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COGNITION AND EMOTION 2007, 21 (4), 902 911

BRIEF REPORT

Emotions and goals: Assessing relations between values and emotions R. M. A. Nelissen, A. J. M. Dijker, and N. K. de Vries Maastricht University, Mastricht, The Netherlands

Whereas most current theories on emotions posit a central position to goals, direct tests of associations between emotions and goals have been sparse. We investigated such relations by comparing ratings of value importance and frequency of emotional experiences in daily life. The results confirmed our general expectation that associations would be found between values and emotions related to corresponding goals. We argue that data like these are fundamental to further development of emotion theory.

Most current theories on emotions attribute a central position to goals, both in the elicitation of an emotional state as well as in accounting for its behavioural consequences. Concerning elicitation, the evaluation of a particular situation or event as relevant for one’s personal goals or concerns, occupies a central position in several appraisal theories of emotions (e.g., Frijda, 1988; Lazarus, 1991; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; see Scherer, 1999, for an overview). According to these theories, the elicitation of a particular emotional state signals opportunities or obstacles to the attainment of a certain, emotion-specific goal. Similarly, functional accounts stress the relation between goals and the consequences *rather than the antecedents *of specific emotions in guiding people’s actions and decisions (e.g., Frijda, 1988; Izard & Ackerman, 2000; see Keltner & Gross, 1999, for an overview). Generally, these theories state that an emotional state is characterised by a motivational tendency to the attainment or maintenance of a particular, emotion-specific end-state. Some have further proposed that Correspondence should be addressed to Rob Nelissen, Department of Social & Economic Psychology, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. E-mail: [email protected] # 2007 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business www.psypress.com/cogemotion DOI: 10.1080/02699930600861330

RELATIONS BETWEEN VALUES AND EMOTIONS

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the goal-directed nature of behavioural consequences of emotions is adaptive, thus portraying emotions as solutions to obstacles and opportunities of physical and social survival (e.g., Plutchik, 1991; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). So it is conceived that an emotion (e.g., fear) signals the implications of a situation (e.g., a stranger approaching in a dark alley) for a particular goal (to maintain safety or avoid risk). Emotions then motivate action (e.g., run away) to realise this goal. Given the pivotal importance of goals in both appraisal and functional theories, it is surprising that direct tests of the proposed association between emotions and goals, either at the level of emotion-elicitation (e.g., Smith & Lazarus, 1993), or in terms of motivational tendencies (e.g., Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994), have been sporadic. Notably, appraisal-oriented research mainly focused on mapping the specific cognitive dimensions of appraisal that differentiate the elicitation of distinct emotions (e.g., Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), instead of investigating appraisals at a ‘‘molar’’ (cf. Smith & Lazarus, 1993) level that is better suited to identifying associations between emotions and goals. Studies investigating the relation between emotions and goals in terms of behavioural consequences (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Wallbot & Scherer, 1986) often confounded actions (e.g., running away), action tendencies (e.g., wanting to escape), and action goals (e.g., being safe) (cf. Roseman et al., 1994). As the same goal can be attained by a wide variety of actions, a focus on goals rather than other action components is more likely to characterise emotions. Explicitly addressing this distinction, Roseman and his associates showed that emotions are indeed associated with distinctive goals. Apart from their limited number, several other reasons call for more studies to investigate relations between emotions and goals. Specifically, relations also need to be assessed for positive emotions, for, as yet, studies have almost exclusively focused on goals associated with negative emotions. Additionally, associations should be documented for a more comprehensive list of goals. So far, goal-measures (e.g., to avoid risk) have been phrased in terms of the emotion(s), e.g., fear, under investigation. Nevertheless, the goals that people refer to when accounting for their actions are not usually framed in such general terms and also appear more diverse that the few general objectives that have been linked to emotions. Several authors have proposed catalogues of goals that more realistically capture the motives people usually ascribe to their actions (see Austin & Vancouver, 1996, for an overview). Moreover, such catalogues are supposed to be more or less exhaustive in listing the general goals underlying human behaviour. The use of such a record thus enables a more systematic report of the goals associated with particular emotions. Finally, previous studies primarily relied on retrospective accounts, asking participants to recall past emotional episodes before documenting the thoughts, feelings, and actions that

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accompanied this experience. The potential for extrapolation from these studies thus suffers from the limitations associated with this particular method (e.g., Parkinson & Manstead, 1992). Alternative research methods are therefore required to obtain converging evidence on the nature of relations between emotions and goals. In the present study, these issues will be specifically addressed. Obviously, systematic investigation of such relations is fundamental to the development of emotion theories that posit a close relation between emotions and goals. Furthermore, it is important in determining the way in which emotions are to be conceptualised (cf. Roseman et al., 1994). Specifically, characteristic differences in associations between emotions and goals would support views of emotions as discrete states, which have been questioned in the past (e.g., Ortony & Turner, 1990). Finally, an empirically well-grounded taxonomy of emotional goals will enhance comparability of studies investigating the causes and effects of emotional states. This paper aims to contribute to the further empirical documentation of relations between emotions and goals by establishing associations between values and emotions. Values can be regarded as motivational constructs that specify abstract goals guiding people’s actions across contexts and time (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). The most popular catalogue of values is probably Schwartz’ Value Survey, a comprehensive list of 10 value types differentiated by their motivational goals, which presumably derived from basic requirements of human existence (see Table 1). Research indicated these values to be universal across cultures (Schwartz, 1992) and ratings of importance of these values appear predictive of a variety of actions (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Feather, Norman, & Worsley, 1998). In general, we expect correspondence between people’s ratings of valueimportance and self-reported frequency of emotional experiences in daily life for emotions and value types that share similar underlying goals. We investigated associations for 11 specific emotions listed below. Specifically, we predicted that: Anger will be related to Power values. Power values express the striving for social dominance and status, which is commonly established by displays or acts of aggression (e.g., De Waal, 1982; Plutchik, 1991) that are often accompanied by feelings of anger (e.g., Berkowitz, 1989). Fear will be associated with Security values. People who frequently feel afraid in daily life should also ascribe great importance to security values, as both fear and Security values share the goal of realising safety (Roseman et al., 1994). Feelings of disgust and contempt will be negatively related with Conformity values. Originally related to the repulsion of harmful substances, the array of disgust-eliciting stimuli has broadened during evolutionary and cultural development to include moral breaches as well (Rozin, Haidt, &


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TABLE 1 Definitions of value types in the Schwartz value survey (and their representative items) Power (.65) : Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources (social power, authority, wealth) Achievement (.68) : Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards (successful, capable, ambitious, influential) Hedonism (.70) : Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself (pleasure, enjoying life) Stimulation (.81) : Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life (daring, a varied life, an exciting life) Self-Direction (.64) : Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring (creativity, freedom, independent, curious, choosing own goals) Universalism (.79) : Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection of the welfare of all people and of nature (broadminded, wisdom, social justice, equality, a world at peace, a world of beauty, unity with nature, protecting the environment) Benevolence (.74) : Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact (helpful, honest, forgiving, loyal, responsible) Tradition (.56) : Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self (humble, accepting my portion in life, devout, respect for tradition, moderate) Conformity (.67) : Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms (politeness, obedient, self-discipline, honouring parents and elders) Safety (.68) : Safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self (family security, national security, social order, clean, reciprocation of favours) Note : Adapted from Bardi, A., & Schwartz, S. H. (2003). Values and behavior: Strength and structure of relations. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 29 , 1208. Numbers in parentheses represent scale alpha values.

McCauley, 2000). Contempt similarly follows perceptions of norm violations and being the focus of others’ contempt likely induces shame and guilt (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). Both emotions can therefore be considered as forces of social cohesion. Frequent experience of either feeling towards other people will decrease tendencies to obey socially prescribed standards of conduct. Put differently, the more importance people ascribe to Conformity values, related to inhibiting impulses that violate social norms or expectations, the less they will feel disgust and contempt towards those with whom they share these norms. Feelings of affection and concern for others will be related to the value types of Benevolence and Universalism that both express pro-social tendencies. Affection towards others is essential to the formation of attachment bonds with others (e.g., Hatfield & Rapson, 2000). Such companionate attachments, in turn, are required to appreciate and preserve other people’s welfare. Similarly, concern for others, being a component of empathy (Batson & Shaw, 1991), is required in order to contribute to their welfare. Hence, the more people aim to contribute to the well-being of others as indicated by adherence to Universalism and Benevolence values, the more

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likely they will be to experience affection and concern for others. Concern for others will also be related to Security values as they also pertain to the security of other people beside the self (e.g., family security). Finally, feelings of concern will relate to Conformity values expressing the restraint to upset or harm others. Interest will be related to the value types of Stimulation, Self-Direction, and Achievement. According to the broaden and build model of positive emotions (Fredrickson, 1998), interest motivates exploration and instigates a desire to ‘‘expand the self . . . and hav[e] new experiences’’ (p. 305), which is expressed by these value types. Excitement will show the same pattern of associations as interest. Notably, both emotions are related to intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000), which ensures continued engagement in an act. To achieve the goals expressed by Achievement and Self-Direction values, such enduring motivation seems required. Furthermore, excitement will also relate to Hedonism values that explicitly involve the striving for pleasure, which is likely to result in feelings of excitement. Feelings of pride, which are often experienced after achievement in the face of personal or social standards (Lewis, 2000), will also be related to Achievement and Self-Direction values, as both express the importance of success and goal-attainment. Finally, feelings of guilt and shame will be related to Conformity values. Whereas pride involves a positive evaluation of the self, shame and guilt involve negative self-evaluations, often following failures to live up to moral or social standards (Lewis, 2000). So, the more important that one considers it to be to live up to social norms, the more likely one is to experience shame and guilt for violating them. Notably, both emotions are associated with a goal to make up for moral transgression (Roseman et al., 1994). A few remarks should be made concerning the nature and strength of the associations between emotions and values. First of all, it should be noted that, in principle, relations between values and emotions are reciprocal and we make no assumption concerning the direction of causation. Correlations may arise because behaviour directed by a particular type of values (e.g., achievement) likely results in the experience of a particular emotion (e.g., pride). On the other hand, frequent experience of a particular emotion (like interest) will instigate behaviour from which people, for instance through self-perception, deduce that certain values (like stimulation) are important to them. Second, unique correspondence of an emotion with a particular value type is unlikely because (a) mutual associations already exist between emotions and between values separately, and (b) emotions specify goals at a more abstract level, which may involve multiple, more specific goals as expressed by different values. Note that we are not looking for goals that differentiate emotions but are trying to further characterise these goals. Finally, we wish to point out in advance that the pattern of relations rather


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than their magnitude constitutes the primary test of our predictions (cf. Bardi & Schwartz, 2003). For several reasons, which will be elaborated in the discussion, correlations are not expected to be very strong.

METHOD Participants and procedure Participants were 487 students (438 females and 49 males, mean age 21 years) enrolled in introductory courses of psychology and health sciences at the University of Maastricht. Following classes, participants completed two questionnaires measuring emotion-frequency and value importance. The order of presentation was counterbalanced. Completion took about half an hour, for which they received t3.50.

Measures The frequency of emotional experience was measured by asking participants to estimate the frequency with which they tended to experience each of the 11 emotions in daily life (cf. Izard, Libero, Putnam, & Haynes, 1993), on a scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (very often). Value importance was assessed using the Dutch translation of Schwartz’ Value Survey (cf. Schwartz, 1994). Participants rate 56 items assessing the importance of a wide range of values as ‘‘guiding principles in your daily life’’, on a scale ranging from 0 (unimportant) to 7 (extremely important), with the additional option to rate a value item as /1 (contrary to my values). The values were presented by catchwords (e.g., ‘‘respect for tradition’’), followed by a brief specification (e.g., ‘‘preservation of time-honoured customs’’). Previous analyses had indicated that these items relate to one of 10 value types. As alpha coefficients derived from the present data were sufficiently high (see Table 1), item scores for each value type were averaged into single measures.

Data analysis Because of the large sample-size, which was likely to render several significant yet spurious relations, we set the critical value for significance at p B/.01, in order to adopt a more conservative test of our predictions and to reduce the expected number of chance correlations to one.

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RESULTS Correlations between measures of value importance and frequencies of emotional experience are presented in Table 2. The pattern of correlations is largely consistent with our general expectation that associations would be found between values and emotions that express similar goals. Of the 21 correlations we predicted, 16 (76%) turned out significant, whereas 5 (24%) failed to reach significance at the p B/.01 level. In addition, results showed 3 relations that were not anticipated. In the following, we will focus on these latter two sets of relations (i.e., those predicted but missing and the additional ones). Contrary to our expectations, feelings of affection and concern for others were not associated with Universalism values. Considering this set of values, one could argue that they refer to states of the world at large, whereas Benevolence values more clearly present guidelines for social interactions. As affection and concern are directed at other people more readily than the world at large, associations with Benevolence values would indeed be more apparent. Also, guilt and shame were not associated with Conformity values. This relation, however, seemed very straightforward, given that violating social norms elicits shame and guilt, and that Conformity values express inhibitory tendencies to do so. We can only suspect that participants may have been reluctant to accurately report experiences of shame and guilt, as both constitute negative self-evaluations, which may have triggered egodefensive underreporting. Similarly, it is difficult to explain the missing TABLE 2 Pearson correlations between value importance and frequency of emotional experiences Emotions

Pow

Ach

Hed

Stim

S-Dir

Univ

Ben

Trad

Conf

Sec

Anger Fear Disgust Contempt Affection Concern Guilt Shame Interest Excitement Pride

.15 /.01 .00 .13 /.05 /.03 /.04 /.01 .01 .01 .12

.10 .09 /.02 .07 .00 .01 /.01 /.05 .20 .11 .22

.06 /.06 /.02 .08 .08 /.01 .01 /.03 .11 .13 .06

.02 /.10 .00 .11 /.04 /.06 /.01 /.08 .21 .15 .08

.03 .03 /.04 .06 .01 .01 /.02 /.04 .30 .13 .20

.01 .11 .00 /.04 .10 .07 .06 .05 .03 .11 .00

/.06 .04 /.13 /.14 .20 .18 .08 .04 .09 .11 /.03

/.02 .11 /.03 .10 /.02 .10 .00 .05 /.08 /.01 /.09

.01 .07 /.14 /.11 .10 .13 .00 /.06 .03 .07 .03

.09 .12 /.06 .02 .09 .13 .01 .03 .01 .06 .03

Note : Pow / Power; Ach / Achievement; Hed / Hedonism; Stim / Stimulation; S-Dir / Self-Direction; Univ /Universalism; Ben /Benevolence; Trad /Tradition; Conf /Conformity; Sec /Security. Correlations in bold italics are significant at p B/.01. N /487.


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relation between Achievement values, stressing accomplishments, and feelings of excitement, which seem likely to ensue. Besides the ones we predicted, we also found a few other relations. First of all, apart from showing the predicted relation with Conformity values, disgust and contempt also appeared negatively related to Benevolence values. As both emotions involve negative evaluations of other people, this negative association does not seem problematic. Nor does the observed association between contempt and Power values. To a certain extent, contempt towards others implies perceiving yourself as superior to them, which may be either a consequence or a cause of striving for Power values.

DISCUSSION The results are largely consistent with our general expectation that associations would be found between emotions and values that relate to similar goals. The majority of the associations predicted for specific emotions were confirmed by the data. A few anticipated correlations however, appeared non-significant. To some extent this could be accounted for in retrospect, although we acknowledge the speculative nature of such post-hoc interpretation. Nevertheless, we do not believe that the number of missing correlations, nor the additional unanticipated ones, proves problematic in the face of our general assertion concerning the relation between emotions and values. We do admit that the magnitude of the observed relations is rather low. For several reasons, however, high correlations were not expected. First of all, values and emotions, in spite of their apparent correspondence in terms of goals, are different psychological constructs, specifying goals at a different level. Particularly, values express goals at a more specific level than the goals that are usually associated with emotions (e.g., Roseman et al., 1994). Indeed, value and emotion items are very discrepantly phrased, which obscures similarities. Moreover, both constructs are assessed on different scales. Finally, emotions were measured by single items. The latter, admittedly, presents a shortcoming to the present study. All three factors are apt to reduce the magnitude of correlations between measures of value importance and frequency of emotional experiences, yet without compromising our interpretation of the observed relations. Second, both constructs also relate to different psychological processes that need not necessarily coincide. For example, observed correspondences may result from emotional responses to situations in which values are violated. Emotions can also arise, however, in situations that do not pertain to value conflicts. For example, I may get angry when I miss my train, though missing the train does not conflict with any value that I consider important. Because of this relative independence of

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emotional experiences from value conflicts, perfect correlations are unlikely. Perhaps assessing emotional experiences in terms of frequency estimates was not optimal. Individual differences exist both in the frequency and intensity of emotional experiences (cf. Schimmack & Diener, 1997). Value importance may have been more readily related to differences in intensity of emotional experiences after violation of a particular value. Nevertheless, we decided to follow a well-documented procedure for measuring emotions, which prescribed the assessment of frequency indices (cf. Izard et al., 1993). Third, and finally, we wish to stress once more that the pattern of correlations, rather than their magnitude presented the primary test of our predictions (see Bardi & Schwartz, 2003, for a similar argument in discussing associations between values and behaviour). Given these considerations concerning the magnitude of correlations, we contend that the associations between emotions and values reported here, support the proposed link between emotions and goals. Only a few other studies have directly and systematically ascertained that goals are indeed involved in the elicitation and behavioural consequences of emotions. The present study makes a valuable contribution to this record by (a) including a wider range of positive emotions than has been studied before, (b) addressing a more comprehensive range of goals, which also more readily correspond to people’s accounts of motives for action, and (c) adopting a different research method to assess relations between emotions and goals, thus enhancing the convergent validity of support to one of the central claims in current perspectives on emotions. Manuscript received 3 February 2004 Revised manuscript received 12 June 2006 Manuscript accepted 14 June 2006

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