feasibility of incentives and disincentives schemes to

INTEGRATED COASTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROJECT ADB Loan No. 2311-PHI / GEF Grant No. 0071-PHI

Department of Environment and Natural Resources Republic of the Philippines

FEASIBILITY OF INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES SCHEMES TO PROMOTE COASTAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

March 2012

Agriconsulting S.p.A. in association with CEST Incorporated and NJS Consultants Co. Ltd.

SR 00.20.04 ISBN No.:

SR 00-20-03

INTEGRATED COASTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROJECT PROJECT MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS

Table of Contents

Cover Page................................................................................................................................... 1 Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................... 2 List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ 3 List of Figures............................................................................................................................... 4 List of Appendices ........................................................................................................................ 5 Executive Summary...................................................................................................................... 6 I. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................... 9 II. METHODS...................................................................................................................10 III. RESULT.................................................................................................................................... 11 IV. DISCUSSION............................................................................................................................ 26 V. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED..........................................................................................28 VI. RECOMMENDATION...................................................................................................29 VII.REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................... 30 VIII. APPENDICES...........................................................................................................................31

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List of Tables No.

Title

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Regions and Municipalities where interviews were conducted in this study with corresponding number of respondents

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List of Figures No.

Title

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1

The ICRM Specialist and Provincial ICRM Specialist during data gathering with the Lady MAO and Agriculture Technologist in Siquijor, Siquijor.

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2

The ICRM Specialist with the MAO, PO President and PEDO PNP discussing survey items in Barili, Cebu.

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Project Management Consultants with the Mayor and MAO of Aroroy, Masbate and PPIU during the incentives- disincentive survey.

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List of Appendices Letter

Title

Page

A

Survey form used in this study

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B

Municipalities where interviews were conducted in this study, with names of respondents and their positions

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Executive Summary The approach taken here is to analyze incentive-disincentive practices at the local level, because this is where most incentives must have their impact on ground. Incentives must serve to correct problems perceived by people in the vicinity of areas which are of particular importance for conserving coastal resources, developed at the community level, and applied within the context of local social organizations. Many of the LGUs around the country are practicing varied modes and levels of incentive-disincentives schemes to encourage stakeholders to do desirable things for the sustainable use of our coastal resources. However, very few of these practices are documented and get analyzed in order to improve and promote its operations for the optimum benefits of municipalities and community members. It is also desirable that different types of incentivedisincentives be known to and expanded to other locations of the country. Thus the main objective of this survey is to document existing incentive and disincentive schemes being practiced by municipal LGUs for possible adoption to other LGUs. Specific objectives are: (1) to document incentive-disincentive practices and analyze successful practices of LGUs; (2) to identify problems in the implementation of incentive-disincentive schemes at local level; and give recommendations for improvement and adoption of such practices to other areas of the country. A total of 54 respondents were interviewed from 21 municipalities, consisting 40% of the total number of municipalities under the project and 72% of ICRMP LGUs identified practicing incentives and disincentives. Case studies are presented in narrative form following the format of McNeely (1988) on incentives and disincentives at the community level. Results showed that in order to compensate villagers for lost resources like establishment of protected zones and relocation of houses, they may be provided directly with cash in various forms or given access to some of the biological resources of the protected area, including such things as access to building materials through CBFM, livelihood, and conservation projects. A variant of this approach is to provide local communities with the profits from both consumptive and nonconsumptive uses of portions of the protected area employing user’s fee. The use of such provides incentives to concerned stakeholders while waiting for the spill over effect of the core-zones of MPAs. Some incentives, like the incentive provided by Masbate City in giving cash for the return of marine turtles to the sea resulted to fishermen, instead of fishing, looked for sea turtles to be presented to LGU since the pay is more lucrative than fishing. In this case, the government has bought the sea turtle resource in a higher value (100 pesos/kilo) than it should be which caused more of the resource to be demanded, because the price is higher than it otherwise would be. This type of incentive made things worse, having a negative instead of positive impact to the environment and resources. Another negative feedback was that government provided gillnets to fishermen who would likely be affected by the prohibition of the use of trammel nets (3-walled gillnet). It turned out that the fishermen assembled trammel nets out of suppose to be single-walled gillnets given to them by the government, resulting to more uncontrolled fishing and exploitation of fish resources. Incentive and disincentive schemes may not be sustainable if it is dependent on user’s fee and fines. This was aired by municipalities who have experienced significant periodic downtrends of number of visiting tourist, thereby affecting their funds for incentives. Economic crises makes sustainability of A griconsulting – CEST – NJS

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funding unstable since economic crises greatly affects tourism where user’s fee is too much depended on. On the other hand, incentive which depends on fines collected from violators faces problems when the municipal waters became clean of violators, due to incremental effective law enforcement. The LGU incentive and disincentive practices were supported by Executive Orders and Ordinances, though some were still at different proposal stages. However, it was apparent that some documents need improvement and it also need to be supported by appropriate policies at the national level. Additional incentives are also relevant at the national level, for both the government institutions involved in managing coastal resources and the institutions whose activities frequently involve external effects on coastal resources. Finally, economic incentives often require support from the international community, primarily in terms of technical assistance, information, commodities agreements, and various measures reflecting existence value as perceived by the international community; these are most relevant for developing countries like the Philippines.

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN IMPLEMENTING INCENTIVE AND DISINCENTIVE SCHEMES 1. Some dive shop owners refused to pay user’s fee on time and the right amount to barangay and municipal LGUs. This issue delays and decreases funds intended for incentives to ground root implementers of ICRM. 2. Barangay level POs have problems in working attitudes. 3. Turn-over of fines and user’s fee collected from barangay to municipality takes too long, delaying incentives to reach on-ground. 4. Municipality without user’s fee mechanism has meager or no financial resources to fund incentive and disincentive schemes. 5. Some LGUs are implementing incentives and disincentive schemes, but legal and other document supporting the scheme are insufficient, like ordinance or executive order must contain specific amount to be paid for specific kind of mammal returned to the sea. 6. Proper documentation for impact of incentives and disincentive schemes is undermined. This includes efficient monitoring and evaluation schemes on the part of LGUs. 7. Some incentive schemes turned out to have negative impacts to fisheries and coastal resources, e.g., sea turtles and gill net incentives. 8. Incentive and disincentive schemes may not be sustainable if it is dependent on user’s fee and fines.

RECOMMENDATION 1. Strict law enforcement in collecting the user’s fee and violation fines. Pass resolution urging dive shop owners to pay fees before diving, specifying violations and penalties; give official A griconsulting – CEST – NJS

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copies and receipt thereof from dive shop owners. Tickets should be paid at the municipal treasurer before diving. Enforce no permit no dive policy. 2. Barangay PO should be subjected to value formation trainings and the like in order to perform duties and responsibilities effectively. 3. The Barangay Treasurer should remit only net income to municipality, so that share of local barangay and PO is immediately deducted from the total remittable amount. 4. Barangay Tanods with tasks like guarding protected areas or resources generating user’s fee should have defined incentives schemes. More incentive efforts and budget must be directed to spring conservation, solid waste management, and other upland sustainable development activities. 5. There was suggestion that management of the Guilotongan MPA in Cebu and the user’s fee must be managed by the community instead of lease system with the business sector. A detailed study of this case must be conducted. 6. Dive shops and LGU/barangay should talk, level off, and agree with incentive and management schemes. 7. Incentive schemes must be monitored for its impact and for its future improvement. 8. An incentive scheme must be properly documented to determine before and after impact to be supported by legal framework with well defined recipients, amount and source of budget. 9. LGU must use results of their incentive assessments/monitoring and evaluation to see if the scheme provides positive results in accordance with the goals and objectives of the incentive-disincentive practices. 10. Coordination with the Office of Tourism of the municipality should be enhanced and include them within ICRM circle. (Tourism Officer must be added to MPDC-MAO-MENRO triad in ICRM), 11. Incentive-disincentive study must be expanded to cover all municipalities and types of incentives across the country. 12. Source of fund for incentive must be diverse, not only fines and user’s fees, but also from Annual Investment Plans and or Regular Fund from LGU. March 2012

BENJAMIN J. GONZALES, Ph.D. ICRM Specialist/DTL, ICRMP Western Philippines University Palawan, Philippines A griconsulting – CEST – NJS

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I.

INTRODUCTION

In economics and sociology, an incentive is any factor (financial or non-financial) that enables or motivates a particular course of action, or counts as a reason for preferring one choice to the alternatives (FWPC Act 1997). It is an expectation that encourages people to behave in a certain way. Ultimately, incentives aim to provide value for money and contribute to organizational success. Incentives motivate desired behaviour, and disincentives discourage behaviour which is not desired. An incentive incites or motivates governments, local people, and international organizations to practice good coastal resource management. Incentives are used to divert resources such as land, capital, and labor towards conserving biological resources, and to facilitate the participation of an individual or group which will benefit these resources. A perverse incentive is one which induces behaviour which depletes biological diversity, though of course such perversity is in the eyes of the beholder (Mcneely 1988). Economic incentives can take a large number of forms and can be categorized in several different ways. There are various sorts of incentives that might be relevant at community, national, and international levels. Some of the categories would fit as easily in one place, while the most effective incentives frequently fall in more than one category. Most incentive packages would contain a mix of these. A disincentive is any inducement or mechanism designed to discourage governments, local people, corporations, and international organizations from depleting biological diversity. Disincentives include taxes, fines and penalties of other types (which are usually administered through legislation) as well as public opinion or peer pressure. Together, incentives and disincentives provide the carrot and the stick for motivating behaviour that will conserve biological resources for sustainable development. A major objective of using incentives is to equalize the uneven distribution of the costs and benefits of conserving biological resources; rather than suppressing the symptoms of resource misallocation, they are intended to address the cause of such abuses through providing a means of reaching compromise on substantive environmental conflicts (Sorensen, et al., 1984). They maintain and improve the situation by mitigating anticipated negative impacts on local people by regulations controlling exploitation of biological resources, and compensate people for any extraordinary losses suffered through such controls, and by rewarding the local people who assume externalities through which the larger public benefits. Finally, they can open up the decision-making process to the people who are most directly affected by conservation of biological resources. Given its intrinsic value and positive association with the level of development, good governance should be pursued in all dimensions as a basic development goal. Improving governance in these dimensions could be used as potential entry points of development strategies for many countries in the region (Zhuang et al 2010). Institutionalization of incentive and disincentive schemes will capacitate the communities in coastal management, while municipal government earns additional income to augment ICRM budget. Good governance needs policies and ordinances on incentive and disincentive in order to encourage desirable and discourages undesirable actions by resource users and managers to a balanced ecosystem. However, funding ICRM activities is still a struggling endeavour since no fix budget is A griconsulting – CEST – NJS

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allocated to activities proposed in the action plan, making it hard to implement consistent good ICRM practices in the municipality (Gonzales, 2011). Most of LGU ICM plans need substantial financial support to implement many of their proposed strategies and activities (Gonzales, 2011). Furthermore, the National ICM program requires user’s fee and private partnership as sources of income to compliment budget for ICRM plan implementation of LGUs. Incentive and disincentive is known to be a good practice to support sustainable development not only for the whole ICRM plan, but also some parts of its activities. Knowledge on the incentive and disincentive practices in the country is part of the requirement of ICRMP. The approach taken here is to analyze practices at the local level, because this is where most incentives must have their impact. Incentives must serve to correct problems perceived by people in the vicinity of areas which are of particular importance for conserving coastal resources, developed at the community level, and applied within the context of local social organizations. Many of the LGUs around the country are practicing varied modes and levels of incentive-disincentives schemes to encourage stakeholders to do desirable things for the sustainable use of our coastal resources. However, very few of these practices are documented and get analyzed in order to improve and promote its operations for the optimum benefits of municipalities and community members. It is also desirable that different types of incentive-disincentives be known to and expanded to other locations of the country. The survey of incentive-disincentive schemes in Philippines municipalities is stated in the Project Administration Memorandum of ICRMP (ADB 2007) and a report on the Feasibility of incentivedisincentive schemes in the municipality can be found as one of the deliverables in the Project Inception Report (Agriconsulting, S. p. A., et. al. 2010). Thus the main objective of this survey is to document existing incentive and disincentive schemes being practiced by municipal LGUs for possible adoption to other LGUs. Specific objectives are: (1) to document incentive-disincentive practices and analyze successful practices of LGUs; (2) to identify problems in the implementation of incentive-disincentive schemes at local level; and give recommendations for improvement and adoption of such practices to other areas of the country.

II.

METHODS

Data and information was gathered across ICRMP project sites between January and February 2012. The provincial ICRM Specialists (PIS) identified 50 LGUs practicing or have proposed policies for incentives and disincentive schemes in coastal management in their respective municipalities. The selection of survey sites was to cover different types of incentives and disincentive schemes practiced by various municipalities and local stake holders along ICRMP sites. Respondents from municipalities were interviewed across the project sites from January 16 to February 24, 2012. Names of LGUs and number of respondents interviewed are presented in Table 1 and Appendix B. During interview, the LGUs were requested to make ready copies of incentive and disincentive-related ordinances and executive orders related to incentives and disincentives. A semistructured Focus Group Discussion method modified from SEAMEO-SEARCA (1997) was used to gather data from field respondents. Interviews made used of a guided questionnaire (Appendix 1) and is only answered after a thorough discussion of the topic (Figs. 1 & 2). A griconsulting – CEST – NJS

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Only one questionnaire was filled up upon consensus among respondents per LGU. Data and information came mostly from LGU Officials and staff composed of the Mayor, C/MPDO, C/MAO, C/MENRO, Fishery Technicians, Agriculture Technicians, ICRM Staff, Community Development Workers, Bantay Dagat Chiefs and Members, PNP, Barangay Officials, POs, and MPA managers (Appendix B).

Figure 1. The ICRM Specialist and Provincial ICRM Specialist during data gathering with the Lady MAO and Agriculture Technologist in Siquijor, Siquijor.

A total of 54 respondents were interviewed from 21 municipalities, consisting 40% of the total number of municipalities under the project and 72% of LGUs identified practicing incentives and disincentives. Case studies are presented in narrative form following the format of McNeely (1988) on incentives and disincentives at the community level.

III.

RESULT

The survey recorded 50 LGUs practicing incentives disincentives out of 79 ICRMP LGUs. A few of these are in proposal stages.

A.

Case Studies 1. INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES TO PROMOTE LOCAL SUPPORT FOR COASTAL MANAGEMENT AND MPA IN BADIAN, CEBU.

Figure 2. The ICRM Specialist with the MAO, PO President and PEDO PNP discussing survey items in Barili, Cebu.

The municipality of Badian has pristine waters in Lambug and its vicinity. In its coral reefs lies a sunken island formed by large area of excellent coral reefs and colourful coral fishes found 11m underwater. There was no significant threat because most of the local fishermen use to fish beyond municipal waters. Nevertheless, community opted to specify a protected area in their municipal waters. In consensus with the communities the municipal government initiated the establishment of MPA of Lambog in 2001. The LGU oriented and conducted IEC in 2001. The establishment of MPA was indicated in the ICRM plan with the help of previous projects like CBRMP, CVRP, etc. sometime 2004. The MPA was legally established in 2006 under an ordinance. In the Comprehensive Fishery/Coastal Resource Management Ordinance no. 05-2006 of the Municipality of Badian, Section 78 states the sharing and appropriation of fines from violators as part of incentives system, while Section 50 states that MPA shall receive 1000 per month from 20% Development Fund for MPA Guard allowance. Fund amounting to 500 thousand for incentives is allotted by the municipal government annually through 20% Development Fund.


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Table 1. Regions and Municipalities where interviews were conducted in this study with corresponding number of respondents Region R4B; Romblon Palawan R7; Cebu

R5; Masbate

R3; Zambales R7B; Siquijor

R11; Davao Or. Total

Municipality/City Sta. Maria Puerto Princesa El Nido Alcoy Argao Badian Barili Boljoon Cordova Dalaguete San Pascual Milagros Aroroy Baleno Masbate City Candelaria Masinloc Lazi San Juan Siquijor Mati 21

No. of Respondents 1 1 1 1 4 3 4 1 4 9 1 1 4 1 5 1 7 1 1 3 1 54

The municipality collects user’s fee for diving in their municipal waters. There was a time that the municipality has accumulated 14 thousand pesos in 3 weeks, with 250 pesos/head as dive fee. But their sharing and collection system later became inconsistent. According to respondents, they wanted to follow that of the adjacent municipality, Moalboal, in which PO member makes 1500 pesos per person per month. User’s fee for diving was paid to the treasurer of the barangay in which the Barangay Treasurer remitted it to Municipal Treasurer. Municipal Treasurer made voucher for sharing to Barangay and PO. Then the PO share was used for local management of MPA, while the share of the Barangay became local fund. The practice of incentive and user’s fee systems of the municipality were assisted by CBRMP, CCEF, DENR-CENRO, DA-BFAR, MFARMC, Tambuyog Development Center, Brgy. LGU, provincial government, and fisheries organizations. Problems identified were that dive shop owners coming from Moal-boal refuses to pay fee on time and the right amount, creating problems with Badian local collectors and treasurers and the president of PO resigned due to political and some discrepancies in management and finance. The municipal staff wonder why divers pay rightful fees in Moalboal (nearby town) and why not in Badian. A griconsulting – CEST – NJS

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Recommendation: strict law enforcement, pass resolution urging dive shop owners to pay fees before diving, and specify violations and penalties; give official copies and receipt thereof by diveshops owners. Tickets should be paid at the municipal treasurer before diving. Enforce no permit no dive policy. Barangay Treasurer should remit only net income to municipality, so that share of loca barangay and PO is immediately taken from the whole amount. 2. INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES TO PROMOTE LOCAL SUPPORT FOR MUNICIPAL WATERS LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DALAGUETE, CEBU. The waters of Dalaguete were blessed with rich coral reefs, which harboured high abundance and rich diversity of fishes in 1960s. The average catch of the fishermen then was 5kgs per fisherman per day. However, between 1999-2000 fishermen have practically no fish catch due to remarkable decline of fish populations brought about by rampant fishing by the use of compressor (hookah diving), use of poisonous substances, and dynamite fishing. This situation has led the fishermen in coastal communities to dry dock their fishing boats and hung their fishing nets on shore. The mode of fishing in the area then was described by the fishermen as an open access. Furthermore, coastal community population growth was estimated to have increased by three times since 1970. These problems were also identified in the ICRM plan of the municipality. The establishment of MPA was initiated in year 2000, and the ordinance of Tasay MPA was passed in 2002, Balud MPA in 2003, and Kawayan MPA in 2006, having areas of 5 ha, 12 ha, and 10 ha, respectively, while Kawayan and Balud MPAs are also due to increase their areas soon. Municipal LGU initiated the establishment of MPAs in the area, complemented by CRMP and CCEF, Barangay, DA-BFAR and DENR as early as year 2000. A kind of coast watch patrol was created to enforce the coastal laws of the municipality called DACOP (Dalaguete Coastal Police). The incentives scheme started 2011, but the members started working earlier as volunteers. Each member of DACOP now receives 500 pesos per month as honorarium. There are 22 members of which six of them at the same time serve as MPA managers that receive 2,500 pesos per month. The budget for the DACOP and MPA Managers comes from the 20% Annual Development Plan of the MANRO (Municipal Agriculture and Natural Resources Office). This is a unique department in the municipality combining the function of MAO and MENRO in the same office. This type of set up is unique to LGUs in the Philippines (Gonzales 2011). Another incentive was the provision of seed money for seaweed livelihood to POs like DACOP and STAMPO. The donors were DA-BFAR, and CCEF. The seaweed incentive scheme was rated by the recipients as 70% successful, since income from this livelihood has greatly helped them financially. The beneficiaries have managed to roll out their seed money successfully in several production cycles. They claimed that they produced 400-600 kg/month with net cash equivalent to 3-6 thousand pesos/person/month within a span of four years, till Typhoon Sendong recently affected their continuous production. At present, they are on their way to recover their lost due to the said typhoon. One recipient (Consolacion) site was not successful due to poor selection of culture area that prevented consistent production of seaweeds due to rough sea condition. The women also join their husbands who were PO members in the production of seaweeds. The coral cover has increase from an estimated live cover of 10% during open access situation in 2002 to 80% live cover in 2012. The community attributed the increase in coral cover to the establishment of MPAs and their law enforcement efforts in the area. Catch per unit effort in the area was zero at times when the community stopped fishing between 1999 and 2000, due to A griconsulting – CEST – NJS

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rampant illegal fishing activities in their municipal water by outsiders. At present a gillnet set at the outskirts of the MPA collects five kg of fish/person/day. It is also worth to note that a violator once caught fishing with gill net inside the sanctuary has 10 kg of fish entangled in his net. Another natural jewel of Dalaguete is the spring resource named Obong Spring, which is managed by Barangay Obong. A part of the spring is owned by the Barangay, wherein it collects user’s fee. Other parts of the spring are owned by private person. The Obong Spring located in Barangay Obong is supported by Barangay Tanod cum Spring Guard with 750.00/month honorarium. But this honorarium was for being Barangay Tanod and not as an incentive as Spring Guard. Ticket fee for the spring comes from the Treasurer’s Office of the municipality. It was recorded that during week days the spring gets about 50 pesos/day, and 2000 pesos/day on week-end days. The peak season is during summer months when 20,000 pesos per month gate fees were collected. No clear incentives coming from the income of spring going to spring guardmen can be decipher yet. Honorarium of guards comes from the Barangay budget, but they have to serve also as barangay tanod. The municipality gives incentive to support MFARMC. MFARMC meets with the MPA managers every 3rd week of the month and transportation allowances are reimbursed by MANRO to MFARMC. At the regional level, DA-BFAR Region 7 gives cash award incentives among municipal clusters of the province of Cebu for best coastal law enforcement. The scheme started 2010. Problems encountered were: a. BFARMC is not yet organized because it is optional in RA 8550. Barangay who are not concern with the coastal management will not form the BFARMC. b. There is still the use of trammel net, which is prohibited in RA 8550. c. Violators use children (13 yr) to fish inside MPAs. d. Cutting and stealing of buoys and markers, so that MPA will be devoid of boundaries e. Short of maintenance of Guard house, buoys and ropes Recommendation: a. increase the honorarium coming from income of the barangay through collection of fees from local Spring. More efforts and budget must be directed to Spring conservation (SWM), management, and development, b. Coordination with the Office of Tourism of the municipality should be enhanced and included in ICRM circle. (Tourism Officer must be added to MPDC-MAO-MENRO triad in ICRM), c.

to strengthen IEC, theme on poverty is not a reason to comment crimes, and


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d. Come up with strategies to prevent loss of markers. 3. INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES TO PROMOTE LOCAL SUPPORT TO MPA AND MUNICIPAL WATERS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN BOLJOON, CEBU. The waters off the municipality of Boljoon have several fishing grounds and diving sites blessed by bountiful and diverse corals and fishes. The municipality has a 9.7 ha Granada MPA. Their traditional fishing ground yields half a bucket of fish estimated to about 6 kg. The Municipality through awareness from NGO and other projects had proposed for the establishment of MPA. The community members selected the Granada MPA due to its proximity to their residential site, purposively preferred in order to watch the MPA from illegal gathering of marine resources therein. The municipal waters of Boljoon were then an open access fishing ground. There were also new few structures added to the coastal areas, especially resorts. In 2000, the municipality through SB initiated MPA establishment process and was approved by SB without hesitation. It took two years for the enactment of MPA ordinance, since in the 1st year of processing of the MPA establishment, about 50% of the fishermen were reluctant to establish MPA in their fishing grounds. As they become aware of the benefits of MPA through IEC, they later agreed to establish the MPA in their local waters. Section 8 of Ordinance number 01-05 says that the municipal government shall allocate annually a corresponding fund to be taken from 20% Development Fund of 50,000.00 for maintenance, operation including honoraria to POs who will enforce regulating activities for MPA. Before the establishment of MPA, the gill net catch in the fishing ground was estimated to 6kg/person/day be (half pale) in 2000. Currently in 2012, the gill net catch has gone up to 3-4 pale (36-48 kg), having at least 500% increase in catch. There were only four motorized bancas in the coastal area in 1987, but this number increased to more than 100 community member-owned pump boats in the coastal area of the municipality in 2012. The community claims that they don’t benefit much from the incentives of the barangay, but they benefit largely from the effect of MPA establishment and protection that considerably increased their fish catch. Fishermen also has added value by selling their fresh catch to locally situated resorts for higher prizes. Sharing was 70% municipality (buoys and ropes), 20% barangay; 10% PO use this for loan access to members at 2% interest with maximum loan of 10,000.00 per member. The loan system further extended the benefit of the incentive to its members. This may use in education, housing needs or livelihood for small enterprise. Bantay Dagat members are given allowance from MAO of LGU. This incentive system was deemed successful (80%) by POs, due to the commitment by the community to environmental protection and close support from LGUs. The municipality also attributes part of their success to their partners composed of CCEF, BFAR, and DENR. There is a need to construct a guard house, of which a solution was found through the support of RARE project funds. The construction will commence April or May 2012. 4. INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES TO PROMOTE LOCAL SUPPORT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OF MPA AND MUNICIPAL WATERS IN ARGAO, CEBU. A griconsulting – CEST – NJS

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The seas of the municipality of Argao have rampant compressor fisher coming from neighboring municipalities, usually owned by influential people. The municipality enacted the Ordinance no. 35 creating the Bantay Dagat Commission in 1998. However, the full support including the budget was realized only in 2009. The Commission was under the office of the Mayor and the budget comes from the Annual Investment Program of the municipality. In 1998, the incentive budget was only provided for meetings. In 2000-2001, the monthly honorarium of 150/day was provided to bantay dagat. In 2007, the monthly honorarium was increased to 175 /day, and currently (2012) there was a move to further increase the honorarium, the amount of which to be determined yet. The Bantay Dagat members also do other jobs as helping in coastal clean –up, tourism, etc. Members of the Bantay Dagat Commission received insurance benefit of 300 thousand each, while 100,000.00 for each of the fish warden. Since fish wardens were too many (50 indv.), they were reduced to 12 persons, with six persons respectively manning the northern and southern portions of the municipal waters. The honorarium was increased to 2,000.00 per warden/month. Under the umbrella network of the Bantay Dagat Commission were the Fish Wardens watching over the Marine Protected Areas in their respective barangays with 1,500 honorarium per month. The POs of the barangays also assist in coast watching by feeding information of illegal activities in their respective barangays to the commission. Last year (2011), the coast watch commission members have engaged with the violators in a gunfight resulting to three dead. Positive comments to the incentive schemes were; 1. Registration and Proper utilization of Payao (FAD); 100 pesos per payao registration, must not be more than 5 km from shoreline 2. MPAs were properly protected. 3. The number of apprehension of illegal activities which was as much as 50 apprehensions per month in 2000 was lowered down to 1 apprehension in 2011. 4. Community says their sea is safer and protected due to the presence of Bantay Dagat. The success of the incentive was because of sufficient political support. Problems before; godfather system Mayors and Vice Mayors of other municipalities were the owners of illegal fishing boats. It is commended that the fishers should follow the ordinance.

5. INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES TO PROMOTE LOCAL SUPPORT TO MPA AND COASTAL TOURISM IN CORDOVA, CEBU. Cordova has relatively extensive mangrove, corals, and seagrass areas. Mangrove area in Day-as was declared ecological park by LGU. The total land area is 789.6 covering 12 barangays with


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approximate 500 ha of mangrove in 7 barangays. Seagrass beds extends to six baranagys about 1000 ha, corals area not indicated in ICRM plan but is present in nine out of ten barangays. The municipality of Cordova being part of Metro Cebu Area is highly urbanized in terms of population and development activities. It is the only LGU with the urban area with the presence of all 3 coastal habitats, mangroves, seagrasses, and corals. Reef areas especially in Gilutongan and Nalusuan Islands are big source of revenues from user fees. Mangrove areas especially in Day-as and Catarman offer a good potential for eco-tourism with the Day-as area already declared as ecological park by the LGU. Historical threats to habitat/ecosystem before management incentives schemes were the existence of illegal and destructive fishing practices especially by fishers of Talisay, low level of environmental awareness among fisherfolks, mangrove cutting and illegal reclamation, insufficient budget for supply and enforcement operation and meagre allowance for patrol operations, existence of illegal structures along the foreshore area, rapid urbanization and human settlement, siltation/pollution, and high population growth in coastal barangays. Coral and seagrass areas were used by the communities as fishing ground for demersal fishes and crabs, gleaning area for shells and the town’s delicacy “bakasi” or small eels. The mangrove areas were utilized for crab gathering or fattening, ecotourism (Brgy. Day-as), mangrove rehabilitation projects (ICRMP supported). The location of the municipality of Cordova which is located within the Metro Cebu area specifically adjacent to the highly urbanized city of Lapulapu, and where the Mactan export processing zone is located has resulted to the rapid increase of human population due to in-migration of workers and Cordova is the nearest area for population spill-over. This was worsened by the rapid infrastructure and residential development brought about by the need for housing and commercial establishments. The threat to the habitat is not so much the resource utilization but more on the garbage, pollution, and destruction of habitats brought about by the development activities in the area. The above-mentioned problems were found and discussed in the ICRM Plan of the municipality. The management incentive method started in late 1999 with the re-establishment of the Gilutungan Marine Sanctuary with the management body. In 2001, the user fee mechanism was implemented and within the first 7 months of implementation (Jan-July), the municipality was able to generate the following income: P 309,247.50 – Net income generated from GMS, P216,473.25 – 70% Municipal share and P92,773.25 – 30% Barangay share. Municipal Allocation of the 70% Municipal Share Staffing Supplies Reefcheck (November) Equipment and facilities IEC/marketing/brochure Maintenance of guardhouse/gasoline Law enforcement (Police humanitarian) Electricity Trainings/seminars/workshops -

36,300.00 20,000.00 35,000.00 20,000.00 20,000.00 45,000.00 10,000.00 7,000.00 23,270.00


17


=========

Total

=

P

216,473.25

Direct incentive: - Sharing system from User fees (Net income)  30% Barangay  70% LGU; Of the 70 %, the fees are distributed as follows:  5% - United Municipal employees cooperatives  5% - Federation of Fisherfolks from 10 brgys to support fisherfolk projects  90% LGU Sharing system from Law enforcement fines/penalties (Net fees)  40% Enforcer  60% Municipality Incentives for Bantay Dagat/Marine Watch : 28 marine Watch personnel are provided with honorarium of PhP 150/day Indirect incentive:  

Priority in project implementation Gilutungan and LGU are showcased for good practices in user fees and incentive mechanism implementation

As years progressed, the Nalusuan Island was added with another scheme (LGU-business sector partnership) and toward 2005-2006, the LGU was already earning between PhP 3-4 Million annually. In 2007 the ordinance was amended and additional due to another scheme (user fee collection for Gilutungan was entrusted to a private business company, with the latter providing a fixed fee to the LGU on a monthly basis). The incentive system was initiated by the LGU, initially, the barangay complained about the delayed release of barangays share but this was eventually resolved. Recipients of the incentives were Gilutungan PO, Mangrove Reforestation Organizations, while the donor (s) were the Provincial LGU, CRMP-USAID, ICRMP-DENR-BFAR, CCEF, PBSP and the partners were DENR, DENR, BFAR. The incentive system was 80 % successful, because of LGU close support through massive IEC, consultation with community and PO, higher incentives (e.g. PhP 150/ per day honorarium of marine Watch), and timely downloading of user fee share to barangays. Outside Support Assistance were technical support (e.g. biophysical monitoring assistance provided by CCEF, CRMP, ICRMP -DENR, BFAR, etc); financial support rehabilitation activities (mangrove rehab supported by ICRMP; FARMC strengthening provided by PBSP, etc). Others assistances came from business sectors (e.g., MEPZA) and Coast Guard support to mangrove reforestation activities. Known management incentive regime impacts were the more vigilance on the community to protect the habitats especially those declared as MPAs, more regular patrolling and strengthened resolved to fight illegal activities in the shoreline and coastal waters, regular biophysical assessment of the MPAs conducted due to available funding, active participation of POs in CRM related activities and project due to the share provided from user fees, sense of pride in implementing CRM related activities project and activities


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There was minimal problem encountered in implementing management incentive/scheme at the municipal and barangay levels except for the loss of life of one of the marine watch members which happened during patrol operation. So there is a need to further strengthen skills of marine watch members in procedural aspect of law enforcement. In addition, directly related to incentive mechanism was the lack of budget of the LGU to fund environmental management/conservation projects before the user fee was implemented. In order to resolve or improve the incentive-disincentive schemes at the municipal level, the current management of the Guilotongan and the user fee must be managed by the community instead of lease system with the business sector.

6. INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES TO PROMOTE LOCAL SUPPORT TO DEVELOPMENT OF URBAN POOR IN MATI, DAVAO ORIENTAL. The municipality of Mati, with its advocacy on environmental protection and strong prospects to become a known tourist area was beset with problems on informal settlers in their development areas as well as in protected areas. Furthermore, community houses were located at identified danger zones by the national government. The municipal government through its City ENRO with the assistance of some NGOs (Interfaith Movement for Peace, Empowerment, and Development (IMPED) and Bangsa Moro initiated strategies to negotiate with the communities to move away from danger zones to safer areas, and also to clear environmentally critical and developmental areas. This initiative was supported by legal framework of the ordinance declaring Barangay Badas and Barangay Dawan Mountain Range and its Environs as Environmentally Critical Areas (ECA’S), and was based on the approved CLUP of the City. The ordinance was enacted in 2007, though processes and initiatives on this have already started even before 2001. The trade off by the municipality was to sell the lands to the settlers in a rent to own basis and the government will eventually buy off the land to amicably settle with the land claimants. This scheme eventually cleared the lands from informal settlers. In the watershed areas, there was problem on cutting of tress by the stewards. The trade off for cutting of trees in watershed by stewards was that the government paid for trees and plants that settlers have planted in the agreement that they move-out of the watershed areas. At the moment, more than 100 beneficiaries/houses have been moved from dangerous locations to proposed safe locations of the city government as planned in CLUP. This incentive scheme has resulted to providing homes for communities, while protecting human lives and biodiversity and environments in the protected areas. 7. INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES TO PROMOTE LOCAL SUPPORT TO MPA, COAST WATCH AND SWM IN MASINLOC, ZAMBALES. The coastal waters of Masinloc are noted for vast mangrove resources, rare mangrove species (Rhizophora lamarkii). However, it was frequently visited by fishers from other municipalities using dynamite and compressor fishing in 1980s. Just beyond Masinloc’s municipal waters, payaos (fish aggregating device) were used coupled with blast fishing, while fishes were collected with the aid of compressor or net. This situation is believed to be the cause for the abrupt decrease of populations of pelagic fishes in municipal waters of Masinloc.


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The first MPA in Masinloc was the San Salvador Fish Sanctuary established in 1991. This fish sanctuary served as the pilot strategy for fisheries management in the area. MPAs were established before it was indicated in the plan. Establishment of more MPAs is found in the ICM plan of the municipality. Four additional MPAs were established, and the MPA Network in Masinloc was created in 2009. Bantay Dagat was institutionalized in 1993 with 300 pesos per month honorarium. Management incentive regime was improved in 2008, when the budget for the incentives came from the General Fund of the municipality. Now honorarium is 1800 pesos for MPA chairman, 1000 for members of which 20% of this is given to the management of the federation as petty cash. Beneficiaries for the incentives were Bantay Dagat, Chairman of MPA, and MFARMC. Compressor fishing in municipal waters is said to still exist when Bantay Dagat operatives are not around. The municipality has scholarship incentives to students. The trade off is that each student would bring 1kl of plastic waste to the municipality every semester. This program has already benefitted more than 3000 students in the municipality. The plastic waste is then shredded and mixed with hallow block making project of the municipality. 8. El Nido Environmental Office The following is the standard procedure of the municipality of El Nido with regards to MPA establishment and environmental concerns funding concerns. a) Funding comes from 20% Development fund, when MPA were still few, each barangay were given 50,000 pesos per annum. As the number of MPAs increases, funds for maintenance where taken from Barangay Development Assistance Program (BDAP) coming from 20% Development Fund. b) Upon approval of Tourism Development Fee: 10% for the municipality 10% Barangay 20% administrative cost 10% protected area office 50% Other 50% goes to Environmental Protection Project 25% envi-protection project 10% Tourism 15% Coastal Resource Management Barangay can submit proposals for project funding. a. Masinloc CRM Office


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a) Since 2004, CRMO has a budget of 20% of 20% of Development Fund. b) Now CRMO has 500 thousand fund for M and E. 2 million funding, including General Fund and 20% Dev Fund. Honorarium 1m a year. Funding of CRMO by Regular Fund and AIP are provided through CRM Code 92-08 Municipal Ordinance 2008. c) General Fund is Sponsored by the Office of the Mayor d) If it needs budget for new project, CRMO will just propose for new projects and the municipality will be the one to look for funding 9. INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES TO PROMOTE LOCAL SUPPORT TO LIVELIHOOD AND PROTECTION OF MARINE TURTLES IN AROROY, MASBATE. Aroroy is known for bounty marine turtle resources. However, fishermen and community members popularly butcher and eat marine turtle meat sometime 1998. Marine turtles were considered nuisance and destructive animals to fishing gears and paraphernalia of fishermen. On the other hand, commercial fishers encroached in the municipal waters of Aroroy, Danish seine from other municipalities and provinces. In 2007, the MFARMC of Aroroy initiated the pawikan incentive system to trade off the butchering and eating of caught pawikan into cash. The system is implemented under the MAO, LGU–CRMO. The recipients were mostly fishermen who have accidentally caught pawikans in their fishing gears. The fishermen were given 500 pesos for returning marine turtles. The budget for the turtle incentive comes from the General Fund of the LGU. A proposal to support livelihood on pawikan is being pushed by MAO and the LGU to augment income for communities. LGU will provide material and supplies while community PO will gradually pay the LGU. Market of fishery product will be facilitated by LGU. The system came to a point when there was an average of four marine turtles returned per week. Four species of marine turtles were reported to be involved in this incentive scheme in the municipality. Fishermen known not returning caught marine turtles are apprehended for violating the Figure 3. Project Management Consultants with the Mayor ordinance. LGU estimated the and MAO of Aroroy, Masbate and PPIU during the success of the incentive to 95 % in incentives and disincentive survey. terms of incidence of killing the endangered sea turtles. The success was attributed to cooperation of Barangay LGU, creation, trainings and presence of Deputy fish wardens (24) in each barangay, the cooperation of fisherfolk, and PO who assists on IEC. Problem encountered was that decrease of turnover of pawikan when cash was changed to kind incentive. Cash reward should be maintained to maintain cooperation with fishermen.


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10. INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES TO PROMOTE LOCAL SUPPORT TO PROTECTION OF MARINE MAMALS AND MITIGATE ILLEGAL FISHING IN MILAGROS, MASBATE. More than a decade ago, the municipal waters and biological resources of Milagros, which is situated in Asid Gulf had suffered from rampant illegal ways of fishing such as Danish Seine and trawl, usually by fishers coming from other provinces. Prevalent killing of marine turtles had occurred, marine turtle meat were commonly sold in markets. Other mammals caught by fishermen’s net were being butchered and consumed. Fishermen claimed that marine turtles were destructive to their nets. These concerns were stated in the municipal ICRM plan. In 2009, the municipality of Milagros, through MAO started the IEC on endangered species. The municipality through MAO and MENRO gave cash reward incentives to fishermen who turn over live endangered mammals to the municipality. Cash incentives given to fishermen ranges from 10002000 pesos per animal. MAO claims that it’s in the Municipal Fisheries Ordinance (MFO) but the specific amount for the endangered species has no official document yet. His office decides on the amount given to the recipient. The budget for the incentive comes from the General Fund of the municipality. Whale shark, marine turtle and dolphins were saved and returned to the sea by this incentive. MAO sees the incentive scheme to be 100 % successful since he estimated that 99% of the accidentally caught turtles were returned to the sea because of this incentive scheme. The Municipal Fisheries Ordinance which is due for revision also contained the protection of endangered marine mammals. With this instance, MPAs were established and Deputy Fish Wardens were organized. Funds for MPA and ICRM operation and maintenance come from the 20% Development Fund of the municipality. The Deputy Fish Wardens received 25% of the fine collected from violators, on top of the 1,500 monthly honorarium per member. In 2010 the team had accumulated 1.38 million pesos from fines alone, with an average of 2500 pesos per violation. Problem in the implementation of their incentive scheme is that the specific amount for kind of mammal has no official document yet. Few illegal fishing activities can still be observed in municipal waters. Elements of incentive schemes (monitored and properly documented, before after impact, supported by legal framework, well defined recipients, amount and budget). 11. INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES TO PROMOTE LOCAL SUPPORT FOR FISHERIES AND MUNICIPAL WATERS OF BARILI, CEBU (Proposal) Municipality of Barili is blessed with wide array of natural ecosystems stretching from the mountains to the sea. Concerned with the protection and sustained use of these natural habitats, the municipal government had proposed to conserve and sustainably manage their freshwater caves, 9 major springs, 15 minor springs, and a 16 ha Marine Protected Area. The municipal government and law enforcers (local police) wary and concern about the conservation of their environment, they jointly initiate education and information campaigns to the communities. There were threats to the fishery of the municipality brought about by the intrusion of commercial


22


fishermen to municipal waters of Barili. This issue was resolved by strict law enforcement before ICRMP-ICRM and MPA management plans were drafted. In support to the environment and fishery conservation effort, the municipality drafted the Ordinance providing for the sustainable management, development, and conservation of the municipality waters and its coastal resources, unifying and harmonizing policy within the South West Cebu Cluster, and for other Purposes in 2009. The ordinance was in its 2nd reading stage as of January 2012, and according to officials it would be enacted within the year. This ordinance was a product of the agreement among 9 municipalities in South West Cebu Cluster. The MPA in Barili was established and became operational in 2001, however it has no incentive and disincentive scheme yet and the scheme is being proposed in the above ordinance. According to the MPA manager of the municipality, fish catch has increase from 2k per fisherman per day to 5 k per fisherman per day since the MPA was established. Diversity or number of fish species in the municipal waters has also remarkably increased. Aware of the effect of using inorganic fertilizers to coastal waters, the municipality created the award system to organizations, government units/agencies and entities in the production of organic compose materials. The municipal government awards cash to highest produced volume of compose materials in a period of time. Furthermore, the municipality also give cash incentives for Barangay most visited by tourist and best practitioners of SWM. The recipients of the incentives were the bantay-dagat. Provincial Government gave 500 k and the Municipal Government has a counterpart of 10 thousand pesos, which increases by 10 thousand pesos per year. This incentive practice is supported by a MOA between the municipality and the provincial government. Partners for management and incentive schemes are the PNP, PO, BFAR, ELAC, CCEF, and the Provincial Government. Problems for MPA management were the issues on slow prosecution of violators. They recommended to improve IEC strategies. 12. INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES TO PROMOTE LOCAL SUPPORT FOR FISHERIES AND MARINE PROTECTED AREAS IN LAZI, SIQUIJOR The municipal government of Lazi recognizes ICRM as a national strategy to ensure sustainable development of the country’s coastal and marine environment and resources and establishing support mechanism. It further admits its responsibilities for the management, conservation, development, protection, utilization, and disposition of all fish and fishery/ aquatic resource therein. Lazi municipal government believes that coastal and upland resources are important resources which directly support and sustain the communities vital to food security and environment sustainability. Thus Lazi adopted a Comprehensive Integrated Upland and Coastal Management Ordinance (CIUCMO) that they feel necessary for the development, conservation, and management of the upland and coastal resources of the municipality. The adoption of CIUCM Ordinance was realized in order to protect and promote the rights of small farmers and fisherfolk who are most affected by the utilization of agriculture and fisheries resources, through preferential use of lands and fisheries/aquatic resources. The ordinance also aimed to promote responsibility and accountability in the use of upland and fisheries/aquatic resources, and provide consistent and substantial support to the agricultural and fisheries sector within the


23


municipality, primarily the small farmers and fisherfolk who rely on the upland and fisheries/aquatic resources for livelihood. Promote social equity, alleviate poverty and ensure food security. The Napayong Marine Reserve and Lalag Bato Marine Sanctuaries are 6.68 and 8.16 ha respectively, established in 2003 at Barangay Talayong and Lower Cabangcalan, Lazi, Siquijor. Napayong Marine Reserve is known for abundance of different species of coral fishes. Visitors are attracted to a cliff wall of the area of umbrella like coral reefs. Lalag bato which means yellow rock in local language is known to be a breeding area of coral fishes. The name signifies the presence of a large yellow coral reef situated in the marine sanctuary. The survey of the Coastal Conservation and Education Foundation (CCEF) showed that these sanctuaries have high coral cover and species abundance. So that the community would be able to sustainably protect these coral reefs, the municipal ordinance named “Comprehensive Integrated Upland and Coastal Management” was enacted in year 2009. The conservation initiatives started in 2003, when municipal staff approached the communities to introduce the MPA concept. At that time, communities were hesitant to the establishment of Marine Reserve, it took about one year to convince them through series of seminars and IEC activities. Bantay Dagat was created in every barangay to serve as eyes and ears for coastal resource protection and as support to law enforcement. The recipients of the incentives were the Management Committees of the marine sanctuaries, Bantay Dagat. Donor was CCEF (Coastal Conservation Education Foundation). Municipality partners with Barangay (in what?) other partners were Provincial Government and DA-BFAR. Incentive scheme was successful because of the barangay officials (grass roots) political will support from Municipality and the provincial governments. Currently they have problems in supplies and materials, equipment. Typhoon Sendong destroyed the ICRMP banca which they use for surveillance and monitoring. They recommend to prioritise the budget in AIP. 13. INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES TO PROMOTE LOCAL SUPPORT FOR FISHERIES AND MARINE PROTECTED AREAS IN SAN JUAN, SIQUIJOR The municipal waters of San Juan are endowed with rich marine biological diversity with special preference to coral reef. Tubod MPA with sandy beach, 7.5 ha since 1989, but on and off. User’d fee started 2001. A resort called Coco Groove is nearest Tubod Sanctuary. Paliton MPA is 9 ha with wall on land, pygmy seahorse and corals establish 2008. Maite MPA has an area of three ha with Mandarin fish, garden eel, and rare squid species. Cangmunag latest MPA with good coral cover and fish abundance, MPA is 12 ha. In addition, 14 dive sites were declared by municipality of San Juan where management body collects the user’s fee for every dive. In 1990s, the use of coastal waters and fishing was open access. Fishermen from other provinces compete with local fishermen. Incentive scheme was introduced in 2001 to collect fees and use part of these fees not only to operate and maintain MPAs in the area, but also control diving and fishing activities. User’s fee collection started 2001.


24


30% of collected fees go to the barangay; 30% to the PO and 40% to Municipality. Portion that goes to municipal LGU is likewise allotted to CRM activities. Peace Corp has also contributed to the project, CCEF and Peace Corps rendered technical assistance. Other assistance came from Allan White group. The awareness and knowledge of the barangay in management of coastal areas and MPAs were the major key to success of incentive scheme. Problems encountered in implementing incentive POs must be trained. Dive shops took a long time to pay user’s fee already paid by diver tourists; economic crises (during AGP bankrupt, no tourist), this makes sustainability of funding unstable, anchored to economy when you depend on tourism. Recommendation for sustained funding is that dive shops and LGU/barangay should talk and agree with incentive and management schemes. 14. INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES TO PROMOTE LOCAL SUPPORT FOR FISHERIES AND MUNICIPAL WATERS OF SIQUIJOR, SIQUIJOR (Proposal) The fisheries sector and the municipality of Siquijor claim that their waters have more fishes compared to its neighbouring bodies of water. They stressed that their waters are known to be the migration path of small pelagic fish species navigating north and south of central Philippines. Incentive and management of seas emanated from the mandates of the local government code. The provincial government gave incentives to trammel gillnet fishers free single wall gillnet materials to encourage them to fish using ordinary gillnets than using trammel nets. This became a problem later on since the nets were used by fishermen to assemble trammel nets instead of single walled gillnets. Provide livelihood/entrepreneurship opportunities to communities, conduct of trainings to fishers for example on seaweeds culture. Budget came from 20% AIP. Proposed are insurance and reward systems for informers. The scheme has seemingly increased the biophysical status of resources and social status of community members, but the population growth and supply and demand, equilibrium with sanctuary (site paper on population in discussion). Legal Basis is a resolution enacting an ordinance providing for a Comprehensive Coastal Law Enforcement in the Municipal waters of Siquijor, Siquijor and for other purposes. Source of incentive is the general trust fund. The recipients of the incentive schemes are PO, Mgt., MPA Management Committees with partners from the Bantay Dagat, CCEF, Provincial Government, and DA-BFAR. Money from user’s fee is kept in trust fund and use to fund coastal management activities. Reasons for success were presence of law enforcement personnel and consistent assistance from the province. They recommended to assign DENR staff at the municipality for more complementation and coordination. 15. INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES TO PROMOTE LOCAL SUPPORT TO MPA AND MUNICIPAL WATERS IN ALCOY, CEBU. Alcoy is a 5th Class Municipality located in the South-eastern Part of Cebu Province. It has a shoal type of MPA with an area of 22 hectares. The protected area used to be the fishing ground of majority of the fisher folks. Resource utilization of the municipal waters was in an open access mode A griconsulting – CEST – NJS

25


and there was weak coastal law enforcement and over fishing. Ecological destruction of the sea bottom was foreseen by the LGU and communities due the use of destruction fishing gears and over fishing. These problems were also stated in ICRM and MPA plan of the municipality. Due to the above situation, the Sangguniang Bayan introduced the Management/Incentive regime in 2003 through the Municipal Ordinance 2003-38, and in 2004 thru Municipal Ordinance 2004-44 (Section 71) to motivate the coastal law enforcers and institutionalize coastal law enforcement. Additional incentives aside from the honorarium were proposed. Direct incentive in the form of cash money of ₱ 200. 00 was given per Fish Warden as per ordinance no. 2003-38. Donors were Coastal Conservation and Education Foundation, Cebu Biodiversity Conservation Foundation, ECOGov Project, ICRMP, Provincial LGU, while partners in these efforts are BFAR, CENRO-DENR, Cebu Southeast Cluster CRM Council. The incentive system was judged successful at75%. Incentives and disincentive institutional tools were: Ordinance No. 2003-38, Ordinance No. 2004-44, Ordinance No. 2005-67, Ordinance No. 2006-78, Ordinance No. 2006-83.

IV.

DISCUSSION

Only case studies numbers 1-11 have significant outputs and outcomes emanating from incentives and disincentives schemes. Some municipalities has either proposed incentive schemes or pending approval of SB, while others have no information or well-documented data and information as basis for the impact of their incentive and disincentive schemes and practices. Priority beneficiaries of the incentives are the coastal law enforcers, which includes MPA guards, and fish wardens. Fisher folks usually become beneficiary when they are involved in coastal law enforcement and some livelihood projects of municipality or NGOs. Fisher folks also receive incentives when they return or release stranded or accidentally caught marine mammals. The inclination of incentive schemes to law enforcement and MPA management is consistent with the ICRM funding mechanism of Philippine Municipal LGU in which highest portions of LGU funds are allocated to coastal law enforcement and MPA establishment and management (Gonzales 2011). Popular source of fund for the incentives of LGU were: a. sharing of income from penalty and fines to fund coastal law enforcement and MPA management incentives, b. use of MPA and environmental user’s fee to support MPA fund coastal law enforcement and MPA management incentives, c. use of municipal LGU 20% Development Fund and General Fund. The flow of incentive funds coming from user’s fee and fines starts from collection by the treasurer of the barangay in which the Barangay Treasurer remitted it to Municipal Treasurer. Municipal Treasurer makes voucher for sharing to Barangay and PO. Then the PO share was used for local management of MPA, while the share of the Barangay became local fund. Successful practices in LGU incentive and disincentive schemes are incentives to promote:


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Increase Fish Biodiversity: Increase in fish catch, diversity, and abundance of fish species. The success was attributed to effective law enforcement and MPA establishment and management with proper incentive and disincentive supporting the LGU program. Protect Coral Reef Ecosystem: The coral cover has remarkably increased from open access situation in early 2000 compared to present, 2012. The community attributed the increase in coral cover to the establishment of MPAs and their law enforcement efforts in the area which are fully supported by incentive schemes. Coastal Law Enforcement: The Deputy Fish Wardens were motivated due to direct benefits brought about by cash sharing of fines and user’s fee, wherein the number of apprehension of illegal activities was lowered down because of awareness and change in perception towards doing illegal activities. Protection of Marine Mammals: Fishermen who returned accidentally caught sea turtles were given incentives by LGUs. On the other hand, fishermen known not returning caught marine turtles were apprehended for violating LGU laws. Incidence of killing the endangered sea turtles and other mammals was lowered to nearly zero in Masbate. Whale shark, marine turtle, and dolphins were saved and returned to the sea by this incentive and disincentive. Protection of Terrestrial Environment: Aware of the effect of using inorganic fertilizers to coastal waters, the municipality created the award system to organizations, government units/agencies and entities in the production of organic compose materials. The municipal government awarded cash to highest produced volume of compose materials in a period of time. Furthermore, the municipality also gave cash incentives for Barangay most visited by tourist and best practitioners of SWM. In Mati, Davao, the city government has an incentive strategy to move settlers to rightful and safe locations. They were able to move beneficiaries/houses from dangerous locations to proposed safe locations of the city government as planned in CLUP. This incentive scheme has resulted to providing homes for communities, while protecting human lives and biodiversity and environments in the protected areas. Community Social Status: The municipality has scholarship incentives to students. The LGU paid tuition fees of (elementary-college) students. The trade off was that each student would bring 1kl of plastic waste to the municipality every semester. This program has already benefitted more than 3000 students in the municipality of Masinloc. The plastic waste is then shredded and mixed with hallow block-making project of the municipality. Economic Status of Community: As indirect impact of MPA establishment and bantay dagat incentives the Catch Per Unit Effort (CPUE) of fishes has increased since 1999 to present, thereby increasing the income of local fishermen. The livelihood incentive in Dalaguete, Cebu has assisted the fishermen to have supplemental income of 3-6 thousand pesos/person/month. Women also join their husbands who were PO members in the production of seaweeds. There were only four motorized bancas in the coastal area of Boljoon, Cebu in 1987, but this number increased to more than 100 community member-owned pump boats in 2012. The community claims that although they don’t benefit much from the incentives given by the barangay, they benefit largely from the effect of MPA establishment and protection that considerably increased their fish catch. Fishermen also has added value by selling their fresh catch to locally situated resorts for higher prizes.


27


In order to compensate villagers for lost resources like establishment of core zones and relocation of houses, they may be provided directly with cash in various forms or given access to some of the biological resources of the protected area, including such things as access to building materials through CBFM, livelihood, and conservation projects. A variant of this approach is to provide local communities with the profits from both consumptive and non-consumptive uses of the protected area employing user’s fee. The use of such provides incentives to concerned stakeholders while waiting for the spill over effect of the core-zones of MPAs. Some incentives, like the incentive provided by Masbate City in giving cash for the return of sea turtles resulted to fishermen, instead of fishing, looked for sea turtles to be presented to the LGU since the pay is more lucrative than fishing. In this case, the government has bought the sea turtle resource in a higher value (100 pesos/kilo) than it should be which caused more of the resource to be demanded, because the price is higher than it otherwise would be. This type of incentive made things worse, having a negative instead of positive impact to the environment and resources. Another negative feedback was that government provided gillnets to fishermen who would likely be affected by the prohibition of the use of trammel nets (3-walled gillnet). It turned out that the fishermen assembled trammel nets out of suppose to be single-walled gillnets given to them by the government, resulting to uncontrolled and more exploitation of fish resources. Incentive and disincentive schemes may not be sustainable if it is dependent on user’s fee and fines. This was aired by municipalities who have experienced significant downtrends of number of visiting tourist, thereby affecting their funds for incentives. Economic crises makes sustainability of funding unstable since economic crises greatly affects tourism where user’s fee is too much depended on. On the other hand, incentive which depends on fines collected from violators faces problems when the municipal waters became clean of violators, due to incremental effective law enforcement. The LGU incentive and disincentive practices were supported by Executive Orders and Ordinances, though some were at different proposal stages yet. However, some documents need improvement and they also need to be supported by appropriate policies at the national level. Additional incentives are also relevant at the national level, for both the government institutions involved in managing coastal resources and the institutions whose activities frequently involve external effects on coastal resources. Finally, economic incentives often require support from the international community, primarily in terms of technical assistance, information, commodities agreements, and various measures reflecting existence value as perceived by the international community; these are most relevant for developing countries like the Philippines.

V.

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN IMPLEMENTING INCENTIVE AND DISINCENTIVE SCHEMES

1. Some dive shop owners refused to pay user’s fee on time and the right amount to barangay and municipal LGUs. This issue delays and decreases the funds intended for incentives to ground root implementers of ICRM. 2. Barangay level POs have problems in working attitudes. 3. Turn-over of fines and user’s fee collected from barangay to municipality takes too long. A griconsulting – CEST – NJS

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4. Municipality without user’s fee mechanism has meager or no financial resources to fund incentive and disincentive schemes. 5. Some LGUs are implementing incentives and disincentive schemes, but legal and other document supporting the scheme are insufficient, like ordinance or executive order specific amount to be paid for specific kind of mammal returned to the sea. 6. Proper documentation for impact of incentives and disincentive schemes is undermined. This includes efficient monitoring and evaluation schemes on the part of LGUs. 7. Some incentive schemes turned out to have negative impacts to fisheries and coastal resources, e.g., sea turtles and gill net incentives. 8. Incentive and disincentive schemes may not be sustainable if it is dependent on user’s fee and fines.

VI.

RECOMMENDATION

13. Strict law enforcement in collecting the user’s fee and violation fines. Pass resolution urging dive shop owners to pay fees before diving, specifying violations and penalties; give official copies and receipt thereof from dive shop owners. Tickets should be paid at the municipal treasurer before diving. Enforce no permit no dive policy. 14. Barangay PO should be subjected to value formation trainings and the like in order to perform duties and responsibilities effectively. 15. The Barangay Treasurer should remit only net income to municipality, so that share of local barangay and PO is immediately deducted from the total remittable amount. 16. Barangay Tanods with tasks like guarding protected areas or resources generating user’s fee should have defined incentives schemes. More incentive efforts and budget must be directed to spring conservation, solid waste management, and other upland sustainable development activities. 17. There was suggestion that management of the Guilotongan MPA in Cebu and the user’s fee must be managed by the community instead of lease system with the business sector. 18. Dive shops and LGU/barangay should talk and agree with incentive and management schemes. 19. Incentive schemes must be monitored for its impact and for its improvement in the future 20. An incentive scheme must be properly documented to determine before and after impact to be supported by legal framework with well defined recipients, amount and source of budget.


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21. LGU must use results of their incentive assessments/monitoring and evaluation to see if the scheme provides positive results in accordance with the goals and objectives of the incentive-disincentive practices. 22. Coordination with the Office of Tourism of the municipality should be enhanced and included and include them within ICRM circle. (Tourism Officer must be added to MPDCMAO-MENRO triad in ICRM), 23. Incentive-disincentive study must be expanded to cover all municipalities and types of incentives across the country. 24. Source of fund for incentive must be diverse, not only fines and user’s fees, but alsofrom Annual Investment Plans and or Regular Fund from LGU.

VII.

REFERENCES

ADB. 2007. Project Administration Memorandum, Integrated Coastal Resource Management, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Visayas Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines. Agriconsulting S.p.A., CEST Inc. And NJS Co. Ltd. 2010. Inception Report, Integrated Coastal Resources Management Project, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Visayas Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines. 43 p. Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 1997. 33 U.S.C. [subsections] 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Gonzales, B. J. 2011. Status and Funding Mechanisms of Municipal LGU ICRM Plans. Integrated Coastal Resources Management Project, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Visayas Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines. 38 p. McNeely, J. A. 1988. “Economics and Biological Diversity: Developing and using economic incentives to conserve biological resources. IUCN, Gland, Switwerland. Xiv+232 pp. SEAMEO-SEARCA. 1997. Sustainable agriculture for the uplands training manual, module 3. 2nd Edition. SEAMEO Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA). 29 p Zhuang J, E. D. Dios, and A. Lagman –Martin. 2010. Governance and institutional quality and the links with economic growth and income inequality: with special reference to developing Asia. ADB Economics working paper Series No. 193: 54 p.


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APPENDIX A SURVEY FORM USED IN THIS STUDY

INTERVIEW FORM FOR FEASILIBILTY OF INCENTIVE AND DISINCENTIVE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

Date: __________

1. Name and location of Municipality/City/Community/Organization: Class of municipality _____

2. Name of respondent(s) and position(s):

3. Description of area? 3.1. Type of ecosystem?_______________________. MPA, Watershed, Parks, etc. 3.2. Size________________________. Area 3.3. Uniqueness in terms of natural resources. Quantity and Quality description.

4. Brief historical background of the area:

4.1.1. Threats to habitat/ecosystem before management/incentive schemes?

4.1.2. Other problem(s) identified before management and incentive regimes were established?

4.1.3. Resource utilization by communities; open access?___. A griconsulting – CEST – NJS

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4.1.4. Population growth? Increase? Threatening the habitat? Explain.

4.1.5. Are these problems found in ICRM or MPA plan?

5. Management/Incentive regime introduced: 5.1. When 5.2. By whom 5.3. why 5.4. Source of budget 5.5. Agreements. (if you submit ordinance no need to accomplish 5.4-5.5)

5.6.

Trade-offs.

5.7. Incentives. 5.7.1. Direct: 5.7.1.1. Cash _____________________________________________________.

5.7.1.2. Kind _____________________________________________________.

5.3.2. Indirect 5.3.2.1. Fiscal__________________________________________________. 5.3.2.2. Service ________________________________________________. 5.3.3.3. Social _________________________________________________.


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5.4.

Fees collected.

5.5.

Penalties/ taxes/ fines

6.

Flow of receivables coming from the field and spend for crm activity:

7.

Organizations involved: a. Recipient____________________________________. b. Donor (s) ____________________________________. c. Partner(s) __________________________________________________. d. Others _____________________________________________________.

9. Institutional tools: a. Name of Legal basis/documents/ ordinance, executive orders.

10. Was the incentive system successful? Yes_____. No_____. At what degree (____%)

11. What made it successful or failure? a. LGU support

b. Outside support/ assistance

c. Motivated stakeholders

d. others.


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12. Management /incentive regime impact: Describe impact of mgt./incentive scheme to communities and biophysical aspects of the ecosystems and area. Compare the socioeconomic and biophysical aspects of the area before and after the implementation of management/incentive disincentive scheme. (base from income life style, etc. And the status of coral reef fishes, fish catch etc.)

Compare it also to nearby communities that have not applied any management/incentive scheme.

13. Problems encountered in implementing management/incentive scheme at the municipal and barangay levels.

14. Recommendations to resolve or improve the incentive-disincentive schemes at the municipal and barangay levels.


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APPENDIX B Municipalities where interviews were conducted in this study, with names of respondents and their positions Region Municipality/City Respondents R4b;Romblon Santa Maria Prosperidad Lignis Palawan Puerto Princesa Rizza Cena El Nido R7a; Cebu

Badian

Alcoy Argao

Boljoon

Dalaguete

Barili

Cordova

Position of Respondents F. MAO

Fisheries Extension Officer Raffy G. Cabate Municipal Environmental Desk Officer Jeric A. Lumasay AT/Fishery Coordinator Alejandro L. Community Dev. Worker Memoracion Ma. May L. CO-BFAR-CRMP Saludsod Jonathan P. MENRO-OIC Alcaria Teodorico S. Bantay Dagat Allawan Christian Jon C. Bantay Dagat Allawan SPO2 Eliezer PNP-Argao, Investigator Monte Anthony Villegas Prog. Dir. Bantay Dagat Commission Danilo N. Lacuna Brgy. Council Member Nat. Res. & Agriculture; PO President. Camilo B. PO DACOP/STAMFA Villahermosa Potenciano C. MPA Mgr./DACOP Domal Fortunato S. CDS ICRMP Camello Ester G. Bante MANRO Jerry V. Piz PO DACOP/STAMFA Ariel E. Sandoval MPA Mgr./DACOP Juan Millan MPA Mgr./DACOP Gilberto C. MFARMC Chair/MPA Entoma Mgr./DACOP Edgar Napoles Agriculture Tech./ICRM focal person Geronimo T. MPDC Basalo Teofanes T. MAO Baruel Mariano Sarcol MPA Manager PO3 Acelino M. PEDO PNP Rica Plaza Lily Alcoy-Ator MPDC


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Timoteo Minguito

R7b;Siquijor

Lazi San Juan Siquijor

R5; Masbate

Aroroy

Boleno Milagros Masbate City

LGU Marine Sanctuary Consultant Lorena PO Secretary, Singgit sa Cabatingan Mananagat sa Cordova Melchor Ompad Barangay Captain, Gilutongan Island Alreich P. Duran Agricultural Technologist Arnold V. MAO Manginsay Chita M. MAO Maglimfe Joseph Marijess Agricultural Technologist Donde Pactor Sr. Aquaculturist, Chief, Darrell T. Pasco CRM Regulatory Section, Prov. Gov. Hon. Enrico Z. Mayor Capinig Fhernee V. Lim Zoning Officer Vincent V. Flores Agricultural Technologist Marilyn V. MAO Velasco Wilfredo. Bautista Administrative Aide, ICRMP Focal Person Vicente De Municipal Agriculturist Jesus, Jr. Rogelio S. City Agriculturist Magalang Tito W. Velza Anselmo Villamor Jr.

San Pascual R3;Zambales

Candelaria Masinloc

Supervising Agriculturist C. CFARMC Chairman

Frederick A. Etac CFRAMC Secretary Pascual R. MENRO Plalencia Ruperto C. Apilado Bantay Dagat Chairman Engr. Medel L. MENRO/CRMO Designate Murata Olive B. Gregorio Chief CRM Staff Nestor Dait E. D Chairman Bantay Dagat Federation Oscar E. Empeno MENRO/CRMO Staff Jr. Ariel E. Abue Masinloc Marine Sanctuary Asso. Network President Isidro C. Imperial Panglit MPA Chairman


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Carlito L. Samonte R2;Cagayan

Claveria

Gonzaga

R11; Davao Oriental

Aparri Mati

ICRMP PENRO Focal Person Hon. Celia T. Layus Mayor Corazon V. MENRO Designate/ Mun. Historquia Assessor/ICRMP Focal Person Marilyn Dalui Municipal Agriculturist Estrella Andres MPDC Emy Amad Z. MPDO Bucaneg Benny Fres Sandi MENRO Designate Norma F. Ragonjan MPDC Eddie Perez City-ENRO Cobacha


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