from non-interference to constructive engagement

Download PDF
0 downloads 0 Views 259KB Size Report
Comment
Malaysia-Myanmar diplomatic relations were officially established in 1958, a year after. Malaysia ... its treatment of ethnic minorities, the Karens and Rohingyas; the house arrest of Aung San .... “secret police” known as Military Intelligence (MI). ..... most classic example was ASEAN's refusal to condemn the genocide killings ...
AAS2008

FROM "NON-INTERFERENCE" TO "CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT": CONTEMPORARY MALAYSIA-MYANMAR RELATIONS1

By: *Nor Azizan IDRIS (PhD) [email protected] & *Zarina OTHMAN (PhD) [email protected]

Program of Strategic Studies and International Relations School of History, Politics and Strategic Studies Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Bangi 43600, Selangr MALAYSIA Tel.: +6-03-8921-5711 ~ Fax: +6-03-8921-3290

1

The article was originally presented at the Association for Asian Studies, 3-6 April 2008, Atlanta, Georgia (USA). Nor Azizan Idris ia an associate professor; Zarina Othman is a senior lecturer. Both teach at Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM/National University of Malaysia).

1

AAS2008

OUTLINE

I.

Introduction

II.

Myanmar’s Political and Economic Situation

III.

ASEAN and Myanmar A. Historical Overview B. The Concepts of Non-interference and Constructive Engagement C. Malaysia's Non-interference Policy

IV.

Malaysia-Myanmar: From Non-interference to Constructive Engagement A. Overview B. The Economic Gains C. Failures of Constructive Engagement

V.

Conclusions

VI.

References

2

AAS2008

FROM "NON-INTERFERENCE" TO "CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT": CONTEMPORARY MALAYSIA-MYANMAR RELATIONS

Abstract Malaysia-Myanmar diplomatic relations were officially established in 1958, a year after Malaysia gained political independence from Britain and a decade after Myanmar became a sovereign state. Due to Myanmar’s internal political turbulence and her isolationist foreign policy, the relations have never been strong. Additionally, as a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Malaysia had adopted a non-interference policy towards Myanmar’s human rights abuse, such as the house arrest of pro-democracy champion, Aung San Suu Kyi. Nevertheless, Malaysia joined those ASEAN members who pushed for acceptance of Myanmar into their regional association, and Myanmar eventually became the 8th member of ASEAN in 1997. However, it appears that neither the ASEAN noninterference policy nor Malaysia's more recent switch to a "constructive engagement" policy have so far had much success in changing conditions in Myanmar. Aung San Suu Kyi, for instance, remains in house detention to this day, and this has reflected badly on the ASEAN image. It is the purpose of this paper to gain an understanding of why Malaysia has shifted its approach towards Myanmar from one of non-interference to constructive engagement. Specifically this paper will investigate two important issues: 1) whether Malaysia’s changing policy towards Myanmar was due to political reasons or 2) whether it has more to do with an investment opportunity (economic reasons). The paper concludes that the time has come for Malaysia to seek a workable alternative for making Myanmar less of a political liability for either Malaysia or ASEAN. Keywords: Myanmar; Malaysia; ASEAN; constructive engagement; human rights abuse; isolationist foreign policy; non-interference; sovereign state

3

AAS2008

FROM "NON-INTERFERENCE" TO "CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT": CONTEMPORARY MALAYSIA-MYANMAR RELATIONS

I. Introduction International relations--relations between and among states--are of course have always been important for the survival of any sovereign state. In today’s international system, however, it has become almost impossible for a state to survive on its own if it chooses to isolate itself from others. Even if a state chooses to do so, usually the result is that while the regime may survive, its people suffer greatly, especially economically. Cuba, North Korea and Myanmar are examples in which this has been the case. In SE Asia, in a strategic region located between the East and the West, Myanmar (formerly known as Burma), is an interesting case to be studied. Being isolated for almost half a century, Myanmar, which has been under a military rule since 1962, was accepted as a member of a well-respected regional organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The organization has been known for its "non-interference" policy, and Malaysia, one of its founding members,2 was among the strongest proponents of bringing Myanmar into membership in organization. As a member of ASEAN, Malaysia had gone along with the "non-interference" approach towards Myanmar’s abuse of its people's human rights, which included especially its treatment of ethnic minorities, the Karens and Rohingyas; the house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi (pro-democracy champion); and recently, the violent crackdown of Myanmar's government on a large number of Buddhist monks who were peacefully protesting against the military regime. 3 First, ASEAN approach was not to interfere with any member countries internal problems, famously known as “noninterference policy.” But the approach has changed. In general, ASEAN has believed that the best policy to pursue in regard to Myanmar is what has become known as "constructive engagement," hoping that such an approach will lead Myanmar eventually onto the road to democracy. However, it appears that neither the ASEAN "noninterference" policy nor the Malaysian "constructive engagement" policy have had much success in changing conditions in Myanmar. Aung San Suu Kyi, for instance, remains in house detention to this day, and this has reflected badly on the ASEAN image. It is the purpose of this article to gain an understanding of why Malaysia has shifted its approach towards Myanmar from one of noninterference to constructive engagement. Specifically, this paper investigates two important issues: 1) whether Malaysia’s changing policy towards Myanmar was due to a political reasons, or 2) whether it has more to do with economic reasons. First, the paper discusses the background of Myanmar’s political and economic situation. Next, the paper focuses on the relations between Myanmar and Malaysia, as it analyzes and compares the two concepts of noninterference and constructive engagement. Finally it discusses the economic effects of the change in policy, and concludes with some recommendations and predictions. II. Myanmar’s Political and Economic Situation

2

Other founding members of ASEAN were Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand . Violence towards the Buddhist monks in Burma. See several issues of Bangkok Post (August & September Oct. 2007) and The Nation (August and September 2007). 3

4

AAS2008

What is today known as the Union of Myanmar is a federation of states. It is bordered by India and Bangladesh on the west, China on the north, and Laos and Thailand on the east.4 The country is rich in natural resources, including teak timber, and an abundance of seafood, petroleum and gas, and precious gem stones of sapphire, jade, and rubies. However, despite being so rich in resources, Myanmar is one of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) under the ranking system of the UN. Opium, which is mostly grown in the northeastern part of the country, continues to be an important cash crop. Like Malaysia, Myanmar is a multi-racial country. The Burmese5 people are comprised of many racial and ethnic groups, but the Burmans are the major ethnic group. The largest minority groups in the country are the Shan (also known as Tai or Dtai), who comprise about 9% of the population, and the Kayin (Karen) who comprise approximately 7%. Overall, about 75% of the population is concentrated in the rural areas. The two major immigrant groups, the Indians and the Chinese, are technically also minorities, but they play such an important role in Myanmar’s economy that they are often not thought of as such.6 Most of the Burmese population practices Theravada (or Hinayana) Buddhism, while smaller percentages are Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and animists. When Myanmar (then known as Burma) gained its political independence from the British in 1948, it created a parliamentary democracy with a multi-party system. In addition, Burma was one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) formed in 1955. Being a NAM member was intended to indicate a stance of neutrality in foreign policy. Burma's neutrality was further demonstrated during the Cold War period when she chose not to join the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a security pact that included Thailand and the Philippines among its members. The formation of this SE Asian counterpart of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was led by the United States, with the main purpose of containing communist expansion in the region.7 On the eve of its independence, Burma was said to be the leading SE Asian nation, based on its richness of resources. However, when the military—led by General Ne Win-took over in 1962, Burma chose to become "underdeveloped" as it implemented the "Burmese Way of Socialism," a state-planned economy. It began to oust foreign corporations, and forced all other businesses to be put under government control. The military junta nationalized all forms of production, including agriculture. Overall, about 15,000 enterprises were taken over by the government between 1963 and 1972, including the British-owned Imperial Chemical Industry. It was not until 1973 that private trade and industry were again allowed, and then only on a limited scale. From the junta’s viewpoint, private investments could lead to a kind of neo-colonialism. As a result, private sector firms were discouraged, and even the small number initially allowed decreased in number over time. This was clearly shown by the private sector share of gross output that fell from 72% to 58% in the fiscal year 1970/1971, a decrease of 14% in one year.8 Nonetheless, the private sector was still eleven times bigger than the size of the public sector and employed ten times the number of workers compared to the public sectors that were run by the government 4

“Burma.” In CIA's The World Factbook 2007. (Washington, D.C.: 2007). "Burmese" refers to all groups of people in Burma/Myanmar. In this paper both Burma and Myanmar are used interchangeably, with no political preference implied. 6 Encyclopedia Americana, 1999, s.v. “Burma.” 7 SEATO was dissolved in 1977. 8 David Steinberg, Burma’s Road Toward Development, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), p. 37. 5

5

AAS2008

Another important institution that had been nationalized in Burma/Myanmar was the banking system. The junta took over 10 foreign and 14 private domestic banks. From these banks they formed the Union of Burma Bank (UBB), which became the central bank and the only source of domestic credit in the country. 9 Burma’s nationalization policy further isolated her from the world’s economy. According to Burma's new ruling regime, one of the objectives of socialism was to create a socialist economy—one that rejected both capitalism and colonialism and promised an equitable distribution of wealth to benefit all citizens. However, instead of creating equality in their society, poverty became more rampant. 10 Within ten years after implementing its planned economy, Burma’s overall value of exports dropped by 100%, while its imports also dropped by 2.5% per year during the same period. This socialist country became the only one in the world in which the dollar value of its exports was lower than during the pre-World War II years. The situation was worsened by Burma’s isolationist policy, which had reduced its foreign borrowing. The ruling junta’s industrialization plan, with its heavy emphasis on import substitution, failed. Similarly, the rice exports dropped, thereby further lowering the foreign exchange rate.11 This was in contrast to the fact that before 1962, Burma had been the world’s leading rice exporter. One outcome of Burma’s state-planned economy was that scarcity of consumer goods created a greater demand for the illegal market. For example, in 1976 the World Bank reported that 60% of Burma’s raw materials were smuggled out of the country. 12 In 1979, smuggling was estimated to compose about 60% of the legal trade; and as of 1988, just before the bloody upheaval of the fledgling democratic process, smuggled goods were worth $13 billion per year, which was four times larger than Burma’s GDP and five times larger than its level of official trade. Smuggling thus has been an important source of income for Myanmar, and today an estimated 70% of the country’s economy is illegal. 13 Smugglers and the black marketeers gained huge profits, while the Burmese people sank deeper into poverty. In 1988 the World Bank estimated that about 40% of Burma’s GNP changed hands on the black market.14 The junta’s solution to their economic problem was simple; they simply declared demonetization. In November 1985, the government announced demonetization, taking the 100 Kyat, 50 Kyat and 20 Kyat notes out of circulation. This was not the first time the junta had taken such action. As one might expect, the country was thrown into chaos. The bottom line was that the ruling regime never admitted their mismanaging of the country’s economy through its policies of isolationism and rigid control over the country's economic development. Instead of taking steps to change those polices, it made things worse by the demonetization. While smuggling activities continued, ethnic insurgencies proliferated, which demonstrated widespread dissatisfaction with the ruling regime. These insurgencies also contributed to an increase in smuggling and trafficking activities—activities that helped provide the resources to sustain insurgent efforts. In fact, such activities of ethnic insurgents 9

Frederica Bunge, (ed.), Burma: A Country Study. (Washington DC: The American University, 1983), p. 149. Robert Taylor, The State in Burma, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), p. 295. 11 Steinberg, Burma’s Road Towards Development, p. 37. 12 Maung Maung Gyi, Burmese Political Values: The Roots of Authoritarinism, (New York: Praeger Pulishers, 1983), p. 231. 13 David Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanmar,(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000), p. 64. 14 Quoted in Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, (London: Zed Book, 1999), p. 98. 10

6

AAS2008

have been evident along the Burmese border ever since the country gained independence in 1948, and now their activities not only have become a direct threat to the ruling regime but also have helped to create the black market operating along the border, which undermines the economy of the country. 15 In 1971, General Ne Win decided to become a civilian president, but the military continued to be the dominant political force. For example, the government established a “secret police” known as Military Intelligence (MI). Any suspicious acts were to be reported to higher authorities and if found guilty the accused would be punished by torture. 16 In 1977, the Burmese government proposed that they would accept a greater volume of foreign aid, and they also suggested the possibility of government joint ventures with foreign firms, although the government still refused to allow foreign enterprises to invest directly in the government. Instead they only allowed cooperative enterprises--joint business ventures with local enterprises. Burma also guaranteed the right of foreign enterprises not to be nationalized until FY 1993. Slowly, Burma began to witness foreign investments flowing into the country. Small-scale private enterprises also began to emerge and grow. These enterprises helped to improve Burma’s economy. By the early 1980s, public and cooperative enterprises contributed 40% of Burma’s GDP.17 In August 1988 a peaceful pro-democracy demonstration demanding political and economic reforms took place, after word had leaked out that their country had been labeled as one of the least developed countries in the world by UN assessments, which was seen as a shocking and embarrassing downgrading of their country's status. The government reacted violently, and what started out with peaceful demonstrations became known as “the August Massacre.” Unofficial resources estimated that as many as 3,000 people died or "went missing," although many believed the exact number might be more. During the ensuing political turmoil, on August 19, 1988 Ne Win installed his own successor, Dr. Maung Maung, a civilian and an educated man who had received his law degree from Yale University in the US. 18 Nonetheless, after only one month, the military carried out another coup d’etat and overthrew Maung Maung, which ended any prospects for democracy and began another phase of military rule. The military coup leaders set up their own government on September 18th 1988, calling it the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The SLORC was led by General Saw Maung, who immediately proclaimed martial law. They also replaced the civil courts with military tribunals, and there were no legal or other institutional checks on military officers. 19 This encouraged corruption among the leaders of the regime. However, upon its establishment, the SLORC had promised that elections would be held soon, and a multi-party system would be allowed. A major turning point came later in March 1989, when SLORC declared an end to the socialist system and introduced its "open door" market economy, in an effort to catch up with its neighbors, economically. The government surrendered its monopoly on all goods, except those considered to be the most valuable assets of the country (which included teak, 15

See Zarina Othman, Human Security in Southeast Asia; A Case Study of Illicit Drug Trafficking as a Transnational Threat in Myanmar (Burma). Un published PhD Thesis (University of Denver, Co. 2002). 16 Zarina Othman. 2004. Human Rights in Myanmar. Jebat. 17 Bunge, Burma: A Country Study, p. 136. 18 Maung Maung. The 1988 Uprising in Burma. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). 19 “Myanmar Economic and Political Uncertainty: A Silent Coup in Yangon.” Strategic Comments. (January 1998), p. 2.

7

AAS2008

petroleum, natural gas, pearls and certain gems. 20 However, over time, because of human rights abuse and job scarcity many people left the country, becoming illegal immigrant workers in neighboring countries, particularly in Thailand and Malaysia. It was about this time, in 1989, that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi became popular. Suu Kyi was one of three children of General Aung San, a popular leader who was assassinated when Suu Kyi was a young child. As an adult, Suu Kyi married a British scholar and resided in England. In 1988 it happened that she had traveled to Burma to care for her ill mother. As events unfolded during the "August Massacre, " she felt obligated to support the Burmese fight for democracy. She gave her first public speech on August 26, 1988, and drew a huge crowd. After that, she traveled throughout the country, giving lectures and speeches about freedom and democracy, and helped found the National League for Democracy (NDL). Fearing her growing popularity, the the SLORC government put her under house arrest on July 20, 1989. To the regime, “The Lady,” as Suu Kyi was referred to by the SLORC, was a threat to their survival in power.21 Suu Kyi’s approach of non-violent protest against the regime, modeled after Mahatma Gandhi of India and Martin Luther King, Jr. of the United States, received world-wide attention. In 1991 she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. While being notoriously brutal, the SLORC at least kept their promise. Burmese national elections were held on May 27, 1990, The result of the election was stunning. Despite Suu Kyi’s house arrest—or perhaps because of it--the NLD won 392 out of the 485 seats in the People’s Assembly that were contested.22 However, the SLORC’s promise of free and fair elections proved to be an illusion, as they declared that the results of the election were null and void, and refused to hand over political power to the NLD. Many of the newly elected members of parliament (MP) were arrested and imprisoned. The cancellation of the national elections again attracted attention of the outside world. Myanmar has continued to witness more repressive oppression. In 1999 alone, it was estimated that more than 1 million crossed the border into Thailand. 23 Along the BurmeseThai border, Burmese refugees have been attacked and abused by the tatmadaw, the Burmese Military. The flow of refugees from Myanmar into Thailand and other ASEAN countries disturbs the social peace and contributes to depressed wages in the host countries. Refugees flee Myanmar for economic as well as political reasons, which makes Thailand a particularly desirable destination because it is a country with a far more successful economy than impoverished Myanmar. The international community, including Australia, Germany, India, Japan, the UK, and the US, have condemned Burma’s human rights violations in the massacre of people and then its refusal to honor its elections. The US suspended all bilateral and multilateral assistance. 24 The US and the European Union (EU) tightened sanctions, restricting trade, investment and travel in the country, in protest of the country’s human rights violations. Nonetheless, the junta has continued to rule, inhumanely oppressing its own people. In November 1997, the

20

Mya Maung, “Facts Versus Fiction: Socio-Political and Economic Development of Burma Under Military Management Since 1988.” The Pacific Review. 8, (1995), #4. p. 667. 21 Whitney Stewart. Aung San Suu Kyi: Fearless Voice of Burma. (Minneapolis: Lerner Publications Company, 1997); Barbara Victor. The Lady: Aung San Suu Kyi Nobel Laureate and Burma’s Prisoner. (Boston & London: Faber & Faber, 1998). 22 Christina Fink, Living Silence: Burma Under Military Rule, (London: Zed Books, 2001), p. 69. 23 PRS, Myanmar: Country’s Report, p. 7. 24 Mary Callahan, “Democracy in Burma: The Lessons of History.” 9, Analysis, (1998), #3, pp., 5-26.

8

AAS2008

military dissolved the SLORC and replaced it with the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), which has remained in power up to the present time. 25 In more recent times the SPDC has opened up the country to foreign investment and trade with other Asian countries, which has helped to develop its legal economy, yet the results benefit only certain groups of people. Burma’s overvalued currency deters foreign investment and hurts exports. Also, because of the overvalued currency, trade is often conducted on a barter basis. Although SPDC has now declared the cross-border trade to be legal, primarily with China and Thailand, one result has been that the Chinese army has stopped patrolling the border. Thus, all sorts of goods, are easily trafficked. 26 The black market, government and business corruption, organized criminal groups, and other illegal activities such as trafficking of illicit drugs, weapons, and human beings, have flourished. These activities pose a threat to the fragile young democracies such as Thailand, and thus threaten the stability of the whole SE Asian region. Like the SLORC, the SPDC continues to be condemned by the international community for abusing its citizens’ human rights and exercising extreme political repression; and accordingly, economic sanctions have been imposed by the US and the European Union (EU). Unfortunately, these economic sanctions have been used by the regime as an excuse for Myanmar’s poverty. In contrast, ASEAN countries have heavily invested in the country, a backlash reaction to the sanctions. Despite Myanmar’s poor economic infrastructure, direct foreign investment (FDI), especially from Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia, has increased. The most favored investments are in hotels and other tourism facilities.27 III. ASEAN and Myanmar A. Overview When ASEAN28 formed as a regional institution some more than three decades ago, resisting communism was the main objective. Yet, unlike SEATO, it was never a security pact. Three main objectives of ASEAN have been: to reduce intra- ASEAN tension; to reduce regional influence of external powers; and to promote socio-economic development of the member countries. The Bangkok Declaration that was signed by the members in 1967 clearly aimed for regional stability and security. It was not surprising, given the fact that the world was then still engaged in the Cold War, that ideological concerns caused communist and other non-democratic states to be clearly excluded from ASEAN. In 1976, the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) was signed by member states. TAC requires their member signatories to settle disputes peacefully and respect the sovereignty of member

25

The International Labor Organization (ILO) reported that Myanmar still forces workers into slave-like conditions to work on construction projects and to serve in the military. 25 Over 100,000 ethnic Karen have fled into Thailand, due to continued violence against them. They occupy the territory along the Burma-Thailand border. About 1 million workers and other ethnic refugees altogether have crossed the border into Thailand. 26 Phone interview with Dr. Ronald Renard, Chiangmai, Thailand, 10/23/00. 27

Medhi Krongkew, “Perils and Prospects of Myanmar’s Economic Reforms,” In John Randon, (ed.), Burma/Myanmar: Toward the 21st Century: Dynamics of Continuity and Change. (Thailand: Thai’s Studies Secion, 1997), p. 73. 28 ASEAN was established in 1967. Founders were Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines. 9

AAS2008

countries. Eventually TAC became an important "doctrine" for ASEAN, and remains so to the present day. 29 Since its formation, among ASEAN's major security challenges was the 1978 invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam, a communist state. The fear of communism has been a serious concern in regard to the stability and security of the region. Nevertheless, with the demise of communism in 1989, followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union two years later, the Cold War ended and opportunity opened for other states in the region to become ASEAN members. Vietnam was added in 1995, 30 and although it was still a communist country, its joining of ASEAN signaled that it was no longer perceived as a threat in the region. In the following year, Myanmar, a non-democratic country, attended ASEAN's Annual Ministerial Meeting. Although designated as an observer, Myanmar’s presence indicated that it might later become the next member of the ASEAN family. Myanmar next became a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and then applied to be a full member of ASEAN. After much discussion, Myanmar was accepted into membership in 1997. This move has been heavily criticized, especially by the United States and the European Union, because of Myanmar’s history of human rights abuse, its treatment of Aung San Suu Kyi, and its refusal to allow the popular pro-democratic forces within the country to share leadership. The ASEAN response to that criticism was that Myanmar’s problems were considered as "internal;" and thus, in accordance with its longstanding "noninterference policy," they should not interfere. ASEAN further argued that leaving Myanmar alone would be more dangerous. Calling its policy "constructive engagement," ASEAN’s acceptance of Myanmar was a way to push Myanmar towards democracy and to move Myanmar away from being too dependent on China—which was seen as a potential threat in the region. Meanwhile, for Myanmar, being an ASEAN member was like "a dream come true." ASEAN membership could at least be a means for its military regime, the SPDC, to gain more recognition at the international level. B. The Concepts of Non-Interference and Constructive Engagement in Foreign Affairs. To better understand the situation between ASEAN and Myanmar, since it has attracted the world’s attention, it is crucial to know something about the background of the non-interference concept as it has been viewed by ASEAN. According to Amitav Acharya, a prominent international relations scholar, the concept of non-interference is Western in origin. It is a corollary to the principle of sovereignty. It was therefore an attractive principle to postcolonial Third World countries, which were opposed to superpower interference in their internal affairs. In SE Asia, the doctrine was abused consistently at the height of the Cold War. The “external interference” referred to the Bangkok Declaration of 1967, which was a pledge by powers outside the SE Asian region, as well as by the SE Asian states themselves, to not interfere in the internal affairs of other states in the region. However, the question remained as to who determines exactly what constitutes the internal affairs of a given state. And to what extent should other states be allowed (or even expected) to interfere in order to save the lives of human beings who are being oppressed by their own state? These questions were not addressed in the 1971 Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and in both the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and 29 30

See TAC, ASEAN Secretariat Upon her independence in 1984, Brunei joined ASEAN.

10

AAS2008

Cooperation (TAC) in SE Asia of 1976. It was small wonder, therefore that “the doctrine lay at the heart of ASEAN regionalism” and that “the idea of a regional community was to be founded upon strict adherence to non-interference and respect for sovereignty.” 31 The four main dictates of the ASEAN doctrine of non-interference were the following: 1. To refrain from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including abuses of human rights; 2. To criticize the actions of states which are deemed to constitute a breach of the non-interference principle; 3. To deny recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize or overthrow the government of a neighboring state; 4. To provide political support and material assistance to member states in their actions against subversive activities.32 Yet, in reality, when states attempted to apply this doctrine to events that unfolded over time, they began to see just how difficult and complex it could be. However, the question remained as to who determines exactly what constitutes the internal affairs of a given state. And to what extent should other states be allowed or even expected to interfere in order to save the lives of human beings who are being oppressed by their own state? The most classic example was ASEAN’s refusal to condemn the genocide killings (estimated to be as many as 1.7 million) of the Cambodian people by Pol Pot and his regime, despite condemnation by most of the rest of the world. Another example is the one mentioned earlier: Communist Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1979 was soundly condemned and resisted for almost a decade, but Vietnam’s communist status was not an issue when it joined ASEAN in 1995. In still another example, many groups within ASEAN countries, including the media, have recently taken the Indonesian government to task over the rapes of Indonesian Chinese women during the May 1998 riots. This was an act of criticism that would have been unheard of even a year ago, because of people's widespread agreement with the ASEAN non-interference doctrine. We may recall that the governments in Kuala Lumpur and Manila had been gently persuaded by Jakarta to disallow the holding of NGO meetings on East Timor only two years before that.33 In recent years, especially since the Asian financial crisis hit the region in July 1997, several ASEAN leaders have been calling for a change, if not a departure, from the practice of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states—the policy that has been the guiding principle of the regional group since its founding in 1967. The call to change this long-observed principle is, as some have argued, legitimate and timely. They contend that ASEAN now has reached a level of political maturity, that the world has become increasingly interdependent, that there is an urgent need to help the newer members of ASEAN, and that certain kinds of "interfering" action should be considered not only acceptable but desirable— of benefit to all concerned. In November 1996, for instance, a prominent senior official from one of the older ASEAN member states called for a more vigorous role for ASEAN in the post-Cold War world. He argued that there was a need for change, from ASEAN’s longstanding hallowed 31

M. Rajaretnam, “Principles in Crisis: the Need for New Directions” In Kao Kim Hourn, Asean’s NonInterference Policy :Principles Under Pressure? London: ASEAN Academic Press, 2000, p. 44. 32 33

Ibid. Ibid.

11

AAS2008

principle of non-interference to one of “constructive intervention.” By 1997, ASEAN began to confront a number of difficult issues such as the pressures on ASEAN from the European Union and the United States over the issue of Myanmar, the regional financial crisis, the environmental haze problem, and the July 1997 events in Cambodia.34 In July 1997, another ASEAN Foreign Minister from mainland SE Asia proposed in Kuala Lumpur that ASEAN should reconsider its principle of non-interference and adopt a more open approach, to allow member states to comment on the domestic policies of other member states that have important regional effects and implications. He called for a “rethinking” of ASEAN and wanted the regional grouping to play a more proactive role in addressing the new challenges facing the region. The following year, those who had come to support the early calls for a change to ASEAN's approach to doing things were mostly the younger, dynamic and emerging leaders in ASEAN. Those calls for a rethinking of ASEAN did not go without challenge, however. Other members of ASEAN, including some of the older members, voiced their preference for ASEAN to maintain the status quo. In fact, at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in July 1998 in Manila, the subject of “flexible engagement” was raised at an informal dinner meeting. Little progress on the issue was made because some ASEAN members objected to it. However, a new term, “enhanced interaction,” appeared in the course of discussions. 35 In spite of all the new catchy terms, non-interference remained the official policy. In a similar vein, ASEAN "constructive engagement" refers to, “… policy which advocates the maintenance of an economic and diplomatic relationship with an authoritarian state, as opposed to imposing sanctions and embargoes on it. It has been described as promoting economic and political ties, while at the same time pressing for democracy, open markets and human rights.”36 To sum up, ASEAN constructive engagement can be interpreted as an alternative way to move a pariah state like Myanmar toward more accepted "universal" norms and values. C. Malaysia's Non-Interference Policy Like Myanmar, Malaysia was also once under a British rule. However, Malaysia did not gain her independence until almost one decade later. On the eve of her independence, Malaysia depended heavily on two major commodities, tin and rubber. Today, Malaysia has moved forward; her economy has been diversified and her political situation is among the most stable in the region. Being a small country, in terms of both size and population, Malaysia has been very careful in conducting her foreign affairs. During the reign of the first prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, anti-communist and pro-Western policies had comprised the main agenda. During the administration of the second prime minister, Tun Razak, efforts were made to neutralize relations with a communist China.37 The shifting paradigm from pro-Western to neutral foreign policy has since become Malaysia's approach towards many international issues. Razak did not live long enough to witness the emergence of a more liberal China. 34

Kao Kim Hourn, Asean’s Non-Interference Policy :Principles Under Pressure? , p. 9. Ibid., p. 10. 36 MN Oo, Constructive Engagement: A Critical Evaluation. Legal Issues on urma Journal, #7, (Dec. 2000), : 43-58? 37 Tun Razak Hussein, Malaysia second prime minister, visited Communist China in 1974. He was the first Asian leader to do so. 35

12

AAS2008

Razak was succeeded by Dato Hussein Onn shortly after Suharto’s Indonesia invaded East Timor in December 1975.38 While Malaysian foreign policy under Hussein Onn basically continued what his predecessor had started, during his term of office ASEAN member countries shifted their primary concern from economic co-operation to political and security measures. Exchanges of military and internal security intelligence increased. ASEAN governments began to present arguments to ignore their respective domestic human rights violations. For instance, the repression and corruption of Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines was never condemned by other ASEAN governments until it was quite clear that he was already on his way out of power. The so-called principle of non-interference was followed in ways that were inconsistent and disgraceful. Accordingly, along with the other ASEAN member states, Malaysia silently condoned Suharto’s annexation of and near genocide in East Timor.39 Due to health reasons, Hussein resigned in 1981 and was succeeded by Dr. Mahathir Mohamad as Malaysia's fourth prime minister. The Mahathir regime quite happily supported Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge and the Cambodian government-in-exile. It condoned General Rabuka’s coup against a duly elected government in Fiji, and even invited Rabuka to visit Malaysia. Instead of insisting on Malaysia’s principled stand on Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) for SE Asia, the Mahathir government helped justify an American military base in Singapore. At one time, Mahathir even suggested that Malaysian facilities could be used by US forces. Of course, this position is not surprising in light of the fact that Mahathir had already signed a so-called ‘military agreement’ with the Reagan administration while on a visit to Washington D.C. in 1984.40 The Malaysian government generally adopted a neutral, non-interventionist stance toward new crises abroad. In relation to Chechnya, the Malaysian government stated that this was an internal matter for Russia to handle. Official involvement with the civil war in Sri Lanka, problems in the Punjab, and human rights violations in East Timor were avoided on similar grounds. As for Kashmir, the Malaysian government did not want to risk displeasing either India or Pakistan by taking a partisan stance. Not only was the stifling of prodemocracy activism in Myanmar deemed an internal affair, but the military junta was welcomed into the ranks of ASEAN in 1997. Protesting in Kuala Lumpur against Myanmar’s admission into ASEAN landed some NGO activists in a police lock-up for two days.41 IV. Malaysia-Myanmar Relations: From Non-Interference to Constructive Engagement Since Malaysia established diplomatic relations with Myanmar in 1958, the relationship between the two countries was not particularly encouraging during this period due to the internal political turbulence in Myanmar. Moreover, the isolationist stance of the Myanmar military government, especially after the military coup in 1962, further distanced 38

Malaysia prime minister were Tunku Abdul Rahman; Tun Abdul Razak Hussein, Tun Hussein Onn, Tun Dr. Mahathir and currently, since 1983, is Dato’ Seri Abdullah A. Badawi. 39 Fan Yew Teng. 2003. “ The Peace Movement and Malaysian Foreign and Domestic Policy” In Meredith L. Weiss and Saliha Hassan (eds.) Social Movements in Malaysia From Moral Communities to NGOs. London and New York: Routledge Curzon, p. 183. 40 Fan Yew Teng. 2003. “ The Peace Movement and Malaysian Foreign and Domestic Policy” p. 185. 41 Ibid., p. 190.

13

AAS2008

them from Malaysia. The desire to admit Myanmar into an expanded ASEAN was to offer it an alternative to closer ties with China, and this was also the main motive that encouraged Malaysia and other ASEAN member states to individually forge closer relations with Myanmar. In August 1996, as an effort to strengthen ties with Myanmar, Malaysia invited then SLORC leader, Senior Gen. Than Shwe, for a state visit to Kuala Lumpur. 42 MalaysiaMyanmar relations become closer in July 1997 when Myanmar, with the strong support and recommendation from Malaysia's Dr. Mahathir as well as the leaders of Indonesia and Singapore, was inducted into ASEAN as a full member, despite dissent and pressure from the West, particularly the United States and the European Union. In his defense of Malaysia’s desire to bring Myanmar into ASEAN, Dr Mahathir said, “… if it (Myanmar) is outside (ASEAN), it is free to behave like a rogue or a pariah (state), while if it is inside, it would be subject to certain norms of behavior.”43 In another statement to rebuff US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who criticized the admission of both Myanmar and Laos44 to ASEAN, Dr Mahathir said: "In this region we believe in a Prosper-Thy-Neighbor Policy…. Prosperous neighbors tend to spill over their borders. It is for this.. reason we reject the Beggar-ThyNeighbour Policy.” 45 Since the inclusion of Myanmar in ASEAN, Malaysia, under Prime Minister Mahathir has adopted an approach called constructive engagement in its bilateral relations with Myanmar. The basis of this approach is to continuously engage Myanmar, particularly in the economic and political arenas, and to create ties with Myanmar rather than ignore or isolate the country. Politically, the constructive engagement approach adheres to the principle of non-interference in Myanmar’s domestic political affairs, leaving the military junta to take care of its own affairs. ASEAN believed that prolonged sanctions would worsen Myanmar’s situation and may lead Myanmar to become more isolated once again, and isolation might mean greater influence of China on the ruling regime. It seems that ASEAN and also Malaysia, had no choice. Either they let Myanmar be a "little brother" to China, or accept its joining ASEAN, regardless of what the situation in the country was. ASEAN believed that Burmese economic progress through trade and economic liberalization would eventually nurture freedom as well as political liberalization. Therefore, it is safe to say that while constructive engagement is aimed at to taming Myanmar and leading it toward democracy, the means is through economic cooperation or "constructive engagement." The UN has been critical of the Myanmar government, but unlike the US and EU, the UN has managed to place itself in a bridging role, through the UN Secretary General’s Envoy, Tan Sri Razali Ismail, a Malaysian citizen, whose role in negotiating with the Myanmar junta regime was crucial. It was indeed a bridging role in very unique political circumstances, acting as a go-between linking the military government on the one hand and Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD on the other. The UN negotiator, hailed by Aung San Suu Kyi as "a great friend of Myanamar," came from Malaysia, a country whose Prime Minister, Mahathir had always been held in high regard by the Burmese government. These then are the political ingredients that paved the way for the execution of the diplomatic coup, "crafting an Asian 42

“The Myanmar-Malaysia Entente Cordial” at: http://www.myanmar.gov.mm/Perspective/persp1996/996/mal.htm 43 “ASEAN Stands Firm on Burma’s Entry Despite Western pressure”, Agence France Presse, 1 May 1997. 44 Laos joint ASEAN in 1999. 45 “Mahathir Rejects Albright Approach” at: http://southmovement.alphalink.com.au/southnews/July25.htm

14

AAS2008

solution to a most intractable Asian problem." Razali was self- effacing in his hour of triumph. He attributed his success to the ASEAN policy of "constructive engagement" and the role played by the Malaysian Prime Minister, saying, "Most certainly, Dr. Mahathir has contributed to this happy event to-day…” For his part, Dr. Mahathir said he believed that it was simply a case of "common sense" prevailing. Later, the Prime Minister also downplayed his part while at the same time giving credit to the UN.46 In Myanmar, however, Dr. Mahathir’s role was never doubted. The Myanmar Times of August 2002 says, “Dr Mahathir, who is a trusted international friend of the Myanmar government, has been widely believed to have had a behind-the-scenes role in Mr Razali’s effort.” 47 Through the good offices of UN special ambassador from Malaysia, Aung Sang Suu Kyi was released from house arrest in 2002. Many also pointed out that the January 2001 visit of Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia played an important role in securing the release of Ang Sang Suu Kyi. At that juncture many speculated that the military junta had compromised with the opposition and Myanmar’s democratization process was moving, slowly but surely, forward. In spite of the international euphoria about the positive prospects in Myanmar as a result of Aung Sang Suu Kyi’s release, little enduring progress has been seen. Malaysia’s effort in engaging Myanmar through constructive engagement approach has been praised by the top leaders in Yangoon. For example, Gen. Khin Nyunt (who was made Prime Minister of Myanmar in 2003--only to be removed from the post in 2004 on corruption charges) said that: “To us in Myanmar, Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad is more than a leader of the dynamic nation of Malaysia…He is [also] a visionary statesman of the region and a staunch defender of the developing world.” 48 Myanmar leaders’ high regard for Dr. Mahathir had apparently, to a certain extent, helped Razali in carrying out his role as the UN mediator in the Myanmar issue. He, for example, had been allowed by the SPDC to travel freely to Myanmar whenever he wished to, a privilege not accorded to his predecessor, Alvaro De Soto. He had also been allowed to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi even when she was under house arrest. Nevertheless, despite the special privileges given to Razali in Myanmar, he has not been particularly successful so far in bringing the two main protagonists, namely the SPDC and Aung San Suu Kyi of the NLD, to the negotiating table; hence no one has been able to bring about democratization in Myanmar. Under the fifth prime minister of Malaysia, Abdullah Badawi, foreign affairs have been mostly conducted by the minister of foreign affairs, Hamid Albar—a change from the policy of his predecessor, Mahatahir. Such change of leadership in Malaysian politics has resulted in a changed Malaysia policy of constructive engagement toward Myanmar. A. The Economic Gains In analyzing Malaysia-Myanmar relations, we argued that economic changes followed the initiation of a constructive engagement policy. This approach supports business interests investing in Myanmar. As a result of this approach, interactions between Malaysia and Myanmar have intensified, and visits of high-level officials have become more frequent. In March 1998, for example, Dr Mahathir paid a two-day official visit to Yangoon. In January 46

Qasim Ahmad, 2003.“Sanctions versus “Constructive Engagement”, p.196 The Myanmar Times, August 26, 2002 In Qasim Ahmad, 2003.“Sanctions versus “Constructive Engagement”: Tackling the Myanmar Issue,”, p. 196 48 “Myanmar Junta Praises Malaysia’s Mahathir”, at: http://www.rebound88.net/02/aug/20.html 47

15

AAS2008

2001 and August 2002, respectively, Dr. Mahathir made subsequent visits to Myanmar. In October 2001, Gen Than Swe, accompanied Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt, came to Malaysia. During his stay in Kuala Lumpur, Gen. Than Shwe witnessed the signing of the Malaysian-Myanmar Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on tourism and information. He also invited Malaysian businessmen to invest in the fishing, manufacturing, petroleum and tourism sectors in Myanmar. During this visit also, Malaysian’s Foreign Minister then Syed Hamid Albar, made a press statement announcing Malaysia’s stance that Myanmar “should be allowed to introduce a democratic change at its own pace, free from international pressure’. 49 The increase in the numbers of high level visits apparently has had a positive impact, particularly on the business and economic ties between the two countries. In May 2000, for example, Padiberas Nasional Berhad of Malaysia signed a US$1 million barter trade deal with Myanmar’s state-owned Agricultural Produce Trading Company (MAPT), in which Padiberas agreed to supply MAPT with rice milling machinery, equipment and spare parts, and in exchange the Malaysian company would receive agricultural commodities, including rice and vegetables from MAPT. Malaysia multinational company, Petronas had promised to help develop the Yetagun gas field. Petronas, had already been involved in the Yetagun Gas Project since 1997 when it acquired a 30% interest in the project from Texaco Incorporated. Apart from its investment in the Yetagun Gas Project, has also been awarded four production sharing contracts (PSCs) by the Myanmar Government for the M-15, M-16, M-17 and M-18 offshore blocks. Under the PSCs, Petronas Carigali Myanmar II Inc, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd and the exploration and production arm of Petronas, would hold 100% equity in the four blocks and would be their operator as well. The four blocks are located in the Tanintharyi area offshore southern Myanmar and they range in sizes from 13,500 to 14,200 sq km. The award of the four blocks reflected the commitment of the Myanmar government to enhance its economic relations with Kuala Lumpur. It was reported that between 1988 and 2000, Malaysian firms had invested a total of US$587 million in 25 projects in Myanmar, making Malaysia the fourth largest foreign investor in Myanmar after Singapore, the United Kingdom and Thailand. Most of the Malaysian projects in Myanmar were in the real estate, hotel and tourism, manufacturing and oil and gas sectors.50 Apart from investment, bilateral trade between Malaysia and Myanmar has also increased. In 2001, Malaysia was Myanmar’s third largest ASEAN trading partner, with volume of bilateral trade estimated at US275 million. Malaysia’s exports to Myanmar during the period were US$ 197 million. In 2000, Malaysia and Myanmar had recorded a two way trade value of only US$200 million.51 In addition to trade and investment, Malaysia and Myanmar had also tried to venture into other areas of cooperation, including defence. In May 2001, for instance, during his visit to Kuala Lumpur, Myanmar Air Force Chief, Lt Gen Kyaw Than met with the Malaysian Chief of Defence Force, Gen. Tan Sri Zahidi Zainuddin and discussed about the possibility of expanding military ties, including holding joint military exercises. 52

49

Larry Jagan, “Burma and Malaysia Forge Closer Relations”, Bangkok Post, 3 October 2001. http://lamankm2a.tripod.com/cgi-bin/m/KM2A1/3558.html 51 Qasim Ahmad, “Sanctions Versus Constructive Engagement: Tackling the Myanmar Issue”, p.197; Larry Jagan, “Burma and Malaysia Forge Closer Relations”, Bangkok Post, 3 October 2001. 52 “Malaysia-Myanmar Look to Expand Ties”, Jane’s Weekly Review, 30 May 2001. 50

16

AAS2008

B. Failure of Constructive Engagement Despite its ability to nurture closer ties with Myanmar through the ‘constructive engagement’ approach and ‘non-interference’ policy, Malaysia is still until today unable to persuade the leadership in Yangon to bring about changes in the country. The current political situation in the country is still very much the same as it was before. There is no indication at this point in time that the military junta will ever allow general elections to be held in the near future, and that the treatment towards Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD still remains largely unchanged. Aung San Suu Kyi is still being held under house arrest and her NLD followers still subjected to harassment by the military forces. The strategic objective of discouraging Myanmar from forging closer ties with China also has thus far failed to produce a desirable result. In fact, the opposite appears to have occurred in that Myanmar is currently perhaps closer to China than it has ever been and that China’s economic, military and political leverage over Myanmar is much greater than the ASEAN member states can counter. As a result of this status quo in Myanmar, Malaysia’s approach of the constructive engagement has been criticized not only by the West, but also by certain members of ASEAN itself. Thailand for example through its former Foreign Minister, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, has since 1998 been trying to propose that the constructive engagement on Myanmar be replaced with the flexible engagement or enhanced interaction in ASEAN’s dealing with Myanmar. 53 Surin, inter-alia, rejected the notion that ASEAN members have no right to critize each other’s domestic politics if they impacted upon other countries. He further said that ASEAN member states”….should not ‘interfere’ in the internal affairs of any country but we will voice our opinion on any issues that impact our country’s ability and our people’s well-being”.54 Malaysia’s position on the constructive engagement received another blow when the country’s own Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim himself suggested the ‘constructive intervention’ policy as an alternative to the ‘constructive engagement’. What Anwar Ibrahim meant by ‘constructive intervention’ in the context of ASEAN ought to allow its member states to express concern, offer help and, indeed, act when a member is clearly in trouble. According to Anwar’s view, neighbouring (member) states naturally have greater interests in common than they do with outside power powers, as well as a crucial appreciation of neighbourhood realities and possibilities. Such facts will help ensure that any intervention by ASEAN stays constructive.55 During the sixth Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)56 for foreign minister in Kildare, Ireland, 2004, the thorny issue of Myanmar’s admission into ASEM was discussed. Syed Hamid Albar said members noted that positive developments had taken place in the country and had agreed to set aside further talks till the next foreign minister meeting in June 2004. The positive moves included steps being taken towards reconciliation between Myanmar’s 53

The Thai proposal of flexible engagement was a challenge to the cardinal principle of non-interference. The proposal, inter-alia, stated that though non-interference was still a valid principle, it should never be absolute and that “it must be subjected to reality tests and accordingly it must be flexible.” The bottom line of flexible engagement was that many matters should be expressed in an open, frank, and constructive manner. See Mann Bunyanunda, “ Burma, ASEAN and Human Rights: The Decade of Constructive Engagement, 1991-2001”, Stanford Journal of East Asian affairs, Vol. 2, Spring 2002, p.124. 54 Aung Zaw, “ASEAN-Burma Relations”, at: http://www.idea.int/documents/Burma/BURMA_beyond_2000_chap1.pdf. 55 “Activist ASEAN?” at: http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/97/0801/ed1.html 56 ASEM is an informal dialogue (forum) between and 25 European Union members and ASEAN+3 (China, South Korea and Japan). It was initiated in 1996. See http://www.aseminfoboard.org

17

AAS2008

military Government and opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), the release of political prisoners, an upcoming national convention on the country constitution, and the effective efforts of UN Special Envoy to Myanmar Razali Ismail. According to Syed Hamid, “There is more positivity about Myanmar now than there was before. But these should not be the conditions (to Myanmar’s entry into ASEM).” But ASEM’s 15 Europeans members want the entry into the grouping to be conditional on Myanmar improving its human rights record.57 But according to United Nations special envoy to Myanmar Razali Ismail, there is no indication yet on when the Myanmar Government is releasing detained Myanmar prodemocracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi and moving towards democratic reform. However, he urged the ASEAN countries to continue persuading Myanmar to expedite the release of Suu Kyi and the implementation of democratic reform. Briefing the Parliamentarian Caucus on Myanmar on the latest development in that country at Malaysia Parliament House, he said that: “ASEAN should continue persuading, perhaps cajoling the Government in Myanmar, besides holding talks with its Prime Minister, Khin Nyunt, on the release of Ang San Suu Kyi and its democratic reform. Some ASEAN countries are making efforts to talk to Myanmar Prime Minister…” in order to solve the problem that had arisen between the European Union (EU) and ASEAN over the issue of Myanmar, which is also a member of ASEAN. 58 Razali said there is no clear indication.” Razali described the negotiation situation with the Myanmar Government as “very difficult” of late. Meanwhile, the parliament caucus chairman, Datuk Mohamed Zaid Ibrahim, said Malaysia hoped to take positive steps in helping to solve issues in Myanmar. According to Zaid, the caucus approach will be multidimensional and multi-faceted. Zaid said the primary objective of the caucus was to help the process of democracy in Myanmar. He said a meeting of ASEAN parliamentarians had been scheduled for October 12, 2004 to get their support in expediting the change in Myanmar. 59 As in 2006, political development in Myanmar run counters to the slow process of democratization in Myanmar. Myanmar military junta has refused to receive Razali Ismail and UN Human Rights monitor for Myanmar, Sergio Pinheiro. In addition, the military junta has also cold shouldered its friends in ASEAN. The failure to accommodate Razali Ismail, Mr. Pinheiro and ASEAN has left a bitter taste in the international community. Malaysia was Myanmar’s strongest advocate in ASEAN is disappointed that the theory of constructive engagement has not yielded the better results. Now Myanmar’s military junta seems indifferent to ASEAN’s overture and criticism from the US and EU. Furthermore, Malaysia former Prime Minister, who was a staunch believer of noninterference policy and constructive engagement approach as well as the main architect of Myanmar’s admission into ASEAN, had made a strong statement a few month before retiring that: “…ASEAN could perhaps want to expel Myanmar from the organization if it continues

57

“OIC: Israel Must Stick to Road Mmap” New Straits Times, April 21, 2004. “No sign when Suu Kyi will be released” New Straits Times, July 7, 2004. 59 Ibid. 58

18

AAS2008

to defy international demands for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi”, and better human rights treatment in Myanmar.60 While Razali has resigned on January 2006 as the UN Secretary General Special Envoy for Myanmar after more than five years in the position. Nevertheless, he reiterated that all ASEAN countries should do their utmost to try to prevent making the problems of Myanmar an issue in the Security Council. The ASEAN meeting in December 2005 decided upon a special envoy to headed by Malaysian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Syed Hamid Albar. The visit was postponed several time and was carry out on 24 March 2006. The visit ended abruptly as the special envoy group was denied any meeting with all political formers and all attempt to cajole Yangon into accelerating the democratization process failed. Conclusions As presented and discussed in this article, despite all pressures and efforts done, Myanmar human rights abuse continues. Being a member of ASEAN has not changed Myanmar’s way of dealing with its citizens. Myanmar has consistently demanded that Malaysia and, for that matter other ASEAN members to abide by the non-interference policy, as if Myanmar had joined the organization on the condition that it cannot be subjected to criticism. While Malaysia and other ASEAN foreign investors in Myanmar gain profits, the Burmese people remain poor in every aspect of their life. Similarly, there is no sign of democracy. How could Malaysia expect Myanmar to move towards democracy if China, whose open door policy is now made it among world’s economic giant, yet remain as a communist and authoritarian country. Perhaps, time has now come for Malaysia and ASEAN to find an alternative to Malaysia’s non-interference policy and constructive engagement approach towards Myanmar in order to avoid Myanmar from becoming a liability to ASEAN. ___________________________________@ References Ahmad, Qasim. 2003.“Sanctions versus “Constructive Engagement” Tackling the Myanmar Issue”, “Activist ASEAN?” at: http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/97/0801/ed1.html “ASEAN rift over move to expel Rangoon”, at: http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/07/22/1058853075475.html?onelick=true “ASEAN Stands Firm on Burma’s Entry Despite Western Pressure”, Agence France Presse, 1 May 1997. Aung Zaw, “ASEAN - Burma Relations”, at: http://www.idea.int/documents/Burma/BURMA_beyond_2000_chap1.pdf. Bangkok Post (Sept.& Oct. 2007) Bunge, Frederica, ed. 1983. Burma: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: The American University. 60

“ASEAN rift over move to expel http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/07/22/1058853075475.html?onelick=true

Rangoon”,

at:

19

AAS2008

Callahan, Mary. “Democracy in Burma: The Lessons of History.” 9, Analysis, (1998), #3, pp., 5-26. CIA. 2007. “Burma.” The World Factbook 2007. Washington, D.C.: Phone interview with Larry Dohrs, 10/7/00. Encyclopedia Americana, 1999, s.v. “Burma.” Fink, Christina. 2001. Living Silence: Burma Under Military Rule. London: Zed Books. Gyi, Maung Maung. 1983. Burmese Political Values: The Social Political Roots of Authoritarianism. New York; Praeger Publishers. Hourn, Kao Kim. 2000. ASEAN’s Non-Interference Policy :Principles Under Pressure? London: ASEAN Academic Press. Jagan, Larry. “Burma and Malaysia Forge Closer Relations”, Bangkok Post, 3 October 2001. Krongkew, Medhi. “Perils and Prospect of Myanmar’s Economic Reforms.’ In John Brandon, ed. 1997. Burma/Myanmar Towards21st Century: Dynamic of Continuity and Change. Thailand: Thai’s Studies Section. “Mahathir Rejects Albright Approach” at: http://southmovement.alphalink.com.au/southnews/July25.htm Maung Maung. 1999. The 1988 Uprising in Burma. New Haven: Yale University Press. Maung, Mya. “Facts Versus Fiction: Socio-Political and Economic Development of Burma under Military Management since 1988. The Pacific Review. 8 (1995), # 44, Bunyanunda, Mann. “ Burma, ASEAN and Human Rights: The Decade of Constructive Engagement, 1991-2001”, Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol.2, Spring 2002. “Myanmar Economic and Political Uncertainty: A Silent Coup in Yangon.” Strategic Comments. (January 1998). “Myanmar Junta Praises Malaysia’s Mahathir”, at: http://www.rebound88.net/02/aug/20.html “Malaysia-Myanmar Look to Expand Ties”, Jane’s Weekly Review, 30 May 2001. The Myanmar Times, August 26, 2002 In Qasim Ahmad, 2003.“Sanctions versus

20

AAS2008

“Constructive Engagement”: Tackling the Myanmar Issue,” The Nation (September and October 2007). Oo, MN. Constructive Engagement: A Critical Evaluation. Legal Issues on urma Journal, #7, (Dec. 2000), : 43-58. “No Sign when Suu Kyi will be Released” New Straits Times, July 7, 2004. Othman, Zarina. 2002. Human Security in Southeast Asia: A Case Study of Illicit Drug Trafficking as a Transnational Threat in Myanmar (Burma). Unpublished PhD Thesis (Unversity of Denver, Co. ). ____________. 2004. Myanmar, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Security Implication. Akademika: The Journal of Social Sciences. 65, 27-43. ______________. 2004. Human Rights in Myanmar. Jebat. Phone interview with Dr. Ronald Renard, Chiangmai, Thailand, 10/23/00. PRS, Myanmar: Country’s Report, . Rajaretnam, M. “Principles in Crisis: the Need for New Directions” In Kao Kim Hourn, ASEAN’s Non-Interference Policy :Principles Under Pressure? London: ASEAN Academic Press, 2000. Steinerg, David. 1981. Burma Road Toward Development: Growth and Ideology Under Military Rule. Boulder: Westview Press. Taylor, Robert. 1987. The State in Burma. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Smith, Martin. 1999. Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 2nd ed. London: Zed Books. Steinberg, David I. 2000. Burma: The State of Myanmar: Washington DC: Georgetown University Press. Sterling Seagrave. 1995. Lords of the Rim: The Invisible of the Overseas Chinese. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons. “The Myanmar-Malaysia Entente Cordial” at: http://www.myanmar.gov.mm/Perspective/persp1996/9-96/mal.htm Stewart, Whitney. 1997. Aung San Suu Kyi: Fearless Voice of Burma. Minneapolis: Lerner Publications Company.

21

AAS2008

Teng, Fan Yew. 2003. “ The Peace Movement and Malaysian Foreign and Domestic Policy” In Meredith L. Weiss and Saliha Hassan (eds.) Social Movements in Malaysia from Moral Communities to NGOs. London and New York: Routledge Curzon. Victor, Barbara. 1998. The Lady: Aung San Suu Kyi, Nobel Laureate and Burma’s Prisoner. Boston & London: Faber & Faber. http://lamankm2a.tripod.com/cgi-bin/m/KM2A1/3558.html

22