Disparagement humor: A theoretical and empirical ...

Disparagement humor: A theoretical and empirical review of psychoanalytic, superiority, and social identity theories MARK A. FERGUSON and THOMAS E. FORD

Abstract This research reviews the empirical and theoretical literature on disparagement humor and amusement. In particular, we ask, ‘‘Why is disparagement humor funny?’’ Three theoretical frameworks provide responses to this question: psychoanalytic theory, superiority theories, and social identity theory. Each framework suggests a distinct psychological mechanism that fosters amusement upon exposure to disparagement humor. The review presents the central theoretical propositions from each framework and assesses their empirical support. Based on this review, we suggest that social identity theory o¤ers a promising new avenue for disparagement humor research. The review concludes by o¤ering future research directions. Keywords: Disparagement humor; social identity theory; superiority.

1.

Introduction ‘‘Humor is an a‰rmation of dignity, a declaration of man’s superiority to all that befalls him.’’ –Romain Gary

Disparagement humor refers to remarks that (are intended to) elicit amusement through the denigration, derogation, or belittlement of a given target (e.g., individuals, social groups, political ideologies, material Humor 21–3 (2008), 283–312 DOI 10.1515/HUMOR.2008.014

0933–1719/08/0021–0283 6 Walter de Gruyter

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possessions). Disparagement humor is distinctive among forms of humor in that it both ‘‘diminishes’’ and ‘‘reinterprets’’ its subject (Fine 1983; Greenwood and Isbell 2002; Wyer and Collins 1992). Because humor communicates that its message is to be interpreted in a non-serious manner, disparagement humor can uniquely denigrate its target while stifling challenge or criticism (e.g., Bill and Naus 1992; Ford and Ferguson 2004; Johnson 1990). Berger (1987) proposed a four-category classification of psychological theories of humor: psychoanalytic theories, superiority theories, incongruity theories, and cognitive theories. These theories di¤er in many ways, but particularly in the relative emphasis placed on the structure of humor content versus the centrality of social context in the elicitation of amusement. Incongruity and cognitive theories emphasize the irony and surprise of humor content (e.g., Attardo 1993; Berger 1987; Raskin 1985; Suls 1972), while psychoanalytic and superiority theories emphasize antagonistic social relationships between humorists and targeted individuals, groups or objects in a given context (e.g., Berger 1987; Freud 1960 [1905]; Zillmann 1983). Since the latter theories focus more on context, they more directly and fully address disparagement humor. Thus, the present review focuses on psychoanalytic and superiority theories. The review also considers a third theoretical framework — social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Although social identity theory has been applied to disparagement humor (e.g., Bourhis et al. 1977), its theoretical relevance remains largely unexplored. Social identity theory bears some resemblance to superiority theories, but it o¤ers distinct explanations for empirical findings and generates novel hypotheses beyond other frameworks. Thus, we examined social identity theory alongside psychoanalytic and superiority theories. In this research, we review central theoretical propositions of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory, prominent superiority theories, and social identity theory. Unlike prior research that addresses the social consequences of disparagement humor (Ford and Ferguson 2004), the present research will focus on the relationship between humor and amusement, as well as the specific psychological processes that mediate that relationship. Our purpose is not to o¤er an exhaustive review of the empirical literature. Excellent reviews exist elsewhere (e.g., Berger 1993). Rather, we intend to examine research testing key hypotheses derived from each theory. We will outline common theoretical issues, as well as delineate potentially fruitful directions for future research.

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Psychoanalytic theory

According to psychoanalytic theory, disparagement or ‘‘hostile’’ humor is a form of ‘‘tendentious’’ humor — humor that has a purpose (Freud 1960 [1905]). The veiled purpose of hostile humor is to attack an adversary. In describing the aggressive purpose of hostile humor, Freud stated that, ‘‘By making our enemy small, inferior, despicable, or comic, we achieve in a roundabout way the enjoyment of overcoming him’’ (103). The innocuous quality of humor masks one’s destructive instincts or impulses and thus bypasses socially-implanted inhibitions (Singer 1968). Indeed, Freud (1960 [1905]) stated that hostile humor facilitates the satisfaction of a hostile instinct ‘‘in the face of an obstacle that stands in its way’’ (101). As a result, disparagement humor serves a positive psychological function. It provides the humorist with a relatively benign means of expressing and satisfying unconscious, socially unacceptable impulses. Abating this impulse facilitates positive social relations, as destructive means of expression are rendered unnecessary (Berger 1993; Gollob and Levine 1967; Sev’er and Ungar 1997). Furthermore, as noted by Singer (1968), a fundamental hypothesis derived from psychoanalytic theory more generally (e.g., Freud 1959 [1911]; Rapaport 1960) is that by providing a release of hostile impulses, disparagement humor should serve as a means of catharsis — a temporary cleansing or reduction of hostile psychic energy. It is noteworthy that by indulging in disparagement humor, the recipient should also (vicariously) experience a cathartic e¤ect. Freud (1960 [1905]) noted: Generally speaking, a tendentious joke calls for three people: in addition to the one who makes the joke, there must be a second who is taken as the object of the hostile or sexual aggressiveness, and a third in whom the joke’s aim of producing pleasure is fulfilled. (Freud 1960 [1905]: 100)

The amusement or pleasure one derives from disparagement humor results from the catharsis it produces. Freud (1960 [1905]) stated that, ‘‘The pleasure in the case of a tendentious joke arises from a purpose being satisfied whose satisfaction would otherwise not have taken place’’ (117). Stated slightly di¤erently, Freud suggested that the pleasure derived from tendentious humor results from the savings of psychological energy spent on the usual inhibition of repressed impulses (119). Importantly, amusement is also dependent on the innocuous form of the humor. Freud

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suggested that tendentious jokes distract both the joke teller and the recipient from the hostile impulses that motivate them. If one’s attention is drawn to the unacceptable impulses, the person’s inhibitions mobilize, and he or she would not be able to enjoy the joke. Perhaps the most important or fundamental hypothesis derived uniquely from psychoanalytic theory is that people enjoy hostile or disparagement humor because it provides an emotional catharsis or release of repressed aggression. However, research has provided equivocal support for this ‘‘catharsis hypothesis.’’ Consistent with the hypothesis, some research has found that exposure to hostile humor decreases aggressive responses on non-behavioral measures (e.g., Landy and Mettee 1969; Mueller and Donnerstein 1977; Singer 1968). Singer (1968) for instance, experimentally induced aggressive motivation in African-American participants by exposing them to an audiotape describing hate crimes and other racially motivated abuses of African-Americans. He then exposed participants to hostile anti-segregationist humor, neutral humor, or a benign documentary. Results showed that exposure to both hostile and neutral humor reduced aggression motivation relative to exposure to the documentary. Still, in support of the catharsis hypothesis, appreciation of hostile humor was uniquely associated with a reduction in ‘‘residual aggressive motivation and tension’’ (1). Contrary to the catharsis hypothesis, however, other research has shown that exposure to hostile humor actually increases expressions of aggression (e.g., Baron 1978; Berkowitz 1970; Byrne 1961; Ryan and Kanjorski 1998). Berkowitz (1970) either angered or did not anger female college students. The students then listened to either hostile or non-hostile humorous tape recordings of a comedy routine. Afterwards, the students evaluated a female job applicant on various positive and negative traits. The results indicate that participants, in the hostile humor condition, ascribed fewer positive traits to the applicant and gave them more negative overall evaluations. Recently, Ryan and Kanjorski (1998) found that enjoyment of sexist humor was positively correlated with several measures of sexual aggression. One problem with reconciling the conflicting findings is that there is disagreement about whether the process of catharsis should result in less aggressive overt responses (e.g., Baron 1978; Berkowitz 1970; Byrne 1961) or a weaker impulse to behave aggressively (Singer 1968). Singer (1968: 3) referred to the impulse to behave aggressively as ‘‘motive strength,’’ and it has been assessed by non-behavioral measures such as mood checklists

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(Dworkin and Efran 1967; Singer 1968) or attitudes toward an aggressor (Landy and Mettee 1969). In addition, the lack of a clear definition and direct measurement of catharsis makes ambiguous the role of catharsis as a mediating variable, even in studies that support the hypothesis. Dworkin and Efran (1967) for instance, found that both hostile and neutral humor reduced hostility scores on a mood adjective checklist (see also Baron and Ball 1974). According to psychoanalytic theory, neutral humor could not have reduced hostility through catharsis. Thus, without a direct measure of catharsis and a test of its mediation, it is impossible to know whether the aggressive humor produced a cathartic e¤ect, or whether it reduced hostility through some other psychological mechanism. Also, it is noteworthy that the catharsis hypothesis has received little empirical support more generally in the social psychological literature (Richardson and Baron 1994). A second hypothesis that has received considerable research attention is that amusement with hostile humor is positively related to one’s level of hostility. Tests of this hypothesis, too, have produced equivocal results. In support of the hypothesis, research has demonstrated that experimental inducement of anger increases a preference for hostile humor relative to neutral humor (Dworkin and Efran 1969) and relative to people in a control condition who were not angered (Strickland 1959). However, Epstein and Smith (1969) argued that such studies fail to test the real psychoanalytic hypothesis directly since they do not assess the e¤ects of repressed hostile impulses on humor appreciation. Humor is thought to be a vehicle for releasing repressed, not conscious, hostile impulses. Accordingly, the appropriate test of the relationship between hostility and appreciation of hostile humor involves the assessment of repressed hostility rather than experimentally induced hostility. Epstein and Smith (1969) tried to measure such repressed hostility; they failed to find support for the hypothesis that repressed hostility is associated with the preference for hostile humor. Overall, it appears that the empirical research provides equivocal support for the central hypotheses uniquely derived from psychoanalytic theory. Based on our review of the empirical literature, we believe that a challenge for psychoanalytic humor researchers is to develop and validate measures of central theoretical constructs such catharsis and repressed hostility. With regards to the catharsis hypothesis, studies need to provide direct evidence that catharsis is the psychological mechanism that leads to enjoyment of hostile/disparagement humor.

288 3.

M. A. Ferguson and T. E. Ford Superiority theories

The earliest considerations of disparagement humor were grounded in the view that amusement results from a sudden feeling of superiority or triumph one feels from the recognition of the infirmities or misfortunes of others. Essentially, amusement was thought to result from the enhancement of self-esteem derived from a ‘‘downward social comparison’’ (Wills 1981) with inferior or disliked others. Theories based on this view have been collectively called ‘‘superiority theories’’ (e.g., Gruner 1997; KeithSpiegel 1972; Morreall 1983). Several thorough reviews of superiority theories and their origins are available elsewhere (e.g., Keith-Spiegel 1972; Morreall 1983; Piddington 1963; Zillmann and Cantor 1996 [1976]). The superiority theory tradition dates back to the writings of classical Greek philosophers. Plato, for instance, suggested that we find ludicrous or ridiculous those who lack self-knowledge (e.g., those who think they are better o¤ than they actually are), and that we derive amusement from such misfortunes or absurdities (Morreall 1983). Similarly, in his allusion to humor in Poetics, Aristotle suggested that people derive amusement from the weaknesses or misfortunes of others as long as they are not too painful or destructive (Halliwell 1998 [1986]). Aristotle suggested that the distinction between comedy and tragedy is that comedy represents people as worse than they actually are, whereas tragedy represents people as better than they actually are (Halliwell 1998 [1986]). Therefore, both Plato and Aristotle argued that people find humor in the infirmities, foibles, and weaknesses of others, and that laughter is an expression of derision or malice directed at the less fortunate.

3.1.

Hobbes’ superiority theory

Hobbes (1996 [1651]) more explicitly stressed the importance of selfesteem enhancement that results from observing the misfortunes of others. He suggested that people are amused by the disparagement of others because they feel good about themselves by comparison: Sudden glory is the passion which makethed those grimaces called laughter; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. (Hobbes 1996 [1651]: 38)

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Gruner (1997) is a strong advocate of Hobbes’ hypothesis. Gruner, likening amusement with humor to the enjoyment of a sport or game, suggested that amusement with humor involves: (1) conflict that keeps tension high, and (2) a swift conclusion that results in victory for the winner and defeat for the loser. Gruner further stated that: When we find humor in something, we laugh at the misfortune, stupidity, clumsiness, moral or cultural defect, suddenly revealed in someone else, to whom we instantly and momentarily feel ‘‘superior’’ since we are not, at that moment, unfortunate, stupid, clumsy, morally or culturally defective and so on. To feel superior in this way is ‘‘to feel good’’; it is to ‘‘get what you want.’’ It is to win! (Gruner 1997: 6)

Therefore, according to Hobbes’ superiority theory, people are amused by disparagement humor, because it enhances self-esteem through a downward social comparison with the target. 3.1.1. A‰liation and reference group models. Wol¤ et al. (1934) extended Hobbes’ superiority theory by introducing the concept of a‰liation. Wol¤ et al. suggested that a‰liated objects are broader psychological extensions of the self. Specifically, they suggested that, ‘‘a‰liated objects are those objects towards which a subject adopts the same attitude as he does towards himself ’ (Wol¤ et al. 1934: 344). Thus, a person should experience self-esteem enhancement upon perceiving disparagement of people or groups with whom he or she is not a‰liated. Accordingly, Wol¤ et al. (1934) hypothesized that people should be more amused upon witnessing disparagement of una‰liated targets (i.e., members of a social out-group) than a‰liated targets (i.e., members of an in-group). Wol¤ et al. (1934) found partial support for their hypothesis. Specifically, Gentiles were more amused than Jews by jokes that disparaged Jews. Contrary to their hypothesis, however, Jews were less amused than Gentiles by anti-Scottish jokes. According to superiority theory, Jews and Gentiles should have found the anti-Scottish jokes equally amusing, as neither was Scottish. Wol¤ et al. suggested that the Jewish participants found the anti-Scottish jokes less amusing than Gentiles, because they vicariously a‰liated with (felt sympathy for) the Scots. The jokes emphasized Scottish stinginess, and both groups have been similarly stereotyped as stingy (in fact, the jokes were Jewish jokes converted to anti-Scottish jokes). In addition, we suggest that the Jewish participants may have

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recognized the jokes as Jewish jokes converted to anti-Scottish jokes and thus perceived indirect or covert disparagement of Jews. Middleton (1959) also provided partial support for superiority theory. African-American participants were more amused by anti-White jokes than White participants. Amusement ratings of anti-African-American jokes, however, were less straightforward. Middleton reported that social class (low vs. middle) moderated African-American participants’ enjoyment of anti-African-American jokes. Consistent with superiority theory, lower class African-American participants enjoyed anti-African-American jokes less than did Whites. However, contrary to superiority theory, middle-class African-Americans enjoyed anti-African-American jokes equally as much as Whites. Middleton proposed that middle-class AfricanAmerican participants distinguished themselves from the AfricanAmericans depicted in the anti-African-American jokes. Therefore, although they were members of the disparaged social category, middleclass African-Americans did not a‰liate psychologically with the ‘‘stereotyped African-Americans’’ depicted in the jokes. Priest (1966) and Priest and Abrahams (1970) o¤ered a similar analysis based on membership in a ‘‘reference group.’’ Priest hypothesized that amusement with jokes disparaging a presidential candidate vary as a function of one’s ‘‘political party membership’’ (Priest 1966: 600). Consistent with this hypothesis, Priest found that participants preferring the democratic political party enjoyed jokes disparaging Barry Goldwater, the republican candidate in the 1964 presidential election, more than jokes disparaging Lyndon Johnson, the democratic candidate. The opposite pattern of results was found for participants preferring the republican political party. Priest and Abrahams (1970) found similar support for the hypothesis in the context of jokes disparaging candidates for the 1968 presidential election. Accordingly, Priest and Abrahams (1970: 779) suggested that, ‘‘reference group membership seems to serve as an anchor for humor in some reference groups (political party reference groups) . . . .’’ Together, the research by Wol¤ et al. (1934), Middleton (1959), Priest (1966), and Priest and Abrahams (1970) expands Hobbes’ original superiority theory to predict amusement with disparagement humor directed not at the self in particular, but at a social group to which one belongs. Accordingly, people should enjoy humor that disparages social outgroups more than humor that disparages social in-groups. Although this hypothesis has been largely supported by empirical research, the a‰liation and reference group models cannot easily account for certain find-

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ings. In both the Wol¤ et al. (1934) and the Middleton (1959) studies, it was suggested that participants informally a‰liated with non-ascribed groups (social groups to which they did not actually belong). This suggestion highlights the possibility that one’s actual group membership need not correspond with his or her psychological or attitudinal a‰liation (La Fave et al. 1996 [1976]). Furthermore, it appears that one’s attitudinal a‰liation with a social group is important in determining one’s level of amusement with humor that disparages that group (La Fave et al. 1996 [1976]; Zillmann and Cantor 1996 [1976]).

3.2.

Vicarious superiority theory: An identification class model

La Fave and colleagues extended Wol¤ et al.’s (1934) notion of a‰liation in their vicarious superiority theory by introducing the concept of identification class (IC) to predict amusement with disparagement humor (e.g., La Fave 1972; La Fave et al. 1996 [1976]). An IC is defined in terms of both a‰liation (group membership) and attitude toward a class or category of persons. La Fave et al. (1996 [1976]) suggested that a positive IC is one for which the person believes he or she is a member or has a positive attitude — the person identifies with the class of persons. A negative IC is one for which the person does not a‰liate or has a negative attitude — the person does not identify with the class of persons. Consistent with Hobbes’ (1996 [1651]) conceptualization of superiority theory, La Fave (1972) and La Fave et al. (1996 [1976]) suggested that the e¤ect of disparagement humor on amusement is mediated by selfesteem enhancement resulting from social comparison. Furthermore, one experiences self-esteem enhancement vicariously through humor that disparages a negative IC and/or esteems a positive IC. Therefore, humor that disparages a negative IC and/or esteems a positive IC should amuse people more than that which esteems a negative IC or disparages a positive IC. La Fave et al. o¤ered the following general hypothesis: Let S believe J is a joke in which identification class A is victorious over identification class B. Then the more positive S’s attitude towards A and the more negative S’s attitude towards B, the greater the magnitude of amusement S experiences with respect to J. (La Fave et al. 1996 [1976]: 67)

A number of empirical studies have supported this general hypothesis. Several complete reviews of the literature are available elsewhere (e.g., La

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Fave et al. 1996 [1976]; Zillmann and Cantor 1996 [1976]). La Fave (1972) for instance, found that Christians were more amused by jokes that esteemed Christian groups (a positive IC) and disparaged agnostics (a negative IC) than by jokes that disparaged Christian groups and esteemed agnostics. Similarly, La Fave et al. (1973) predicted amusement with humor disparaging Canadians or Americans based on whether participants had a strong pro-Canadian attitude or a strong pro-American attitude. Participants were Canadian college students who had a positive attitude toward Canadians (pro-Canadian Canadians) and American college students who had a positive attitude toward Americans (proAmerican Americans). As expected, pro-American Americans enjoyed jokes that disparaged Canadians more than jokes that disparaged Americans. Pro-Canadian Canadians enjoyed jokes that disparaged Americans more than jokes that disparaged Canadians. La Fave et al. (1996 [1976]) emphasized the importance of people’s attitude toward the disparaged group rather than just membership in that group as a determinant of amusement with disparagement humor. They suggested that one’s actual a‰liation with a disparaged IC is predictive of humor appreciation only insofar as it corresponds to his or her attitude toward the IC. Accordingly, La Fave et al. (1974) tested the importance of one’s attitude toward an IC in predicting humor appreciation independent of actual group membership. La Fave et al. (1974) took advantage of a ten-day student sit-in held in the Theology Department at the University of Windsor. Participants were selected on the basis of their attitudes toward students involved in the sit-in. Half of the participants had a positive attitude toward the students (pro-occupiers) and the other half had a negative attitude (anti-occupiers). Participants read jokes involving a dialogue between a pro-occupier and an anti-occupier. Half of the jokes esteemed the pro-occupier and disparaged the anti-occupier. The other half esteemed the anti-occupier and disparaged the pro-occupier. Consistent with vicarious superiority theory, pro-occupier participants enjoyed jokes that esteemed the pro-occupier and disparaged the anti-occupier more than jokes that disparaged the pro-occupier and esteemed the antioccupier. Similarly, anti-occupier participants enjoyed jokes that esteemed the anti-occupier and disparaged the pro-occupier more than jokes that did the opposite. Vicarious superiority theory expands upon previous superiority theories by addressing the importance of attitudes toward the disparaged group and the disparaging (victorious) group as determinants of amuse-

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ment with disparagement humor apart from actual a‰liation with or membership in those groups. The theory has received considerable empirical support and can account for findings that people are sometimes amused by humor that disparages their in-group (e.g., Middleton 1959). The theory suggests that in-group disparagement humor will be humorous insofar as the recipient does not identify with the in-group — the ingroup is not a positive IC for the recipient.

3.3.

Disposition theory: An attitudinal model

Zillmann and Cantor (1996 [1976]) criticized vicarious superiority theory and previous conceptualizations based on a‰liation or reference groups for treating the humor recipient’s relationship with the disparaged target as a categorical or dichotomous variable. Wol¤ et al. (1934) and Priest (1966) had predicted humor appreciation based on whether the humor recipient is or is not a member of the disparaged group. Similarly, La Fave et al. (1974) had predicted humor appreciation based on a dichotomy of one’s attitude toward the group — people appreciate disparagement humor more if they have a negative rather than a positive attitude toward the disparaged group. In contrast to vicarious superiority theory, disposition theory treats attitude toward a disparaged target as a continuous variable (Zillmann 1983; Zillmann and Cantor 1996 [1976]). Zillmann and Cantor (1996 [1976]: 100) stated, ‘‘we have dismissed the dichotomization of a‰liation, groups, or classes, and instead employed a conceptual continuum of affective disposition ranging from extreme negative a¤ect through a neutral point of indi¤erence to extreme positive a¤ect.’’ Accordingly, Zillmann and Cantor proposed that: Humor appreciation varies inversely with the favorableness of the disposition toward the agent or entity being disparaged, and varies directly with the favorableness of the disposition toward the agent or entity disparaging it. (Zillmann and Cantor 1996 [1976]: 100–101)

A more detailed discussion of disposition theory can be found in Zillmann (1983: 92). Zillmann and Cantor (1996 [1976]) argued that their concept of a¤ective disposition (attitude) is more general and inclusive than the concepts

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of a‰liation, reference group, or IC. Their disposition model can thus explain findings showing that humor appreciation is predicted by membership in a social group or by dichotomous attitudes toward the disparaged IC. Indeed, Zillmann and Cantor (1996 [1976]) suggested that vicarious superiority theory and models based on a‰liation or reference groups are special cases of their more general disposition theory. Zillmann and Cantor (1996 [1976]: 104) also suggested that by predicting humor in terms of a¤ective disposition toward disparaged targets, their disposition model can account for instances of humor appreciation that vicarious superiority theory and a‰liation or reference group models cannot. First, they claim that ICs and reference groups are relatively stable, whereas a¤ective dispositions are relatively transitory. Therefore, the disposition theory can uniquely account for appreciation of humor that disparages a positive IC, such as a friend or fellow member of an ingroup. The person must simply be angry or otherwise momentarily unhappy with the target. Zillmann and Cantor (1996 [1976]) suggested that anger is a transitory disposition or attitude and can motivate the person to laugh or enjoy humor that disparages the target even if the person otherwise likes the target. Second, Zillmann and Cantor (1996 [1976]) suggested that other superiority theories require that a person be able to represent the disparaged target as part of a class or category of persons with which he or she either does or does not identify. Therefore, those theories cannot easily account for appreciation of humor that disparages a target (e.g., a person, animal, object) that one cannot easily represent as a member of a broader class or category. Zillmann and Cantor have empirically supported their disposition theory. Zillmann and Cantor (1972), for instance, presented participants with cartoons depicting superior-subordinate relationships that they claimed were characterized by mutual resentment (e.g., professor-student, parent-child). In half of the cartoons, the superior disparaged the subordinate (e.g., during a graduation ceremony, a professor hands a student a diploma, and then instead of shaking his hand, throws a pie in the student’s face). In the other half of the cartoons, the subordinate disparages the superior (e.g., during a graduation ceremony, as a professor hands a student a diploma and o¤ers to shake hands, the student throws a pie in the professor’s face). Zillmann and Cantor (1972) found that participants who typically occupy a superior position in social relationships (e.g., professionals) enjoyed cartoons depicting the superior disparaging the subordinate more than cartoons depicting the subordinate disparaging the

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superior. They found the opposite for participants who typically occupy a subordinate status (e.g., students). Zillmann and Cantor (1972; 1996 [1976]) and Cantor and Zillmann (1973) proposed that the disparagement of a resented target is, in and of itself, su‰cient to elicit amusement. That is, it is not necessary for disparagement of a resented target to be accompanied by the enhancement of an esteemed target. In the Zillmann and Cantor (1972) study, however, disparagement of a resented target was always accompanied by the enhancement of an esteemed character — the esteemed character always got the ‘‘last laugh.’’ Therefore, Cantor and Zillmann (1973) presented participants with cartoons depicting a character about to su¤er a misfortune. The character was manipulated to elicit either a high degree of sympathy (i.e., the character was depicted as a zookeeper) or a low degree of sympathy (i.e., the character was depicted as a police o‰cer). The character’s misfortune was caused by a person or object (e.g., a small child, or a bird) for which participants were likely to have a neutral (rather than clearly positive or negative) attitude. Cantor and Zillmann (1973) found that, even though participants’ attitudes toward the disparaging agent were neutral, they enjoyed the cartoons more when they had less sympathetic attitudes toward the disparaged target. More recently, Zillmann et al. (1998) presented participants with a fictitious press release alleging that either Bill Clinton or Newt Gingrich had contracted venereal disease. Participants’ amusement with the press release was negatively related to the degree to which they liked the targeted person. Other lines of research have revealed similar findings (e.g., McGhee and Du¤ey 1983; Wicker et al. 1980). In the context of sexist humor, for instance, there is substantial evidence suggesting that, regardless of sex, people enjoy sexist humor insofar as they have negative (sexist) attitudes toward women (e.g., Butland and Ivy 1990; Ford, 2000; Ford et al. 1999; Henkin and Fish 1986; LaFrance and Woodzicka 1998; Moore et al. 1987). Greenwood and Isbell (2002) found that men and women high in hostile sexism, antagonism toward women (Glicke and Fiske 1996), rated ‘‘dumb blonde’’ jokes as funnier than people low in hostile sexism. Similarly, Thomas and Esses (2004) found that men reported more enjoyment of female-disparaging jokes and a greater likelihood of telling those jokes, insofar as they were high in hostile sexism. Although the explanatory power of disposition theory may appear to have eclipsed vicarious superiority theory, a simultaneous test of these theories revealed their mutual importance in predicting amusement with

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disparagement humor. Gallois and Callan (1985) found that both attitudes toward the generic social categories of the source and target of disparagement humor, as well as attitudes toward the specific source and target, are important for predicting amusement. Thus, it seems the concept of identification class does contribute to amusement beyond attitudes toward the specific source and target of disparagement humor.

4.

Social identity theory

Social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986) o¤ers a unique perspective on the e¤ects of disparagement humor on amusement by emphasizing the relationship between social groups. In this perspective, social groups are viewed as competing — not necessarily for material resources — but for social recognition. This recognition is known as positive distinctiveness. When a group is recognized as superior to a relevant out-group along some valued dimension, it has achieved positive distinctiveness. Because social groups value such distinctiveness, they will use various means for attaining it. One such means is disparagement humor. This section explores the social identity perspective on the appeal of disparagement humor. We begin with a review of an important distinction between social identity and personal identity, thereby addressing key considerations in social identity theory (e.g., identity salience; social comparison). We then outline a theoretical model of disparagement humor derived from social identity theory. It provides an explanation for why disparagement humor elicits amusement, as well as what elicits such humor. Finally, we distinguish social identity from superiority theories, emphasizing social identity theory’s unique interpretations of superiority research and derivation of novel hypotheses.

4.1.

A distinction between social identity and personal identity

Social and personal identities comprise separate components of the self ‘‘that cannot be reduced to one another’’ (Verkuyten and Hagendoorn 2002: 286). The term social identity refers to that part of an individual’s self-concept deriving from perceived membership in social groups (Tajfel and Turner 1986: 16). Personal identity derives from perceptions of unique attributes in comparison to members of a one’s own social groups.

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Though often treated as dichotomous, one can think of personal and social identity as two poles on a continuum of self-categorization (e.g., Turner 1987). Social identity becomes salient in intergroup settings where individuals categorize themselves and others according to salient social group memberships. Although habitual identification with certain groups can create a proclivity to categorize one’s self as a member of those groups (Tajfel and Turner 1986), the social identity that becomes salient depends largely on which categorizations are relevant in a given context — individuals self-categorize to adapt to situational demands (Turner and Reynolds 2001; Turner et al. 2006). Thus, in one context, one might categorize his or her self based on race (e.g., when interacting with members of a di¤erent race) and, in another, based on occupation (e.g., during a weekly meeting at work). Intergroup settings elicit comparisons with out-groups on valued dimensions (e.g., ‘‘How does my fraternity compare to others in terms of athletic ability and intellect?’’). A fundamental proposition of social identity theory is that, in intergroup contexts, people ‘‘strive to maintain or achieve a positive social identity’’ (Tajfel and Turner 1986: 16). This is accomplished by perceiving positive in-group distinctiveness through favorable social comparisons with relevant out-groups (e.g., ‘‘My fraternity is the best at intramural sports.’’). Conversely, social identity is threatened when social comparisons reveal that one’s in-group is negatively distinguished from relevant out-groups (e.g., ‘‘My fraternity is the dumbest on campus!’’). In such cases, group members will be motivated to restore positive in-group distinctiveness (see Branscombe et al. 1999 for a review). In fact, social behavior is viewed as largely motivated by e¤orts for the in-group to be perceived, by one’s self or by others, as positively distinct (cf. Brewer 1991). Ellemers et al. (1997), for instance, found that members of a student group, which had received negative publicity on campus (a threat to positive distinctiveness), rated their negative traits as less typical of themselves than did the students with no group affiliation. They minimized their perceptions of how much their negative characteristics set them apart from other groups in response to a threat to distinctiveness, thus promoting a positive social identity. In contrast, personal identity becomes salient in interpersonal settings where individuals focus on their di¤erences from other individuals, without explicit regard for group membership (Turner et al. 2006). In interpersonal contexts, individuals perceive or categorize themselves based on

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their unique attributes that distinguish them from other individuals. This encourages interpersonal comparisons with other individuals, in which individuals self-define based on di¤erences from others. Even though personal identity is invariably tied to the specific social context (e.g., Americans and Germans might self-define on di¤erent traits), the social behavior of individuals is governed by interpersonal rather than intergroup di¤erences. Personal identity is enhanced when social comparisons favorably distinguish one’s self from relevant others; it is threatened when social comparisons negatively distinguish one’s self from others. In the latter case, individuals should be motivated to restore positive distinctiveness (Ellemers et al. 2002).

4.2.

Application to disparagement humor: The role of positive distinctiveness

Social identity theory can be readily applied to understanding disparagement humor and its potential for amusement. From this perspective, disparagement humor helps to bolster or maintain positive distinctiveness through: (1) specific social categorizations and (2) social comparisons to relevant out-groups on valued, identity-relevant dimensions. By applying social identity theory to disparagement humor, the following theoretical model can be derived: IDENTITY THREAT ! DISPARGEMENT HUMOR ! POSITIVE DISTINCTIVENESS ! AMUSEMENT This model answers two important theoretical questions for disparagement humor theorists based on the particular point in the above sequence. First, why do people initiate disparagement humor? This model suggests that people initiate disparagement humor in response to a threat to personal or social identity, as a means for restoring positive distinctiveness. For instance, if majority groups feel threatened by the social advances of racial minorities, they might communicate ethnic jokes that portray the minorities as incompetent. In essence, disparagement humor functions as a cultural tool for bolstering or maintaining positive distinctiveness. Consistent with this perspective, researchers have suggested that disparagement humor functions to enhance social identity (e.g., Bourhis et al. 1977; Martineau 1972; Meyer 2000; Ruscher 2001). Martineau (1972), for instance, suggested that disparagement humor enhances the solidarity

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of the in-group — the degree to which members identify with a given social group. In addition, Bourhis et al. (1977) suggested that disparagement humor is a mechanism by which people attain positive distinctiveness from an out-group, allowing them to maintain a positive social identity. They proposed that, ‘‘anti-outgroup humour can, through outgroup devaluation and denigration, be a creative and potent way of asserting in-group pride and distinctiveness from a dominant outgroup’’ (Bourhis et al. 1977: 261). Second, why are people amused by disparagement humor? The model suggests that the appeal of disparagement humor is mediated by its consequences for positive distinctiveness. To the extent that exposure to disparagement humor elicits positive distinctiveness, it should elicit amusement. If the ethnic jokes mentioned above successfully enhance personal or social identity in the specific social context, then the humor should elicit amusement. In contrast, to the extent that disparagement humor diminishes positive distinctiveness, it should not elicit amusement. When the ethnic jokes target individuals in the social context, the humor could threaten their personal or social identity, thereby diminishing amusement. The idea that disparagement humor can enhance or threaten (personal or social) identity is consistent with Martineau’s (1972) view that disparagement humor functions either as a ‘‘lubricant’’ or as an ‘‘abrasive.’’ Disparagement humor can facilitate smooth or conflicting relations, depending on its rewards or costs for a given identity.

4.3.

Interpretations of previous findings and novel hypotheses

Social identity theory shares central propositions and predictions with superiority theories, particularly Zillmann’s (1983) disposition theory. Most importantly, both theories propose that amusement with disparagement humor is mediated by self-enhancement through social comparison. There are important subtle di¤erences, however, in how the theories conceptualize self-enhancement through social comparison. Superiority theories conceptualize self-enhancement as an increment of self-esteem or personal sense of triumph over a disliked other (e.g., Hobbes 1996 [1651]; Gruner 1997; La Fave et al. 1996 [1976]). In contrast, social identity theory emphasizes the role of positive distinctiveness rather than self-esteem.1 Also, unlike superiority theories, social identity theory distinguishes between social comparisons in intergroup and interpersonal contexts, thus

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distinguishing between enhancement (positive distinctiveness) of social identity and personal identity. By di¤erentiating between distinctiveness in terms of personal and social identity, social identity theory o¤ers unique interpretations of previous research and derives a number of novel hypotheses. Consider, for instance, Middleton’s (1959) findings that middle-class African-Americans found racist humor amusing, whereas lower-class African-Americans did not. Middleton predicted that African-Americans would not be amused by humor that disparaged African-Americans. This was an intergroup prediction. When middle-class African-Americans found the humor amusing, Middleton o¤ered another intergroup explanation post-hoc — the middleclass participants did not identify with the disparaged group. This explanation poses a comparison based on social classes (middle versus low) rather than on race. Social identity theory would agree that middle-class African-Americans might not have identified with the disparaged target. However, according to social identity theory, it is possible that for middle-class participants, the context did not elicit intergroup comparisons but rather interpersonal comparisons. Thus, participants’ responses to the disparagement humor might have reflected personal identity enhancement rather than social identity enhancement. Consider also Cantor and Zillmann’s (1973) results. Participants enjoyed cartoons that disparaged a disliked target regardless of the category membership of the disparaging agent (a small child or a bird). Cantor and Zillmann o¤ered this finding as evidence that disparagement humor need not esteem a positive IC (identification class) and diminish a negative IC to elicit amusement. Rather, a negative attitude toward the disparaged target, alone, is su‰cient for amusement. Social identity theory o¤ers an alternative interpretation. Cantor and Zillmann’s study may have highlighted interpersonal rather than intergroup comparisons thus obviating a real test of La Fave’s (1996 [1976]) IC hypothesis, which is predicated on intergroup comparisons. Indeed, nothing in the humor — not the agent, target, nor event — encouraged an intergroup categorization and comparison. Therefore, participants could have readily self-categorized in a way that made salient their personal identities. The humor, in turn, could have fostered a positive distinctiveness through a favorable interpersonal comparison with the ‘‘butt’’ of the humor (e.g., ‘‘I’m not as dumb as that police o‰cer.’’). In other words, it is possible that enhancement of personal identity, not a negative attitude toward the target, was responsible for amusement. Furthermore, accord-

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ing to this interpretation, Cantor and Zillmann’s study did not rule out the possibility that when the context makes salient intergroup comparisons, amusement with disparagement humor is based on enhancement of social identity (e.g., enhancement of a positive IC; diminishment of a negative IC). These post-hoc explanations for the Middleton (1959) and Cantor and Zillmann (1973) studies highlight interpretive ambiguities that can result in research failing to di¤erentiate between personal and social identity. Social identity theory can also provide a framework for deriving a priori hypotheses about how the distinction between personal identity and social identity a¤ects amusement with disparagement humor. For instance, the degree to which humor that disparages a social group versus an individual is self-enhancing, and thus amusing, might depend on which level of one’s identity is more significant or salient in the immediate context. If recent experiences make one’s social identity particularly salient, he or she might particularly enjoy out-group disparaging humor, because it creates positive in-group distinctiveness through a favorable intergroup comparison. On the other hand, if the context activates personal identity, one might particularly enjoy humor that disparages another individual as it would positively distinguish one’s self from through a favorable interpersonal comparison. Consistent with this hypothesis, Gallois and Callan (1985) found that participants high in ethnocentrism rated jokes that disparaged an ethnic target as funnier than the same jokes without the ethnic labels. People high in ethnocentrism may be characterized as people for whom a social identity is chronically salient (e.g., Higgins 1996). In addition, it is possible that the di¤erent types of disparagement humor (group versus individual) are di¤erentially self-enhancing and thus amusing depending on the level of one’s identity that, at the time, is most in need of enhancement. For instance, when social identity is threatened through negative distinction (e.g., Texans learn that theirs is the fattest state in 2004), people might enjoy humor that disparages a relevant out-group (e.g., another state) more than comparable humor that disparages an individual.

5.

Future directions for disparagement humor research

Each of the theories of disparagement humor we reviewed o¤ers compelling frameworks for explaining amusement with and functions of

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disparagement humor. As a group or class of humor theories, however, they face common challenges to substantiate theoretical propositions more fully and to continue generating interest and empirical research on disparagement humor.

5.1.

Specifying and testing theoretical models

Each theory proposes a simple mediational structure, in which the e¤ects of disparagement humor on amusement are mediated by a psychological variable: catharsis, self-esteem, or positive distinctiveness. Surprisingly, however, there appears to be relatively little research designed to measure mediating variables directly. As mentioned earlier, psychoanalytic theory suggests that catharsis mediates the e¤ect of disparagement humor on amusement. However, researchers have not clearly defined catharsis (and other central concepts) on either a conceptual or an operational level. Thus, its role as a mediator remains unclear and under-investigated. Similarly, according to superiority theories, enhancement of self-esteem or sense of triumph is considered an important mediator of the e¤ect of disparagement humor on amusement (e.g., Gruner 1997; Hobbes 1996 [1651]; La Fave et al. 1996 [1976]). The increment in self-esteem we experience through a social comparison with the disparaged target elicits a positive a¤ective reaction in the form of amusement. By implicating the role of self-esteem enhancement, superiority theories suggest that disparagement humor can play an important role in the way we perceive the self, as well as extensions of the self (e.g., a‰liated/esteemed groups, or identification classes). Yet few studies directly measure self-esteem enhancement. Research that includes such direct measures and tests of mediation is necessary for theoretical substantiation and further development. From the framework of social identity theory, it is important that research be conducted to test novel hypotheses based on the distinction between social and personal identity. In doing so, it is critical to collect measures of personal and social identity enhancement (distinctiveness) and to test their roles as mediators in the models of initiating and responding to disparagement humor. For instance, one could include measures of personal and collective self-esteem — self-evaluations as a member of a social group (Luthanen and Crocker 1992). Measures of personal and collective self-esteem are indicators of individual and in-

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group distinctiveness, respectively. A second possible class of measures includes identity maintenance strategies (Ellemers et al. 2002; Branscombe et al. 1999). If disparagement humor does a¤ect personal identity and/or social identity, it would be valuable to collect some measures consistent with predicted identity maintenance strategies. Measures of identity maintenance strategies could help discern the e¤ects of humor as a tool for improving distinctiveness, or responses to humor as a threat to social or personal identity.

5.2.

Expanding the scope: Measuring a¤ective responses other than amusement

Research guided by disparagement humor theory has typically measured amusement, as the primary dependent variable. Furthermore, amusement is typically measured using self-reports on rating scales. Measuring amusement alone is problematic, as it negates the investigation of a wider variety of potential a¤ective responses to disparagement humor. Indeed, research has largely ignored negative emotional responses to disparagement humor, such as embarrassment, disgust, guilt, anger, and frustration. Such negative a¤ective responses are not theoretically irrelevant — disparagement humor theories are not silent on such a¤ective reactions. According to each theory reviewed in this paper, disparagement humor should meet with negative a¤ective reactions (not simply lack of amusement) under certain conditions. In addition, the reliance on self-report measures of amusement may not always provide an accurate gauge of actual amusement. Research participants may give false reports because of demand characteristics in a given study or because of social desirability concerns more generally. Even laughter, if not appropriately measured, can be subject to such self-report biases. Ekman et al. (1980) distinguished between di¤erent types of smiles: the Duchenne smile, characterized by muscular changes in the face around the eyes and the mouth, and the non-Duchenne smile, characterized by changes in the facial muscles around the mouth only. Relevant to the present analysis, only the Duchenne smile is consistently associated with subjective reports of positive a¤ect. Thus, laughter not accompanied by a Duchenne smile may actually be a false report of amusement. Accordingly, we recommend that researchers measure a variety of nonverbal responses to disparagement humor, such as facial expressions and

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gestures, because they are generally less reactive and can reflect both positive and negative a¤ective states. LaFrance and Woodzicka (1998), for instance, found that hostile sexism — antagonism toward women (Glick and Fiske 1996) — was positively related to ‘‘genuine smiling’’ in response to female-disparaging jokes. However, participants who possessed nonsexist attitudes displayed non-verbal and self-reported negative a¤ective reactions to the sexist jokes. Further research using non-reactive measures that can assess both positive and negative a¤ect could complement and extend existing research guided by disparagement humor theory.

5.3.

Expanding the scope: E¤ects of disparagement humor on social judgment and behavior

In keeping with a growing recognition that disparagement humor (e.g., racist, sexist) is a subtle form of prejudice (e.g., Frazier et al. 1995), researchers have recently begun to examine the consequences of disparagement humor on social judgment and behavior. Hobden and Olson (1994) found that reciting jokes that disparaged lawyers led participants to adopt more negative attitudes toward lawyers. Also, Maio et al. (1997) found that Canadian participants who recited humor material that disparaged Newfoundlanders adopted a more negative stereotypical representation of Newfoundlanders. Thus, it appears that telling disparaging jokes can have a negative e¤ect upon the joke teller’s attitudes and stereotypes of the disparaged group. Others have recently focused on the e¤ects of exposure to sexist humor (e.g., Ford 2000; Ford et al. 2001; Olson et al. 1999; Ryan and Kanjorski 1998). Ryan and Kanjorski (1998), for instance, found that men who were exposed to sexist humor and found it amusing reported greater tolerance of rape myths and violence against women. In addition, Ford and Ferguson’s (2004) prejudiced norm theory has generated a considerable amount of research demonstrating that exposure to sexist humor can expand the bounds of appropriate conduct in a given context, creating a perceived norm of tolerance of sexism among those high in hostile sexism. Furthermore, as a result of this perceived norm, men high in hostile sexism reported greater personal tolerance of a subsequently encountered sexist event upon exposure to sexist jokes than upon exposure to comparable sexist statements or neutral jokes (Ford 2000; Ford et al. 2001). Finally, Ford et al. (2008) have found evidence that exposure to dis-

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paragement humor can actually foster discriminatory behavior among those high in prejudice. Future research can extend these findings by more directly investigating whether disparagement humor influences social judgment and behavior by releasing suppressed prejudice. Crandall and Eshleman’s (2003) Justification-Suppression Model (JSM) of the expression of prejudice contends that people actively suppress the expression of prejudice because of internal forces (e.g., personal standards, religious beliefs) and/or external forces (non-prejudiced norms). That is, people may suppress prejudice in order to maintain a non-prejudiced self-concept or to avoid the appearance of prejudice to others (Crandall and Eshleman 2003: 420). JSM further contends that people are likely to ‘‘release’’ or express prejudice only when there is su‰cient justification for doing so. Justifications or ‘‘releasers of prejudice’’ allow people to express prejudice while protecting them from the implication that they may be prejudiced. It is possible that disparagement humor serves as a releaser of suppressed prejudice. For instance, a African-American with hostile feelings toward a White-American might feel free to express the hostilities upon exposure to humor that disparages Whites. In this case, the humor might create climate of tolerance of discrimination and, thus, permitting the expression of suppressed prejudice (Crandall and Eshleman 2003). Future research would benefit from more directly examining this possibility as well as other social consequences of disparagement humor.

6.

Conclusion

Disparagement humor is pervasive in contemporary society. It has appeared repeatedly in all forms of mass media, from newspapers to the Internet. Researchers have long recognized the insidious e¤ects of disparagement humor. Whether through communicating cultural knowledge of stereotypes (e.g., Devine 1989), contributing to an outlet for subtle expressions of prejudice (e.g., Crandall and Eshleman 2003), or facilitating hostile and discriminatory environments for others (e.g., Ford 2000; Fitzgerald et al. 2005), disparagement humor can have important social consequences. With the growing awareness that disparagement humor can function as a potential tool of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination, there is a

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clear need for social scientists to continue developing, testing, and refining theories of disparagement humor. The present research o¤ers one contribution to this e¤ort by reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature on the e¤ects of disparagement humor on amusement, with an emphasis on psychoanalytic theory, superiority theories, and social identity theory. We reviewed the key propositions of each theory, as well as research providing empirical tests of these propositions. Our goal was to provide researchers with a basis for making informed judgments about the current empirical status and explanatory value of each theory, as well as areas that require further theoretical development. While each theoretical framework faces unique challenges to furthering our knowledge of disparagement humor, we suggest that social identity theory represents a promising new advance in answering the question — ‘‘Why is disparagement humor funny?’’ It appears that such humor is most amusing to those individuals whose personal or social identity is enhanced in the particular social context. Through reinterpreting previous research findings, as well as generating novel hypotheses, social identity theory o¤ers important insights beyond traditional frameworks. We hope that this research will cultivate further interest in a theoretically guided and empirically grounded research literature on disparagement humor. University of Kansas Western Carolina University

Note Correspondence Address: [email protected] 1. It might appear that the self-esteem and positive distinctiveness are synonymous, and thus, social identity theory is redundant in this manner. Still, theorists have pointed out that it is incorrect to equate the terms. When viewed from the proper level of categorization, self-esteem might provide a marker for distinctiveness, but it is not the distinctiveness itself (Turner and Reynolds 2001).

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