Food for thought: Change and continuity in German ...

Critical Policy Studies

ISSN: 1946-0171 (Print) 1946-018X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcps20

Food for thought: Change and continuity in German food safety policy Katharina T. Paul To cite this article: Katharina T. Paul (2007) Food for thought: Change and continuity in German food safety policy, Critical Policy Studies, 1:1, 18-41, DOI: 10.1080/19460171.2007.9518507 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19460171.2007.9518507

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Food for Thought: Change and Continuity in German Food Safety Policy Katharina T. Paul1 University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam School for Social Science Research (ASSR), Department of Political Science,

Abstract This paper examines German food safety policy from a discourse-theoretically informed perspective. It draws on qualitative research, including textual analysis and in-depth interviews. Its aim is to understand why the occurrence of 'mad-cow-disease' (BSE) in Germany in the year 2000 led to what some saw as a radical turnaround in food safety policy, the Agrarwende ("Agricultural Turnaround"). The discovery of BSE is conceptualized as a set of 'dislocatory moments' that made possible the re-emergence of previously marginalized discourses and hence a renegotiation of the very meaning of food safety'. By tracing these discourses and the practices, categories and discursive strategies that constitute them, the paper offers insights into a remarkable policy change, both in content and style.

Introduction Policy-making is often linked to three processes: agenda-setting, decision-making and implementation. In a number of policy-analytical accounts concerned with the effects of food scares on food safety policy in Europe - both on a national and supranational level - policymaking is presented as a set of linear and distinct processes that are based on 'reality and facts', identified problems, evaluation of possible solutions and the decisions taken by the competent (experts) and authorized policy elites. More recently, process-tracing accounts of food safety policy have taken into account the role of scientists, governmental committees,

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industry, and to some extent non-governmental organizations (hereafter NGOs) involved in the policy domain under consideration here (Abell 2002; Boin and 't Hart 2003; Feindt and Kleinschmidt 2004; Feindt and Ratschow 2003; Forbes 2004; Jasanoff 1997; Loeber and Hajer2006; Miller 1999; Millstone and vanZwanenberg 2001; Millstone andZwanenberg 2005; Nestle 2002,2003; Roslyng 2006; Smith 2004; Tacke 2001 ; Van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2003; Vos 2000; Waskow and Rehaag 2004), as well as the role of supranational institutions, such as the European Union (EU). In Germany, events related to the discovery of BSE in domestic cattle led to the emergence of the Agrarwende (Agricultural Turnaround), a major policy program seeking to integrate in a holistic fashion agricultural policy with ecological and health-related concerns. Three core questions informed the formation of this policy program: first, what can be done to deal with the effects of food safety crises? Second, what can be done to avoid food safety crises in the future? And third, what makes for a sustainable food safety policy? The aim of this paper is not to discuss the technical details of policy programs, but to 'unpack' German food safety policy by devoting attention to the diverse, diffuse and often overlapping discourses that have informed the policy change in question. Rather than treating the experience of crisis as a given, the approach taken here emphasizes contextual contingency and the different discursive premises that enable people to produce meaning and make sense of events such as food scares. Drawing on qualitative research, the paper identifies both change and continuity in German food safety policy discourse and hence presents the case study as an instance of dislocation (Laclau 1990) and subsequent renegotiation of the meaning of food safety through the interplay of a number of re-empowered discourses. In addition, the paper will also highlight the way s in which these discourses are enacted in particular practices. A set of conceptual assumptions inform this paper: first, policy-making is understood to consist of world-making practices in a variety of sites including governmental agencies, NGOs, scientific research centers, quasi-governmental organizations, and private businesses. A related assumption informing this research is that the meaning of food safety cannot be taken as given - rather, it is constantly negotiated, produced and reproduced in complex interactive practices, performed on different discursive premises - such as the nature conservation and the consumer rights discourse, as will be discussed below. In that sense, food safety is understood as a policy discourse, denoting "a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities" (Hajer 1995: 44). Finally, a given policy discourse is never fully hegemonic, as it is based on the exclusion of other alternative discourses. This contingency of a policy discourse renders it vulnerable to change in situations where previously marginalized, or excluded, discourses re-emerge. By conceptualizing the BSE-related events in Germany in these terms, one may arrive at an enhanced understanding of the seemingly radical turnaround in German food safety policy, and shed a new light onto a story that risks being reduced to (the failure of) rational considerations, or the - albeit severe - economic effects of the 'mad-cow-disease crisis'. The conceptual tools employed here will be further explicated below.

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Food for Thought: Change and Continuity in German Food Safety Policy

The material collected for the purpose of this paper consists of policy documents, newspaper items and a total of 17 semi- structured, in-depth narrative interview s with policymakers and NGO representatives in Bonn, Berlin and Stuttgart. More specifically, the policy documents were collected systematically within the time frame of 2000-2006, beginning with the discovery of the first case of BSE in Germany. They were obtained from ministries and federal offices (such as newsletters, reports, and speeches) as well as NGOs (newsletters, press releases, position papers) and industry representations (mainly readily available web-based material). These documents were first used for general information and historical overview. The simultaneous process of interviewing significantly improved the author's understanding of the dynamics under consideration here and guided further empirical research: the collected documents were subsequently subjected to multiple critical readings through which repetitive themes, references to perceived changes and allusions to past and future developments, and a range of key discursive categories were distilled. Subsequently, these were grouped into three sets of discourses which may be considered as analytical constructions of the researcher. Finally, follow-up interviews refined the author's understanding of the subject.2 This paper consists of two main parts: first, I will discuss the changing food safety policy discourse by tracing it in terms of three discursive stages: first, the post-war policy context, second, the BSE events, and third, the post-BSE policy discourse. In the second section, the paper unfolds the core argument regarding the mobilization of a set of previously marginalized discourses that, through a hegemonic struggle, led to a transformation in the way food safety is governed, as reflected in the Agrarwende. Moreover, the section will illustrate on a concrete empirical level how discourses are enacted in institutional, business, as well as consumption practices. The concluding remarks will summarize the findings, highlighting the implications of the theoretical framework employed here on the empirical analysis.

SECTION I I. 1. Post-WWII: Continuity and Change Unlike in other countries, food safety was institutionally linked to public health from early on in Germany, particularly since the Second World War.3 Until the Second World War, selfsufficiency with respect to food was regarded as a means of ensuring economic and political independence. Similarly, during the so-called ' Third Reich' ', the Reichsnährstand- the centrally controlled agricultural and food supply system - was intended on the one hand, to ensure autarky and on the other hand, it emphasized the importance of Blut and Boden (' 'blood and soil") in Nazi ideology by promoting domestic products, sometimes with an explicit military motivation (Wippermann 2001). As Hendriks points out, food policy hardly changed after the war, as food autonomy became a key objective after the worst food shortage crises had been overcome (Hendriks 19 87). This discourse manifested itself in an intensification of agriculture, and importantly, a strengthening of the position of and the general respect for farmers and the farmers' union

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(Bauernverband). The policy discourse of food autarky persisted throughout the 1970s, notwithstanding the pressure exerted in the negotiation of the early EU Common Agricultural Policy (hereafter CAP) at the time. The German position in these negotiations has frequently been reduced to a mere protectionist policy but can perhaps better be understood as a continuation of the food autarky narrative. Moreover, given the legacy of the severe and arguably traumatizing food crises of 1949 where average consumption hardly exceeded 1000 calories per day (Hendriks 1987: 36), a particular discourse developed that strongly linked agricultural production to the aim of 'keeping the nation healthy and strong '. This may help explain why food policy was subsumed under the responsibilities of the health authorities early on - rather than those of the agricultural ministries, as it was the case elsewhere. Then, in the 1980s, news about a suspected cow disease in the UK emerged, later to be known as Bovine SpongiformEncephalopathy (BSE).4Despite expert opinions suggesting that prions, the BSE pathogens, resisted high temperatures, rendering the disease easily transmittable, farmers and industry insisted that the German pressure sterilization technique could in fact overcome this problem. Notably, food safety regulation was still a matter of national regulation at the time - hence, the so-called Specified Risk Material (hereafter SRM), as determined by the EU, did not have to be removed from cattle intended for consumption in Germany (Millstone and vanZwanenberg 2005: 195-6). Although Germany was one of the few countries to acknowledge BSE as a public health hazard rather than merely an animal disease, this framing only applied to foreign cattle, not German herds (ibid.). In other words, the idea that German cattle could be infected did not surface during this time period as, arguably, it did not fit into the hegemonic discourse of German beef being clean and healthy. Given this context, November 24th of 2000 had a tremendous impact on German food safety policy.

1.2. What is BSE? Cow Trixi, aged four, would have been sold for sausage production, if it was not for Richard Basche of Itzehoe, Schleswig Holstein, who offered parts of Trixi's brain to aprivate laboratory in Hamburg in order for it to be tested for BSE. Previously, the German authorities had declared Germany to be free of the cattle disease that is most probably caused by the inclusion of a particular protein supplement in cattle feed, namely meat and bone meal (hereafter MBM) produced from animal carcasses. The first case of BSE was confirmed in Schleswig-Holstein on November 24th 2000, symbolizing what Minister of Health at the time, Andrea Fischer, referred to as the "GAU of the industrialized agriculture".5 Only a few weeks later, BSE was confirmed in three cows in Bavaria, "where cows still have their own names" (Neumann 2000), shattering the longdefended legend of the 'clean' Bavarian cattle feed.6 Shortly after the confirmation of the laboratory results, the Minister of Health Andrea Fischer (Greens) and Minister of Agriculture, Karl-Heinz Funke, who had wrongly declared German beef as BSE-free, were forced to resign as they found themselves in a "crisis amidst a crisis" (Interview 14) : not only was BSE confirmed in German cattle, but authorities had


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also lost credibility and trust. Chancellor Schröder declared an "end to agricultural factories" and beef consumption dropped dramatically (Oosterveer 2002).7 Within weeks, a law was passed banning the usage of MBM as animal feed. Immediately after the first cases of BSE were identified, a report was commissioned to assess the organization of consumer health policy, drawn up by the president of the Federal Auditing Court {Bundesrechnungshof), Herta von Wedel. This report insisted on the separation of risk assessment ('science') from risk management ('politics'), whereas the Federal Office for Technology Assessment (TAB) had strongly recommended the opposite (Böschen et al. 2002).8 Among the institutional rearrangements that followed, the establishment of the Federal Ministry for Consumer Protection, Nutrition and Agriculture (BMVEL) was the most prominent The ministry is most frequently referred to as the Consumers' Ministry, and as interviews and media reports indicate, the telling name of the new institution and the non-agrarian background of its head Renate Künast symbolized a dismantling of the institutionalized power of the agrarian lobby.9

1.3. What does BSE mean? The resignation of two ministers and a set of institutional rearrangements failed to assuage the general public outcry over the events and did not adequately tackle the apparent problem of mistrust vis-à-vis the authorities.10 Indeed, the developments recounted above were accompanied by not only an explicit critique of the informal and formal influence of the agricultural industryintheformerMMstryofAgricultare(BML),butevenmoreirnrx)rtanÜy,theemergence of a broader critical discourse. Künast, the newly appointed minister, famously announced the aforementioned Agrarwende in her inauguration speech in 2001 (Künast 200 la).11 The Agrarwende program, supported by the Green Party and the Social Democrats, explicitly aimed at a 20% market share of organically produced food against "the ills of an agricultural policy geared to mass production" (Künast cited in Nicholson-Lord 2001). Künast called for an end to "agriculture as we know it" (Künast 2001a), and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder called for "an end to factory farming", despite his alleged fondness of Currywurst (curry sausage), arguably an icon of industrial meat production. The new approach to agriculture, it was announced, would focus on "Quality, not quantity" [Klasse statt Masse] (Künast 2001a) in order to "never return [...] [to] the treadmill of thoughtless mass consumption" (Künast cited in NicholsonLord 2001). Similarly, a Green MP considered BSE to represent what the Chernobyl disaster had represented to nuclear power: the beginning of the end (Beste 2001). Furthermore, Künast called for a Reinheitsgebot (imperative for purity) in German meat production, which is an analogy to the 'purity principle ' practiced in beer brewery (BZ 2001 ). While in the UK, the BSE episode as well as the occurrence of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (2000-1) certainly triggered strong debate and a period of negotiating responsibilities, it is the language of a 'point of no return' and the announcement of a Wende ("turning point") that catches our interest in the German context. It suggests a different reasoning, as well as a different experience of the same disease, the economic and health-related effects of which

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were actually much greater in the UK. Although this paper is not concerned with a comparative analysis of food safety policy discourse, a case study approach is often implicitly informed in such manner, and in the context of this paper, it triggers questions such as: what triggered this apparently 'radical' turnaround (re)linking the policy domains of food, agriculture and environment? And how 'new' is this policy discourse? How is this changing policy discourse enacted in practices? The next section will offer a set of conceptual tools that may help in approaching these questions.


SECTION II II. 1 Reconceptualizing Crisis: A Poststructuralist Approach Among the vast range of scholarship dealing with food safety policy, one particular school of thought engages with the notion of 'crisis' and they way crises relate to policy change. Drawing on this body of literature, this section addresses the notion of 'crisis' as a theoretical problem. To that end, a poststructuralist framework is sketched out that proposes to capture the BSErelated events as instances of dislocation.12 For instance, Boin and 't Hart draw on empirical analyses of institutional change and reform (Boin and't Hart 2000; see also Alink et al. 2001 ), focussing on two important questions: first, why and how does a policy sector - defined here as an institutional field of actors, rules and practices - slither into crisis? Secondly: what happens in a sector once a crisis has manifested itself (Boin and 't Hart 2000:287)? Rejecting the view that certain moments, which seem to operate as triggers for a crisis, are 'freak events' then leads them to suggest that crises are in fact manifestations of a certain institutional vulnerability that can be traced back to developmental logics in the 'pre-crisis' period. Alink et ai. suggest three elements to be central in the course of a crisis: the institutional integrity at stake, the process of deinstitutionalisation brought about by growing uncertainty, and the challenge to policymakers and stakeholder representatives that are held accountable for the organisations, its modus operandi and policy agenda. These "cracks in institutional stability", they argue, "offer opportunities to agents of change" (Alink et al. 2001: 302). Yet, they argue, the outcome of a crisis depends on whether a reformist or conservative approach to crisis management prevails. Hood, on the other hand, provides a theoretically valuable analysis of policy dynamics by conceptualizing the politization of food scares in terms of 'risk-games' and 'blame-games' (Hood 2002). The basic assumption is that politicians seek to maximise political support, which Hood defines as the aim to "credit less blame from voters". From this starting point, Hood conceptualises "the simplest possible version" of the blame game when politicians exercise a choice of direction or delegation within a policy domain as they seek to claim credit and avoid blame from voters, while the latter choose between praising or blaming those who have direct responsibility in public policy, in the face of benign or malign policy effects (Hood 2002).


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Yet, Hood does not provide empirical illustrations of the manners in which such 'games' translate into institutional practices, and how these effect institutional changes in times of crisis. Secondly, the stylized nature of his model tends to neglect the cultural and historical contingency inherent in political institutions and agencies, and thus the very conditions of possibility contingent interpretations of a crisis-event - that enable the kinds of interactive 'games' he envisages. Finally, a number of commentators - both in academic scholarship and the media - present the occurrence of BSE as primarily an economic threat to agriculture and vested interests, and/or an incidental 'window of opportunity' for the Greens to strategically promote their policy agenda (cf. Feindt and Kleinschmidt 2004). While these accounts all contain insightful elements, two major questions remain. First, the notion of agency and strategy remains underdeveloped. Second, the authors fail to consider the way s in which hegemonic policy discourses are contested and hence shifts may occur. Conversely, Griggs and Howarth (2002) offer an innovative policy-analytical approach, drawing on poststructuralist theory. In their largely theoretical discussion of policy change, they problematize the conception of interests versus ideas and the notion of agency in rational choice and ideational accounts, as well as framing approaches. While they do not deny the possibility of agency and strategy, they offer a suitable middle-path approach that emphasizes the importance of dislocations in order for radical agency and hence policy change to occur. This middle-way approach-privileging neither 'interests' nor 'ideas' -takes seriously the notion of agency in times of crisis which becomes possible because of the breakdown of 'normal' rules and roles (Griggs and Howarth 2002: 107). From that perspective, the BSE-related events in Germany may be considered as moments "that cannot be represented, symbolized, or in other ways domesticated by the discursive structure - which therefore is disrupted" (Laclau 1990: 41; cf. Howarth 2000).13 As Stavrakakis (2000), moments such as the discovery of BSE revealed that "the certainty which supported our way of life, which made our way of life possible - an integral part of that way of life was the consumption of meat - were not privileged and undeniable truths - as almost everyone was led to believe - but social constructions with limited duration and validity" (ibid. : 3). In that sense, the BSE events challenged the routines and sedimented practices of policymakers - such as the conventional models of risk analysis - as well as those of the meatconsuming citizen, the 'apolitical' scientists, and last but not least, farmers. For the discovery of BSE in all its dimensions could not be incorporated into the hegemonic policy discourse of - in simplified terms 'German beef is clean and safe' and 'intensified agriculture keeps us healthy and strong'. If we take institutions to denote sedimented discourses, this dislocation caused what Hajer calls institutional ambiguity, where "established institutions are [...] unable to resolve [issues] in a manner that is perceived to be both legitimate and effective", and new spaces may emerge that feature an "ensemble of mostly unstable practices that emerge in the struggle to address problems" (Hajer 2003:176). Laclau emphasizes that traumatic events or moments necessarily entail a productive element, and open up the discursive space for the production of new meanings and identities (Torfing

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1999:149-51 ; Laclau 1990). As Griggs and Howarthput it, "[a]gents, who are unable to draw upon 'normal' decision-making procedures, are able to reconstruct the discourses and rules of social life" (Griggs and Howarth 2002:107-8). Indeed, the post-BSE period witnessed the emergence of innovative governance practices and at the same time an empowerment of previously marginalized discourses and groups. Below, the case of the acrylamide scare is used to illustrate such an instance of discursive negotiation, where different discourses compete in defining a particular problem and hence a solution. The opening of new political sites "away from the familiar topography of formal political institutions' ' (Haj er and Wagenaar 2003: 3) may be considered exemplary for the ' 'politics of life", as arguably, issues in the field of medicine, health, food, or environment (ibid.) tend to trigger "debates [...] about the nature of society, the value of particular ways of life and Humanity's relationship with the natural world" (Chalmers 2003:550).14 In this field of politics, the formulation of policies becomes particularly difficult often requiring that "disparate actors [... ] find nascent points of solidarity in the j oint realization that they need one another to craft effective political agreements" (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003: 3). The next section inquires precisely after this 'political agreement', articulated in the Agrarwende, by investigating the post-BSE policy narrative, which strongly incorporated notions associated with nature conservation, and a particular - though not uncontested consumer discourse. Secondly, it will relate this new policy narrative to changing constellations in food safety governance and the ways in which government, industry, trade and NGOs have come to jointly govern food safety in Germany. In doing so, the paper also highlights the importance of the concept of the 'food chain' and the way it facilitated a sense of 'collectiveness' across institutional boundaries and the political spectrum, and hence the Agrarwende as a discourse combining the three different perspectives.

II. 2 The Post-BSE Policy Narrative The previous section described the emerging critical discourse that accompanied the BSE events, or perhaps: that constructed those events as issues arising from industrialization and agricultural mass production. Subsequently, a conceptual framework was laid out that will be used here to discuss the emergence of the different discourses the Agrarwende narrative draws on. Although these discourses are intertwined and draw on each other, it is - for practical purposes possible to schematize them as follows: first, the 'food chain discourse', second, the 'nature discourse', and third, the 'consumer discourse'. Moreover, I will identify new governance practices that relate to these discourses.

Bringing the Food Chain Back to Life While the idea of a 'food chain' originally stems from biology, its usage in a political sense can be traced back to two distinct sources (Jackson et al. 2006): first, in Wallerstein's work on world systems theory, a commodity chain is understood as ' 'a network of labour and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity" (Wallerstein 1974; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986: 159, cited in Jackson et al. 2006). The second source can be traced back


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to the 'new political economy' literature on food and agriculture, such as Friedland's work on the sociology of agriculture and the comparative analysis of production systems. His analysis of technological change in agriculture led him to extend his perspective beyond the farm, taking into account corporate power and agricultural production systems - what would then become to be called the 'food commodity chain' (Jackson et al. 2006).15 In the context of a series of food scares, such as the discovery of B SE and the dioxins affair, the notion of the food chain in its politicized version has experienced a revival. In the present case, the notion of the food chain matters in three respects. First, the notion denotes interconnectivity and a systemic character, which has brought anew sense of 'collectiveness' to the fore. This is not least recognizable in the employment of the term 'stakeholders' thathas emerged in recent years and is frequently employed in policy documents as well as by interviewees.16 The idea of "talking to the chain", as officials have referred to it, has become an intrinsic element in the 'farm to fork' food safety policy discourse in various European contexts.17 In the German context Renate Künast first used the term "magic hexagon" to refer to the six essential stakeholders being the feed industry, the food industry, the retailers, the farmers, civic society suchas consumer organizations, and politicians (Künast 2001a). Similarly, Künast commented on the Food and Feed Law (2004) by stating that "food safety is indivisible [and means] safety from the field and the stable to the plate - this comprehensive understanding of food safety lies at the core of this new law" (BMVEL 2004). An official at the Consumers' Ministry expresses it as follows: One cannot view these systems as separate from one another. One has to view [these structures] across systems, horizontally, and across national borders. Particularly in times of globalization it does not make sense to view things each on its own terms. One has to view everything, from farm to plate, production, transport etc. [...]. It has to be one (Interview 14). A concrete instance may illustrate this better: In 2002, new research findings suggested that potatoes developed high levels of acrylamide, a potentially carcinogenic chemical, when treated with high temperatures. This was not a new problem as such, as frying and roasting have been common cooking practices for long, and these new research findings were more or less incidental.18 In light of the uncertain nature of the issue and its possible carcinogenic character, a round table discussion was called for by the Federal Office for Consumer Protection and Food Safety (BVL) and the Consumers' Ministry (BMVEL) that included "all relevant stakeholders' ' along the food chain, including food industry, consumer organizations, professional associations such as in the tourism and restaurant sector, as well as women's associations, environmental NGOs, and Foodwatch, a prominent private food watchdog. The content and style of discussions reflect the inclusion of a range of discursive premises: suggestions ranged from developing new frying techniques both for industrial and household purposes to finding new ways to grow potatoes - which, in a sense, reflects the variety of discursive premises

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from which people make sense of events and hence formulate diverse problems and solutions. Moreover, the active involvement of these different groups and their self-understanding as stakeholders indicate a renewed sense of urgency that makes possible a renegotiation of roles, rules and discursive meanings. Notably, the whole 'policy process' - including scientific risk assessment, risk management and risk communication - was eventually a process of 'coproduction' of policymakers, NGOs, and particularly industry. In reference to this sort of practice, an interviewee remarks: "[t]he good guy/bad guy distinction simply does not hold anymore [...] [and] this is something like a paradigm change" (Interview 11). Similarly, this systemic thinking is enacted in business governance practices. First, the Quality Assurance scheme (QS: Qualitätssicherung Stufenübergreifend; 'Quality Assurance across the food chain' ) was established in 2001 explicitly in response to BSE and is based on voluntary declarations. The requirements for the QS system are set "by the whole food chain [...] because only something that is supported by all can be implemented" (QS 2006). Furthermore, the QS system "creates linkages that put all elements along the food chain on an equal footing". The individual firm has to fulfill its obligations with respect to quality assurance, but it is not the sole bearer of responsibility, therefore "we all have to engage in quality assurance together across the whole food chain [...] [because] only cooperation across the whole chain can make these efforts visible to the consumer" (QS 2006). Importantly, this private 'self-regulatory' scheme employs standards that are in essence the same as those set by the governmental authorities - with the additional requirement of a veterinary surveillance based on private contracts and a renouncement of the use of antibiotics in animal rearing (QS 2006). The nature of this practice, one may argue, shows an implicit construction of 'collectiveness', turning food safety into a ' societal endeavor ', and reflects the internalization of a new food safety discourse in the private sector.19 The practice of traceability, an inherent feature of the farm-to-fork approach across the EU, works in a similar way: Downstream tracking refers to the systematic control of food safety practiced on a day-to-day basis and facilitates upstream tracing, which refers to the process of finding the 'weakest link' in the food chain in case of concrete problems that arise, and makes possible the withdrawal of food products when necessary (Ökolandbau 2006). When the system was introduced, it initially created confusion particularly with small businesses as they had understood it to be a merely technical and potentially expensive IT-based measure. As an official at the ministry expressed it, ' 'it took a while for them to understand that this is not merely technical, but that all parties along the food chain depend on each other" (Interview 14). Indeed, it seems as though the notion of the 'food chain' has become something like a code as ' 'one no longer has to explain to j ournalists what it means' ' (Interview 17).20 Finally, similar ideas of interconnectivity across institutional and even national boundaries have helped policymakers 'reorder their worlds', as the following quote illustrates well: Self-organizing and self-learning systems would be the dream of risk assessors and risk managers. [A] command-and-control structure and a top-down approach of individual compliance to rules is [...] less adapted to modern


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[...] societies with growing interdependency. [...] In particular, internationalization and production complexity makes food supply chains and its processes difficult to break down into readily codifiable nodes. [There is a] need for capacity and knowledge building between private and public sector [and a] 'holistic approach ' [taking into account] the interactions and subtle feedbacks between sources of hazards, like the climate change, which can only be appreciated through a much broader strategy (Noteborn et al. 2005:12-4; see also OECD 2003). This idea of a holistic approach is examined in more depth below, by means of tracing the way ideas of systems, nature, and stakeholderness within the food chain have been drawn on by NGOs. This section has illustrated that the re-emergence of the notion of the food chain has played an important role in the farm-to-fork policy discourse on multiple levels. A closer look at the empirical material, such as business practices, allows us to identify meaning-making processes beyond strictly defined institutional boundaries. Asa result, it becomes clear that the notion of the food chain has come to represent more than just a series of technical procedures: in a sense, it now connotes the (negotiated) collective endeavor to keep food safe as something that needs to be performed collectively by the food chain itself - the 'stakeholders' across institutional and national boundaries. Below, this idea of 'collectiveness' is further explored, as well as the ways in which discourses on 'nature' have served as additional discursive resources in the post-BSE policy narrative.

Nature as a 'Stakeholder' On the occasion of a forum in September 2003 amongst the members of the Agrarbiindnis, an alliance of a variety of NGOs and farmers, a trip was organized to an organic farm, Gut Körtlingshausen, in order to inspire discussions on the future of agriculture (Agrarbündnis 2003): [Should we] create permanent and lasting conditions or engage dynamically with our environment, because agricultural activity implies change? What are the limits to change and intervention, and who sets these limits? [...] In order to develop common goals, mutual understanding is necessary [...] [and] a democratic landscape can only grow through a collective participatory process (Agrarbiindnis 2003:1-2). How can a landscape grow democratically then? During the interviewing process, it became clear that the Agrarwende and the German implementation of the 'farm to fork' approach had to be further contextualized: In the early 20th century, Germany witnessed the formation of a number of associations for Naturschutz (nature protection) and Heimatschutz (homeland protection) (Lekan2004). By 1914, a concrete environmental reform movement had emerged with members in every German state and province (ibid.). These organizations devoted

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themselves to the preservation of nature, and their practices included researching and cataloging Germany's natural features, lobbying government agencies to formalize the protection of the Heimat landscape, and raising public awareness about the 'beauty of nature' and the need to care of the 'natural environment', including animals (Lekan 2004: 3). In the 1920s, these organizations began to involve themselves in regional landscape conservation, known as Landschaflspflege, that advocated future-oriented, environmentally sensitive planning, which may be regarded as a forerunner of today's sustainable development (Lekan 2004; Interview 17). This very idea - which still forms part of agricultural policy in Germany - does not only imply an essential obligation on the part of the population to literally 'take care' of nature and landscapes, but in addition, it introduces an element of aesthetics into the discourse. This is also reflected in policy language: commenting on 'Germany's ideas for anew agricultural policy', Künast, for instance, envisages [wjalking through a countryside where fields and meadows alternate with trees, hedges and ponds, a countryside with animals grazing [...] bright friendly animal houses [...] and a farmyard café with home-baked cake and flour produced on the farm [...], and agriculture backedby the people (Künast 2001b). Similarly, speaking at a women's forum on nutrition, food, and rural policy, Bavarian state secretary Emilia Müller expresses these connections in the following way: "If we want to preserve the identity of rural areas [...], we have to include their social and cultural essence: the togetherness of their inhabitants, heritage and traditions, and our Christian values" (Müller 2004). A key concept here is the idea of Bäuerliche Landwirtschaft ('peasant agriculture') which denotes more than merely employing organic principles in farming. The following quote may further illustrate the argument that the Agrarwende is indeed based on a combination of discourses: Bäuerliche Landwirtschaft is a way of living [and depends on] natural, societal [...] and cultural conditions " [Its principles are meant to] "form a bridge between society and agriculture [that is built on the pillars of] social, ecological, economic, global and intergenerational sustainability and animal welfare. [It requires] thinking in terms of cycles: first, in terms of production techniques (preserving fertility and biodiversity), second, regionalism, and third, thinking in generations (Agrarbiindnis 2001: 63-4). The link between land and food is presented here as one of cyclical interconnectivity in the idea of Kreislaufwirtschaft - a holistic concept denoting a self-sustaining agricultural production system that takes into account social as well as ecological concerns. This reasoning resonates in various discursive premises, and across political parties (Agrarbündnis 2002;


29



Verbraucherzentrale 2004; vzbv 2006). Moreover, it may be interesting to point out that the German word Lebensmittel literally means 'means for life' and is derived from what some consider to be the 'god-given' Lebensraum (Kirchenamt 2002:4). It follows that "the task of agriculture [is] the protection of water, grounds and air in the original meaning of Lebens-mittel [...] and respecting animals and plants as God's creation" (ibid.).21 Similarly, the minister for consumer affairs comments that "the food industry and the agricultural sector are not only responsible for our food but also our landscape and nature, and to ensure respect for farmers as well as rural areas, the environment, and landscapes, we have to enter a societal contract" (Seehofer 2005). Finally, it may be worth noting that the German translation of the 'farm to fork' approach was translated into 'from the field to the plate', hence connecting food safety back to 'where it really comes from' : which, here, is not the farm, but its 'natural environment'. As an environmental NGO puts it, punning on a German saying: Landschaft geht durch den Magen - one can taste landscape (BUND). It becomes evident that food scares such as BSE have led to a much stronger rethinking of agricultural and food policy than in other contexts, given the importance of the 'natural environment' - including ground, plants, and animals - in the German cultural context. Indeed, 'naturalness' is a key element in German food safety policy discourse. Yet, ideas of naturalness are not 'new' as such in the German context, but they were marginalized in the industrialization process, the intensification of agriculture, and the growing significance of agricultural trade. One interviewee indeed describes the experience of BSE, and the hegemonic agricultural practices that are assumed to be the cause of the disease, as an "alienation from nature" (Naturentfremdung) (Interview 17).22 The re-emergence of this previously marginalized discourse may well be illustrated in particular food governance practices. For instance, the Biosiegel label was established in response to the BSE crisis in 2001. Interestingly enough, this legally protected label for organically produced foods features considerably stricter requirements than the EU equivalent (Kropp et ai. 2005).23 Second, with respect to consumption, sociological research suggests that buyers of organic food in Germany have the following motivations for their behavior: organic food, it is assumed, is less 'polluted' with pesticides; second, it is thought to be 'more natural' and 'less risky', and in sum 'somehow healthier' or 'good for body and mind' (Kropp et al. 2005: 40). Moreover, buyers see organic food as being "produced in harmony with needs of the environment and the needs of animals, and produced "under fair conditions" (ibid.). It becomes clear here again that the connotations of 'organic food' range far beyond production methods. Within this discourse, safety turns into quality, which does not only include factors such as taste, texture, and produce being free of contaminates: rather quality increasingly refers to what is referred to as procedural quality, such as in the aspect of animal welfare and concern with the environmental effects of food production (Apel 2004; BUND 2005 ; vzbv 2001 ).24 As a recent food industry campaign puts it: safety means ' 'nature on our plate" (CMA 2002-6). It is intriguing to see that even abroad, 'naturalness ' matters with respect to German food.

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The Central Marketing Agency (CMA) conducted a study that enquired after the qualities that importers of German agrarian products associated with the latter.25 The results indicated that even abroad, 'naturalness and cleanliness', along with 'firm control and quality', was strongly associated with the image of German food (Bauernverband 2004).26 Problems frequently identified by interviewees are issues regarding labeling and the general appearance of products. Labels suchas 'natural' and 'traditional', or 'organic' (Öko and Bio) are claimed to "misrepresent nature" (Interview 17).27 Therefore, several groups call for a gläserne Produktion, which denotes transparent production, using 'glass' as a metaphor. Furthermore, consumer associations criticize meat advertisements that draw on an idealized image of Bäuerliche Landwirtschaft that links the consumption of meat with health and strength (Müller 2002: 4). Moreover, the increasing focus on making products look hygienic suggests 'cleanliness' and consumers "no longer understand what 'natural' really means" (Interview 17). In this context, the recent Hygiene Regulation (Hygienepaket), both on the national and the EU level, is seen to send the 'wrong signals' to the consumer (Interview 17; Fink-Kessler et al. 2006).28 But who is this consumer?

The Rise of the Consumer 'The consumer' has been mentioned a number of times in this paper without much explication as to the origins, or the qualities associated with this category. Instead of taking this category as a given, it is crucial to inquire after its status here. However, this constitutes a difficult task, as the origins of 'the consumer ' are extremely diffuse and diverse. In a sense, the consumer is ubiquitous in food safety discourse, as already suggested above, in the world of food industry, processors, retailers, scientists and policymakers. Hendriks (1987) points out that the influence of consumer associations in the post-war period could by no means be compared to that of the farm lobby. While the aforementioned Federal Consumers' Association occasionally organized boycotts, a wide-scale consumer mobilization never took place. In addition, the considerable influence of a Christian discourse that valued "family farms, entrepreneurial initiative, [...] family involvement, nature and animals and a sense of knowledge about growth, maturing and death" was hardly conducive to the growthof aUS-styleconsumermovement (Hendriks 1987: 43). However, while the consumer rights discourse was blocked from developing into a strong movement in the post-war period, 'the consumer' does have a history in Germany. Between roughly the 1970s and 1990s, the principle of consumer healthprotection was institutionalized in policy, due to its connection with the 'precautionary principle', apolicy measure considered to be the 'typically German'. However, the concept of the consumer here was at best implicit, considering that the precautionary principle primarily referred to environmental issues rather than potential effects for the individual. The concept of the consumer gradually emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s in continental Europe, whereas the US already saw a firmly established consumer movement by then. The increasing level of welfare and discourses of economic liberalization during the 1980s certainly aided the emergence of a consumer discourse in Europe.29 Yet it was not until the late 1990s,


31

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and particularly the BSE-related events, that the consumer discourse in Germany could be mobilized against the hegemonic discourse of intensive farming and industrialized food production, and thus turned into a consumer rights discourse. Certainly, the 'infrastructure' was already present to a certain extent, primarily in the form of publicly funded consumer associations.30 But it was the dislocatory experience of BSE and along with it, the mobilization of the notion of the food chain as a discursive resource that made possible a sense of empowerment. Moreover, the reinvention of a new identity vis-à-vis the government and the industry as the primary targets of criticism indicates the emergence of agency through these dislocatory experiences. In this process, the category of the consumer was incorporated into the food and agricultural policy discourse, linking, as the recently nominated Minister for Consumer Protection states, ' 'these three political domains [nutrition, consumer protection, agricultural policy] in a circular relation [...] [as] the basis for a safe and a prosperous future" (Seehofer 2005). However, this link between agriculture and food is not uncontested. Foodwatch, for instance, a rather prominent food safety watchdog, argues that the Agrarwende was too strictly connected to organic farming and hence sustained a market niche, rather than considering the wider context of the mass food sector. The organization whose founder Thilo Bode is former head of Greenpeace criticizes the ' 'wrong concepts' ' currently used in German consumer policy : the construction of the link between agricultural and consumer policy, it is argued, creates a normative image of the "good consumer" buying organic food (foodwatch 2005). This more liberal conception of the consumer, emphasizing the notion of individual choice, indeed stands in stark contrast to the hegemonic consumer discourse that manifests in a number of publicly funded proj ects and campaigns (ÖkoFair 2006). lathe fair-feels-good initiative, for instance, a variety of NGOs in the anti-globalization movement, the environmental movement, and a consumer organization have launched campaigns focusing on arange of issues, such as workers' rights, fair trade and organic farming (Fair-Feels-Good 2005). Notably, the government itself has also launched a number of campaigns promoting 'sustainability in the shopping bag', such as the Federal Program on Organic Farming (Bundesprogramm Ökologischer Landbau), fair trade campaigns and numerous campaigns promoting organic food (Bio-Kann-Jeder 2006; CMA 2002-6; ÖkoFair 2006; BMELV 2006). Furthermore, numerous (governmental and private) initiatives aim at raising the 'responsible consumer' by way of organizing school activities around nutrition 'from the crèche to the canteen' (Interview 15; aid 2006).31 Overall, this material suggests that the hegemonic understanding of the 'right decision' in this context is to consume healthy and safe food that is produced with consideration for animal welfare and the environment, as well as fair trade products. The 'informed and responsible' consumer (Bundesregierung 2003; Reisch2003) has also entered the world of policymakers as a Leitbild (' 'mission' '), both literally and metaphorically. Arguably, the category of the consumer and the construction of her interests, preferences, and emotions represent a benchmark for institutions to measure their own performance, manifesting itself in regular surveys measuring trust and risk perception, both on a national and supranational level.32

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Furthermore, institutions have experimented with scenario exercises in which crises are simulated in order to improve risk communication skills, and in addition game-theoretical models are developed in order to anticipate consumers' reaction as well as to 'make rational and logical decisions' in times of crisis (Interview 11 ; 13; cf. Noteborn et al.). Similarly, the consumer has entered the sphere of scientific experts: The Federal Risk Assessment Institute (BfR) declares its work to be based on the principles of consumer health, free consumer choice, and the continuous optimization of the precautionary consumer protection (BfR 2003 ; Henning 2004). Moreover, engagement and dialogue with the public is sought through informal participatory practices such as 'Open Science Nights' and Open Days in which 'laypeople' are invited to look over the shoulders of experts.33 Part of the paradigm change that interviewees refer to is perhaps then the dissolution of the strictly defined identities of "so-called experts and so-called laypeople", as the president of the Federal Risk Assessment Institute puts it (Hensel 2004). In a sense, the consumer has become part of the lab. The consumer remains a highly contested category, or what Gabriel and Lang ( 1995) refer to as 'unmanageable', and has been assigned an integral, yet complex role in the policy discourse under consideration here. In its malleability as a discursive category, it intermediates between different discursive premises and has become, in a sense, ubiquitous: the notions of health, responsibility, rationality,risk,hygiene and other, more 'peripheral' concepts such as sustainability all hinge upon particular notions of 'the consumer '.

Concluding remarks

,

This paper set out to investigate why and how the occurrence of BSE made possible the emergence of anew policy discourse that integrated concerns of agriculture and environment with those of food safety. To that end, first, I recounted German food policy roughly over the past century, identifying continuities and changes. The analysis of continuity and change continued in the second section, where the paper examined the discursive traces of the early environmentalist movement and the more recent consumer rights discourse in the Agrarwende policy discourse. Gradually, it became clear that the Agrarwende policy discourse was not as new as it seems at first: Rather, the moments of dislocation and the symptomatic institutional ambiguity that the discovery of BSE brought about, created a discursive opening for the reactivation of previously marginalized discourses and hence a renegotiation of the very notion of'food safety'. The occurrence of BSE led to the partial breakdown of the hegemonic discourse that framed industrialized agriculture as bringing welfare and health, a discourse that saw the state as the guarantor of food safety, and presented German beef as clean, healthy and safe. Finally, it also called into question the hegemonic policy discourse of national regulation in this policy domain and facilitated the growth of a transnational policy discourse. In the second section, 'the food chain' was identified as a central discursive category which facilitated the empowerment of previously marginalized groups as 'stakeholders', and consequentially, the emergence of new food governance practices. Secondly, this part of the paper illustrated how these discursive resources made possible the emergence of a policy


33

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discourse that transformed 'food safety' into 'food quality', incorporating aspects of animal welfare, nature conservation, aesthetics and a sense of collective responsibility. In sum, this paper illustrated that a discourse-analytical approachmay enhance our understanding of policy change, perhaps particularly in the 'politics of life'. In conclusion, further research is needed to improve our understanding of important aspects such as the growing transnational policy discourse and the changing actor constellations that come with it, as well as the role of the 'consumer discourse' in similar policy domains in the 'politics of life'. Moreover, the usage of alternative data such as business governance practices certainly deserves more attention in future research as it may illuminate our understanding of the role of discourse in practices beyond institutional and organizational boundaries.

Notes 1

Amsterdam School for Social Science research (ASSR) and Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam. The author gratefully acknowledge the comments and advice of Annette Freyberg-Inan, Maarten Hajer, colleagues at the Amsterdam Discourse Centre, and Paul Sengmüller at the University of Amsterdam, Barbara Prainsack at the University of Vienna, and seminar participants at the ECPR Joint sessions in Nicosia, Cyprus, April 2006. Finally, the author is grateful to the anonymous referees for their useful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper. Funding for this research project was provided by the Dutch Organisation for Scientific research (NWO) in the form of a dissertation grant, and additional financial support was received from the ASSR.

2

The primary sources used in this paper were translated by the author; originals available upon request. Where considered necessary, the original term was added. In addition to the 17 interviews conducted in Germany, 28 interviews in the Netherlands and the EU context contributed to the author's understanding of the subject matter. Most interviews were recorded and transcribed by the author.

3

Food security was, of course, an issue all over Europe in the immediate post-war period. However, whereas in other countries the priority was to provide sufficient food, food provision programmes in Germany soon emphasized the importance of 'healthy ' nutrition. Traces of these experiences are still evident, such as in the institution of the aid, an agency founded in the context of the Marshal Plan. While during that period, it was charged with organizing food aid distribution programmes, today, it functions as apublic health information service, focussing on nutrition. Although food aid is no longer a necessity, the agency still operates under the same name and today features a variety of online forums, educational programmes in school concerning 'healthy nutrition' and hygiene.

4

BSE was first diagnosed in the UK in 1986 as a disease of the brain in cattle. The human variant of the disease, new variant Creutzfeld-Jacob Disease (vCJD) was first publicly announced only ten years later in March 1996 in the UK. Although scientific uncertainty still marks the BSE /vCJD debate, it is now generally assumed to be caused by the

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transmission of BSE to humans. BSE belongs to a group of diseases named 'prion diseases', the nature of which has not been fully understood in bio-medical research. 5

The term GAU originated in the context of nuclear power accidents and stands for "Grösster Anzunehmender Unfall" (worst case scenario).

6

Only a few months later, the Bavarian state organized a citizens' panel on the subject of BSE. For an analysis see Hendriks (2004).

7

In the period between December 2000 and February 2001, 47% of German households boycotted beef and beef products (Gerlach et al. 2005: 5).

8

The idea of separating assessment of risks and decisions about them was first institutionalised in the WTO in 1995. The Codex Alimentarius (World Health Organization) also operates in this manner. On a European level, Commission President Romani Prodi first foresaw an integration of the two responsibilities along the lines of the US Food and Drug Administration, yet "it soon became clear that this was not an option for Europe after the dioxin affair and the BSE crisis" (Interview 4).

9

The new institution was charged with the policy domain of consumer protection previously belonging to the Ministry of Health and a set of competences previously assigned to the Ministry of Agriculture (BML), and took over the responsibility for consumer policy from the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Technology. In early 2006, its name was changed into from BMVEL to BMELV, changing the order of competencies (Nutrition first, rather than Consumer Protection), when the newly elected government took over.

10

In fact, BSE was even experienced as a trauma by some (Interview 17; 45).

11

The term itself was hardly present prior to this speech. (Feindt and Ratschow 2003).

12

See Roslyng (2006) for a similar analysis in the UK context.

13

For an analysis of the British salmonella crisis from this perspective, including the use of the concept of dislocation, see (Roslyng 2006). For other empirical work employing the concept of dislocation, see (Howarth, Norval et al. 2000).

14

See, for instance, Prainsack (2006) for an analysis of the role of narratives in the regulation of embryonic stem cell research and cloning in Israel.

15

See Jackson et al. (2006) for an analysis of the mobilization of the notion of the food commodity chain.

16

The English term is used in Germany, too. Judging from interviews conducted in Brussels with both NGOs and policymakers, the term is likely to have been transported from Brussels via forums such as conferences, expert meetings, Council meetings, and the European Food Safety Authority.

17

The policy phrase 'from farm to fork', or 'stable to table' emerged in the aftermath of BSE in the UK and the EU setting - although it is impossible to trace precisely where, and in which setting it was first articulated. In the EU context, according to an interviewee, the


35



motto is currently being reformulated, perhaps still in informal policy circles, in order to 'put the consumer first' : fork-to-farm, rather than farm-to-fork (Interview 11). 18

Swedishhealth authorities performed an assessment of workers' health in the sector.

19

Thanks to Barbara Prainsack for an inspiring discussion on this point.

20

According to EC Regulation 178/2002, the principle of traceability aims at ensuring that businesses are at least able to identify the immediate supplier of the product in question and the immediate subsequent recipient, with the exemption of retailers to final consumers. The development of a transnational policy discourse in this area raises important questions and interesting material for further research.

21

Again, this sort of discourse is not restricted to church-based organizations. In a TV interview, former Minister Künast (Greens) called for "respect for God's creation" in reference to changes in the husbandry of laying hens. Arte Info, Friday April 7th 2006; 19:45.

22

The interviewee has an organic farming background.

23

The EU Regulation 2092/91/EEC is statutory law and it is directly applicable in all Member States of the European Union. In countries such as Denmark, Spain and Finland the relevant governmental authorities are responsible for its implementation. In Germany however, private agencies are in charge of correct implementation that are periodically checked by governmental authorities ("Kontrolle der Kontrolle")

24

This is reflected, for instance, in the regulations concerning animal husbandry (e.g. chicken) that are stricter than those of the EU (e.g.Tierschutz-Nutztierhaltungsverordnung 2002; Tierschutzbund 2006).

25

The CMA (Central Marketing Agency) is a quasi-governmental organization that promotes German agricultural products. Farmers have to pay taxes for their (compulsory) membership.

26

Traces of this 'hygiene' discourse can be found, for instance, in the initial assumption that the 'German' sterilization technique could prevent BSE transmission.

27

The labeling debate is not limited to the German context. However, in the UK as well as the EU context, it seems more strongly set within the consumer rights discourses concerning "health claims" made by industry (cf. Interview 2).

28

In February 2005, the European Commission began considering a number of implementing measures and transitional arrangements concerning EU Regulations 853, 854 and 882/ 2004. The consolidated EU Food Hygiene legislation and a new EU Regulation on Official Feed and Food Controls (OFFC) have been in place since 1 January 2006.

29

The very prominent consumer magazine Öko-Test, founded in 1985, combined environmental aspects with consumer protection from the very beginning and still does so today. It conducts tests on food and some consumer products, such as cosmetics.

30

(the AgV, now vzbv).

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Recent scandals related to the discovery of forged labels on rotten meat have triggered strong public reactions in Germany. However, it is at this point difficult to gauge the effects this may have on the discourse presented here.

32

See for instance, the Eurobarometer surveys, the EU-funded Trust in Food project [www.trustinfood.org], and on a national level, surveys by the Dutch Food Safety Agency (VWA, Voedsel en Warenautoriteit), and the UK Food Standards Agency (FSA).

33

Similar practices can be found in the UK Food Standards Agency (e.g. Open Board Meetings), the Dutch Food Safety Agency (VWA), and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA).

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Miller, D. (1999) Risk, science and policy: definitional struggles, information management, the media and BSE, Social Science & Medicine 49(9), pp. 1239-1255. Millstone, E. and van Zwanenberg, P. (2001) Politics of expert advice: lessons from the early history of the BSE saga, Science and Public Policy 28(2), pp. 99-112. Millstone, E. and van Zwanenberg, P. (Eds.) (2005) BSE: risk, science and governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Müller, E. (2002) Agrarwende in der Nutztierhaltung, Speech (date unknown), (Berlin: vzbv). Müller, E. (2004) Wir auf dem Lande - Leben und Mitgestalten im ländlichen Raum. Speech given at the Landfrauentag in Amberg-Sulzbach, 2 February. Nestle, M. (2002) Food Politics. How the Food Industry influences Nutrition and Health (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press). Nestle, M. (2003) Safe Food: Bacteria, Biotechnology, and Bioterrorism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press). Neumann, C. (2000) Das hätten wir nie gedacht ! Der Spiegel 52, pp. 182-184. Nichsolson-Lord, D. (2001) The future of food: safety first for agriculture; the foot-andmouth and BSE crises have forced a reappraisal of the way Britain produces food. The Independent, 7 July (London). Noteborn, H. P. J. M., Ooms, B. W. and de Prado, M., Eds. (2005) Emerging Risks Identification in Food and Feed for Human Health. (The Hague: Voedsel en Waren Autoriteit, VWA). OECD (2003) Emerging Systemic Risks in the 21st Century: An Agenda for Action. (Paris: OECD). ÖkoFair (2006) Public Fair Trade Campaign. http://www.oekofair.de/oekofair.php/cat/4/ title/Information. [acc March 2006]. Ökolandbau (2006). Informationsportal: Warenrückverfolgbarkeit. http:// www-oekolandbau-de/verarbeiter/qualitaet/warenrueckverfolgbarkeit [ace. March 2006]. Oosterveer, P. (2002) Reinventing Risk Politics: Reflexive Modernity and the European BSE Crisis, Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning 4, pp. 215-229. Prainsack, B. (2006) 'Negotiating Life' : The Regulation of Human Cloning and Embryonic Stem Cell Research in Israel, Social Studies of Science 36(2): 173-205. QS (2006) Gemeinsam Stark - die Organisation des QS. www.q-s.info [acc. March 2006]. Reisch, L. (2003) Diskussionspapier des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats für Verbraucherund Ernährungspolitik beim BMVEL: Strategische Grundsätze und Leitbilder einer neuen Verbraucherpolitik (Stuttgart-Hohenheim/Berlin: BMVEL). Roslyng, M. M. (2006) Constructing Risky Food: An Analysis of the Salmonella and BSE Debate in Britain, PhD thesis. (Colchester, Essex: Department of Government, University of Essex). Schuh, H. (2006) Irrsinn BSE. Die Zeit, 1 February (Berlin). Seehofer, H. (2005) Regierungserklärung anlässlich der Amtsübernahme des neuen Bundesministers für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Verbraucherschutz (Berlin).

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Main Articles

Smith, M. (2004) Mad Cows and Mad Money: Problems of Risk in the Making and Understanding of Policy, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 6, pp. 312-332. Stavrakakis, Y. (2002) The Ethical and Political Challenge of Constructionism in Risk Societies: Post-democratic Trends and Civil Society, Essex Papers in Politics and Government, Ideology and Discourse Analysis (Colchester, Essex: University of Essex). Tacke, V. (2001) BSE as an organizational construction: a case study on the globalization of risk, British Journal of Sociology 52(2), pp. 293-312. Tierschutzbund (2006) Legehennen - Leiden im Käfig. Deutscher Tierschutzbund, http:// www.tierschutzbund.de/00219.html [acc. February 5 2006]. Van Zwanenberg, P. and Millstone, E. (2003) BSE: AParadigm of Policy Failure, Political Quarterly 74(1), pp. 27-37. Verbraucherzentrale (2004) Regionale Lebensmittel. Ein Weg, der sich lohnt? Sachinformationene für Lehrerinnen zu regionalen Lebensmitteln., (Düsseldorf: Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen). Vos, E. (2000) EU food safety regulation in the aftermath of the BSE crisis, Journal of Consumer Policy 23(3), pp. 227-255. vzbv (2001) Resolutionspapier anlässlich des Weltverbrauchertags 2001, 6 April (Berlin). vzbv (2006) Nähe Schafft Vertrauen. http://www.naehe-schafft-vertrauen.de/ [acc. March 2006]. Waskow, F. and Rehaag, R. (2004) Ernährungspolitik nach der BSE-Krise - ein Politikfeld in Transformation. Diskussionspapier Nr. 6 (Cologne: Katalyse, Institut für angewandte Umweltforschung). Wippermann, W. (2001) 3000 Jahre Verbraucherschutz. 125 Jahre Institut für gesundheitlichen Verbraucherschutz und Veterinärmedizin (Berlin: Bundesinstitut für Risikoforschung), http:/ /www.bfr.bund.de/cm/221/wippermann_vortrag.pdf [acc. February 2006].


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