Earthquake Planning for Government Continuity - Springer Link

Earthquake Planning for Government Continuity RONALD W. PERRY* School of Public Affairs Arizona State University Tempe, Arizona 85287-0306, USA MICHAEL K. LINDELL Institute for Crisis and Disaster Management George Washington University Washington, DC 20052, USA ABSTRACT / The problem of assuring government operational continuity following earthquakes has been given little research attention. Recent earthquake experience has documented that government organizations without a public safety mission do incur damaged facilities and routinely see increases in public demands following an earthquake. Impediments to service delivery associated with such dam-

Natural hazards form one component of the environment that humans occupy and attempt to manage. While individuals may adopt personal adjustments, comprehensive large-scale management of environmental threats remains the province of government (Alexander 1993, pp 579–580). Thus, governments endeavor, through programs for disaster mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery, to minimize negative consequences for citizens. In this context, planning for citizen protection should also include planning for government preservation. Unless government structures and personnel are operational after a disaster, the capacity for citizen service delivery and continued environmental management is significantly reduced. There is a limited body of research on government emergency planning designed to enhance the probability that operational capacity will survive disaster impact (Drabek 1986). Most of this research focuses upon measures taken by emergency management offices, fire departments, and law enforcement agencies (Brouillette 1970, Kartez and Lindell 1987, 1990). These types of agencies are public-safety oriented and increasingly have been found to adopt internal planning practices to insulate themselves from impact consequences as a way

KEY WORDS: Emergency planning; Earthquakes; Government preparedness *Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.

Environmental Management Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 89–96

ages can be minimized if agencies address earthquake plan elements likely to enhance postimpact functioning, including: the potential to relocate operations, protection for the workplace, possession of an organizational inventory, emergency instructions for employees, the ability to use volunteers, and communication capacity. Factors associated with the adoption of these plan elements were studied in one county government and its municipal county seat in the southwestern United States. A census of departments within these jurisdictions was asked to complete a questionnaire reporting the level of planning activity relative to each of these plan elements. It was found that the overall level of preparedness was low, but statistically significantly related to agency size, perceived risk, and information seeking. The implications of these findings underscore the potential for disruption to government service delivery and permit the identification of potential avenues for increasing levels of preparedness.

of preserving response capacity (Quarantelli 1984). Conversely, little attention has been given to examining the extent of such planning by other types of government agencies lacking a public safety mission (Lindell and Meier 1994). Recent California earthquakes underscore the importance of planning for government continuity by documenting that local governments are inundated with service demands following earthquakes (California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services 1994). Many of these demands were disaster-impact related and directed at fire departments, police forces, and emergency services offices, but many disaster-related demands as well as more routine demands were directed at a broad spectrum of other government offices (Cooke 1995). These included demands related to housing, financial support (temporary or long-term job loss led to applications for unemployment and food stamps), sanitation, schools, and other sectors of government responsibility. Furthermore, when citizens became frustrated with slow or no movement by federal or state government, they often appealed to local governments. In the short-term aftermath (eight to ten weeks), these demands appeared to increase in number rather than decrease (Anthony 1994). Consequently, it is critical that all government departments be able not just to continue functioning at preearthquake levels, but that they be able to accommodate a substantial increase in demands related to the earthquake.

r 1997 Springer-Verlag New York Inc.

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R. W. Perry and M. K. Lindell

This paper addresses the issue of planning to reduce or minimize structural and nonstructural earthquake damage in government organizations. The premise is that agencies must have structural and personnel integrity to maintain service delivery. The analytic concern is with a subcomponent of the larger problem of organizational emergency planning. The importance of the data presented here lies in two distinct domains. First, the data characterize the extent to which public organizations in an earthquake-prone area have attended to specific earthquake plan elements that would enhance their level of disaster survivability. Information on the extent of earthquake plan element adoption alerts governments to the issue of operational continuity, identifies important plan elements, and provides basic information for estimating vulnerability. A second area of significance is that the data provided here form a basis for identifying correlates of continuity planning for earthquakes. Such information can be used as an evaluative tool for estimating both the degree of disruption of government operations under specific conditions and for identifying governments likely to experience problems.

The Community Studied The county selected for study is located in the southwestern United States. (As a precondition for study, the county manager and agency heads were promised anonymity.) In the United States the form of local government closest to citizens is the city or town. A county represents a usually large geographic area, also with an elected government, that may include both municipalities and ‘‘unincorporated areas.’’ Municipalities are responsible for arranging citizen services within their political jurisdictions, and county governments typically handle services in areas that lie within the county but are not subsumed within cities or towns. Thus, the intergovernmental hierarchy includes cities within counties and counties within states. The county studied is geographically large (5509 square miles), and sparsely populated (106,000 people), with the bulk of citizens residing in one city (the county seat of government). The entire county contains only five towns and one city; 62.5% of the housing units are classified as urban. Thus, the county is characterized by clusters of population surrounded by large empty spaces. The population is 45% minority (primarily MexicanAmerican and American Indian) and poor (mean family income: US$25,000), with a 23% unemployment rate. The area is subject to a moderate earthquake threat; the municipality housing county government is located approximately 75 miles from the San Andreas

fault and within 35 miles of the Imperial fault. Serious damage was experienced from earthquakes on 18 May 1940 (magnitude 7.1) and 15 October 1979 (magnitude 6.5). The segment of the San Andreas fault nearest the county has not felt a major earthquake for more than 300 years, and geologically the fault is capable of generating a magnitude 8 or greater earthquake. On average, smaller magnitude ‘‘felt’’ earthquakes are reported several times each year by county residents. The county area is subject to both ground-shaking and liquefaction threats and experienced significant liquefaction damage following the 1940 Imperial Valley earthquake. The principal policy focus of our research is on government planning aimed at maintaining operational continuity following an earthquake. Two government jurisdictions were selected for study: the county level organization and the largest city organization in the county. A census, rather than a sample, was taken of all departments within each organization. At the county level, these departments included the county manager’s office and all departments, the assessor, attorney, recorder, treasurer, and courts. City offices questioned included the manager’s office, all departmental offices, school district offices, and magistrates. All offices associated with any form of emergency service delivery were eliminated from the sample, including emergency management offices, sheriff, police, and fire departments. These were excluded on the assumption that, since their main function was to delivery emergency services, their preparedness and planning processes would be significantly different from other municipal and county departments. A mailed questionnaire was prepared and sent to the director or chief executive of each department. A total of 42 questionnaires were mailed, and after three follow-up contacts, 31 (73.1%) were completed and returned. This return rate is deemed appropriately high to meaningfully analyze questionnaire data (Babbie 1990). The presentation of results is structured in terms of two tasks. The initial discussion reports the level of effort directed at specific continuity elements in each department. Then, these elements are assembled into an index of preparedness, and an elementary model of factors in planning is created and tested.

Earthquake Plan Elements There are a number of frameworks available for describing the content and process of organizational disaster planning (Foster 1980, Drabek and Hoetmer 1991, Lindell and Perry 1992). The literature addressing plan elements that contribute to organizational

Earthquake Planning for Government Continuity

Table 1.

Plan element descriptors and summary statistics

Element Operations relocation

Workplace protection

Department inventory

Employee instruction

Volunteer utilization

aRange

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Score

Descriptor

Mean

SDa

No plan (0) Minimal (1) Some (2) Substantial (3) No plan (0) Minimal (1) Some (2) Substantial (3) No plan (0) Minimal (1) Some (2) Substantial (3) No plan (0) Minimal (1) Some (2) Substantial (3) No plan (0) Minimal (1) Some (2) Substantial (3)

No activity. Discussion only; 50% of work postimpact. Planning, but 25% of work postimpact. Planning; less than 10% of work postimpact. No activity. Discussion only. Evacuation plan only. Evacuation plan plus physical protection. No activity. Routine list available. Routine list plus discussion of emergency use. Emergency list available. No activity. Information posted only. Systematic distribution. Systematic distribution plus drills. No activity. Discussion only. Written plan. Written plan plus trial or periodic use of volunteers.

0.68

0.87

0.52

0.96

1.33

0.94

0.42

0.67

1.55

1.25

of scores on all five elements 5 0–3.

viability following disasters is considerably narrower (Banerjee and Gillespie 1994, Drabek 1994, Gillespie and Banerjee 1993). From this work (especially Committee on Emergency Response and Recovery 1993), six plan elements were chosen as having a direct impact on organizational functioning in the immediate aftermath of an earthquake. These elements reflect the potential for structural damage and direct operational impacts and thus are crucial to the maintenance of organizational functioning: (1) plans for an alternate base for organizational operations, (2) employee protective measures for the workplace, (3) possession of an inventory of personnel and equipment, (4) safety training for employees, (5) plans for the use of volunteers to supplement regular staff, and (6) a capacity for emergency communications. Since county and municipal departments are parts of larger organizational networks, attention was given to operationalizing the six plan elements in a way that put them under the discretionary control of a unit manager. That is, items were selected for study that reasonably could have been instituted by a department head without supervisory consultation. In this way, we could characterize the departmental preparedness, with a minimum of influence from the overall preparedness of the larger jurisdictional organization. It is not possible to completely erase such influences, since governments are large bureaucracies with hierarchical decision authority. By dealing with elements at the level of department manager control, however, one can assess differen-

tial departmental emphases upon particular plan elements. The first five elements identified above were measured by asking department heads to classify levels of planning activity on a fixed scale. The scale ranged from ‘‘no plan’’ (assigned a score of 0), through ‘‘minimal plan’’ (score 5 1) and ‘‘some plan’’ (score 5 2), to ‘‘substantial plan’’ (score 5 3). The descriptors used to standardize levels of planning for each element are shown in Table 1. The capacity for communications capacity measured as a simple count of the number of alternate models of communication included in the departmental emergency plan. The following discussion summarizes levels of planning for each element. Operations Relocation Potential Building damage is a principal consequence of earthquake-induced ground movement, but damage can be caused by a variety of other earthquake-related events as well. Other factors that render buildings unoccupiable include fires, natural gas leaks, electricity failures, water or sewer main failures, and toxic materials releases. The average age of many government buildings makes the potential especially high that government departments may find themselves without a safe building in which to operate. All of these factors demand that departments have some plan to resume operations in a safe environment following structural damage. The level of preparedness to relocate operations was

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low; the mean score on this dimension was 0.68. Indeed, 54.8% of the departments reported no plan. Only 25.8% had engaged in minimal planning, and a single department claimed to have a substantial plan. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the majority of departments would face the challenge of relocating and resuming operations only after earthquake impact—when the least time and resources would be available. Workplace Protection Minimizing injuries to staff and damages to equipment constitute an obvious priority for continuity of operations following an earthquake. There are a wide variety of structural mitigation measures that can be taken to reduce earthquake damage ( Jirsa 1993), ranging in scope from structural renovation and reinforcement to simply securing occupants and contents within the workplace. Since analytic concern is with measures that could be realistically authorized and undertaken by department heads, the types of protective actions examined here focus on securing the workplace. Thus, two classes of protection were targeted. The first was the development of a site evacuation plan—a means to move employees to relatively safer areas following initial impact. The second area of interest was the implementation of site securing measures, such as attaching files, bookcases, and other materials to walls, adding latches to cabinets to prevent the contents from becoming flying objects, and locating furniture and equipment in relatively safe operational areas. The mean workplace protection score was 0.52. In this case, 74.2% of the departments had engaged in no planning. This portends serious operational difficulties following any significant earthquake. Thus, most of these managers would be forced to engage in a salvage operation for equipment and records before resuming operations. Organizational Inventory A persistent problem for organizations trying to resume operations in the aftermath of an earthquake deals with possession of an updated inventory of personnel, equipment, and records (Fligg 1993). There are several reasons why multilayered bureaucracies need to be able to account for inventory when the risk of building collapse or severe physical damage is high. Accurate personnel accounting is necessary to determine needs for search and rescue and for planning subsequent staffing patterns. Accurate equipment and records inventories allow assessments of needs for short-term continued service delivery and for reporting damages in connection with potential disaster declarations.

The mean score for inventory planning was 1.3, indicating that this plan element captured more attention than those previously examined. Only 12.9% of departments reported no plan. The majority (64.5%) claimed to have a minimal plan, and 19.4% reported a substantial plan. Most of this planning, however, represents far less than optimal effort. It is likely that respondents were relying on nonemergency inventory listings, kept for accounting purposes, that may or may not be current. Employee Emergency Instructions A fourth dimension of basic earthquake preparedness involves giving employees instructions on response protocol if an event occurs during working hours (Cheu 1987). The principal purpose of such measures is to reduce deaths and injuries to organizational personnel. In the present study, concern focused on the extent to which any protective guidance had been disseminated to employees. Among these departments, the attention to employee instructions was low, with a mean score of 0.42. No planning at all was reported in 67.7% of the departments. Minimal plans were claimed by 22.6%. Thus, in these jurisdictions, the lack of emergency instructions could produce enough personnel losses, even in a moderate earthquake, to reduce levels of experienced staff below those needed to continue operations. Use of Volunteers Research documents that volunteers are available to help with a variety of response operations following disasters (Gillespie and others 1986). Relative to government operations, an additional source of potential volunteers can be found among government employees of departments with nonemergency missions and from retired employees. Volunteers can be effectively utilized, however, only by departments who have planned for their use during or after an emergency (Lindell and Perry 1992). The departments studied reported a relatively higher level of planning activity for volunteers; the mean score was 1.55. Only 29.9% of the departments reported no plan in this area. Nearly one fourth (22.6%) achieved minimal planning, while 35.5% reported substantial planning. In an absolute sense, however, these levels remain low. Nearly two thirds of the departments would be forced to improvise some level of planning during the aftermath to use volunteers. The inability to use volunteers removes an important source of personnel to maintain routine departmental tasks.


Communications Maintaining communications in the response phase of a disaster is often cited as one of the highest planning priorities (Creasy 1994). Especially in the case of earthquakes, an important problem arises in simply having a functioning medium on which to communicate both inter- and intraorganizationally. Earthquakes typically disrupt commercial lifelines—especially electrical power and telephone lines—and communications systems that depend on them are interrupted. In converting this issue to planning action, one can focus on the number of alternate modes planned for by a given organization. A basic emergency planning principle for communications is to establish diversity and redundancy. That is, it is important to have the capacity to use any of a variety of alternate modes in the event that special circumstances or impacts render some forms inoperable. It is usually assumed that superior operational viability is evidenced in organizations that can institute communications via a number of different modes. Respondents were given four common modes (in addition to wired telephones)—radio communication, police message relay, ham radio relay, and cellular telephone—and asked to indicate how many were addressed in departmental emergency plans. Eight departments (25.8%) reported no plan for communications beyond simply using land-line-based telephone; these were assigned a score of 0. The experience in the Northridge earthquake clearly indicates that such sole reliance on standard telephones is likely to produce a communications failure (Lindell and Perry 1995). The largest single proportion (35.5%) of departments reported arranging for one communication mode beyond standard telephones. Four departments (12.9%) planned for two modes, six departments (19.4%) planned for three alternatives, and two departments (6.5%) planned for all four options. The mean number of modes across all departments was 1.55. These response patterns suggest that the probability of communication system difficulties following an earthquake is likely to be high in this county. Characterizing Organizational Readiness To develop an estimate of the degree to which a government organization has attended to measures likely to enhance postearthquake operations, a simple index may be created. An index offers a statistically based means of combining responses to individual questions into a meaningful summary statistic (Babbie 1995). A simple index of operational readiness can be formed by summing numeric scores for each of the six plan elements. This yields a measure of the extent of organizational planning directed at enhancing postim-

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pact operations. The lower anchor of the index is a score of 0. This score would represent an organization that had developed no plan for all six elements. The upper limit of the index is 19, representing an organizations with a substantial plan regarding each of the individual elements, plus possession of four communication modes other than telephone. Among the departments studied, the lowest score observed is 0 (by one department) and the highest score obtained is 14 (also by a single department). The mean score on the index was 5.9 (standard deviation 5 .64) with a median score of 6.0. These statistics indicate that there is a clustering of the organizations in the lowest one third of the index scores. Indeed, 21 organizations (67.8%) showed index scores in the range between 2.0 and 7.0. While there is no absolute interpretation for the index scores, the distribution indicates that the majority of departments studied evidenced low levels of preparedness related to operational continuity following an earthquake.

Correlates of Continuity Planning An important issue for planning and vulnerability assessment lies in identifying factors that are correlated with higher levels of organizational preparedness. The research available on correlates of preparedness must be, however, interpreted cautiously relative to the present data set for at least two reasons. First, the variable of concern here—attention to earthquake plan elements aimed at operational continuity—is much more narrow than the notion of disaster preparedness (Gillespie and Streeter 1987). Thus, predictor variables that would be expected to have an impact on general emergency preparedness may not similarly affect earthquake continuity planning. Second, most of the prior research has been conducted on organizations with specific emergency missions or that are not connected with governments. These organizations include emergency management agencies (Quarantelli 1985), hospitals (Quarantelli 1970, Aldred and others 1973), public schools (Turner and others 1981), and tourist businesses (Drabek 1994). The differences in organizational mission between government departments and these previously studied organizations may introduce ambiguity into the apparent connection between predictor variables and preparedness (Dynes and Quarantelli 1975). With these caveats, three variables were identified that prior studies suggest should be correlated with organizational preparedness. Organizational size has long been argued to be positively correlated with emergency planning behavior (Quarantelli and others 1979, Quarantelli 1981). The logic behind this assertion


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Table 2.

Regression analysis summary Intercorrelationa

Predictord

Mean

SD

1

2

3

rb

bc

1. 2. 3. 4.

198.5 3.0 0.5 1.1

125.2 1.1 0.5 1.7

— 0.31 0.04 0.10

— — 0.22 0.46

— — — 0.12

0.49 0.64 0.06 0.61

0.34 0.31 0.05 0.43

Size Perceived risk County department Information seeking

aBivariate

Pearsons r 2 among predictor variables.

bBivariate

Pearsons r 2 with index; coefficients $ 0.31 are statistically significant at alpha 5 0.05.

cStandardized dR 2

partial regression coefficient; coefficients $ 0.31 are statistically significant at alpha 5 0.05.

5 0.64; F4,30 5 10.5, P , 0.05.

is that larger organizations are more likely to have greater resources and greater needs for strategic planning (Gillespie and Streeter 1987, Banerjee and Gillespie 1994, Lindell and others 1996). Organizational size was operationalized here as the total number of staff employed in the government department (summing across all site locations for those with multiple sites). As Table 2 shows, the mean number of employees was 198.5 (standard deviation 5 125.2). These statistics indicate that the departments studied vary widely along the dimension of number of employees. There is a well-documented positive relationship between risk perception and preparedness behavior (Lindell and Perry 1992). In an organizational context, research suggests that higher levels of perceived risk on the part of managers will result in higher levels of organizational preparedness (Hoetmer 1983, Anderson 1969, Drabek 1990). A global self-report by department managers was used to measure perceived risk. Managers were asked to rate the likelihood that their area would be affected by ‘‘a major, damaging earthquake during the next 20 years.’’ Answers were recorded on a standard five-point scale with anchors ranging from ‘‘very unlikely,’’ through ‘‘even odds,’’ to ‘‘very likely’’; the scale was coded such that higher scores reflected higher perceived likelihood. The mean score for risk perception was 3.0 (standard deviation 5 1.1). Finally, the third predictor of organizational preparedness examined here is the notion of information seeking. Much research on citizens has shown a positive relationship between seeking information on a given hazard and preparedness actions (Perry and Lindell 1989). Some organizational research also indicates that possession of higher levels of threat information leads to more effective disaster planning (Lindell and others 1996) and response (Quarantelli 1970). Furthermore, there are data to suggest that in requesting threat information from emergency-mission organizations, the requestor organization tends to increase both hazard awareness and preparedness capacity (Stallings 1978). The logic for including information-seeking here is that

initiating contacts for information can be seen as evidence of a higher level of motivation to attend to the earthquake threat. In measuring information-seeking behavior, department managers were asked to list ‘‘the principal sources of earthquake threat information with whom you have initiated contact during the past 12 months.’’ The mean number of sources was 1.1 (standard deviation 5 1.7), with a range from a low of zero sources to a high of four sources. A fourth predictor variable was included in the model to accommodate the operating context of the organizations studied. That is, departments within a municipality or county, although they may be conceptualized as independent in terms of policy and operations, are not independent relative to jurisdictional budget processes. Thus, being a larger governmental unit, the county studied had access to potentially greater resources to be distributed among departments. While this is certainly not the case for all US county–municipal relationships, it does prevail in the study area. Consequently, it is possible that differential access to resources might account for some variance in departmental preparedness. To measure the extent to which this might be true, a dummy variable (county agencies were coded as 1.0) was created for county–municipal affiliation and included as a predictor variable. Table 2 indicates that, at the zero order, all four predictor variables are positively correlated with the index of preparedness. The intercorrelations among predictors are sufficiently below levels that would indicate multicolinearity problems (Lewis-Beck 1980). The beta (standardized partial regression coefficient) values show that only one predictor—county/municipal affiliation—is not statistically significant; thus, whether a department is embedded in a county or municipality has no impact on level of preparedness. Among the remaining variables, information-seeking was the most important predictor, showing a beta value of 0.43. Department size and the manager’s perception of risk each are less important than information-seeking in determining change in the index score. However, the


beta values for these two variables are sufficiently similar to make it difficult to suggest that one is more important than the other. Together, the predictor variables accounted for nearly two thirds (R 2 5 0.64, P , 0.05) of the variance in preparedness behavior. Consequently, for the departments studied, it was found that higher preparedness existed for those who sought more information, had larger numbers of employees, and whose managers believed the level of earthquake risk was higher.

Conclusions A constellation of at least three conclusions may be drawn from the data examined here. Most notably, attention to earthquake plan elements aimed at ensuring operational continuity is uniformly low across the government departments studied. Given the observed level of planning, these organizations would be confronted with many operational impediments following a damaging earthquake. This low level of planning persisted in spite of conditions which should have promoted earthquake awareness: (1) planning for public safety is high in the jurisdiction; (2) a large earthquake impacted the area 15 years ago—easily within the memory and experience of most current officials; and (3) felt earthquakes—although low in magnitude— affect the area regularly. These conditions suggest that while high levels of environmental cues promote public safety planning (Mileti and Sorenson 1987), they are not sufficient alone to induce continuity planning among government departments. It may also be concluded that the government departments studied failed to focus on some of the more important plan elements relative to operational continuity. In particular, four plan elements were given virtually no attention by more than two thirds of the study organizations. First, structural workplace protections tied to the safety and preservation of equipment, records, and the work environment were almost universally ignored. This is ironic in that these types of measures are relatively inexpensive and not disruptive to install. Second, providing explicit emergency instructions to employees was also largely a missing feature of departmental emergency plans. Departments did not report either training for employees for self-protection or providing guidance for organizational operations following earthquake impact. A third element attended to by only a few organizations was making arrangements for an alternate site in the event structural or other damage closed their normal site. Since even moderate earthquakes routinely produce interruptions of water, electricity, and sewer functions, this constitutes a critical omission. Finally, planning to ensure uninterrupted

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communications was sporadic at best. Many organizations had given no thought to developing alternative modes, choosing to rely only on commercial telephone lines. Based on the above pattern of planning, most organizations were (at least by default) pursuing a path that would lead to loss of workplace, potential personnel shortages due to injury and records loss, and loss of communication capacity. Clearly, the findings indicate that a policy promoting awareness of earthquake threats to government continuity should be established. The analysis of factors correlated with the planning index offers a starting place for developing hazard awareness strategies. The positive relationship between information-seeking and preparedness suggests that the expansion of interdepartmental contacts within a jurisdiction forms one option for effectively sharing threat information. This could be accomplished, for example, by including all governmental departments—not just fire protection, emergency management, law enforcement and public works—in jurisdictional disaster drills and exercises. Such contacts form the basis for sustained information exchange (which builds a foundation for hazard awareness) between departments having an emergency mission and the remaining agencies. The positive relationship noted between size and preparedness further suggests that smaller departments in particular should be targeted for threat information and earthquake planning support. Finally, it is clear that earthquake risk perception on the part of managers is one key element in department preparedness. To this end, special attention should be given to educating and including managers from all departments in briefings and exercises pertaining to jurisdictional vulnerability to natural and technological hazards.

Acknowledgments This research was supported in part by the US National Science Foundation, grant CMS 9415728. None of the conclusions expressed necessarily reflects the views of the sponsoring organization.

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