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Effectiveness of Voluntary Conservation Agreements: Case Study of Endangered Whales and Commercial Whale Watching DAVID N. WILEY,∗ †† JUST C. MOLLER,∗ RICHARD M. PACE III,† AND CAROLE CARLSON‡§ ∗

National Marine Sanctuary Program, Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary, 175 Edward Foster Road, Scituate, MA 02066-4342, U.S.A. †National Marine Fisheries Service, Northeast Fisheries Science Center, 166 Water Street, Woods Hole, MA 02543-1026, U.S.A. ‡International Fund for Animal Welfare, 411 Main Street, Yarmouthport, MA 02675, U.S.A.

Abstract: The use of voluntary approaches to achieve conservation goals is becoming increasingly popular. Nevertheless, few researchers have quantitatively evaluated their efficacy. In 1998 industry, government agencies, and nongovernmental organizations established a voluntary conservation program for whale watching in the northeast region of the United States, with the intent to avoid collisions with and harassment of endangered whales by commercial and recreational whale-watching vessels. One important aspect of the program was the establishment of 3 speed zones within specific distances of whales. We wanted to determine the level of compliance with this aspect of the program to gauge its efficacy and gain insights into the effectiveness of voluntary measures as a conservation tool. Inconspicuous observers accompanied 46 commercial whalewatching trips from 12 companies in 2003 (n = 35) and 2004 (n = 11). During each trip, vessel position and speed were collected at 5-second intervals with a GPS receiver. Binoculars with internal laser rangefinders and digital compasses were used to record range and bearing to sighted whales. We mapped whale locations with ArcGIS. We created speed-zone buffers around sighted whales and overlaid them with vessel-track and speed data to evaluate compliance. Speeds in excess of those recommended by the program were considered noncompliant. We judged the magnitude of noncompliance by comparing a vessel’s maximum speed within a zone to its maximum recorded trip speed. The level of noncompliance was high (mean 0.78; company range 0.74–0.88), some companies were more compliant than others (p = 0.02), noncompliance was significantly higher in zones farther from whales (p < 0.001), and operators approached the maximum speed capabilities of their vessel in all zones. The voluntary conservation program did not achieve the goal of substantially limiting vessel speed near whales. Our results support the need for conservation programs to have quantifiable metrics and frequent evaluation to ensure efficacy.

Keywords: boat speed limits, conservation guidelines, endangered whales, marine protected area, ship strike, voluntary conservation agreement, whale watching Efectividad de los Acuerdos de Conservaci´ on Voluntarios: un Caso de Estudio de Ballenas en Peligro y la Observaci´ on Comercial de Ballenas

Resumen: El uso de enfoques voluntarios para alcanzar metas de conservación se está volviendo cada vez m´ as popular. Sin embargo, pocos investigadores han evaluado su eficacia cuantitativamente. En 1998, la industria, las agencias gubernamentales y no gubernamentales establecieron un programa de conservaci´ on voluntario para la observaci´ on de ballenas en la regi´ on noreste de los Estados Unidos, con la intenci´ on de evitar colisiones y molestias a las ballenas en peligro con embarcaciones comerciales y de observaci´ on recreativa de ballenas. Un aspecto importante del programa fue el establecimiento de 3 zonas de velocidad dentro de las distancias espec´ıficas de las ballenas. Quisimos determinar el nivel de cumplimiento de este aspecto del

††email [email protected] §Current address: P.O. Box 32, Provincetown, MA, U.S.A. Paper submitted April 24, 2007; revised manuscript accepted October 8, 2007.

450 Conservation Biology, Volume 22, No. 2, 450–457 C 2008 Society for Conservation Biology; No claim to original US government works. Journal compilation DOI: 10.1111/j.1523-1739.2008.00897.x

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programa para medir su eficacia y percibir la efectividad de las medidas voluntarias como una herramienta de conservaci´ on. Observadores inconspicuos acompa˜ naron 46 viajes de observaci´ on comercial de ballenas de 12 compa˜ n´ıas en 2003 (n = 35) y 2004 (n = 11). En cada viaje, la posici´ on y la velocidad del barco fueron registradas en intervalos de 5 segundos con un receptor GPS. Se utilizaron binoculares con telémetro interno y br´ ujulas digitales para registrar la distancia y el rumbo de las ballenas avistadas. Elabiramos mapas de localizaci´ on de las ballenas con ArcGIS. Creamos a ´ reas de amortiguamiento alrededor de las ballenas avistadas y las sobrepusimos a los datos de velocidad y rumbo del barco para evaluar el cumplimiento. Las velocidades en exceso de las recomendadas por el programa fueron consideradas como incumplimiento. Juzgamos la magnitud del incumplimiento mediante la comparaci´ on de la velocidad m´ axima de una embarcaci´ on dentro de una zona con la velocidad m´ axima registrada. El nivel de incumplimiento fue alto (media 0.78; rango por compa˜ n´ıa 0.74-0.88), algunas compa˜ n´ıas cumplieron m´ as que otras (p = 0.02), el incumplimiento fue significativamente m´ as alto en zonas alejadas de las ballenas (p< 0.001), y los operadores se aproximaron a las capacidades m´ aximas de velocidad del barco en todas las zonas. El programa de conservaci´ on voluntario no alcanz´ o la meta de limitar la velocidad cerca de las ballenas. Nuestros resultados soportan la necesidad de que lo programas de conservaci´ on tengan medidas cuantificables y sean evaluados frecuentemente para asegurar su eficacia.

Palabras Clave: acuerdo de conservación voluntario, área marina protegida, ballenas en peligro, directrices de conservaci´ on, golpe de barco, l´ımites de velocidad de lanchas, observaci´ on de ballenas

Introduction Voluntary approaches are being considered an important “new tool” for conservation and environmental management (e.g., Dietz & Stern 2002a; Ashford & Caldart 2005; Brouhle et al. 2005), including the protection of biodiversity and endangered species (e.g., ANZECC 1997; FWS/NMFS 1997; Scudder 1999; Langpap & Wu 2004). Voluntary approaches to conservation can include agreements between regulatory agencies and private enterprise, agreements among industrial firms, or codes of conduct within a professional or industrial group (Dietz & Stern 2002b). In each case participants commit to holding their environmental performance to a stricter standard than required by law (i.e., behavioral changes favoring conservation or environmental quality are expected, but there are no penalties for noncompliance) (Karamanos 2001; Krarup 2001; Alberini & Segerson 2002). Advantages of such agreements over the more traditional command-and-control regulatory methods are that voluntary agreements are less confrontational and therefore less prone to lengthy and expensive litigation, are less costly to implement and monitor, allow greater flexibility in designing and implementing policies, provide a more integrated and coordinated approach that addresses underlying environmental problems, promote technological innovation, and take greater advantage of local knowledge and user expertise (Khanna 2001; NRC 2002; Rivera & de Leon 2004). In general, voluntary agreements are designed to improve the environmental performance of a target group and to display the improvement to the public (Nash 2002). Although the success of voluntary programs is frequently heralded, there is ongoing debate over their effectiveness and why participants become involved in them

(e.g., Dietz & Stern 2002b; Rivera & de Leon 2004; Hansen 2005). In practice the actual monitoring of voluntary programs rarely extends past the number of participants enrolled or is plagued by problems of data availability, credibility, self-selection, or poor design (Furger 2002; Harrison 2002; Mazurek 2002), making rigorous evaluation difficult. This is problematic because there are strong expectations on the part of the government and the public that participants will adhere to the agreements. Often, the existence of such agreements is used to negate the need for formal regulations. Therefore ascertaining the effectiveness of such programs is crucial. Most researchers to date have focused on voluntary programs involving manufacturing firms (Rivera & de Leon 2004, but see Scarpaci et al. (2003) and Whitt and Read (2006) for studies of dolphin watching). Our focus here on conservation of endangered species represents an extension of those studies. We provide a case study of the efficacy of a voluntary agreement to operational procedures (guidelines) established for commercial whale-watching vessels used to view endangered and other protected species of whales. These guidelines were created by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and are in effect throughout the northeast region of the United States (Maine–Virginia), including the Gerry E. Studds Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary (Stellwagen Bank NMS), where we conducted our study. Guidelines were created to avoid whale strikes and to keep whalewatching vessels from “harassing” animals as prohibited under the 1994 Amendments to the Marine Mammal Protection Act, where harass means any act of pursuit, torment, or annoyance that has the potential to disturb marine mammals (50 CFR 216.3) or “taking” animals as prohibited under the U.S. Endangered Species Act, where

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take includes activities that harass, harm, pursue, or attempt to harass, harm, or pursue a listed species (50 CFR 222.102). The Stellwagen Bank NMS is a 2181-km2 federally designated marine protected area off the coast of Massachusetts (U.S.A.) and in the southwestern Gulf of Maine. Since the early 1980s, it has been one of the world’s leading areas for whale watching, hosting 11 species of cetaceans including endangered North Atlantic right (Eubalaena glacialis), humpback (Megaptera novaeangliae), fin (Balaenoptera physalus), and sei (B. borealis) whales and protected minke (B. acutorostrata) whales (Hoyt 2001). In 1996, the most recent year for which data were available, nearly 1 million people participated in whale-watching cruises in the Stellwagen region, resulting in an estimated $21 million in gross annual revenue (Hoagland & Meeks 1997). Commercial whale watching presents an opportunity to enhance environmental tourism, regional economics, environmental education, and research (Orams 1997; Hoyt 2001). Nevertheless, the activity is not without concerns. For example, in some areas and for some species, commercial whale-watching vessels have been listed as having a relatively high frequency of collisions with whales (Laist et al. 2001; Jensen & Silber 2003), contributing to high noise levels around whales (Erbe 2002), disrupting whale behavior (Blane & Jaakson 1994; Duffus 1996; Bejder et al. 2006; Williams et al. 2006), and reducing reproductive fitness (Samuels & Bejder 2004; Williams et al. 2006). Federal approach and distance regulations in our study area exist only for North Atlantic right whales, with voluntary guidelines in effect to protect all other species. These guidelines were first developed in 1984 by an ad hoc committee of naturalists, captains, and scientists associated with whale watching (Beach & Weinrich 1989). The guidelines were revised in 1999 following a sharp increase in the average speed of whale-watching vessels and collisions with 3 whales in 1998, at least 1 of which was fatal (Russell & Knowlton 1999). The current guidelines recommend speed reductions beginning within 3.7 km of a whale, the posting of dedicated lookouts within that zone, avoiding head-on vessel approaches to whales, and a no-approach zone within 30.48 m of a whale. The National Marine Fisheries Service and Stellwagen Bank NMS have made extensive attempts to make whale-watching vessels aware of the guidelines, including mailings to companies, informational meetings, and information for posting on vessels. Voluntary agreements can be used by industries to solve conservation problems or merely as a way to avoid regulation (Harrison 2002; Nash 2002). Given the vast difference between these outcomes, it is important to monitor and evaluate the approach (Stem et al. 2005). Our case study represents an unusual opportunity to evaluate voluntary agreements in that the agreement was negoti-


ated among a broad range of stakeholders, focused on endangered and protected species in a federally designated marine protected area, was well communicated to the stakeholders, and contained quantifiable components (speed restrictions).

Methods Overview Speed zones around the whales consist of a series of concentric rings, within which explicit speed limits are recommended. As such, they provide a quantifiable means by which to evaluate the industry’s compliance with a key aspect of the voluntary agreement. To gather speedzone compliance data, we placed observers as paying customers aboard whale-watching vessels. Observers were not identified as such to the crew or passengers. Observers collected data on the track and speed of the vessels (vessel data) and the location of whales in the vicinity (whale data). We determined noncompliance by overlaying the vessel track and speed data on speed-zone buffers (speed zones) created around the whale location points recorded during the trip (compliance analysis). Observers monitored vessels of the area’s 12 principal whale-watching companies approximately 4 times each (range 1–5). Of the 48 potential trips, data collected from 1 trip was discarded because of a weak GPS signal (2003), and 1 company did not operate in 2004. Therefore, we used data from 46 trips (35 in 2003 and 11 in 2004). Vessel and Whale Data We used a Garmin 76S WAAS-enabled GPS (Garmin, Olathe, Kansas) unit to record vessel movements. The GPS unit was programmed to record time, latitude, longitude, speed, and heading at 5-second intervals. An external antenna was used to increase satellite signal sensitivity. The GPS antenna was placed in a location with an unobstructed view of the sky to ensure maximum satellite signal strength, yet remain undetected by the ship’s crew. The unit also received the signal from the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), which permitted real-time vessel position corrections to within a manufacturerspecified 3-m location accuracy and a velocity accuracy to approximately 0.19 km/h. When a whale was sighted, the time, range, and bearing to the animal were recorded with Leica Vector Viper II binoculars (Leica, Solms, Germany). The binoculars included a digital compass displaying grid azimuth and a laser rangefinder for measuring distance to 4000 m. Resolution was 0.5 m. Bearings (azimuth) were measured in milliradians with a resolution of 0.2 mrad (6283 mrad = 360◦ ). Data were automatically downloaded through a RS232 cable from the Leica binoculars to a Dell Axim X5 PDA computer (Dell, Round Rock, Texas) running a

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menu-driven data recorder and database, which allowed us to collect data in an unobtrusive manner. To calculate whale locations, we used the range and bearing to the animal, computed from the vessel’s position at the time of sighting. Compliance Analyses We used GIS software (ArcView 8.3, ESRI, Redlands, California) to analyze speed-zone compliance. Each of the 46 whale-watching trips was analyzed separately and then grouped by company. Whale locations (point features) were buffered to the speed-zone distances by creating polygon features around the whale locations. The vessel tracks were derived from the GPS points (latitude and longitude). These points, which included vessel speed and distance traveled attribute data, were then extracted for each speed zone with the speed-zone polygons and ArcView’s geoprocessing Clip function. This provided speed and distance data within each of the whale-watching speed zones (e.g., Fig. 1). The 3 speed zones were identified as: zone 1, 30.5–927 m, suggested speed ≤13 km/h; zone 2, 927.1–1853 m, suggested speed ≤18.5 km/h; and zone 3, 1853.1–3706 m, suggested speed ≤24 km/h. Speed-zone compliance was designed to demonstrate an individual company’s and the overall industry’s level of noncompliance with the voluntary speed restrictions. Noncompliance level was calculated as the ratio of distance not in compliance to the total distance traveled

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within each of the 3 zones, for each trip. A level of 1.00 equaled complete noncompliance, which meant the vessel always exceeded the suggested maximum speed, and a value of 0.00 equaled complete compliance. A noncompliance level of 0.70 meant that noncompliant speeds accounted for 70% of the linear distance traveled in the measured zone(s). We analyzed these data with a mixed general linear model (Littell et al. 1996). Model structure was similar to a split plot design in which trips within year by company groupings would be whole plots (random) split by observation in each zone. We used Akaike information criterion (AIC) to select among competing models that included interactions among the various fixed effects of year, company, and zone (Burnham & Anderson 2002). Speed comparison was designed to identify the magnitude of noncompliance (i.e., Were vessels traveling slightly or substantially above the suggested speeds and how did those speeds compare with the speed capabilities of the vessel?). For each trip we identified a vessel’s maximum speed capability as the highest speed attained during the trip. We identified the highest speed reached in each of the 3 restricted speed zones during that trip. We then compared the maximum speed capability of the company’s vessel to the maximum speed attained in each of the 3 restricted zones and to the voluntary speed limit for those zones. We summarized these data for each company by calculating the mean maximum speed for their trips and compared that to their mean maximum speed for each speed zone. This provided a measure of the magnitude of noncompliance.

Figure 1. Globalpositioning-system-derived vessel track relative to the 3 restricted speed zones around whales from a sample commercial whale-watching trip. Noncompliant portions of the vessel track (i.e., traveled above recommended speeds) are in black and compliant portions are in gray.


Table 1. Total distance (km), by company, traveled in each whale-watching restricted speed zone (zones 1, 2, and 3) and in all restricted zones combined.∗

Company code

Speed zone

Number of trips

1

2

3

1–3

4 4 4 4 4 3 1 5 4 4 4 5 46

37.5 48.2 42.9 33.5 35.5 31.5 10.7 37.4 41.3 26.4 28.6 39.6 413.2

23.2 17.7 15.7 16.6 18.1 8.8 2.0 17.2 10.2 9.6 13.3 17.3 169.9

42.5 33.6 32.3 33.7 29.7 11.3 3.8 26.1 25.6 20.2 15.6 24.8 299.2

103.1 99.5 90.9 83.9 83.4 51.7 16.5 80.7 77.1 56.2 57.5 81.7 882.3

A B C D E F G H I J K L Total ∗ Noncompliance

was calculated as a ratio of the distance traveled not in compliance to the total distance traveled.


1.0

(b)

0.9

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.7

NONCOMPLIANCE LEVEL

0.6 0.5

Trip vessels ranged from 24 to 42 m in length. Each trip was from approximately 4 to 5 h long, including transit time to and from the whale-watching areas. Distance traveled in the restricted zones per trip averaged 19.2 km (Table 1). In 2003 range and bearing data were acquired for 650 whale surfacings (a single whale could be acquired multiple times). Mean acquisition distance was 109 m (range 5–551 m). Eighty-eight percent (n = 575) of the surfacing acquisitions were within 200 m of the vessel. In 2004 range and bearing data were acquired for 296 surfacings. Mean acquisition distance was 105 m (range 5–559 m). Ninety-three percent (n = 272) of the surfacings were within 200 m of the vessel. The level of noncompliance differed among speed zones and companies (Fig. 2). During our analysis a single best model emerged for estimation in the sense that the AIC for a model with no year-interaction terms had an AIC value at least 10 lower than its closest competitor. Estimated noncompliance was significantly higher (F = 173.97, df = 2, p < 0.001) in the outer zones (zone 2, industry noncompliance level 0.93, individual trip range 0.76–1.00; zone 3, industry noncompliance level 0.94, individual trip range 0.64–1.00) than in the zone closest to the whales (zone 1, industry noncompliance level

0.6

Results

(a)

0.5

For example, if within a zone the maximum speed for a vessel was only slightly higher than the suggested speed it would indicate an effort to adhere to the speed restriction guidelines. If a vessel attained maximum or nearly maximum speeds within the zones, it would indicate little effort to comply.

1.0


454

A B C D E

F G H

COMPANY

I

J

K L

1

2

3

ZONE

Figure 2. Mean (sum of individual trip compliance level/number of trips) (SE) levels of noncompliance by (a) company and (b) zone associated with a voluntary conservation agreement to limit the speed of commercial whale-watching vessels near endangered or protected whales as estimated by the best-fit generalized linear model. Speed zone restrictions were zone 1, within 30.5 to 927 m of a whale recommended speed ≤13 km/h; zone 2, within 927.1 to 1853 m of a whale recommended speed ≤18.5 km/h; zone 3, within 1853.1 to 3706 m of a whale recommended speed ≤24 km/h.

0.61, individual trip range 0.40–0.84), but was high in all zones. Overall, total zone mean noncompliance levels (zones 1–3 combined) differed significantly among companies (F = 2.52, df = 11, p = 0.02) but was high for all companies (0.78; range 0.74 to 0.88). Despite voluntary guidelines that call for maximum speeds of 13, 18.5, and 24 km/h in zones 1, 2, and 3, respectively, vessels during most trips achieved speeds near their maximum speed and well in excess of the guidelines in all zones (Fig. 3). Ranges of maximum speeds were 25.7–68, 27.8–68.3, and 27.8–69.5 km/h observed in zones 1, 2, and 3, respectively, whereas overall maximum speed ranged from 29.3 to 69.5 km/h.

Discussion Support for voluntary guidelines, conduct codes, and other nonregulatory forms of natural resource management has become increasingly popular in recent years

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50 40 30 20 10

MAXIMUM SPEED (Km/h)

60

70

455

0

TRIP ZONE 1 A

B

C

D

E

F

ZONE 2 ZONE 3 G

H

I

J

K

L

COMPANY

Figure 3. Mean (symbol) and range (vertical lines) by company of maximum vessel speeds recorded during whale-watching trips and of maximum speeds within voluntary speed-reduction zones. Horizontal lines depict the agreed-upon maximum speeds of operation in varying proximities to whales.

(Dietz & Stern 2002a;). Although some laud the approach, others are skeptical. For example, Rachlinski (1998) found that reliance on the voluntary actions of landowners is unlikely to protect endangered plants on private lands. Rivera and de Leon (2004) found that ski areas participating in a voluntary conservation program frequently had lower environmental performance ratings than ski areas that chose not to participate. In this case the authors speculated participants were looking for a “free ride” by using the existence of the agreement to appear “green” without the cost of adhering to a higher environmental standard. In contrast, Kenow et al. (2003) found that a voluntary program substantially reduced harassment of waterfowl by boaters in a national wildlife refuge, and Miranda et al. (2007) judged voluntary agreements to be a powerful instrument for watershed protection in Costa Rica. Despite a lack of consensus on their value or substantial data supporting their efficacy, the use of voluntary agreements for conservation is increasing and their existence is often used to negate the need for stronger forms of management, such as regulations. Thus, determining the efficacy of these agreements is important to the conservation and management communities. Such a determination is particularly important for managers dealing with endangered species because reliance on a management tactic that is not working can cause species to decline further. Our case study indicated that industry compliance with the measured portion of the conservation agreement was

low and unlikely to have achieved the goal of substantially reducing the speed of vessels within proximity to endangered and protected large whales (although vessels probably could have gone faster). Failure was not restricted to a few bad actors, but occurred throughout the industry. In addition, there were indications that noncompliance was often a conscious decision on the part of operators, as demonstrated by operators achieving speeds near their vessel’s maximum capability within even the most restrictive speed zone that was closest to the whales. It is possible that our study presents an overly critical picture of the industry’s behavior. For example, guideline compliance might be extremely low because the guidelines are impossible to follow. The guidelines stated that operators must begin to slow down within 3.7 km of a whale and that they were in violation if they failed to do so. If operators did not observe an animal until the animal was closer than 3.7 km, then they would unintentionally be out of compliance. This situation undoubtedly occurred during the study, but was not likely the rule because in many instances operators were made aware of the presence of whales by other whale-watching vessels already in the vicinity of the animals, which provided a clear indication of whale position. Historically there has also been substantial communication among operators concerning whale locations as they approach viewing locations. In addition, when crafting the guideline, operators stated that they were routinely capable of spotting an animal 3.7 km away and used their ability to do so to argue against the need for blanket speed restrictions within the Stellwagen Bank NMS (M. Weinrich, personal communication). It is also possible that the study occurred during a period when guideline compliance was at a minimum. When provided with the results from the study, some operators asserted that the study years (2003 and 2004) were not indicative of normal industry operations because there were fewer whales in the Stellwagen Bank NMS during that period and operators were under intense time pressures to show whales to passengers, while maintaining their commercial schedule. Thus they were unable to comply with the guidelines. This argument represents a particularly interesting rationale because it typifies one argument against voluntary conservation agreements. Participants in voluntary agreements have the flexibility to ignore restrictions when they become inconvenient or interfere with business, as might have happened in this case study. Under regulations such flexibility is theoretically not possible. During the study period the scarcity of whales was real (Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary, unpublished data). Nevertheless, it is unclear why those animals would be in less need of protection than whales in more abundant times. In addition, during periods of whale abundance operators might be within 3.7 km of a whale during a large portion of their trip, which would put an additional strain



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on schedules. Therefore, it would seem that a legitimate business reason to ignore the guidelines could be manufactured for most conditions encountered within the Stellwagen Bank NMS. Similar situations and rationales might exist in other industries participating in voluntary conservation agreements. There are a number of reasons to believe these estimates on noncompliance may be conservative. First, for a whale to be entered into the database, the observer had to acquire its range and bearing when it surfaced. On numerous occasions, vessels passed whales at speed, and the observer could not acquire the animal’s position. Therefore noncompliance was not registered even though it had occurred. In other cases vessels slowed rapidly to observe an animal and sped up rapidly after brief observation, but the whale’s position was not acquired. In this situation not only was noncompliance not indicated but if the slowdown occurred within the speed zone of a different animal, it inadvertently increased compliance. In addition, much of the compliant sections that occurred in zone 1 could be due to the fact that the whales being watched usually traveled below the agreement’s speed limit. Thus, vessels could have slowed to match speed with the whales or waited for them to surface rather than directly attempting to comply with the guidelines. Our conclusion that the voluntary agreement did not work is troubling because the commercial whalewatching industry involved in the case study seemed an ideal candidate for the successful use of the voluntary approach to management. This optimism stemmed from the industry’s (1) focus on charismatic federally endangered and protected species, (2) operation within a federally designated marine protected area, (3) close links to education and conservation (most trips provided naturalists for narration, many of whom work for conservation groups), (4) professed sympathies for the animals, (5) dependence on a concerned public for paying customers and the public’s willingness to report the mistreatment of animals, (6) stated ability to self-regulate and formally or informally deal with noncompliant operators, and (7) substantial efforts on the part of government agencies to ensure that operators were aware of the guidelines. In addition, our results corroborated the concerns of those skeptical of voluntary management techniques in that the existence of guidelines forestalled creation of approach regulations for whales in the region (D. Gouveia, personal communication). Our case study indicated that despite conditions that seemed supportive of the use of voluntary measures for management, industry compliance with the measures was low and probably failed to achieve the desired conservation goals (although no whales were struck during the period). Nevertheless, the existence of the voluntary measures did effectively thwart the promulgation of regulations governing the actions of the whale-watching


industry. Thus, our results tend to confirm the concern that voluntary approaches to conservation management should be viewed with caution and, when used, should have quantifiable outcomes that are monitored and evaluated carefully. This recommendation would also apply to the use of regulations, which would similarly require monitoring and enforcement to ensure compliance, and evaluation to ensure efficacy. Finally, the goal of any program, whether voluntary or regulatory, should be high levels of compliance. The challenge to scientists and managers is to bring participant behavior up to the standards needed for conservation, rather than dropping standards to a point where high levels of compliance can be achieved.

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