Forum. Climate Change Governance after Bali. â¢. Peter M. Haas*. It is a long and ... ism through an effort to fortify the foundations for meaningful multilateral.
Climate Change Governance after Bali
Peter M. Haas
Forum Climate Change Governance after Bali •
Peter M. Haas*
It is a long and winding road from Bali to a meaningful climate change regime. The “Bali Roadmap” is singularly indistinct in its details. Because the stakes are extremely high, we are unlikely to see any diplomatic breakthroughs in the negotiations until the very last minute. Consequently, I argue in this piece that the next year or so can be fruitfully used to help build the political support for achieving a genuine breakthrough at that fateful point. Relying on multilateral diplomacy, based on the general model which has been successfully pursued to create international regimes in other substantive domains of global environmental politics, is not likely to be effective for climate change in the short to medium term. I offer some suggestions to improve the prospects for multilateralism through an effort to fortify the foundations for meaningful multilateral diplomacy while we still have time. The issue of climate change now seems ªrmly planted on the international agenda. Yet the political will for meaningful action is not yet apparent. The facts of the matter are now fairly clear. Scientiªc consensus is expressed in the most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Working Group (WG) I report, which calls anthropogenic climate change “unequivocal.”1 Between the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, the Stern Review, and now the recent award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Al Gore and the IPCC, it is widely agreed that severe consequences will occur if global concentrations of carbon are allowed to exceed 450–550 ppm by 2050. Keeping emissions below this level will entail 50–85 percent reductions in carbon dioxide emissions by 2050 from current levels.2 A standard list of policy responses was also endorsed by the IPCC WG III, many of which hearken back to 1970s efªciency framing of the energy policy * Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Yale University Working Group on Global Governance 15 May 2007, and at the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change Conference 24 May 2007, Amsterdam, Netherlands. I am grateful to Nat Keohane for clarifying the operation of carbon markets for me, and for editorial comments by MJ Peterson, Steinar Andresen, Andreas Kraemer, and to 2 GEP anonymous referees. 1. IPCC 2007, 2. 2. Ibid, 20. Global Environmental Politics 8:3, August 2008 © 2008 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
1
2
•
Climate Change Governance after Bali
debates. These responses include: increased energy efªciency, fuel switching, more renewables, nuclear power, conservation, appliance efªciency, emission control, carbon sequestration, aforestation, and international cooperation.3 Some mitigation responses call for changes in production, and others for changes in lifestyle and consumption. Adaptive responses can help the majority of the world’s population, but don’t receive as much policy attention in terms of immediate actions. Estimates show that these goals are demanding, but attainable. The annual costs are something on the order of 1 percent of current world GDP, and 1 percent of world gross ªxed capital consumption. However, these consensual “goals” are well beyond the less demanding targets of Kyoto, which have not been achieved. Thus focusing on a more demanding global aspiration seems unlikely to succeed. This is not to reject multilateral environmental diplomacy which has worked well in dealing with such issues as stratospheric ozone depletion, European acid rain, and marine pollution in many of the world’s oceans. Climate change is the limiting case, though, for the multilateral diplomacy approach. Climate change is economically and politically more difªcult than other issues yet addressed, so it is not surprising that the diplomatic efforts to date have been disappointing. Why Collective Action on Climate Change is Politically Challenging The core political reality is that the likely short to medium term victims from climate change are primarily those in the countries of the Global South, which lack meaningful political clout at the international level, whereas those who are asked to make meaningful short to medium term (and possibly highly expensive) policy changes are the more inºuential countries of the Global North. Thus those with the most political capacity for dealing with climate change are some of the most reluctant to make meaningful short term commitments. While the EU talks a good game, its emissions are still projected to increase. Without the votes in the UN General Assembly of the small Paciªc Island states, Egypt and Bangladesh, it seems unlikely that discussions would have ever begun. While recent public opinion surveys show that climate change is a widely shared concern worldwide, the intensity with which environmental values are expressed still tends to be rather shallow. Few people are willing to make corresponding economic sacriªces, and most people make electoral decisions based on local and economic factors rather than global environmental ones. Governments’ perceptions of economic consequences also inhibit their willingness to actively cooperate. Climate change is not seen as a pressing problem in the short term by major economic actors because the costs of acting are concentrated, while the beneªts are diffuse. While the global environmental 3. Socolow 2004.
Peter M. Haas
• 3
market is valued at approximately 700 billion dollars, most companies producing clean up products also sell polluting ones, and thus are unlikely to make for a strong green-friendly lobby. In the absence of strong domestic pressures for action, governments have been reluctant to organize international institutions and knowledge-application in a way that would exercise any degree of inºuence over the states themselves. So far, governments have lacked the political will to resort to stronger institutions, or to strengthen existing institutions. Political will in this regard comes from the perceptions of interest from salient political participants—elites and mass electorates—and from economic actors—ªrms. So far, few countries have achieved the limited aspirations laid out in Kyoto. Governments have not made major inroads on their emissions. The OECD countries’ greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have increased since the baseline years 1990/1992 and are likely to continue to grow.4 Strong economic growth means Chinese emissions are going through the roof, and China has already become the largest national GHG emitter earlier than projections anticipated. There is little evidence of policy change occurring as a consequence of the Kyoto Protocol or the UN Framework Convention on Climate change (UNFCCC) regime. The reductions from expected emissions trajectories that have occurred seem to be the result of structural economic changes such as privatization, fuel switching, more expensive energy, the emergence of the service economy, and recessions. The nearly 20 years of persistent negotiations on the climate change regime have had signiªcant second order displacement effects on environmental governance more generally. They have diverted attention away from other possibly pressing problems, crowding out such issues as ecosystem decay, or Third World water quality. They have unnecessarily elevated “cooperation” to the status of an end rather than a means to environmental protection. Scarce political capital has been channeled into trying to build a constituency for climate change policies and domestic enforcement. The institutional backdrop against which negotiations occur is weak by comparison to other international regimes. There is a medium-sized secretariat. The UNFCCC has only 12 senior staff, but with a large number of consultants and other staff. It has a modest budget of US$ 26 million per year. Few synergies or horizontal linkages to other regimes operate. Other international organizations and regimes try to piggyback on climate change, but don’t get many resources. Financial resources are relatively tight. Little money is yet available through the Global Environment Facility (GEF), World Bank, Clean Development Mechanism or Joint Implementation. Carbon trading markets in Europe are still at the experimental stage, and cover only half of the major sectors. The 4. OECD 2007, 12–13.
4
•
Climate Change Governance after Bali
relatively low price of carbon permits at present suggests that many participants remain leery about the extensive transaction costs and enforcement mechanisms for the trading scheme. Emission permit trading schemes provide efªcient mechanisms for achieving previously stipulated goals, but may distract attention from clearly identifying and achieving those goals. There is no meaningful issue-nesting in either the normative or framing sense. It isn’t clear if environmental protection, market liberalization, or sovereignty is the common principle applied by states for addressing climate change, leaving diplomats no conceptual compass with which to navigate. Similarly, talks have pursued a norm of fairness that has been applied at the expense of efªciency. But fairness itself has multiple applications: in terms of universal participation, and also in terms of uniform but differentiated obligations. Frames providing a map for substantive linkages between issues are contested by governments. China says sustainable development is the appropriate frame, while the UK says it should be security. Gaps exist in making effective use of consensual knowledge for addressing the problem. The knowledge base isn’t “useful” for two reasons.5 First, the formal organization responsible for providing science to policy makers, the IPCC, remains politically suspect, and thus only partially legitimate. This is due to concerns about government involvement in selecting scientists and in drafting the summary reports of the working groups. Second, the science is not cast in ways that directly addresses individuals’ experiences, so it remains difªcult to mobilize public opinion through direct reference to it. The IPCC reports are silent on sensitivities between emissions, concentrations, and the timing of consequences. Many effects are presented within estimates of 20–40 years, a 2 generation timeframe which is too long for meaningful planning by governments, ªrms or individuals. Likely impacts are presented at the scope of continents, which aren’t politically meaningful for most decision-makers or citizens. The weak diplomatic context has been one of choice. A historical reconstruction of regime negotiations since 1988 and a tracing of the process demonstrates that the weak institutionalization on this issue is deliberate. Surely, governments could have created or deferred to stronger institutions in this domain, but preferred not to. For instance, negotiations could have been launched within the OECD, with the addition of India and China, thus creating a k-group, avoiding the difªculties of negotiating with large numbers. Such an approach could also have focused on advanced technology-based agreements. Moving outside the UN is still an option. The choice is due in part to strategic efforts to prevent binding commitments, and in part to the reºexive application of UN procedural norms. The social construction of climate change governance occurred as diplomats identiªed climate change as a global problem requiring a global solution through institutions with global membership—the UN—and through procedures of global compromise—consensus.6 These processes have 5. Haas 2004. 6. Hoffmann 2005.
Peter M. Haas
• 5
slowed deliberations, and introduced voting principles that lead to least common denominator type outcomes.7 Climate Change was consigned to the UN in the late 1980s to avoid exposure to other political forces which may have led to stronger outcomes. The US and other states tried to keep climate change out of the hands of NGOs, scientists and UNEP, following experiences with UNEP and at the nonstate organized 1988 Toronto Conference which had surprisingly called for 20 percent cuts in GHG emissions.8 Improving Prospects for Dealing with Climate Change What can we do to better decarbonize the international political economy? How can the requisite political will be developed? Arguably, the international community has ªve to ten years grace period to develop the political will to commit to a massive technological push along the lines already outlined by the IPCC. A new generation of efªcient green technology must be developed which can be implemented without requiring the unnecessary and inefªcient cost of continually upgrading investments as the technology improves. A concerted push for national-level research and development on energy alternatives across a wide portfolio of technologies could help build the political will for stronger international cooperation. Such a push is likely to be sustained in most of the major industrial and industrializing countries because it serves several policy goals: reducing dependence on high priced energy sources, reducing vulnerability to fuel supply interruptions, and stimulating niches in new green markets. By supporting national technological breakthroughs, better policy alternatives will become commercially viable and economic constituents for international action will be mobilized. Prior examples of priming the technological pump can be drawn from the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the internet, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Japanese economic miracle of the 1970s-1990s, and the replacement of CFCs with ozone-friendly alternatives. Private sector demands for regulation to force them beyond the limited market incentives have been echoed from a wide array of sectors.9 A reasonable institutional venue for achieving cooperation on technological development is the G8 plus China and India, or the International Energy Agency. Relying on voluntary commitments from the “major economies” or the Asia Paciªc Partnership on Clean Development and Climate lacks the ªnancial resources to adequately drive technological change. Such efforts outside the UN would still have to be coordinated closely with the Bali Roadmap in order to maintain the legitimacy of the entire enterprise. Public education efforts by international institutions and civil society can also help induce governments to take stronger positions internationally. A 7. Victor 2006. 8. Haas and McCabe 2001.
6
•
Climate Change Governance after Bali
shift from an interest-based policy discourse to a norm-based discourse would help overcome domestic focus on potential free riding. Al Gore’s powerful PowerPoint presentation won an academy award in the US, and has helped to encourage or at least deªne a shift in the policy discourse from self-interest to ethics. Gro Harlem Brundtland was appointed as a climate change ambassador to serve as a high proªle global normative advocate by the UN Secretary General. Imaginative uses of scale can also help promote protection at the global level. Two experiments merit attention. Economic regulation of important markets at the sub-national scale can have a strong snowball effect. The US state of California recently set ambitious technology standards to cut GHG emissions by 20 percent from the 1990 level by 2050. As a sub-national unit in the US with a sufªciently large economy, California’s regulations can have signiªcant snowball effects for producers elsewhere, as well as a high proªle demonstration effect. Two regional initiatives in the US are now underway: the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in New England and the Western Climate Initiative on the West coast. The latter effort also includes three Canadian provinces, thus providing a mechanism by which local concern in the US and Canada may percolate up to inºuence foreign environmental policies. A second scale initiative has to do with better presentation of knowledge at politically meaningful scales of resolution. Talking about the environmental effects of climate change at the national or continental levels has little political meaning for citizens. The Union of Concerned Scientists has cleverly started to issue climate change analyses crafted at the most sensitive political scales, identifying high costs for potentially politically inºuential constituencies, such as California and New England. A very real problem is China, which has already become the largest emitter of greenhouse gases. It is very hard to exercise economic leverage over China, because the US and Europe are more dependent on the Chinese market than vice-versa. Pushing for market liberalization within China will promote foreign investment, and NGOs and international institutions can seek to ensure that foreign companies will apply the environmental standards they follow in their home markets.
Conclusion Architects of institutional design have been reºexively applying a dysfunctional blueprint to dealing with global climate change. The political foundation for meaningful movement to build an effective post–Kyoto multilateral environmental agreement is still weak. Yet the very thinness of the social constructions of the issue developed through the UN mean they can be replaced with other procedural and substantive norms, such as coordinating UN negotiations with discussions elsewhere, or going beyond consensus voting rules. It is better now
Peter M. Haas
•
7
to work on building the political and economic support before further undermining the credibility of collective diplomacy. We should delay hard bargaining on a post-Kyoto agreement for a year or two while seeking to build stronger foundations for a better treaty and for achieving short term policy gains.
References Haas, Peter M. 2004. When Does Power Listen to Truth? Journal of European Public Policy 11 (4): 569–592. Haas, Peter M. and David McCabe. 2001. Ampliªers or Dampeners: International Institutions and Social Learning in the Management of Global Environmental Risks. In Learning to Manage Global Environmental Risks, volume 1, edited by the Social Learning Group, 323–348. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Hoffmann, Matthew J. 2005. What’s Global about Global Governance? A Constructivist Account. In Contending Perspectives on Global Governance: Coherence, Contestation and World Order, edited by Alice D. Ba and Matthew J. Hoffmann, 110–128. Routledge: New York. IPCC. 2007. Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Summary for Policymakers. Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. OECD. 2007. Key Environmental Indicators. Paris: OECD. Socolow, Robert, et al. 2004. Solving the Climate Problem. Environment 46: 10 December. Victor, David. 2006. Toward Effective International Cooperation on Climate Change: Numbers, Interests and Institutions. Global Environmental Politics 6 (3): 90–103.
