From Olympic administration to Olympic governance

Sport in Society Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics

ISSN: 1743-0437 (Print) 1743-0445 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fcss20

From Olympic administration to Olympic governance Jean-Loup Chappelet To cite this article: Jean-Loup Chappelet (2016) From Olympic administration to Olympic governance, Sport in Society, 19:6, 739-751, DOI: 10.1080/17430437.2015.1108648 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17430437.2015.1108648

Published online: 19 Nov 2015.

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Date: 06 July 2016, At: 02:36

Sport in Society, 2016 VOL. 19, NO. 6, 739–751 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17430437.2015.1108648

From Olympic administration to Olympic governance Jean-Loup Chappelet Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration (IDHEAP), University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland

Downloaded by [Universitaire De Lausanne] at 02:36 06 July 2016

ABSTRACT

This articles describes three models which played a key role in the evolution of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and all the organizations which contribute to the staging of the Olympic Games and constitute the Olympic System, from its beginnings in 1894 to the present day. This evolution and the addition of many stakeholders has increased the complexity of the management of the Olympic System over the years from pure Olympic administration (when the IOC headquarters moved to Lausanne in 1915) to Olympic network governance which must take into consideration more than 24 types of stakeholders, including goverments and intergovernmental organizations.

When the International Olympic Committee (IOC) moved its headquarters and archives to Lausanne (Switzerland), on 15 April 1915 (Gilliéron 1993), it was a small organization with no employees. At the time, it was still being run by Pierre de Coubertin, the founder of the modern Olympic Games. Created in 1894, one of the IOC’s original tasks was to choose, every four years, the cities that would host the Games. In just over a century, it has grown into an important non-governmental organization (NGO) at the centre of a network of more or less closely connected bodies that contribute to the staging of the Olympics. The IOC now employs more than 500 people in Lausanne and, according to the fundamental principles laid down in the Olympic Charter, it does much more than attribute the Games. Of course, the huge expansion of the IOC – and of the bodies connected with it – has been accompanied by equally large changes in the way the organization is managed. In short, it has moved from a relatively traditional form of administration without staff, a sort of club of co-opted and unpaid natural persons, which it still is according to the IOC’s statutes, to a form of governance that has to take into account a diverse network of stakeholders who began exerting their influence during the last century and who, since the 1980s, have enjoyed substantial financial resources. (The present article follows Freeman’s (1984) definition of a stakeholder in an organization as ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives’.) These new stakeholders affect the management of the IOC, which must ensure its partners’ strategies and operations are aligned with its own.

CONTACT Jean-Loup Chappelet

[email protected]

© 2015 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group


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The present article traces the emergence of each of these stakeholders and analyses the managerial consequences for the system they form. It also examines the resulting repercussions for Olympic governance as a whole, taking into account the recent evolution of the Olympic phenomenon and the challenges it faces today. The history of Olympic administration can be divided into three periods on the basis of stakeholder assertiveness. The first three sections of this article describe these three periods, from the development of the ‘classic’ Olympic System’s five main stakeholders (central core) to the construction of the ‘regulated’ Olympic System at the end of the twentieth century and the emergence of the ‘total’ Olympic System, which includes ever more stakeholders, at the beginning of the twenty-first century. A fourth section discusses the consequences of the increasing complexity of the Olympic System in terms of its management and governance. The conclusion summarizes these findings and compares the traditional notion of Olympic Movement with the twenty-first-century Olympic System.

The classic Olympic System Staging the Olympic Games involves five main stakeholders: the IOC, (local) Organizing Committees for the Olympic Games (OCOGs), National Olympic Committees (NOCs), International Sport Federations (IFs) and National Sport Federations (NFs). These five parties (like the five interlinked rings invented by Coubertin but completely unrelated to the five stakeholders) vary greatly in size and importance depending on the sport, the country and the era. The following paragraphs provide a brief overview of how they evolved during the previous century. The growth of the Olympic Games has gradually enabled the IOC to become a very powerful organization, but it was not until the 1980s, after a period of boycotts (1972–1984) and under the presidency of Juan Antonio Samaranch (Chappelet 2014), that the IOC rose to the head of what it calls the ‘Olympic Movement’. Hence, the IOC is now the dominant body in a movement that Fundamental Principle 3 of the 2014 Olympic Charter defines as ‘the concerted, organised, universal and permanent action, carried out under the supreme authority of the IOC, of all individuals and entities who are inspired by the values of Olympism’. In 1999, following a major corruption scandal involving some of its members (Wenn, Barney, and Martyn 2011), the IOC was forced to make a number of structural reforms (MacAloon 2011), including the introduction of members proposed by three of its main stakeholders (up to 15 members for each stakeholder): the IFs, the NOCs and active athletes (who are competing/ have competed in current or most recent Olympic Games and who are elected by their peers). Once co-opted into the IOC, these members, just like the 70 (maximum) individually co-opted members, undertake to represent the interests of the IOC, rather than those of their original body (Olympic Charter 2014, article 16.1.3 and 16.1.4), even if this is difficult to check. The IOC’s power is also financial, as it has attracted substantial revenues over recent Olympiads (US$ 5 billion for 2009–2012 – IOC 2014b). At the end of 2014, the IOC unanimously adopted its ‘Agenda 2020’, which lays down the 40 (20 + 20) strategic objectives of the committee’s new president, Thomas Bach, elected the previous year (IOC 2014a). OCOGs have existed under a variety of appellations from the very first edition of the modern Olympic Games, in 1896. Since then, the Games have taken place every four years, except in 1916, 1940 and 1944 because of the two world wars. OCOGs were all powerful until the 1970s, when the IOC began to receive a proportion of the broadcasting rights for


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the Games, thereby gaining a degree of autonomy. However, it was not until 1992 that the IOC took full control over broadcasting and sponsoring rights and began distributing a proportion of these rights to the OCOGs (US$ 1070 million for London 2012 – IOC 2014b). Following the significant profits made by the 1984 Los Angeles Games, organized by a ‘private OCOG’ in the form of a limited company with no public contribution or guarantees, the OCOG for the 1996 Atlanta Games, also in the United States, adopted a similar model and restricted local, regional and federal government involvement in organizing the Games. But all the Games held since the 1970s, even Atlanta 1996, have involved ever-greater contributions, both financial and logistic, from the public authorities. As a result, since the early 2000s, OCOGs have often had to work alongside other bodies created to look after certain strategic domains (transport, security, new sport facilities). In 2007, former Olympic cities gathered in Lausanne to launch the World Union of Olympic Cities (UMVO) with the aim of enabling host cities to share the expertise and experience accumulated by their OCOGs and communities, and thereby reduce the cost of staging future editions of the Games. This would also allow former host cities to continue benefiting from their Olympic legacy. By 2015, the organization had 30 members and was recognized by the IOC. Nevertheless, the number of cities interested in bidding for the Games fell massively at the beginning of the twenty-first century (see the article by John MacAloon in this special issue), greatly restricting the IOC’s choices, particularly for the Winter Olympics (three candidates for 2018, two candidates for 2022) and the Youth Olympic Games, which were created in 2007 (one candidate for 2016 and two candidates for 2020). NOCs are responsible for selecting and managing the Olympic team that will represent their country or their territory (which may not be recognized by the UN). NOCs also represent the IOC and promote Olympism in their country. The first NOCs were set up in countries such as Germany (1895), Austria (1906), Belgium (1906) and Switzerland (1912) in order to form national teams and avoid participation in the Games by private individuals, as occurred at the first Olympics, held in 1894, 1900 and 1904. From the earliest days of the Olympic Movement, Coubertin recognized the NOCs (and therefore the right to take part in the Games) from non-independent territories, such as Bohemia (which is now part of the Czech Republic). As the Olympics grew, NOCs were set up all across the globe, from Canada (1904) to China (1910), from Egypt (1910) to New Zealand (1911) and from Japan (1911) to Brazil (1914). Decolonization led to an explosion in the number of NOCs during and after the 1960s, increasing the number of NOCs taking part in the Games from 121 at Munich 1972 to 140 at Los Angeles 1984 (despite the absence of 15 countries from the Soviet bloc) and 204 at London 2012. Having an NOC is one of the first signs a new territory gives of its desire to be accepted on the international stage. Kosovo and South Sudan are the latest NOCs to be recognized by the IOC. In 1979, the NOCs created the Association of National Olympic Committees (ANOC). At first, the IOC viewed the ANOC with displeasure, as it saw itself as the representative of the NOCS, even if, as noted above, the IOC has only half as many members as there are NOCs and IOC members are supposed to represent the interests of the IOC, not those of their home NOC. In addition, the ANOC was founded on the principle of ‘one country/NOC = one vote’, which is not part of the IOC’s tradition. The ANOC (and its continental branches) have grown in importance since 2001, when it began to take control over the redistribution of the NOCs’ share of the rights to the Games through an organization called Olympic Solidarity. This share has grown steadily since the 1970s, reaching US$ 735 million for the period 2009–2012 (IOC 2014b).


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IFs are IOC-recognized organizations that supervise the sports competitions included in the Games and which, outside the Olympic fortnight, manage their sport (and its different ‘disciplines’) across the world (lay down rules, co-organize international competitions, distribute any commercial revenues, etc.) Three of these IFs (rowing, gymnastics and ice skating) existed before the creation of the IOC. Most were set up at the beginning of the twentieth century under the impetus of the Olympic Games (swimming, athletics, skiing, canoeing, etc.) or to organize world championships (football, badminton, etc.). Others were formed at the end of the twentieth century so they could be included in the Olympic Games (taekwondo, triathlon, curling, karate, etc.). Some IFs control several ‘disciplines’. For example, the IF for swimming, now known as aquatics, controls swimming, diving, water polo, synchronized swimming and marathon swimming, all of which are Olympic disciplines. As early as 1921, the IFs felt the need to present a united front in their dealings with the IOC. As a result, during an Olympic Congress in Lausanne they created the ‘Permanent Bureau of International Federations’ and elected the French cyclist, boxer and journalist Paul Rousseau as its first president. Rousseau and his colleagues quickly set themselves up in competition with Coubertin (Grosset and Attali 2009). In 1967, the IFs created the General Assembly (later Association) of International Sport Federations (AGIFS) in Lausanne. Switzerland’s Thomas Keller, the head of the rowing IF, was elected president, while France’s Roger Coulon, president of the wrestling IF, was appointed General Secretary. Keller played an important role during the Olympic boycotts of 1972–1984 and moved the AGIFS’s head office to Monaco. But he never saw eye to eye with the then IOC president, Juan Antonio Samaranch (1980–2001), who moved to create two new associations of IFs, one for Summer Olympic sports (ASOIF) and one for Winter Olympic sports (AIOWF), which he then gave the right to distribute Olympic revenues to the IFs (around US$ 520 million for the 26 Summer Olympic IFs at London 2012 and US$ 209 million for the 7 Winter Olympic IFs at Vancouver 2010) (IOC 2014b), thereby undermining the AGIFS’s power. Thomas Keller died in 1989 at the early age of 64. In 2003, under the instigation of Hein Verbruggen, the president of the cycling IF, the AGIFS changed its name to SportAccord and moved back to Lausanne. Verbruggen wanted to turn it into an organization to serve its members, whether or not they were Olympic IFs (with their sport on the Olympic programme), most notably through a SportAccord annual convention and by organizing multisport competitions such as the Combat Games, Mind Games and Beach Games (especially for non-Olympic sports). The IOC supported these projects during Jacques Rogge’s presidency, thanks to Rogge’s friendship with Verbruggen. However, the IOC’s new president, Thomas Bach, elected in 2013, did not get along with the new president of SportAccord, Marius Vizer, the head of the judo IF, who was elected the same year as Bach. A clash was almost inevitable, as one of Vizer’s goals was to create a ‘united world championships’ that could have competed with the Olympics. In April 2015, Vizer launched a stern attack on the IOC and its Agenda 2020, expressing his views in such a way that many of SportAccord’s 116 members felt the need to suspend or withdraw their SportAccord membership. In addition, the IOC refused to even discuss the 20 reforms Vizer had proposed, such as increasing the IFs share of Games revenues to 25%, paying prize money to Olympians, creating a retirement fund for athletes and transferring half of the ownership of the Olympic TV channel (Olympic Channel) to the IFs (Vizer 2015). As a result, Vizer resigned just a month after his reelection as president. SportAccord now

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IOC

NOCs

OCOGs

IFs

NFs


Olympians

Figure 1. The classic Olympic System.

will concentrate on its annual convention and be mostly replaced by ASOIF and AIOWF for its other duties. NFs are the last of the five main stakeholders in the classic Olympic System. The NFs’ responsibilities include preparing Olympians (athletes who compete at the Olympics) and proposing athletes to their NOC, which formally selects the team that will represent their country. To be selected, athletes must attain the minimum standard laid down for the IF in their sport; however, in order to guarantee the Universality of the Games, each NOC can send one man and one woman in athletics and swimming who has not attained the minimum standard. Some NFs are recognized by their IF but not by their NOC, and vice versa, but a NF must be recognized by both bodies if it is to send athletes to the Games. In 1995, the IOC oversaw the creation of the World Olympians Association, divided into national chapters, but this association has never truly represented Olympians within the Olympic System because, since 2000, active athletes have been elected to the IOC by their peers in the Olympic village. Other associations of athletes (FIFPRO, EU Athletes, etc.) have not been integrated into the Olympic System. Figure 1 summarizes the system formed by the five stakeholders described above (the rings), which are all connected by functional or financial links (the lines connecting the rings) in return for recognition/designation by the IOC (Chappelet 1991). The only weak link is between NFs and OCOGs, as participation in the Games is governed by the NOCs in cooperation with the IFs. The IOC’s administration currently works with several OCOGs at a time (4–6 depending on the year), more than 200 NOCs, 35 IFs of Olympic sports and around 30 recognized IFs (a sort of antechamber to the Games). The IOC accepts up to 10,500 Olympians at the Summer Games and 2900 Olympians at the Winter Games (plus their entourage). Table 1 shows the sums the IOC distributed to the OCOGs, NOCs and IFs following each edition of the Games since 2002.

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Table 1. Sums distributed by the IOC from 2002 to 2012 (US$ million). Edition of the games summer/winter Athens 2004 Beijing 2008 London 2012 Salt Lake City 2002 Turin 2006 Vancouver 2010

Sums distributed to OCOGs 965 1250 1070 552 561 572

Sums distributed to NOCs 234 301 520 87 136 215

Sums distributed to summer/winter IFs 257 297 520 92 128 209

Source: IOC 2014b.


The regulated Olympic System In the 1970s, the classic Olympic System saw the arrival of six new stakeholders who began to take an increasing interest in the Olympics because of the preeminence acquired by the Games, especially due to the Cold War. These stakeholders were governments, national and international sponsors, professional sports leagues and two specialist organizations. As described below, they all contributed to the worldwide regulation of the system, most notably by introducing checks and balances. During the 1970s, governments began to fully realize the political importance of the Olympic System, which had, until then, been administered by private, non-profit associations. Numerous countries, including Switzerland (1972), France (1975), the United States (1978) and Japan (1961), introduced legal frameworks that gave their NOCs an official role. Most NOCs are subsidized by their governments or by state lotteries. If the Olympics are held in their country, the local, regional (host communities) and national authorities are increasingly involved in staging the Games, for example, in the construction of sports facilities, ensuring security, organizing transport and even, in the case of national governments, through authorizing visa-free admission to the country (as required by the Olympic Charter). When the sports movement failed to control the problem of doping, governments from Europe (through the Council of Europe) and around the world got involved, leading to the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) (see below), which is a mixed organization with members from governments and the classic Olympic System. In the 1980s, commercial sponsors began to provide substantial amounts of finance to national (OCOG, NOC, NF) and international (IOC, IF) sports organizations. OCOGs, in particular, set up sophisticated marketing programs. It was this type of programme (and television revenues) that enabled the Los Angeles 1984 OCOG to become one of the first OCOGs to make a significant profit. NOCs, NFs and athletes also began to attract sponsorship from commercial companies, although this sometimes created problems of exclusivity, especially between OCOGs and NOCs. For example, the Los Angeles 1984 Games were sponsored by Fuji, while the United States Olympic Committee, and therefore the national team, were sponsored by Kodak, one of Fuji’s competitors – a situation the public targeted by these campaigns found hard to understand. In order to avoid such problems in the future, the IOC created TOP (The Olympic Programme, then The Olympic Partners), which gives multinational companies, such as Kodak or Fuji, exclusive sponsoring rights for their product category for four years or more, and covers the IOC, all NOCs, the Winter Olympics and the succeeding Summer Olympics. Revenues from this programme (which reached US$ 1 billion for the period 2009–2012) are shared with the OCOGs, NOCs and, finally, the IFs. The IOC allows the OCOGs to manage their own ‘domestic sponsoring’


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programs, involving companies that can only advertise their association with the Games in the host country (unless they have also signed contracts with the NOCs and NFs of other countries, who retain their national sponsoring rights). Today, this domestic programme is the main source of revenue for OCOGs (alongside ticket sales and the IOC’s contribution). Domestic sponsoring raised US$ 1158 million for London 2012 (Chappelet 2013). The 1990s saw professional athletes begin to play a role in the classic Olympic System. Up until then, professional sports (e.g. tennis, golf, basketball, ice hockey, etc.) had been excluded from the Games under the credo of amateurism that was gradually being abandoned at this time. This change coincided with the increasing professionalization and commercialization of sport. At first, the IOC and the IFs allowed a few professionals to compete in the Olympics (e.g. football, tennis and figure skating in 1984). Then, in agreement with the National Basketball Association (NBA) and its teams (franchises), which pay the players’ salaries, a team of professional American basketball players (dubbed the Dream Team) was allowed to take part in the 1992 Barcelona Olympics. Similarly, in 1998, American (and other nationalities) ice hockey players from the National Hockey League (NHL) were allowed to compete at the Nagano Olympics. The NHL even interrupted its season during the Games. Baseball is the only IF that has not managed to persuade its professional players (and their league – MLB) to take part in the Olympics. Baseball was added to the Olympic programme in 1992, and then removed in 2012 (to be reinstated in 2020). Today, the participation of professional athletes is supervised by each sport’s IF in agreement with the corresponding association of professional athletes, if there is one (ATP – Association of Tennis Professionals, PGA – Professional Golfers Association, NHL, etc.) One of the IOC’s Agenda 2020 commitments is to ‘forge relations with professional leagues’ (recommendation 8). In 1984, the IOC set up, under the aegis of the Swiss legal system, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in Lausanne. The CAS’s role is to settle by arbitration sporting disputes between stakeholders, that is, without going through national civil courts, considered to be slow, expensive and to have little understanding of sport. Thirty years on, it can be said that the CAS has helped clarify legal aspects of the Olympic System, most notably by suggesting the progressive removal of sporting rules that are incompatible with athletes’ fundamental rights (right to be heard, right of appeal, etc.). Problems remain with respect to the restricted choice of arbitrators (in a closed list) and possible contradictions between decisions made by the CAS and those made by civil courts or other courts of arbitration. In addition, the Olympic System’s commercial partners rarely call upon the CAS. In 1999, in Lausanne, the IOC helped set up the WADA in order to tackle the problem of doping in sport, which had become much more widespread since the 1960s, both at the Olympic Games and elsewhere. WADA, which now has a budget of around US$ 27 million, was a new type of entity, as it is a joint organization whose Foundation Board (supreme decision-making body) is composed equally of representatives from governments and the sports movement (represented by the IOC, IFs and NOCs). WADA set up its head office in Montreal (Canada) as a way of distancing itself from the Olympic System, which has been overwhelmingly based in Switzerland, mostly in Lausanne, since 1990 (more than 50 IFs as well as the IOC). Governments (under a UNESCO convention signed in 2005) and the sports movement contribute equally to WADA’s budget. Over the years, WADA has flexed its muscles (to the displeasure of the IFs) by examining IFs’ and NOCs’ compliance with the World Anti-Doping Code, a unified document that replaced the dozens of anti-doping rules drawn up by each sport and by the Olympics. The World Code recognizes the CAS as

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CAS


WADA

Governments

IOC

International sponsors

NOCs

Host communities

OCOGs

IFs

National sponsors

Olympians

NFs

Pro

leagues

Figure 2. The regulated Olympic System.

the highest authority for cases of doping dealt with by WADA. The relatively small budget allocated to WADA compared with the size of its mission and the inadequacy of tests for detecting cases of doping are problems that will have to be resolved if WADA is not to become an alibi for the Olympic System with respect to doping. Figure 2 shows the system formed by the eleven stakeholders described above (encompassing the classic Olympic System) at the end of the twentieth century. All these stakeholders are interconnected by functional or financial links (Chappelet and Kübler 2008). The IOC remains at the heart of the system, but its decisions, like those of the IFs and NOCs, can be (and have been) challenged by WADA or the CAS (Chappelet 2010). The IOC’s administration must deal with all of these stakeholders, some of which include IOC members on their boards (potential conflicts of interest).

The total Olympic System At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the importance of many other stakeholders started to increase. SportAccord (formerly AGIFS), ASOIT, AIOWF and the ANOC (and its continental associations, which control continental Games such as the Asian Games, Pan-American Games and European Games) have already been mentioned. The United Nations and its constituent organizations, especially UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), have developed closer links with the Olympic System, as is shown by the international convention against doping UNESCO member states signed in 2005 and the granting of observer status to the IOC by the United Nations General Assembly in 2009. Nevertheless, the IOC failed to persuade UNESCO to include the autonomy of sports organizations in the 2015 revised version of its International Charter of Physical Education and Sport, originally drawn up in 1978 when UNESCO was more of a

Sport in Society

UN UNESCO EU, EC

ANOC


Continental associations

Governments

Regional Games

NOCs

Media

National sponsors

Equipment suppliers

Entourage

Swiss or other courts

CAS

WADA

IOC

OCOG OCOGs

Host communities

NFs

International sponsors

ASOIF, AIOWF,

IFs

Competition organisers

Pro

Olympians

leagues

Clubs

Parents

Athletes

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sportspeople

SportAccord

Fans

NGOs opinion

Figure 3. The total Olympic System.

competitor to the IOC than a partner (UNESCO 2015). During his term as IOC president, Jacques Rogge oversaw the strengthening of relations with the European Union (through regular meetings with the European Commissioner for Sport) and the Council of Europe (amongst other things, for the fight against match fixing – Chappelet 2015a). Many other categories of stakeholder have also become increasingly important in the current Olympic System. They include athletes, their entourages (the importance of which was recognized in 2009 when the IOC set up an Entourage Commission), equipment suppliers (indirect sponsors), organizers of sports competitions of all sorts and of regional multisport games (e.g. Commonwealth Games, Mediterranean Games, games for the deaf), fans, amateur sportspeople (‘sport for all’) and parents (who encourage children to do sport), the media (non-rights holders, otherwise they would be included with national sponsors because they buy broadcasting rights for one – or several – national territory), NGOs and public opinion, which must increasingly be taken into account (e.g. Transparency International, Amnesty). Stakeholders in the system can call upon courts and tribunals in Switzerland and other countries as a last recourse (most notably, the Swiss Federal Court, if the CAS does not follow correct procedures). Figure 3 provides an overview of the system formed by these 24 stakeholders at the beginning of the twenty-first century (encompassing the regulated Olympic System). They are all connected by functional or financial links (figure first outlined in Ferrand, Chappelet, and Seguin 2012).

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Table 2. The three interlocked Olympic systems. Period System Main stakeholders Total number of stakeholders Total number of relations Managerial doctrine

1894–1910 Foundation of the Olympic Movement IOC

1910–1985 Classic Olympic System OCOG-IOC

1985–2010 Regulated Olympic System IOC-IF-NOCgovernments

2010–today Total Olympic System

1

5

11

IOC-ANOCgovernments- AMAsponsors-media 24

0

7

24

65

Administration

Governance


Managerial consequences The first observation that can be drawn from the preceding description is that the IOC is far from being the only organization to play a role in the total Olympic System at the beginning of the twenty-first century. This is in marked contrast to the situation at the time the IOC set up its headquarters in Lausanne a century ago (1915), when the other stakeholders barely existed. As in every system, the relations (shown by lines) between the parties (shown by rings) are capital, as they lead to the formation of a system that is truly greater than the sum of its parts. It is unrealistic to claim, as the IFs sometimes do about the NOCs, and vice versa, that any one party could organize the Olympics without the others. Every stakeholder plays an essential role and must be administered, but no party can be governed without the others, even from a financial point of view (the IOC redistributes a large proportion of its revenues, but it would not receive these revenues if the OCOGs, NOCs and IFs, in particular, did not work with the IOC to stage the Games). Table 2 shows how the three systems described above are interlocked. Secondly, the Olympic System has become much more complex to manage compared with the days when it involved administering a central body with a small number of important stakeholders. Today, it has evolved into a complex network of stakeholders that requires a more global form of governance capable of taking into account each stakeholder’s own interests and the relations between stakeholders, including national and supranational governments, which had until recently been kept at a distance. The IOC under Thomas Bach seems to have recognized this, declaring that politics and sport have to work hand in hand (while respecting the autonomy of sports organizations and the laws of sovereign states). This was already the theme of Bach’s electoral campaign and of his speech to the 2009 Olympic Congress, entitled ‘Unity in diversity’. In this speech, he recognized the variety of the parties working together with a single objective – the regular staging of the Olympic Games, which generate substantial revenues for the entire system while promoting ‘Olympic values’. Recommendation 13 of Agenda 2020 – ‘Maximise synergies with Olympic Movement stakeholders’ – reprises this theme, although in different language. (I will come back to the difference between system and movement.) This case is interesting from a theoretical point of view because it involves the arrival of governments in a field that has traditionally been managed by private organizations, whereas governance usually involves the arrival of the private sector (via privatization) in fields traditionally managed by public bodies and governments.


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Thirdly, from a practical point of view, it would be better if the Olympic Charter more clearly defined the relations between the system’s essential stakeholders. Although the charter provides detailed descriptions of Olympic designations and protocol, it does not even mention the IOC’s financial contributions to OCOGs and recognized NOCs and IFs, or, in fact, the criteria for recognizing IFs. At the time when the IOC relied on the OCOGs for its revenues, it was understandable that it would not want to be too categorical on this volume. But, today, providing financial support to its partners and the redistribution of revenues are essential goals in the IOC’s 2009–2012 strategic plan (Chappelet 2011) and Agenda 2020 (according to which, 90% of the IOC’s revenues are redistributed to sport and athletes, IOC 2014a, 2). Fourthly, a consequence of the emergence of these systems is that one stakeholder’s reputation affects all the other stakeholders and sport as a whole. Hence, the 1998 Tour de France doping scandal (Festina affair) and improper behaviour associated with the Salt Lake City 2002 bid (and other bids) led to the creation of WADA and reforms to the structure of the IOC in 1999. Corruption scandals at FIFA (IF for football) (2010–2015), the FIVB (IF for volleyball) (2004–2008) and WTF (IF for taekwondo) (2003–2007) resulted in the resignation of their presidents, all three members of the IOC. The IOC demands ‘responsible autonomy’ for sports organizations in exchange for their ‘good governance’ (Chappelet 2015b). This means ensuring Olympic stakeholders’ compliance with good governance, as has been explicitly required by the Olympic Charter (Fundamental principle 5) since 2011. In fact, the IOC has now set up a department within its administration to check this (Agenda 2020, recommendation 31). It also means that the IOC must set a good example in terms of transparency, sustainability and human rights, etc., as is noted by several of Agenda 2020’s recommendations. Finally, the Olympic System is clearly centred round the Olympic Games, which are the pinnacle of elite sport, including professional sport. Many people have realized that this association with elite athletes has cut off the Olympic System from the Movement, and left out the vast majority of sportspeople who will never be able to rival with the exploits of Olympians. Most importantly, young people appear to be increasingly disinterested in the Olympic Games and competitive sport. Television audiences are aging and are not being replaced by those watching via the Internet. This poses a major threat to the Olympic business model because, eventually, sponsors will become reluctant to spend large proportions of their advertising budgets on the Olympics, which will lead to a drop in television rights, etc. Of course, the importance of Olympic values in the philosophy of sport known as Olympism should not be forgotten. But this is an idea that many people find difficult to understand, especially young people and those who feel that Olympic sport is all about winning, not taking part, as Coubertin claimed a century ago, and that the (educational) movement has been replaced by a (functional and financial) system. Concrete proof is needed that the Olympic System has a place for all active sportspeople, from the grassroots to the elite; it must become more inclusive. The Olympic and Paralympic Games (already linked) will remain the summit of the sporting calendar, but other multisport games could provide a four-year calendar for athletes who may never reach the Olympics but who may be interested in taking part in other events, whether at the grassroots level, through events such as the ‘Olympic Day Run’ (NOC organized sport for all race held since 1983) or at higher levels, through events such as the IOC’s Youth Olympic Games (for under 18s, or U18), the School Games (U14), the Student Games or Universiades (U23–25), or even the Masters

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Games (for older athletes), which have existed for many years and which are controlled by organizations other than the IOC. From this point of view, the Youth Olympic Games should have a bright future, especially for underlining the educational image of the system. The following calendar for each Olympiad could be adopted as of 2022. Year n: Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games (February–March) and School Games (July–August); Year n + 1: Winter Universiades (February–March) and Summer Youth Games (July–August); Year n + 2: Winter Masters Games (February–March) and Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games (July–August); Year n + 3: Winter Youth Games (February–March) and Summer Universiades (July–August), etc. The idea of moving the Youth Games from the year between the Winter and Summer Olympic Games (as suggested above) has already been accepted by the IOC (Agenda 2020 recommendation 25), as has cooperation with the Masters Games.

Conclusion Staging the Olympic Games every 4 years involves 24 types of stakeholder, which form a complex network centred round 5 main bodies (IOC, OCOGs, NOCs, IFs and NFs/ Olympians) that have evolved significantly over the past century. Managing the Olympic System is no longer a question of each stakeholder administrating its affairs, but of a more global governance of the network formed by these parties, taking into account their numerous interrelations. The IOC began referring to the ‘Olympic Movement’ in the 1950s and never used the expression ‘Olympic System’. The main difference between a movement and a system is that a movement focuses on people (in this case, Olympians, athletes and fans), whereas a system revolves round organizations, even if Olympians and sportspeople in general, with their clubs and national federations, can be considered stakeholders in the Olympic System (which is there to serve them, according to the IOC’s official line). In addition, the notion of movement has more positive connotations from a social point of view, as is reflected by names such as the Red Cross Movement, Scout Movement and civil rights movement. A movement is concerned with the preoccupations of individual people and this type of approach is essential if the Olympic System is to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century, especially, the need to strengthen the educational dimension of Olympism. According to Pierre de Coubertin ‘Olympism is in no way a system, it is a state of mind’ (de Coubertin 1918). Nevertheless, the day-to-day managerial reality whether we like it or not, lies in the network governance of a complex system. The primary goal of the term ‘System’ is to highlight what is at stake. But the main objective of the Olympics must be to incarnate a movement based on a strong ideology of respecting human rights and, since the end of the twentieth century, the environment. This can only be achieved by implementing a sustainable system of management. Further research is needed to outline possible avenues that could be followed in this vast field.

Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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