favor of the US. He cites as examples the lack of consultation before the invasion of Grenada, the pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or “Star Wars”), and assistance in the 1986 bombing of Tripoli. After the bombing of Libya, some even referred to her as “Reagan’s poodle”. Riddell argues that Thatcher’s anti-communist rhetoric was moderated by the appointment of Sir Geoffrey Howe as foreign secretary after reelection in 1983. This, he continues, enabled closer relations with the USSR. After meeting Gorbachev in December 1984, Thatcher remarked, “I like Mr. Gorbachev. We can do business together”. 516 Thatcher visited Moscow in 1987 and after finding out that President Bush’s private opinions regarding the Soviet Union were much more moderate than his public statements, she sent a letter to Gorbachev saying such. 517 These developments suggest that Thatcher did, at least to a certain extent, act as a bridge between the US and the USSR. Despite Thatcher’s criticisms of the EC and Atlanticist leanings, Britain continued to receive rebates from the EC that ran into the billions of pounds. Moreover, by 1987, 49 percent of Britain’s exports were going to EC and 59 percent of its imports were from Europe. 518 The dilemma or paradox in Thatcher’s position is captured by Jenkins (1987): She wishes British industry to have the benefit of a large, single market, and would like to exercise a political leadership role within it. But her self-righteous and instinctive nationalism makes it difficult for her to see that these objectives can only be achieved on
514
See Baylis 1989, 56. Attempts to place Sir Anthony Parsons as foreign secretary led to fears of a “Henry Kissinger in the basement at number 10” (Ibid). 516 Beschloss and Talbot 1993, 30 517 Ibid, 81. 518 Norton 1991, 272. 515
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a basis of give and take and respect for both the legitimate self-interest and the European idealism of others. These practical economic realities ran into nationalist streaks within the Conservative party and a split developed between those in favor of pragmatic integration and the Euroskeptics. Thatcher complicated the issue further with her antagonism towards German reunification. Her nationalism did lead to a 20 percent increase in military spending during the 1980s in what constitutes somewhat of a realization of the continued role of Britain as a great power. In the final analysis, however, Thatcher like Eden, demonstrated both the powers and the limitations, domestic and international, of the office of the prime minister. The arms build up, however, did put her successor John Major on a stronger footing to join in the effort to repulse Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait in the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War. By 1992, the contradictions between the three circles and visions of the UK as a great power had yet to be resolved. The infrequent and random nature of efforts to assess British foreign policy in the Plowden Report of 1964, the Duncan Report of 1969, and the foundered Berrill Report of 1977, to Coles (2000, 80-81), are signs of a lack of direction and underscore the reliance on British foreign policy mythology. These perceptions, however, did not lead to uniform results. Table 6.2 provides a listing of descriptive data regarding the number of militarized interstate dispute (MID) dyads across the governments from 1950-1992. Although historical circumstances by no means can be dismissed, the evidence does suggest that Churchill and Eden were willing to use militarized means in international disputes. Another pattern that can discerned from the data is that involvement in disputes has had a general downward turn suggesting that despite perceptions of and desires for greatness, British foreign policy has adjusted, if in a reactive way, to the a somewhat lesser role in international politics. The fact that
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Table 5.2: MID data applied to 1950-1992 UK prime minister sample based on individual and Party. Prime Minister/UK Atlee: 1/50-10/51 Churchill: 10/51-3/55 Eden: 4/55-12/56 Macmillan: 1/57-9/64 Wilson: 10/64-5/70 Heath: 6/70-2/74 Wilson: 3/74-9/74 Callahan: 10/74-4/79 Thatcher: 5/79-11/90 Major: 12/90-12/92 XXXXXXXXXXXX Average MID Dyads per year: Conservative Average MID Dyads per year: Labour
Party
Total MID dyads
Labour Conservative Conservative Conservative Labour Conservative Labour Labour Conservative Conservative XXXXXXXX 1.88
3 14 5 15 8 4 1 5 14 3 XXXXXXXXXXXXX Number of MIDs Instigated: Conservative Number of MIDs Instigated: Labour
1.34
Average MID Dyads per year 1.64 4.10 3.00 1.94 1.41 1.07 1.71 1.09 1.22 1.44 XXXXXXX 16/ .55 per year
MIDs Instigated 1 3 3 3 3 1 0 0 3 3 XXXXX
4/ .32 per year
Britain has maintained a comparatively high number of disputes also indicates that the perceptions of power have had tangible outcomes. Moreover, these findings confirm the expectation regarding majoritarian governance. Interestingly, the data indicate that the Conservative party is somewhat more predisposed to militarized solutions to international problems. They are moderately more likely to be involved in as well as instigate MIDs. Perhaps this has something to do with the greater insularity and centralized power of the Conservative party itself. Whether this is due to historic factors during de-colonization in the 1950s (although it should be noted the process continued into the 1980s), ideological preferences, or party structures is beyond the scope of this study. It is worth noting, however, that a correlation exists between concentrated power in political parties, which of course translates into governmental power when the Conservatives are in
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office, and the likelihood of being involved in MIDs. One undeniable fact can be drawn from the data and that is variation exists across governments. Post-1992 Unlike the cases of Italy and Japan, major institutional changes did not occur in the United Kingdom in the post-1992 era. The Blair government did attempt to move in the direction of consensualism, but as Flinders (2005) finds, these shifts have been modest at best. Considering that moving from majoritarian institutions towards greater consensualism would entail a net loss in governmental power for the party in power, it is no surprise that little change occurred. The post-Cold War era provided the occasion for a sea change in British foreign policy as the primary threat had ceased to exist. This was not the case. As Coles (2000, 47) states, “The end of the Cold War is particularly identified as a time when the opportunity to redistribute resources was missed”. As it was, the Thatcher government decided to maintain the Trident missile system. 519 General military spending remained at a high level in comparison with its European counterparts. 1992 did see the approval of the Maastricht treaty by referendum in Continental Europe and the establishment of the European Union. The chunnel was completed in 1994, physically connecting Britain to the continent. Devolution occurred as Scotland was granted greater powers as a governing jurisdiction within the United Kingdom. Wallace (2005, 54) argues that Major had little influence on EU policy. A review of the 1998 Report by the Foreign Office lists eight objectives that have a decidedly United Kingdomcentric perspective that suggests Britain has yet to throw its lot in with its economic interests in
519
Riddell 1991, 199.
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Europe. 520 Blair has followed through with assisting the developing world by pushing for debt reduction in 2005. The goals also demonstrate that the Commonwealth circle is alive and well. The Blair government has helped launch two efforts within the EU: the Malo Initiative on European Defense in 1998 and the Lisbon Agenda on economic reform in 2001. Blair has also tried to follow the lead of Thatcher and Macmillan and act as a bridge between the US and Europe. As Wallace (2005) argues, he has failed to influence Washington, and the EU does not believe the United Kingdom has pull in Washington. Blair, of course, joined in the unsanctioned US invasion of Iraq even though his own intelligence services, with the now famous “Downing Street memo”, were aware that the US Bush administration were fixing the intelligence around the policy. This strong tilt towards Washington was not largely supported in Europe or at home where Wallace (2005, 56) notes voters are skeptical about “further subordination of British Foreign policy to US objectives”. During his time in office, Blair has had to deal with factionalism from the Labour bloc headed by Gordon Brown because of divisions within the Labour party regarding its move towards the center under Blair. One recent development regarding the Blair/Brown divisions is that the Labour party outside of parliament now has a bigger role in the selection of leadership. Moreover, party loyalty has been diminished because of Blair’s continued commitment to the unpopular war in Iraq. Yet through it all, Blair has managed to stay in power. The findings of this research indicate that majoritarian institutions contributed to this outcome. Blair’s waning popularity in the face of recent scandals and his decision not to run for a fourth time for the 520
They are (1) to ensure the security of the United Kingdom; and to promote international peace and stability; (2) to improve, through international action, economic opportunities for a prosperous United Kingdom; (3) to improve the quality of life world-wide; and to develop a strong international community; (4) to increase the impact of and respect for British foreign policy and values; (5) to ensure the United Kingdom plays a strong role in a strong Europe, responsive to people’s needs; (6) to ensure the protection of British citizens abroad; (7) to ensure efficient and effective implementation of entry-clearance arrangements; and (8) to ensure the security of United Kingdom overseas territories, promote their prosperity and uphold sustainable development and good government. (Coles 2000, 103-04)
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office of the Prime Minister, however, suggest that there are limitations to executive power in majoritarian systems. Conclusions and Prospects for the Future British foreign policy elites have yet to resolve the lack of direction of the three circles and the desire to remain a great power. This lack of resolution naturally impacts 10 Downing Street in perceptual ways that transform into policy reality. The decision to join in the US invasion of Iraq based on potentially dubious evidence may prove to be example of the degree to which British leaders will go to maintain the ‘special’ relationship. It also highlights the longstanding tradition to see the world based on power issues; i.e. the US has significant military might. Because British foreign policy has remained reactive by nature and based on perceptions of the international environment and Britain’s place within it, there is little reason to believe British foreign policy will dramatically change, especially considering this elite consensus exists in an institutional structure with concentrated power. The above analysis demonstrates that the British office of prime minister is an institutionally strong position of executive leadership. The governmental institutional structures are limited in their ability to constrain direction from 10 Downing Street. Limitations do exist in the form of law, convention, and public pressure. After all, Britain is a democracy. In comparison with other democracies, in particular with other European states, the British system does contain extensive centralization of power inherently associated with majoritarianism. This fact, in congruence of a historic legacy as a great power, which includes the Commonwealth and other ties to countries across the globe, and the persistent ‘declining global power syndrome’ suggests that the United Kingdom will continue to find itself involved in comparatively frequent MIDs.
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Wallace (2005) is convinced that Britain must choose between the European and US circles and favors the European choice. Rational economic choice would indicate that is the logical direction. If Britain chooses Europe and embraces the constraints inherent in this position and the EU develops stronger and more coordinated foreign policy approaches, the United Kingdom will invariably be involved in fewer militarized disputes. Those are two big ‘ifs’, especially in the face of British foreign policy self-perceptions. Whatever direction Britain chooses, however, there is little doubt that the prime minister will have a significant hand in that course of action. Conclusion The review of Japan, Italy, and the United Kingdom indicate that historic experience shapes the international behavior of states. International systems in the shape of the bipolar Cold War structure can also be significant variables in the direction of state foreign policy. The evidence indicates foreign policy consensus provides parameters within which leadership must operate. Moreover, economic interdependence has contributed to greater international cooperation. The findings, however, also suggest that institutional and procedural structures and the according degree of concentration of power within the executive strongly influence leadership behavior. The Japanese prime minister is powerfully constrained by influential bureaucracies, LDP factions, public opinion, extensive business and social networks, and cultural consensualism. In Italy, prime ministers must facilitate and coordinate the policy process across multiple power centers in a fragmented system such as coalition parties, party factions, strong ministries, and informal political networks. British prime ministers, on the other hand, have greater leeway to pursue individual objectives. Moreover, prime ministers that are more inclined to see the world
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Chapter 6 Conclusion As significant and interesting as the findings of democratic peace theory have been, the line of inquiry raises more questions than it answers. Perhaps the theory’s greatest contribution to political science is that it has instigated an expansive investigation of democracies’ foreign policy behaviors. Although sweeping generalizations about democracy serve political purposes, science requires a level of skeptical questioning that brings us closer to the truth as we can understand it. This research questions whether variations in leadership, institutional and procedural structures, and the interactions between the two contribute to differences in foreign policy outputs. The findings suggest that all three variables do indeed influence the behavior of democracies on the international stage. In the course of the inquiry, however, a more expansive framework is developed that includes systemic variables, hence providing a two level approach to understanding how leaders and institutions operate within the realm of foreign policy. In effect, a “stages” approach is applied to the foreign policy process. This conceptual construct is the culmination of the research presented here. Prior to turning to the stages model, however, a synopsis of the findings is required in order to review the dynamics of leadership, institutions, and the leadership/institutions nexus and how they operate on an individual basis. After this step, leadership and institutions are then be placed within the model of the foreign policy process. Leadership is examined here through analysis of US presidents from Truman to George H. W. Bush. The foreign policy objectives of the administrations were found to be influenced and/or constrained by foreign policy consensus, the political tenor of the times, and international developments. Within the parameters created by these factors, however, variations in foreign
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policy did occur. Divergence in conceptual complexity, sensitivity, the impact of liberal values, and rigidity of beliefs across presidents contributed to variation in foreign policy pursuits and outputs. Hagan’s (1994) political orientation typology of moderates, pragmatists, and militants, operationalized by a selection of George’s (1969) operational code questions, provided a useful tool for categorizing president’s perspectives and perceptions of the international environment and the accompanying methods used for pursuing goals in a manner that demonstrated the affect individual leaders can have on foreign policy. Collapsing the administrations into three categories of most similar cases and assessing variations in policy outputs indicated that leadership, based on political orientation, can have a significant impact on the degree to which foreign policy in militarized. In short, leadership matters. Moreover, the evidence suggests that majoritarianism in the executive-parliamentary dimension empowers leadership to pursue militarized foreign policies in democracies. Following the test case of leadership in a system that leans majoritarian on the executiveparliamentary dimension, this research quantitatively investigates that affect institutions have on foreign policy by testing a 23 country sample categorized on the basis on Lijphart’s (1999) dichotomy of consensus and majoritarian democracies. The analysis includes mixed democratic systems that vary based on whether they were consensual or majoritarian on the executiveparliamentary dimension as an additional means of assessing conflict-proneness. Lijphart’s dichotomy was selected because is captures variations in the centralization of power in the executive, which is seen here as central to leadership’s role in foreign policy. The expectations were that systems that institutionally concentrate power in the executive inherently provide greater opportunity for leaders to pursue their policy preferences and therefore give greater
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leeway to leaders who view the international environment in conflictual terms to implement aggressive foreign policies. The analyses support the expectations that institutionally constrained leadership will pursue less aggressive foreign policies. Consensualism was uniformly associated with more pacific foreign policies while majoritarianism correlated with greater use of the military in foreign policy. This pattern was consistent with interactions with democracies and nondemocracies alike. These results suggest that democratic peace theory should consider heterogeneity across democracies within its conceptual constructs. In other words, differences in the institutional and procedural structures of democratic governments contribute to the degree to which foreign policy is militarized. Simply put, institutions matter. Finally, the research explores the nexus of leadership and institutions in a qualitative manner through in-depth, descriptive analysis of Japan, Italy and the United Kingdom, countries that range from consensus to majoritarian democracies. The evidence suggests consensualism does constrain leadership in the formation of foreign policy. British prime ministers have a much greater say in the creation of foreign policy outputs than prime ministers in Japan and Italy. The analysis also demonstrates the significance of international and domestic constraints on state foreign policy. Moreover, each country had its own combinations of international and domestic issues with which to contend when developing foreign policy. These findings, in conjunction with the results supporting the influence of leadership and institutions on foreign policy, suggest that the formulation of foreign policy does follow different paths. These findings, in turn, led to the creation of a flow-chart of potential foreign policy paths based on stages where leadership, institutions, and external and domestic constraints can shape the direction of foreign policy.
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Foreign Policy Paths / A “Stages” Model Figure 7.1 is a diagram of the foreign policy flowchart, which focuses on the leadership/institutions nexus. Considering that leadership holds a significant explanatory role in this research, I begin this discussion with leadership’s political orientation. By political orientation, I am referring to the philosophical, conceptual, and instrumental beliefs held by leadership that provides the basis for their beliefs regarding causal relations in international politics. Holding similarities with operational codes analysis, this research utilizes two of George’s operational code questions as a guide to assessing political orientation. The chosen questions address whether leadership views the political universe as essentially harmonious or conflictual and how leadership assesses the nature of their political opposition. The evidence found here suggests that leadership’s tendencies towards these questions can influence their policy preferences. To augment operational code analysis, conceptual complexity and sensitivity can be added as means for explaining individual’s decision-making dispositions to their environments. Rigidity of belief structures, often influenced by leadership’s experience, is the final ingredient of assessment for shifts in beliefs will invariable affect foreign policy outputs. Of particular interest is Hermann et al’s (2001) notion of a crusader, individuals with limited conceptual complexity. Crusaders hold so firmly to their convictions that they exhibit extensive cognitive dissonance in terms of advisory input; they view political opponents as either ignorant of the realities of international politics or nefarious in intention; and they see resistance to their policy preference merely as obstacles to overcome rather intellectually valid points of contention. Moreover, crusaders are more likely to ignore dissonant international events and domestic pressures.
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Policy Flow Chart
Conceptual Complexity Institutions
o
Yes
Foreign Policy Outputs
Ye s
on C
High Lo w
External Constraints
o N
N
aj M
Leadership’s Political Orientation
Success
Domestic Constraints
Yes
w Lo
Ye s
gh Hi
No Opportunity
Foreign Policy Outcomes
No Domestic Opportunity
External Opportunity
= Policy Filter Figure 7.1
Hagan (1994) provides a typology of leadership orientation towards the international environment that includes four ideal types: moderates, pragmatists, militants, and radicals. 521 Because radicals seek to significantly alter the international environment and this is a study of democracies, the international status quo of state governance, this research focuses on moderates, pragmatists, and militants. Of the three remaining ideal types, militants are particularly prone to militarizing foreign policy. Considering that this research finds that domestic institutional and procedural structures significantly influence state foreign policy, the first obstacle/stage
521
These ideal types are defined in chapter 2.
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leadership faces when attempting to pursue its policy preferences institutions in the form of Lijphart’s majoritarianism and consensualism. 522 Majoritarian systems inherently empower the executive and therefore provide greater latitude for leadership of any political orientation in decision-making. Consensual systems, on the other hand, disperse power and provide a greater myriad of institutional policy obstacles than majoritarianism. Accordingly, democracies with consensus systems provide a “policy filter” in the foreign policy decision-making process. Pragmatists are likely to be significantly influenced by such a filter in shaping foreign policy. Moderate and militant crusaders, on the other hand, will be more likely to fight through institutional barriers, with moderates attempting to pursue cooperative goals and militants pursuing militarized and aggressive foreign policy outputs. This study finds that militants are particularly prone to secrecy as a tool for overcoming such roadblocks. Yet consensualism inherently provides a greater variety of policy veto points and therefore constrains crusading leadership more so than majoritarian systems. The net result is that consensus democracies are more likely to inhibit the pursuit of militarized foreign policies. The next stage or consideration in the flowchart is external constraints. These include systems variables such as the international power structure and significant focusing events. External constraints may also include historic legacies involving former international behaviors. Italy and Japan were both internationally constrained during 1945-1992 by their legacy as defeated nations in World War II. Britain’s historic legacy of colonialism, on the other hand, provides impetus for greater involvement in international affairs. 523 Whereas majoritarism provided a greater opportunity for leadership to pursue its policy preferences, the limitations or
522
Because the executive-parliamentary dimension is central to foreign policy decision-making, mixed democratic systems are collapsed into majoritarian or consensus categories based on the direction they lean on the executiveparliamentary dimension. 523 Of course, the Commonwealth is one of Churchill’s “three circles”.
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absence of constraining external variables also can be seen as opportunities. If powerful international influences do exist, however, the external environment constrains leadership and therefore acts as a policy filter. Once again, crusaders will be more likely to try to overcome or ignore these barriers, yet the ability for leadership to do so will be particularly difficult for states that are small or medium powers. The domestic constraints stage includes internal barriers in the form of public opinion, public mood, and social or cultural attributes of individual states. The intuition is that leaders in democracies will not stay in power for very long if they ignore such factors. Eden’s decision to intervene in the Suez Crisis provides an interesting example of how ignoring public opinion can lead to the unseating of the executive. Moreover, the Suez example demonstrates the interrelations of the constraint stages or policy filters of the model in that the United Kingdom is majoritarian and therefore gave Eden a greater opportunity to pursue this foreign policy objective. Japan presents an example of how culture can restrain the individual. The traditions of harmony (wa) and consensus inhibit leaders from pursuing adventuresome foreign policies. Japan’s institutional consensualism also acts as a constraint and hence contributing to a profoundly constraining policy environment for executive leadership. Historic legacies may also contribute to domestic constraint. Vasquez (1993) argues that the outcome of the last war can have a powerful influence on the public’s support for future international confrontation. In the cases of Italy and Japan, the failure of militarism and imperialism created consensuses for economic development through interdependence. On the other hand, a state that achieved a military victory at low cost in its last war may find the public more willing to support militarized conflicts. These conditions would favor the militant crusader in the pursuit of militarized solutions to international issues. Moreover, successful policies that
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focus on international cooperation and integration, such as Italy’s engagement in the European Community, can embolden moderate or pragmatic leadership in pursuing such policy goals. As this suggests, lessened domestic constraints create an environment of opportunity for leadership of any stripe. When domestic constraints are powerful, however, they act as a policy filter. The net results of leadership policy preferences’ path through the institutions, external constraints, and domestic constraints policy filters are foreign policy outputs. The results of such outputs are foreign policy outcomes. Judging success or failure, however, can be a difficult process. Some measures, such as winning or losing a war or dramatic economic growth, may seem conclusive but are often interpreted through normative and subjective perceptual lenses. For instance, dramatic economic growth can be seen negatively if it leads to extreme inequalities. It is because perceptions are so vital that leadership’s conceptual complexity, sensitivity, and political orientation/belief set play a significant role in interpreting the flowchart’s foreign policy outcomes feedback loop. In fact, an entire stage is devoted to conceptual complexity. At a minimum, leadership in democracies will attempt to paint most foreign policy outcomes as successes. Leaders may, however, hold different opinions in private as were the cases of President Bush’s opinion regarding the Soviet Union and Nixon and Kissinger’s appraisals of the situation in Vietnam when they came to office. Those with lower levels of conceptual complexity and sensitivity, on the other hand, will be more likely to apply cognitive dissonance and therefore be less likely to view outcomes in a negative light. Leadership’s openness to different informational stimuli and alternative explanations becomes a critical factor in how rigid its political orientation will remain. If a policy is judged a success, the belief structures of leadership with both high and low levels of conceptual complexity will be reinforced. Those with high levels of complexity,
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however, will tend to make more accurate assessments regarding the success or failure of policy due to greater reception of advisory inputs, including dissonant points of view. Leaders with lower levels of conceptual complexity, on the other hand, are more likely to interpret foreign policy outcomes through normative and subjective frames of reference. In other words, they are more likely to see success where there is failure. These assessment errors of foreign policy outcomes are therefore more likely to reinforce questionable or dubious beliefs for those with lower levels of conceptual complexity. If foreign policy outputs are deemed failures, those with high levels of conceptual complexity are more likely to learn from the event and alter their decisions in the future. In effect, information is processed through a cognitive and policy filter and therefore increases the potential for changes, both subtle and substantial, in their political orientation. This dynamic will tend to be most profound for militants and moderates with high levels of conceptual complexity and move them towards pragmatism. Those with low levels of conceptual complexity will tend to not have such a cognitive or policy filter when interpreting failure. In particular, crusaders will simply see failure as yet another obstacle to overcome rather than as evidence that a shift in their views is required. In these ways, conceptual complexity and sensitivity shape or fail to shape the belief sets or political orientation of leadership. In sum, this research finds that leadership can have a significant influence on the foreign policy behavior of democracies. The degree to which institutions act as a constraint affects the ability of leadership to pursue its policy preferences. The evidence, therefore, suggests that the leadership/institutions nexus is a significant factor in the production of foreign policy outputs. International conditions and developments, in addition to the domestic political environment, are also important factors in the foreign policy decision-making process. Failure to adequately
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address such issues can lead to a loss in the next election or, if a lame duck, an inability to accomplish political objectives. The leadership/institutions nexus interacts with external and domestic constraints/opportunities in the formulation of foreign policy outputs. The level of conceptual complexity possessed by leadership often powerfully affects how foreign policy outcomes are judged. Those with lower levels of complexity will tend to rely on ideological and therefore subjective interpretations of events and hence have tendencies towards favorable judgments of their actions, cognitive dissonance, and belief set rigidity. Those with high levels of complexity will be more open to alternative explanations, to learn from the experience, and adjust their political orientations to meet reality. Democratic peace theory has offered only limited space to the issues brought forth in this study. Liberal or economic interdependence theory, the handmaiden of democratic peace theory, has little to say about the role of militant leadership in democracies. Realism sometimes rejects that state level variables matter at all. The findings here, however, offer support to the constructivist interpretation of international relations if applied to the state level of analysis. The evidence suggests that a two-level game does occur regarding the development of foreign policy outputs. The “constructive” influence leadership in democracies can have on foreign policy based on belief sets and therefore perceptions of constraints imposed by institutional and procedural structures, especially in majoritarian circumstances, indicates that the foreign policy process is actually a “three-level” game. Do these findings about the leadership/institutions nexus mean that, the paraphrase Wendt (1992), foreign policy is what leaders and states make of it? That would be overstating the case for external and domestic constraints exist that inhibit such a direct causal relationship regarding foreign policy outputs. The evidence does suggest, however, that theorists who ignore leadership, institutions, and the leadership/institutions nexus
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do so at their own peril, for they will often be ignoring the deciding factors in international relations. References George, Alexander (1969). “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making”. International Studies Quarterly 13: 190-222. Hagan, Joe D. (1994). “Reflection, Evaluation, Integration: Domestic Political Systems and War Proneness”. Mershon International Studies Review 38: 183-207. Hermann, Margaret G. (2001). “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework”. Mershon International Studies Review 3, 2: 47-81. Lijphart, Arend (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in ThirtySix Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Vasquez, J. A. (1993). The War Puzzle. Cmabridge: Cambridge University Press. Wendt, Alexander (1992). “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”. International Organization 46: 391-425.
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