Famine Crimes

FAMINE CRIMES

Military Operations, Forced Migration, and Chronic Hunger in Eastern Burma/Myanmar (2006-2008) BY KEN MACLEAN

Cover Photo Woman fleeing attacks in Kyaukkyi Township, Nyaunglebin District (Bago Region) Free Burma Rangers (2007) Maps 1. Myanmar States and Regions, available at: http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/mapsonline/basemaps/myanmar-statesregions (accessed 3 March 2018). 2. Township Map, International Human Rights Clinic, Legal Memorandum: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in Eastern Myanmar (Cambridge: Harvard University Law School, 2014), p. 11. 3. Government and KNU Administrative Boundaries, available at: http://khrg.org/sites/default/files/maps/Locally_defined_Karen_State_1_North_Final.jpg (accessed 3 March 2018).

CLARK UNIVERSITY | INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNITY, AND ENVIRONMENT

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This report is published by Ken MacLean © Ken MacLean 2018. All rights reserved. Contents may be reproduced or distributed on a not-for-profit basis for media and related purposes. Commercial reproduction is prohibited.


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Table of Contents Acknowledgments........................................................................................................................... 7 Differences in Transliteration ......................................................................................................... 8 Acronyms and Terminology ......................................................................................................... 10 Map 1 Burma/Myanmar................................................................................................................ 11 Map 2 Township Map................................................................................................................... 12 Map 3 Government and KNU Administrative Boundaries........................................................... 13 Introduction................................................................................................................................... 14 Famine Crimes .............................................................................................................................. 19 Methodology................................................................................................................................. 22 Northern Offensive ....................................................................................................................... 26 2004-2005 Forced Migration Summary.................................................................................... 29 2006 Forced Migration Summary............................................................................................. 34 2007 Forced Migration Summary............................................................................................. 40 2008 Forced Migration Summary............................................................................................. 46 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 52 Appendix 1 Tatmadaw Command Structure................................................................................. 57 Appendix 2 Destroyed, Relocated, or Abandoned Villages (Thandaung Township)................... 59 Appendix 3 ERA Reports ............................................................................................................. 60 Appendix A Thandaung and Tantabin Townships (Toungoo District, Karen State) ............... 61 Report Number KORD-2004-02........................................................................................... 62 Report Number KORD-2004-06........................................................................................... 70 Report Number CIDKP-2004-02.......................................................................................... 78 Report Number CIDKP-2004-09.......................................................................................... 83 Report Number CIDKP-2005-01.......................................................................................... 88 Report Number CIDKP-2005-08.......................................................................................... 93 Report Number KORD-2005-02......................................................................................... 103 Report Number KORD-2005-05......................................................................................... 114 Report Number KORD-2006-03......................................................................................... 123 Report Number KORD-2006-04......................................................................................... 132 Report Number CIDKP-2006-15........................................................................................ 144 Report Number CIDKP-2006-16........................................................................................ 152 Report Number KORD-2007-05......................................................................................... 160 Report Number KORD-2007-06......................................................................................... 169 Report Number CIDKP-2007-19........................................................................................ 176 Report Number KORD-2008-09......................................................................................... 184 Report Number KORD-2008-13......................................................................................... 190 Report Number KORD-2008-21......................................................................................... 201 Report Number CIDKP-2008-11........................................................................................ 207 Report Number CIDKP-2008-12........................................................................................ 217 Report Number CIDKP-2008-16........................................................................................ 227 Report Number Et Tu Hta IDP Camp................................................................................. 239 Appendix B Mone Township (Nyaunglebin District, Bago Region) ..................................... 247 Report Number CIDKP-2004-05........................................................................................ 248 Report Number CIDKP-2004-07........................................................................................ 252


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Report Number CIDKP-2004-12........................................................................................ 256 Report Number KORD-2005-03......................................................................................... 259 Report Number KORD-2006-08......................................................................................... 267 Report Number KORD-2006-16......................................................................................... 277 Report Number CIDKP-2006-02........................................................................................ 285 Report Number CIDKP-2006-14........................................................................................ 292 Report Number KORD-2007-09......................................................................................... 297 Report Number KORD-2007-15......................................................................................... 305 Report Number CIDKP-2007-06........................................................................................ 319 Report Number CIKDP-2007-21........................................................................................ 326 Report Number KORD-2008-10......................................................................................... 334 Report Number CIDKP-2008-05........................................................................................ 341 Report Number CIDKP-2008-06........................................................................................ 348 Appendix C Kyaukkyi Township (Nyaunglebin District, Bago Region) ............................... 355 Report Number KORD-2006-02......................................................................................... 356 Report Number KORD-2006-06......................................................................................... 366 Report Number KORD-2006-13......................................................................................... 377 Report Number CIDKP-2006-06........................................................................................ 385 Report Number CIDKP-2006-13........................................................................................ 391 Report Number KORD-2007-10......................................................................................... 402 Report Number KORD-2007-11......................................................................................... 410 Report Number CIDKP-2007-09........................................................................................ 416 Report Number CIDKP-2007-22........................................................................................ 426 Report Number CIDKP-2008-04........................................................................................ 431 Report Number CIDKP-2008-07........................................................................................ 436 Report Number CIDKP-2008-13........................................................................................ 441 Appendix D Hpapun Township (Hpapun District, Kayin State) ............................................ 449 Report Number KORD-2006-05......................................................................................... 450 Report Number KORD-2006-10......................................................................................... 460 Report Number CIDKP-2006-09........................................................................................ 470 Report Number KORD-2007-08......................................................................................... 481 Report Number KORD-2007-12......................................................................................... 489 Report Number KORD-2007-13......................................................................................... 498 Report Number CIDKP-2007-01........................................................................................ 504 Report Number CIDKP-2007-05........................................................................................ 514 Report Number CIDKP-2007-17........................................................................................ 521 Report Number KORD-2008-04......................................................................................... 530 Report Number KORD-2008-06......................................................................................... 538 Report Number KORD-2008-11......................................................................................... 545 Report Number KORD-2008-12......................................................................................... 553 Report Number CIKDP-2008-09........................................................................................ 560 Appendix E Pasaung and Pruso Townships (Bawlahke and Loikaw Districts, Kayah State) 565 Report Number KSWDC-2004-01 ..................................................................................... 566 Report Number KSWDC-2004-05 ..................................................................................... 572 Report Number KSWDC-2005-03 ..................................................................................... 578 Report Number KSWDC-2005-07 ..................................................................................... 585


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Report Number KSWDC-2006-01 ..................................................................................... 589 Report Number KSWDC-2006-05 ..................................................................................... 595 Report Number KSWDC-2007-03 ..................................................................................... 602


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Acknowledgments First and foremost, I wish to acknowledge the extreme hardships and suffering of the tens of thousands of individuals whose experiences constitute the basis of the report. It is my hope that the report provides a fuller account of what occurred and, should transitional justice initiatives ever become possible, be of practical use in the future. I also thank the brave and dedicated staff at KORD (Karen Office for Relief and Development) and CIDKP (Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People). KORD and CIDKP staff, as part of their efforts to provide emergency humanitarian aid to these IDPs, carefully documented the human rights violations the state’s armed forces (Tatmadaw) committed against civilians in eastern Burma/Myanmar during the military operations known as the “Northern Offensive” (2006-2008). I am also grateful to the Thai Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), now The Border Consortium (TBC), for making it possible to gain access to the KORD and CIDKP documents. I would additionally like to thank the International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) at Harvard University for allowing me to review 1) the interviews its research team conducted with Karen IDPs who fled from the conflict area to Thailand seeking refuge; and 2) the expert testimony three specialists provided them. The report is intended to complement and to expand upon the work of the above organizations and individuals. However, the views expressed and conclusions reached are entirely my own, as are any errors, which are fully mine. On a final note, IDPs developed a wide range of self-protection strategies that are still inadequately understood and, according to some, are undermined by traditional approaches to delivering humanitarian aid in conflict settings. 1 The report is not meant to downplay the significance of these strategies or the agency of IDPs more generally. This important topic is simply beyond the scope of this analysis.

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For academic studies, see, e.g.: Kevin Malseed, “Networks of Noncompliance: Grassroots Resistance and Sovereignty in Militarized Burma,” The Journal of Peasant Studies 36, no. 2 (2009): 365-391; Ashley South, “The Politics of Protection in Burma: Beyond the Humanitarian Mainstream, Critical Asian Studies 44, no. 2 (2012): 175204; Stephen Hull, “The ‘Everyday Politics’ of IDP Protection in Karen State,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 28, no. 2 (2009): 7-21.


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Differences in Transliteration Significant differences exist across Karen dialects—the two most widely used ones being S’gaw and Pwo. The differences are such that speakers of one dialect cannot always understand the speakers of another. Additionally, the script is a modified version of the Burmese alphabet. Consequently, the transliteration of village and place names varies.2 In January of 2011, fourteen leading Karen civil society organizations (CSOs) reached a consensus on a new standardized transliteration system. 3 Previous spellings remain in widespread use, however, and nearly all of the source material included in this report predates the new system. The variant spellings that exist in the sources reflect this history, which is compounded by the fact that fact-finders are often writing in their third or fourth language. Minor inconsistencies should not be used to challenge the credibility of the people who documented the human rights violations featured in the report. The small size of many of the villages in conflict-affected areas complicates matters further. Historically, agricultural practices (e.g. swidden) and poor soil fertility in upland areas contribute to repeated instances of village “fission” (i.e. out-migration of multiple, but not all of the households) to settle other areas. For the past four decades, military operations have been the driving force behind out-migration in conflict-affected areas. Approximately twenty-five percent of the villages across the country lack official GPS coordinates as a result. A number of Karen CSOs maintain their own geospatial databases, in addition to the Karen National Union (KNU). But most of the databases are relatively new due to the lack of equipment and technical expertise prior to this point. Moreover, these groups generally do not make their geospatial data publicly available due to security concerns. Thus, the exact coordinates of many small villages (especially those abandoned, relocated, or destroyed in remote areas) are not precisely known. Instead, the locations of such villages are approximations based on the testimonies of local people, typically IDPs who fled them. Again, minor discrepancies should be regarded as a result of this history. Finally, government and KNU administrative boundaries overlap, but they are not the same, which can be a source of confusion for people unfamiliar with these territorial distinctions (see Map 3).4 The table below provides both names for the districts and townships mentioned. 5

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Similarly inconsistencies are found in transliterations of Burmese village and place names into English. See The Permanent Committee on Geographical Names, “An Introduction to the Toponymy of Burma” (2007), available at http://pcgn.org.uk/Burma%200907.pdf (accessed 15 July 2014). 3 Copy on file with author. 4 Compare MIMU, “South East States/Regions and Townships” (2013), available at http://www.themimu.info/search/node/south%20east%20region%20and%20township (accessed 22 December 2017) with KHRG, “Locally Defined Northern and Central Karen Districts (2012), available at http://khrg.org/sites/default/files/maps/Locally_defined_Karen_State_1_North_Final.jpg (accessed 22 December 2017). 5 States and Divisions are divided into districts. These districts consist of townships. Village tracts, the smallest administrative unit in rural areas, are groups of adjacent villages that range anywhere between 5 and 25 in number.


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Government and Locally Karen-Defined District and Township Names District (Burmese) Toungoo Toungoo Nyaunglebin Nyaunglebin Nyaunglebin Hpapun

District (Karen) Taw Oo Taw Oo Ker Lwee Htu Ker Lwee Htu Ker Lwee Htu Mu Traw

Township (Burmese) Thandaung Tantabin Mone Kyaukkyi Shwegyin Hpapun

Township (Karen) Daw Pa Kho Taw Ta Tu Mu Ler Doh Hsaw Htee Lu Thaw

Local informants use KNU-designations when providing testimony. The report follows this practice when referring to events at the village tract and village levels.


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Acronyms and Terminology CIDKP DKBA FBR fonds KHRG KNLA KNPLF KNPP KNSO KNU KORD KSWDC Kyat IHRC NSAG SPDC Tatmadaw TBBC

Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People (Humanitarian organization) Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (NSAG) Free Burma Rangers (Humanitarian organization) An aggregation of documents originating from the same source Karen Human Rights Group Karen National Liberation Army (Military wing of the KNU) Karenni National Peoples’ Liberation Front (NSAG) Karenni National Progress Party (NSAG) Karenni National Solidarity Organization (NSAG) Karen National Union (Non-state political organization) Karen Organization for Relief and Development (Humanitarian organization) Karenni Social Welfare and Development Center (Humanitarian organization) Myanmar currency International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard University Law School Non-State Armed Group State Peace and Development Council (Military junta from 1988 to 2011) Myanmar State Armed Forces Thai Burma Border Consortium (Humanitarian organization)

Measurements Basket Tin viss

2 tins Standardized unit of volume, approximately 10.5 kg (paddy) or 16 kg (milled rice) 1.6 kg

Military Terms Baw Bi Doh BC Camp Company Column IB LIB LID MOC NSAG ROC SOC TOC

“Short Pants” (Guerrilla Retaliation Units) Battalion commander Basic military unit (10-11 soldiers) 100 soldiers (at full strength) Combination of companies Infantry Battalion Light Infantry Battalion Light Infantry Division (10 battalions for combat operations) Military Operations Command Non-State Armed Group Regional Operations Command Strategic Operations Command (3-4 battalions for defensive operations) Tactical Operations Command (3 battalions for combat operations)


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Map 1 Burma/Myanmar


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Map 2 Township Map


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Map 3 Government and KNU Administrative Boundaries


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Introduction “They stayed quite close to the village, and they came back and told us the military came to camp in our village. I did not hear how many soldiers were in the village. On November 28, 2005 we saw the smoke. We slept on the hill and then in the morning we saw from this place the smoke. It was in the morning about 7.30 a.m. The smoke we saw was at first blue and black in color, later on we saw the red colored smoke. It was in the distance so we did not see the fire but we saw the smoke. I stood together with my wife and children. We stood up and watched for just a moment about 2-3 minutes. I estimate that the fire lasted about two hours this is my guess because there were many houses in the village. The villagers who were watching also came back and told us that the village had been burned down.” 6 Tatmadaw battalions carried out dry-season offensives in eastern Burma/Myanmar for decades. The offensives primarily targeted civilian populations, displacing tens of thousands of people each time they occurred. The goal: to cut the ability of the Karen National Union (KNU) to obtain the food, money, intelligence, and recruits needed to maintain a degree of autonomy in a context where successive military regimes sought to destroy it. 7 The Northern Offensive, which lasted approximately two years (2006-2008), was the biggest one to date. The military operations connected with it provide the conflict setting for this report. The Northern Offensive, according to many observers, began with an attack on Hee Daw Kaw, a remote village in the rugged mountains of Thandaung Township, Toungoo District. 8 Fortunately, the residents, as the above quote indicates, had some advanced notice of the troop movements before the soldiers fired mortars and automatic weapons into the village. Approximately three hundred people fled with limited belongings and about two weeks worth of food, to nearby hiding sites in the forest. Nearly six hundred more people from surrounding villages fled as well. 9 Columns 1 and 2 of IB-73, under Southern Regional Command, camped in Hee Daw Kaw for two days before burning twenty-five to thirty homes to the ground. The soldiers also killed all the animals, destroyed food supplies and whatever personal property remained, then buried antipersonnel landmines before departing to prevent the IDPs from returning. 10 Systematic and widespread attacks on civilians did not begin in earnest, however, until late January and early February following the arrival of at least seven combat divisions (See Appendix 1 for 6 Clinic Database, Interview no. 124. See also interview nos. 87 and 128. Other local sources identified IB-75 as participating in the attack. See KORD-2006-03. 7 Ashley South, Burma’s Longest War: Anatomy of the Karen Conflict (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2011). 8 Tatmadaw units began to impose severe travel restrictions in Toungoo and Nyaunglebin Districts to isolate KNU/KNLA areas in early October of 2005 as part of preparations for the Offensive. “KNU Says Junta Carries Out All Cuts Policy in Karen Areas,” BBC Burmese Service (2 October 2005). See also, “Burmese Troops Shell and Burn Five Villages,” Irrawaddy, 30 November 2005. 9 For further details, see KHRG, “Recent Attacks on Villages in Southeastern Toungoo District Send Thousands Fleeing into the Forests and to Thailand” (16 March 2006), available at http://khrg.org/2006/03/khrg06b3/recentattacks-villages-southeastern-toungoo-district-send-thousands-fleeing (accessed 11 January 2018). 10 FBR Report: Burma Army Attack in Karen State (28 November 2005), available at http://www.freeburmarangers.org/2005/11/28/900-idps-as-villagers-flee-burma-army-attacks/ (accessed 1 December 2017).


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details on the Tatmadaw Command Structure). 11 More than fifty battalions then commenced largescale clearance operations targeting rural populations in townships across northern Kayin State, eastern Bago Region, and southwestern Kayah State. 12 Military operations damaged and destroyed homes and means of livelihood of civilians in more than 100 villages in Thandaung Township alone, several of them on more than one occasion, over the next two years (Appendix 2). 13 The Offensive left more than 160,000 people in urgent need of food aid according documentation two cross-border humanitarian organizations—the Karen Organization for Relief and Development (KORD) and the Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People (CIDKP)—gathered as part of their relief missions during the Offensive. KORD, formed in 1993 following a major military offensive, is a fully independent CSO. CIDKP, created in 1998 after another major military offensive, is the humanitarian wing of the KNU. 14 However, the staff of CIDKP, although part of the KNU’s administrative status, operates according to international humanitarian principles. More than two decades of foreign donor support, including grants from Western governments, for crossborder humanitarian assistance to IDPs demonstrate a high degree of confidence in the documentation practices of both organizations and their professionalism more generally. The report relies on KORD and CIDKP field data. But it also expands upon an earlier report. The International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) at Harvard University Law School published an influential legal memorandum in 2014. The field-based research, upon which the memorandum was based, sought to determine, first, whether the abuses committed during the Northern Offensive (2006-2008) violated international criminal law and, second, whether sufficient evidence existed to assert that specific Tatmadaw (i.e. Myanmar state armed forces) officers could be charged with these crimes.15 IHRC focused its investigation on two military units – Southern Regional Military Command and Light Infantry Division 66 (LID-66) – in Thandaung Township. 16 The 150 in-depth interviews generated more than 1,000 pages of witness statements. The content of which led IHRC to assert that that three commanding officers could be charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes, as defined in Articles of 7 and 8, respectively, of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 17 The officers, the Clinic further concluded, could be held legally responsible for these crimes under two theories of liability: individual criminal liability under Article 25 and command responsibility under Article 28. In the Clinic’s view, the evidence already 11 The divisions, each of which consists of ten battalions, augmented the 22 garrison battalions already quartered there. Local reports indicate that many of the battalions were severely undermanned; nevertheless, best estimates place the total number of troops in or near KNLA-controlled areas at between 10,000-15,000 at the start of the Northern Offensive. Clinical Expert Declaration, Expert 3, para. 36. 12 Such operations were not limited to these three areas. Tatmadaw battalions carried out similar ones elsewhere in northeastern and southeastern Burma/Myanmar (Shan State, Mon State, and Tenasserim Division, now known as the Tanintharyi Region), but on a smaller scale. 13 Thai Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), Internal Displacement Survey (Bangkok: TBBC, 2007), pp. 68-70; TBBC, Internal Displacement and International Law (Bangkok: TBBC, 2008), pp. 55-57. The lists also include the names of villages damaged, destroyed, or relocated in the other affected townships. Villages in these areas are often referred to as “hiding (ywa bone) villages,” as their inhabitants flee whenever Tatmadaw troops approach. 14 For background, see Burma Ethnic Research Group, Forgotten Victims of a Hidden War: Internally Displaced Karen in Burma (Chiang Mai: BERG and Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 1998). 15 IHRC, Legal Memorandum: War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in Eastern Myanmar (Cambridge: Harvard Law School, 2014a). 16 Light Infantry Divisions normally operate independently. But during the Northern Offensive, LID-66 fell under the de facto control of the Southern Regional Command. 17 ICC (2011), pp. 5-42; IHRC (2014a), pp.1-2, 7. IHRC had equally strong evidence on several lower-ranking officers but chose not to focus on them.


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gathered is “sufficient to satisfy the standard required for the issuance of an arrest warrant by the ICC as set forth in Article 58 of the Rome Statute.” 18 The individuals are: Major General Ko Ko, the commander of Southern Regional Command during the Offensive. He was promoted afterwards to Myanmar’s Home Affairs Minister; Brigadier General Khin Zaw Oo, the commander of LID-66 during the offensive until May 2006. He was promoted afterwards to Myanmar Army Bureau of Special Operations (BSO) 4; and Brigadier General Maung Maung Aye, the commander of LID-66 during the Offensive after May 2006. The data corroborate IHRC’s findings, which documented nine underlying crimes: 1) attacking civilians; 2) displacing civilians and forcible transfer; 3) destroying or seizing the adversary’s property; 4) pillage; 5) murder and execution without due process; 6) enslavement; 7) torture and other inhumane acts; 8) rape; and 9) persecution. 19 KORD and CIDKP field data, reproduced in Appendix 3, provide further evidence of these crimes. 20 Particularly notable is the information on indiscriminant attacks on and the willful killings of civilians by Tatmadaw units, the subject of a second policy memorandum by IHRC. 21 International humanitarian law requires “Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants… and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objects.” 22 Violations of the principle of distinction, which applies to non-international as well as international conflicts, constitute war crimes.23 KORD and CIDKP data again supports IHRC’s conclusion that indiscriminant attacks reflect longstanding operational policy, which dictates how (non-) commissioned officers command soldiers under their tactical control. 24 Civilians in “black areas,” i.e. areas where government control is “weak or non-existent,” are reportedly subject to being shot-on-sight, for example. Based on IHRC

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IHRC (2014a), pp. 3, 7-8. The question of guilt, of course, would be determined by the court. IHRC (2014a), pp. 47-57. IHRC interview also identified IB-48, under the command Zaw Tun, as being particularly brutal (2014a), pp. 6567. ERA requests also documented the involvement of IB-48 in numerous attacks on civilians, including willful killings, during 2004 and 2005 (KORD-2005-02, KORD-2005-5, CIDKP-2004-02, CIDKP-2004-09, and CIDKP2005-08). IB-48 appears to have ceased operations after 2005 according to KORD and CIDKP data. 21 IHRC, Policy Memorandum: Preventing Indiscriminate Attacks and Wilful Killings of Civilians by the Myanmar Military (Cambridge: IHRC, 2014b). 22 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I), adopted 8 June 1977 and entered into force 7 December 1998. See, in particular, Article 51(4)(a). 23 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Conflicts (AP II), adopted 8 June 1977 and entered into force 7 December 1998. The Burma/Myanmar government did not sign this protocol. Many of the provisions are now part of customary international law and thus apply, even without the government’s ratification. 24 For further discussion, see Section III, “Causes of Attacks on Civilians at Three Levels of Military Authority” (IHRC 2014b), pp. 26-37. 19 20


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interviews, Tatmadaw units considered nearly all of Thandaung Township to be a “black area” during the Northern Offensive.25 Three-quarters of the documents examined for this report (seventy fonds total 26 ) include allegations of indiscriminate attacks, with automatic weapons and mortars being the most commonly used weapons. Furthermore, the data indicate that such attacks, which often result in injury or death, are not limited to the criminal actions of battalion troops operating in Thandaung Township under LID-66 or Southern Regional Command orders. These indiscriminant attacks occurred on a widespread basis in Tantabin, Mone, Kyaukkyi, Shwegyin, Hpapun, Pasaung, and Pruso Townships. 27 The report, however, focuses on an important, but under-examined grave breach of the Geneva Conventions—namely, “the extensive destruction or appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.” 28 According to one military expert, Tatamdaw units carry out counter-insurgency operations in four phases: “(1) An ‘assault’ that drive out insurgents and inhabitants; (2) ‘clearing,’ which involves the destruction of homes, fields, and property; (3) ‘gleaning’ of information, including capturing villagers; and (4) ‘mining,’ whereby landmines are placed to make areas uninhabitable.” 29 Military columns commonly “move in tandem along parallel courses to drive civilian populations from a given area” as well. 30 The goal is to depopulate contested areas. Thus, the temporal patterns of these operations typically follow the agricultural cycle. Farmers plant upland paddy fields between May and June, and harvest their crops between October and November. 31 Tatmadaw units routinely target villages during these critical periods, and the destruction of food supplies and seeds have a devastating impact of the ability of farmers to cultivate enough food to survive from season to season. The 25

IHRC (2014a), pp. 25-29. A fonds is an archival term for the aggregation of documents originating from the same source. KORD and CIDKP fonds typically contain an “Emergency Ration Assistance” (ERA) request, which functions as a situation analysis and IDP needs assessment; an ERA Distribution Summary, which provides an updated situation analysis and details on aid delivery, and, in some cases, and ERA Impact Assessment. 27 Thandaung Township (KORD-2006-03, KORD-2006-04, CIDKP-2006-15, CIDKP-2006-16, KORD-2007-05, CIDKP-2008-11, CIDKP-2008-12); Mone Township (KORD-2006-08, KORD-2006-16, CIDKP-2006-02, KORD2007-09, KORD-2007-15, CIDKP-2007-06, CIDKP-2007-21, KORD-2008-10, CIDKP-200806); Kyaukkyi Township (KORD-2006-02, KORD-2006-06, CIDKP-2006-06, CIDKP-2006-13, KORD-2007-09, KORD-2007-11, CIDKP-2007-09, CIDKP-2007-22, CIDKP-2008-04, CIDKP-2008-13); Hpapun Township (KORD-2006-05, KORD-2006-11, CIDKP-2006-09, KORD-2007-08, KORD-2007-12, CIDKP-2007-01, CIDKP-2007-05, CIDKP2007-17, KORD-2008-04, KORD-2008-06, KORD-2008-11, CIKDP-2008-09); Pasaung and Pruso Townships (KSWDC-2006-01, KSWDC-2006-05, KSWDC-2007-04); and Ei Htu Hta IDP Camp. 28 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), Article 8 (2)(a)(iv), available at http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm (accessed 8 January 2018); Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 12 August 1949, Article 147,” International Committee of the Red Cross International Humanitarian Law Database,” available at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/380600169 (accessed 8 January 2018). 29 Clinic Expert Declaration, Expert 1, cited in IHRC (2014a), p. 25. For additional details, see Free Burma Rangers (FBR), A Campaign of Brutality (Chiang Mai, Thailand: FBR, 2008), p. 17. 30 FBR (2008), p. 17. 31 Interview Saw Barnabas, Karen Environmental and Social Action Network (3 June 2003). 26


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destruction of cash crops, especially cardamom, further exacerbates the situation because villagers often sell them to purchase rice when stores run low. 32 One hundred percent of the KORD and CIDKP fonds provide highly detailed accounts of how Tatmadaw units destroy, remove, or otherwise render useless objects indispensable to survival— namely, agricultural areas, crops, food stuffs, and livestock. 33 The primary purpose: to deprive the KNU of food, funds, intelligence, and popular support, a strategy known as the “Four Cuts” (Pya Ley Pya). 34 The deliberate starvation of civilians as part of the Four Cuts qualifies as a war crime and a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute.

32 According to local producers, between 65-75% of all farmers in Thandaung Township cultivate cardamom. China is the primary market for its seeds. Heavy government and KNU taxation, as well as landmine contamination, constrain larger-scale production. PeaceNexus Foundation, An Assessment of Business Opportunities in the Kayin State (Prangins, Switzerland: PNF, 2013), pp. 15, 24. In terms of the annual cycle, villagers harvest and sell betel leaf (January-May), durian (March-June), cardamom (August-September), dog fruit (August-September), and then betel nut (October-December). Caring for the crops between harvests requires a significant time and labor commitment year-round. Travel restrictions and clearing operations often make doing so extremely difficult to impossible. 33 The practice violates Article 14 of Protocol II, which prohibits the starvation of civilians. See also, ICRC, “Customary International Humanitarian Law,” Rule 54, available at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule54 (accessed 8 January 2018). 34 IHRC (2014a), p. 25; Maung Aung Myoe, “The Counter-Insurgency in Myanmar: The Governments Response to the Burma Communist Party,” PhD Dissertation, Australian National University, 1999, pp. 134-138. Tatmadaw units have employed the tactics since the 1960s, and they remain in use today in conflict-affected areas, e.g. Kachin State and northern Shan State.


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Famine Crimes The right to food in situations of armed conflict has its origins in elements of humanitarian law, human rights law, and international criminal law. 35 However, efforts to hold individual state actors responsible for using food as a weapon of war remain extremely difficult in large part because the concept of “famine crimes” is not yet codified into a single, comprehensive legal framework. 36 Several factors contribute to this situation. Famine, as a concept, has no universally agreed upon definition, for example. Some experts regard famine as an “event,” whereas others view it as a “process.” Consequently, different methodologies using different indicators exist, and they measure different aspects of a food security crisis, predominantly in quantitative terms. 37 But the number of deaths is not a definitive indicator of famine, though these figures are often used as a proxy for it. In reality, famines vary in intensity and magnitude, and they have complex and multifaceted “macroeconomic, socio-cultural, psychological, and other consequences” on affected populations. 38 The report adopts this more expansive understanding as a rejoinder to the biggest obstacle to prosecuting famine crimes. The obstacle requires a substantive shift in thinking—from a long-standing preoccupation with questions regarding the causes of and responses to instances of extreme man-made food insecurity to ones that ask whose actions cause or contribute to famine and what can be done to hold them legally accountable? 39 Currently, the deliberate starvation of civilians is criminalized under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)—directly, in the case of war crimes, and indirectly, in the case of crimes against humanity and genocide. 40 The crimes under the Rome Statute require both the requisite prohibited act (actus rea) and intent (mens rea). 41 The latter legal concept, which must be present for prosecuting alleged perpetrators, requires either proof of intent to commit a crime 35 Jelena Pejic, “The Right to Food in Situations of Armed Conflict: The Legal Framework,” IRRC 83, no. 844 (2001): 1097-1109; Diane Kearney, “Food Deprivations as Crimes Against Humanity,” International Law and Politics 46 (2013): 253-289. 36 Several cases, one in Cambodia and another in Rwanda, have resulted in convictions of defendants charged with withholding food from imprisoned populations. See, e.g., Co-Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment (26 July 2010) and Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR95-1-T, Judgment (21 May 1999). 37 Stephen Devereux, Theories of Famine (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993). 38 Paul Howe and Stephen Devereux, “Famine Intensity and Magnitude Scales: A Proposal for an Instrumental Definition of Famine,” Disasters 28, no. 4 (2004), p. 362. 39 For background, see, e.g.: Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1997), p. 152; Amartya Sen, “Famines and Other Crimes,” in Development as Freedom (London: Anchor Books, 1999); Jenny Edkins, Whose Hunger? Concepts of Famine, Practices of Aid (New York: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); Jenny Edkins, “The Criminalization of Mass Starvations: From Natural Disaster to Crime Against Humanity.” In The New Famines: Why Famines Persist in an Era of Globalization, ed. Stephen Devereux (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 52. 40 Article 8 (2)(b)(xxv) of the Rome Statute specifically lists starvation as a war crime. Article 7 (1)(k) defines “Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health,” as a crime against humanity. This report argues that famine crimes, although not an enumerated act itself, is a means of committing one. The charge of genocide is not applicable in the case under discussion (see below). Finally, a consensus on the definition of crimes of aggression, which also falls under the jurisdiction of the ICC, was not reached until 2017. The ICC has no authority to investigate alleged crimes of aggression, which could include famine crimes as an element, prior to this date. 41 International Criminal Court, “The Elements of Crimes” (The Hague: ICC, 2011), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/resourcelibrary/official-journal/elements-of-crimes.aspx (accessed 2 December 2017).


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or knowledge that one’s (lack of) action would permit a crime to be committed. Proving mens rea is very challenging due “to the evidentiary requirements and the ability of defendants to assert plausible intervening causes.” Frequently, this is the case where contributory factors, such as natural disasters (droughts and flood), as well as logistical challenges (poor roads and insufficient transport vehicles), are present. 42 Legal scholar David Marcus has proposed two changes to address the evidentiary problem with regard to famine crimes. The first proposal involves elevating famine crimes to a stand-alone toplevel offense that falls under the ICC’s jurisdiction. 43 The second proposal entails lowering the mens rea requirement solely for famine-related prohibited acts. 44 The concept of “faminogenesis,” he argues, offers the means to achieve this end. State conduct that contributes to the creation and/or the perpetuation of famine is “faminogenic,” according to Marcus. 45 He divides faminogenic conduct into four categories, which he differentiates in terms of degrees of intent. Fourth-degree and third-degree faminogenic conduct do not meet the mens rea requirement, however, as poor governance characterizes the former and indifference to starvation defines the latter. Both types of (in-) action are reprehensible, but not criminal at the international level due to the absence of demonstrable intent. By contrast seconddegree and first-degree faminogenic conduct do satisfy the mens rea requirement and may qualify, if other conditions are also met, as a mass atrocity crime under the 1998 Rome Statute. “Governments [that] implement policies that themselves engender famine, then recklessly continue to pursue these policies, despite knowing that they are causing mass starvation,” are guilty of second-degree faminogenic crime Marcus states.46 Whereas, first-degree faminogenic conduct, he continues, displays clear intent to “deliberately use hunger as a tool of extermination to annihilate troublesome populations.” 47

42 Renee Dopplick, “Famine and International Criminal Law Under the Rome Statute,” Inside Justice (27 April 2009), available at http://www.insidejustice.com/intl/2009/04/27/famine_rome_statute/ (accessed 2 December 2017). 43 The Preparatory Commission for the ICC included draft text proposing that it would have jurisdiction over acts that affect the “conditions of life [which] may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, deliberate deprivation of resource indispensible for survival, such as food.” Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Addendum, Part II, Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, Art.6(c) n.4, available at http://www.icls.de/dokumente/icc_elements_crime.pdf (accessed 2 December 2017). 44 For an assessment of the pros and cons of both proposals, see Dopplick (2009). She points out that the wording of Article 30 is such that it is unclear whether “recklessness,” the key element of second-degree faminogenic conduct, satisfies the “intent and knowledge” requirement set out in the Rome Statute. 45 David Marcus, “Famine Crimes in International Law,” The American Journal of International Law 97, no. 2 (2003), p. 245, fn. 1. 46 Marcus (2003), p. 247. The difference between third- and second-degree faminogenic conduct appears at first glace to be slight but is in actually significant. Both forms of conduct involve indifference. However, the former concerns instances in which the government fails to respond to non-anthropogenic famine, such as droughts and floods. The latter concerns instances in which the government knowingly continues to implement a policy or policies that cause the famine. 47 Ibid.


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The counter-insurgency tactics Tatmadaw soldiers historically utilized in eastern Burma/Myanmar do not meet the threshold of first-degree faminogenic conduct, which is genocidal in intent.48 Instead, the Tatmadaw’s deliberate destruction and confiscation of civilian food supplies and objects is second-degree in nature and, as the prima facie evidence indicates, is a mass atrocity crime. 49 As the conduct, which inflicts “great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health by means of an inhumane act,” is one of the prohibited acts. 50 A crime against humanity differs from an ordinary crime in that it must have been committed in the context of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population, and was knowingly carried out “pursuant to or in furtherance of State or organizational policy,” the mens rea requirement. 51 The report details these tactics, the strategic goal of which was to starve civilians out of the mountains, denying Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) the ability to obtain material support (e.g. food, money, information, and recruits) from them in the process. The report focuses on famine crimes in Thandaung Township and neighboring Tantatbin Township, which is also part of Toungoo District. The report also makes reference to similar patterns in three neighboring districts: Nyaunglebin District (eastern Bago Region), Hpapun District (northern Kayin State), and Bawlakhe District (southwestern Kayah State). The details pertaining to the affected townships in these districts appear in Appendix 3. The field data contained therein provide further documentation of the widespread and systematic nature of the famine crimes Tatmadaw units committed in eastern Burma/Myanmar prior to and during the Northern Offensive (2006-2008).

48 Article 6, “For the purposes of this Statute, ‘genocide’ means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group…” ICC (2011), p. 3 49 Such objects include: “foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations, and supplies and irrigation works.” Article 54 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), 8 June 1977, available at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/470 (accessed 2 December 2017). Additionally, “destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict” constitutes a war crime in non-international armed conflicts. See Article 8(2)(e)(xii), ICC (2011), p. 41. 50 Article 7 (1) (k) Crime against humanity of other inhuman acts, ICC (2011), p. 12. 51 Clinical Expert Declaration, Expert 3, para. 57. Quoted in IHRC (2014a), p. 6.


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Methodology The IHRC report draws from several sources. First, the research team, with the assistance of local partners, conducted interviews with more than 160 people who fled Thandaung Township during the Northern Offensive and could report on events that primarily occurred between January 2005 and December 2006. Informants included villagers, village leaders, former porters, and former soldiers. The transcripts generated more than 1,000 pages of witness statements, which prosecutors could use as a stating point for their own research. Second, the report includes information from expert declarations conducted with four individuals with extensive knowledge of the key issues examined: Tatmadaw counter-insurgency strategy and tactics, the humanitarian impacts of the state-sponsored violence on civilian populations in the affected area, and international criminal law. Third, the Clinic also referenced reports prepared by internationally known and respected third-party local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Free Burma Rangers (FBR) and the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG). Both NGOs conducted human rights fact-finding work in some of the affected areas during the Northern Offensive. 52 This report supplements the one IHRC prepared both spatially and temporally. It does so by covering a much large geographic area than Thandaung Township, though I feature events in it, and a somewhat longer period of time (2004-2008). The additional details indicate that the patterns the IHRC report documented were not isolated. Rather, the patterns were widespread and systematic, and evinced clear evidence of command responsibility, which is also critical for proving individual criminal liability. 53 IDP profiles, generated by KORD and CIDKP, provide the core data for this report. IDP profiles rely upon enumerative techniques. Quantitative methods are geared towards the rapid collection of demographic information, the statistical accuracy of which varies depending of the type utilized, such as: 1) aerial or satellite imagery for areal surveys, 2) flow monitoring (counting the number of people passing a fixed point when IDPs are on the move), 3) dwelling counts, and 4) headcounts. These methods are ideal when speed is critical and/or access to displaced populations is difficult or impossible due to natural disasters, government restrictions, armed conflict, and so on. The results provide the core data for the profile, which minimally consists of the number of displaced persons, often disaggregated by age and sex, as well as the geographic location(s) of the IDPs. Qualitative methods utilize focus group discussions and key informant interviews with which they generate supplementary data, most often: cause(s) of displacement, patterns of displacement, protection concerns, humanitarian needs, and potential solutions. The data in Appendix 3 contain information derived from both quantitative and qualitative methods. The data are redacted to include only relevant information on military activities and humanitarian needs. Administrative and financial details are removed. The same is true of the supporting information the profiles contain: township maps (indicating the location of the affected villages), letters of recommendations from local administrative officials, and photographs. The excerpts are lightly edited for clarity. 52

IHRC (2014a), pp. 15-20. Appendix 3 contains the names of alleged perpetrators to demonstrate these command-and-control relationships. The officers identified should be regarded as innocent until proven otherwise in a court of law. 53


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The profiles, which are archived as fonds, consist of three primary parts. First, the emergency ration assistance (ERA) request, normally prepared within sixty days of the displacement. Information provided to KORD and CIKDP teams by district- and township-level officials, as well as village heads and IDPs, serves as the basis for the ERA requests. Second, the ERA distribution summary, usually submitted three-four months after the request. The summary also includes further details on military operations and abuses that occurred after the submission of the ERA request. Third, an ERA impact assessment, when included, is typically submitted seven-nine months after the distribution of cash aid. Impact assessments were rare prior to 2008, when they became a standard part of the ERA reporting. Villagers typically flee either in response to a direct attack or ones nearby. 54 They are rarely able to bring much with them in terms of personal items (e.g. clothing, blankets, and mosquito nets) or food. Tatmadaw units, as the ERA documents indicate, destroyed and/or confiscated whatever was left behind. Villagers maintained several secret food caches, especially bags of rice wrapped in plastic and buried underground, in the forest for this reason. 55 The amounts stockpiled were not sufficient for any length of time, however. IDPs reported that they commonly ate thin rice porridge mixed with bamboo shoots, wild yams and/or roots for weeks or months on end, which contributed to increased morbidity and mortality from preventable diseases, especially diarrhea and malaria, the result of sleeping in the forest without mosquito nets. ERA funds provide IDPs with some emergency financial support, which enabled them to make decisions about their livelihood options. Cash assistance was calculated by multiplying the number of IDPs times the amount needed to provide each of them with a three-month supply of food, the cost of which was calculated using the local price of a big tin—a standardized unit of volume weighing approximately 10.5 kg., if paddy, and 16 kg., if milled rice. 56 (The report uses 1 tin/person/month for calculations.) Cash, in sharp contrast to heavy sacks of rice, was much easier to transport across rugged terrain into conflict-affected areas. Additionally, providing IDPs with funds to purchase rice and other urgently needed necessities locally prevented inflationary pressures, which would otherwise have reduced food security in the surrounding region by raising prices. 57 The cash assistance totals in paddy/rice kilogram equivalents thus functioned as a proxy for the impact of the military operations on food security. The totals are somewhat misleading, however, as they do not take into account future losses. Existing fields may become permanently unusable because of landmine contamination and/or the construction of new Tatmadaw camps nearby, which posed an ongoing security threats to those civilians. Commercially valuable spices (e.g. cardamom), the most important cash crop in upland areas, and trees (e.g. areca palms), also 54 Other villagers are the primary source of information about nearby military patrols and attacks according to one survey: 64% of the time in IDP hiding areas. TBBC (2005), p. 53. 55 According to the same survey, 60% of the villagers living in IDP hiding areas cache food supplies or crops in case they need to flee on short notice. Ibid., p. 54. 56 Paddy, because it retains its protective hull, is less likely to spoil or rot when it becomes damp as a result of humidity or rain. However, it can be difficult to remove the hull (typically by pounding) when in hiding. 57 KORD and CIDKP, like other local cross-border humanitarian organizations, convert Thai baht into Burmese kyat using money-changers based on the border. The market rate during 2006 fluctuated around 1,300 kyat per 1 US dollar (author’s field notes).


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required years of cultivation before they produced seedpods and betel nuts, respectively. (The former takes 3-4 years, while the latter requires 4-5 years.). Nevertheless, tracking the cash totals provides a useful, if imperfect, measurement of severity and magnitude of the famine crimes that occurred. The statistics that follow offer additional baseline data on living conditions in the conflict-affected townships prior to the Northern Offensive. The findings illustrate how precarious food security already was at the time (2004-2005). The Back Pack Health Worker Team (BPHWT), a multi-ethnic cross-border humanitarian organization made up of mobile medics, conducted a rapid health assessment survey in 2004. The researchers collected basic mortality and morbidity data from two thousand households (approximately 140,000 people) in eight zones in southeastern Burma/Myanmar, many of them within the boundaries of KNU-delineated Karen State. 91.7% of the households responded, nearly one-quarter of them in areas the Tatmadaw targeted during the Northern Offensive. 58 Notably, 71.6% of the people surveyed in Toungoo District, where Thandaung and Tantabin Townships are located, reported the destruction and/or looting of their food supplies by Tatmadaw units. 59 45.4% of them stated that they abandoned their homes at least once over the previous year because of military operations. 60 Unsurprisingly, BPHWT found that health status of people in the zones surveyed – using standard indicators such as child malnutrition frequencies, protein deficiencies, mortality rates, and the prevalence of preventable diseases – were broadly consistent with those documented in war-torn Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 61 The Thai Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), an international humanitarian organization, also conducted a large-scale, multi-cluster survey during 2004 (6,070 people in 1,071 households in sixty areas across six states and divisions (now known as regions). 62 The households were variously located in relocation sites, mixed administration areas, IDP hiding areas, and ethnic ceasefire areas. TBBC’s cross-border CSO partners carried out the data collection, and they documented the prevalence of the following patterns over the past year among those surveyed: Protection Issues      

57% of households forced to provide labor for authorities; 52% of households ordered to pay arbitrary taxes and/or other forms of extortion; 24% of households with crops or food stocks damaged and/or destroyed by authorities; 17% of households with a member arbitrarily detained without cause; 12% of households forcibly evicted; and 1.2% of population wounded or killed by military assault in past two years. 63

Coping Strategies 58

Back Pack Health Worker Team [BPHWT], Chronic Emergency: Health and Human Rights in Eastern Burma (Chiang Mai, Thailand: BPHWT, 2006), p. 29. 59 Ibid., p. 43. 60 Ibid., p. 46. 61 Ibid., p. 65. 62 TBBC, Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma (Bangkok: TBBC, 2004), p. 1. 63 Ibid., p. 5.


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   

71% of households accessing loans to survive disruptions to livelihoods; 30% of households accessing aid to survive disruptions to livelihoods; 17% of households migrating for work to survive disruptions to livelihoods; and 22% of households selling assets to survive disruptions to livelihoods. 64

All of the protection threats have a direct impact on the food security of households in eastern Burma/Myanmar, as the statistics on civilian coping strategies makes clear. These patterns also inform two further troubling findings. The survey found that only 23% of all households had access to two meals/day for every month in the past year, and the chronic shortages contributed to a 16% rate of acute malnutrition (moderate to severe wasting) in children under the ages of five. 65 TBBC conducted another multi-cluster survey in 2005, covering 1,044 households residing in Tatmadaw relocation sites, mixed administration areas, IDP hiding areas, and ethnic ceasefire areas. 66 TBBC published the results in October, shortly before the Northern Offensive began. Forced labor as well as travel restrictions to fields and markets, 51% and 30% respectively, posed significant challenges to food security for civilians in mixed administration (also known as brown) areas. 16% of them reported the destruction or confiscation of food by authorities as a problem. Travel restrictions also affected 19% of IDPs in hiding areas. But the destruction or confiscation of food, at 30%, was by far the single largest threat to their livelihoods in the past year. 67

64

Ibid., p. 5. Ibid. p. 6. 66 TBBC, Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma (Bangkok: TBBC, 2005), pp. 10-12. 67 Ibid., p. 49. 65


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Northern Offensive The Northern Offensive affected a wide-swathe of KNU-delineated Karen State, primarily Daw Pha Kho, Htaw Ta Htu, Lu Thaw, Mu, Ler Doh, and Hsaw Hti Townships. 68 The boundaries of these locally recognized administrative units roughly correspond with Thandaung, Tantabin, Hpapun, Mone, Kyaukkyi, and Shwegyin Townships on government-delineated maps. 69 The KORD and CIDKP data sets make it possible to describe the Tatmadaw’s widespread and systematic use of faminogenic practices across all six townships, the details of which appear in Appendix 3. But Thandaung (Daw Pha Kho) and Tantabin (Htaw Ta Htoo) Townships, both of which fall within the boundaries of Toungoo District on KNU-delineated maps, are the primary geographic focus of the report. Many of the operations simultaneously targeted villages on both sides of the township boundary—hence, the decision to analyze them concurrently. Battalions under Southern Regional Command also operated further south in Mone Township, which borders Tantabin. Details regarding their activities are included in the forced migration summaries for this reason as well. Tatmadaw units have carried out attacks against civilians in Toungoo District for decades. The earliest reports of Four Cuts operations in the district date back to 1974-1975, and major offensives occurred again in 1992 and 1996-1997. 70 The latter offensive enabled the Tatmadaw effectively to divide the region in half, with the various commands in control of areas north of the Toungoo – Kler Lah – Maw Chi Road and the Southern Command in areas south of it. Road construction, completed using considerable amounts of civilian forced labor between 1995 and 1998, contributed to the increased militarization of Thandaung and Tantabin Townships.71 The process resulted in a significant rise in the number of Tatmadaw bases and camps, as well as the number of villages forced to relocate closer to them. 72 Much of the district is mountainous, especially in the southeast. Elevations in this area often range from 1,000-2,500 meters above sea level. With few exceptions, remote areas are accessible only on foot or, in places where rivers drain the Ka Ser Lu Range, small boats. The KNU/KNLA still retained a significant presence in the both townships following the above offensives. But Tatmadaw military operations conducted during 2002, 2003, and 2004 further eroded the ability of the KNU to administer daily affairs and Brigade No. 2 of the KNLA to retain territory. 73 68

See Map 3. For more detailed maps, see KHRG, “Location,” available at http://khrg.org/reports/location. See Myanmar Information Management Unit, “GIS Resources,” available at http://themimu.info/gis-resources for official maps. 70 KORD and CIDKP informants routinely reference these offensives when recounting local conflict histories. 71 IHRC (2014a), pp. 30-31. 72 KHRG, False Peace: Increasing SPDC Military Repression in Toungoo District of Northern Karen State (25 March 1999), available at https://khrg.org/1999/03/khrg9902a/false-peace-increasing-spdc-military-repressiontoungoo-district-northern-karen (accessed 18 December 2017). 73 See ERA requests in: CIDKP-2002-13, KORD-2002-15, KORD-2003-04, KORD-2003-06, KORD-2004-02, CIDKP-2004-02, KORD-2004-06, and CIDKP-2004-09. For background, see KHRG, Flight, Hunger, and Survival: Repression and Displacement in the Villages of Papun and Nyaunglebin, available at https://khrg.org/2001/10/anthony0103dps/flight-hunger-and-survival-repression-and-displacement-villages-papunand (accessed 1 December 2017); KHRG, Expansion of the Guerrilla Retaliation Units and Food Shortages in Toungoo District of Northern Karen State (16 June 2003), available at https://khrg.org/2003/06/khrg03u1/expansion-guerrilla-retaliation-units-and-food-shortages-toungoo-districtnorthern (accessed 1 December 2017); KHRG, Enduring Hunger and Repression: Food Scarcity, Internal 69


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According to KORD and CIDKP documentation, Tatmadaw attacks on civilians in Thandaung Township, which is sparsely populated, displaced 6,784 people in 2002, 7,570 people in 2003, and 14,838 people in 2004. Using 2014 national census data, which is the only official data available, the successive operations displaced approximately nine, ten, and nearly twenty-percent of the township’s total rural population, respectively. 74 Despite the informal “gentleman’s [ceasefire] agreement” between the KNU and the Tatmadaw, reached in January of 2004, the latter’s battalions continued to expand their presence in Toungoo District, in addition to neighboring Hpapun District. The Tatmadaw did so by building dry-season roads and establishing new camps in areas where they previously had none. 75 These actions violated the terms of the agreement, which specified what areas troops could be stationed as well as rules regarding their deployment, and resulted in more than 200 skirmishes during the first six months of the ceasefire. 76 The skirmishes contributed to further displacement. According to KHRG researchers, an estimated 10,000-12,000 IDPs continued to hide in the rugged mountains of Toungoo District, with approximately half of them in Thandaung Township and the other half in Tantabin Township. 77 Villagers residing in areas close to roads and/or military encampments endured a sharp increase in demands for forced labor, money, and the provision of construction materials by Tatmadaw troops as well. Together, these patterns significantly reduced the ability of both populations to grow and to forage sufficient food, engage in day labor with which to purchase necessities, travel to markets, and so on. 78 One cross-border humanitarian aid expert offered three possible reasons as to why the 2004 informal ceasefire did not hold. 79 First, construction of Naypyidaw, the new administrative capital began in late 2005, and the desire to create a “security perimeter” to protect it was likely a contributing factor. 80 Second, the regime also wanted to build a series of hydroelectric dams along

Displacement, and the Continued Use of Forced Labor in Toungoo District (24 September 2004), available at https://khrg.org/2004/09/khrg0401d/enduring-hunger-and-repression-food-scarcity-internal-displacement-andcontinued (accessed 1 December 2017). 74 The census found 96,052 people living in the township, nearly eighty-percent of them in rural areas. The average population density is population density of 26.44 people km2. See https://www.citypopulation.de/php/myanmaradmin.php?adm2id=030103 (accessed 1 December 2017). 75 In 1995, the Tatmadaw maintained 10 camps in Eastern Pegu Division (now Bago Region). By 2005, the number had increased to 17. The militarization of Karen State was far more pronounced over this same period, with the number of camps rising from 20 to 75. See map, “Militarization in Eastern Burma 1995-2005,” in TBBC, Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma (Bangkok: TBBC, 2005), p. 19. During this same period, Tatmadaw activity resulted in the destruction, relocation, or abandonment of 146 villages in Eastern Bago Region and 672 villages in Karen State. Ibid., p. 23. 76 TBBC, Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma (Bangkok: TBBC, 2004), p. 32. 77 KHRG, ‘Peace,’ or Control? The SPDC’s Use of the Karen Ceasefire to Expand Its Control and Repression of Villages in Toungoo District, Northern Karen State (21 February 2005), available at https://khrg.org/2005/03/khrg05f3/peace-or-control-spdcs-use-karen-ceasefire-expand-its-control-and-repression (accessed 15 December 2017). For a time-specific map, see TBBC (2004), p. 33. 78 KHRG (2005). 79 U.S. Embassy, “KNU Letter to SPDC Appeals for Peace,” Cable No. 05RANGOON908 (5 August 2005). 80 The theory, although widely reported at the time, is not convincing. It fails to explain why large-scale clearance operations targeted Karen civilians in townships in eastern Bago Region and Karen State, both of which are quite distant from Naypyidaw.


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the Salween River, three of them (Weigyi, Dagwin, and Hatgyi) in Karen State. 81 To do so, permanent control of the sites and the access routes to them was needed. Third, the affected areas are part of the KNU “heartland” and “hardline elements in the regime” may have wished to defeat them militarily on the assumption that they would, unlike KNU/KNLA leaders farther south, never surrender. 82 The IHRC report concluded that the primary goal of the Northern Offensive was in fact to clear the targeted region of civilians, and thus deprive the KNU/KNLA of much needed resources.83 KORD and CIDKP data corroborate IHRC’s conclusion.

81 Salween Watch Coalition, “Damming Burma’s War Zone: Proposed Salween Dams Cement Military Control Over Ethnic Peoples (1 October 2006), available at https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/dammingburma’s-war-zone-proposed-salween-dams-cement-military-control-over-ethnic-peoples (accessed 11 January 2018). 82 U.S. Embassy, “Offensive in Karen State?: A Cross-Border Aid Worker Offers Views,” Confidential Cable No. 06BANGKOK3799 (28 June 2006). For a Karen analysis of the causes behind the offensive, see KHRG, “Civilians as Targets” (30 April 2006), available at http://khrg.org/2006/04/khrg06c1/civilians-targets (accessed 28 December 2017). The October 2004 arrest of Prime Minister and Chief of Military Intelligence, Lieutenant-General Khin Nyunt, is one sign of this shift. The subsequent purge of his supporters by hardliners, led by Senior General Than Shwe, effectively ended reconciliation efforts with non-ceasefire NSAGs and political liberalization more generally. Brigadier-General Ye Win and Brigadier-General Win Myint, who oversaw combat forces in Thandaung Township were among them. Both were appointed ambassadors, which is widely seen to be a form of exile. “All Change: Burmese Junta Reshuffles Officers Again, Democratic Voice of Burma (20 May 2005). 83 IHCR (2014b), p. 35.


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2004-2005 Forced Migration Summary In late 2003, three battalions (IB-53, IB-75, and IB-124), under the Southern Regional Command, carried out search-and-destroy patrols along both sides of the Day Loh River in Thandaung Township, as well as constructed new front-line camps on the Kayah Border. 84 The patrols, which lasted nearly a month, affected 3,307 people (558 households) from 17 villages. 85 According to one local source, General Tin Aye, the Southern Military Commander, ordered Khin Maung Oo, the Military Strategy Commander, to instruct his battalions to destroy all paddy farms, as well as paddy and rice barns. IDPs reported that troops located and destroyed 58 paddy farms and forced them to abandon more than 100 cardamom gardens. Ongoing patrols into January of 2004 prevented the IDPs from clearing new fields, and the remaining rice they had spoiled due to heavy rains. One villager from Ga Mu Der explained, “In the present situation, the living of those under the SPDC control are like living without a life.” 86 Pasaung (Bawlakhe District) in Kayah State, borders Kayin State (see Appendix E). Much of the rugged and heavily forested terrain is a black zone due to the presence of a hostile armed ethnic group, the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP). Tatmadaw units have long targeted villages in it, especially those close to Thandaung and Tantabin Townships. 87 10 Tatmadaw battalions operating in Pasaung Township in late 2003 and early 2004 caused 1,998 people (402 households) from 17 villages in the Maw Chi area to flee south to 5 hiding sites in neighboring Toungoo District, located to the west, and Hpapun Township, located to the south. 88 The decision to leave was, in part, prompted by an order signed by the commander of IB-55, which stated: “Those who refuse to relocate [to Pasaung, Maw Chi and Nan Kit] will be regarded as illegal people or anti-government elements, and the government will not take any responsibility on them in case of any matter occur[s].” 89 Tatmadaw soldiers, in other words, will regard them as insurgents and treat them accordingly. The IDPs were able to carry only a few weeks of food as a result, which prompted KSWDC’s request for emergency ration assistance. 90 Troops under Eastern Regional Command (IB-54, IB-135, LIB-337, LIB-429, LIB-502, LIB-511) also sought consolidate village south of Maw Chi Town, another black area. The battalions carried out search-and-destroy operations in May and laid landmines throughout the area. The operations 84 IB-73, LIB-590, and LIB-599, under the Southern Regional Command, carried out clearing operations in four village tracts in KNU-delineated Mone (Mu) Township, which borders Toungoo District during this same period. (The villages are located relatively close to Mone and Paungseik Towns.) The operations affected 1,819 people (281 households) from 9 villages. CIDKP-2004-05. 85 Military activities do not always result in displacement, especially in brown areas where everyday forms of exploitation (e.g. forced labor, extortion, and theft) erode food security and generate requests for ERA. Flight is the common practice in black areas. To avoid confusion, I use the “affected” rather than “displaced,” as it applies in both conflict contexts. 86 KORD-2004-02. 87 The number of Tatmadaw camps in Kayah State as a whole rose from 12 to 50 between 1995 and 2005. Military activity resulted in the destruction, relocation, or abandonment of 270 villages during this same period. Specific figures for Pasaung and Pruso Townships are not available, however. TBBC (2005), pp. 19, 23. 88 The Toungoo Town – Baw Ga Li (Kler Lah) – Maw Chi – Pasaung Town all-season road provides the primary access route for Tatmadaw operations to the north (Thandaung Township) and south (Tantabin Township), in addition to the Maw Chi area in neighboring Kayah State. 89 KSWDC-2004-01. 90 Ibid.


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prompted 2,098 people (392 households) from 16 villages to flee—some to Hpapun Township (80 households), whereas others relocated south of the Toungoo – Maw Chi Road (312 households). Many of the IDPs broke into small groups (2-3 households) for hiding purposes, but that makes them more vulnerable. A KSWDC staff person explained, “many of their hiding places are known to them [the battalions] and it means that if killed, there is no one to report it.” 91 Between December 2003 and April of 2004, several of the same battalions under Southern Regional Command (IB-39, IB-48, IB-92, IB-124, and LIB-589) cleared civilians out of the Western Klay War area (Thandaung Township) and the Kaw Thay Der area (Tantabin Township). 92 The area is close to the Toungoo – Maw Chi Road, near the Kler Lah Relocation Camp, adjacent to the Kayah State border. In addition to indiscriminant attacks on civilians, troops targeted cash crops, e.g. coffee, betel nut and, especially, cardamom. The operations affected 2,740 people (496 households) from 9 villages. 93 Six battalions (LIB-94, LIB-117, LIB-508, LIB-509, LIB-511, and LIB-509) belonging to Tactical Command 551 of LID-55 carried out similar operations, which began in December of 2003 and continued until mid-March of 2004. The battalions concentrated their patrols north of Bu Hsa Khee Village and south of the Toungoo – Maw Chi Road, adjacent to the Kayah State border. Two other armed ethnic groups allied with the Tatmadaw, KNPLF and the KNSO, participated as well. Between mid-March and late April, military activity led 4,457 people (750 households) from 22 villages to flee, many of them to hiding sites in the deep forest. The troops, local administrators stated, burnt homes, as well as destroyed farms and food supplies (more than 1,500 baskets of paddy were lost). For IDPs in hiding sites, the nearest place to purchase rice and other necessities (markets in Kler Lah and Tha Daw) was a twenty-mile hike through a conflict zone on foot. For people who returned to their villages by the end of the year, further militarization meant that forced labor had become a defining feature of everyday life.94 During this same period, several of the same Southern Command battalions (IB-39, IB-48, IB-55, and IB-75) conducted search-and-destroy operations in Thandaung and Tantabin Townships, west of the Day Loe and Ya Loe Rivers. The area is a black zone, as one informant explained: “When the Burmese troops meet with them [civilians] the troops open fire to them…” Local sources again stated that General Tin Aye, the Southern Military Commander, ordered Khin Maung Oo to increase the frequency of the missions and to plant more anti-personnel landmines. The joint operations, which continued into mid-April of 2004, affected 4,334 people (795 households) from 17 villages. 95 In May of 2004, LID-55, led by Col. Thet Oo, launched clearance operations in the Maw Chi region of Kayah State that continued until late September. “The SPDC,” one local source explained, “labeled the Maw Chi region a black area, which means that the area is void of law and order…” Fifteen different battalions, plus KNPLF and KNSO troops, participated. LIB-135 91

KSWDC-2005-03. LIB-599, also under Southern Regional Command, forcibly relocated 1,521 (152 households) from Ko Ni Village, south of Mone Town, in February 2004. Local sources report travel restrictions, torture, and indiscriminant attacks on civilians between February and May. CIDKP-2004-12. 93 CIDKP-2004-09. 94 KORD-2004-06. 95 CIDKP-2004-02. 92


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Commander, Lt. Col. Aung Aung, ordered 7 villages to relocate to Bawlahke, stating: “Noncompliance will be termed as KNPP sympathizers and threatened to be severely treated,” i.e., people who refuse will be considers supports of the insurgent group and treated accordingly. The inhabitants of these villages refused, as did thousands of others, who went into hiding. All told, 4,123 people (788 households) from 41 villages in affected areas of Pasaung Township needed funds with which to purchase emergency rations according to KSWDC. 96 Battalions under Southern Command (IB-73, IB-124, LIB-53, LIB-60, LIB-590) utilized forced labor to resupply their frontline camps between September and December 2004. Patrols originating from these camps caused 3,838 people (750 households) from 16 villages in the Maw Nya Bwa and Kaw They Der areas (Tantabin Township) to go into hiding temporarily. The timing of the search-and-destroy patrols, which primarily targeted food supplies, prevented villagers from harvesting crops during November and December. CIDKP field staff were not able to document the total crop losses, including cardamom, resulting from the patrols, however. 97 Troops from the same Southern Command battalions (joined by LIB-439) also conducted search and destroy patrols south of the Toungoo – Maw Chi Road, adjacent to the Kler Lah – Bu Hsa Khee Road, which cuts southeast towards neighboring Hpapun Township. The patrols began in November and continued into February 2005. IDPs report that the battalions stole or destroyed the majority of the harvest, burnt paddy barns in each of the affected villages, and seized betel nut, approximately 240,000 viss, from 178 gardens in the area. Firefights with KNU troops (at least six occasions in December) made the situation increasingly unstable for the 2,906 people (457 households) from 15 villages that sought refuge in the forest. (Most of them were living in temporary groups, 5-10 households, to reduce the likelihood that patrols would find them.) The KORD assessment team wrote, “At the time we visited the area, we found that the villagers were depending on the little paddy that were not found by the SPDC, and we believe that they [the IDPs] will finish it already. Now they will have to depend on borrowing from lowland villages or working on daily labor as on any kind of work they could find.” 98 Southern Regional Command battalions (IB-26, IB-48, IB-60, IB-73, IB-75, IB-92, LIB-440) continued search-and-destroy operations in Western Klay Soe area (Thandaung Township) and the Kaw They Der area (Tantabin Township) during the hot season. 99 These battalions targeted upland paddy fields and cardamom gardens between February and June 2005. 3,841 people (676 households) from 9 villages abandoned their homes as a result. Villagers normally prepare their paddy fields during these months. The patrols, which prevented them from doing so, and the widespread destruction of the cardamom gardens, meant the IDPs would have little or no money to purchase rice in the Kaw Thay Der and Kler Lah markets.100 96

KSWDC-2004-05. CIDKP-2005-01. KORD-2005-02. 99 IB-73, LIB-590, and LIB-599 battalions, under Southern Regional Command, also conducted clearing operations in four village tracts in Mone Township between January and May of 2005. Villagers in these areas normally flee whenever troops approach. The operations, east of the Mone – Thandaung Road and north of the Kyaukkyi – Mu Theh – Saw Hta Road, affected 1,389 people (197 households) from 8 villages. IDPs reported extensive crop losses: 3,000 tins of rice burnt, which is equivalent to a three-month supply, and the destruction of more than 100 gardens used to cultivate cash crops (cardamom, betel nut, dog fruit, and durian). KORD-2005-03. 100 CIDKP-2005-08. 97 98


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Southern Regional Command battalions (IB-30, IB-48, IB-73, and IB-92), along with “guerrilla retaliation units” (Sa Thon Lon Dam Byan Byaut Kya), commonly known as “Short-Pants” (Baw Bi Doh) in Karen, also conducted operations farther south in the Kho Khee and Kaw Thay Der areas in Tantabin Township. The area, east of the Bu Hsa Khee – Kler Lah Road and south of the Kler Lah – Maw Chi Road, is a “hiding area,” i.e., a black area. Villagers normally abandon their homes whenever troops approach—in this instance: 2,133 people (356 households) from 11 villages. The patrols, which began in April and continued through July, destroyed 204 cardamom gardens, 33 coffee gardens, 13 durian gardens, and 14 paddy fields. The overarching goal of the operations, local sources explained, was to build further military camps and establish secure supply lines for them. 101 Battalions under Eastern Regional Command targeted Pasaung Township, and conducted patrols during the hot season (June-July 2005) as well. 6 battalions (IB-135, LIB-337, LIB-429, LIB-511, and LIB-502) launched “clearing” operations north of the Pasaung – Kler Lah Road, largely in response to a KNPP ambush, which left one Tatmadaw officer and five privates killed. The needs assessment, despite its limited information, indicates that 3,503 people (623 households) from 24 small settlements were affected. 102 In total, Tatmadaw battalions conducted 12 large-scale operations – variously referred to a “clearing” and “search-and-destroy” patrols in the ERA requests – in Pasaung, Thandaung, and Tantabin Townships between December 2003 and July 2005. 103 The 4 operations in Pasaung Township affected 11,722 people (1,819 households) from 98 villages and settlements. Most of the IDPs either fled west into neighboring Thandaung Township or south to Hpapun Township.104 Eight operations in Thandaung and Tantabin Townships affected 24,249 people (4,280 households) from 99 villages. 105 Requests for emergency rations, which provide a three-month supply of paddy/rice, allotting three tins/person, were substantial. In the case of Thandaung and Tantabin Townships, the total amount of ERA requested was equivalent to 763,844 kg. of paddy or 1,163,952 kg. of milled rice. Village tracts to the north and to the south of the Toungoo – Maw Chi Road, which bisects Thandaung and Tantabin Townships, and connects with Pasaung Township to the east were the

101

KORD-2005-05. Karenni CSOs, including religious leaders, sought to facilitate ceasefire talks at the end of the year, but SPDC officials refused. “Karenni Groups Offer to Mediate New KNPP Cease-Fire,” Mizzima News (14 December 2005). 103 Tatmadaw search-and-destroy operations were not limited to these areas prior to the Northern Offensive. Battalions targeted villages in Hpapun Township (4 times in 2004 and 5 times in 2005), and Kyaukkyi (6 times in 2004 and then 4 times in 2005). See “2004 ERA Financial Tracker” and “2005 ERA Financial Summary” (on file with author). Details on these operations can be found in Appendix 3. For related discussion, see Human Rights Watch, “The Came and Destroyed Our Village Again”: The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Karen State (New York: HRW, 2005). 104 See: KSWDC-2004-01; KSWDC-2004-05; KSWDC-2005-03; and KSWDC-2005-07. It is likely that one of the strategic goals of the Tatmadaw operations south of the Toungoo – Maw Chi Road was to expand military control in the area surrounding the Maw Chi Mine in Bawlakhe District. The mine is a major source of tin-tungsten, which is used to solder wires on circuit boards of computers, mobile phones, etc. 105 See: KORD-2004-02; KORD-2004-06; CIDKP-2004-02; CIDKP-2004-09; CIDKP-2005-8; KORD-2005-02; CIDKP-2005-01; KORD-2005-05. 102


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most heavily targeted “black” areas. The existing and newly established (frontline) camps in these areas would later function as staging areas for the Northern Offensive. 106 Battalions under the command of Major General Ko Ko (Southern Regional Command) and Brigadier General Khin Zaw Oo (LID-66), were very active in both Thandaung and Tantabin Townships during 2004-2005. 107 The battalions reportedly perpetrated a wide array of human rights violations, including indiscriminant attacks and the willful killings of civilians, in addition to the deliberate destruction of food supplies. IHRC determined both generals werer responsible for crimes against humanity and war crimes during the Northern Offensive. 108 The KORD and CIDKP data indicate that they could also be held legally responsible for the crimes carried out prior to it.

106 Historically, road upgrades and new road construction are key indicators of impending large-scale clearance operations. Clinical Expert Declaration, Expert 2 (IHRC 2014a), p. 31. See also, U.S. Embassy, “Food Shortages and Roadwork in Northern Karen,” Cable no. 06RANGOON624 (9 May 2006). Troops imposed a complete blockade on the import of rice into the area, according to the cable, worsening existing food shortages in advance of the rainy season. 107 See Myanmar Tatmadaw Military Command Structure 2002-2010. It is not clear from the documents when LID66 troops withdrew from the region, before returning as part of the lead-up preparations for the Northern Offensive. 108 IHRC (2014a), pp. 58-71.


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2006 Forced Migration Summary The geographic focus of the report is on clearance operations in Thandaung and Tantabin Townships. But summaries regarding operations in neighboring Mone Township, located immediately south of Toungoo District, are also included where battalions under Southern Regional Command (IB-60, LIB-590, and LIB-599) were involved. 109 These battalions, often in conjunction with those under other MOCs, carried out search-and-destroy patrols on numerous occasions between November 2005 and January 2007, affecting 12,025 people (1,796 households) from 63 villages in Mone Township according to KORD and CIDKP documentation. 110

109

In 2006, roving patrols also prompted ERA requests from KORD and CIDKP throughout the region: 6 ERA requests from Hpapun Township (17,343 people from 67 villages); 8 from Kyaukkyi Township, which includes Mone Township data (28,924 people from 109 villages); 2 from Shwegyin Township (7,405 people from 38 villages); and 3 from western Kayah State (9,526 people from 45 villages and settlements). 2006 ERA Financial Tracker (on file with author). For further details, see Appendix 3. 110 CIDKP-2006-02; KORD-2006-08; KORD-2006-16; and KORD-2007-09. Map source: FBR, “Situation Map: Nov 1 2006,” available at: http://www.freeburmarangers.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/02/20061031_situation_map.jpg (accessed 2 March 2018).


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MOC-16 battalions, also under the Southern Regional Command, began roving patrols in Kyaukkyi Township, south of Mone Township, while its Southern Regional Command counterpart, MOC-21, targeted villages on both sides of the Yunzalin River, which bisects Hpapun Township. MOC-10 and MOC-15, both under South Eastern Regional Command, patrolled the mountains of eastern Shwegyin Township and northern Hpapun Township. 111 (69,000 baskets of paddy were burnt or confiscated by these battalions in Hpapun Township alone. 112 ) TBBC, drawing upon CSO data, reported that successive operations, which involved more than 30 battalions, forced residents to abandon more than 100 villages in the three townships, displacing in excess of 22,000 civilians in the process. 113 Thandaung and Tantabin The first KORD ERA request detailed attacks on 15 villages in the Klah Wa Mu Htaw area, north of the Mo Khee – Kler Lah Road, in Thandaung Township, and the Kaw They Der and Kho Khee areas, between Mo Khee and the Bu Hsa Khee Road in Tantabin Township. Villagers in these two areas rely on hillside paddy cultivation (30%), gardening (35%), day labor (25%), as well as some animal husbandry and forest products. The operations began in November of 2005 and continued through February of 2006, affecting 2,683 people (446 households). Battalions under Southern Regional Command (four total) and LID-66 (nine total) conducted search-and-destroy patrols through this period. 114 Troops destroyed 640 baskets of paddy, 492 baskets of rice, and 26 cardamom gardens, as well as burning more than two-dozen houses. According to local sources, the troops constructed new camps and stockpiled food and ammunition with the goal of clearing the area entirely within six months. “They” [troops] spread the news to villagers in hiding areas [IDPs] that they will be the focus and shot at if there is any fighting [with the KNLA] or harm to the soldiers.” 115 More than 1,300 of the IDPs made the dangerous 100-kilometer journey to the ThailandBurma/Myanmar border following patrols by Southern Regional Command, LID-66, and MOC16 battalions during January and February 2006. One aid worker stated that IDPs “do not show themselves to the SPDC as the SPDC regards them as their enemies. Villagers are easy to kill if they are found. Therefore, people in this area are always running away [when] they heard that the SPDC troops come close to them.” According to the day-by-day data that KORD gathered from local sources, the troops set up successive short-term camps with the apparent goal of driving the IDPs from hiding place to hiding place, denying them access to sufficient food along the way. KORD statistics indicate that 958 of the IDPs joined the unofficial Ee Tu Hta IDP camp, which is located in northern Hpapun Township on the banks of the Salween River. Others opted to cross the river and enter the Mae Ra Ma Luang refugee camp in Mae Hong Son Province (Thailand).116

111 Ibid.; TBBC (2006), p. 37. KORD staff state that LIB-301 of LID-88, also under the Southern Regional Command, conducted an operation in Hpapun Township. KORD-2007-12. 112 TBBC (2006), p. 37. 113 Data current as of August 2006. Ibid., pp. 37, 57-58. 114 The KORD documents do not specify when the LID-66 troops arrived. IHRC dates their arrival to late January or early February, i.e., at the very end of these patrols. 115 KORD-2006-03. 116 Ei Htu Hta Camp 2006.


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LID-66, based in Kler Lah (Baw Ga Li Gyi), which is strategically situated along the Toungoo – Maw Chi Road, carried out clearance operations in the Kaw Thay Der area (Tantabin Township) January through July. Livelihoods in the area are largely based on cash crops (e.g. cardamom, betel nut, durian, and mangosteen), as the poor soil prevents significant paddy cultivation. Many of the affected villages – 5 total – are located relatively close to the road. Civilians are routinely subject to forced labor, which reduces the time they have available to tend their crops, and extortion. Much of the road-related forced labor occurred between Kaw Ter Der Village and the Naw Soe military camp. Inhabitants were warned that soldiers would “shoot villagers on sight travelling on or within 50 yards of the road,” once all of the vegetation close it had been cleared. Troops (battalion not specified) also set the forest close to the road on fire to further reduce the risk of future KNLA ambushes. The fire destroyed many of the cash crops, especially cardamom. LID-66 troops and the other battalions in the area (IB-1, IB-10, IB-11, LIB-14, and LIB-568) additionally closed all markets and imposed tight travel restrictions, preventing people from spending the night in their paddy huts (makeshift shelters in their fields). 2,173 people (409 households) needed emergency rations due to the shortfall in food according to CIDKP staff. 117 LID-66 and MOC-16, which is under Southern Regional Command, and MOC-15, from Western Regional Command, conducted search-and-destroy operations south of Thandaung Town, close to the Toungoo – Maw Chi Road between June and November 2006. During this period, the troops burned or otherwise destroyed 47 houses in 7 of the 11 affected villages, causing 2,272 people (522 households) to flee the Maw Nay Bwe area in Tantabin Township to avoid forced relocation. (Residents of three of the villager eventually relocated to military-controlled areas.) Villagers had to abandon 300 acres of paddy fields and approximately 1,400 baskets of rice, as well as 150 acres of peanuts. Patrols shot and killed 5 villagers and wounded 2 more for working in their farms or traveling between villages.118 LID-66 battalions (LIB-14, LIB-35, and LIB-108), as well as LIB-440 (Southern Regional Command), continued their patrols in Maw Nay Pwa and the Kaw Thay Der areas in February, resulting in further displacement. The village tracts are located west of the Kaw Thay Der – Bu Hsa Khee Road, in Tantabin Township. The village tracts are “free-fire zones” (i.e. black) according to local sources, meaning that residents flee to the nearest hiding-sites whenever patrols approach. (At least three people were shot.) The 2,494 people (390 households from 14 villages) left behind 580 baskets of paddy, 360 baskets of rice, 445 viss of cardamom seed, and 800 viss of betel nut. Total losses are much higher, KORD staff report, but the security situation prevented them from conducting further fact-finding. During the ERA distribution in June, an IDP stated that, “currently, as the movement of the SPDC was increasing, the living area of the villagers were also getting narrow narrowed. Travel restrictions and landmines, typically placed along the paths to gardens, as well as continued indiscriminate attacks on civilians (mortars fired into fields and suspected hidings sites), made it increasingly difficult to cultivate and/or to purchase sufficient rice. Troops [battalions not specified] also forced 800 people from 5 villages to porter military rations to the Tha Aye and Naw Soe military camps to support future clearance operations in forward areas. 119

117

CIDKP-2006-16. CIDKP-2006-15. 119 KORD-2006-04. 118


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KNU leaders sought ceasefire discussions with SPDC officials in April and May of 2006 in response to the clearance operations in northern Karen areas. 120 The officials refused to meet with them, however. Despite these refusals, SPDC Military Affairs Security Chief Lieutenant-General Ye Myint did not formally nullify the existing “gentleman’s agreement,” as the existing informal ceasefire with the KNU was known, until October. SPDC negotiators stated that new negotiations were the only option for moving forward. Further clearance operations, such as the one below, rather than dialogue, ensured, however. 121 Between June and October, 6 MOC-16 battalions, 4 MOC-15 battalions, and 2 Southern Command battalions (LIB-590 and LIB-599) targeted highland settlements west of the Yunzalin River and north of the Kyaukkyi – Saw Hta Road. The villages are in a black zone, and people normally flee when patrols approach. Troops regularly fired mortars and shot indiscriminately into suspected IDP hiding areas, where many of the 3,794 people (628 households) from 21 villages affected by the operations had fled. The ongoing patrols prevented the IDPs from accessing their hidden food caches and other food sources. 3,240 baskets of paddy, 380 baskets of rice, 34 pigs, and 185 chickens were also lost. 122 Seven LID-66, MOC-16, and MOC-15 battalions deployed twice. The first operation lasted two weeks (August), and the second for nearly two months (September-November). 2,285 people (358 households) from 17 villages fled, as the area, Maw Nay Pwa and Kaw Thay Der Village Tracts in Tantabin Township, is a black (i.e. “shoot on sight”) zone. Patrols destroyed rice fields (240 total), harvested paddy (900 tins), 1,200 viss of cardamom seed, and 755 viss of betel nut. Indiscriminant attacks on civilians, including the firing of mortars into suspected IDP hiding sites, resulted in the death of at least five people. Due to the remoteness of the area, the nearest market (Kaw Thay Der) is a 2-3 day walk. Frequent patrols led IDPs seeking to buy rice to travel at night, which is very dangerous given the widespread use of landmines. The ERA distribution team, which in May of 2007, found that further attacks had killed two more civilians and wounded two others. 123 LID-66 also initiated clearance operations in Klay Wa Mu Village Tract in Thandaung Township, located to the northeast of Maw Nay Pwa and Kaw Thay Der Village Tracts. IB-1, IB-4, IB-11, and IB-14 conducted patrols from 1 September until 21 November, affecting 3,307 people (533 households) from 8 villages. The village tract is a mixed administration area (brown), and its inhabitants are dependent on shifting cultivation (swidden) and cardamom seeds of their livelihoods. During September, the battalions informed villagers that, “if they found any of [them] 120

“Junta Halts Peace Talks with KNU,” The Irrawaddy (28 April 2006). The Junta continued to allege that the KNU was a “terrorist organization,” and thus was responsible for Tatmadaw operations. Shah Paung, “KNU Denies Junta Accusations,” The Irrawaddy (10 April 2006). 121 “Myanmar Rebels Make Desperate Call for Ceasefire Talks,” Agence France Presse (17 May 2006); “Gentleman’s Agreement is Dead Says Burma Junta to KNU,” Democratic Voice of Burma (11 October 2006). KNU/KNLA infighting further hampered the ability of the factions to provide a united front on this issue. “Discord among Burma’s Karen Insurgents,” U.S. Embassy-Rangoon cable no. 06RANGOON1065 (26 July 2006); Shah Paung, “Growing Disunity among Karen Opposition Leaders,” The Irrawaddy (21 July 2006). For a broader discussion of such agreements during this period in time, see Zaw Oo and Win Min, Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords (Washington: East-West Center, 2007). 122 KORD-2006-16. 123 KORD-2007-05. The ERA Impact Assessment Report (25 January 2008) indicates that ongoing operations led approximately 600 people from the affected area to relocate to the Ei Htu Hta IDP camp.


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going out of the villages, they will regard [them] as their enemy and kill them straight away. The restrictions, combined with poor weather and wild animals destroyed the harvest, resulting in the loss of an estimated 45,000 baskets of paddy and 7,000 viss of cardamom seeds. The four battalions, following orders from the LID-66 Division Commander, forced residents of the villages to rebuild and “clean” two dry-season roads linking Kaw Thay Der with Bu Hsa Khee as well as Klay So Khee with Pay Mu Kho. LID-66 and LID-88 troops began forcing people in the area to porter rations and ammunition to frontline camps, in addition to road and bridge repairs, beginning in early 2007. 124 Mone Another joint force targeted food supplies in four village tracts in Mone Township during two deployments (November-December of 2005 and February of 2006). 3 battalions under Southern Regional Command (IB-60, LIB-351, and LIB-599) participated in the roving joint patrols, which targeted villages close to the Kyaukkyi – Saw Hta Road, southeast of Mone Town. The first deployment, consisting of approximately 650 troops, lasted 25 days and resulted in the destruction of 168 farms that would typically produce 10,000 baskets of paddy, enough to feed 2,200 people for 3 months. The second deployment lasted 16 days. The troops burnt down another 42 paddy barns, destroying 3,521 of recently harvested paddy in the process. Both deployments left 3,577 people (499 households) from 20 villages in need of ERA. 125 5 battalions, including LIB-590 and LIB-599, under Southern Regional Command, carried out indiscriminate attacks on civilians living in 8 village tracts in Mone Township between mid-March and mid-May. 3,484 people (566 people) from 15 villages were affected by the patrols, which resulted in the destruction of 90 homes and 19 paddy barns, containing 5,000 baskets of paddy and 200 baskets of rice. At least 17 people died, and five more were wounded. Subsequent patrols, conducted between April and September, forced villages to flee as many as 4-5 times. 126 LID-66 and MOC-16 battalions, both of which are under the Southern Regional Command, and troops from MOC-15, conducted clearance operations in Mone Township in February, and into northern Hpapun (KNU: Luthaw) Township in April. They returned to the Kaw Thay Der area in Tantabin Township in June, again targeting villages near the Taungoo – Maw Chi Road, south of Thandaung Town and west of the Kayah State border. Troops continued to undermine food security through severe travel restrictions, extortion, and the destruction of gardens (cardamom, betel nut, durian, and mangosteen) upon which local livelihoods depend. (Poor soils limit paddy production.) Widespread forced labor further hindered the ability of villagers to tend and harvest cash crops, several of which (namely fresh fruit) are time-sensitive. In particular, troops required one person/household/day to help clear the road between Kaw Thay Der and the Naw Soe military camp to provide greater security from KNLA ambushes. “The SPDC announced that it would shoot villagers on sight travelling on or within 50 yards of the road,” after this section was cleared according to one local source. Ongoing military demands left 2,173 people (409 households) from 5 villages in need of emergency rations. 127 124

KORD-2007-06. CIDKP-2006-02. 126 KORD-2006-08. 127 CIDKP-2006-16. 125


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Change in IDPs Figures 2005-2006 128 States and Regions

IDPs in Hiding Sites 2005 2006 Eastern Bago 13,400 17,400 Karen 38,800 49,100

IDPs in IDPs in Relocation Sites Ceasefire Areas 2005 2006 2005 2006 7,900 6,400 0 0 6,100 4,300 45,000 45,900

Total IDPs 2005 2006 92,500 76,300 89,900 99,300

The IDP figures reported in the KORD and CIDKP documents above are part of a broader pattern of forced migration stemming from the Northern Offensive, with thousands of people opting to go into hiding rather than Tatmadaw-controlled relocation sites.129 In Thandaung, the 13 battalions operating under the command of LID-66 displaced 5,000 new individuals, while more than 13,000 chose to remain in hiding as close to their abandoned villages and fields as they dared despite the risk regular patrols and landmines posed to them. According to KORD, CIDKP, and other local CSOs, the military activities resulted in 22 civilian deaths, and the loss of “at least 160 paddy fields, 10,000 baskets of husked paddy, 1,000 baskets of milled rice, 420 cardamom gardens, 30 betel gardens, and 150 coffee gardens.” 130 Travel restrictions and nation-wide inflation further undermined IDP food security, as the cost of one tin of rice rose 100% for those in hiding. 131 The UN condemned the military regime on multiple occasions in 2006 as these events unfolded. The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights Myanmar issued a series of statements to the UN General Assembly and the Human Right Council in February. 132 In May, five UN Special Rapporteurs and an Independent Expert on Minority Issues specifically addressed the situation in northern Kayin State and eastern Bago Region, and called on the governing military regime “to take urgent measure to end the counter-insurgency operations targeting civilians.133 The military regime did not respond. 134

128

TBBC (2006), p. 22. For further discussion of displacement in Thandaung (Daw Pho Kho), Tantabin (Htaw Hta Htoo), and Hpapun (Luthaw) Townships, see American Association for the Advancement of Science, High-Resolution Satellite Imagery and the Conflict in Eastern Burma (Washington D.C.: AAAS Geospatial Technologies and Human Rights Project, 2010), available at https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/AAAS_Burma_Report.pdf (accessed 18 January 2018). 130 TBBC (2006), p. 36. 131 Ibid. The situation was similarly dire in the Kyaukkyi and Shwegyin Townships (eastern Bago Region) and Hpapun Township (Kayin State). Ibid., pp. 37-39. For further discussion, see KHRG, One Year On: Continuing Abuses in Toungoo District (Mae Sot, Thailand: KHRG, 2006). 132 Report of the Special Rapporteur, Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, “Questions on the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World: Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar” Report No. E/CN.4/2006/34 (7 February 2006), para. 104. 133 “UN Human Rights Experts Call on Myanmar to End Counter-Insurgency Operations Targeting Civilians in Northern Kayin State and Easter Pegu Division,” Office of the High Commission for Human Rights. Press release (16 May 2006). 134 The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which had grown more critical of the military regime by this point, did not publicly denounce the attacks on civilians either. 129


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2007 Forced Migration Summary MOC-21, MOC-10, and MOC-9 battalions continued their efforts to expand their control over civilians in Nyaunglebin District, especially Kyaukkyi Township, for much of 2007. 135 Villagers in lowland areas were subject to increased forced labor and extortion, which further undermined their food security. Meanwhile, clearance operations in the mountains east of the Sittaung River largely destroyed the food security of people in these black areas. According to KORD and CIDKP data, military activity, affecting 75 villages, left 16,566 people in need of ERA. Patrols in neighboring Shwegyin Township, resulted in 2 ERA requests to assist 8,411 people from 37 villages. Clearance operations in northern Hpapun, specifically KNU-delineated Luthaw Township, generated the greatest need, however: 9 ERA requests for 21,688 people from 87 villages. Luthaw Township is heavily forested and contains very little flat land, leaving villagers dependent on a combination of upland paddy cultivation, cash crops, and wild food sources. The Tatmadaw considered it to be a black area, and the battalions focused their energies on two objectives. First, battalions with bases in elevated areas regularly fired mortars into villages located along the banks of the Yunzalin River to destroy homes and crops, as well as to drive civilians into the forest. Second, other battalions renewed efforts to improve existing dry season roads and to construct new ones to more easily resupply frontline camps. By the end of 2007, troops had completed a large section of road that connects with the major all-season Kyaukkyi - Saw Hta Road, effectively dividing Luthaw Township in half along a north-south axis. This development created a major security hazard for IDPs, who were no longer able to safely move through this area when fleeing roving patrols. The completion of this section was also a major step towards finishing a network of roads linking together bases and camps in southern Toungoo District, northeast Nyaunglebin District, and western Hpapun District. Thandaung and Tantibin Military operations in Thandaung and Tantabin Townships declined somewhat in 2007. (CIDKP issued 3 ERA requests, 2 of them coincided with the harvest.) Villagers identified MOC-10, under Southern Regional Command, in coordination with MOC-5, MOC-9, and MOC-21 battalions as the most active. Operations during 2005 and 2006 had further extended Tatmadaw control in these townships, which made forced labor, in addition to the deliberate destruction of cash crops, the primary causes of food insecurity. By contrast, operations in neighboring townships, Hpapun to the east and Kyaukkyi to the south, intensified. KORD and CIDKP submitted 9 ERA requests to support affected villagers and IDPs in the case of the former and 7 requests in the case of the latter due to urgent need for food in both townships. 136

135

Some operations began in late 2006 and continued into 2007. See the KORD and CIDKP data in Appendix 3 for further details. 136 2007 ERA Financial Tracker (on file with the author). During 2007, some battalions under Southern Regional Command were also active in Hpapun Township (KORD-2007-12), Kyaukkyi Township (KORD-2007-09; KORD2007-10; KORD-2007-11; CIDKP-2007-09; CIDKP-2007-22), and Mone Township (KORD-2007-15; CIDKP2007-06). Battalions also conducted an operation in Pasaung Township (KSWDC-2007-03).


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The first ERA request resulted for military activity in the Maw Nay Bwa area of Tantabin Township, which is located east of the Sittaung River, adjacent to the southern boundary of Thandaung Township. During the hot season (April-June), MOC-9 battalions forced villagers to build four new outposts, porter food and ammunition to them, as well as construct a road from Tha Pye Nyung Village to Play Hsa Loe Village, a distance of approximately 16 miles. (Troops then laid landmines along it.) The battalions burnt at least 8 homes, 22 betel nut gardens, and cardamom gardens. Travel restrictions, which prevented villagers from getting their food to market, further undermined their food security. “The villagers have to go out very secretly to work for their families. When the villagers go out of the village to work, they have to cross the Burmese army troops, who will shoot them without question,” stated one former resident. An unknown number of civilians, out of the 1,044 people (182 households) from 6 villages the needed aid, scattered in different directions: some to hiding sites in the Per Hti area, others to the Play Hsa Loe relocation village, and still others to IDP camps near the border. 137 MOC-5 and MOC-10 battalions also made extensive use of forced labor in the Kaw Thay Der area of Tantabin Township, which other military units had targeted on at least three prior occasions.138 These troops forced villages to (re-) build roads and bridges during the hot season (March-June), as well as contribute materials (bamboo and thatching) for fences. Severe travel restrictions, timed to coincide with the betel nut and cardamom harvest (November-December), resulted in significant loss of income, as did indiscriminate attacks, primarily mortars fired into gardens and suspected IDP hiding sites, which exacerbated food insecurity. These actions affected 2,199 people (398 households) from 4 villages according to CIDKP field staff. MOC-5 commander, Kaung Myat, reportedly stated that anyone travelling outside their village,” if found will be shot to death.” MOC10 troops later forced 500 people, including convict porters, to transfer supplies from Kler Lah, where it is based, to Maw Daw Kho and Naw Soe camps in March of 2008. 139 6 MOC-9 battalions and LID-88 troops, along with battalions under the Southern Regional Command (LIB-590, LIB-599, and IB-60) stockpiled a year’s worth of food rations and ammunition in camps north of the Kyaukkyi – Saw Hta Road, west of the Sittaung River, in Mone Township during April and May of 2007. The battalions forced villages in lowland areas to porter the supplies to frontline outposts that trucks could not reach, and then imposed a severe travel ban. Roving patrols targeted upland villages in “free fire zone[s].” Troops carried out indiscriminant attacks targeting IDP hiding areas while also burning homes and destroying crops. Some villagers returned after the patrols ended, but a substantial number opted to remain in the forest where they subsisted on rice gruel mixed with bamboo. KNLA troops were occasionally able to arrange “secret trips” so that IDPs could obtain rice in mixed-administration areas. Due to the food losses, KORD requested ERA to help support 4,400 people (692 households) from 33 villages scattered across 9 KNU-delineated village tracts. 140 The KNU-delineated Maw Keh Tha, Per Kho, Yu Loe, and Ka Mu Loe Village Tracts are in a mixed administration area dominated by hills. No roads exist, but the Mone River, which runs east to west, is partially navigable. Due to permanent presence of Tatmadaw troops in the area, villagers 137

CIDKP-2007-19. CIDKP-2004-09; KORD-2005-05; and CIDKP-2006-16. 139 CIDKP-2008-11. 140 KORD-2007-15. 138


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regularly experienced severe travel restrictions, demands for forced labor (e.g. portering military supplies), and looting. MOC-16 and MOC-9 battalions ordered several of the affected villages to relocate in March 2007. The battalions later allowed them to return after paying a very large sum, but then forced them to relocate again in August. Troops killed several civilians and destroyed 32 gardens (including 5,600 betel nut trees and 34 acres of cardamom), which reduced their ability to sell their cash crops with which to purchase rice. In total, 2,691 people (360 households) from 8 villages needed ERA according to CIDKP. 141 Southern Regional Command battalions (LIB-590, LIB-599, and IB-6), LID-88, and MOC-9 troops) began patrolling village tracts to the north of the above ones in April. The upland area is a “hiding zone.” Tatmadaw units began establishing outposts in many of the village tracts in 2006, which dramatically reduced freedom of movement (in part due to growing landmine contamination) and the available of arable land, which contributed to a very poor harvest.142 As a result, a substantial, but unknown number of people moved to the Thailand-Burma/Myanmar border region. Growing demands for forced labor (portering rations and ammunition to outposts) and several indiscriminant attacks on civilians, led people to abandon their homes and fields for weeks at a time. The patrols made it extremely difficult for people to access rice elsewhere, leaving 4,400 people (692 households) from 33 villages in need of ERA. 143 The Maw Nya Bwa area in Tantabin Township, which is a mixed administration area west of the Yaw Loe Khlo River, consists of steep hills and valleys, so cash crops (cardamom, betel nut, durian, dog fruit, and mangosteen) are important sources of income. The influx of troops during 2006 enabled the Tatmadaw to militarize the area by establishing new roads, camps, and 4 relocation sites. Since then, the elderly, women, and children live in the camps, while the men travel outside them to cultivate their fields and gardens, as well as collect forest products. One resident stated, “it is very dangerous, some were shot by the Burma army, and died [or] were wounded.” (The ERA request contains information on the 7 people killed, 11 wounded, and 12 arbitrarily arrested between January and July of 2007). During November and December of 2007, MOC-21 arrived to oversee the (re-) construction of the Tha Kye Nyunt – Ma Lu Loe – Si Daw Kho Road and to provide security for the transport of military supplies. Beginning in February of 2008, MOC-9 started fires, which burnt 46 cardamom and 51 betel nut gardens. CIDKP requested aid for 1,794 people (332 households) from 8 villages in response to these pressures on food security. 144 During November and December, MOC-21 and MOC-4 battalions targeted additional hiding areas in the Maw Nay Pwa, Kaw Thay Der, and Kho Khe areas, located east of the junction where the Kler Lah – Saw Mu Road and the Plaw Kler Lah – Maw Chi Road meet. 145 Earlier patrols, carried out in July, caused villagers to abandon 50 hillside paddy fields. This round of patrols, which included the construction of 2 new outposts and the destruction of 40 houses resulted in significant food and cash crop losses: 2,156 baskets of paddy, 866 viss of cardamom, 120 viss of betel nut. The patrols, which coincided with the harvest, also forced villagers to abandon 48 more paddy 141

CIDKP-2007-21. People in these areas received ERA in December of 2006 as a result of the militarization. KORD-2006-16. KORD-2007-15. 144 CIDKP-2008-12. 145 LID-66 and LID-88 battalions carried out clearance operations in this same area. KORD-2008-09. 142 143


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fields, which the troops later destroyed. Troops withdrew on 10 December, leaving 1,877 people (330 households) from 18 villages in need of humanitarian assistance.146 Mone LIB-351 and LIB-590, as well as MOC-16, which is also under the Southern Regional Command, along with MOC-10 troops, patrolled 2 neighboring village tracts in Mone Township. The patrols had an adverse impact on the food security for 2,370 people (341 households) from 12 villages. The patrols began in March and ended in November, lasting between 2-3 weeks each. The KNUdelineated Hgo Pu and Hsaw Mee Luu Village Tracts are “hiding areas,” and the villagers had to repeatedly flee when troops approached. Despite the risks (battalions regularly fired on civilians) IDPs secretly cultivated their fields at night and recovered their hidden caches when circumstances allowed. The patrols destroyed 93 rice fields that would have produced approximately 8,300 baskets of paddy. They also burnt or removed the tops of 151 paddy barns to allow rain to spoil the remainder of the previous harvest, which IDPs said totaled 10,337 baskets. 147 LIB-590 and LIB-599 also patrolled the KNU-delineated Myet Yeh Village Tract, which is a mixed administration area east of the Sittaung River, relatively near Kyaukkyi Town. Due to the proximity of the village tract to the town, where the battalions are based, troops frequently demanded forced labor (215 people had to porter food supplies and construct military camps for 12 days in July, for example) and extorted money (LIB-599 detained 11 civilians from 2 villages, threatened to imprison them for 10 years, and finally released them after a substantial ransom was paid). The battalions proceeded to burn 130 farm huts in August, claiming that they provided KNLA soldiers with shelter. In August, LIB-599 troops killed several villagers and then imposed a travel ban that prevented people from cultivating their fields. 172 fields were either destroyed by the soldiers or flooded as a result of the ban. CIDKP staff were able to access the area in 2008, and they found that 2,123 people (310 households) from 4 villages required ERA.148 LIB-590 and LIB-599 continued to tighten their control of the Myaung Oo Village Tract, which is east of the Sittaung River, close to Mone Town from late 2007 into early 2008. The battalions instituted severe travel restriction in August, which remained in place through January. LIB-590 burnt 230 paddy farms and warned villagers that they would be “shot-on-sight,” if found in their fields during this period. Flooding and pests destroyed a further 170 acres of rice that would have produced 17,000 tins of paddy according to local sources. Due to the extended presence of the battalions, troops regularly demanded forced labor and extorted considerable sums of money, which often required villagers to sell their livestock and personal property to pay. CIDKP provided ERA to those in need – 2,623 people (345 households) from 3 villages – in September of 2008.149 LIB-590 and LIB-599, with MOC-21 and MOC-9 battalions, also targeted hiding areas in 6 upland village tracts located north of Kyaukkyi Town and east of the Sittaung River in Mone Township. Villagers in this area rely upon hillside paddy production and cash crops (cardamom, betel nut, 146

Ibid. See also CIDKP-2008-12 for additional information. CIDKP-2007-08. CIDKP-2008-06. 149 A subsequent impact assessment, submitted in June 2009, indicated that the same battalions continued to commit the abuses throughout this nearly two-year period. CIDKP-2008-05. 147 148


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dog fruit, and durian) for their livelihoods. The area is also hiding area, noted one KORD staff person, who then quoted an IDP, “Whenever the SPDC comes close, people are running away to escape from the SPDC troops as they will be killed straight away if found.” The battalions entered the area in December of 2007 and did indeed carry out indiscriminate attacks, firing mortars into suspected hiding sites and shooting villagers they encountered. IDPs reported that the troops burnt 10 houses and 15 farm huts, as well as destroyed 600 baskets of paddy, 110 baskets of rice, and 250 viss of betel nut. LIB-590 and LIB-599 patrolled the lower areas with the goal of blocking upland-lowland trade by identifying hidden travel routes and laying landmines along them. The operations continued through the end of January 2008, preventing the villagers from cultivating their fields and gardens, which resulted in a much smaller harvest and thus food shortages. According to the KORD profile, 2,330 people (341 households) from 16 villages only had sufficient food for a couple of months. The report on the ERA distribution indicates that further patrols occurring, after the submission of the ERA request (a period of three months), displaced villagers 2-3 more times. 150 In sum, TBBC, using KORD and CIDKP data, found that more than 42,000 people in Thandaung, Hpapun, Kyaukkyi, and Shwegyin Townships were displaced between November of 2006 and November of 2007 due to the more than 40 “roving” battalions targeting civilians in these areas.151 Troops active in Thandaung alone killed at least 38 civilians during this period according to local sources.152 However, the primary goal was to force villagers to leave black areas rather than kill them, using a combination of terror (e.g. indiscriminant attacks) and the destruction of food supplies. TBBC’s 2007 IDP survey, based on field data CSOs (including KORD and CIDKP), supports the claim. The CSOs administered survey questionnaires to nearly 1,000 households in 38 townships in southeastern Burma/Myanmar. Cluster sampling enabled them to collect information from villagers in hiding sites, relocation sites, mixed administration areas, and ceasefire areas. Not surprisingly, heavy artillery attacks (31%), small arms attacks (23%), and landmines or military patrols (58%) constitute the greatest threats to IDPs in hiding areas, especially in eastern Bago Region and northern Karen State, the epicenter of the Northern Offensive. 153 All three sources of insecurity are indirect, i.e., they are designed to depopulate areas and to prevent return to them— hence, the low number of fatalities. 154 The biggest threats to their livelihoods are thus travel restrictions (39%), the destruction or theft of food (28%), and the destruction of their forms or forced relocation. 155 60% of the IDPs in hiding sites surveyed maintain hidden food caches, and 63% of them are prepared for emergency evacuations as a result.156 Due to these vulnerability 150

KORD-2008-10. TBBC, Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma 2007 Survey (Bangkok: TBBC, 2007), p. 36. For township specific figures, see Ibid., p. 67. FBR reports that 23 battalions were active in Toungoo District, 33 in Nyaunglebin District, and 28 in Hpapun District. But the battalions, which are normally supposed to have at least 800 troops, frequently contain less than half of that number. U.S. Consulate Chiang Mai, “Burmese Army Possibly Preparing for Karen State Offensive,” Cable No. 07CHIANGMAI03 (28 December 2007). 152 TBBC (2007), p. 36. 153 Ibid., p. 46. 154 By contrast, more direct forms of violence (e.g. arrest or detention, torture or beatings, and forced labor— including portering and landmine sweeping) are most common in areas under Tatmadaw control, specifically mixed administration zones and relocation sites. Ibid., p. 47. 155 Ibid., p. 47. 156 Ibid. p. 54. 151


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factors, acute malnutrition among children, typically used as a proxy for the population as a whole, was 9.5% among new refugee arrivals in 2006 and IDPs in 2007.157

157 Ibid., pp. 52-53. For further discussion, see Thomas Lee and et al., “Mortality Rates in Conflict Zones in Karen, Karenni, and Mon States in Eastern Burma,” Tropical Medicine & International Health 11, no. 7 (2006): 11191127; Luke Mullany and et al., “Population-Based Survey Methods to Quantify Associations between Human Rights Violations and Health Outcomes among Internally Displaced Persons in Eastern Burma,” Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health 61, no. 10 (2007): 908-914.


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2008 Forced Migration Summary LID-66 and LID-88 battalions continued to displace civilians in KNU-delineated Luthaw Township (Hpapun District) for much of 2008. More than 12,000 people from 40 villages found themselves in need of ERA according to KORD and CIDKP. Due to the ongoing operations, some people fled deeper into the mountains. Others moved to the Thailand-Burma/Myanmar border. Still others found themselves forced into relocations sites further south in lowland areas of KNUdelineated Bu Thoh and Dweh Loh Townships. Meanwhile, clearing operations under the direction of LID-33 remained intense across upland areas in Kyaukkyi Township. 158 KORD and CIDKP provided ERA to 17,394 people from 60 villages. By contrast, operations in Shwegyin dropped significantly. Only 18 villages, home to 3,487 people, needed emergency food rations. The frequency and severity of Tatmadaw operations in Thandaung and Tantabin Townships similarly declined dramatically in 2008. KORD and CIDKP only requested ERA on 3 occasions. Thandaung and Tantabin MOC-5 (LIB-371, LIB-372, and LIB-373) and MOC-10 (LIB-363, LIB-364, and LIB-365) battalions targeted remote hiding areas in the Eastern Day Loe area in Thandaung Township in early December of 2007. Patrols continued through mid-January 2008. The area is located north of Thandaung Town, east of the Day Lu Mu Htaw River, and west of the Kayah State border. Villagers rely upon a combination of hillside paddy and cash crops (cardamom, dog fruit, durian, betel nut, and mangosteen) for their livelihoods. Troops constructed five new outposts in the area in early December, enabling them to extend their roving patrols further into the mountains, which prompted 2,046 people (353 households) from 15 villages to flee. One local source, speaking about the Northern Offensive, stated that it “mainly targeted civilians as the main enemies of them [the Tatmadaw]. [They] looked for villagers to kill them and destroyed their places by burning them with fire.” Total losses support the claim: 12 houses, 3 huts, and 219 cardamom gardens burnt. 412 baskets of paddy and 75 baskets of pounded rice were either lost or destroyed. An additional 500 baskets of paddy in the fields went uncollected, and 6,000 viss of betel nut was not harvested because of the military activity. 159 The next major operation did not occur until July and August during which LIB-603 patrolled the Htee Tha Saw area in Thandaung Township. It is the northernmost part of the township, located between the Thandaung – Leikhto Road, with the Kayah State border to the east. By the end of the operations, 7 of the 9 villages affected were firmly under Tatmadaw control. Forced labor and extortion, the residents reported, were rife, and severe travel restrictions made it very difficult for them to sell cash crops (cardamom, coffee, and betel nut) with which to purchase rice. At the time of the ERA request, these villagers had only 1-2 months supply of food, an insufficient amount to last until the next harvest. Villagers from Thee Pu Hta and Htee Thee Pu La went into hiding, and they remained so until the end of the year. The total number in need: 1,505 people (299 households) from 9 villages. 160

158

Battalions under Southern Regional Command operated in Kyaukkyi Township on three occasions: (CIDKP2008-04; CIDKP-2008-07; CIDKP-2008-13). 159 KORD-2008-13. 160 KORD-2008-21.


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Indiscriminant attacks by MOC-10 and MOC-21 battalions in Maw Nay Pwa and Kaw Thay Der areas of Tantabin Township forced 1,572 people (283 people) from 14 villages into hiding in early September. Operations during 2006 enabled Tatmadaw units to establish more military camps along the Kler Lah – Bu Hsa Khee Road. Units targeted the area on several occasions since then. On this occasion, the battalions prevented villagers from tending and harvesting crops, especially cardamom. Troops frequently fired assault rifles and mortars into suspected hidings sites, which, in conjunction with poor weather and insects, damaged 222 paddy fields (capable of producing more than 11,000 tins of paddy), and 5,660 viss of cardamom cultivated by 283 households. The KNLA is often able to warn the villages about Tatmadaw patrols, allowing residents to escape before soldiers arrive. But purchasing rice remains very difficult because of the frequent patrols. The journey requires 2-3 days, must be arranged in advance, and carried out “in the jungle,” as it is not safe to enter Kler Lah or Kaw Thay Der Towns. 161

161

CIDKP-2008-16.


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Tatmadaw-induced forced migration was not limited to the areas discussed in this report. Civilians throughout eastern Burma/Myanmar had to flee military operations and, increasingly, “development” projects. In total, CSO fact-finding efforts determined that Tatmadaw clearance operations throughout eastern Burma/Myanmar led to the destruction, relocation, or abandonment of 886 villages between 2005-2008, raising the cumulative total to 3,386 (1996-2008). 162

162

TBBC, Internal Displacement and International Law in Eastern Burma (Bangkok: TBBC, 2008), pp. 22-23, 19.


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The Northern Offensive accounts for a substantial percentage of the increase. By the end of 2008, 235 battalions had colonized large swathes of eastern Burma/Myanmar. 163

163

KHRG, “Patrols, Movement Restrictions, and Forced Labor in Toungoo District” (28 September 2009), available at http://khrg.org/2009/09/khrg09f16/patrols-movement-restrictions-and-forced-labour-toungoo-district (accessed 23 January 2018). MOC-5 battalions, according to villagers, are responsible for these violations.


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The construction of new bases in cleared areas significantly reduces the likelihood that civilians will return, as the militarization of everyday life results in more travel restrictions, increased forced labor, and relentless demands for material support (money, food, and construction materials). In the areas most affected during the Northern Offensive, Tatmadaw battalions added 103 new bases: 26 in Toungoo District, 39 in

Nyaunglebin District, and 38 in Hpapun District. 164

164

TBBC (2008), p. 15; TBBC, Protracted Displacement and Militarization in Eastern Burma (Bangkok: TBBC, 2009), pp. 29-48. For GPS coordinates, see FBR (2008), pp. 75-77.


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The proximity of these troops to villages increased civilian perceptions of overall threats to their safety and security throughout eastern Burma/Myanmar. TBBC survey data indicate that the threats steadily climbed between 2005-2009, with the most significant uptick being military patrols or landmines.

Threats to livelihoods either remained the same or only marginally improved despite the cessation of large-scale military operations throughout eastern Burma/Myanmar, including the areas the Tatmadaw targeted during the Northern Offensive. 165

In light of the findings, TBBC concluded that, “The resilience of local coping strategies are showing signs of exhaustion. Social networks are increasingly constrained, which has adversely affected early warning signals of approaching troops. Given the Burmese government’s ongoing restrictions on humanitarian access into conflict affected areas, cross border aid [of which ERA is a part] delivered by community based organizations remains vital.” 166

165

Table (TBBC 2009), p. 35. TBBC (2009), p. 3. On civilian responses, see KHRG, Village Agency: Rural Rights and Resistance in a Militarized Karen State (Mae Sot: KHRG, 2008).

166


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Conclusion The publication of this report marks the 10th anniversary of the end of the Northern Offensive (2006-2008). Tatmadaw operations, involving more than fifty battalions, sought to depopulate contested areas in northern Kayin State and the eastern Bago Region, as well as southwestern Kayah State—displacing tens and tens of thousands of people in the process. 167 IHRC concluded that troops had committed war crimes and crimes against humanity against civilians during these operations. The KORD and CIDKP data support IHRC’s conclusion. The same data also add to them by documenting the “famine crimes” that occurred both prior to and during the Northern Offensive. The KNLA claims to have engaged in 535 “clashes” with Tatmadaw units between 1 January and 30 June 2006, killing 154 and wounding 401. 168 The KNLA reported 1,807 clashes from June 2006 to May 2007. According to its records, KNLA troops killed 424, wounded 1,248, and captured 16 Tatmadaw soldiers over this period. 169 No casualty data for the remainder of the Northern Offensive are available unfortunately, and these figures should be treated with caution given the source. 170 Nevertheless, the numbers make a larger point: large-scale combat was not a defining feature of the offensive. (As the ERA reports make clear, the KNLA commonly engaged in firefights with Tatmadaw troops to enable IDPs to flee to safer areas. 171) Nevertheless, at least 370 civilians died over the course of the offensive according to FBR records. 172 The number very likely undercounts the total. FBR (like KORD and CIDKP) data relies heavily upon the IDPs they were able to locate and to assist. The total, while not insignificant, again makes the same point. The 167

According to KORD and CIDKP data, 18 infantry battalions and 57 light infantry battalions participated in attacks on civilians between 20042008. For a complete list, see ERA Index Tatmadaw Battalions participating in the Northern Offensive (2006-2008) in Eastern Burma/Myanmar. 168 Karen National Union, “Summary Report on Military Activities in KNLA Areas for the Period from January 31 to June 30, 2006” (although the KNLA battle statistics aggregate DKBA and Army casualties, clashes with the DKBA were uncommon in these areas). Cited in Clinical Expert Declaration, Expert 3, para. 37. Mahn Sha, then the General Secretary of the KNU, provide slightly higher figures. The KNLA, he said, lost 12 soldiers and suffered 14 wounded during the first-half of 2006, whereas 185 Tatmadaw soldiers died and 448 were wounded. “Interview: Mahn Sha, General Secretary, Karen National Union (KNU),” Jane’s Intelligence Review (1 December 2006). 169 KNLA, “Summary Report on Military Activities in KNLA Areas for Period from June 1, 06 to May 31, 2007, (Clashes with SPDC-A),” 30 June 2007. Cited in Clinical Expert Declaration, Expert 3, para. 37. 170 Clinical Expert Declaration, Expert 1. The source, a US army officer with extensive understanding of the conflicts explains why the figures are so lopsided: “The Burma Army is almost always on the losing end of clashes with the KNLA in terms of casualties. In an average encounter, the Burma Army will suffer ten casualties and the KNLA will suffer one; or the Army will lose ten and the KNLA will lose none. I have witnessed small numbers of KNLA soldiers, sometimes as few as two or three, repel the advance of Army columns ten-times as large. This type of situation occurs frequently in Karen State.” Clinical Expert Declaration, Expert 1, para. 25. 171 FBR (2008), p. 17. 172 Convict porters did die in significant numbers relative to the total forced to support Tatmadaw operations, however. FBR documented the use of more than 2,200 convict porters during the Offensive, of which at least 225 died (i.e., a little more than 1 in 10). FBR (2008), pp. 13, 28. KHRG cites a higher total, estimating that Tatmadaw battalions employed between 3,000-5,000 convict porters during 2005-2006 alone. MOC-10, under Southern Regional Command, MOC-15, and LID-101 relied heavily upon convict porters for operations in Tantabin Township, Mone Township, and Lu Thaw Township, north of Hpapun Town, over this period. KHRG, Less than Human: Convict Porters in the 2005-2006 Northern Karen State Offensive (Mae Sot, Thailand: KHRG, 2006), pp. 5-6. The practice was not limited to the Northern Offensive. It dates back decades and battalions continued to utilize convict porters are subsequent offensives. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, Dead Man Walking: Convict Porters on the Front Lines in Eastern Burma (New York: HRW, 2011).


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Tatmadaw’s strategic intent was not to kill large numbers of civilians, as some have claimed.173 Rather, it was to starve villagers out of contested areas, either into locations where Tatmadaw troops could exert control over their daily lives or towards the Thailand-Burma/Myanmar border. ERA Cash Disbursements by Township in Kilogram Equivalents (2004-2008) 174 Township

District

Thandaung & Tantabin Mone Kyaukkyi Shwegyin Hpapun Pasaung & Pruso Total

Toungoo Nyaunglebin Nyaunglebin Nyaunglebin Hpapun Bawlakhe

Villages Households People ERA ERA Affected Affected Affected (paddy) (rice) 306 9,926 55,826 1,758,519 2,679,648 174 94 133 127 147

5,432 4,410 n.a. 4,791 3,674

981

28,233

37,582 1,183,833 32,961 1,038,271 26,370 830,655 35,882 1.130,283 19,987 629,590

1,803,936 1,582,128 1,265,760 1,722,336 959,376

208,608 5,440,868 10,013,184

The cumulative totals demonstrate that Tatmadaw battalions purposefully destroyed and/or confiscated civilian food supplies in a massively widespread and systematic manner. The prima facie evidence further demonstrates that the counter-insurgency clearance operations were knowingly carried out “pursuant to or in furtherance of State or organizational policy,” satisfying the mens rea requirement for mass atrocity crimes under the 1998 Rome Statute. Tatmadaw efforts to starve civilians out of the mountains, a form of 2nd-degree faminiogenic conduct, did not end in 2008, however. Clearance operations continued to target civilians in Thandaung, Kyaukkyi and Hpapun Townships well into 2009, albeit on a much smaller scale.175Artillery attacks and roving patrols in these townships forced approximately 20,000 people to relocate to hiding sites in the mountains, raising the total number of IDPs to an estimated 60,000. 176

173

Cf. Guy Horton, Dying Alive: A Legal Assessment of Human Rights Violations in Burma (Chiang Mai: Images Asia, Inc., 2005). 174 The cash disbursements, paid in kyat, are equivalent to the local market price of 1 tin of paddy/person/month for 3 months. Totals for Thandaung and Tantabin as well as Pasaung and Pruso Townships include data from 20042005 operations. Shwegyin Township lacks complete household data, and the figures, which do not appear in the appendices, are drawn from: 2005 ERA Financial Summary; 2006 ERA Financial Tracker; 2007 ERA Financial Tracker; and 2008 ERA Financial Tracker (on file with author). 175 TBBC (2009), p. 19. 176 Ibid., p. 3.


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IDP Figures (2009) 177 Regions and States Eastern Bago Karen State Total

IDPs in Hiding

IDPs in IDPs in Total Relocation Sites Ceasefire Areas IDPs 21,000 23,500 0 49,500 10,900 44,500 70,500 34,400 44,500

44,500 104,900 149,400

Large-scale military operations ended following a major offensive in 2010-2011. Some positive developments have occurred since then. The 2012 ceasefire between the Tatmadaw and the Karen National Union (KNU), which had fought for greater autonomy for more than sixty years by this point, froze large-scale troop movements, including seasonal operations targeting civilian populations. 178 Multi-year trust-building initiatives, made possible with generous international funding followed, additionally raised hopes that the cessation of hostilities would produce a “peace-dividend.” 179 Some signs indicate that such a dividend exists, at least for some people in some areas. 180 However, the sustainability of the peace dividend remains an open question. Observers who underscore the fragility of the situation point to a number of issues. The multi-party national peace process remains stalled. 181 Small-scale skirmishes involving Tatmadaw and KNLA troops are common occurrences, landmine contamination poses a major threat, and the epidemic of land seizures further undermine rural livelihoods. 182 For these reasons, it is not surprising that nearly 100,000 refugees, most of them Karen, continue to live in the refugee camps in Thailand. Sally Thompson the Executive Director of The Border Consortium (TBC), an international humanitarian organization formerly known as the Thailand Burma Border Consortium, explained: “There are no pull factors in the southeast [of Myanmar]. The peace process is going very slowly, the army is still in the villages in the southeast, people’s mistrust of the army goes very deep and it will take years for that to be turned around. People are looking for changes on the ground.” 183 For tens of

177

Ibid., pp. 22, 54. Health conditions remained poor and food security lacking during 2011. The survey found that hunger was moderate to high in more than 13% of the households. More tellingly, 47% of all households faced serious food shortages in September, peaking during the weeks prior to the harvest. W.W. Davis et al., “Health and Human Rights in Karen State, Eastern Myanmar,” PLoS One 10, no. 8 (2015). A 2012 survey reported similar findings. See, W.W. Davis et al., “Militarization, Human Rights Violations, and Community Responses as Determinants of Health in Southeastern Myanmar: Results of a Cluster Survey,” Conflict and Health 9, no. 32 (2015). 179 Myanmar Peace Support Initiative, Lessons Learned from MPSI’s Work Supporting the Peace Process in Myanmar (Yangon: MPSI, 2014). 180 Adam Burke, Nicola Williams, Patrick Barron, Kim Jolliffe, and Thomas Carr, The Contested Areas of Myanmar: Subnational Conflict, Aid, and Development (Yangon: Asian Foundation, 2017); Kim Jolliffe, Ceasefires, Governance, and Development: The Karen National Union in Times of Change (Yangon: Asia Foundation, 2017). 181 Humanitarian Country Team (United Nations and Partners), Myanmar: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017 (Yangon: UNOCHA, 2016). 182 Displacement Solutions, Land Rights and Mine Action in Myanmar (Yangon: DS and Norwegian People’s Aid, 2014); Human Rights Watch, ‘The Farmer Becomes the Criminal’: Human Rights and Land Confiscation in Karen State (New York: HRW, 2016). 183 Ron Corben, “Myanmar Refugees in Thai Camps Face Repatriation Challenges” (11 May 2017), available at https://www.voanews.com/a/myanmar-refugees-thai-camps-repatriation-challenges/3847329.html (28 January 2018). 178


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thousands of people who remained displaced in this region, these changes have yet to occur.184 The armed conflict and the waves of forced migration it produced in the past thus remains a defining condition of the present. Commanding officers, such as the three that IHRC identified are, of course, are unlikely to face domestic criminal charges for their actions during the Northern Offensive despite the compelling prima facie evidence of crimes against humanity and war crimes—at least for the foreseeable future. 185 The same is true for the lower-ranking officers and ordinary soldiers whose names appear throughout the KORD and CIDKP documents contained in Appendix 3. Article 445 in Chapter 14 of the 2008 Constitution contains a controversial immunity clause. 186 The clause states, “All policy guidelines, laws, rules, regulation, notifications and declarations of the State Law and Order Restoration Council and the State Peace and Development Council or actions, rights, and responsibilities of the State Law and Order Restoration Council and the State Peace and Development Council shall devolve on the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. No proceeding shall be instituted against the said Councils or any member thereof of any member of the Government, in respect to any [emphasis added] act done in the execution of their respective duties.” 187 The International Center for Transitional Justice notes that the clause does not specify which acts are covered by the amnesty. The ambiguity opens the possibility that it may not apply to “any act done in violation of national or international law,” which would presumably fall outside the scope of their official duties. 188 Numerous structural mechanisms that perpetuate impunity remain in place, however. These obstacles, including the absence of an independent judiciary, make any effort to legally test the scope of the immunity clause impossible. The current government’s support for the Tamadaw’s widespread and systematic violence towards the minority Rohingya Muslim population, the severity of which has prompted the U.N. High Commission for Human Rights to call for an investigation by the International Criminal Court, makes that point abundantly clear. 189 The protracted crisis situation in Kachin State and northern 184

TBC conducted the last major IDP survey in Southeast Burma/Myanmar in 2014. Its researchers estimated that approximately 110,000 were still displaced at that time. TBC, Protection and Security Concerns in Southeast Burma/Myanmar (Bangkok: TBC, 2014), 1. More current data is not available. 185 One country expert with significant human rights legal expertise pointed out that this situation could change. He noted that the “scapegoating” of soldiers, typically at the lower level, has occurred, particularly with regard to the violation on the ban on all forms of forced labor. But a power struggle could result in the targeting of high-ranking officials, as was the case with the arrest of former Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt and the purge of his supporters. Similarly, he continued, the governments of several Latin American countries (e.g. Guatemala and Chile) successfully prosecuted high-ranking military officials several decades after the fact for their role in mass atrocities. Anonymous (personal communication, 14 April 2018). 186 Some scholars called for a “qualified amnesty” in 2006, as the Northern Offensive was unfolding, to break the political deadlock. The immunity clause, as the text indicates, went much further and remains a key obstacle to transitional justice in any meaningful form. Roman David and Ian Holliday, “Set the Junta Free: Pre-Transitional Justice in Myanmar’s Democratization,” Australian Journal of Political Science 41, no. 1 (2006): 91-105. For a revised and updated discussion, see Ian Holliday, Burma Redux: Global Justice and the Quest for Political Reform in Myanmar (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 187 Cited in International Center for Transitional Justice, Impunity Prolonged: Burma and its 2008 Constitution (New York: ICTJ, 2009), p. 33. 188 Ibid., p. 33. 189 U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, “Special Session of the Human Rights Council on the Human Rights Situation of the Minority Rohingya Muslim Population and Other Minorities in the Rakhine State of Myanmar” (5 December 2017), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22487&LangID=E (accessed 23


55

Shan State are less well covered in the media as a consequence. But Tatmadaw battalions have targeted civilian populations and committed the same abuses described in this report and the IHRC one before it since the collapse of the 2011 ceasefire. 190 Despite the unlikelihood of punitive justice through criminal legal action, Karen CSOs and other relevant actors should develop clear and consistent policies and procedures for securely preserving all of the human rights documentation gathered to date. 191 The documentation could provide the basis for reparations. Reparative justice entails the public acknowledgement the wrongdoings that occurred, the harms victims suffered, and possibly include material benefits of some kind. 192 The documentation could also provide the basis for a truth commission, that is, an official body created to investigate and report on patterns of past human rights abuses. Such a process, while inevitably imperfect, is widely regarded by survivors, in addition to experts, as an essential step towards national reconciliation. 193 This report offers a modest contribution towards both goals.

February 2018). Despite ongoing conversations, significant security sector reform is unlikely to occur for the foreseeable future. For recommendations regarding the official use of lethal force, see IHRC, Policy Memorandum: Preventing Indiscriminate Attacks and Wilful Killings of Civilians by the Myanmar Military (Cambridge: Harvard University Law School, 2014). 190 Mandy Sadan, “Myanmar: Ongoing Conflict in Kachin State,” Southeast Asian Affairs (2015): 246-259; United States Institute for Peace, “Burma’s Northern Shan State and Prospects for Peace” (29 September 2017), https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/09/burmas-northern-shan-state-and-prospects-peace (accessed 28 April 2018); OCHA, “Myanmar: IDP Sites in Kachin and northern Shan States (Sep 2017), available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/59eefd854.pdf (accessed 28 April 2018). 191 For further discussion, see: Antonio González Quintana, Archival Policies in the Protection of Human Rights (Paris: International Council on Archives, 2009); U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Seminar on Experiences of Archives as a Means to Guarantee the Right to Truth A/HRC/17/21 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2011). 192 Modest compensation to enhance or to develop new livelihoods is common, for example. For further discussion, see: “The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law” U.N. General Assembly Resolution 60/147 (16 December 2005); Carla Ferstman, Mariana Goetz, and Alan Stephens, eds., Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity: Systems in Place and Systems in the Making (London: Brill, 2009). 193 See, e.g.: R. Rotberg and D. Thompson, Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Patricia Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions (London: Routledge, 2010); Jonathon Doak, “The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice: Emotional Repair and Victim Satisfaction in International Trials and Truth Commissions,” International Criminal Law Review 11, no. 2 (2011): 263-298.


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Appendix 1 Tatmadaw Command Structure The following information is excerpted in full from the IHRC’s 2014 Legal Memorandum: War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in Eastern Myanmar. Regional Military Commands RMCs are responsible for military operations in precisely defined geographic areas. Within their assigned territories, RMCs maintain permanent bases staff by battalions under their direct control, often referred to as “garrison battalions.” Within and RMC, garrison battalions are split into several Special Operations Commands (SOCs) that are generally identified by the location of the SOC’s headquarters base. Battalions are identified as either Infantry Battalions (IBs) or Light Infantry Battalions (LIBs). Although there may have been historical differences in the structure and function of IBs and LIBs, during the Offensive they were functionally identical and remain so today. IBs and LIBs are officially to have 826 soldiers, but at the time of the Offensive were severely understaffed, with many having fewer than 200 soldiers. Southern Command is the RMC that was responsible for Bago Division and parts of Kayin State north of Hpapun Town during the Offensive. During that time, Southern Command maintained Tactical Operations Commands (TOCs) headquartered in Baw Ga Li (Kler Lah in the Karen language), Kyaukkyi, Shwegyin, and Thandaung (or Thandaunggyi). Southern Command’s garrison battalions during the Offensive included IB 20, IB 30, IB 39, IB 48, IB 53, IB 57, IB 73, IB 75, IB 124, LIB 349, LIB 31, LIB 439, LIB 440, LIB 589, LIB 590, and LIB 599. Combat Divisions Combat divisions operate alongside—but are distinct from—the nationwide network of RMCs and garrison battalions. Combat divisions take the form of Light Infantry Divisions (LID) and Military Operations Commands (MOCs). LIDs and MOCs are headquartered at locations throughout the country, but rather than being responsible for proximate territories, they are deployed to the area of active conflict. LIDs and MOCs have been sent most often to join in counterinsurgency operations against insurgent groups, although they have, at times, been deployed to help suppress political unrest in urban areas. Like LIBs and IBs, there is no functional difference between LIDs and MOCs. Within the Army chain of command, LIDs and MOCs report directly to the General Staff Office. During combat operations in the field, they generally come under the control of the RMC that is responsible for the area. However, at times, orders are


57

also issued directly from central command to field units, bypassing the formal chain of command. Each LID or MOC is normally comprised of ten battalions that may be IBs, LIBs, or both. Within an LID or MOC, battalions are divided into three TOCs, each having three or four battalions. Unlike SOCs, which are labeled by the location of their headquarters, TOCs are identified by numbers—1, 2, or 3. LID 66 was one of at least seven combat divisions deployed to eastern Myanmar at the outset of the Offensive. During the Offensive, LID 66 was headquartered in Pyay, Bago Division and was comprised of IB 1, IB 11, IB 14, IB 35, IB 80, LIB 4, LIB 5, LIB 6, LIB 10, and LIB 108. These battalions were divided into three TOCs, referred to as TOC 66-1, TOC 66-2, and TOC 66-3. 194

194

International Human Rights Law Clinic [IHRC], Legal Memorandum: War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in Eastern Myanmar (Cambridge: Harvard Law School, 2014a), pp. 21-23. See also, Documentation and Research Department of the Network for Democracy and Development, Civil and Military Administrative Echelon of State Peace and Development Council in Burma (Mae Sot, Thailand: NDD, 2007), pp. 105-130; Myanmar Tatmadaw Military Command Structure 2002-2010.


58

Appendix 2 Destroyed, Relocated, or Abandoned Villages (Thandaung Township) 2006-2007 Bu Hsa Khee Tha Kwee Soe Khu Ler Der Hsaw Wa Der Thay Khu Der Ha To Per Tha Aye Khee Klay Khee Bu Khee Wah Soe Hi Daw Khaw Kho Khee Soe Ser Plo Mu Der Si Kheh Der Khaw Htu Hto

Per Lo May Daw Kho Law Bee Ler Oo Per Blah Khee Maw Tu Der Thay Mu Der Kho Haw Der Haw Lu Der Sho Kho Pwi Khee Khaw Mee Kho Thay Ya Yu Pha Der Kah Pha Weh Ma Wa Khaw

De Dah Kho Ma Pweh Kho Lae Kher Der Kah Lae Kher Der Kho Lae Kher Der Tha Maw Thay Der Paw Pha Lay Oh Lo Si Daw Kho Pway Baw Der Saw Mu Der Wa Mi Per Kho Yer Lo Thay Gi La Maw Khu Der Htee Hsa Khee

Ber Kha Lay Kho S’Wa Daw Kho Phu Mu Der Thaw Khaw Saw Saw Law Kho Ka Ta Khee Kaw Law Khee Ga Mu Doh Kher Der Hu Mu Der Ler Klah Klaw Mee Der Phaw Pho Lo Pwee Lo Ta Per Khee Plo Baw Der Total: 64 195

2007-2008 Pha Weh Kay Law Khee Ma Wa Khaw Ka Mu Do Di Dah Kho Ma Pwae Kho Khaw Mee Kho Pha Der Kah Way La Khaw

Saw Law Kho Lae Kho Der Kah Thaw Khaw Saw Ka Ta Khee Thay Ya Yu Lae Kho Der Kho Ler Kher Der Tha Pho Mu Der Sa Wa Daw Kho

Wa Mi Per Kho Saw Mu Der Pway Baw Der Si Daw Kho Bu Hsa Khee Tha Kwee Soe Bu Khee Thay Aye Khee Ha Htoe Per

Hsaw Wa Der Thay Khu Der Klay Khee Kho Khee Hi Daw Khaw Sho Ser Wah Soe Htee Thee Pu De Htee Pu Der Total: 36 196

195 196

TBBC (2007), Appendix 3, pp. 69-70. TBBC (2008), Appendix 2, p. 56.


59

Appendix 3 ERA Reports

Burnt remains of a home in Bukhee Village, Toungoo District (FBR 2008)


60

Appendix A Thandaung and Tantabin Townships (Toungoo District, Karen State)


61

Report Number KORD-2004-02 Date Submitted: 31 December 2003 Location: East and West of the Day Loh River State-defined Administrative Units State/Region Kayin

District Toungoo

Township Thandaung

Village Tract(s) n.a.

Township Daw Pha Kho

Village Tract(s) West Day Loh

Karen-defined Administrative Units State/Region n.a.

District Taw Oo

Zone: Black Population Statistics [Total Numbers Affected] Villages

Households 17

People 558

3,307

Military Units Identified [Needs Assessment Report] Regional Command MOC Light Infantry Division Light Infantry Battalions Infantry Battalions Other

Southern Command

IB-53, IB-75, IB-124 Military Strategy 1

Military Units Identified [Distribution Report – if included] Regional Command MOC Light Infantry Division Light Infantry Battalions Infantry Battalions Other

LID-55 LIB-511


62

Military Units Identified [Impact Assessment Report – if included] Regional Command MOC Light Infantry Division Light Infantry Battalions Infantry Battalions Other

n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

ICC Article 7: Crimes Against Humanity Reported Murder (Extrajudicial Execution) Enslavement (Forced Labor) Deportation (Forced Relocation) Imprisonment or Severe Deprivation of Physical Liberty Torture Rape and ICC-defined Forms of Sexual Violence Enforced Disappearance of Persons Other Inhuman Acts Causing Physical and/or Mental Suffering

ICC Article 8: War Crimes Reported Willful Killing (Attempted and/or Reported) Torture or Inhuman Treatment Willing Causing Great Suffering, or Serious Injury to Body or Health Extensive Destruction and Appropriation of Property Taking of Hostages


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KORD-2004-2 ERA Request Summary 31 December 2003 Demographics 3,307 people, 558 households, 17 villages in Thandaung Township KNU calls: Daw Pha Kho Township of Taw Oo Rationale 3 SPDC battalions established a new base camp on the Karenni State border, while frontline troops searched and destroyed villagers’ crops and property from September-November 2003. At least 58 paddy farms destroyed and at least 58 tins of rice stolen during this period. Over 100 cardamon gardens abandoned. Anecdotal reports of widespread theft of property and paddy. Reports of SPDC troops opening fire on villagers in at least 2 villages, but no one was reported injured Another 3 villages with 119 households (655 people) affected by this offensive, but KORD reports they are not in as urgent need as those identified in this report. General Description of SDPC Actions Location: East and West of the Day Loh River (see sketch map) Date: 4/10/03-30/10/03 (27 days) Perpetrators: Military Strategy 1: Commander Khin Maung Oo - G 1: Commander Tin Bo Aung - G 2: Commander Thet Oo Battalions - IB-75: Commander Nyi Nyi Thain, 2nd Tin Maung Hla - IB-53: Commander Aung Kyaw Htay, 2nd Aung Kyaw Min - IB-124: Commander Kyi Win, 2nd Hla Htun

Description


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Battalions entered and “strategically created disturbance and trouble to the villages” in the areas west and east of the Day Loh River. Similar actions date back to August 2003. IB-53 entered area and constructed new base camp near Kler Pa Hti Village. Construction began 1/8-27/8/03. (Goal to enable front line battalions “to be able to move up and down as quickly as possible around the area during their operation against KNU.”) Began patrols. IB-124 established their front line camps at Tha Aye Hta, Sheh Lor, Ler To Day, and Pay Mu Kho along the Karenni State border. Began patrols. IB-39: Commander Win Soe and 2nd Kha Maung Win entered area and changed duty on 4/10/03. 5/10/03 IB-124 left the camps to head to Sho Kho and Ma Bwe Kho Villages and began operations. Villagers from Di Dah Kho, K’ta Khee, Ka Mu Doh, and Kay Law Khee fled to hide in the jungle. 13/10/03 IB-124 Troops moved to Kaw Mi Kho. 16/10/03 IB-124 Troops moved to Way Lar Kaw Village and began patrols. Villagers not able to return and harvest their crops in time “because they are afraid they might be caught and killed or tortured by the troops, therefore, instead of return for the harvest they kept hiding in the forest.” Crops damaged by weather and eaten by wild animals and troops. 58 farms affected that they know of. 58 tins of cached rice found and removed. 18/10/04 IB-124 arrives at They Ya Yu areas. N.d. Provides supplies and ammunition to IB-75 and IB-124. 20/10/03 IB-53 arrives at Par Weh. 23/10/03 IB-53 arrives at They Ya Yu where meets IB-124 IB-75 6/10/03 IB-75 Column 1 left camp and arrives in Ler Khe Der Tha and Ler Ker Der Kah to carry out search and destroy missions. 12/10/03 IB-75 moves to Kaw Mi Kho villages to do the same. Combined operations 23/10/03 Combined battalions begin joint search-and-destroy missions from village to village: Par Weh, Ler Ker Der Kho, Ler Ker Der Kah, Thaw Kaw Saw, Kaw Lo Kho, Ler Ker Der Thar, and Par Der Kah were in great fear. Destruction of cardamom, particularly hard (after rice), since it’s a cash crop. When they are short of food they sell it to buy rice, seeds fetch a good price. One of their key survival strategies.


65

24/10/03 IB-39, Column 1 (Company Commander Myint Kyi) enters They Gi La and who shoot at villagers near a paddy hut, but no one was wounded. 28/10/03 IB-39 Column 2 (Capt. Khin Maung Win) fires on villagers near Htee Ya Hta and They Gi La area. Background on incidents [Relevant excerpts] “The SPDC recognizes the villagers in this area as the hard core of KNU.” “According to the instruction given by the Southern Military Command, Commander General Tin Aye, these troops in the operations area have full authority to search and destroy all the hiding places, working sites, and food of those who keep hiding and don’t face them. They can do everything as they like.” According to the information from the reliable source the commander of (Ta Pa Ka) Southern Military Command led by Tin Aye had instructed his under control troop of (Sa Ba Ha) Military Strategy 1 commander Khin Maung Oo to give instruction to every battalions under his control to destroy all the paddy farms, paddy or rice barns of the hidden villages wherever they found.” Villages and Number of People Affected No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Village Thay Ya Juh Thaw Ka Saw Lei Ker Der Ka Pa Der Ka Ka Muh Doh Ma Bwe Kho Kaw Mi Kho Kay Law Khee Pa Wa Sho Kho Wee La Khee Dee Die Kho Leh Kah Der Tha Ma Wa Khaw Ka Ta Khee Saw Loe Kho Leh Kah Der Klo Htee Thee Pu Kler Pa Hti Kler Der Kah

Households 36 20 21 25 20 ?1 26 ?0 ?8 ?4 22 23 29 13 30 24 66 48 31 677

Total 232 112 110 148 123 207 145 180 331 470 114 124 194 75 178 158 406 251 186 218 3,962


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Total in urgent need of food No. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Township Daw Pa Kho Daw Pa Kho Daw Pa Kho Daw Pa Kho Daw Pa Kho Daw Pa Kho Daw Pa Kho Daw Pa Kho Daw Pa Kho Daw Pa Kho Daw Pa Kho Daw Pa Kho Daw Pa Kho Daw Pa Kho

Village Pa Der Ka Ka Muh Do Ma Bwe Kho Kaw Mi Kho Kay Law Khee Pa Wa Sho Kho Wee La Khee Dee Die Kho Leh Kah Der Tha Ma Wa Khaw Ka Ta Khee Saw Loe Kho Leh Kah Der Kho

Households 25 20? 4? 2? 3? 4? 8? 2? 2? 2? 1? 3? 6? 66 558

Total 148 123 207 145 180 331 470 114 124 194 75 178 406 406 3,307


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ERA Distribution Summary 24 March 2004 Everyone receives aid as requested. Note: 1,141 boys and 1,147 girls under 10 years of age, 509 males and 510 females over 10 years old (total: 3,307 people, 558 families) Mission required 44 days (3 February – 17 March 2004) Relief team spotted by SPDC while crossing Saw Hta - Kyaukgyi road near Tha Dah Der. Brief skirmish, but no one was injured. Relief delivered in 2 locations over four days. Recipients had to walk between 30 minutes and 5 hours to reach distribution points. Situation SPDC has shifted attention further south since aid delivered, along the Toungoo – Maw Chi Road. In December, 2 SPDC bulldozers destroyed by KNLA, which resulted in reprisals, especially forced labor to reconstruct the road to the Karenni State border by hand. LIB-511 and Light Infantry Division 55 were reported as having burned houses in Maw Too Der Village during this period.


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Description of Distribution Situation report for Taw Oo District area - One group [of Total] under SPDC control, the other not. Former: forced labor, extortion, portering, mine-sweeping and other human rights violations daily. Latter: great insecurity, lack of shelter and food (1 day of labor = 300 Kyat) Can purchase food and other goods in three places (Kaw Thay Der, Kler La, and Thandaung). Travel requires knowledge of SPDC troop movements. To go to Thandaung requires travel pass from village headman. Low quality rice costs 3,000/tin, 4,500-5,000 in areas where distribution of aid occurred. SPDC Movements against Villagers Received reports of combined troops: LIB-117 (Aung Thein Oo,) a group of KPNLF and a group of KNSO [Karenni National Solidarity Organization] (Ta Mla Htoo) with 4 companies totaling about 140 soldiers. Began patrols around Bu Khee, Bu Hsa Khee, Tha Ae Khee, Klay Khee, Kho Khee, and Ha Pto Per. Villagers in these areas fled. Total report having fled 3 times already from beginning of 2004 to time of aid distribution. Severe food shortages. “A Klay Khee villager said, ‘many of the villagers have to eat the spoiled rice already, as a result from the improper cultivation from last year and the continuous rains in this year.” Total are not able to cut and clear upland fields because of patrols, which will have an impact next year. 17/2/2004 [The relief team] meet[s] four families in Hiw Daw Khaw area. They fled after reprisals for KNU destruction of bulldozers. “Then the SPDC camp commander from Kler Lah instructed that all of the villages near the incident area have to move away from the area. They will treat anyone as they like if they found in the area. Therefore, the Klay So Khee and Ga Mu Der villagers left away from their villages move to jungle area.” A Ga Mu Der villager said, “In the present situation, the living of those under the SPDC control are like living without a life.” “On this trip we found that many villagers are being displaced and are fleeing in jungle and some in other villages. We received specific information of the human rights violations made by the SPDC troops in the area. We received information of the SPDC troops are sending food supplies and ammunition to frontline areas and even there still is fighting. In particular, we ourselves experienced that there was fighting while we were crossing Mu Theh – Saw Hta Road there was fighting. The second experience when we first entered Taw Oo District area, we had to wait for many days before we could continue our journey because of the SPDC movements. On these reasons, it is very difficult to understand why the SDPC calls for cease-fire talk. If they call for real cease-fire talk, I think the military movements should be stopped.”


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Report Number KORD-2004-06 Date Submitted: 15 April 2004 Location: Southern Daw Pha Kho Township and Northern Htaw Ta Htu Township State-defined Administrative Units State/Region Kayin

District Toungoo

Township n.a.


Township Daw Pha Kho Htaw Ta Htu



District Taw Oo

Zone: Brown and Black Population Statistics [Total Numbers Affected] Villages

Households 22

People 750

4,457

Military Units Identified [Needs Assessment Report] Regional Command Military Operations Command Light Infantry Division Light Infantry Battalions Infantry Battalions Other

Southern Command LID-55 LIB-94, LIB-117, LIB-508, LIB-509, LIB-511, LIB589 Tactical Command 551, KNPLF, KNSO

Military Units Identified [Distribution Report – if included] Regional Command Military Operations Command Light Infantry Division Light Infantry Battalions Infantry Battalions Other



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Military Units Identified [Impact Assessment Report – if included] Regional Command Military Operations Command Light Infantry Division Light Infantry Battalions Infantry Battalions Other


ICC Article 7: Crimes Against Humanity Reported Murder (Extrajudicial Execution) Enslavement (Forced Labor) Deportation (Forced Relocation) Imprisonment or Severe Deprivation of Physical Liberty Torture Rape and ICC-defined Forms of Sexual Violence Enforced Disappearance of Persons Other Inhuman Acts Causing Physical and/or Mental Suffering ICC Article 8: War Crimes Reported Willful Killing (Attempted and/or Reported) Torture or Inhuman Treatment Willing Causing Great Suffering, or Serious Injury to Body or Health Extensive Destruction and Appropriation of Property Taking of Hostages


71

KORD-2004-6 ERA Summary 15 April 2004 Demographics 4,457 people, 750 households, 22 villages in Thandaung Township. KNU: part of southern Daw Pha Kho and northern Htaw Ta Htu [Tantabin] Townships in Taw Oo District. Location: adjacent to Karenni State border, north of Bu Kaw Kee and south of the Taungoo Demawso Road. Rationale: SPDC and KNSO patrols in northern Daw Pha Kho in late 2003 resulted in destruction of paddy fields and cardamom plantations (see KORD-2004-2), for which aid distributed in February. This request due to another round of patrols further south during January and February after crops harvested –although it is noted that these villagers also had an unspecified amount of fields ruined during the first round of patrols. 2 entire villages and 13 shelters (at minimum) burnt by SPDC and KNSO troops during more recent patrols. 1 villager killed and at least 2 caught in crossfire of skirmishes between KNLA and SPDC/KNSO. SPDC/KNSO demands on villagers for food supplies resulted in loss of at least 1,500 baskets of paddy, 100 chickens, and 50 viss of cardamom seed. 16 villagers captured and held hostage by troops for more than a week before released. Patrols passed through further 3 villages and 230 households, but were not forced to flee and assessed as not being in need of ERA.


72

ERA Request n.d. February 2004 Description of SPDC actions 15 December 2003 – 16 February 2004 Occurred in eastern part of Klay Lo in Daw Pha Kho Township and Kho Khee area of Htaw Ta Htu Township in Taw Oo District. Group of perpetrators (with commanders) From Tactical Command 551 under the control of Division 55 Tactical Commander: Lt. Col Nyi Lin G-2, Maj. Kyaw Thu Ya G-3, Maj. Kyaw Moe 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

LIB-94, BC Cap. Tin Maung Myint with 2nd BC Cap. Aung Naing LIB-117, BC Maj. Aung Thein Oo with 2nd BC Cap. Htun Shwe LIB-511, BC Aung Kyaw Moe with 2nd BC Kyaw Kyaw Win LIB-508, BC Myo Kyi with 2nd BC Cap. Htan Hlan Baik LIB-589, BC Lt. Col. Thein Htun with 2nd BC Maj. Mya Thu LIB-509, BC Nyunt Win

Description of incident Tactical Command 551 from Light Infantry Division 55 to Aung Myin military camp on Karenni border. LIBs (above) with KNPLF and KNSO troops operated in eastern part of Klay Lo and Kho Khee in Daw Pha Kho and Taw Ta Tu townships. 17/12/03 Entered and patrolled Sho Kho areas. 18/12/03- [Battalions not specified] divided into 2 groups: a) entered and patrolled Pwi Khee, Koe Haw Der, and Haw Lu Der areas; b) Maw Too Der, Ber Kha Lay Kho, Blah Khee, Thay Mu Der areas (The same troops that burned Maw Too Der Village 19/12/03). Troops burned and destroyed food and belongings except for what they took for themselves. Group b later moved on to Oo Per, Maw Khu Der, Htee Hsa Per, Thay Gi La areas. 16/1/04 at 2 pm - Fired 5 mortars and small guns at Htee Hsa Per villagers while they were in their homes. One villager hit and died. Others escaped. At 3 pm they burnt the upper part of Htee Hsa Per Village. 17/1/04 They burnt the lower part.


73

LIB-117 and LIB-94 entered Shoe Ser, Wah Soe, Hi Daw Khaw, Kho Khee, Klay Khee, Thay Khu Der, Ha Htoe Per, Tha Aya Khee, Bu Hsa Khee, Bu Khee, Tha Kwee Soe to conduct operations in area. 25/1/04 Entered Shoe Ser and engaged KNU troops at Shoe Set. 26/1/04, 2 companies from Column 2 from LIB-117 entered and patrolled Bu Hsa Khee, Tha Kwee Soe and then on to Bu Khee area. 27/1/04 LIB-94 entered and patrolled Shoe Ser, Wah Soe areas where villagers were hiding. 4/2/04 LIB-511 returned to Htee Hsa Per area. 6/2/04 LIB-511 went to Thay Gi La area and then slowly moved back to Kler La – Mo Khee Road to Tha Aye Hta camp. N.d. LIB-117 and LIB-94 with KNPLF and KNSO troops entered Kler La – Mo Khee Road and moved to Kler La – Bu Hsa Khee Road to Bu Hsa Khee camp. Patrolled: Bu Hsa Khee, Tha Kwee Soe, and Bu Khee. 7/2/04 – [These] troops captured 2 villagers from Tha Aye Khee: Saw [Name Redacted] (age 50) and Naw [Name Redacted] (age 28) to act as guides. 8/2/04 Entered Klay Khee and captured 14 students and required them to come. 9/2/04 Encountered KNU troops in area and stayed in Kho Khee. 16/2/04 Released those captured. Troops returned to Hi Daw Khaw, Shoe Ser, and then along the road to Pay Mu Kho (Aung Myin) on Karenni State border. Operations lasted 64 days total and involved SPDC, KNSO, KNPLF troops. Villagers from 25 villages in eastern part of Klay Lo in Daw Pha Kho Townships and Kho Khee area in Taw Ta Tu Townships had to flee homes and hide in the jungle. Troops burnt their homes, destroyed their paddy farms and food stockpiles. Total: 2,000 viss of betel nut, 5 pigs, 31 choppers, 60 viss of salt, 1 casting net, 3 percussion lock firearms, 1 air gun, 50 viss of fish paste, 12 cooking pots, 30 dishes, 100 spoons, 6 pairs of slippers, 50 viss of cardamom seed, 2 mats, 2 tea kettles, 2 tea cups, 15 blankets, 2 hammocks, 400 tins of rice, 1,559 baskets of paddy, 100 chickens, and 13 homes burnt. Background reason of incident: Villages under control of KNU. The SPDC attacked them by the same means to attack the KNU because the SPDC regard the villagers as their enemies.


74

Villages and Number of People Affected No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Village Tract n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

Village Maw Khu Der Oo Per Htee Hsa Per Ber Kha Lay Kho Blah Khee Thay Gi La Thay Mu Der Maw Too Der Pwi Khee Haw Lu Der Ko Haw Der Klay Khee Bu Khee Tha Aye Khee Ha Htoe Per Wah Soe Hi Daw Khaw Sho Ser Thay Kho Der Kho Khee Bu Hsa Khee Tha Kwee Soe Klay Soe Khee Ga Mu Der Kaw Thay Der

Households 35 23 45 69 32 13 40 37 32 25 56 34 22 36 43 32 51 23 15 43 31 23 62 35 133 990

Total 180 120 240 458 178 92 198 210 155 145 324 240 160 250 264 177 250 165 90 256 185 120 359 199 914 5,929


75

Total in Urgent Need of Food No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Township Daw Pha Kho Daw Pha Kho Daw Pha Kho Daw Pha Kho Daw Pha Kho Daw Pha Kho Daw Pha Kho Daw Pha Kho Daw Pha Kho Daw Pha Kho Daw Pha Kho Htaw Ta Htu Htaw Ta Htu Htaw Ta Htu Htaw Ta Htu Htaw Ta Htu Htaw Ta Htu Htaw Ta Htu Htaw Ta Htu Htaw Ta Htu Htaw Ta Htu Htaw Ta Htu

Village May Khu Der Oo Per Htee Hsa Per Ber Kha Lay Kho Blah Khee Thay Gi La Thay Mu Der Maw Too Der Pwi Khee Haw Lu Der Kho Haw Der Klay Khee Bu Khee Tha Aye Khee Ha Htoe Per Wah Soe Hi Daw Khaw Sho Ser Thay Kho Der Kho Khee Bu Hsa Khee Tha Kwee Soe

Households 35 23 45 69 32 13 40 37 32 25 56 34 22 36 43 32 51 231 15 43 31 23 760

Total 180 120 240 458 178 92 198 210 155 145 324 240 160 250 264 177 250 165 90 256 185 120 4,457


76

ERA Follow Up Report 28/12/04 Those villagers that received assistance now had bought rice by themselves. When they going to buy rice at Kaw Thay Der and Kler La Der, according to the situation, they have to depend on the villagers who are under control of the SPDC. If the villagers there told them the SPDC troops were staying in their camp, not moving to any other places, then they quickly entered to the village and bought the rice. Some time they can depend on information from local authorities of Karen. Some villagers bought the rice in their own area and some tried to get the rice by their own way from the SPDC control area. Related to distribution trip, we have not find any difficulty they found in time of purchasing rice. There wasn’t any checkpoint of the SPDC to pass through on the way of buying rice. So the villagers didn’t have to pay any taxes to the SPDC. Whenever they going to buy rice, they must have contact with the villagers from who lived under of the SPDC certainly as they didn’t face with any the SPDC troops on the way. There we noticed that after the assistance distribution, we don’t heard any news about the distribution spread out, because of the villagers who received assistance money were situated in deep jungle, hillside, and stream source. There had been forced labor, porter, messenger, build the military camp, making fence, digging the bunker, cleaning the car roads, and villagers those have cars are forced to transport military supplies in the area of the SPDC control.


77

Report Number CIDKP-2004-02 Date Submitted: 10 May 2004 Location: Daw Pha Kho and Htaw Ta Htu Townhsips State-defined Administrative Units State/Region Kayin

District Toungoo

Township Thandaung


Township Daw Pha Kho Htaw Ta Htu

Village Tract(s) West Day Loh West Ya Loh


District Taw Oo

Zone: Population Statistics [Total Numbers Affected] Villages

Households 17

People 795

4,334


Southern Command LID-66 LIB-39, LIB-53, LIB-75, LIB-124 IB-39, IB-48, IB-55, IB-75 Strategic Command 1




78






79

CIDKP-2004-2 ERA Distribution Summary 10 May 2004

Demographics: 4,334 people, 795 families, 17 villages in Thandaung Township. 252 boys and 230 girls < 5, 1,892 males and 1,970 females > 5. Logistics Left Mae Sariang 11/2/2004-7/4/2004 (54 days). 14 days walking, 3 waiting for security clearance, 9 more days walking to area, 16 days registering villagers and distributing aid, 5 days resting, 3 days conducting needs assessment for further aid, 7 days walk return. Team delayed crossing the Saw Hta - Kyaukgyi Road for 3 days due to SPDC patrols. Relief distributed at 6 locations over 6 days. Villagers did not have to walk more than 1 hour to distribution point. Protection Since request submitted, IB-48 burnt 13 cardamom plantations and 1 barn holding 90 tins of rice. Forced labor reported common on Kler Lah – Bu Hsa Khee Road to transport military supplies. Attacks resulted in at least 1 civilian death. No external support for primary schools.


80

ERA Distribution Report [Continued] n.d. Situation in Western Day Loe and Western Yaw Loe in Taw Oo (Taungoo) District: Four Cuts began in 1997 and militarization began to occur. Large numbers of Total in both areas since then. In 1999, LIB-124 under Strategic Command (1) established B’ Yin Naung base at Than Thaung Gyi Town (operations in Daw Pa Kho area- western Dai Loe). 2,000 Short-pants began operating (Kei Der and Ler Kla Der in Taw Ta Htoo Township and Maw Nyui Bwa area attacks under leadership of Tin Hla). “When the Burmese troop meet with them the troop open fire to them or when they were arrested by the troop they were certainly facing with death.” [Note: When durian, betel nut, and cardamom are destroyed it takes another 4-5 years before new ones produce.] Security issues 8/03 SCA Division Commander Tin Aye ordered tactical commander (1), Khin Maung Oo, and his sub-commanders to destroy or burn all hiding places and paddy fields belonging to Total. 10/9/3 General Tin Aye ordered Strategic 1 Commander Colonel Kay Maung Oo and battalions to step up search and destroy missions (LIB-53, LIB-39, LIB-124, LIB-75) and plant mines. 18/11/03 IB-39 carried out operations in Maw Kho Der Village and fired on Saw [Name Redacted] (30 yrs. old) and badly wounded. 20/12/03 IB-55 fires on Maw Toe Der Village and Saw [Name Redacted] (21 yrs. old) killed. 22/12/03 IB-48 under Lt. Ko Ko Aung and IB-73 carried out a joint operation in Khu Thay Der Village. 15-31/10/4 IB-75 Column 2 began operations in Day Loe area. IB-53, under BC Moe Min Myint, with 100 soldiers established a camp from which they carried out search and destroy missions, especially during the dry season.


81

Villages and Number of People Affected No. 1 2 3

Village Tract W. Day Loe W. Day Loe W. Day Loe

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

W. Day Loe W. Day Loe W. Day Loe W. Day Loe W. Day Loe W. Day Loe W. Day Loe W. Day Loe W. Day Loe W. Day Loe W. Day Loe W. Day Loe W. Yaloe W. Yaloe

Village Htee Bu Khi Bwe Bu Khi Ka Thwee Dee Bwe He Kho Kler Bar Htee Kler Mu Hgah Ker Der Kar Ler Gei Kho Der Ka Ler Gei Kho Ker Weh Htee Ta Bu Thu Gay Der Ka Thaw Bwe Sa Ba Law Khee Ku Thay Der Kaw Law Ka Hgeh Der Ler Kla Der

Households 22 23 19

M>5 51 58 52

F>5 52 66 59

M5) 78 189 36 98 42 102

W. Klay War W. Klay War W. Klay War W. Klay War

48 163 45 6

140 382 115 18

111 400 107 20

12 44 10 3

12 45 14 0

275 871 246 41

Kay Thay Der

78

187

164

22

33

406

496

1,231

1,193

145

171

2,740


457 204 239

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Report Number CIDKP-2005-01 Date Submitted: 18 April 2005 Location: Maw Nya Bwa and Kaw Thay Der Village Tracts State-defined Administrative Units State/Division Pegu Division

District Toungoo

Township Tantabin

Village Tract(s) n/a

Township Htaw Te Htoo

Village Tract(s) Maw Nya Bwa Kaw Thay Der

Karen-defined Administrative Units State/Division Karen

District Taw Oo


Households 17

People 750

3,838


Southern Command

LIB-53, LIB-60, LIB-590 IB-73, IB-124




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Report CIDKP-2005-01 Emergency Rations Request Summary 18 April 2005 Demographics: 3,838 people, 750 families, 16 villages in Maw Nya Bwa and Kaw They Der areas, Htan Ta Htoo Township, Toungoo District. 216 boys and 256 girls [472] < 5 and 1,613 males and 1,753 females >5. Rationale: Southeast Command HQ issued order in late September that 2 villages had to pay 50 kyat/day for day passes to farms. Fear of arbitrary execution keeps people away from fields. 30 yr.-old male killed by SPDC gunfire in one village [not named]. LIB-60 patrolled Maw Nay Bwa Village Tract for at least 2 weeks beginning in late November searching for people in these free-fire areas and destroying settlements along the way. LIB-53 simultaneously patrolled Kaw They Der Village Tract for at least 2 weeks beginning in late November, and villagers also fled to forest. Extensive reports of petty theft, extortion, and forced labor in this request. Undocumented amount of cardamom and rice fields that could not be harvested due to restricted access and the ongoing need to hide in the forests. SPDC Operations 6/9/2004 IB-124, based at Tha-Aye-Hta demanded 2 women from Gar-Mu-Doe to transport military supplies from Baw-Ga-Li to Tha-Aye-Hta camp. 7/9/2004 IB-73, led by Bo Aung Kyaw Myint, demands 12,000 kyat from Sha-Zi-Po Village for four rice mills (3,000/per). 10/9/2004 IB-73, led by Bo Thiri Zaw, demands a sack of rice from Htaw-Ma-Ee Village. Also demand Sha-Zi-Po villagers provide 300 kyat for a messenger. 15/9/2004 LIB-590, led by Bo Aung Gyi, based at Kaw-Thay-Doe camp, orders 3 women and 1 man from Kaw-Thay-Doe Village to porter military supplies to Naw Soe camp.


90

16/9/2004 Operation Command 1, led by Commander Khin Sin of Southeast Command Headquarters, based at Baw-Ga-Li, commandeers a truck from Naw Ah Ree of Kay-Thay-Doe Village to transport firewood to their army camp. 16/9/2004 Commander Khin Sin orders villagers in Baw-Ga-Li and Kaw-Thay-Doe Villages that they must pay 50 kyat/person to travel to their fields. He threatened to take action on any villagers who fail to write a pass. 17/9/2004 IB-73 Column 1, led by Battalion Commander San Mytin, came to Ka-Ser-Doe Village, stole 2 ducks and 3 chickens for meat and in addition, they took 6 people as porters. 18/9/2004 IB-124, based in Tha-Aye-Hta camp, order Gar-Mu-Doe villagers (one woman and three men) to porter military supplies from Baw-Ga-Li to Tha-Aye-Hta. 19/9/2004 IB-73, led by Major San Myint, came to Mwee-Lor Village and demanded 6 villagers to porter military supplies. Troops from IB-73, based at Klaw-Mee-Doe camp, led by Bo Lwin Oo, summoned the Hu-Mu-Doe village head and asked for the names of the pastor, the schoolteacher, and demanded village provide 1 viss meat/month. He also demanded the village head to send information every day. 20/9/2004 IB-73, Klaw-Mee-Doe camp commander, Lwin Oo, ordered 5 villages [not named] in Tantabin Township to deliver rice to Major San Myint at Mwee-Lor Village. 23/9/2004 LIB-590, based at Kaw-Thay-Doe camp, forcibly collected villagers of Kaw-thay-doe Village: 1) Saw [Name Redacted], 2) Saw [Name Redacted], 3) Saw [Name Redacted], 4) Saw [Name Redacted], 5) Saw [Name Redacted], and 6) Saw [Name Redacted] to porter rations from Kaw-Thay-Doe camp to Naw-Soe camp. 23/9/2004 IB-73 Column 2, led by Major Maung Maung So, shot at villagers at Tha-PanChaung, killing [Name Redacted] (30 yrs. old) of Zyat-Gyi Village, and looted from him 150,000 kyat 28/11/2004 LIB-60, based in Tha Byin Nyut (with strength of 4 sections) and led by Battalion Commander Hlain Win Tin and 2nd Battalion Commander Maung Maung Hta, entered Play Hsa Loe, Yer Loe, Ta Pa Khi, Plaw Baw Der, Keh Der, Wah Loe, Swa Loe, Klaw Me Der, Lay Oh Loe, Baw Pa in Mya Nya Bwa areas. Everyone in these villages fled and hid in the jungle. These troops are conducting search-and-destroy in this area. 28/11/2004 LIB-53, led by Battalion Commander Aung Kyaw Myint and 2nd Battalion Commander Nay Myo Win, left from Per Hti Village in Htaw Te Htoo (Tantabin) for Khaw Poe Loe, Mwee Loe, Hu Mu Der, Ler Kla Der practicing search-and-destroy operation. These troops also have military activities in Kaw Soe Kho, Wa Tho Kho and Ler Koh. The villagers fled and hid in the jungle. These troops are still having search-and-destroy operations in these areas until now.


91

Note: Due to military operations, villagers could not harvest crops (November and December), the food stored from rainy season almost gone, and they were not able to bring much food with them. Total in urgent need of food No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Village Tract Maw Nay Bwa Maw Nay Bwa Maw Nay Bwa Maw Nay Bwa Maw Nay Bwa Maw Nay Bwa Maw Nay Bwa Maw Nay Bwa Maw Nay Bwa Maw Nay Bwa Maw Nay Bwa Maw Nay Bwa Maw Nay Bwa Maw Nay Bwa Kaw Thay Der Kaw Thay Der Kaw Thay Der

Village Wah Loe Swa Loe Klaw Me Der Lay Oh Loe Baw Pa Hu Mu Der Ler Kla Der Khaw Poe Loe Plaw Baw Der Mwee Loe Keh Der Ta Pa Khi Yer Loe Play Hsa Loe Kaw Soe Kho Wa Tho Kho Ler Kho

Households 16 38 117 12 13 56 40 15 31 32 50 23 48 71 115 44 29 750

M>5 40 86 266 26 29 129 110 32 65 64 108 42 83 15 227 105 46 1,613

F >5 40 83 285 27 24 128 98 41 87 77 124 38 126 172 239 97 67 1,753

M 5 M 87 215

5F

5 36 64 101 126 25 269 128 129 87 40 113 1,118

F>5 43 82 92 140 34 326 158 145 76 51 119 1,266

M 5. Area: located east of Tantabin Town and Sittaung River, adjacent to southern boundary of Thandaung (Daw Pa Kho) Township. Rationale: April – June LIB-540, LIB-375, IB-539 of MOC-9 deployed their patrols in the area, forcing villagers to porter supplies, burning their plantations, imposing travel restrictions, building military camps, constructing roads, and using them as sentries. More than 700 people in all, 3 of them were killed [Unclear whether summary execution or willful killing. CIDKP documented 22 betel nut plantations, 27 cardamom gardens, and 8 houses burnt by troops. Villagers forced to construct he new car road from Tha Pye Nyunt Village to Play Hsar Loe Village (approximately 16 miles) without pay. SPDC promised to provide them with travel documents so they could sell their fruit and vegetables in Tha Pye Nyunt, but they did not, so food, valued at millions of kyat, were ruined. 4 new military outposts established and travel more restricted than normal. Landmines also planted. Due to forced relocations in 2006, IDPs have spread in different directions—some to hiding sites in the Per Hti area, some to relocation sites (Play Hsar Loe Village), some to the IDPs camps near the border.


178

CIDKP-2007-19 ERA Request n.d. Situation Analysis Area targeted for “Four Cuts” during 1974-1975, and the “Scorched Earth” campaigns between 1992-1997 in KNU-controlled areas. Search-and-destroy missions increased in 2006. Villagers in Play Hsar Loe area subject to forced labor during all of 2006 and 2007, and travel restrictions enacted. “The villagers have to go out very secretly to work for their families. When the villagers go out of the village to work, they have to cross the Burmese army troops who will shot them without question.” The Play Hsar Loe relocation village is “too narrow” forcing 2-3 families to reside in the same house. Water is scarce during the summer. During the rainy season MOC-9 Tactical No. 2 carries out operations east of Play Hsar Loe Village. Tactical Commander, Saw Tay Soe, oversees LIB-540 and LIB-375 operations. Villagers forced to build a new camp, Klaw Klay Der, between Play Hsar Loe and Saw Tay Der & Ler Wah Soe between Si Der Koh and Ka Mu Lo & Klar Ho Day between Hu Mu Der and Khoh Lu & another one [not named] between Ler Klah Der and Toe Hta, as well as porter supplies, act as guides, etc. The time and energy spent performing forced labor prevented them from working for their families. During the hot season MOC-9 and IB-539 carried out search-and-destroy missions. 1/3/07 IB-539 Columns 1 and 2, based in Htee Nya Pah Lo (Klaw Me Der) and TOC No. 2 LIB375, led by MOC-9 BC Moe Aung and 2nd BC Toe Toe Lay and Capt. Soe Myit Naing set forest fires along the road, which destroyed nearby fields and orchards. Resources Destroyed Area Lay Gaw Loh Yur Lah Tar Pa Kee Plaw Baw Der

Betel Nut Gardens 7 5 4 6 22

Cardamom Gardens 8 7 6 6 27

Houses 0 0 4 0 4

16/4/07 MOC-9 LIB-375, based in Play Hsa Lo camp, led by BC Toe Aung Za and Capt. Soe Myit Naing, forced 100 people from Play Hsa Lo Village to porter food from Tha Kaw to Play Hsar Loe military camp.


179

17/4/07 MOC-9 TOC No. 2, led by TOC Commander Tin Soe, forces 20 villagers and then 35 the next day to porter supplies from Tha Kaw to Play Hsar Loe camp. 22/4/07 MOC-9 TOC No. 2, led by Tin Soe, forced 22 people in the relocation site to porter food from Tha Kaw to Play Hsar Loe. 23/4/07 MOC-9 TOC No. 2, led by Tin Soe, forced 150 people in the relocation site to porter food from Tha Kaw to Play Hsar Loe. 5/5/07 LIB-375 forces 20 villagers to porter food from Paw Pa to Play Hsar Loe. 7/5/07 LIB-375 forces villagers to cut 550 bamboo poles to make roofs for the military camp. 17/5/07 Play Hsar Low military camps forces 20 villagers to carry injured soldiers to Tha Pye Nyunt Village. 18/5/07 50 villagers forced to porter supply from Play Hsar Loe to the new Klaw Klay Day military camp. 26-29/5/07 6 men and 11 women forced to porter supplies to Ka Mu Khi. 28/5/07 TOC No. 2 forces 50 Play Hsar Loe villagers to porter supplies from Play Hsar Loe to Klaw Klay Day camp. 30/5/07 25 Play Hsar Lo villagers to porter supplies from there to The Pye Nyunt military camp. 31/5/07 20 villagers forced to porter supplies (same route). 3/6/07 10 villagers to transport injured soldiers from Play Hsar Loe to Tha Pye Nyunt camp. 4/6/07 10 villages forced to porter supplies from Play Hsar Loe to Klaw Klay Day camp. 11/6/07 40 villagers forced to porter supplies from Play Hsar Loe to Klaw Klay Day camp. 13/06/07 10 villagers forced to serve as sentries at that Klaw Klay Day camp. 14/6/07 5 villagers forced to accompany troops to the front line [as human shields?]. 15/6/07 TOC No. 2 forces 30 villagers in Play Hsar Loe to porter food to the front line. Combat Summary: MOC-9, TOC No. 2, LIB-540 and LIB-375 conducted operations throughout the Play Hsar Loe and Maw Nay Pwa areas for all of May. Fighting ensued:


180

14/5/07 fighting east of the Play Hsar Loe Village around Day Bu Day involving LIB-540 and KNLA. 19/5/07 fighting west of Play Hsar Loe Village between LIB-377 and KNLA. 25/5/07 fighting west of Play Hsar Loe and Lay Yo Lo Villages. 30/5/07 fighting west of Play Hsar Loe between LIB-540 and KNLA. 1/6/07 fighting east of Play Hsar Loe in Say Wah Lu area. 3/6/07 fighting east of Play Hsar Loe in Klaw Klay Day area (3 X same day) 8/6/07 fighting east of Play Hsar Loe between MOC-9, TOC No. 2, LIB-375 and KNLA. 11/7/07 fighting east of Play Hsar Loe in Klaw Klay Day area. 16/7/07 fighting east of Play Hsar Loe in Hter La Day area.


181

ERA Distribution Summary 15 February 2008 Demographics: Provided ERA to 185 not 182 households as originally planned (1,044 people). 16% of the beneficiaries < 5 years of age. Logistics: 12 November 2007 – 21 January 2008 (69 days). 25 days of travel, 25 days of waiting (for information, security personnel, transport), 3 days aid distribution, 2 days of meetings with village heads, 3 days HR documentation, and 1 day celebrating Christmas with IDPs. Road crossings (Kyaukgyi – Hsaw Ta and Pya Gaw – Bu Hsa Khi) difficult. Villages and Number of People Affected

No. 1 2 3 4 5 6

Village Ta Per Khi Plaw Baw Der Yer Loe Play Hsar Loe Lay Hgo Loe Pau Pa

Households 20 32 42 65 14 12 185

>5 M 42 76 97 159 26 25 425

>5 F 38 91 112 167 26 16 450

5 120 13 18 5 5 38 63 43 48 76 12 20 62 63 49 30 42 103 810

M5 66 101 35 39 46 91 64 47 46 50 34 36 75 92 73 895

F5 106 68 85 53 71 42 90 67 81 663

F5 133 263 60 60 916

M5 121 143 122 42 78 157 95 19 777

F>5 99 130 116 33 61 141 101 16 700

M5 18 6 14 10 38 124 78 28 57 42 38 72 64 69 658

M5 72 52 91 66 89 81 116 114 111 792

M5 124 265 178

82

Total 314 613 408

185

255

Report Number CIDKP-2004-12 Date Submitted: 4 August 2004 Location: Ko Ni Village, near Mone Town, Noe Nya Lar Relocation Camp State-defined Administrative Units State/Region Bago

District Nyaunglebin

Township Mone


Township Ler Doh

Village Tract(s)


District Kler Lwee Htoo

Zone: White Population Statistics [Total Numbers Affected] Villages

Households 1

People 152

1,521


Southern Command

LIB-599




256






257

CIDKP-2004-12 ERA Request Summary 4 August 2004 Demographics: 1,521 people (152 HH) from Ko Ni Village (a short distance south of Mone). KNU: Ler Doh Township in Nyaunglebin District. (Now reside in Noe Nya Lar relocation camp in Mone Township). 73 boys and 86 girls < 5 and 547 females and 445 males > 5. Rationale: Villagers relocated 3X to different locations since 2000, most recently in February 2004 when forced to destroy their own homes while troops killed their animals. One woman was killed and others beaten during the forced eviction. 2000 relocated to Yan Myo Aung beside a military camp 2/2001 relocated one hour’s walk from above site. 2/2004 LIB-599, led by BC Major Win Htway, forces them to Noe Nya Lar. Villages not permitted to cultivate fields or tend orchards and gardens. 10/2/2004 LIB-599, led by BC Major Win Htway, enters Ko Ni and forces them to destroy their homes. Seven people beaten and 7 wounded. One, Saw Wee Hla, died of a broken skull. 4/2004 local SPDC authorities extorted 250,000 kyat from the villagers, and then ordered them to build a fence around the garrison. 5/2004 Troops [unspecified] opened fire on villagers as they were returning from collective wild fruits and nuts. One man (age 24) killed. 5/2004 Troops institute travel restrictions that limit their ability to gather food from the forest. Villagers now required to buy a travel pass (1,000 kyat – good for 1 month) if they want to leave Noe Nya Lar. 30/5/2004 LIB-599, led by Sergeant Ni Ni [2nd BC?], opened fire on people returning from the forest near Noe Nya Lar. Saw Has Gro (age 24) killed. Two others, Naw Pi Pi and Naw Mu Shee, were arrested, beaten at Kyoen Bin Sit military camp, and ransomed for 100,000 kyat.


258

Report Number KORD-2005-03 Date Submitted: 18 April 2005 Location: East of Mone – Thandaung Rd., north of Kyaukgyi – Mu They – Saw Hta Rd. State-defined Administrative Units State/Region Bago


Township Kyaukgyi


Township Mu

Village Tract(s) Thet Baw Der Saw Tay Der Kheh Po Der Yaw Khee


District Kler Lwi Htoo


Households 8

People 197

1,389


Southern Command

LIB-590, LIB-599 IB-73


Southern Command LID-66 LIB-204, LIB-246, LIB-264, LIB-351, LIB-504, LIB531, LIB-590, LIB-599, LIB-789 IB-33, IB-60, IB-73, IB-116 Military Strategic Command 2


259






260

KORD-2005-03 ERA Request Summary 18 April 2005 Demographics: 1,389 people (197 HH) from 8 villages in Kyaukgyi Township, Pegu Division. (KNU: Thet Baw Der, Saw Tay Der, Kheh Po Der, and Yaw Khee Village Tracts of Moo Township, Kler Lwi Htoo District.) Located east of the Mone – Thandaung District Road, north of the Kyaukgyi - Mu Theh - Saw Hta Road. [Far-eastern corner, directly adjacent to the southeast corner of Taw Oo District]. Most villagers flee whenever SPDC patrols enter the area. Rationale: Between January and April 2005 LIB-599, LIB-590, and IB-73 patrols committed the following acts: 3,000 tins of rice burnt, more than 100 betel nut, cardamom, dog fruit, and durian [cash-crops used to purchase rice] cut down, representing over 3 months of food supplies for the affected populations. Troops conscripted 400 bullock carts and porters from Ta Khaw Pwa Village in March and April to transport food supplies to the Kaw La Wah Lu camp. Lowland populations forced to construct and to repair LIB-590’s camp and perimeter fence. 2 new company garrisons established in the area, enabling roving patrols into upland areas, displacing populations for 3 months, during which food supplies were destroyed. New landmines were laid in the area. At least one village lost his legs.


261

ERA Request General description: 8 villages in four village tracts affected (Thet Baw Der, Saw Tay Der, Kheh Po Der, and Yah Khee). Period: Beginning of January 2005 through end of March 2005. Military Units Identified: LIB-599, led by BC Win Htay and 2nd BC Yan Naing Soe (based in Inn To Inn Shin Camp) LIB-590, led by BC Ko Ko Oo and 2nd BC Nyein Charn (based in Ye Oh Sin camp) IB-73, led by BC Htun Minn and [unspecified] militia group (based in Tha Pye Nyunt camp) Description: 1 January Saw [Name Redacted] of Ma La Daw Village stepped on a landmine laid by LIB-590 soldiers and lost his legs. “Since then the high officers of the SPDC in the area instructed the troops in the base camps and frontline outposts to repair their camps and outposts and its fences. At the same time troops were instructed to make stronger operation in the area.” [No date] Two columns from LIB-590 began patrols in lowland and midland areas. Forced labor to repair camps, extortion, and the loss of property reported. Troops reportedly evicted 8 households in Myaw Oo and Htee To Lo Villages and “built a place for the military.” [No date] Two columns from LIB-599, led by BC Win Htway and 2nd BC Yan Naing Oo, began search-and-destroy operations in highland areas of Thet Baw Der, Saw Tay Der, Kheh Po Der, and Yaw Khee Village Tracts forcing Total to flee in multiple directions.


262

Villages and People Affected No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Village Tract Thet Baw Der Thet Baw Der Thet Baw Der Thet Baw Der Saw Tay Der Saw Tay Der Khe Po Der Yaw Khee Yaw Khee Yaw Khee

Village Ka Waw Kho Play Khee Play Pa Thet Baw Der Saw Tay Der Play Khee Kheh Po Der Yaw Khee Ka Mu Lo Yu Lo

Households 39 23 22 26 11 41 15 20 52 65 314

Total 290 227 166 179 55 235 103 134 295 353 2,037

Households 39 23 22 26 11 41 15 20 197

Total 290 227 166 179 55 235 103 134 1,389

Total in Urgent Need of Food No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Village Tract Thet Baw Der Thet Baw Der Thet Baw Der Thet Baw Der Saw Tay Der Saw Tay Der Kheh Po Der Yaw Der

Village Ka Waw Kho Play Khee Play Pa Thet Baw Der Saw Tay Der Play Khee Kheh Po Der Yaw Khee


263

ERA Distribution Summary 29 August 2005 Demographics: Assistance provided to 1,389 people (197 HH) from 8 villages. 947 children < 10 (474 boys and 473 girls), 232 males and 210 females > 10 Livelihood Summary (p. 1) Forced labor, extortion, and travel restrictions widespread in lowland areas where practice wetpaddy production. Many villagers are fleeing into upland areas as a result. So too are Shan, Burmans, and Indians living in the area. Food production in upland areas is diverse: some animal husbandry plus chilis, pumpkins, long beans, gourds, etc. However, harvests are inadequate, so many people also work as day laborers (500 kyat/day) or travelling peddlers. Trips to markets to purchase rice (normally 3-4 times/month) require a half-day or full-day walk. Market price: lowest quality 3,500-4,000/tin while better quality is 5,000/tin. ERA will help them pay back debts SPDC United Identified No. 2 Military Strategy Commander Khin Maung Soe oversees: IB-60, led by BC Win Bo Shein and 2nd BC Khin Maung Lwin), based in Than Bo (Wai Ler Doh). IB-73, led by BC Tun Min combined with militia (people’s army), led by officer Thein Tun, based in Tha Bye Nyunt. LIB-531, led by BC Tint Hswe and 2nd BC Aung Naing Soe, based in Sis Hsay Gone. LIB-599, led by BC Myint Htein, based in Inn To Inn Shay (or) Tone Daw. LIB-599, led by 2nd BC Yan Naing Soe, based in Ma La Daw. LIB-599, led by Capt. Myint Htay, patrols lowland areas. LIB-590, led by BC Ko Ko Gyi and 2nd BC Nyein Chan, based in Ye Oh Zin. Sergeant Inn Tun, based in Myaung Oo (front line military camp). Warrant Officer Khin Maung Than, based in Mee Taing Daw. Warrant Officer Myint Than, based in Htee To Lo. Capt. Hla Myint Zaw, based in Kaw Lar Lu, patrols midland areas.


264

SPDC Operations Since ERA Request 15/3/2005 LIB-204 Column 2 replaced LIB-599 at That Bye Nyunt camp. LIB-204 Column 1 replaced LIB-599 troops at Kaw Lar Wah Lu. 22/3/2005 Two combined columns from LIB-599 and LIB-590 forcibly requisitioned 244 bullock carts from midland villages to transport military rations to Kaw Lar Wah Lu. 24/32005 Strategic Commander [presumably Khin Maung Soe] with LIB-590 and LIB-504 (approximately 400 troops) arrived in Maw Lay Village and “organized a public festival, but we don’t know about their aim to do this.” 28/3/2005 LIB-351, led by Yeh Win, with 20 soldiers, entered Thit Cha Seik and arrested three elderly villagers: 1) U Lu Pu; 2) Than Sein; and 3) Ma Wai Htoo and immediately sent them to military strategy camp. 31/3/05 LIB-351 entered Oo Chit Kein at 2 am and arrested 6 village elders and sent them to the police station: 1) Myint Win; 2) Kyaw Naing Win; 3) Tun Myint; 4) Thein Hlaing; 5) Kyaw Moe Lwin; and 6) Nga Soe. 31/3/05 IB-116 Column 1, led by Hla Thein Shwe of Division 33, with approximately 120 soldiers entered Moo Township and engaged with local KNU troops at Ta Hoe Kwee. 1/4/05 Continuous fighting occurred in different places around Pa Na Gu Khee Kwee, Kli Sa Hta (at noon) and Ba Mae Lay (at 2 pm). 3/4/05 LIB-351, lead by Yeh Win, entered Oo Chit Khin Village and arrested a villager, Soe Nyunt, and immediately sent him to Military Strategy base camp and has yet to release him. 2/4/05 IB-116 Column 1 enters Ler Klah Village Tract and engages with KNU troops twice in the Pa Hi Soe Kho area. 3/4/05 Continuous fighting: Kay Khaw Hti (10 am), Maw Khee (2 pm), Wa May Bwa (Maw Per Kho Traw) (3 pm), and Naw Beh Day Kho (5 pm). 4/4/05 Fighting in Pa New Soe (7 am) and Pway Soe Kho (7:30 am). 18/5/05 LIB-264, IB-33, and DKBA troops combine at Maw Lay and Kyauk Pya Villages, then divided into 3 columns, each of which had approximately 80 soldiers. The columns depart to conduct search-and-destroy operations: Column 1 travelled to Htee Yar Khee Village. Column 2 travelled to Pyi Pyeh Village and Kyauk Chin Thit. Column 3 travelled to the abandoned village of Htee Ler Baw Hta. 22/5/05 DKBA troops ordered [by whom not specified] to leave their current camps in Maw Lay and Kyauk Pya, and return to central headquarters in Myaing Gyi Ngu. LIB-246 replaced them.


265

22/5/05 LIB-590 engaged with local KNU troops in Ka Haw Hta near Ma La Daw Village. 25/5/05 SPDC Strategic Commander [not named] ordered villagers working in Htee Ywa and Noh Kho Hti [relocation sites?] to return to their former villages. 27/5/05 DKBA troops entered Maw Lay and Kyauk Pya and forced the village headman to provide rice for their soldiers (150 baskets of rice from each village in the village tract). They also extorted 450,000 kyat from village tract residents, and they “warned them to keep silent.” 28/5/05 LIB-246 replaced DKBA troops in Maw Lay and Kyauk Pya, who returned to Ler Doh town. 7/6/05 LIB-789 arrives in Kaw Lar Wah Lu (with approximately 200 troops) to patrol Moo Township. 12/6/05 “The SPDC now asked 10 soldiers from each battalion to establish guerrilla forces to use them for special movement in the front line areas and at the same time they forcibly asked the villagers to build three guard houses between Maw Lay and Kyauk Pya Villages.”


266

Report Number KORD-2006-08 Date Submitted: 5 July 2006 Location: Close to southern Toungoo District State-defined Administrative Units State/Region Bago


Township Mone


Township Mu

Village Tract(s) Kheh Po Der Thae Baw Der Kyauk Pya Maw Keh Tha Per Kho Ka Mu Lo YuLo




Households 15

People 516

3,484


Southern Command MOC-10 LID-33 LIB-240, LIB-522, LIB-576, LIB-590, LIB-599


Southern Command MOC-16 LID-33 LIB-240, LIB-345, LIB-351, LIB-353, LIB-438, LIB522, LIB-531, LIB-536, LIB-590, LIB-599, LIB-607 IB-60


267






268

KORD-2006-08 ERA Summary 5 July 2006 Demographics 3,484 people (516 households) from 15 villages in northern Kyaukgyi Township, Pegu Division. KNU: Mone Township, Kler Lwi Htu District (adjacent to southern Taw Oo) Village tracts affected: Kheh Po Der, Thae Baw Der, Kyauk Pya, Maw Keh Tha Per Kho, Ka Mu Lo, and Yu Lo. The first four village tracts are hiding areas, while the last three are mixed administration areas. Rationale: Hiding Areas Between March and 5 May 5 battalions (approximately 500 men) under Division 33 and OCH10 have been active patrolling the northern part of the township. Patrols destroyed and/or confiscated almost all of the food resources (paddy, gardens, animals) and household materials. Troops [unspecified] shot and killed 9 people, including 1 porter. Another person was wounded but escaped east into the forest towards the Papun Township border. Total depend heavily on villagers in Papun Township for food. Some Total able to obtain food through contacts in lowland areas. Between January and May SPDC troops killed 17 and wounded five people, burnt a total of 90 houses in 7 villages as well as 19 paddy barns, 5,000 baskets of paddy, 200 baskets of rice. Troops looted 70 chickens, 23 pigs, and 15 cattle. The losses are equivalent to a 3-month supply of food for 1,000 people. Mixed Administration Areas Between 29 March and 3 April, 2 columns of troops from LIB-599 and LIB-590, under the command of Division 33, relayed orders prohibiting travel outside of the villages in the following village tracts: Maw Keh Tha Per Kho, Yu Lo, and Ka Mu Low. Orders first enforced on 3 April when soldiers shot 2 men while they were fishing outside of their village. The travel restriction remained in force until mid-May when the troops returned to Toungoo. Villagers in area had previously relocated from surrounding areas [concentrate dispersed populations]. Undocumented reports of forced labor and portering to support patrols in upland areas.


269

ERA Request 18 June 2006 Location: 7 village tracts: Kheh Po Der, Thae Baw Der, Kyauk Pya, Saw Tay Der, Maw Keh Tha Per Kho, Ka Mu Lo, Yu Lon in Mone Township, Kler Lwi Htu District. Period: 15 March – 13 May 2006 Military Units and Commanders Identified Light Infantry Division 33 LIB-599 LIB-590 MOC-10 LIB-576 LIB-522 LIB-240 Military Operations Highland area, hillside paddy cultivation, and gardens (betel nut, durian, dog fruit, and cardamom). Some of the population lives in hiding areas, whereas others live in mixed administration areas. Hiding areas: Saw Tay Der, Kheh Po Der, Thae Baw Der, Kyauk Pya Village Tracts. “People do not face with the SPDC as they are regarded as the enemy of the SPDC by the SPDC. They will be killed if they were found, and their belonging being destroyed or taken away at anytime found by the SPDC.” Mixed Administration areas: Maw Kheh Tha Per Kho, Yu Lo, Ka Mu village tracts. “Villagers were easily tortured and forced to work and to move from place to place [relocations] as the SPDC want.” 15 March LIB-599, led by Yeh Naing with 150 soldiers, left Tha Pyin Nyunt and Myaung Oo camps and entered Kheh Po Der, Saw Tay Der, Yu Lo, Ka Mu Lo Village Tracts and stationed troops in Saw Tay Der, Yu Lo, Ka Mu Lo, Yaw Khee, Khe Po Der Villages. Villagers fled to the jungle along Mu Traw District border (Karen State). Patrols lasted 10 days and then the troops moved to Ma La Daw and Ter Kweh Lay Kho camps for a short rest. During the patrols, troops destroyed all paddy, rice, plants in gardens and orchards, and household materials.


270

20 March Combined troops from LIB-522, LIB-240, and LIB 576 (approximately 300 soldiers) entered Htee Ler Baw Hta and Kwee Di Khaw Village Tracts and conducted patrols for 2 days. 23 March these troops divided themselves into three groups. One group patrolled Htee Ler Baw Hta and Kwee Di Khaw Village Tracts. During the patrols soldiers from this group shot at Nya Mu Hta [not clear whether wounded or killed]. The other two groups patrolled Kyauk Pa and Thae Baw Der Village Tracts. These troops shot and killed Saw Maung Kha in the Maw Li Lu area. These two groups then “spread out” to patrol Ka Pa Hta, Kyauk Pya, Ka Waw Kho, Thae Baw Der, Phlay Khee, Phlay Pa, To Pho Khee for the next ten days. “The mainly waited and check in the places where villagers have the cultivation” [to ambush them?]. Troops shot and killed Naw Bi Bay Phaw and wounded her granddaughter, Naw Ywa Eh Phaw. That same day, troops also shot and killed Saw Pho Hseh Pyah and Saw Ko Ro [units and location not specified]. They conduct search-and-destroy mission (as above) during this period. These two groups then move to Kaw La Wah Lu camp, rested briefly, and moved to midland areas to collect rations. 29 March Combined troops from LIB-599 and LIB-590 formed 2 columns. “These troops shot at two Maw La Daw villagers in their betel nut garden,” after which they returned to Maw La Daw camp, collected rations, and left to patrol Maw Keh Tha Per Kho, a midland area. “There they made an order said that no villagers can go outside the village and they will be killed if found outside the village which is in the area along the car road.” Order given to resides of Maw Keh Tha Per Kho, Yu Lo, and Ka Mu Lo Villages that are in close proximity to the road. Troops forced villagers to repair the road and to porter supplies. “Some of the husbands dare not face with the SPDC and family members have to separate.” 30 March LIB-599 and LIB-590 troops sent rations to Tha Pyin Nyunt using 16 trucks. They also “ordered” 100 carts to transport rations to Maw La Daw camp. 3 April LIB-599 and LIB-590 troops arrived in Yu Lo and Ka Mu Lo and shot 2 villagers, Saw Nah Doh and Saw Maung Aye, while they were fishing [in violation of the above order]. Troops then conducted search-and-destroy missions [primarily focusing on gardens which provide villagers with cash to purchase rice] in the following villages: Maw Khe Tha Per Kho, Ter Kweh Lay Kho, Yu Lo, Ka Mu Lo, Yaw Khee, Kheh Po Der, Thae Baw Der, and Saw Tay Der. 26 April Column 1 [combined troops from both LIB] entered Ter Kweh Lay Kho, “shot at a porter and took out his two eyes.” Column 2 entered Yu Lo and Ka Mu Lo that same days and shot at villagers; they also destroyed betel nut and durian trees and looted 15 cattle, which they took back to Tha Pyin Nyunt camp. 1 May LIB-576, LIB-522, and LIB-240, after resting briefly at Kaw Law Wah Lu, began patrols in Saw Kha Der, Ler Klah, Htee Ler Baw Hta Village Tracts. The patrols were ongoing through the ERA request date (5 July). 2 May Column 2 returned to Ter Kweh Lay Kho and shot at Saw Pho Hset, from this village.


271

13 May Column 2 entered Saw Tay Der, Kyauk Pya, and Thae Baw Der villages, shot at villagers at Kaw Waw Kho, and destroyed paddy, rice, and household materials. These troops patrolled the area from about one week and then travelled through Yu Lo, Ka Mu Lo, and Yaw Khee en route to Taw Oo District. Between January and the date of the needs assessment [not given], troops killed 17 villagers and wounded 5, burnt 90 houses and 19 paddy barns in 7 seven villages. 500 baskets of paddy, 200 baskets of rice, and 27 betel nut, durian, dog fruit, and cardamom gardens destroyed. 70 chickens and 23 pigs looted. Villages and People Affected No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Village Tract Kheh Po Der Kheh Po Der Thae Baw Der Thae Baw Der Thae Baw Der Thae Baw Der Kyauk Pya Kyauk Pya Kyauk Pya Saw Tay Der Saw Thay Der Maw Keh Tha Per Kho Maw Keh Tha Per Kho Ka Mu Lo Yu Lo Kwee Di Khaw Kwee Di Khaw

Village Kheh Po Der Phlay Khee Ka Waw Kho Thae Baw Der Phlay Khee Play Pa Ka Pa Hta Kyauk Pya Kaw Pho Khee Saw Tay Der Ter Kweh Lay Kho Maw Khe Tha Per Kho Yaw Khee Ka Mu Lo Yu Lo Saw Kher Khee Nya Mu Khee

Households 15 41 40 22 24 21 16 17 28 11 23 132 20 34 72 19 20 555

Total 105 245 299 176 236 163 122 119 164 56 141 770 134 234 520 128 122 3,734


272

ERA Distribution Summary 1 November 2006 Current Situation: Price 1 tin of rice rose from 7,500 kyat (time of request) to 9,000 kyat (time of distribution). Villagers only able to purchase rice in a place called Kwee Tu Khaw by secret arrangement between highland and lowland populations, typically only 2 times per week. Ongoing SPDC patrols prevented villagers from harvesting crops. 26 hillside paddy fields destroyed. SPDC troops stationed at outposts and can most of the fields in the vicinity. Between April and September villagers had to flee 4-5 times. Between June and September at least 3 people shot and killed, more than 100 houses burnt or destroyed, domestic animals looted and/or eaten, extorted more than 1,000,000 kyat, requisitioned bullock carts, forced villagers to serve as porters and to fence villages, fired mortars into hiding areas. April n.d. General Khin Soe orders 7 villages to relocate to a sub-town between Hteik Htu and Thu Ka Ba stating that gold mining operations will begin there enabling them to work there. LIB-438 commander, Myint Thein Aung, extorted 15,000 kyat from every household, allegedly to compensate people already there. The total amount collected: 7,275,000 kyat from 485 households in 7 villages. Mying Thein Aung, after collecting the money, moved to another area taking the money with him. Camp Locations 1) Tha Phay Nyunt 2) Hsaw Wa Der 3) Ma La Daw 4) Wee Li Soe 5) Pan Kan Kweh Doung 6) Ta Thwa Kho 7) Shan Ywa 8) Mi Tan Daw 9) Myaung Oo 10) Htee To Lo 11) Ye O Zin – LIB-590 12) Kaw Law Wah Lu 13) Taung Ko Lone 14) Aung Laung Sein 15) Htone Daw – LIB-599 16) Kjun Bin Seik Tha Htay Gone 17) Kyaung Pyan 18) Maw Lay


273

19) Ta Ler Dae 20) Htee Klei Lo Klo 21) Than Bo – IB-60 22) Tha Phay Gone – LIB-351 23) Hsaw Mi Lu 24) Ko Pla Lay Kho 25) Mu That Monastery 26) Ka Baw Soe 27) Ler Taw Tha Commanders Identified: OCH-16: Commander General That Oo Military Southern Command: Major General Ko Ko LIB-599: BC Aung Ko Oo LIB-590: n/a IB-60: n/a LIB-351: n/a Military Strategy Commander: Kyi Soe based at Ma La Daw Myaung Oo camp: Hla Myo Oo (in charge) Mi Tan Daw camp: Pho Hsaung (in charge) SPDC Operations Since ERA Request 7/6/06 LIB-240 and LIB-522, under OCH-16, based at Ma La Daw, forced 10 households in Ta Kweh Lay Kho Village to move to Ma La Daw and Upper Ma La Daw Village. LIB-240 and LIB-522 troops also forced villagers to clear the road from Ma La Da to Tha Phay Nyunt. 7/5/06 LIB-599 BC and his section officer, Ye Min, based at the Kyun Bin Seik military camp, extorted 3 baskets of (Kauk Kyi) rice, 6 baskets of (Kauk Ngel) rice, and 2 bottles of cooking oil from Noh Nya La village. 15/6/06 LIB-599 extorted money from the owners of 93 paddy huts (3,000 kyat/hut) in Naung Bo Village Tract. LIB-599 troops also requisitioned 200 bullock carts from Htaw Tha Wa, Tha Phya Nyunt, and Nyung Bin Thar Village Tracts. 23/6/06 LIB-536 and LIB-351, under OCH-15, gathered at Mu Thet and departed from Kheh Der Kho. The following day, the combined troops entered Saw Kha Der Village Tract and burned the village there. 3 pm that afternoon, troops shot at Saw Wee Moo but missed. The troops remained in the Saw Kha Der Village Tract from 3 days, during which they ate 7 pigs and 30 chickens. They returned to Mu That military camp on the 28th. 23/6/06 LIB-522 (approximately 100 soldiers) left Ma La Daw camp carrying landmines, entered Ka Pa Hta Village the following day, and arrested Naw Kwee Kwee and Saw Bi Au. Troops killed Saw Bi Au. They then left from Ta Law Plo and Thi Mi Baw Villages.


274

26/6/06 LIB-522 troops fired mortars into IDP hiding places. 27/6/06 LIB-522 went to Thae Baw Der Village Tract, Ka Waw Kho the next day, Saw Tay Der the following one, and returned to Ma La Daw camp on the 30th. 11/7/06 LIB-522 left Ma La Daw travelled to Saw Tay Der Village and destroyed Saw Lu Hseh’s house, taking 3 baskets of rice and 2 cooking pots. 27/7/06 LIB-607, under OCH-16, with approximately 50 men, entered Kyauk Tan. The following day these troops burned 16 paddy huts and filled in their water wells. IB-493 troops blocked villagers’ access to their working sites [while this was occurring?]. 7/8/06 Division-33, with 19 bullock carts, arrived at IB-60 base. The following days troops arrived at Maw Lay Kho and another in Mu Thet Village “targeted to clean Mone Township area.” 7/8/06 LIB-590, led by Aung Tun Oo, with approximately 20 soldiers, entered Lu Ah village and arrested 5 people: 1) Saw Pho Tha Htoo; 2) Saw Kyaw Htoo; 3) Saw Lay Doh; 4) Saw Tha Ya Gone; 5) Saw Tun Naing Oo. Troops also entered Pho Thaung Suu Village and extorted 1,000,000 kyat. Two villagers, Saw Pho Tha Htoo and Saw Kyaw Htoo, were sent to Taw Oo Town. 9/8/06 Combined troops from LIB-345 and LIB-353, under OCH-15, with about 200 soldiers, left Mu Thet for the Saw Kha Der area and patrolled the area around Bway Kho Lu Village until 12/8/06. 10-11/8/06 Troops [not specified] under OCH-16, based in Phlay Hsa Lo and Ma Law Daw, left and entered Yu Lo and Ka Mu Lo Villages, and forced residents to relocate on the 11th. Troops burnt 3 houses and destroyed 32 more [pulled down?]. The troops then destroyed the bridge (known as Kaung Kin Tha Tar) on Ka Mu Lo and Yu Lo rivers [unclear]. 22/8/06 LIB-599 instructed villagers in Ta Khaw Pwa Village Tract to build double fences around their villages. 24/8/06 Division 66 troops, led by Than Oo, shot and killed Saw Mae Lone (22 years old) of Taw Pu Village. 26/8/06 Division Commander, Ko Ko, instructed his front line soldiers to force villagers to build double-fences around their own villages. 15/9/06 LIB-599 forced 28 people from each village in Mi Tan Daw Village Tract to porter military rations. 18/9/06 LIB93, led by Thein Htay, arrested Saw Wah Shi of Ma La Daw Village, tortured and then killed him.


275

18/9/06 OCH-16 commander, That Oo, instructed LIB-599 commander, Aung Ko Oo, to send rations to Kaw Lar Wah Lu camp. He requisitioned 27 bullock carts and 280 people from Mone town, 16 bullock carts and 157 people from Mi Tan Daw, 11 bullock carts and 112 people from Myo Yo Gyi, 6 bullock carts and 77 people from Kjun Daw, 6 bullock carts and 60 people from Moe Tway, 21 bullock carts and 226 people from Nyung Bin Thar, 11 bullock carts and 120 people from Ta Khaw Pwa, 6 bullock carts and 27 people from Gone Ni to porter supplies. SPDC troops reportedly established 2 more camps at Saw Tay Der and Ka Pa Hta Villages. Preparations under way to begin logging in the Ta Kweh Lay Kho region.


276

Report Number KORD-2006-16 Date Submitted: 25 October 2006 Location: East of Mone, west of Yunzalin River, and north of Kyaukgyi – Saw Hta Road. State-defined Administrative Units State/Region Bago


Township Mone


Township Mu

Village Tract(s) Kwee Di Khaw Ler Klah Saw Kha Der Htee Ler Baw HTa




Households 21

People 628

3,794


Southern Command MOC-15, MOC-16 LIB-345, LIB-351, LIB-353, LIB-507, LIB-522, LIB536, LIB-568, LIB-590, LIB-599 IB-68, IB-240, IB-241

Military Units Identified [Distribution Report – if included] Regional Command Military Operations Command Light Infantry Division Light Infantry Battalions

MOC-16 LIB-96, LIB-241, LIB-242, LIB-323, LIB-507, LIB522, LIB-569

Infantry Battalions Other


277






278

KORD-2006-16 ERA Request Summary 25 October 2006 Demographics: 3,794 people (628 households) from 21 villages in Mone Township, Pegu Division (KNU: Kler Lwi Htoo District, Mone Township) East of Mone town, west of Yunzalin River, and north of Kyaukgyi – Saw Hta Road. Hillside cultivation, and gardens (betel-nut, durian, dog fruit), and some day labor Black area: villagers typically flee whenever SPDC troops patrol. Rationale: LIB-522, LIB-568, LIB-507 and IB0-240, IB-241, IB-68 of OCH-16 & LIB-345, LIB-353, LIB536, and LIB-351 of OCH-15 & LIB-599 and LIB-590 of SCH have been patrolling area since 23 June to date. Reports of indiscriminate shooting of civilians, mortar attacks on areas where Total thought to be hiding, and widespread use of landmines where villagers travel. “The transportation of military supplies used 107 bullock carts and 1,067 people from lowland and villagers along the route have fled into the jungle since SPDC troops patrolled along.” 2 villagers (1 male and 1 female) arrested on 24 June. Combined troops from LIB-522 and LIB528 killed the man and took the female to their basecamp. On 1 October, LIB-522 troops shot and killed a woman (48 years of age). Ongoing SPDC patrols have prevented Total from accessing hidden caches of paddy and other food sources. 3,240 baskets of paddy, 380 baskets of rice, 34 pigs, and 185 chickens lost.


279

ERA Request Location: - Kwee Di Khaw, Ler Klah, Saw Kha Der, and Htee Ler Baw Hta village tracts in Mone Township of Kler Lwi Htu District (see maps) Period Covered: 23 June 2006 – 25 October 2006 Military Units Identified: -

OCH-16: LIB-522, LIB-568, LIB-507, IB-240, IB-241, IB-60 OCH-15: LIB-345, LIB-353, LIB-536, LIB-351 SCH (under OCH?): LIB-599, LIB-590

Military Operations: 23/6/Troops from LIB-536 and LIB-351 (OCH-15) left Mu Thae camp and headed towards Kheh Ka Kho. 24/6 The above troops entered Saw Kha Der and Ler Klah Village Tracts, where the following villages are located: Klaw Khee, Thay Nweh Khee, Saw Kha Der, Ler Klah, Ta Waw Pu, Ler Htaw Der, Htee Kho, Saw Khee, Mee Ya Htah, and Mu Lu Kho. “There they shot at villagers as they found, but fortunately no one got shot.” Patrols lasted five days. 28/6 The above troops returned to Mu Thae camp. 26/6 IB-241, IB-240, and IB-69 (OCH-16) begin patrols in Htee Ler Baw Hta and Ler Klah Village Tracts, where the following villagers are located: Ler Klah, Ta Wa Pu, Ler Htaw Der, Htee Kho, Saw Khee, Mee Ya Htah, Ma Lu Kho, Thay Khay Lu, Ter Mu Khee, Nwah Htee, Nwah Hta, and Wa Tho Kho. They patrolled the area until 1 July. 23/6 LIB-522 and LIB-568 troops combined to carry out joint operations (approximately 100 soldiers). 24/6 these troops entered Kha Pa Hta “with a lot of landmines” and arrested 2 villagers (Naw Kwee Kwee and Saw Bi Or). “Then they killed the man and took the woman to Ko Ni, which is the lowland area.” Patrols continued in the areas around Saw Kher Khee, Nya Mu Khee, Tae Na Hta, Gi Blay Hta, Ler Wah Lu, and Naw Lay Kho Villages in Khwee Di Khaw Village Tract. 26/6 troops shell mortars into areas where Total are fleeing and lay landmines along the paths they commonly use to travel. 28/6 The above troops move to Thae Baw Der.


280

29/6 The above troops move to Saw Thay Der. 30/6 The above troops return to Ma La Daw. 11/7 These same troops enter the Wah Khee and later move to Kwee Di Kho Village Tract where they conducted continuous patrols until 2 August. 9/8 LIB-345 and LIB-533 (OCH-15) combined troops (200 soldiers) left to conduct operations in Mu Thae area. 10/8 these troops arrive in Saw Kha Der Village Tract and patrol the area for one week. 16/8 August these troops return to Mu Thae camp. 13/8 LIB-507 troops from Maw Lay and Kyauk Lya traveled to Htee Ler Baw Hta Village Tract and established a new base between Ler Taw Tha and Maw Pha Leh, which is close to villagers’ paddy fields and gardens. Villagers from Thay Khay Lu, Ter Mu Khee, Nwah Khee, Nwah Hta, and Wa Tho Kho flee as a result. 26/8 LIB-599 and LIB-590 combined troops leave Kyauk Pya and Maw Lay and enter the Ler Klah Village Tract to conduct patrols around the following villages: Ler Klah, Ta Waw Pu, Ler Htaw Der, Htee Kho, Saw Khee, Mee Ya Htah, and Maw Lu Kho. Villagers flee. 31/8 troops return to Kaw La Wah Lu. 9/9 OCH-15 instructs LIB-599 to transport rations to Kaw La Wah Lu camp. LIB-599 orders villagers from lowland areas to provide bullock carts (107 total) and labor (1,607 people total) to complete the task. They do so on 16 September. LIB-599 troops patrol the Kwee Di Kha Village Tract to provide security and villagers again flee. 28/9 [unspecified] troops leave Paw Khay Kho and patrol the Mu Traw District. 1 October, these troops enter the Saw Kha Der Village Tract and conduct patrols. 8 October these troops return to Mu Thae camp. 1/10 LIB-522 troops (OCH-16) enter the Thae Baw Der Village Tract and shot Saw Eh Blu (age 48) from Thae Baw Der Village. “He died at once.” These troops then patrolled Kwee Di Khaw Village Tract until 5 October. Villagers go into hiding. Impact: Total are known to have lost 3,240 baskets of paddy, 380 baskets of rice, 34 pigs, and 185 chickens. Most of the Total from Kwee Di Khaw Village Tract move to Traw Lo valley. Most of the Total from Htee Ler Baw Hta and Ler Klah Village Tracts move to Saw Khee. Most of the Total from Saw Kha Der Village Tract moved to Ta Pway Lay Kho. Some remained in hiding whereas others went to other villages.


281

Total are eating “soft rice” and those with money can purchase food from Mu Thae and Kwee Di Khaw. Villages and People Affected No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

Village Tract Kwee Di Khaw Kwee Di Khaw Kwee Di Khaw Kwee Di Khaw Kwee Di Khaw Kwee Di Khaw Ler Klah Ler Klah Ler Klah Ler Klah Ler Klah Ler Klah Ler Klah Saw Kha Der Saw Kha Der Saw Kha Der Htee Ler Baw Hta Htee Ler Baw Hta Htee Ler Baw Hta Htee Ler Baw Hta Htee Ler Baw Hta

Village Saw Kher Khee Nya Mu Khee Tae Na Hta Gi Blay Hta Ler Wah Lu Nwah Law Kho Ler Klah Ta Waw Pu Ler Htaw Der Htee Kho Saw Khee Mee Ya Htah Maw Lu Kho Thay Nweh Khee Klaw Khee Saw Kha Der Thay Khay Lu Ter Mu Khee Nwah Khee Nawah Hta Wa Tho Kho

Households 14 19 18 16 11 72 12 22 42 46 39 39 31 34 35 30 24 22 18 61 23 628

Total 104 115 75 97 65 427 73 134 218 240 202 198 187 240 246 210 127 150 117 390 179 3,794


282

KORD-2006-16 Distribution Summary 17 April 2007 Logistics: 4 December 2006 23 January 2007 (50 days) Beneficiaries: 6 HH more than original request. 46% female and 18% of total under 10 years of age Current Situation: Continuous patrols from January through the harvest have required villagers to regularly abandon fields and gardens. SPDC troops destroyed and/or pillaged personal belongings. Military Units, Locations, and Commanders: MOC-16 Headquarters: That Oo LIB-323 Column 1, led by Win Zin Tun, based at Phy Ro Kyo camp LIB-323 Tin Aung Myint, Kwee Dae Khaw camp commander LIB-323 Han Zaw Min, Mah Lah Dah camp commander LIB-507 Htay Lin Battalion Operations commander LIB-507 Myo Myint Aung, Htee Wa Bway camp commander LIB-96 Mya Kho, Battalion Operations commander (Column 1) LIB-96 That Naing Oo, Battalion Operations commander (Column 2) LIB-241 Kyaw Thu, Battalion Operations commander (Column 1) LIB-241 Tin Soe, Battalion Operations commander (Column 2) Area of operations: Phlay Hsa Lo and Ko Phla Lo Klo LIB-522 Myint Lwin, Column 1 commander Area of operation: Mu That LIB-522 Nyan Oo, Column 1 commander Area of operations: Mu That LIB-242 Aung Kyaw Moe, Column 1 commander Based at Mu That camp LIB-242 Zaw Lin Oo, Column 2 commander Based at Hsaw Me Lu camp LIB-569 Soe Pain, Battalion Operations commander:


283

“Since the beginning of 2006, the SPDC entered to Moo Township area and kept patrolling in the area until harvest time. The villagers have been fleeing constantly and still not dare to go back and to collect their crops even the harvest time. At the time of running, the SPDC stolen and destroyed and took all the villagers’ property as they found. The aims of the SPDC operation in the area is not only to destroy the villagers’ property and the shelter, but also shot killed the villagers on site. Wherever they reached these the SPDC set up a lot of landmines where the villagers usually travel, under the banana tree, under the paddy, under paddy husk. As a result, villagers had fled to many different places for life security…”


284

Report Number CIDKP-2006-02 Date Submitted: 31 March 2006 Location: Southeast of Mone, along the Kyaukgyi – Saw Hta Road State-defined Administrative Units State/Region Bago


Township Mone


Township Mu

Village Tract(s) Hsaw Kar Der Ler Klar Htee Ler Baw Hta Kwee De KAw


District Kler Lwee Htoo


Households 20

People 499

3,577


Southern Command

LIB-116, LIB-351, LIB-599 IB-60




285






286

CIDKP-2006-02 ERA Request Summary 31 March 2006 Demographics: 3,577 people (499 households) in 20 villages in Kyaukgyi Township, Pegu Division (KNU: Hsaw Kare Der, Ler Kla Htee Ler Baw Hta and Kwee De Kaw Village Tracts in Mone Township, Nyaunglebin (Kler Lwee Htoo) District). Target population includes 209 girls and 252 boys under 5 years of age and 1,549 females and 1,567 males over 5 years of age. Area runs along the Kyaukgyi – Saw Hta Car Road and South-east of Mone Town. Subject to counter-insurgency operations since the mid-1970s. Rationale: A joint force of about 650 SPDC troops from IB-60, LIB-116, and LIB-351 divided into 2 columns and conducted “search-and-destroy” patrols at the end of last year’s harvest (20 November – 15 December, 2005). Deliberate destruction of crops combined with fear caused by heavy artillery attacks into paddy fields and hiding sites, resulting in a total of 168 paddy farms with a potential to produce 10,000 baskets of paddy. Total equivalent to provide rice supplies for 2,200 people for 3 months. During the first-half of February 2006, 800 troops from the above battalions plus LIB-599 deployed troops on another “search-and-destroy” patrol. 1 villager was shot dead, 3 others wounded, 29 houses burned as well as 31 paddy barns holding over 2,770 baskets. Total losses equivalent to rice supplies for 900 people for over one month.


287

ERA Request 31 March 2006 Terrain consists almost entirely of steep hills and valleys. Livelihoods: betel nut and leaf, dog fruit, and durian. Most of the plantations destroyed during the “Four Cuts” operations, which began in 1975-1977. Serial displacement followed due to subsequent campaigns, e.g. “Scorched Earth Campaign” (1997), and establishment of new military camps. Area targeted from “search-and-destroy” operations at least once every 2-3 years.

Military Operations: 20/11/05 Approximately 650 troops from LIB-116, LIB-351, and IB-60 calling them selves “Pyaung Shin” (clean everything out), led by Major Khin Maung Lwin, Major Moe Hhein, and Major Thein Oo [respectively?] entered the following village tracts: Hsaw Kar Der, Ler Klar, Htee Ler Baw Hta, and Kwee Di Kaw. The troops divided into 2 columns and conducted patrols in the following area: LIB-351 (Hsaw Kar Der and Ler Klar), and IB-60 as well as LIB-116 (Htee Ler Baw Hta and Kwee Di Kaw). Patrols lasted 25 days and withdrew on 15 December 2005. Troops and artillery attacks destroyed: 31 paddy farms in Hsaw Kar Der (typically produces (2,400 baskets), 36 paddy farms in Ler Klar (2,700 basktects), 58 paddy farms in Htee Ler Baw Hta (3,200 baskets), and 43 paddy farms in Kwee Di Kaw (2,900 baskets) Village Tracts. 4 February 2006 Approximately 800 combined troops from IB-60, LIB-116, LIB-351, and LIB599 led by Col. Win Htay entered Hsaw Kar Der, Ler Klar, Htee Ler Baw Hta, Mee Ya Hta, and Kwee Di Kaw Village Tracts. One artillery company [not identified] established a position on Pau Mu Hta hill and fired shells. No one was injured, but residents fled to hiding areas. “Searchand-Destroy” operations conducted for 16 days, after which troops returned to Than Bo and Shwe Lan Taung camps. During these operations, troops [not identified] located and shot villagers in the Htee Daw Mu Hta hiding site: Saw Kler Say (killed); Saw Law Khi, Saw Ka Tar, and Saw Loe Noh wounded. During these operations, troops burnt down the following (by village tract): 29 houses in Hsaw Kar Der and Ler Klar, 9 paddy barns containing 748 baskets of paddy in Hsaw Kar Der, 6 paddy farms containing 789 baskets of paddy in Ler Klar, 16 paddy barns containing 1,020 baskets of paddy in Htee Ler Baw Hta, 11 paddy barns with 964 baskets of paddy in Kwee Di Kaw. Troops found 3 caches belonging to Saw Eh Lweh, Daw Du Doo, and Naw Gay Paw and looted, valued at approximately 1.5 million kyat.


288

Villages and People Affected No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Village Tract Hsaw Kar Der Hsaw Kar Der Hsaw Kar Der Hsaw Kar Der Ler Klar Ler Klar Ler Klar Ler Klar Ler Klar Ler Klar Ler Klar Htee Ler Baw Hta Htee Ler Baw Hta Htee Ler Baw Hta Htee Ler Baw Hta Kwee De Kaw Kwee De Kaw Kwee De Kaw Kwee De Kaw Kwee De Kaw

Village Thay Nee Khi Klaw Khi Hsaw Kar Der H[t]ee Oo Mee Ya Hta Ler Klar Ta Wor Pu Ler Taw Der Hsaw Khi Htee Kho Maw Lu Kho Htee Taw Khi Thay Kay Lu Nwa Htu Ta Mu Khi Hsaw Kher Khi Nya Mu Khi Gi Blay Hti Ler Wah Lu Tae Nar Hta

Households 17 15 20 16 31 10 12 21 32 43 30 5 5 70 28 16 19 17 13 79 499

M>5 54 47 69 52 90 33 36 63 100 121 88 17 18 239 89 58 61 56 38 238 1,567

F>5 66 53 69 58 91 30 42 59 92 131 92 15 15 195 93 57 63 58 37 233 1,549

M5 53 25 22 146 157 129 90 43 84 53 139 107 1,048

M10

M10

M10

M5 53 25 22 146 157 129 90 43 84 53 139 107 1,048

M5 314

M 5 294 518 349

F5 135 192 343 139 809

M5 239 108 84 24 42 77 139 107 72 40 33 33 26 99 34 96 50 52 99 1,454

M5 256

M5 218 125 64 37 24 24 177 207 84 64 64 35 136 47 139 62 123 74 1,759

M5

M5 266 238 105 141 323 75 1,148

M5 112

M5 126 89 190 68 79 128 196 79 145 212 186 1,498

M5 107 88 76 113 175 559

M5 74 110 114 298

M5 164 208 126 149 49 48 127 49 108 80 49 58 1,215

M10 147 62 58 81 121 56 73 56 90 75 819

F5 206 211 75 492

F5 93 63 168 41 54 40 459

M 5 M 5 years of age. The entire area is considered a “black area” in which SPDC forbids civilians to stay. Tough mountainous terrain, dense jungle and almost complete absence of flat land for cultivation.

Rationale: December 2005 SPDC, KnSO, and KNPLF troops deployed in 4 groups west of Maw Chi resulting in an unknown number of people fleeing the area, for unspecified lengths of time, deep in the jungle. Constant deployments have also spontaneously targeted people who fled to Karen State and are in hiding sites. 46 rice barns destroyed within their village and 16 others found/destroyed in the jungle. An undocumented amount of food abandoned and destroyed, while people are scared to return because of landmines. 2 cases of forced portering affected 15 people documented. 1 village burnt down, though it is not clear where these people fled to and whether they are included in the request. 3 skirmishes with KNPP forces documented. Military Operations: 2004 SPDC assigns KnSO to serve as “watchdog” for the region. It patrols with SPDC troops looking for the KNPP, as the region serves as the “hub” of its military operations. People constantly on the move as a result. 11/2005 Many adult IDPs return to fields to prepare for next season’s crops despite land mines. Unable to complete due to operations below and destruction of food caches. 10/12/2005 Joint SPDC, KNPLF, KnSO operation (150 troops), led by Major Myo Myint Aung of LIB-424, launched area-clearing operations. Based in Boo Ko. The seized 6 villagers from Sho Daw Kho and made them serve as guides. Pa Ke Me escaped. The fate of the other 5 is unknown. (Four columns from Pasaung, Mawchi, and Pruso).


591

12/12/2005 Joint force (120 soldiers), led by Major Myo Myint Aung, with two companies from LIB-421 with one section from KNSO, led by Saw Jeh, began patrols on 1/12/05. Firefight with KNPP on this date at Kye Khee. 2 companies from LIB-428 (150 soldiers), led by Column Commander Win Zaw, left Pasaung and reach Pa Haw Koh on 17/12/2005. They rounded up 9 villagers (men and women) and interrogated them and made them serve as porters for the column. 16/12/2005 Third column, led by Maj. Htun Htun Win, with two companies from LIB-426 (160 troops) and one KNPLF company, led by Company Commander Khee No, commenced patrols in Ho Ya, Kay Kaw, and Phah Poh village areas in Pruso Township—prior to firefight on this date. 18/12/2005 Firefight with KNPP where Upper and Lower Boo Ko River meet. 23/12/2005 Firefight between the column and Karenni Army at Ge Waw Be Village. The joint force burnt down the village.


592

Villages and People Affected No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Village Htathuday Nuthukee Lehkee Padopal Wewa Hpahpu Htokkahto Gaylo

Households 13 18 37 16 95 47 74 38 338

M>5 26 42 65 33 259 102 138 103 768

F>5 20 38 76 26 273 114 151 102 800

M5 124 54 49

F>5 128 58 46

M