Dec 15, 2014 - array of think tanks but many of them operate on a forâprofit basis and do not focus much on publicâpolicy issues. There are also only very few ...
Foreign Policy Think Tanks in China and Japan: Characteristics, Current Profile, and the Case of Collective Self‐Defense (draft version, December 2014) Pascal Abb and Patrick Koellner Institute of Asian Studies German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) Abstract The role of Foreign Policy Think Tanks (FPTTs) in policymaking processes has received substantial attention in recent decades, with most studies focusing on US‐based organizations. In this article we discuss FPTTs in two East Asian countries, China and Japan. China has come to host the second‐largest think‐tank scene in the world, with many FPTTs having witnessed increased funding and academic qualification of their staffers in recent years. Japan also hosts a sizeable array of think tanks but many of them operate on a for‐profit basis and do not focus much on public‐policy issues. There are also only very few genuine FPTTs. FPTTs in both countries are mostly linked to the government. While they seek to inform and influence foreign and security policy as well as public discourses on international affairs, they usually do not act as agenda setters. Examining the case of constitutional reinterpretation in Japan, aimed at allowing for collective self‐defense, we show how Japanese think tankers helped to legitimize this controversial move and how Chinese FPTTs reacted publicly to the reinterpretation by providing media commentary in support of the official government line.
Keywords Foreign policy, think tanks, China, Japan, collective self‐defense, bilateral relations The role of think tanks in the foreign policy process has received substantial attention in recent decades, mainly stemming from an interest in determining their influence over policy outcomes in this field.1 Many of these studies focus on the specific impact of foreign policy think tanks (FPTTs) on US foreign policy, which is understandable given that Washington has been the place where these organizations originally took roots, the US is home to dedicated research programs such as the Think Tanks and Civil Societies project, and continuing US preeminence in world affairs makes it particularly worthwhile to study the sources of input to its foreign policy.
1 See, for example, Donald Abelson, A Capitol Idea: Think Tanks and US Foreign
Policy (Montreal: McGill‐Queens University Press, 2006); Richard Higgott and Diane Stone, "The Limits of Influence: Foreign Policy Think Tanks in Britain and the USA", Review of International Studies 20, 1 (1996): 15‐34; Inderjeet Parmar, Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of the Role and Influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939‐1945 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004). 2
However, as scholars working on international comparisons of think tank scenes have have noted,2 these organizations have become a truly global phenomenon and have spread to every continent, albeit not to the same extent.3 This is highly relevant to the study of think tank development and influence, because the political and economic conditions which are seen as the bedrock of Western policy research – mainly independence from government structures through external financing and a free, competitive "marketplace of ideas" – cannot be taken for granted in other regions of the globe. Interestingly, think tanks have actually flourished precisely where these conditions are the least pronounced: East Asia is now home to the largest number of institutes outside of the Western world, and China stands out as the global number two behind the US. This fact, coupled with the political rise which China has experienced as a consequence of three decades of rapid economic
2 See James McGann and Kent Weaver (eds), Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000); Diane Stone and Andrew Denham (eds), Think Tank Traditions: Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004). 3 For a recent tally on the global distribution of think tanks, see James McGann,
“The
Global
Go‐to
Think
Tank
Index
Report
2013,”
http://gotothinktank.com/dev1/wp‐ content/uploads/2014/01/GoToReport2013.pdf (accessed 15 December 2014). 3
growth, has also led to considerable interest in the role and influence of Chinese FPTTs.4 China’s seemingly unstoppable rise has been mirrored by Japan’s relative decline in recent years. Once seen as on the way to becoming the global “number one,” two decades of more or less stagnant growth have seen the country even being overtaken as the world’s second largest economy by its big neighbor. This has been a heavy blow to Japanese national self‐esteem. Japan, once the largest provider of development aid to China, is now more concerned with how to react in security terms to the challenge of a rising China. The two countries are also involved in a territorial dispute over the small Senkaku islands (Chinese: 4 China Quarterly devoted an issue to the topic in 2002, featuring contributions by David Shambaugh, “China's International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process,” Bonnie Glaser and Phillip Saunders, “Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence,” and Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, “Chinese Military‐Related think Tanks and Research Institutions,” The China Quarterly 171 (2002). For more recent overviews see Cheng Li, “China's New Think Tanks: Where Officials, Entrepreneurs, and Scholars Interact,” China Leadership Monitor, 29, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2009/08/summer‐china‐li (accessed 15 December 2014); Thomas Bondiguel and Thierry Kellner, “The Impact of China's Foreign Policy Think Tanks,” BICCS Asia Paper 5, 5, http://www.vub.ac.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/Asia%20papers/201004 05%20‐%20Bondiguel%20Kellner.pdf (accessed 15 December 2014). 4
Diaoyutai). While this conflict centers on the surface on fishing grounds and suspected natural resources in the area, it has – even more importantly – become a highly symbolically loaded issue, with China seeking to expunge decades of humiliation by Japan since the late 1800s. China’s perceived growing assertiveness in the East and the South China Seas and the country’s growing military‐force projection abilities has alarmed Japan. Under the conservative Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, in power since late 2012, Japan’s has been seeking a more muscular foreign and defense policy: Abe has promised to strengthen the alliance with the US and to ensure a stable presence of US forces in Japan, courted strategic partners in the Indo‐Pacific region including Australia and India, beefed up the defense budget, established a National Security Council, abandoned a decades‐long ban on the export of weapon technologies and has sought to reinterpret the constitution to make Japan a more “normal country” in terms of its defense and security profile.5 In China, these moves have been met with intense suspicion, as they are thought to be aimed at containing China and at thwarting its ambitions at regional leadership.6 5 See Sheila Smith, Japan's New Politics and the US‐Japan Alliance (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2014). 6 See Amy King, “Where Does Japan Fit in China’s “New Type of Great Power
Relations?,”
The
Asan
Forum,
20
March
2014,
http://www.theasanforum.org/where‐does‐japan‐fit‐in‐chinas‐new‐type‐of‐ great‐power‐relations/ (accessed 7 December 2014); Taylor Fravel, “Things Fall Apart: Maritime Disputes and China's Regional Diplomacy,” MIT Political Science Department
Research
Paper, 5
15
January
2014,
To capture this dynamic and the role of think tanks in it, we will zoom in on one important policy shift in the security domain. The focus will be on the Japanese Cabinet's decision to reinterpret the Japanese Constitution to allow for Collective Self‐Defense (CSD) and the reactions by Chinese think tanks to this move. Accordingly, we not only aim to show how the FPTT sectors in Japan and China compare to each other in institutional terms but also to highlight the potentials and limits of think tanks involvement in terms of informing and influencing foreign and security policy in both countries. Last but not least we intend to contribute to a better understanding of how think tanks work in non‐Western societies, which should be of interest for those wishing to engage with them. The article is structured as follows: The next section provides an overview of Japan's FPTT landscape and its recent development. Here, we also sketch the process leading to the recent reinterpretation of the Japanese Constitution and the role of external policy advice therein. We follow up on it with a similar description of China's FPTT system and the ways in which these organizations can contribute to national policy making. Since China played no active role in the CSD decision, but was very much alarmed by it, we focus in this section on public reactions by China's think tanks and how these relate to the central government's response. The last section concludes the article by highlighting
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2466488 (accessed 7 December 2014). 6
some of the main similarities and differences between the FPTT sectors in both countries and by addressing their role in managing Sino‐Japanese relations. Foreign policy think tanks in Japan Overview Foreign and domestic observers alike have often bemoaned the lack of a vibrant think‐tank scene in Japan. They point to the lack of independence of many think tanks, their inadequate staffing, to instable financial resources, and to the perceived inability of think tanks to impact on public policy.7 Such assessments stand in stark contrast to the sizeable array of think tanks that do exist in Japan. A recent survey puts their overall number at close to 230, which however represents a significant decrease since the start of the new millennium when over 330 were counted.8 It would seem that Japan’s stagnating economy during the past two decades has also taken a heavy toll on domestic think tanks.
for example, Raymond J. Struyk, Makiko Ueno, and Takahiro Suzuki, A
7 See,
Japanese Think Tank: Exploring Alternative Models (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1993), xiii, 3; Ayako Mie, “Japan urged to embrace U.S.‐style think tanks,”
Japan
Times,
10
January
2014,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/01/10/national/japan‐urged‐to‐ embrace‐u‐s‐style‐think‐tanks/ (accessed 24 April 2014). 8 Sōgō kenkyū kaihatsu kikō (NIRA), “’Shinku tanku jōhō 2013’ no chōsa kekka
no gaiyō (Tokyo: NIRA), July 2013: 2. 7
Most Japanese think tanks tend not to focus much on informing or influencing public policy. Rather, close to half of the existing think tanks operate as for‐profit organizations, often as affiliates of large corporations including financial institutions. The apparent lack of a public‐policy orientation of most Japanese think tanks can be explained by reference to a number of demand and supply factors influencing their operation. Basically every publication on think tanks in Japan first and foremost points to the traditional role of the national bureaucracy, clustered in Tokyo’s government district Kasumigaseki, in terms of shaping public policies. And virtually every bureaucrat, politician and think tanker interviewed during the past few years have noted in a mantra‐like fashion that “Kasumigaseki is Japan’s biggest think tank.” For decades, Japan’s elite bureaucracy has been able to attract some of the best and brightest university graduates. For sure, the reputation of the bureaucracy has deteriorated since the latter half of the 1990s in the wake of a number of sleaze and other scandals. Moreover, the heydays of Japan’s “developmental state,” which gave elite bureaucrats a clear sense of mission and put numerous important policy instruments at their disposal, are long gone. Still, in international comparative perspective, Japan’s national bureaucracy continues to be perceived by domestic actors as a powerful policy agent. When external input and public participation in preparing public policy was seen necessary to give greater legitimacy to relevant decisions, the bureaucracy has traditionally preferred to rely on ministerial advisory or policy deliberation councils, whose members could be handpicked and whose operations could be better steered. In sum, Japan’s elite bureaucrats, who for decades enjoyed a symbiotic relationship 8
with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), have not been very much interested in genuine alternative policy inputs by think tanks and other policy‐ research institutions. The same has by and large also held true for their long‐ time principals within the LDP, which – except for a few years – has been in power since 1955. On the supply side, some additional factors also help to account for the lack of vibrant public‐policy oriented think‐tank scene in Japan. First, unlike in the US and some other countries, there is no tradition of philanthropy in Japan. Think tanks thus cannot bank on generous financial support from private‐sector donors. Until very recently, only a small share of donations to think tanks has been tax‐deductible. Most think tanks thus remain dependent on funding for research projects commissioned by corporations or the state. Think tanks that do not receive basic institutional support from their parent companies, from individual ministries or local governments have to cope with unstable funding, which constrains their ability to employ high‐caliber researchers. The general attractiveness of a think‐tanker career is also limited by the absence of a revolving‐door mechanism linking think tanks and the government. For one, the seniority principle prevailing in most Japanese organizations prevents such exchanges. Moreover, the number of political appointments in the national bureaucracy tends to be low and openness to lateral entry is rather limited. As a consequence, only few think tankers ever serve in the executive. Overall, Japan provides a fairly inhospitable terrain for public‐policy oriented think tanks.
9
The strong business and economic focus of many Japanese think tanks can also be gleaned from their most important areas of research, which are economic issues, land development/use, welfare, environmental affairs, and industry. The share of research projects on international affairs among all research projects carried out by surveyed Japanese think tanks ranged from three to seven percent between 1993 and 2011.9 In 2012, only eight think tanks surveyed said that international affairs constituted their most important area of research. The few existing FPTTs in Japan can be grouped, following Diane Stone’s useful typology, into government, civil‐society, and business‐affiliated think tanks.10
9 NIRA, “’Shinku tanku jōhō 2013’”; 4, 8, and earlier editions. 10 Diane Stone, “Think Tanks and Policy Advice in Countries in Transition,” in
Toru Hashimoto, Stefan Hell, and Sang‐Woo Nam, eds, Public Policy Research and Training in Vietnam (Tokyo: Asia Development Institute, 2005), 48. Two other types mentioned by Stone, political party‐affiliated and university‐affiliated think tanks, have not played major roles in Japan. While the current two main parties, the LDP and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), started their own think tanks after 2005, these two organizations proved short‐lived, understaffed, and not well integrated into the parties’ policy‐making apparatuses. In any case, they also did not focus on foreign affairs. Some university‐affiliated FPTTs exist in Japan, e.g. at Takushoku and at Ritsumeikan University. While some well‐known academics and foreign affairs commentators are based at these institutes, they tend to be constrained in terms of operations and international outreach. 10
Government‐affiliated or state‐sponsored FPTTs include the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), whose predecessor got set up in 1952. The NIDS is a formal government agency under the Ministry of Defense (MOD). Its main missions are to train military and other executive personnel, to organize international exchanges with similar organizations in the Asia‐Pacific region and beyond, to conduct research into Japan’s military history, and to undertake policy‐relevant research on current security affairs. The NIDS currently has around 85 research fellows. It publishes monthly briefing papers and conducts research commissioned by the MOD. Senior institute researchers provide briefings to the policy‐planning staff of the MOD and, once a year, also to the Minister of Defense and the Prime Minister (PM). Internationally, the NIDS might be best known for its English‐language yearbook East Asian Strategic Review.11 The Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) has traditionally played a related role for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). It got set up in 1959 at the initiative of former PM Shigeru Yoshida. His idea was to model the JIIA after Britain’s Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations in the US. While the JIIA until recently received core institutional funding from the MOFA (see below) – with corporate and individual membership dues serving as a secondary source of income –, it never became formally part of the ministry. Close links were nonetheless maintained, not least through the seconding of MOFA staff to 11 The latest
edition
is
available
online
at
http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east‐asian/e2014.html (accessed 12 December 2014). 11
JIIA and the institute’s heading by former MOFA officials. JIIA came to be seen as one of Japan’s windows to the world and, though nominally independent, as a de facto arm of the MOFA. Notably, the JIIA never had that many experienced research fellows capable of providing genuine policy input. Rather, it concentrated on publishing foreign affairs journals and, perhaps even more importantly, serving as a platform for the exchange with international policymakers and scholars. It has basically performed roles the MOFA’s bureaucrats could not or would not play themselves. Similar platform or “salon” functions12 have also been served by a number of civil‐society based FPTTs such as the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE). The JCIE was established in 1970 – generally considered as the start of the first think‐tank boom in Japan – and over the years successfully ran a number of dialogue forums with individual foreign countries. In particular, the JCIE was instrumental to establishing pipelines to US policymakers and their staff. Another small FPTT, the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), got founded in 1978 by a former president of the National Defense Academy with encouragement from the then Defense Agency, the MOFA and the business federation Keidanren. The most important legacy of the RIPS has been a 12 On these and other functions of FPTTs see Patrick Köllner, “Think Tanks: Their
Development, Global Diversity and Roles in International Affairs,” GIGA Focus International Edition, No. 6, 2011, http://www.giga‐ hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/gf_international_1106.pdf (accessed 15 December 2014). 12
scholarship program for young Japanese researchers, established in the late 1980s with government support. Around 100 young scholars have benefitted from this program, including many who went on to become university professors. The program has helped to create and nurture a security studies community in Japanese academia and beyond. Two other civil‐society based FPTTs are the Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) and the Tokyo Foundation (TF). Both organizations can rely on a firmer financial basis. The IIPS, funded by income derived from a 50‐million‐US dollar endowment plus annual corporate membership fees, was established in 1988 – at the time of another think tank boom in Japan – by former PM Yasuhiro Nakasone. He established the IIPS in response to what he saw as the problem of stove‐piping inside the Japanese bureaucracy. Accordingly, one of the main missions of the IIPS – apart from publishing journals, conducting research with its limited pool of regular in‐house researchers, and getting groups of like‐ minded academics together to produce policy recommendations on foreign and security policy, education reform, and constitutional change – has been to bring officials from various ministries and corporations together to spend two years at the IIPS. There they are supposed to engage in individual research but also to establish bonds across organizations. So far, over ten such cohorts have stayed at the institute. The TF got established as an operative foundation in 1997. As in the case of its sister organization, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, a charitable organization which also runs many people‐to‐people exchange programs, the TF derives its 13
substantial income from the Nippon Foundation (not to be confused with the government‐funded Japan Foundation), which is funded by profits from a legalized gambling activity, viz. the Sasakawa family’s monopoly on running betting on motor‐boat racing. While the TF’s leadership exhibits a clear conservative flavor, the same cannot be said of all of its senior program officers and research fellows, some of whom spent a formative period in Washington think tanks. The TF runs some foreign‐policy related dialogue forums and publishes numerous briefing papers and policy briefs by in‐house and associated researchers. FPTTs with close ties to the business world include the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), which got established in 1987, amidst rising trade tensions centering on Japan, by former foreign minister Saburō Ōkita, the corporate magnate Ichirō Hattori – who also contributed the then equivalent of 1.4 million US$ to the institute’s endowment –, and the diplomat‐turned‐ academic Ken’ichi Itō. Over the years, the JFIR, which is also a fairly slim organization funded mainly by corporate and individual membership fees as well as conference or project grants, has organized many bilateral and multilateral dialogue forums and also produced some extensive policy recommendation‐ papers in cooperation with university‐based academics. As in the case of the JIIA, the JFIR has served as one of Japan’s windows to the world. The only think tank linked to an individual corporation, which focuses in a substantial manner on foreign affairs, is the Canon Institute for Global Studies. It got set up in 2007 on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Canon 14
Corporation, a well‐known Japanese imaging and optical‐products company. Given its limited personnel resources – only a handful of researchers work on international affairs –, foreign policy‐relevant research focuses on Northeast Asia. The institute is also involved in the nurturing of next‐generation foreign affairs and security specialists and government officials, e.g. by running simulation and role‐playing exercises. Senior researchers at the institute also tend to be active as media commentators on international affairs. Recent developments Developments in recent years have affected Japanese FPTTs in different, often ambivalent ways. To start with, popular interest in foreign and security affairs has clearly grown, especially in view of the challenges posed by China’s rise, increasing threat perceptions vis‐à‐vis North Korea, and mounting tensions in the East and South China Seas. Also, more politicians have become interested in foreign affairs as a consequence of electoral reform in the early 1990s, which replaced multi‐member constituencies across the nation with single‐seat constituencies plus party‐based proportional representation. This electoral system change has increased the need of politicians for broader knowledge of policy issues across the board and has also led to more programmatic, less clientele‐oriented electoral platforms. While some media‐savvy FPTT analysts have benefited from increased demand for their services, demand for genuine policy input from FPTTs has not substantially increased according to politicians and thank tankers interviewed. Also, the change of government in 2009, with the
15
DPJ gaining power, did not lead to more demand for policy input by such organizations. On the supply side, a law passed in June 2011, making it easier for non‐profit organizations (including some think tanks) to get favorable tax status, has apparently not led to a significant increase in donations – which is perhaps not surprising given Japan’s economic situation. One well‐known FPTT, the JIIA, even got into big financial trouble when the new DPJ‐led government decided, as a result of a new budget‐screening process,13 to phase out institutional funding to the institute. What particularly irked the DPJ were the close links between the JIIA and the MOFA, including the tradition of having “old boys” from the ministry head the institute. Institutional funding for the JIIA effectively stopped in 2013. On the other hand, more project‐based funding has become available on a competitive basis from the MOFA in recent years. In particular, experienced FPTTs like the JIIA, the JFIR, and most recently also the IIPS have benefited from this. Such funding, useful as it is for the successful FPTTs and NGOs, does however not help much to alleviate the chronic underfinancing and understaffing of most Japanese FPTTs. According to a MOFA advisory‐group report presented to then Foreign Minister Kōichirō Genba in August 2012, the budgets of the top five FPTTs in Japan had shrunk by 40 percent between 1998 und 2008 while the budget of top five FPTTs in the US had grown in the same period by 150 percent.
13 Incidentally, this weeding out of “unnecessary” public expenses was based on
recommendations by a domestic think tank, which had examined Canadian experiences with budget screening. 16
The same wise men’s group also recommended establishing a new FPTT to make Japan’s voice better heard in the international arena.14 While the LDP‐led government, back in power since late 2012, is unlikely to heed this call, it might be more forthcoming in terms of supplying existing FPTTs with some extra funds in the future. This would be based, among other things, on the government’s National Security Strategy of December 2013, which includes a passage saying that “Japan will promote practical research on national security, and engage in deepening exchanges among the Government, higher education institutions and thinks, thereby promoting the sharing of insight and knowledge.”15 Other noteworthy recent developments in Japan’s FPTT scene include the challenges faced by some venerable organizations to successfully bring about generational change at their helm and the arrival of a new media and general public‐oriented think tank, the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (RJIF), founded by the well‐known liberal journalist Yō’ichi Funabashi with some business support.16 Finally, the establishment of a National Security Council in
14 See Toshihiro Nakayama, “How to Enliven Japan’s Foreign Policy Think Tanks,”
Nippon.com, 7 September 2012, http://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00049/ (accessed 1 November 2013). 15 Available online at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss‐
e.pdf (accessed 12 December 2014). 16 Recent
RJIF activities include a thoughtful report on US‐Japan strategic
cooperation and the establishment of a dialogue forum for former high‐ranking 17
Japan in early 2014, with a corresponding 70 staffers‐strong National Security Secretariat, will provide opportunities for a last a few think tankers to serve some time in the national executive. Still, given the overall ambivalent picture surrounding Japanese FPTTs, it seems somewhat premature to herald the “emergence of a vital [FPTT] community in Japan.”17 Reinterpreting the Constitution When Shinzō Abe first served as prime minister for twelve months in 2006/7 – he resigned after a lost Upper House election and also for health reasons – he convened an “Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security,” which was to deliberate legal issues affecting Japan’s ability to actively contribute to peace and stability in Asia and beyond, focusing on four particular cases. At the core of panel discussions was the right of collective self‐defense, which is permitted under the charter of the UN but not, according to standard interpretations, under the Japanese Constitution. In its famous article 9, the Constitution renounces Japan’s sovereign right to wage war and to maintain armed forces for that purpose. Japan’s military, which was (re‐)established in the early 1950s and further developed in the following decades, was thus supposed to serve for the defense of Japan only. This also implied that Japan could not support its alliance partner, the United States, militarily in the case of military officials from the two countries (see http://rebuildjpn.org/en/project/, accessed 11 December 2014). 17 Sebastian Maslow, “Thinking Security: Foreign Policy Think Tanks in Japan,”
Asian Politics & Policy 5, no. 2 (2013): 304. 18
contingencies outside Japan. Subsequent reinterpretations of the Constitution at last allowed for Japan’s participation in international peace‐keeping operations, though on a rather limited scale. Article 9 has always been a thorn in the side for conservative Japanese politicians, including PMs Nakasone and Abe, wanting to make Japan a “normal country” in terms of its security and defense profile and also to render the alliance with the US less unequal. The advisory panel established in April 2007, consisting of hand‐picked members and headed by former MOFA administrative vice‐minister Shunji Yanai, had not arrived at a final report by the time Abe resigned. His successor Yasuo Fukuda did not prioritize security affairs and chose not to act upon the recommendations contained in the panel’s June 2008 report. Yet, after Abe had regained power in late 2012, he reconstituted the advisory council “in light of the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan.”18 Notably, think tankers played some role in the panel. Its 13 members included a professor from the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, a government‐funded academic institution with think‐tank functions, a diplomat‐turned‐head‐of‐think tank, and the president of another FPTT, the IIPS. Moreover, there was Shin’ichi Kitaoka serving as acting head of the panel. Kitaoka is one of the few Japanese academics who has successfully managed to on the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for
18 “Report
Security,”
15
May
2014,
here
page
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyou2/dai7/houkoku_en.pdf (accessed 12 December 2014). 19
53,
straddle the spheres of academia and government, being a renowned professor, a veteran of many governmental advisory boards on international affairs and also many bilateral dialogue forums, a former extraordinary ambassador to the UN, a director or research at the IIPS, and an adjunct research fellow at the TF. While the government found the advisory report, submitted in May 2014, somewhat heavy‐going in terms of legalistic jargon and also considered a few of the recommendations politically unfeasible, it nevertheless seized on some core statements including a reinterpretation of the Constitution, arguing that Article 9 effectively permits collective self‐defense as long as “(1) there is an imminent unlawful infringement against Japan, (2) there is no other appropriate means available to repel this infringement; and (3) the use of force is limited to the minimum extent necessary.”19 The advisory report thus came to play a vital role in terms of legitimizing the reinterpretation of the Constitution by the government, composed of the LDP and its coalition partner Kōmeitō. In July 2014 the Cabinet declared that collective self‐defense was permissible if there was an armed attack “against a foreign country that is a close relationship with Japan” and if that attack also posed a “clear danger” to Japan’s own security.20 This new
19 “Report on the Advisory Panel…,” here page 29. 20 See
“Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to
Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People,” 1 July 2014, here page 8 (http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/decisions/2014/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2014/07 /03/anpohosei_eng.pdf, accessed 12 December 2014). 20
interpretation will now get translated in changes in a number of relevant laws, including the Self‐Defense Forces (SDF) Law and the PKO Law. The case of constitutional reinterpretation highlights the possibilities as well as the limits of think‐tank engagement in Japanese foreign and security policy. Following established practice, the government chose to set up an expert panel consisting of handpicked, likeminded members rather than go directly for think‐ tank input. And the think tankers that were part of the panel were mostly well‐ known academics or former high‐ranking officials and might have well been chosen to serve on the panel even if they had not been affiliated with think tanks. In any case, the panel itself played an important role in terms of helping to legitimize the controversial reinterpretation of the Constitution. Foreign Policy Think Tanks in China Overview China boasts a vast and diverse landscape of FPTTs, which has in recent years attracted considerable attention from Western scholars.21 Most of these authors
21 In addition to the literature cited above, see Xuanli Liao, Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China's Policy towards Japan (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2006) for a specific focus on the role of FPTTs in Sino‐Japanese relations. For recent contributions see Bonnie Glaser, “Chinese Foreign Policy Research Institutes and the Practice of Influence” and Zhao Quansheng, “The Limited Impact of Think Tanks on Policy Making in China,” both in Gil Rozman (ed), 21
focused on the question of policy influence, which is readily explained by China’s rapidly growing importance in international politics, itself an object of intense study for the past decade. However, many of the most well‐known FPTTs in China predate the country’s rise by decades, having been established in the 1950s and 1960s based on Soviet models. Relatively little is known about the way in which they operated in these early years, but the monopolization of foreign policy making by a tiny clique of top leaders renders it doubtful whether they had any genuine impact. During the Cultural Revolution, think tanks across China mostly shared the fate of universities, with the institutes being closed down and many of the experts being exiled to the countryside. The resurgence of the think tank sector has been closely tied to the adoption of reform policy in the late 1970s. China’s long‐time leader Deng Xiaoping himself was an early advocate of the value of technocratic advice in improving policy outcomes, and he personally spearheaded the initiative to establish a massive new top‐level think tank in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), which also features an extensive International Studies research program.22 Most of the other “first wave” FPTTs were revived in a similar manner in the 1970s China's Foreign Policy: Who Makes it, and How is it Made? (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013). 22 See
Merle Goldman, China's Intellectuals: Advise and Dissent (Cambridge
(Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1980), 217‐220. 22
and 1980s, and joined by newly established institutes as almost every state agency involved in foreign policy issues sought to build its own reservoir of expertise. Today, China is home to what is estimated to be the world’s second‐largest think tank sector after the United States,23 and the field of international studies still features prominently in it. It would be impossible to name all of the respective institutes here, so we will instead focus on distinct organizational groups and name a few of the most prominent examples for each. The biggest and, by some accounts, most influential institutes in the field are usually attached to specific state agencies and organs. The aforementioned CASS is China’s highest‐level think tank, since its direct attachment to the State Council means that it is of ministerial rank. Various ministries engaged in foreign policy also maintain their own institutes, such as the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or the China Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) under the Ministry of State Security. The same is also true for many local governments, particularly those whose regions are heavily dependent on international trade. Shanghai boasts the largest foreign policy research establishment outside of Beijing, with the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies (SIIS) often being singled out for its international network and academic avant‐gardism. This proliferation of think tanks is mainly due to the prevalent phenomenon of “stove piping” in China’s
23 McGann, “Global Go‐To Think Tanks.”
23
policy apparatus, whereby subordinate units will predominantly communicate their findings to their superiors rather than sharing them with peers. Although horizontal communication has increased as well, agencies are still intent to have exclusive access to their own think tanks and their output.24 Next are university research departments in the field of IR or area studies, which often perform similar services to think tanks in the Chinese context as a result of explicit directions by the leadership. Experts from the nation’s top universities, like Beida, Renmin and Qinghua, are regularly invited to provide lectures for the Politburo, and famous individual scholars like Wang Jisi and Yan Xuetong are known for their ability to drive broad debates about China’s role in the world from the academic sector.25 The aforementioned universities all boast large IR research establishments like the School for International Studies (SIS) at Beijing University, but some smaller centers focusing on especially important issues – like the Center for American Studies at Fudan University – have also performed think tank functions. Beyond state structures, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also maintains its own research capabilities, with most of the foreign policy‐related programs clustered in the Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS) of the Central Party School. Similarly, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has built up a
24 Glaser, “Chinese Foreign Policy Research Institutes.” 25 Alastair
Johnston, “The State of International Relations Research in China:
Considerations for the Ford Foundation” (Beijing: Ford Foundation, 2003). 24
research program focusing on strategic studies and security policy, drawing on its educational facilities like National Defense University (NDU) and the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS).26 Finally, the absence of privately‐run think tanks from this list may surprise readers accustomed to Western think tank systems, but this is no omission. While there are a few private institutes focusing on economic policy, foreign policy has remained a jealously guarded domain of the state. There are some intermediary cases – one prominent new organization focusing on public diplomacy, the Charhar Society, has played up its status as a “non‐governmental” think tank, presumably in order to add credibility to its message. However, institutes like this one are not genuinely independent, but mostly the result of joint initiatives between the state and intellectuals, with both working in tandem to achieve a mutual goal – in this case, improving China’s international image.27 Accordingly, state control of the FPTT sector is not just a relic of China's socialist past, but an enduring feature that reflects the will of successive leadership generations, most recently reaffirmed by China’s President Xi Jinping: acknowledging their role in “scientific and democratic decision‐making, modernizing China's governing system, and strengthening Chinese soft power” and promising further support for their development, Xi also stressed that they
26 Gill and Mulvenon, “Chinese Military‐Related Think Tanks.” 27 Pascal Abb, “China's Foreign Policy Think Tanks: Institutional Evolution and
Changing Roles,” Journal of Contemporary China, 24, 93 (2015). 25
would continue to be led by the CCP and had to adhere to its political guiding function.28 Recent developments When it comes to institutional development, the strong reliance of Chinese think tanks on the state sector has allowed them to share in the benefits of China’s rise. As the demand for their services has grown, so have the resources – financial and otherwise – that they are endowed with. This is nowhere more apparent than with respect to the background of employees at major institutes: virtually every single staffer now holds a PhD or is in the process of obtaining one, and many of them have obtained advanced degrees from Western or Japanese universities. This represents a significant shift compared to the 1980s and early 1990s, when think tanks were still predominantly staffed by practitioners, particularly former officials from the foreign ministry. This sea change has also reached the senior leadership of many institutes, with career academics gradually taking over. Besides their ability to pay competitive salaries for highly educated staff, the increasing budget of China’s FPTTs is also apparent from other perks. Institutes such as CIIS and SIIS reside in modern, purpose‐built facilities that would not seem out of place on Massachusetts Avenue. On the other hand, many CASS institutes continue to languish in cramped quarters, which is arguably indicative “Xi Calls for New Type of Think Tanks,” People's Daily, 27 October 2014,
28
http://en.people.cn/n/2014/1027/c90785‐8800606.html December 2014). 26
(accessed
8
of a loss in status and continuing neglect by authorities.29 Regular foreign travel, which used to be restricted to senior personnel due to its high costs, is now the norm for most employees, and travel grants are also issued to foreign specialists who wish to participate in conferences organized in China. This has led to a boom in international networking, and has increased the ability of Chinese FPTTs to monitor and even influence debates in major partner countries, communicate Chinese views of the international environment to policy elites abroad, and to link up with the latest research trends. Many of these institutes have also put the newly available resources to good use in boosting their output, both in the fields of academia and – more recently – commentaries in Chinese newspapers and online media.30 This is especially relevant, as it represents both a shift from their earlier role of providing internal policy advice while maintaining a low public profile, as well as making it much easier for outsiders to trace Chinese policy debates and expert arguments. Public expert statements often fulfil a specific political purpose and can therefore not be assumed to be completely in line with advice provided behind the scenes (see also below). However, judging from many personal conversations with Chinese 29 Margaret Sleeboom‐Faulkner, “Regulating Intellectual Life in China: the Case of
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,” The China Quarterly, 189 (2007), 83‐99. 30 For
example, the total journal‐article output of eleven prominent Chinese
FPTTs rose by about 70 percent between 2002 and 2012, while their appearances in newspapers increased almost tenfold over the same timespan (Abb, “China's Foreign Policy Think Tanks”). 27
experts, they are usually very frank and straightforward, and their writings reflect genuine beliefs rather than purely propagandistic needs. While messages are government‐influenced and of course subject to China's general censorship regime, they should be understood as indicative of a consensus between officials and experts, rather than the use of the latter as mere mouthpieces. Apart from public writings, Chinese think tanks also still engage in the practice of submitting reports on current events via internal communication channels, which connect them to their administrative superiors. Since this process is not only opaque to outside observers, but also to most researchers themselves, the policy impact of individual pieces is hard to gauge, except for rare cases where a high‐level decision maker personally recommends a specific report.31 Most experts, however, agree that the sheer quantity of information that the leadership is exposed to has influenced the practice of Chinese foreign policy.32 For one, the redundancy brought about by “stove piping” has benefits in that many experts from institutes with distinct outlooks will weigh in on an issue, presenting additional policy options and leading to more diverse debates. Second, Chinese leaders have increasingly found it necessary to develop policy positions on emerging issues, where China will nowadays be quickly put on the spot to take a position. (The 2009 Copenhagen climate summit serves as a prime
31 Glaser, “Chinese Foreign Policy Research Institutes.” 32 Shambaugh, “China's International Relations Think Tanks;” Li, “China's New
Think Tanks.” 28
example in this regard). On these questions, there are few political prejudices, and experts who have conducted cutting‐edge research will have more opportunities to shape a debate right from the beginning. Third, academic expertise and credibility have become a crucial resource in Chinese policy debates, similar to the role which experts already play in Western “marketplaces of ideas.” Distinguished scholars based at think tanks or universities have found it much easier to attract attention to their views, and a select few have even been given personal access to officials as a result. Chinese think tank reactions to Japan's constitutional reinterpretation Given the current tense relationship between China and Japan and the high relevance of security issues for regional politics, it is not surprising that the Japanese government's reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution had repercussions abroad as well. Abe's announcement to this effect drew an immediate and sharp rebuke from China's foreign ministry, accusing the Japanese government of “stirring up trouble in both the fields of history and security policy,” and wondering whether this meant that Japan had “left the path of peaceful development and sought to overturn the postwar order.”33 Like the Chinese government, the nation's think tanks did not waste any time in reacting to this new development: throughout July 2014, the pages of newspapers were filled with dozens of expert commentaries from all major institutes, eager to get 33 “Remarks by MoFA
spokesperson
Hong
Lei,”
1
July
2014,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/jzhsl_602247/t1170302.shtm l (accessed 8 December 2014). 29
their own analysis on its effects out. From these, we selected a sample of ten documents, covering the voices of several different authors from each of the four biggest Chinese FPTTs – CASS, CICIR, CIIS and SIIS. When comparing these documents to each other and with China's official stance on the issue summarized above, it is immediately apparent that they strongly resemble each other in content and tone – not only do they uniformly condemn the move, but they also stress the exact same points as the ministry's statement. For example, all but two connected the issue to Abe's provocative handling of history and warn of a resurgent Japanese militarism. All but one of the authors also concluded that this new policy would raise regional tensions and ultimately undermine Japan's own development, echoing spokesman Hong's remarks verbatim. Another very common point found both in the official response and most commentaries is the argument that Japan is playing up the so‐called “China threat” theory as a justification for its policy change, and is in fact pursuing an encirclement policy towards China.34 Finally, many authors also took up the domestic political angle of the reinterpretation, pointing out that this manoeuver 34 See Liu Junhong, “anbei qiangtui jiti ziweiquan yizai hewei zhongguo,” Ziguangge,
15
August
2014,
http://zggzz.zgg.gov.cn/zxyq/201408/rcyzhsh/GHJHJ/201408/t20140815_463 490.html (accessed 26 November 2014); Jia Xiudong, “riben cheng de bu shi baohusan, ershi yexin,” Renmin Ribao Overseas Edition, 14 July 2014, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2014‐07/14/content_1452436.htm (accessed 24 November 2014). 30
had sidelined the Diet and faced significant opposition from Japanese intellectuals, newspapers and ordinary citizens, who took to the streets in protest. Interestingly, one author took specific issue with the way in which the blueprint for this policy change had been drawn up by outside experts (the “Advisory Panel” mentioned above), but was immediately adopted as government policy upon the publication of their report. In his view, the use of experts was little more than window‐dressing to legitimize a preexisting policy preference, using scholarly authority to prepare the theoretical ground for a move to CSD and establish it as a new orthodoxy.35 On this issue, it is clear that the public activity of China's FPTTs was tightly constrained by the official response, and mostly took the form of expounding and elaborating on it. This mostly concerned background information about the policy's immediate effects, the complex workings of regional alliance mechanisms, and the role of the US in effecting the change. Absent, however, were policy suggestions on how the Chinese side should react to these developments, which are usually a staple of Western think tank commentaries. The second major issue addressed by FPTT commentators concerned the intentions behind the shift, focusing specifically on the motivations of PM Abe and the LDP's conservative wing. Again, they were unanimous in identifying the root cause in Japan's eclipse by a rising China, a trend which “rightists” or “hawks” sought to both exploit and ultimately reverse by unlocking the country's
35 Liu Junhong, “anbei qiangtui.”
31
untapped potential as a military power in a bid to reestablish regional leadership.36 Chinese experts were also careful to point out differences between Abe's policies and the majority views of Japanese citizens, which they praised as hanging on to Japan's postwar pacifist traditions.37 These messages were not only intended to portray the Cabinet decision as illegitimate, but also calibrated to discourage a demonization of Japan as a nation, which has in recent years been a frequent target of nationalist writings and protests in China. In identifying Abe and his circle as the lone culprits, they provided the government yet another service in deflecting popular pressure for a hardline response and stressing the desirability of a future return to cooperation, which is also of crucial importance to China's own development. While this example is instructive for the work of China's FPTTs, there are some special circumstances that need to be taken into account when generalizing from it: first, Sino‐Japanese relations and especially their historical dimension is a highly politically sensitive issue in China, and related debates will always be tightly controlled and scripted. Even in the absence of control, Abe's handling of historical issues has been very negatively received by the expert community, and 36 See, for example, Wu Jinan, “riben anquan zhengce quanbian de liyou shi xujia
de,” Xinmin Wanbao, 15 August 2014, http://xmwb.xinmin.cn/resfile/2014‐08‐ 15/B04/B04.pdf (accessed 25 November 2014). 37 See Lian Degui, “riben xianfa cheng le huaping,” Jiefang Ribao, 5 July 2014,
http://newspaper.jfdaily.com/jfrb/html/2014‐07/05/content_1175992.htm (accessed 26 November 2014); Wu Jinan, “riben anquan.” 32
as a result, academic debates on Japan have tended to narrow around fears of a resurgent Japanese militarism.38 Second, this is China's second most important bilateral relationship behind the one with the US, lending itself to a monopolization of decision‐making at the top and fewer opportunities for think tanks to exercise influence. Third, the vast majority of Chinese citizens already hold strong (and very negative) views about Japan and its current government due to Abe's treatment of historical issues,39 which also makes it harder for experts to exercise influence over public opinion. These caveats notwithstanding, the example very much showcases an emerging task of Chinese FPTTs: they are increasingly engaged in a public role, providing background information on current events not only to policy elites, but also the interested public. This is both a way of circumventing the often inefficient internal advice channels and an opportunity to shape public opinion in a way
38 King, “Where Does Japan Fit?” 39 See Pew Research, “Global Attitudes Report. Chapter 4: How Asians View Each
Other,” 14 July 2014, http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/chapter‐4‐how‐ asians‐view‐each‐other/ (accessed 9 December 2014). Notably, Japanese popular perceptions of China have also very much deteriorated in recent years. Nowhere among the G7 countries are negative images of China these days more pronounced than in Japan. 33
that is conducive to China's own strategic aims, for whose pursuit popular nationalism is often a hindrance rather than an asset.40 This special function is, of course, a direct consequence of their tight integration with government structures, and reflects the current arrangement between the leadership and its experts – essentially, their joint project is to manage China's rise and to see their nation restored to regional leadership, while also tackling the problems which this shift is causing with other nations. Under these circumstances, it is not likely that any Chinese FPTT or its staffers will publicly criticize the government and lobby for policy changes, as Western institutes often do. Rather, they will continue to work in close coordination with government authorities, and strive to maintain this order by providing it with expertise and public support. Conclusions Foreign policy think tanks in Japan and China share many aims and ambitions. Both seek to influence and, ideally, also impact on public discourses as well as elite‐decision making on foreign and security policies – be it by issuing policy briefs and policy recommendation papers, by providing commentaries in the media or by serving as platforms for the exchange of views with representatives from other nations. FPTTs in both countries aim at conveying Chinese and Japanese standpoints to international audiences and, ultimately, also at Chen Weiss, Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China's Foreign
40 Jessica
Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 34
contributing to their respective countries’ involvement and standing in international affairs. FPTTs in Japan and China have been embraced by their peers in North America and elsewhere, who seek insights into current foreign and security‐policy thinking in these two countries. Similarities between many FPTTs in China and Japan also include their strong ties to individual ministries and government agencies – though at least some Japanese think tanks seek to transcend such links and resulting obligations. While many FPTTs in China have however witnessed increasing funding and more academic qualification of their staffers in recent years, many Japanese FPTTs continue to struggle in terms of funding and personnel. Also mirroring China’s rise in international politics and economic affairs and Japan’s relative decline in these spheres, China’s FPTTs have become more visible and vocal on the global stage while their Japanese counterparts, few in number and often understaffed as they are, are having a more difficult time to get their messages across. Seen from a broader perspective, it is noteworthy that FPTTs in Japan and China hardly ever serve as genuine agenda setters in their two countries’ foreign and policy security policy. Far more often they play a more reactive role, e.g. by helping to legitimize existing policy preferences and positions. This does not mean that FPTTs merely serve as mouthpieces of political leaders in both countries – in many cases FPTT scholars in China and Japan very much share the worldviews of political leaders in their countries and thus act out of conviction. They recent involvement of think tankers in the Japanese government’s advisory 35
panel, which ultimately helped to legitimize the Cabinet’s reinterpretation of the Constitution – a long‐time aim of current PM Abe and likeminded colleagues in the LDP – to allow for collective self‐defense, serve as cases in point. While Chinese FPTTs’ reactions to the reinterpretation were predictably harsh and remained close to the official line as formulated by the Foreign Ministry, they were also nuanced in that they distinguished between the intentions of political leaders and the views of many ordinary Japanese on these issues. This reflects their establishment status and resulting desire in keeping Sino‐Japanese relations on an even keel. Given that many of the existing FPTTs in both Japan and China have in the past played very useful roles in terms of operating bilateral dialogue forums, they are also well poised to contribute to current and future Sino‐Japanese exchanges among politicians and opinion leaders. Venues like the annual Beijing‐Tokyo Forum bring think tankers, officials and business leaders from both nations together and can serve as a reliable conduit for frank exchanges even in times when relations between top leaders are acrimonious. 41 These days such exchanges are all the more valuable and timely as many veterans knowledgeable about the other country have left the scene in recent years, leading to a palpable drying up of “human pipelines” between China and Japan. One should however not expect wonders from such bilateral “track two” or “1.5” dialogues as they are 41 “10th Beijing‐Tokyo Forum held in Japan,” China Military Online, 29 September 2014,
http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news‐channels/china‐military‐news/2014‐
09/29/content_6160355.htm (accessed 16 December 2014). 36
constrained by the prevailing political climate. As long as nationalistic and increasingly assertive agendas dominate in Beijing and Tokyo, the potential of bilateral forums operated by FPTTs in the two nations will remain tightly conscribed. Without such activities, however, the danger of unintended collisions between East Asia’s two giants would be all the bigger.
37
