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Impediments to the Effective Use of Ballistics Imaging Information In Criminal Investigations: Lessons from the Use of IBIS in a Developing Nation a

William R. King & William Wells

a

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College of Criminal Justice, Sam Houston State University, George J. Beto Center, Huntsville, Texas Published online: 19 Aug 2015.

Click for updates To cite this article: William R. King & William Wells (2015) Impediments to the Effective Use of Ballistics Imaging Information In Criminal Investigations: Lessons from the Use of IBIS in a Developing Nation, Forensic Science Policy & Management: An International Journal, 6:1-2, 47-57, DOI: 10.1080/19409044.2015.1051673 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19409044.2015.1051673

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Forensic Science Policy & Management, 6(1-2):47–57, 2015 Copyright Ó Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1940-9044 print / 1940-9036 online DOI: 10.1080/19409044.2015.1051673

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Impediments to the Effective Use of Ballistics Imaging Information In Criminal Investigations: Lessons from the Use of IBIS in a Developing Nation William R. King and William Wells College of Criminal Justice, Sam Houston State University, George J. Beto Center, Huntsville, Texas

ABSTRACT We use a case study approach to explore the facilitators and impediments to effectively using forensics ballistics imaging technology to improve police investigations in a developing country. The study site, Trinidad and Tobago, a nation located in the Caribbean basin, was experiencing a homicide epidemic during the time of this study. The homicide epidemic involved the repeated use of a limited number of firearms, conditions that are ideal for ballistics imaging technology. This nation also possessed a professionalized forensic crime lab and advanced ballistic imaging technology. The analysis reveals that the effective use of ballistics imaging was impeded by inefficient processes and backlogs at the national crime lab, time delays in identifying ballistics hits, and an inefficient system of transmitting hit reports to police investigators. In sum, organizational arrangements in the forensic crime lab and police in the focal country blunted the effectiveness of a proven forensic technology. KEYWORDS

ballistics, IBIS, gun violence, developing nations

INTRODUCTION

Received 10 December 2014; accepted 12 May 2015. Address correspondence to William R. King at College of Criminal Justice, Sam Houston State University, George J. Beto Center, Box 2296, Huntsville, TX 77341. E-mail: [email protected] Color versions of one or more figures in this article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/ufpm.

This manuscript uses a case study approach to explore the facilitators and impediments to effectively using forensics ballistics imaging technology to improve police investigations in a developing country. Technological advancements such as ballistics imaging hold great promise for improving criminal investigations provided the information resulting from these analyses is transmitted to and used by investigators. The successful implementation of ballistics imaging technology is contingent upon a system of human actors; humans who find and transport physical evidence to crime labs, lab employees who operate the equipment and interpret the results, those who transmit the results, and those who receive and utilize the information (Gagliardi 2009; King and Maguire 2009). 47


The interface where humans interact with technologies has been recognized as important for years, yet the potential problems that can result at this interface have only recently been explored by scholars (e.g., Perrow 1984; Snook 2000; Starbuck and Farjoun 2009). There are a host of potential problems that may occur when humans interact with technology. In some instances the technology works as designed, but humans use the technology inappropriately or respond in maladaptive ways, thus diminishing the effectiveness of the technology.1 We use data and observations of a ballistics imaging system, a crime lab, and a police agency in a developing nation to explore the facilitators and impediments to effectively using ballistics-imaging technology to improve the investigation of violent crime. This paper is a narrative built around descriptive statistics and information derived from an analysis of Integrated Ballistics Information System (IBISTM )2 records and interviews with, and observations of, police officers, scientists employed at a national forensics laboratory, and foreign consultants to the criminal justice system in a developing nation, Trinidad and Tobago (TT), in the western hemisphere. Our analyses demonstrate that a properly managed and structured ballistics imaging system can provide useful information to law enforcement agencies, but in the present case, ballistics intelligence was not used optimally by the police. We attribute these shortcomings in the use of ballistics technology to breakdowns in processes at the crime lab and poor inter-organizational communication, not to the nature of the imaging technology itself. We suspect that our findings are applicable to a range of forensic technologies and issues faced by developing nations (Maguire and King 2013).

FORENSIC TECHNOLOGIES AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS Since the spear and the stone axe, humans have used technological tools to improve human life and society. The general public assumes that better technologies produce better outcomes and in most instances they are correct to think so. In some instances, however, a sound technology is embedded within inefficient systems that consequently impede the effectiveness of the technology. For example, computers may improve the functioning of businesses and bureaucracies, but might be of little help in environments where electricity is W. R. King & W. Wells

unreliable or where employees are not trained in using computers. Similarly, forensic technologies such as DNA typing, automated fingerprint identification systems, and ballistics imaging systems may prove ineffective when coupled with inefficient crime labs and police agencies, and poor inter-organizational communication and processes among justice agencies.

Ballistics Imaging Technology When a firearm is fired, it imparts unique, individual characteristics or tool marks upon the fired bullet and the expended cartridge case (see Nichols 2007 for a review of this research). Firearms examiners may match these unique tool marks on fired bullets and cartridge cases to the gun that fired the ammunition by a process of visually comparing the tool marks with the aid of a comparison microscope. In the past this process of manual comparison and matching was laborious because it entailed visually comparing a large number of possible matches (Braga and Pierce 2004). For example, a firearms examiner might compare hundreds of cartridge cases in order to identify a match with a particular cartridge case from a crime scene. Ballistics imaging uses a computer to capture, or acquire, highresolution images of firearms evidence (fired bullets or cartridge cases) and convert these images into a digitized signature (NRC/NAS 2008, p. 101). The computer can then compare large numbers of converted images in order to assist in identifying likely matches (NRC/NAS 2008, p. 26). Computer software produces a list of likely matches, called high confidence candidates, which are ranked via a correlation score. High confidence candidates must be manually confirmed, a process that involves using a comparison microscope to compare the actual fired cartridges or bullets. If an examiner confirms a match, the high confidence candidate is designated as a hit (King et al. 2013). Ballistics imaging makes it possible to link crimes involving the same firearm to each other more efficiently and, thus, has the potential to improve the ability of police to apprehend suspects, build criminal cases, and gain insight into gun markets. Research conducted with the Boston Police Department indicated that a ballistics imaging system helped the firearms section produce six times the number of ballistics matches as compared to manual comparisons of ballistics evidence (Braga and Pierce 2004), and the use of advanced 48


bullet imaging technology increased the number of bullet hits in Boston (Braga and Pierce 2011). The utility of ballistics imaging, however, lies in the information it produces relating to a hit (or match) or the absence of a hit.3 Under ideal circumstances, this information helps law enforcement personnel identify, arrest, and charge suspects. The use of ballistic imaging during the investigation of one or a few crimes is referred to as tactical usage (see Gagliardi 2010; King et al. 2013). The strategic use of ballistic imaging involves revealing patterns of gun usage in a community or region and among groups of criminals such as gangs. Because the information produced by ballistics imaging must be transmitted between different criminal justice organizations, such as between a forensic crime lab and a police agency, we turn now to an interorganizational perspective on forensic information before we discuss the uses of ballistics hits in particular.

accurately reflect the benefit of an organization’s activities. For example, instead of using arrests to measure police agency performance, a better indicator is probably a police agency’s successes at controlling violent crime or improving public safety. Forensic systems, including crime scene investigators (CSIs) and crime labs, perform a wide range of functions, such as receiving and analyzing physical evidence, producing reports, testifying in court, and consulting with law enforcement and prosecutorial organizations. We suggest here that forensic systems4 ultimately serve the cause of justice by providing information to other criminal justice agencies, especially the police.

The Outputs and Outcomes of Forensic Systems

Information concerning the results of forensic analyses must be communicated and routed from the crime lab to law enforcement and prosecution agencies. The importance of this communication in based on the premise that criminal investigations and prosecutions benefit from information derived from forensic analyses. We argue that this communication process is an important outcome of forensic systems (see Ritter 2013), and we seek to understand the patterns of communications, including impediments, involving ballistics evidence in a developing nation.

Crime labs and police agencies are organizations that engage in interactions by transporting physical evidence from the police to the lab, by communicating test requests from police agencies to crime labs, and by communicating the results of forensic analyses from labs to police agencies. Because we embed crime labs and police agencies in an organizational framework, we turn now to a brief and general discussion of organizations and the product of their tasks and work. Organizational scholars generally divide the intended effects of organizational behaviors into outputs and outcomes (Gromley and Weimer 1999; King and Maguire 2009; Mohr 1973). Outputs are easily counted organizational products or activities, such as the number of cars built by an automobile manufacturer or arrests made by a police agency. Outputs are often simple, and sometimes they are subject to manipulation by organizational members, so they are not always optimal performance indicators for organizations. For example, a police agency may arrest a large number of people in order to improve its outputs, yet the arrests may be improper or even illegal. Worse yet, the outputs (i.e., arrests) might have no effect on important organizational goals such as crime and public safety. In lieu of outputs, outcomes measure the intended effect of organizational activities and more 49

No matter how accurate the analyses produced by crime labs or other entities, the analyses are not useful until the findings are disseminated to, and used by, those who need the information to conduct investigations and adjudicate offenders. The dissemination and usage of information is vital to the success of the criminal justice process (King and Maguire 2009, p. 167).

Criminal Investigations, Information, and Forensic Analysis Criminal investigations involve a process in which investigators attempt to locate information in order to solve crimes (Simms and Petersen 1991). Sanders (1977, p. 6) notes, “. . . detectives are essentially information gatherers, [and] detective work is a form of information work . . .” Information may come from a variety of sources, such as witnesses, victims, and suspects. Forensic tests and analysis, such as ballistics analysis, may also provide information for investigators. For investigators, the most pertinent information produced by forensic analyses either links a specific suspect to the crime scene or links a suspect with a specific object such as a particular gun that is linked with the Impediments to the Effective Use of Ballistics Imaging


crime. Regardless of the source, at the heart of the investigations process is the production and consumption of information by investigators. Advances in forensic technology, including ballistic evidence processing, are exciting because they produce information that, under ideal conditions, is meaningful to investigators. However, prior research on the utility of forensic evidence for investigations is mixed. Often, forensic evidence is either not present or it has not been tested by the time of an arrest (Eck 1983; Horvath & Meesig 1996; Peterson, Mihajlovic, & Gilliland 1984; Peterson et al. 2010). Some researchers find that when forensic evidence is available, it does not assist in criminal investigations but is useful during prosecution (Horvath & Meesig 1996). Others have found that forensic evidence is used during the investigation process to link suspects to crimes, and is less important during the prosecution process (Peterson et al. 1984; Peterson et al. 1987) or that advanced ballistics imaging technology is helpful for criminal investigators (Braga and Pierce 2011). The value of forensic evidence, especially DNA, appears to vary with the type of crime and other aspects of the investigation. DNA appears to help clear burglaries (Roman et al. 2008), but not homicides (Schroeder & White 2009) and the value of DNA during sexual assault investigations seems to vary with other case characteristics (Menaker, Campbell, and Wells, in press). We suspect that the reason for these disparate findings is due to two different factors. First, processing systems differ in the timeliness of forensic evidence processing. Some police-lab systems are able to process evidence very quickly, while other systems are not (King et al. 2013; Peterson, Sommers, Baskin, & Johnson 2010). Slower systems will probably not produce information that is helpful for police investigations, but might still be helpful for prosecutors or judges. Second, some systems are capable of effectively producing and transmitting informative reports to investigators and prosecutors, while others are less capable. The present research and findings shed light upon these mixed findings by unpacking the dynamics among crime labs, investigators, and investigations.

GUN HOMICIDES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD Gun violence and homicides plague large portions of the world’s population. The United States has W. R. King & W. Wells

relatively high levels of violent crime, homicide, and gun crimes when compared to most other developed nations in the world. For example, during the 20th century, the United States has experienced approximately 10 times the homicide rate of the United Kingdom (Monkkonen 2001, p. 171; see also Zimring & Hawkins 1997). Firearms were responsible for 67% of homicides in the U.S in 2011 (Maguire 2013, Table 3, 118.2011). Although the U.S. has high rates of violent crime and gun crime, the highest homicide rates (30 per 100,000) are found in the Caribbean basin (United Nations and World Bank 2004). Caribbean countries with notable homicide rates include: Guyana (79 per 100,000 in 2001), Jamaica (49 per 100,000 in 2006), Trinidad and Tobago (42.8 per 100,000 in 2008),5 the Dominican Republic (27 per 100,000 in 2005), and the Bahamas (21 per 100,000 in 2002) (United Nations and World Bank 2007). By comparison, the homicide rate in the United States was 5.6 per 100,000 in 2007 (FBI 2008), and the worldwide homicide rate was 9 per 100,000 in 2002 (United Nations and World Bank 2007). (King, Maguire, and Katz 2009). Firearms play a prominent role in the Caribbean homicide problem. Homicide rates in Caribbean countries due to non-firearms have remained relatively stable since the early 1990s. The increases in the homicide rate in Caribbean countries since 1995 are due to firearms violence (Montoute and Anyanwu 2009). Around the world in 2010 firearms accounted for 42% of homicides, but in the Caribbean firearms were involved in 61% of homicides (Gilgen 2012) and more than 70% of crime (Montoute and Anyanwu 2009, pp. 10). Due to the prevalence of firearms in Caribbean violent crime, ballistics imaging should be able to link gun crimes and help reduce gun violence in the Caribbean. It is reasonable to suspect that ballistics imaging should be more impactful in the Caribbean due to the unique nature of gun ownership and markets in most Caribbean nations. Guns may be less readily available to offenders in the Caribbean because gun ownership is more strictly regulated than in the United States. Offenders are less likely to dispose of firearms used in crimes because it is difficult to replace them with guns that have not been used in crimes.6 Thus, it can be assumed that guns are more likely to be used in multiple crimes when they cannot be easily replaced. In these locations ballistics imaging can make a significant impact because it is possible to link together greater numbers of crimes. Investigators can use this 50


information to advance their investigations and narrow lists of potential suspects. There have been no published examinations of how well ballistics imaging performs in developing nations where civilian gun ownership is more tightly regulated and firearms are presumably less available for use in crime. Further, with the exception of two studies from the U.S. (Braga and Pierce 2011; King et al. 2013) little is known about the ways in which investigators utilize information produced by these ballistics-imaging technologies. To address this question we use data derived from an extensive study of violent crime, homicide, and the criminal justice system in Trinidad and Tobago, a developing nation in the Caribbean. The current analysis explores the impediments to the effective operation of a ballistics imaging system. In particular we elucidate how a crushing backlog of physical evidence overwhelmed the ability of the crime lab’s firearms section to populate the ballistics-imaging database with evidence. We also detail the ways in which the communications network between the crime lab and the police impeded the effective transmission of information and hit reports concerning ballistics imaging hits.

the change in homicides (Maguire et al. 2008; Katz & Maguire 2006). The homicide epidemic caused residents to become increasingly fearful. In a study of one distressed community near the capital, Port of Spain, Johnson (2006) found that more than half of the residents believed there is a high risk of being injured or killed due to crime. Given the marked increase in the lethal effects of firearms in Trinidad and Tobago, this nation’s experience makes it a fruitful place to examine the utility of ballistics imaging. How well does a ballistics imaging system operate in a country with very high levels of lethal firearms violence and relatively tight restrictions on civilian firearm possession? Trinidad and Tobago is served by a national police service called the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS)7, and a national crime lab, called the Forensic Science Centre (FSC) located in the capital. Historically the TTPS has processed crime scenes and delivered physical evidence to the FSC for analysis. The FSC purchased and installed ballistics imaging in July 2004 when an integrated ballistics imaging system (IBIS) was procured from Forensic Technology Inc. (now Ultra Electronics Forensic Technology Inc.).

DATA The Setting Trinidad and Tobago is a two-island nation located in the eastern Caribbean, about seven miles from the northeast coast of Venezuela. In the early 19th century Trinidad and Tobago was established as a British colony. The nation became one of the most prosperous in the Caribbean when oil was discovered in Trinidad and Tobago in 1910. Trinidad and Tobago obtained its independence from Great Britain in 1962 but British influence is evident in many sectors. The republic remains a member of the Commonwealth of Nations (a voluntary association consisting largely of former British colonies). The demographic composition is approximately 40% East Indian, 37.5% African, and 20.5% Afro-Indian. Between 2000 and 2007 Trinidad and Tobago experienced a homicide epidemic that was driven by firearms use (Maguire, Willis, Snipes, & Gantley 2008; World Bank 2007). Homicides increased 418%, from 93 in 1999 to 546 in 2008, and firearms accounted for almost all of the increase in homicides (see Figure 1). In addition, gang warfare was responsible for much of 51

Our data come from four sources covering the 2000 to 2008 time period. First, we use data collected by the national crime lab in Trinidad and Tobago (called the Forensic Science Centre, or FSC) to track the growth, and then decline of a substantial backlog of firearms evidence. These data, provided by the lab’s LIMS (lab information management system) database provide

FIGURE 1 Trends in homicides by weapon type, Trinidad and Tobago: 1999 – 2008. Impediments to the Effective Use of Ballistics Imaging


counts for cases, exhibits, and productivity by firearms examiner between 2000 and 2008. Second, we use data on confirmed ballistics hits that were extracted from the IBIS database. These data let us describe the nature of the IBIS database and the number of confirmed hits. Third, we analyze 33 IBIS gun reports produced between January 2006 and August 2007. These 33 IBIS gun reports, which cover 49 different crime dyads and 83 unique crimes, help describe the nature of gun crime in Trinidad and Tobago and the performance of ballistics imaging. During 2007 we used these 33 IBIS gun reports and interviews with police personnel to determine whether the IBIS information was transmitted to the appropriate police investigator. The final source of data comes from an extensive number of observations and interviews with key informants in TT. For almost three years we observed and interviewed police officers, detectives, homicide detectives, and special tactical police officers in the national police force. We spent extensive periods of time interviewing and observing scientists at the nation’s crime lab. A specific focus was on gathering data about firearms crimes and the national lab’s processing of firearms evidence. We interviewed all the firearms examiners at the national crime lab at least twice (and some of them up to ten times). We also interviewed one retired firearms examiner on multiple occasions and two individuals who served as the IBIS systems operators in the national crime lab. We interviewed foreign consultants and technicians from the United Kingdom and United States who worked with the national crime lab, the national police, and the Ministry of National Security (some of them on multiple occasions). We conducted multiple analyses of the national crime lab’s physical evidence database to determine the size of backlogs in firearms, productivity of firearms examiners, and the mean time which elapsed between the receipt of evidence by the lab and the completion of a report.

FINDINGS Impediments to Ballistics Imaging: The Detrimental Effects of Inefficient Processes and Evidence Backlogs Forensic evidence databases, such as a ballisticsimaging database, must be populated with items of evidence. If the items are too few in number, correlations W. R. King & W. Wells

or matches are unlikely. A computerized IBIS system was installed at the national crime lab in Trinidad and Tobago in July 2004 but the system did not produce a hit until January 2006 because the database was not populated sufficiently with firearms evidence. Initially the IBIS system in Trinidad and Tobago did not produce hits in part due to a crushing backlog in the firearms section at the national crime lab. Although the number of gun crimes and homicides had increased greatly in the nation since 2000, the firearms section at the lab had only two firearms examiners until June 2004 (when a third examiner was added). By late 2005 the firearms backlog had grown to 2,058 firearms related cases. These firearms examiners were hard pressed to handle the backlog that had amassed since 2000. Simply, the firearms examiners were too busy writing case reports, attending court, and performing their other duties to devote sufficient time to inputting images of evidence into IBIS or reviewing correlation lists and as a result the technology did not produce a single hit for 18 months. During the fall of 2005, the crime lab received assistance from foreign experts from the United Kingdom (U.K.) who worked in the firearms section and assisted with sorting evidence and processing cases. These experts also helped improve the process of inputting evidence into the IBIS system, and their effect was noticeable as the ballistics imaging system began producing hits during January 2006. Personnel from the U.K. could not fully process cases since they were not allowed to testify in court, however, and their effect upon the backlog of firearms cases was diminished. These individuals from the U.K. were replaced during the fall of 2006 with three experienced firearms examiners from the United States. The U.S. examiners were temporarily employed by the crime lab in order to process cases, eliminate the backlog of firearms evidence, and to assist in training additional examiners. The U.S. examiners could testify in court and thus completed casework alongside the Trinidad and Tobago crime lab examiners. Between late 2006 and the summer of 2008 the firearms backlog shrank significantly, evidence was acquired by the IBIS system, and the number of IBIS hits increased substantially. By February 2008, the IBIS system contained images of 10,457 fired cartridge case exhibits and images of 1,106 bullet exhibits. The majority of images acquired by the IBIS system were not crime evidence collected from crime scenes or suspected offenders—they were 52


from test-fires of police and military weapons. For example, 62.24% of the fired cartridge cases in IBIS were from police and military weapons, and only 7.16% were from cartridges recovered at homicide scenes. It is generally held that IBIS systems produce the greatest number of hits when they are populated with evidence from crime scenes first, and then with evidence from test fires of guns confiscated from criminals second (King et al. 2013). Evidence from test fires of police or military weapons are least likely to produce hits. Regardless of the source of the inputs, however, the sheer number of acquired images is impressive, especially given the relatively short time-span involved. When the TT IBIS inputs (for cartridges input between 2004 and early 2008) are compared to images of cartridge acquired by 223 IBIS sites in the U.S. between 1999 and 2012, the TT IBIS system contained more cartridge images than 78% of U.S. IBIS sites (King et al. 2013, p. 51). As the IBIS database was populated, weapons and evidence were associated via hits. Between October 2006 and late February 2008 the IBIS system in TT produced 337 gun hit reports.8 The experience in Trinidad and Tobago provides a quasi-experimental, one case experimental design that demonstrates the effects of a new technology in conjunction with increasing levels of personnel. There are two lessons we derive from the above narrative. First, an efficient ballistics-imaging program requires more than the technological hardware (i.e., the IBIS terminal and software). Efficient ballistics imaging requires effective processes for inputting evidence into the system. Efficient systems are impeded when there are too few employees to handle all the tasks associated with a firearms section—tasks such as attending court, cataloging evidence, writing reports, and consulting with police officers and prosecutors. The addition of personnel from the U.K. and the U.S. helped improve the IBIS processes and provided labor, both of which helped facilitate inputting more evidence into IBIS. The second lesson is that evidence backlogs can impede the performance of a ballistics imaging system because the database of images is not sufficiently populated to identify hits. Thus, adding personnel did not produce hits, initially. Only after a tipping point in the database of ballistics images of evidence from crimes did the system of technology and personnel begin to identify hits. Once efficient processes are implemented and sufficient evidence is input, the system can begin to identify 53

and confirm hits. Confirming hits is only a necessary condition for making ballistics imaging systems effective, it is, by itself, not sufficient.

Impediments to Ballistics Imaging: Time Lags in Hit Confirmation Hit reports are most helpful when they are produced and transmitted to police investigators and prosecutors in a timely manner. Although the IBIS system in Trinidad and Tobago began to produce hits during January 2006, due to the backlog, many of these hits involved crimes that were old. Correlating firearms evidence requires evidence from two crimes. If the second crime does not occur until later in time, there may be a considerable time lag between the two incidents. Sometimes a time lag is due to the backlog in firearms. For example, one gun crime report produced in February 2007 showed that two pieces of evidence from different crimes, one murder in January 2003 and a possession case from February 2003, involved the same gun. In this instance, the report was generated four years after the offenses. Of the 71 offenses (appearing in the 33 gun crime reports) with occurrence dates (12 of the 83 offenses are missing occurrence dates), one offense occurred in 2007, 13 in 2006, 14 in 2005, 27 in 2004, and the remaining 16 offenses took place prior to 2004 (see Figure 2). The average time between submission of firearms evidence (to the lab, by a police employee) and a gun crime hit report (for these 71 incidents with offense dates) was 863 days (the median time was 850 days). These times are far longer than the time that elapses between a crime and confirmation of a hit in U.S. IBIS sites, which generally take a median of 101 days (King et al. 2013).

FIGURE 2 Years of the offense that have been connected using IBIS.

Impediments to the Effective Use of Ballistics Imaging


The IBIS reports analyzed here illustrate the value this technology holds, especially in a context like Trinidad and Tobago. The reports show that 33 different firearms have been used in 83 different incidents, including 42 homicides, 11 gunshot woundings, and 7 shootings without injuries (see Figure 3). Twenty-three firearms were connected to at least one homicide. Nine “active” firearms were used frequently in cases of serious violence. Each of these nine guns was linked to more than 1 homicide and was involved in 28 total homicides, 4 gunshot woundings, and 2 shootings with no injuries. Within this group of nine guns, one uniquely active gun was connected to eight homicides and one non-lethal wounding. This illustrates that IBIS can be used to prevent serious crime if connections are made in a timely manner and are used to build cases against shooters. One of the greatest benefits of IBIS is its ability to link crimes that, heretofore, were not linked by other investigative efforts. If a single gun can be linked to multiple cases and help narrow down a list of suspects, then investigators have new avenues for solving several serious crimes and, in turn, potentially preventing serious crimes from occurring in the future.

Impediments to Ballistics Imaging: Transmission of Hit Reports In addition to data about firearm crimes obtained from IBIS, we gathered interview and observation data to provide an understanding of how police use IBIS information. Specifically, we traced the information from 19 gun hit reports from the national crime lab and into the TTPS to determine if IBIS intelligence was being delivered to detectives. The purpose of this investigation is simple. Hit reports that do not reach the

FIGURE 3 Incidents involving 33 firearms identified in a sample of IBIS reports. W. R. King & W. Wells

appropriate investigator will not prove helpful in an investigation. We tracked a sample of 19 crimes associated with our list of gun hit reports. These 19 crimes, consisting of 14 homicides and 5 woundings, were chosen because they occurred in one of the three TTPS police stations with the greatest number of IBIS reports (Morvant, Belmont, and Besson Street).9 All three stations are located near the capital city of Port of Spain, and all three districts suffer from substantial violent crime problems. We also chose these 19 cases to facilitate in-person interviews with the detectives assigned to investigate these crimes. We started with the crime lab IBIS gun report and attempted to identify and interview the investigator assigned to each crime. In Trinidad and Tobago, gun crime reports are routed to the police officer listed on the report, who is often the individual who delivered the evidence to the crime lab. In 7 of the 19 crimes we discovered that the police contact listed on the IBIS gun report was not the investigator assigned to the case. Oftentimes the officer who submitted the evidence to the lab (sometimes a CSI) was listed as the investigating officer in the TTPS, instead of the actual investigator. In other instances an investigator was listed on the report, but the case was later assigned to another investigator. Our interviews revealed that the IBIS report was not routed to the second, correct investigator assigned to the case. In all seven instances the proper investigator had not received the IBIS gun report. In another six (of 19) cases we could not determine if the IBIS report had been delivered to the proper investigator. We found disagreements concerning who was truly responsible for investigating some crimes. For example, the police log would show one officers name, but upon interviewing that officer, they would claim another officer had been assigned the case. When we interviewed that second officer, they would claim that a third officer (or sometimes the first officer) was responsible. Eventually we would be directed to a police officer who was unavailable for interview. In the end, we could not determine who was responsible for investigating 6 of these 19 crimes and therefore who should have received the IBIS report. Finally, in 6 (of 19) cases, during the course of our interviews with investigators, we confirmed that the investigator assigned to the case had received the IBIS report. This crude analysis shows that the ineffective transmission of ballistics reports can prevent information 54

from getting to the appropriate investigator in at least one-third of cases, and perhaps up to two-thirds of cases. Again, less than optimal systems for transmitting information trump the efficient use of forensic technology.


CONCLUSIONS Given the prevalence of both homicides and gun violence in Trinidad and Tobago, how effective was IBIS in linking gun crimes? We conclude that an efficiently run IBIS system can produce a wealth of tactical and strategic information concerning gun crimes in developing nations, provided conditions are right. But to be effective, the technology needs to be embedded in a system of efficiently coordinated organizations and communication networks. These networks ensure that evidence is delivered to the lab, entered in IBIS, and that hits are identified and information transmitted quickly to the proper investigator. Lapses or breakdowns in the systems of organizations and networks, such as evidence backlogs, lapses in processing evidence and identifying hits, and problems in transmitting hit information to investigators will blunt the impact of the technology. IBIS requires effective management of crime lab personnel and police officers. Lab personnel must prioritize cases based upon the likelihood they will help combat a gun crime/homicide epidemic, not plod blindly through a backlog based upon “oldest cases first.” Police officers must receive IBIS correlations that are pertinent to their cases, and they must know how to interpret these reports and how to capitalize upon them. These management issues can become serious when multiple agencies are involved but not coordinated and/or law enforcement organizations are geographically diffused. IBIS also requires effective communication linkages between components of the criminal justice system. For instance, there must be an efficient way to communicate IBIS results from the crime lab to the police. Further, police officers and CSI’s need an efficient way to communicate with the lab. For instance, an investigator may need to explain the relative importance of particular items of evidence or to fine-tune comparisons of various pieces of physical evidence (i.e., did this bullet come from this gun?). The IBIS information is only 55

useful if it is distributed to the right people in a timely manner. The exact nature of an effective communication network depends upon local exigencies. In developing nations, for example, it is unlikely the LIMS will be networked with law enforcement organizations. Therefore, it would be ineffective to communicate hits via LIMS or other computer networks. In the absence of well-developed computer networks, however, networks of people may suffice. In smaller agencies, hit communication may be entrusted to one individual who serves as a boundary spanner between the lab or firearms section and the investigations section. This assignment is partially analogous with the role played by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) National Integrated Ballistics Information Network (NIBIN) “contractors” in the U.S. Briefly, NIBIN contractors research ballistics hit reports, add information from databases to the reports, and communicate with investigators. Contractors add value to the hit reports and help investigators link a specific crime to other crimes involving the same weapon (King et al. 2013; U.S. DOJ-OIG 2005). In developing nations, IBIS boundary spanners could be built into pre-existing supervision and management systems because responsibility for communicating hits would rest with a person instead of an electronic network. In small agencies where the lab is housed near the police, the boundary spanner could even be a firearms examiner.10 This simple recommendation should leverage the best outcomes of supervision and accountability afforded by organizations in combination with the importance of personal networks so common in smaller communities and developing nations. We contend that it is also useful for hit reports to be routed to crime analysis units, where they can be compiled, studied, mapped, and converted into useful strategic intelligence for law enforcement. There is anecdotal evidence which suggests that adding information to hit reports on possible suspects, victims, addresses and geocodes, possible gang affiliations, and motive improves the hit reports for investigators (King et al. 2013).

FUNDING Funding for this research was provided by the Ministry of National Security of Trinidad and Tobago. The points of view expressed in this paper are those of the Impediments to the Effective Use of Ballistics Imaging

authors alone and do not represent the official policies or positions of the Ministry of National Security or the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.

following confirmation, the head of the firearms section walked down the hall to the detectives’ offices and informed the investigator working the case about the hit. This process of immediately notifying investigators of a NIBIN hit via face-to-face communication is more challenging in sites where the lab and investigators are housed in different locations.”


Notes 1. For example, during WWII U.S. Navy ships usually had radar and Japanese Navy Ships did not. U.S. Navy captains sometimes ordered that their ship’s radar systems be kept off, and sometimes positioned ships with more advanced radar systems at the rear of their columns, where the utility of the radar were impeded by friendly ships (Hornfischer 2012, p. 60, 261). 2. IBIS is a registered trademark with the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (TMA481028). For brevity, however, we do not include the trademark designation to further references to IBIS in this paper. 3. The absence of a hit might eliminate a suspect from consideration by investigators, which could prove informative for investigators. 4. King and Maguire (2009, p. 159) define the organizations that collect and process forensic evidence as the “forensic evidence processing industry, which encompasses police agencies, coroners, medical examiners, and crime laboratories that gather and process physical evidence. The industry also includes the agencies, units, and personnel charged with securing, transporting, and storing this evidence.” 5. Trinidad and Tobago experienced 540 homicides in 2008 with a population of 1,262,366. Population figure retrieved from the Trinidad and Tobago Central Statistics Office on August 12 2009 from http://www.cso.gov.tt/statistics/census2000. aspx. 6. The assumption is that offenders desire firearms that have not previously been used in crimes because, if caught, then the possessor may be charged for the crime in which the firearm was previously used. 7. Trinidad and Tobago is also served by a police-military hybrid organization called SAUTT (Strategic Anticrime Unit of Trinidad and Tobago). During the time-period of the present study, SAUTT did not employ criminal investigators or homicide detectives and thus did not account for IBIS inputs or use hit reports. 8. In Trinidad and Tobago, ballistics hits are reported to the TTPS via a gun crime report. Each report lists the total number of crimes associated with a particular firearm. Although the FSC in Trinidad and Tobago calls these “hit reports” they differ from hit reports in the U.S. In our experience in the U.S., police agencies present ballistics matches as one hit report that link two crimes. Thus, a gun used at five different crimes would yield one gun crime report in Trinidad and Tobago, but would produce four hit reports in the U.S. If two guns (a .38 and a 9mm for example) were used at the same crimes (A and B) in Trinidad and Tobago, however, there would be two gun crime reports; one for each crime-gun combination. In the U.S., this scenario would produce only one hit report (since hit reports in the U.S. link crimes and not guns). For comparison sake, if the IBIS machine and crime lab in Trinidad and Tobago were a part of ATF’s NIBIN program, it would be ranked at the 81st percentile in terms of total hits confirmed as compared to all NIBIN sites. 9. One additional case was added from Caroni police station due to a chance meeting with a retired police investigator. 10. For example, King et al. (2013, p. 41) report: “(Santa Ana) revealed an especially rapid form of communicating information about hits. The site visitor observed as a hit was identified using NIBIN, the evidence was compared under a microscope, and the hit was confirmed. Immediately W. R. King & W. Wells

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