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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ: A STUDY OF SALAFI PESANTRENS IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA Het Koesteren van de Salafi Manhaj: Een studie naar Salafi Pesantrens in Hedendaags Indonesië (met een samenvatting in het Nederlands)

PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit Utrecht op gezag van de rector magnificus, prof. dr. G.J. van der Zwaan, ingevolge het besluit van het college voor promoties in het openbaar te verdedigen op maandag 27 januari 2014 des ochtends te 10.30 uur door Din Wahid geboren op 14 juli 1968 te Indramayu, Indonesië

Promotor: Prof. dr. M.M. van Bruinessen

This thesis was researched and written with financial support from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the Training Indonesia’s Young Leaders framework

Acknowledgment

Many people and institutions have helped me in completing my study. Without their support, this thesis would not have materialized. First, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Martin van Bruinessen, for his critical comments and valuable suggestions from the initial to the final stage of my study. My thankfulness also goes to Prof. Wim Stokhof, Dr. Nico Kaptein and Marise van Amersfoort of the Training Indonesia’s Young Leaders (TYIL) program in the Netherlands. The program has provided me with an academic environment and has assisted me in logistic matters as well. My thanks also go to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta and S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University for their generous support that enabled me to study in the Netherlands and to carry out fieldwork in Indonesia and Singapore. My study in the Netherlands would not have been possible without the consent of the Rector of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. At UIN Jakarta, my appreciation goes to Prof. Komaruddin Hidayat, Prof. Azyumardi Azra, Prof. Amsal Bachtiar, Jamhari and Hamid Nasuhi. My indebtedness also goes to Prof. Dede Rosyada and Mastuki of the Directorate of Islamic Higher Education of the Ministry of Religious Affairs for their support in granting me a scholarship for the completion of my thesis. I benefitted much from the regular discussions of the “Salafi researcher group” held jointly by the defunct International Institute for the Study of Islam iii

NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ

in the Modern World (ISIM) and Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands. I am indebted to scholars and friends who were involved in these discussions: Prof. Harald Motzki, Roel Meijer, Martijn de Koning, Joas Wagemakers, Carmen Becker, and Zoltan Pall. I am also indebted to Michael Feener and Robin Bush of the Asia Research Institute (ARI), National University of Singapore (NUS) for granting me an affiliation with the institute during the final phase of writing my thesis in Singapore. Some Salafi ustadhs deserve mention here as well, since my study on the Salafi pesantrens would not have been possible without their permission and help enabling me to carry out research among them. They not only gave me the opportunity to visit but also allowed me to stay in their pesantrens. Here, I would like to express my sincere thanks to them: Abdul Hakim Abdat (Jakarta), Yazid Jawas (Bogor), Khatib Muwahid (Ciamis) Thaharah (Cirebon), Muhammad As-Sewed (Cirebon), Aunurrafiq Ghufran (Gresik), Mubarak Bamualim (Surabaya), Abu Qatadah (Tasikmalaya), Abu Haidar (Bandung), Ja’far Umar Thalib (Yogyakarta), Afifuddin (Gresik), Abdul Mu’thi (Yogyakarta), Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin (Solo), Nafi Zainuddin (Salatiga), Qasim Saguni (Makassar) and Sarbini (Bogor), Wildan (Batam) and Adil Harahap (Batam). During my study in The Netherlands, I enjoyed the friendship and the togetherness of my Indonesian colleagues. Special thanks go to the TYIL’s “Laskar”: Hilman Latief, Yasrul Huda, Amiq, Kusmana, Sujadi, Nurkholis, Siti Nurul Azkiyah, Salamah Agung and Yanwar Pribadi. Their friendship and togetherness made me stronger during this long intellectual journey. There are many Indonesian fellows whom I cannot mention all. Warm thanks go to Dyah Aryani Perwitasari, Tri Rini Nuringtyas, Dinar Sari Wahyuni Cahyaningrum, Sylvia Pratiwi, Purin Purnama, Henni Vanda, Jani Kurni, Alia Baidhowi, Bang Suryadi Sunuri, Mbak Lies Mustafa, Pak S. Mintardjo, Alpha Amirrachman, Chaider S. Bamualim, Umar Hadi, Ramon Mohandas, Zainal “van Patrol” and Mini Muttaqin. They have helped me in many ways to make my life in the Netherlands more cheerful. My research center, Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM) UIN Jakarta, has provided me with an intellectual environment and has supported me to pursue my PhD program. Here, I would like to thank the PPIM and the gang: Ali Munhanif, Jajat Burhanudin, Fuad Jabali, Ismatu Ropi, Dadi Darmadi, Jajang Jahrani, Oman Fathurrahman, Didin Syafruddin, Arief Subhan, Saiful Umam, Murodi, Dina Afrianty, Asep S. Jahar, Tasman, and Idris Taha. I should also appreciate Dick van der Meij who has edited this thesis.

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Finally, my special thanks go to my family. My father, the late H. Amir, and my mother, Hj. Sawen, for their support during my study in their own ways. My truthful thanks go to my wife, Khalimatu Sa’diyah, and our children, Nadia Azmi Wahid and Adiel Azhari Wahid, for their love and patience: they have lived without my presence for the long period of my study in the Netherlands. Their reiterated question “Papa, kapan disertasinya selesai?” has encouraged me to finish my study soon. To them, this dissertation is dedicated.

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Note of Transliteration

Throughout the text, I have adopted the transliteration system in the International Journal of Middle East Studies, but diacritics have been reduced for simplification. The names of personalities, organizations, and foundations, as well as the titles of books, journals and articles are rendered as locally spelled and transliterated. For plural forms of Arabic words, I simply add an “s”, such as fatwa becomes fatwas. There are some Arabic and Indonesian terms that are used interchangeably, such as madrasa and madrasah, baraka and berkah. For the translation of the Qur’anic verses, I adopt The Holy Qur’an: English Translation of the Meanings and Commentary, revised and edited by the Presidency of Islamic Research, Ifta, Call and Guidance, n.d.

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Contents

Acknowledgment___iii Note of Transliteration___vii Contents___ix Introduction___1 Background___1 Previous Studies___6 The Focus of this Study___10 Method of collecting the data___12 Structure of the Book___14 Chapter One Who is Salafi?___17 A. Defining Salafism: is Salafi the same as Wahhabi?___17 Who is Salafi?___17 Salafism and Wahhabism___21 B. The Basic Principles and Characteristics of the Salafi Manhaj___25 Tawhid___25 Following Sunna (Ittiba’ al-Sunna) and Opposing Bid’a___27 Al-Wala’ wa al-Bara’___30 Obedience to the ruler___32

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C. Which Salafism?: Contesting Salafi Claims___35 D. Salafism and Mainstream Islam in Indonesia___44 Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)___45 Muhammadiyah___46 Persatuan Islam___48 Al-Irsyad___50 Concluding Remarks___53 Chapter Two The Salafi Movement in Indonesia: Development, Mobilization and Network___55 A. The Origins and Development of the Salafi Movement in Indonesia___56 B. Mobilization and Network___78 Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia (Dewan Da’wah), Jakarta___80 Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA)___86 The Religious Attaché of the Saudi Embassy, Jakarta___89 Al-Irsyad___90 Pondok Modern Darussalam, Gontor, Ponorogo, East Java___91 Lajna Khayriyya Mushtaraka, Jakarta___94 Economic Resources___96 Religious Teachings in Mosques___98 Dawra___101 Radio___102 Periodicals: Magazines, Bulletins and Pamphlets___105 C. Strengthening Transnational and Developing Regional Networks 106 Concluding Remarks 108 Chapter Three Salafi Leaders: The Emergence of New Religious Authorities___111 A. Defining Religious Authority___113 B. The Social and Political Role of Religious Leaders___123 C. Salafi Ustadhs: Challenging Religious Authority___129 D. The Social Background of Salafi Leaders___141 Abu Qatadah___142 Thaharah___145 Mubarak Bamualim___147 Concluding Remarks___150

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Chapter Four Salafi Pesantren: Development and Community’s Responses ___151 A. Early Wahhabi-influenced Pesantrens___153 Madrasah Wathaniyyah Islamiyyah, Kebarongan, Banyumas, Central Java___153 Pesantren Maskumambang, Dukun, Gresik, East Java___156 B. The Development of Contemporary Salafi Pesantrens___161 Pesantren al-Furqan, Srowo, Sidayu, Gresik, East Java___163 Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari, Banjarsari, Ciamis, West Java___167 Pesantren Assunnah Cirebon___171 C. Community Responses___177 Concluding Remarks___189 Chapter Five Salafi Pesantren: Nurturing the Salafi Manhaj___191 A. Educational Programs___194 B. Curriculum: Between Middle Eastern Orientation and National Demands___205 C. Kitabs Used and Basic Materials___214 Kitabs (books) Used___214 Basic Material and Texts___215 1. ‘aqida___215 2. Hadith___220 3. Fiqh___223 D. Internalizing the Salafi Manhaj in Daily Practice: the Students’ Lives___224 Rejecting Entertainment (Music, Radio and Television)___224 Isbal, Jalabiya, Lihya, and Niqab___226 Kunya Name___228 Having Meals___229 Students’ Lives___229 The Influence of Salafi Doctrines on the Students’ Behaviour___232 Concluding Remarks 234 Chapter Six Transforming Individuals and Society___235 A. Framing: Struggle against bid’a, opposing the West, and back to ‘true’ Islam___236

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B. Being Salafi: Retreat from the ‘World’___244 C. Being Salafi: ‘Reborn’ Muslim___249 D. From radical to ‘moderate’: a life history___253 Abu Rizal, Tasikmalaya, West Java ___253 Main argument: Loyalty to the Government___257 Social and Political Context___258 E. Creating a Salafi enclave: Imagining and practicing the model of the early Islamic community___261 The Salafi Enclave in Beji, Depok, Bogor, West Java___262 Concluding Remarks___269 Conclusion___271 Bibliography___277 List of Abbreviations___303 Glossary___307 Samenvatting___313 Quaestiones Infinitae___319 Curriculum Vitae___323

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Introduction

Background My first encounter with the Salafi movement was in 2002 when I was doing research on the Laskar Jihad, a paramilitary Salafi group that called on Muslims to join its jihad (holy war) in the Moluccas. From 2002 to 2004, my colleagues (Jajang Jahroni and the late Edi Kusnadiningrat) and I received a research grant from the Indonesian Institute of Science (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, LIPI). At that time, we carried out a research project on the relationship between religion and politics, focusing on three contemporary militant Muslim groups: Laskar Jihad, Front Pembela Islam and Ikhwanul Muslimin.1 In the course of this research, I interviewed various Laskar Jihad activists at their headquarters in Cempaka Putih Tengah, Central Jakarta. I also attended various events, including the National Working Consultation (Musyawarah Kerja Nasional), held on May 13-17, 2002, at Asrama Haji Pondok Gede, East Jakarta. The meeting was attended by national figures, including the then Vice President, Hamzah Haz.2 However, at this time, I was still not aware of the existence of Salafi pesantrens.

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The first year’s report of the project was published by Rajawali Pers. See Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (eds), Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia, Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2004. See, Din Wahid, “Laskar Jihad”, in Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (eds), Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia, Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2004, p. 109.

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Later in 2006, I was engaged in a small research project on “Pesantren Traditions and Democratic Values”. The project was designed to identify pesantren teachings, cultures and traditions that are supportive or obstructive to democracy. One of the pesantrens I visited for this project was Pesantren Imam Bukhari in Solo, Central Java. It was my first encounter with a Salafi pesantren and I became interested in getting to know it better because it teaches its students different Islamic books than those taught in other pesantrens. I had learned about the Salafi movement and Salafis’ basic ideas on certain issues, such as the Islamic state, democracy and gender equality, but I did not know Salafi pesantrens. The encounter made me eager to learn more about the methods the pesantrens use in transferring knowledge and in habituating their students with the Salafi manhaj (method or path of the Salaf). My interest in the Salafi pesantrens increased further when I read the International Crisis Group (ICG) report titled “Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix”.3 This report reminded me that foreign scholars distinguish between Salafism and terrorism, while many Indonesian scholars were still unable to understand them proportionally and had problems to make a clear distinction between the two. This confusion was caused by, among other things, the fact that terrorists claimed to be adherents of Salafism. This report also surprised me as it stated that there were no less than twenty-nine Salafi pesantrens at that time. Moreover, the report provided me with a list of Salafi pesantrens and foundations, their main teachers, addresses and contact numbers.4 Since then, I decided to do research on Salafi pesantrens in order to provide scholarly readers with a better understanding of Salafi pesantrens in particular and of Salafism in general. ICG’s report demonstrates the rapid growth of Salafi pesantrens. Despite the fact that the precise number of the Salafi pesantrens is unknown, I assume that their number increases and probably has grown to 50 pesantrens. In the course of my fieldwork for this study, I found various new Salafi pesantrens, which were not listed in the ICG report. This number, indeed, is insignificant if we compare it with the more than 47.000 pesantrens and madrasahs that belong to other Muslims organizations such as the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam (Persis).5 In spite of this small number, Salafi pesantrens 3 4 5

International Crisis Group (ICG), Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix, ICG Asia Report No. 83, 13 September 2004. ICG, Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism, pp. 36-47. Azyumardi Azra, Dina Afrianty and Robert W. Hefner, “Pesantren and Madrasa: Muslim Schools and National Ideals in Indonesia” in Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (eds), Schooling Islam, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 191.

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have drawn relatively much attention and have been able to attract many students. Salafis also are active is preaching Salafism through many means, such as organizing regular religious lessons, publications and on-air da’wa. It is no exaggeration to say that Salafism and Salafi pesantrens have coloured, to some degree, Indonesian Islam. Salafi pesantrens pay special attention to the doctrine of Salafism, mostly the teachings of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. These doctrines can be traced back to an earlier period, to the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya and Ahmad ibn Hanbal. In the contemporary period, Abdul Aziz Abdullah ibn Baz and Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani are among the most influential Salafi authors. Salafis texts, such as the Kitab al-Tawhid and al-Usul al-Thalatha by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and al‘Aqida al-Wasitiyya by Ibn Taymiyya are among the main textbooks used in Salafi pesantrens. All these works are very different from those studied in the salaf (traditional) pesantrens as described by Martin van Bruinessen.6 Salafi pesantren should not be confused with salaf pesantrens that belong to or are associated with the NU. We have also another type of pesantrens, modern ones that belong to the Muhammadiyah, Persis, and independent foundations such as Pondok Modern Gontor and its kind. To differentiate between the last two types, salaf pesantrens usually employ non-classical methods of learning, namely sorogan and bandongan. Sorogan is individual consultation in which a student, usually an advanced one, comes to a kyai or a senior ustadh to study certain books, while bandongan is collective lessons in which a group of students sit in front a kyai or ustadh listening to his instruction. Another characteristic of salaf pesantrens is their persistence in teaching classic books of Islam called Kitab Kuning. Modern pesantrens use the classical method with a specific curriculum and teaching materials. However, this contrast is no longer applicable since salaf pesantrens have also adopted modern teaching methods as they run Islamic schools with a curriculum that includes general sciences as well as religious knowledge. The emergence of the Salafi movement in this world’s largest Muslim country has brought about tension and conflict in the community. In Mataram, Lombok Island, for example, conflict between Salafis and traditional Muslims aroused in April 2006 when traditional Muslims damaged a musalla (small prayer house) that belonged to the Salafis. The conflict was triggered by the lectures of a Salafi 6

Martin van Bruinessen, “Kitab Kuning: Books in Arabic Script Used in the Pesantren Milieu”, BKI, 149, 1990, pp. 226-269.

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ustadh charging traditional Muslims of practicing bid’a (religious innovation).7 Conflicts between Salafis and other Muslims also took place in other regions, such as in Banjarsari, Ciamis, West Java, and Sidayu, Gresik, East Java. The most striking phenomenon of the Salafi movement in Indonesia that received much attention in scholarly works was the birth of Laskar Jihad. Under the leadership of Ja’far Umar Thalib, this paramilitary group mobilized Muslim support and called on them to carry out jihad in the Moluccas on the ground of defending Muslims from Christian attack. These phenomena have changed the image of Indonesian Islam from what Martin van Bruinessen termed the ‘smiling face of Islam’ to ‘conservative Islam’.8 Salafi pesantrens are part of the contemporary Salafi movement that emerged in the late 1980s. This movement calls on Muslims to purify their beliefs and religious practices from bid’as through the return to the Qur’an and the hadith, and the examples of the al-Salaf al-salih, the first three generations of Muslims. Islam as prescribed in the Qur’an, the hadith and the practices of the Salaf is held to be pristine or authentic Islam, unpolluted by local traditions. When Muslims conquered other regions and Islam spread there, Muslims interacted with local inhabitants. This interaction led to the mixing of Islamic doctrines and practices with local traditions and cultures, so that Islam became impure as it became contaminated by local beliefs. In order to purify Islamic doctrines, Salafis urged Muslims to return to the Qur’an, the hadith and the examples of the al-Salaf al-salih. In fact, the “call” to pristine or authentic Islam is not novel. According to a commonly accepted hadith, the Prophet is reported to have said that in every century a Muslim reformer will appear who will reform Islamic doctrines. In modern times, the Salafiya movement emerged in the late nineteenth century in Egypt and called on Muslims to purify their beliefs and ritual practices. The movement was started by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and was continued by Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida. In addition to a return to the two foundational sources of Islamic doctrines, they called on Muslims to exercise 7

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Nuhrison M. Nuh, “Kasus Salafi versus non-Salafi di Kabupaten Lombok Barat – NTB”, in Nuhrison M. Nuh and Ahmad Rosidi (eds), Kasus-Kasus Aliran/Faham Keagamaan Aktual di Indonesia, Jakarta: Badan Litbang dan Diklat, Puslitbang Kehidupan Keberagamaan, Departemen Agama RI, 2006, pp. 22-27. Martin van Bruinessen, “What Happened to the Smiling Face of Indonesian Islam? Muslim Intellectualism and the Conservative Turn in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, Working Paper Series, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, 6 January 2011.

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ijtihad, independent reasoning. They divided Islamic doctrines into ‘aqida (creed), ‘ibadat (rituals) and mu’amalat (social interactions). The first two elements of Islam, they argued, remained static and unchanged, while the last one changed in line with the changing circumstances and demands of the era. In order to cope with the problems Muslims faced, these reformers urged them to exercise ijtihad. In the Muslim world, this Salafiya movement is also called Islamic modernism or Islamic reformism. The wave of this Islamic reformism or Islamic modernism emerged in Indonesia with the birth of reformist organizations, namely the Muhammadiyah, al-Irsyad and Persis. These organizations call upon Muslims to purify their creeds and ritual practices from bid’a, takhayul and khurafat (superstitions). The contemporary Salafi movement in Indonesia is part of a worldwide Salafi movement that receives full support of the Saudi Government. In order to halt the increasing influence of Arab Socialism in Egypt in the nineteen sixties, and the Iranian revolution in the late nineteen seventies, and to dam its influence in the rest of the Muslim world, the Saudi Government has made various efforts to export its variant of Islam. These attempts included granting scholarship to young Muslims to study at Saudi universities, building mosques in Muslim countries, publishing textbooks and distributing them freely, and supporting Muslim organizations. In Indonesia, the Saudi government has supported the Dewan Da’wah Islamiyyah Indonesia (DDII, or Dewan Da’wa, Indonesian Islamic Da’wa Council), an Islamic organization that pays great attention to Islamic propaganda in rural areas of the archipelago. Through this council, the Saudi government has granted scholarships to its comrades to pursue tertiary education at Saudi universities. When returned home, these graduates initiated Salafi da’wa in Indonesia. More importantly was the Saudi’s initiative to set up the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA) in Jakarta, a branch the Jami’a Imam Ibn Su’ud in Riyadh. Supported by LIPIA graduates, the Salafi da’wa became livelier. However, the Dewan Da’wah was not the only Muslim organization that paved the way for the advent of Salafism in Indonesia. The reformist Muslim organizations mentioned above also contributed to the expansion of Salafism. The shared spirit of the purification of Islam among these organizations and the Salafis is the reason behind their collaboration. The Muhammadiyah in Sidayu, Gresik, for instance, provides the ground for Salafis to emerge, while Pesantren al-Irsyad in Tengaran, Salatiga has become one of the earliest Salafi pesantrens in the country.

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Salafis are enthusiastic in preaching their da’wa, utilizing any possible means to accelerate it, including organizing religious gathering in mosques and offices, organizing Salafi dawras, and publishing books and periodicals. Financially supported by their counterparts in Middle East, they have established Salafi foundations, pesantrens, radio stations and even a satellite television channel. Of all these activities, pesantrens have become central in the efforts to spread Salafism. Through the various programs these pesantrens offer, Salafis teach Salafism systematically. The pesantrens not only produce Salafi preachers, but also try to influence the surrounding community. Previous Studies Much research has been carried out on Islamic educational institutions, particularly on madrasahs and pesantrens, and on Salafism. The Islamic educational system and its institutions have received much attention, especially after the terrorist attack on World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001 and the Bali bombing in October 2002.9 A classic reference on pesantrens is no doubt Zamakhsyari Dhofier’s work, Tradisi Pesantren.10 This book is the Indonesian published version of his dissertation he submitted to the Australian National University (ANU). Employing an anthropological approach to the subject, the author discusses important aspects of pesantrens, such as their curriculum, methods of learning, intellectual traditions, and the networks of the pesantrens and their leaders, kyais. His inquiry into pesantrens and kyais’ networks is a valuable contribution to the study of Islamic education in Indonesia. In his research, the author found that the endogamous marriage system between families of great kyais has become an essential factor in the establishment of the religious authority of a kyai. In addition to deep knowledge of Islam, the endogamous marriage system guarantees the strong authority of a junior kyai in establishing a new pesantren. The Dutch scholar Karel A. Steenbrink’s work Pesantren Madrasah Sekolah11 is important to understand the history and development of Islamic educational 9

See, for example, Alexander Evans, “Understanding Madrasahs: How Threatening Are They?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 1, 2006, pp. 9-16; Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, “The Madrassa Scapegoat”, The Washington Quarterly, 29: 2, Spring 2006, pp. 117-125; and Justin Magouirk, “Connecting a Thousand Points of Hatred”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 31, 2008, pp. 327-349. 10 Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1984. 11 Karel A. Steenbrink, Pesantren, Madrasah, Sekolah, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986.

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institutions. As reflected in the title of the book, this work provides us with a gradual shift in the Islamic education system from Pesantren to Madrasah and finally to Sekolah (public School). As traditional Islamic boarding schools, pesantrens taught religious subjects only. However, the modernization of Islamic education the government introduced in the mid-nineteen seventies forced Muslim educators to adopt a new form of educational institution, the madrasah. Unlike pesantrens, the madrasah curriculum covers both religious and secular subjects. Furthermore, Muslims also have adopted the Sekolah system that more train students in secular subjects. Taking into account this gradual shift in the adoption of a secular educational system, Steenbrink predicts that in the future, the segregation between these three forms of Islamic educational institutions will become fluid and blurred. He puts this gradual move in a phrase that reads “From Kyai Haji (K.H) to Drs.” The “Kyai Haji” is the traditional title given to a knowledgeable person or religious scholar who leads a pesantren and who has performed the pilgrimage, while, the title “Doctorandus” is the official title given to a person who has finished tertiary education. This phrase describes the gradual move of religious authority from traditional title to the legal one. Martin van Bruinessen’s work, Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat: TradisiTradisi Islam di Indonesia,12 remains important in pesantren studies. In addition to a discussion on pesantrens and its living traditions, the contribution of this work lies in its discussion of the so-called ‘Kitab Kuning’, classic sources of Islamic teachings that constitute the trademark of traditional pesantrens. Based on extensive research in forty-six pesantrens throughout Indonesia, the author identified the most popular books pesantrens use in all branches of Islamic knowledge and Arabic, including Arabic and its tools (nahw, sarf, balagha, mantiq), fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and usul al-fiqh, hadith and ‘ilm al-hadith, ‘aqida, tafsir, akhlaq (ethics), tasawuf, and sirat al-nabi (history of the Prophet). The contemporary development of Islamic educational institutions in Indonesia has been studied in Mencetak Muslim Modern: Peta Pendidikan Islam Indonesia,13 edited by Jajat Burhanudin and Dina Afrianty. In this book, researchers from the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) of Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN, State Islamic University) Syarif Hidayatullah in 12 Martin van Bruinessen, Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat: Tradisi-tradisi Islam di Indonesia, Bandung: Mizan, 1995. 13 Jajat Burhanudin and Dina Afrianty (eds), Mencetak Muslim Modern: Peta Pendidikan Islam Indonesia, Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada in collaboration with PPIM UIN Jakarta, 2006.

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Jakarta discuss the various models of Islamic educational institutions in some provinces in Indonesia including traditional and modern pesantrens, madrasahs and integrated Islamic schools. The book examines the changes and continuity within Islamic education in response to modern challenges. Robert W. Hefner’s work Making Modern Muslims: The Politics of Islamic Education in Southeast Asia14 has contributed to a better understanding of Islamic education. The book discusses various types of Islamic educational institutions in Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Cambodia), and their attempts to reform in response to social, cultural and political changes. The work also examines their curricula on contemporary issues, including citizenship, pluralism and gender equity. To compare their findings with Islamic education institutions in other countries, Hefner and his colleague, Muhammad Qasim, have also edited Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education,15 which includes Pakistan, India, Morocco, Turkey, Egypt, Mali, and even in the West, Britain. In this work, the authors discuss the various types of Islamic educational institutions in these countries and their responses to social and political changes. Recent studies on pesantrens and madrasahs are found in The Madrasa in Asia, Political Activism and Transnational Linkages,16 edited by Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand and Martin van Bruinessen. This work gives us a better understanding of the madrasahs, Islamic educational institutions that have been recently alleged as being incubators of Muslim fundamentalist. Most articles included in the book are based on papers presented at the international conference on “The Madrasa in Asia: Transnational Linkages and Real and Alleged Political Role” in 2004, organized by International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) in Leiden, the Netherlands in cooperation with the Zentrum Moderner Orient (Center for Modern Oriental Studies) in Berlin. The book discusses various types of madrasahs; traditional, modern and the Salafi, in the different countries in Asia. Some elements of the madrasah, such as the curriculum, methods of learning, institutional reforms, and networks are discussed in the book. Madrasah networks have connected them to the wider 14 Robert W. Hefner (ed.), Making Modern Muslims: The Politics of Islamic Education in Southeast Asia, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009. 15 Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim (eds). Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007. 16 Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand and Martin van Bruinessen, The Madrasa in Asia, Political Activism and Transnational Linkages, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008.

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world and enable them to communicate with their counterparts both in their home countries and outside. Like pesantrens and madrasahs, the contemporary Salafi movement has received serious attention in scholarly works. The first extensive work of the contemporary Salafi movement in Indonesia is no doubt Noorhaidi Hasan’s Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia. It portrays the origins, development, and fragmentation of Salafism and Salafis’ engagement in the jihad in conflict areas in the Moluccas. Focusing on the Laskar Jihad, the author discusses not only the drama of jihad itself, but also the processes of mobilizing support, including getting fatwas from Salafi sheikhs in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, Muslims’ support in the home country, and warrior recruitment. The author has paid much attention to the key actors in the jihad. He demonstrates that the jihad in the Moluccas was viable because of the availability of the theological basis for the jihad (fatwas, religious opinions from Muslim scholars) and Muslims’ support in the home country. One of the interesting conclusions the author draws is that the Salafi doctrine on the obedience to ruler was not strong enough; once the Salafis had opportunity to exercise power, they abused it. Roel Meijer has edited Global Salafism17 that provided us with a comprehensive understanding of movement. The work is based on papers presented in the three-day conference on Salafism held in 2007 collaboratively by Radboud University, Nijmegen, and ISIM, Leiden, the Netherlands, in which many experts on Salafism took part. The significance of this book lies in its discussion of all aspects connected with the Salafi movement in the world, including its basic principles and doctrines, the various types of Salafism (quietist, politico and jihadist), and the various movements of Salafism that exist worldwide. A more recent work on Salafism is Zoltan Pall’s Lebanese Salafis between the Gulf and Europe.18 It discusses the emergence of the Salafi movement in Tripoli and Northern Lebanon, and its fragmentation into “purist” and “haraki” (activist). In his research, Pall discovered that the first group of Salafis is supported by the Kuwait-based foundation, the Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath, while the “haraki” group received generous funds from the Qatar-based Sheikh Eid Charity Foundation. Both foundations also have operated to support Salafi movements elsewhere in the Muslim world, including in Indonesia. More interesting is Pall’s criticism 17 Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism, London: Hurst and Company, 2009. 18 Zoltan Pall, Lebanese Salafis Between the Gulf and Europe, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012

9


of Quintan Wiktorowicz’s typology of the Salafi movements that classifies them into “purist”, “politico” and “jihadi”. After criticizing this typology, Pall proposes a new classification that categorizes them into “purist” and “haraki” with subdivisions of each. While the above works on pesantrens discuss traditional and modern pesantrens, studies on Salafism consider Salafism as a social and religious movement. As a movement, as Hasan has shown, Salafism to a certain degree discusses the political affairs. Most studies on Salafism, however, have ignored Salafi educational institutions, Salafi pesantrens and madrasahs. A Salafi pesantren is an institution that teaches Salafism systematically, prepares a Salafi generation and produces Salafi preachers. It is the nest where Salafism is nurtured, preserved, and practiced by its adherents in their daily life. Indeed, Hasan’s article “The Salafi Madrasa in Indonesia”19 provides us with a general overview on Salafi pesantrens in the country. However, due to spatial constraint the author fails to discuss many aspects of the Salafi pesantren. The Focus of this Study This study is about Salafi pesantrens. I have visited 14 Salafi pesantren but I focus especially on three pesantrens in Java, namely, al-Nur al-Atsari in Banjarsari, Ciamis, West Java; Assunnah in Cirebon, West Java, and al-Furqan, Sidayu, Gresik, East Java. As educational institutions, Salafi pesantrens have developed an educational system that includes educational programs, curriculum, textbooks and materials, as well as methods of learning. Questions on these matters include: What are the programs pesantrens offer? What kind of curriculum do the pesantrens develop? What are the books pesantrens use? What kind of methods does the pesantren adopt in transferring knowledge? In this study, I address all these matters. However, there is another important question concerning the internalization of the Salafi manhaj in the daily life of the students. The Salafi manhaj includes not only the way of thought in religious matters, but also way of conduct in daily life. The students in pesantrens not only study Salafism, but also put it into practice, such as by wearing a jalabiya, keeping a long beard, avoiding isbal, and a specific etiquette in having meals. By looking at the process of internalizing of the Salafi manhaj carefully, I analyse the dynamics of the students’ life in pesantrens, the interaction between the 19 Noorhaidi Hasan, “The Salafi Madrasas of Indonesia”, in Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand and Martin van Bruinessen, The Madrasa in Asia, Political Activism and Transnational Linkages, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008, pp. 247-274.

10

WHO IS SALAFI?

mudir (director), ustadhs (teachers) and santris (students), and the interaction between individuals in the pesantrens and those outside. Unfortunately, during my fieldwork, I was unable to access and interview santriwatis (female students) and ustadhas (female teachers). Salafis strictly prohibit any contact between a woman and non-mahram men (men whom a women may not marry). Because of this constraint, a discussion of female Salafis is beyond this study. As educational institutions, Salafi pesantrens are not passive and static, but active and dynamic. They always respond to changing circumstances in order to meet current needs. Salafi pesantrens, for example, must respond to the government’s educational policies concerning materials to teach. Related to this issue, in this study, I also analyse the responses of the pesantrens in order to cope with these challenges. This response can be observed in their adjustment of the programs they offered, and by the changes in the curriculum the pesantrens adopt. On the other hand, I also observe the different community’s responses to the emergence of Salafi pesantren in particular, and to the Salafi movement in general. It is important to realize that Salafi pesantrens are embedded in networks of similar pesantrens, and thus are not isolated, but connected to their counterparts both in Indonesia and abroad. The network of Salafi pesantrens is maintained through collaborative actions, such as teacher exchanges. The Salafis also keep in touch with their sheikhs in the Middle East by inviting them to teach in the Salafi dawras in Indonesia. Other means of conserving this linkage is by sending students to study with them and asking them various fatwas on cases happening in the country. In addition to discussing the traditional network they have with the Middle East, in this study, I also investigate new regional links in Southeast Asia between Salafis in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Another important issue concerning the pesantrens is fundraising. The key question in this matter is how Salafi pesantrens obtain their funds. Do they receive financial support from international donors? My inquiry found that most Salafi pesantrens receive financial support from international sources, both from charity foundations and individuals. The Kuwaiti charitable foundation, Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath al-Islami, remains the main donor that grants large sums of money to Salafi pesantrens and institutions. Smaller amounts of money have been granted to Salafi institutions by the Qatari Sheikh Eid Charity foundation. Moreover, Salafi pesantrens also have found individual donors. In addition to international sources, Salafi pesantrens have mobilized their own financial sources, such as though publications and tuition fees.

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I also analyse the historical development of the Salafi movement in Indonesia. Studying this aspect, I explore the dynamics of the movement in responding to the social, religious and political settings of the country. In this context, we see, for example, the creation of the Laskar Jihad by a group of Salafis to respond to ethno-religious conflict in the Moluccas. Their different attitude towards the government, as in the case of Laskar Jihad, has caused divisions among the Salafis into so-called “purist”, “haraki” and “jihadi” groups. After all, studying the Salafi movement in Indonesia cannot disregard the theological aspects of Salafism. Thus, I also allocate a certain portion of this book to studying Salafism’s theological debates and basic doctrines. Method of collecting the data This study employs an anthropological approach. To collect data, I spent seventeen months doing fieldwork divided over two periods; the first was conducted from mid-August 2008 to mid-April 2009, while the second was carried out from mid-December 2009 to mid-September 2010. During the first period, I visited fourteen Salafi pesantrens in Java. When visiting the pesantrens, I stayed at the pesantrens and interviewed mudir and ustadhs, and had informal talks with ustadhs (male students). My stay in the pesantrens gave me the opportunity me to closely observe all santri activities in the pesantrens. I participated in some of their activities, such as performing collective prayers in the mosque, attending religious lectures in the morning after dawn prayer or in the evening after sunset prayer, attending lessons in the classrooms, and having meals together with ustadhs. My participation in these activities aimed at observing exactly what happened during these activities: how teachers delivered lectures; how they explained and elaborated on these the lesson; what kind of questions students and other participants posed; how teachers reacted to these questions; and what the ustadhs did during the lessons in the classrooms and public lectures. During my first fieldwork, I also visited Salafi and non-Salafi foundations that supported the Salafi da’wa, such as the Lajna Khayriyya Mushtaraka and the Dewan Da’wah, while I interviewed some prominent figures of the institutions. I also attended Salafi public lectures held in various mosques in Jakarta, Cirebon, Yogyakarta, Surabaya and Gresik. In such events, I observed the situation during the lectures and had informal conversations with participants, asking them about the reasons behind their interest in Salafism.

12

WHO IS SALAFI?

My findings from the first fieldwork brought me to focus on the aforementioned pesantrens in the second fieldwork. In my view, these three pesantrens are interesting because they have survived while encountering serious challenges of the community, especially from local religious leaders. Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari, for example, was attacked by villagers in 2002, while Pesantren al-Furqan was dissolved by the sub-district authorities in 1994. Having survived serious trouble, the pesantrens have grown and have developed significantly and currently leave behind other traditional pesantrens in their villages. Different from the first fieldwork when I stayed in the pesantrens, during the second fieldwork I did not stay in the pesantrens but resided in the house of a villager. Nevertheless, I still visited the pesantrens, interviewed ustadhs, making informal conversations with ustadhs and administrative staff members in order to update my data. I applied this strategy in order to see objectively the responses of the communities surrounding the pesantrens. Outside the pesantrens, I interviewed the local leaders of Muslim organizations, such as the Muhammadiyah, the NU, Persis, and Persatuan Umat Islam (PUI). I also had informal talks with ordinary people, such as retailers in the traditional markets, and observed how ordinary people reacted to the Salafis, examining whether or not their responses different from their leaders. During the second fieldwork, I also visited various Salafi pesantrens in Makassar, South Sulawesi, and Batam, Riau Islands, in order to make comparisons between Salafi pesantrens in Java and outside Java. In Makassar, I found the Wahdah Islamiyyah, a Salafi group that adopted a form organization. Batam is an important site to visit, since Salafis in this island have set up a strong network with their counterparts in Singapore and Malaysia. The Hang radio station in Batam Center plays an important role in this network since it reaches audiences in Singapore and Johor Bharu, Malaysia. To confirm this network, I made a short trip to Singapore. During this visit, I interviewed various Indonesian young Salafis who studied at the Nanyang Technological University (NTU), and I attended Salafi religious lessons in Kembangan delivered by Rasul Dahri, a prominent Singaporean Salafi ustadh. In addition to observation and interviews, there are also other primary sources such as documents like CDs and DVDs that record Salafis’ lectures, leaflets and booklets are the main references of the study. Salafi textbooks written by Indonesian Salafi figures and Salafi periodicals are indeed important sources for this study. In Salafi magazines, I found interesting articles representing Salafis’

13


opinion on contemporary issues, such as bank interest and working women. The Internet was without doubt a vital source for this study. This is because all Salafi groups, institutions and pesantrens, and even Salafi individuals have created their own websites or blogs. Moreover, lectures on Salafism are now easily found on YouTube. During this study, I also often listened to Salafi radio stations that put on air various programs, such as public lectures, tartil (Qur’anic recitation), and questions and answers on religious matters. Research on Salafism is not always easy. During my study, I often faced suspicion from Salafis asking about my intention why I was carrying out this study. My affiliation with Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, which is regarded by Salafis as a secular institution, and my study in the Netherlands, led them to be careful in providing me with the information I needed. During the fieldwork, I was forbidden to visit a Salafiya pesantren in Jember, East Java, because of my study in the Netherlands. However, I am fortunate to be a Gontor alumnus . I found many Gontor graduates who had become leading Salafi figures, such as Mubarak Bamualim from Surabaya and Khatib Muwahhid from Ciamis. Bamualim introduced me to Aunurrafiq Ghufran, the director of Pesantren al-Furqan in Gresik, and asked him to welcome me in his pesantren. Meanwhile, Muwahhid, the leader of al-Nur al-Atsari, let me visit his pesantren. Being myself a Gontor alumnus, I thus found its network helpful in accessing Salafi pesantrens and institutions. Structure of the Book This book comprises of six chapters. Chapter One defines Salafism. It explains the meaning of Salafism, Salafi, and the Salafis’ arguments concerning their claim that the Salafi manhaj is the only true manhaj. After this definition, I continue to elaborate on the basic principles of Salafism, followed by a discussion on the fragmentation of Salafism. In the end, I provide a discussion on Salafism in the context of mainstream Islam in Indonesia as represented by primary Muslim groups, namely the Muhammadiyah, the NU, Persis, and al-Irsyad. Chapter Two concerns the historical development of Salafism in Indonesia and the resources mobilized by Salafis. In the discussion on the origins and development of the Salafi movement, I employ various social movement theories, namely Political Opportunity Structure (POS) and Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT). Using these theories, I discuss the social and political setting of Indonesia that enabled the Salafi movement to emerge. In the beginning, the Salafis benefited from existing organizations such the Dewan Da’wah and al-Irsyad. However, after gaining a sufficient number of followers, the Salafis started to 14

WHO IS SALAFI?

mobilize all possible means to support their da’wa, including organizing religious gatherings, dawras, establishing Salafi institutions, publications, and others. In the last part of this chapter, I pay attention to the transnational network of Indonesian Salafis, both their traditional network to Middle Eastern countries, and a newly established regional network in Southeast Asia. In Chapter Three, I analyse the emergence of Salafi leaders as new religious authorities who challenge established ones. I start this chapter with a discussion on the theory of authority in general and religious authority in particular. Then I continue to explain the social and political roles of Salafi ustadhs in the community. To demonstrate the challenge Salafism poses to existing religious authority, I take the case of mubahatha (discussion, dialogue) between Salafis and members of Persis in the West Javanese region in Bandung, where each party elaborated and examined the arguments of their belief in the fundamental sources of Islamic doctrines. I conclude this chapter with analysing the social background of Salafi ustadhs. Chapter Four analyses the development of Salafi pesantrens and the community’s responses to them. My analysis starts with a discussion of early Wahhabi-inspired pesantrens in Indonesia, followed by a description of the history and the development of the three Salafi pesantrens that have become the main subjects of this study. I also examine the dynamics of the community in responding to the Salafi pesantrens, which varies from strong resistance to acceptance. Muslims who are affiliated to reformist organizations such as the Muhammadiyah and Persis activists tend to accept Salafism, while those who are affiliated to the traditionalist NU tend to oppose it. In Chapter Five, I discuss the ‘contents’ of the Salafi pesantrens. It analyses various aspects related to the pesantrens, namely the programs they offer, their curriculum, methods of learning, textbooks and the material students read, and more importantly the ways pesantrens preserve and nurture the Salafi manhaj and teach it to their students. In the pesantrens, the students not only study Salafism, but also practice the Salafi manhaj in daily life. I conclude this chapter with evaluating the influence of Salafi doctrines in the student’s life. The last chapter deals with the changing attitudes of individuals after their conversion to Salafism. There are three models of individuals’ behavioural changes: “retreat” from the world, being a “reborn” Muslim, and the move from having a radical attitude to a moderate stance towards the government. However, the changes occur not only on the individual level, but also in the community, especially when Salafis have created their own enclaves. An analysis on these enclaves appears in the last part of this chapter.

15

Chapter One

Who is Salafi?

The term “Salafi” is much in vogue both among scholars of Islam and among a wide range of Muslim activists who claim this name exclusively for themselves (and thus deny its use to others). Traditionalist, reformist, but also liberal Muslims have claimed to be followers of the al-Salaf al-salih, the ‘pious predecessors’. Recently, scholars have begun to pay serious attention to the Salafi movement worldwide. The main reason for this interest is the fact that although most Salafis are quietist and non-political, some of them are jihadis. At present, Al Qaeda is the best-known jihadi Salafi movement. Also in Indonesia there are a number of small groups that adhere to a Salafi jihadi ideology. However, those called Salafi in Indonesia adhere to the non-political tendency of Salafism. In this chapter, I shall explore how one may describe Salafism and how this term relates to other terms like Wahhabism. I shall discuss also the various claims Indonesian Salafis make. A. Defining Salafism: is Salafi the same as Wahhabi?

Who is Salafi? The term “Salafi” derives from the verb, “salafa”, which means “to precede”, and “salaf” means “predecessor”.1 A Salafi is a person who follows the manhaj 1

See, Ibn Mansur, Lisa al-‘Arab, Dar al-Malaria, Vol. 3, p. 2068; Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas, Muglia dengan Manhaj Salaf, Bogor: Pustaka At-Taqwa, 2008, p. 14.

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(path) of the salaf, the first three generations of the Muslim community who are perceived as exemplary Muslims following a famous hadith that says: “the best of you are those of my own epoch (qarni), subsequently those who follow on, then those who follow them....”2 Muslims usually refer to these three generations when they speak of the al-Salaf al-salih: the Companions of the Prophet (sahaba), their followers (tabi’un) and the followers of the followers (tabi’un al-tabi’in). Muslims consider them the people who best understood Islamic doctrines as they lived during or close to the time of the Prophet. The Prophet directly guided the Companions and they witnessed the revelation and knew the context in which it was revealed. According to the Salafis, Muslims are obliged to follow the Salafi manhaj and adhere to Salafi views. The term “manhaj” stems from the word “nahaja”, which means “to proceed”.3 It denotes the “method” and the “clear path”4 as the Qur’an [5:48] says: “We have ordained a law and way of life for each of you”. Thus the “Salafi manhaj” is “the straight and clear way of the application of religion in line with the Companions of the Prophet”.5 The word “Salaf ” is often contrasted to the term “Khalaf ” (which literally means “successor”) as seen in the expressions ‘ulama al-Salaf” and ‘ulama al-Khalaf. While the former are associated with ‘ulamas who follow the path of the first three generations of Muslims, the latter are identified as contemporary Muslim scholars who follow the former.6 One reason for focusing on the earliest generations as models to be followed is the awareness that in later times the umma had become divided into numerous different groups. According to a widely accepted hadith, the Prophet predicted that the umma would be divided into seventy-three sects of which only one will be saved. All sects are destined for hell, except this single ‘saved group’ (al-firqa al-najiya). Usually this sect is said to be the ahl al-sunna wa-l-jama’a, the ‘people who follow the Prophet and belong to the Congregation’. Traditionalists have consistently claimed this name for themselves but the Salafis also claim that they are the true ahl al-sunna wa-l-jama’a. Another hadith relates who belong to 2 3 4 5 6

This translation is adopted from E. Chaumant, “Al-Salaf wa’l Khalaf ”, The Encyclopaedia of Islam (EI), vol. VIII, Leiden: Brill, 1995, p. 900. Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1961, p. 1002. Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-‘Arab, vol. 6, p. 4554. Abdul Hakim bin Amir Abdat, Lau Kaana Khairan la Sabaquunaa Ilaihi, Jakarta: Pustaka Mu’awiyah bin Abi Sufyan, 2007, pp. 60-62. Yazid Jawas, Mulia, p. 14. E. Chaumant, “Al-Salaf wa’l Khalaf ”, p. 900.

18

WHO IS SALAFI?

the jama’a: “all the groups will go to hell except one, the group where I am and my Companions are in it.”7 Yazid Jawas, a leading Indonesia Salafi, explains that they were called the jama’a in the past, because they were united by their imam on the true path, and did not want to leave the group.8 The Salafis have put forward several arguments derived from the Qur’an and the hadith on the obligation to follow the Salafi manhaj. The first is Qur’an [2:67]: “Oh Allah! Guide us to the right way. The way of those whom You favoured; not those who have earned Your wrath, or those who have lost the Way.” Quoting Ibn Kathir in his Tafsir, the Salafis argue that the al-sirat al-mustaqim (right way) has four connotations: the truth (al-haqq), Islamic religion (Islam), al-Qur’an and the first two caliphs (Abu Bakr al-Siddiq and ‘Umar ibn Khattab). Their way of reasoning is as follows: when a Muslim follows the Prophet and the examples of Abu Bakr and ‘Umar this means that he or she accepts the truth, the religion of Islam and the Qur’an. Thus, as Yazid Jawas, whom we shall encounter repeatedly in this dissertation, puts it, the above verses contain the three fundamental sources of Islamic doctrines: the Qur’an, the hadith and the examples of the pious forerunners (al-Salaf al-salih).9 Yazid quotes another Qur’anic verse [9:100] to support his argument. The verse reads: “As for the first pioneers who embraced Islam, the muhajir (emigrants who followed the Prophet from Mecca to Medina) and the ansar (supporters in Medina) and those who follow them in good deeds, Allah is well pleased with them and they are pleased with Him. He has prepared gardens beneath which rivers flow, wherein they shall live forever: that is the mighty achievement.” The Salafis argue that Allah’s satisfaction with the Companions implies that Muslims should follow their path.10 In addition to the Qur’an, the Salafis quote various hadiths to support their claim on the obligation to follow the Salaf, like one that says: “O mankind! I have left for you all, by which you will not deviate forever if you hold strongly the Book of God and the sunna of His Prophet”.11 Another hadith reads: “It is an obligation for you all to follow my sunna and the sunna of the rightly guided caliphs. O you all, hold them strongly and bite it with molars, and keep away from innovations (in religion), for each innovation is bid’a and all bid’a leads to hell”.12 7 8

Yazid Jawas, Mulia, p. 21. Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas, Syarah Aqidah Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’ah, Bogor: Pustaka Imam Syafi’i, 2006. p. 37. 9 Yazid Jawas, Mulia, p. 55-57. 10 Yazid Jawas, Mulia, p. 15; Abdul Hakim Abdat, Lau Kaana, p. 122. 11 Yazid Jawas, Mulia, p. 95 12 Yazid Jawas, Mulia, p. 25.

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On the basis of these textual arguments, the Salafis conclude that every Muslim is obliged to follow the Salafi manhaj, the path of the pious predecessors. For them, the Salafi manhaj is the third source of Islamic teachings after the Qur’an and the hadith. Muslims’ return to the first two sources alone is not a warranty that they will embrace true Islam because they still may go astray due to a false understanding of these sources. It is this issue, the obligation to follow the manhaj of the Salaf that constitutes the area of dispute between the Salafis and reformist organizations like the Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam (Persis). The debates to which the issue of the Salafi manhaj has given rise will be reviewed in a later section of this chapter. Salafis use various names to refer to themselves: ahl al-hadith (followers of the Prophetic tradition), ahl al-athar (followers of the Prophetic tradition), al-jama’a (congregation), ahl al-sunna wa al-jama’a (followers of sunna and the congregation), jama’at al-muslimin (congregation of Muslims), al-firqa alnajiya (the saved group), al-ta’ifa al-mansura (the victorious group), ahl al-ittiba’ (followers) and al-ghuraba’(strangers). “Hadith” and “athar” mean almost the same: the Prophetic tradition. Salafis are called ahl al-hadith or ahl al-athar because they advocate a hadith-based interpretation of the Qur’an. In Islamic history, the ahl al-hadith came up in the beginning of the second century of the hijra. The term ahl al-hadith is often contrasted with ahl al-ra’y (followers of rational judgment), which refers to those people who advocate a rational interpretation of the Qur’an. Ahmad ibn Hanbal, the eponymous founder of the Hanbali School of Islamic jurisprudence, is regarded as one of the strictest advocates of the reliance on the hadith and of the rejection of the ra’y.13 The ahl-i hadith came up in India and Pakistan in the late eighteenth century as a movement calling on Muslims to return to refer to the Qur’an and the hadith instead of referring to the four well-established schools of Islam.14 Al-Jama’a, as stated above, means ‘Muslim community’. Al-Ta’ifa al-mansura (victorious group) is close in meaning to al-firqa al-najiya (the saved group). As God will save the Salafis from hell, they will be the only sect to enter paradise. The Salafis are called the ahl al-ittiba’ (followers), since they usually use dalil (argument) and do not engage in taqlid (blind imitation). The difference between ittiba’ and taqlid is 13 J. Schacht, “Ahl al-Hadith”, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 1, Leiden: Brill, 1986, pp. 258-259. 14 S.H. Inayatullah, “Ahl-i Hadith”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edition, vol. 1, Leiden: Brill, 1986 p. 259. See also, Stéphane Lacroix, “Between Revolution and Apoliticism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism” in Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism, London: Hurst and Company, 2009, pp. 61-62.

20

WHO IS SALAFI?

somewhat vague since ittiba’ may be considered a form of taqlid. However, the former denotes that a person knows the source of the dalil, while the latter does not. Salafis are labelled al-ghuraba’ because they are aliens to others. The term corresponds to a hadith that says that Islam came as something alien and will become alien again.15 Bernard Haykel summarizes the fundamental ideas of the Salafi da`wa as follows: 1) the return to pristine Islam, as prescribed in the examples of the al-Salaf al-salih; 2) an emphasis on certain highly specific doctrines concerning tawhid (rububiyya, uluhiyya and al-asma’ wa al-sifat); 3) the struggle against shirk (polytheism); 4) the claim that the Qur’an, the hadith and the consensus of the Companions (ijma’ al-sahaba) are the only valid sources of Islamic law; 5) cleansing the Muslim community from all religious innovations; and 6) advocating a literal interpretation of the Qur’an and the hadith in order to guide Muslims in their life.16 Added to these characteristics is the unconditional respect for the Companions. Although the Salafis do not believe that the Companions were infallible (ma’sum), they do prohibit Muslim from insulting them.17 Instead of discussing the disputes among the Companions of the Prophet, such as the case of the jamal fitna (camel war, the civil war between the Companions), Salafis opt to avoid the discussion by arguing that it was subject to the Companions’ ijtihad.

Salafism and Wahhabism Some scholars make no distinction between Salafism and Wahhabism and simply consider the former a new manifestation of the latter. The name “Salafi” has come to be preferred, they claim, because of the negative views many Muslims have of Wahhabism.18 To many Muslims, the term Salafi seems to sound less threatening than Wahhabism. The supporters of the Salafi movement strongly reject the name Wahhabi because it points to Muhammad ibn `Abd alWahhab and thus suggests the veneration of a human being. The influence of Wahhabism – in the restricted sense of the movement Muhammad ibn `Abd al15 Abdul Qadir Jawas, Syarah Aqidah, p. 39. 16 Bernard Haykel, “On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action”, in Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism, London: Hurst and Company, 2009, pp. 38-39. 17 Interview with Aunurrafiq Ghufran, director of Pesantren al-Furqan, Gresik, 26 December 2009. 18 Noorhaidi Hasan, “The Salafi Movement in Indonesia: Transnational Dynamics and Local Development” in Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, vol. 27, No. 1, 2007, p. 8.

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Wahhab inspired that took control of Mecca in the late 18th and again in the early 20th century – on contemporary Salafism needs to be more critically explored. Tracing its history is one way of gaining a proper understanding of Wahhabism. Wahhabism is a movement that pays enormous attention to the purification of Islam by cleansing it from all that is not supported by the Qur’an, the hadith or the practice of the al-Salaf al-salih. Unlike other reformist movements that came up in the twentieth century as reactions to Western colonialism, this eighteenth century movement was a response to internal conditions within the Muslim community itself.19 In this century, Muslims indulged in local traditions that were alien to pristine Islam such as visiting the shrines of saints. At the time, Muslims believed that a saint was endowed with the spiritual power to mediate between them and God. Wahhabism calls on Muslims to purify their creed and their religious practices from these local traditions that are alien to Islam. Although reformist Muslims faced the same situation in the twentieth century, the reform movement at the time was very much influenced by Western colonialism. As a result, reformist figures addressed ideas and practices that had been developed in the West such as women’s rights and bank interest. In Egypt, pioneers of Islamic modernism such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida clearly discussed these matters in their thoughts.20 Confronted with this situation, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab called on Muslims to renew their tawhid by ridding their belief from local practices. He was forced to move from one place to another due to threats from existing ‘ulama, before he finally entered into an alliance with local tribal leaders. He allied with Uthman ibn Hamid ibn Mu’ammar and they agreed to support each other in matters pertaining to religion and politics. Gaining political impetus, in his da’wa, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab started to resort to violent actions like demolishing tombs, cutting down trees to avoid spirit veneration and such like.21 This collaboration ended when the more powerful leader Sulayman ibn Muhammad challenged Ibn Mu’ammar and put pressure on him to expel his ally. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab subsequently went to Dir’iya where he gained support from its local leader, Muhammad ibn Su’ud. The two men entered into a mutual oath of loyalty (bay’a) to support each other: the latter would support the religious teaching of the former, while the former would 19 Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, from Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, London: IB Tauris, 2004, pp. 7-8. 20 On these three reformist figures, see Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 21 Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, pp. 21-22.

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WHO IS SALAFI?

show his allegiance to the political power of the latter. In 1744, this coalition led to the creation of the first Saudi State.22 This agreement continues into the modern period as Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s heirs maintain their religious privilege in return for their support to Ibn Su’ud’s heirs in their political positions. Thus, what distinguishes Wahhabism from other Islamic movements is its use of force and violent actions in its da’wa. Wahhabism elaborated on the concepts of takfir (excommunication), hijra (migration) and jihad. Takfir means labelling as kafir (unbelievers) those Muslims who fail to perform their daily religious duties. According to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, any Muslim who invokes the help of a dead person or makes vows to holy men violates his faith and commits major idolatry (shirk akbar). Moreover, any Muslim who fails to consider these practice idolatry is dubbed kafir as well. Such Muslims must either repent to God or be killed.23 Later, after Sayyid Qutb, the doctrine was often applied to Muslim rulers who failed to implement Islamic law but preferred to enact manmade laws. This resulted in political turbulence as it legalized rebellion against the legitimate ruler. 24 Hijra means that Muslims should move from an “infidel” community to a pious, Islamic one. Jihad in Islamic discourse is defined as the “exertion of one’s power in Allah’s path, that is, the spread of belief in Allah and making His word supreme over this world.”25 In spite of this extensive meaning of jihad, fundamentalists prefer to limit its meaning to holy war or to the fight against any social system that contradicts Islamic law. Jihad is closely linked to the concept of al-amr bi al-ma’ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar (commanding right and forbidding wrong).26 By elaborating these concepts, Wahhabism wants to legitimize its political goals. In case a ruler is labelled takfir, Wahhabism urges Muslims to either leave their country or wage war against him. The Saudi ruler has adopted Wahhabism as a religious ideology. It provides the religious bases of the state, its political reality and its laws. In Saudi Arabia, the ruler often uses Wahhabism as a political tool in order to provide his policies 22 Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, p. 34; Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007: p. 46. 23 David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006, p. 24. 24 Ahmad Mousalli, “Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who Is the Enemy?”, A Conflict Forum Monograph, Beirut, London and Washington: January 2009, pp. 6-7. 25 Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955, p. 55. 26 Rudolph Peters, “Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History”, PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam, 1979, p. 119.

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with a religious foundation.27 In the 1990s, for example, the official Saudi ‘ulama issued a fatwa legitimizing the ruler’s invitation of the infidel US army forces and their allies to protect the holy land from the Iraqi invasion.28 As a consequence, Wahhabism has granted the Saudi ruler his citizen’s unconditional loyalty, which subsequently has become one of Wahhabism’s central doctrines. Here we see the doctrine changing from takfir to loyalty. Salafism emerged earlier in the second century after the hijra. It appeared in the ahl-i hadith movement that opposed the ahl al-ra’y. Salafism differs from Wahhabism as the former uses acts of non-violence whereas the latter tends to resort to violence as became evident in the early phase of the Wahhabi movement. However, Salafism calls on Muslims at the grassroots level to purify their creed and to cleanse their religious practices in the hope that the Islamic community will materialize when all elements of the community have resorted to the Salafi manhaj. In order to achieve this end, the Salafi apply the means of tarbiya (education) and tasfiya (purification).29 Salafi teaching encompasses more than that of Wahhabism. Wahhabis mainly refer to the works of their eponymous sheikh, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and of three earlier scholars, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Ahmad ibn Taymiyya, and Muhammad ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya. It is clear that these works, particularly those of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab on the Islamic creed (‘aqida), constitute Salafism’s main teachings. This explains the great influence Wahhabism has over Salafism. Even in Indonesia, some Salafi teachers have no objection to the use of the label Wahhabism to designate their movement.30 Moreover, some Salafis have written books in defence of Wahhabism’s founder.31 They contend that ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s da’wa was Salafi as it called on Muslims to return to the Qur’an and the hadith.32 However, Salafism expands its references to other scholars who took the path of the al-Salaf al-salih, such as Abu Muhammad al-Hasan ibn 27 Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, p. 4. 28 Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, p. 36. 29 Zainal Abidin bin Syamsudin, Buku Putih Dakwah Salafiah, Jakarta: Pustaka Imam Abu Hanifah, 2009, pp. 174-180. 30 Interview with Ja’far Sholeh, director of Pesantren Salafiyah, Depok, August, 2008. 31 At least two books clarifying this matter circulate in Indonesia: Muhammad ibn Jamil Zainu, Mitos Wahhabi, Yogyakarta: al-Husan, 2010; and Abu Ubaidah Yusuf asSidawi, Meluruskan Sejarah Wahhabi, Gresik: Pustaka al-Furqan, 1427 H (2007). While the first book is a translation from an Arabic work written by a prominent Salafi scholar, the latter is written by an Indonesian Salafi teacher. 32 Yazid Jawas, Mulia, p. 425.

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WHO IS SALAFI?

‘Ali ibn Khalaf al-Barbahari (the author of Sharh al-Sunna) and Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi’i, the founder of the Shafi’ite school. The Salafis also list the most authoritative hadith collections, Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim among their references. They even study and teach al-Nawawi’s works Riyad al-Salihin and alArba’in al-Nawawi, which are commonly found in traditional pesantrens and are used in majelis taklim (religious gatherings). B. The Basic Principles and Characteristics of the Salafi Manhaj Salafis have developed the basic doctrines of the Salafi manhaj. They give priority to ‘aqida (creeds) over fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). For them, ‘aqida is more essential than fiqh because the former will lead Muslims to the performance of the correct rituals. Salafis believe that true ‘aqida will result in the glory of the Muslims. The following passages will discuss some of Salafism’s basic principles and characteristics which include tawhid, following the sunna, being opposed to bid’a and al-wala’ wa al-bara’, and obedience to the ruler. While all Salafis agree with the first three doctrines, some Salafi groups object to the use of the fourth as a guide regulating Muslims’ attitude towards government.

Tawhid Tawhid (monotheism) is central to the teaching of Islam. According to Islam, all Semitic religions are based on this essential doctrine. The first call that Muhammad made to the people during his da’wa in Mecca was to tawhid. Tawhid means the Oneness of God or the belief in one God. Salafis have divided the concept of tawhid into three aspects: tawhid rububiyya (Oneness of Lordship), tawhid uluhiyya (Oneness of Godship), and tawhid al-asma’ wa sifat (Oneness of Names and Attributes). For Salafis, belief in all three aspects is crucial and the belief in one God alone is insufficient for Muslims. Later, the jihadist added a fourth aspect of tawhid, tawhid mulkiyya or hakimiyya (Oneness of Governance). Muslims traditionally do not make a distinction between these aspects. Rather, they simply believe in one God as the manifestation of the shahada (Islamic confession), that “there is no god but Allah”. They also believe in the ninetynine Names and twenty Attributes of God. Tawhid rububiyya is the belief that God is the only Lord, the Creator of the universe, and the One who provides a livelihood to all His creatures in the universe.33 The Qur’anic verses, [23: 86-89], read: 33 Yazid Jawas, Syarah Aqidah, p. 146.

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“Say: ‘who is the Lord (Rabb) of the seven heavens and the Lord of the Mighty Throne?’ They will say: “(They belong) to Allah.” Say: “Will ye not then fear?” Say: “Who is it in whose hand is the sovereignty of all things, Who protects (all), but is not protected (of Any)? (Say) if you know.” They will say: “(It belongs) to Allah.” Say: “Then how are ye deluded?”

These verses imply that all human beings hold this belief including unbelievers; Salafis contend that this type of tawhid is insufficient for Muslims.34 Based on these and other similar verses, Salafis urge Muslims to embrace higher levels of tawhid, specifically tawhid uluhiyya and tawhid al-asma’ wa al-sifat. Tawhid uluhiyya is the belief that only God should be subject to human worship. This type of tawhid marks a sharp distinction between Muslims and unbelievers and polytheists. This pillar of tawhid is the manifestation of the Islamic confession, la ilaha illa Allah. In contrast to the common translation of this phrase into “there is no god but God”, Salafis interpret it as “there is no god to be rightly worshipped but Allah.”35 This is in line with Qur’anic verse, 1:5, “Thee do we worship and Thee do we seek aid.” Tawhid al-asma’ wa al-sifat is the belief in the literal meaning of Allah’s Names and Attributes. The Salafis contend that all the Attributes of Allah should be accepted as they are without ta’til, tahrif or ta’wil, takyif, tashbih and tafwid.36 Thus, the Qur’anic verses describing God’s Attributes such as His Face, His Hand and His Chair should be understood literally. Furthermore, unlike rationalist Muslims, Salafis contend that Muslims are not allowed to interpret them as “power”, for example. Salafis equate the Attribute to the Essence (Dhat) of Allah and therefore questioning the Attributes of Allah means questioning the Essence of Allah, something prohibited for Muslims.

34 Yazid Jawas, Syarah Aqidah, p. 151. 35 Yazid Jawas, Syarah Aqidah, p. 132. See also, Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay, New York: Islamic Publications International, 2002, pp. 31-32. 36 Ta’til means to negate or deny some of God’s Attributes. Tahrif or ta’wil means to change the literal meaning of God’s Attributes or to interpret them into other more rational meanings. Takyif means to pose further questions about what the God’ Attributes are. Tashbih is to compare the Attributes of God to those of living creatures like human beings, thus equating God’s attributes to those of human beings. Tafwid means not to decide the meaning of God’s Attributes as prescribed in the Holy Book and accepted hadiths. See, Yazid Jawas, Syarah Aqidah, p. 132, note no. 218, 219, 220, and 221. See also, Muhammadi bin Jamil Zainu, al-Firqatun al-Najiyah: Jalan Hidup Golongan Selamat, Yogyakarta: Media Hidayah, 2003, pp. 32-33.

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WHO IS SALAFI?

Salafis understanding of God’s Names and Attributes is in part similar to that of the Ash’arite, a traditionalist Islamic theology to which the majority of Muslims in Indonesia adhere. The Salafis and the Ash’arite share similar beliefs: that God has Names and Attributes and that they do not interpret when they encounter anthropomorphic Attributes of God (bila kayfa). They, however, differ in defining God’s Names and Attributes. While Salafis equate the Names and Attributes, the Ash’arite distinguishes between them. As result, they disagree in the quantity of God’s Names and Attributes. On the one hand, the Ash’arite believe that God has ninety nine Names (al-asma’ al-husna) as mentioned in the Qur’an, and summarize God’s Attributes to twenty, such as wujud (Existence), baqa’ (Eternal) and irada (Powerful).37 However, Salafis believe that there are many more Attributes. Meanwhile, tawhid mulkiyya or hakimiyya means that God is the only Ruler of the universe. Human beings have no right to make new laws but are only entitled to implement what has been prescribed in the Qur’an and by the examples of the Prophet. The hakimiyya concept was developed by the Pakistani thinker Abul A’la al-Maududi and later adopted by Egyptian activist Sayyid Qutb, the ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the Salafi majority refutes this dimension arguing that this element is already included in the first part of tawhid, tawhid al-rububiyya.

Following Sunna (Ittiba’ al-Sunna) and Opposing Bid’a Sunna literally means “way, method, and path” which accords with a hadith that reads as follows: “Whoever creates a good path (tradition) in Islam will receive a reward for doing so and reward from who follows this method. Whoever creates a bad way, he will accept punishment from it and punishment from who imitates this way.”38 Sunna here refers to the true religious way or method of thought and practices in accordance with the ways of the Prophet and his Companions.39 Furthermore, Salafis maintain that the sunna is identical to 37 In Indonesia, the Ash’arite theological doctrines are summarized, for example, in a booklet called the Kitab Perukunan Melayu, which is commonly found among the Muslim community. See, for example, Yayasan Sosial dan Penerangan Islam, Kitab Perukunan Melayu Besar, Jakarta: M. A. Jaya, n.d. While the main contents relate to fiqh, the book also includes the twenty Attributes of God. 38 Abd al-Salam bin Salim al-Suhaymi, Menjadi Salafy Sejati, Yogyakarta: Pustaka alHaura’, 1429 (2009), pp. 39-40. 39 Abdul Hakim bin Amir Abdat, Risalah Bid’ah, Jakarta: Pustaka Mu’awiyah bin Abi Sufyan, 2004, p. 37. See also, Abd al-Salam bin Salim al-Suhaymi, Menjadi Salafy Sejati, pp. 39-41.

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Islam. Al-Barbahari says: “Islam is sunna and sunna is Islam. Each cannot stand firmly without the support of the other.”40 This phrase explains the significance of the sunna. Abdul Hakim Abdat, a leading Salafi scholar in Indonesia, explains that a Muslim cannot truly understand correctly and implement the Islamic doctrines without referring to the sunna, the utterances and the practices of the Prophet.41 The sunna is the opposite of bid’a (innovation). In line with its original meaning as “a new creation that has no precedence”,42 the term bid’a is commonly defined as “a new creation in religious matters.” Some Salafis define bid’a in a wider sense as “a new innovation in religious matters seemingly equal to the shari’a in order to excessively worship God.”43 This definition suggests that bid’a is seen as similar to the shari’a, and many Muslims have posited religious arguments to support this. However, Salafis believe that such definition is totally against the shari’a. The starting point for the discussion of bid’a is the view that Islam is a complete religion and, therefore, does not need additional ritual or thought. The totality of Islam has been stated definitely in the Qur’an [5:3]: “Today I have perfected your religion for you, completed my favour upon you and approved al-Islam as din (way of life for you)”. This argument is supported by a Prophetic tradition that reads: “any religious action without an earlier example of the Prophet is reputed.”44 Salafis classify bid’a into two categories: bid’a haqiqiyya (essential bid’a) and bid’a idafiyya (additional bid’a). The first type refers to a bid’a that has no basis at all in the Qur’an, the hadith, ijma’ (consensus), and the opinions of the ‘ulama. An example of this type is a person who admits that he has received a revelation from God after the Prophet Muhammad. The second type of bid’a is a bid’a that appears to have a basis in religious argument, but, in fact, does not. The practice of traditional Muslims of gathering every Thursday evening to read sura Yasin falls into this category. While the shari’a prescribes the recitation of the Qur’an, the recital of a specific Sura during a particular time has no basis in Islam.45 40 Abu Muhammad al-Hasan ibn Ali ibn Khalaf al-Barbahari, Sharh al-Sunna, Riyad: Dar al-Sami’i, 2007, p. 59. 41 Abdul Hakim Abdat, Lau Kaana, p. 56. 42 Ali ibn Hasan ibn Abd al-Hamid al-Halabi al-Atsary, Mengupas Tuntas Akar Bid’a dalam Timbangan Al-Qur’an dan Sunnah”, Bekasi: Pustaka Imam Adz-Dzahabi, 2009, p. 19. 43 Ali ibn Hasan al-Atsari, Mengupas Tuntas, p. 20. 44 Ali ibn Hasan al-Atsari, Mengupas Tuntas, p. 23. Also, Abdul Hakim Abdat, Risalah Bid’ah, p. pp. 47-48. 45 Ali ibn Hasan al-Atsari, Mengupas Tuntas, pp. 135-136; also, Abdul Hakim Abdat, Risalah Bid’ah, pp. 92-93.

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In addition to the above classification, Salafis also divide bid’a into bid’a i’tiqadiyya (creedal bid’a) and bid’a ‘amaliyya (bid’a of religious practice or ritual). While the former relates to theological doctrine that does not correspond with the belief of the Prophet and his Companions, the second concerns religious practices that have no roots in early Islam as practiced by the al-Salaf al-salih.46 Both categories of bid’a are haram. Some bid’a may lead Muslims to polytheism such as tawassul (intercession), asking for God’s mercy through a mediator, particularly through dead pious Muslims. Most bid’a fall into the bid’a idafiyya category. To fight against bid’a is harder than to fight against sinful actions. Every Muslim believes that adultery and theft are sins, and as a result it is easy to ask Muslims not to do these things. By contrast, not every Muslim is aware of bid’a, and, in fact, many Muslims believe that their religious practices are true and right and supported by religious arguments.47 Consequently, many Muslims are keen to defend their religious practices. Salafis are very strict in their denouncement of bid’a. All religious thoughts and practices that have no roots in the Qur’an, the hadith and the examples of the Companions are categorized as bid’a. Their dedication to combatting bid’a includes not only the fight against popular religious traditions such as the commemoration of the Prophet’s birthday (mawlid al-nabiy) and tahlilan (Qur’anic recitation combined with the chanting of other religious formulas) at the commemoration of the death of a person on certain days, but also encompasses the new tradition of enhancing Islamic symbols such as the Musabaqa Tilawat al-Qur’an (MTQ, Qur’anic Recitation Competition).48 There are a number of reasons why bid’a is committed: ignorance of the sources of Islamic law, following one’s own passion when interpreting Islamic law, and using reason to define Islamic law.49 Ignorance often leads Muslims to taqlid (blind imitation) and ta’assub madhhabiy (fanatically following a particular school of thought).50 Taking these reasons into account, Salafis do not condemn every person who commits bid’a as ahl al-bid’a (the people of bid’a). In their view, only 46 Abdul Hakim Abdat, Risalah Bid’ah, pp. 93-94. 47 Abdul Hakim bin Amir Abdat, Hukum Tahlilan, Jakarta: Pustaka Mu’awiyah bin Abi Sufyan, 2009, pp. 11-12. 48 In his book, Risalah Bid’ah, Abdul Hakim Abdat identifies more than 500 religious practices and thoughts that are regarded as bid’a. It deals with religious, social and political aspects. 49 Ali ibn Hasan ibn Abd al-Hamid al-Halabi al-Atsary, Mengupas Tuntas Akar Bid’a, pp. 38-42. 50 Abdul Hakim Abdat, Hukum Tahlilan, pp. 18-19.

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those people who have sufficient knowledge of Islam but still commit bid’a and even encourage fellow Muslims to do the same, are considered ahl al-bid’a. Salafis believe that these people deserve special treatment: they should be subjected to isolation (al-hajr) and banned from having contact with fellow Muslims. Furthermore, Muslims should not greet them or even smile at them when they meet them.51 Moreover, Muslims should not heed their calls and not attend their debates and discussions since doing so may awaken doubts about Islam. The aim of these sanctions is to make the people of bid’a return to true Islam.

Al-Wala’ wa al-Bara’ Closely related to the concept of tawhid is the concept of al-wala’ wa al-bara’ which means “alliance and disassociation”. While al-wala’ etymologically means “to love, help, follow and approach something”, the term al-bara’ means “to distance, cleanse, escape from, and hate.”52 Thus the concept of al-wala’ wa al-bara’ bears the meaning of love and hate for sake of Allah. It implies that true Muslims should love and help their fellow Muslims, defend the interest of Islam (al-wala’) while at the same time criticize and condemn infidels and un-Islamic ways of living while making every effort to protect themselves from infidel corruption (al-bara’).53 As Joas Wagemakers has shown, the concept of al-wala’ wa al-bara’ has existed since pre-Islamic Arab times when Arab ethnic groups were in conflict forcing them to enter into alliances among themselves. The advent of Islam did not wipe out the concept; rather, it kept it alive. The Kharijites made use of al-wala’ wa al-bara’ for the first time following the conflict between ‘Ali and Mu’awiyah. The Kharijites made a clear-cut boundary between its in-group and the others. After Sunni scholars had regarded it as religious innovation (bid’a) for centuries, Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) reconstituted the idea. Although he did not use the concept al-wala’ wa al-bara’, he made a clear distinction between true Muslims and non-Muslims. He was aware of the influence of non-Muslim cultures on Muslims and warned them not to deviate from the true path. Muslims were cautioned to distinguish themselves from non-Muslims including in their way of dress.54 From that moment on, Sunni scholars adopted the concept and it 51 Abdul Hakim Abdat, Risalah Bid’ah, p. 277. 52 Yazid Jawas, Prinsip Dasar Islam, pp. 221-222. 53 Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia, New York: Cornell University, 2006, p. 138. 54 Joas Wagemakers, “The Transformation of a Radical Concept: al-Wala’ wa-l-bara’ in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, in Roel Meijer, Global Salafism, pp. 82-

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has since been developed by contemporary radical thinkers such as Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, the leader of a radical group that rebelled against their king and who occupied the Grand mosque of Mecca in 1979,55 Yusuf al-‘Uyairi and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.56 Unlike mainstream official ‘ulama who supported the Saudi rulers, al-‘Utaybi, for example, extended the meaning of the concept of alwala’ wa al-bara’ to include hijra and qital. Moreover, the Palestinian-Jordanian thinker, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi extended the concept to include the notion of takfir (labelling other Muslims as kafir). He uses the concept of takfir to denote those Muslim rulers who refuse to apply the laws of God.57 Meanwhile, al‘Uyairi makes the adoption of the concept of al-wala’ wa al-bara’ a precondition for exercising revolutionary jihad.58 The concept derives from Qur’anic verses, like 3:28: “Let not the believers take for friends or helpers unbelievers rather than believers; if any does that shall have no relation left with Allah, except by way of precaution, that ye may guard yourselves from them. But Allah cautions you (to fear) Himself, for the final goal is to Allah”.

Another Qur’anic verse, 60:4, says: “There is for you an excellent example (to follow) in Ibrahim (Abraham) and those with him, when they said to their people: ‘We are clear of you and whatever ye worship besides Allah: we have rejected you and there has arisen between us and you enmity and hatred forever unless ye believe in Allah and him alone.’ But not when Abraham said to his father: “I will pray for forgiveness for thee, though I have no power (to get) aught on thy behalf from Allah.” (They prayed): “Our Lord! In Thee 86; Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad, p. 140. 55 On the rebel movement of Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, see for example, Thomas Hegghammer and Stéphane Lacroix, “Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-‘Utaybi Revisited”, in International Journal of Middle East Studies, 39, 2007, pp. 109-113. 56 On al-Maqdisi’s view of al-wala’ wa al-bara’, see a comprehensive account on his thought by Joas Wagemakers, “A Quietist Jihadi-Salafi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi”, PhD thesis, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, 2010, especially chapters 6 and 7, pp. 151- 192. 57 Joas Wagemakers, “The Transformation of a Radical Concept, pp. 92-93; Joas Wagemakers, “A Purist Jihadi-Salafi: The Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi”, in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 36 (2), 2009, p. 289. 58 Roel Meijer, “Yusuf al-‘Uyairi and the Making of a Revolutionary Salafi Praxis”, Die Welt des Islams, 47, 2007, p. 445.

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do we trust and to Thee do we turn in repentance. To Thee is (our) final return.”

Based on these verses, Salafis contend that the doctrine of al-wala’ wa albara’ is indispensable to religion. It forms part of the tawhid as a manifestation of the Islamic confession, “la ilaha illa Allah”. They believe that the concept should be practiced daily in faith, utterance, and action.59 This includes, among other things, not helping non-Muslims, not attending non-Muslim religious festivals, not greeting non-Muslims, not imitating the habits and customs of the unbelievers, not being loyal to unbelievers, and leaving infidel countries.60 However, enmity and hatred towards unbelievers should not lead Muslims to behave in a hostile way towards them. Muslims, for example, are allowed to make a peaceful agreement with non-Muslims, and to do business with them.61 The Salafis implement the doctrine of al-wala’ wa al-bara’ in a strict manner: it is applied not only towards non-Muslim but also to other Muslims. Salafis limit their interaction with other Muslims. For instance, during a Friday sermon delivered at Pesantren Al-Nur al-Atsari, a khatib (preacher) advised the jama’a to abandon their friends, groups and organizations that adhere to a different manhaj.62 They have to adopt this attitude in order to firmly observe the Salafi manhaj. Association with others may instil doubt in the hearts of Salafis. Thus, some Salafis do not even greet their fellow Muslims.

Obedience to the ruler Although not agreed to by all Salafis, the doctrine of the people’s obedience to the ruler is a pivotal Salafi doctrine in relation to Muslims’ attitudes towards the government. The idea of submission to the government is almost absolute and can only be ignored for very fundamental reasons of faith. There is, no doubt, a small group of Salafis who object to this doctrine and who support the takfir idea as discussed above. This objection, however, does not detract from the significance of the dominant Salafi doctrine concerning allegiance to the ruler. Madawi al-Rasheed has noted that in Saudi Arabia, the doctrine of obedience to the ruler dates back to 1929 after the ikhwan’s rebellion against the then Saudi ruler, Abd al-Aziz ibn Su’ud. Ibn 59 Yazid Jawas, Prinsip Dasar Islam, pp. 223. 60 Yazid Jawas, Prinsip Dasar Islam, pp. 220-238; Yazid Jawas, Sharh Aqidah, pp. 502-509; Muhammad Saeed al-Qahtani, al-Wala’ Wa’l-Bara’ According to the ‘Aqeedah of the Salaf, part 3, London: al-Firdous Ltd., 2000, pp. 18-19. 61 Yazid Jawas, Sharh Aqidah, pp. 513-514. 62 Friday sermon by Abu Fauzan at Pesantren Al-Nur al-Atsari, December 12, 2008.

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Su’ud defeated his own rebellious comrades in the battle of al-Sibla and repelled them to the neighbouring Gulf States, which were under British rule. Soon after quelling the rebellion, Saudi clerics developed the doctrine of obedience to the ruler in the home country. Any attempt to oppose him was deemed khuruj ‘ala al-hakim, rebellion against the ruler.63 This doctrine of loyalty is supported by many dalils from the Qur’an, the Prophetic tradition and the examples of the pious predecessors, the al-Salaf al-salih. In Salafi doctrine, Qur’anic verse 4: 59 contains the main argument for the submission to the government. This verse states that Muslims should obey God, the Messenger and their rulers (waliy al-amr). Both government and ‘ulama are included in the category of ‘ruler’.64 Another Qur’anic injunction, verse 4: 83, tells us that Muslims should always refer back to the Prophet and the ruler. Unlike the submission to God and His messenger, which are absolute, obedience to the ruler is conditional in so far as a ruler’s command does not contradict the commands of God. Should the ruler command his people to commit sinful acts, however, Muslims are told they are not allowed to execute his order.65 In addition to the above reference, there are a number of Prophetic sayings that command Muslims to obey a ruler and not to rebel against him even in cases where he is a tyrant, repressive or acts like the devil.66 The Prophet relates submission to the ruler to submission to himself: loyalty to the ruler equates devotion to the Prophet.67 The Prophet also tells that a Muslim who dies being disloyal to the government dies in a state of jahiliyya (as if in the age of ignorance), as according to Ibn Taymiyya, rebellion against the ruler is a jahiliyya tradition. However, Salafis follow the example of the pious predecessors and quote the story of Ahmad ibn Hanbal who, despite being tortured by his ruler, remained loyal to him.68 63 Madawi Al-Rasheed, “The Minaret and The Palace: Obedience at Home and Rebellion Abroad”, in Madawi al-Rasheed, Kingdom without Borders, London: Hurst and Company, 2008, p. 203. 64 In spite of the minor difference in interpreting the term “waliyy al-amr minkum” (ruler from you), the Salafis agree that the term includes the ruler and the ‘ulama. See, “Kewajiban Mentaati Penguasa dalam Perkara yang Baik (Tafsir Surat An-Nisa’ 59)”, in Salafy, Vol. 5, No. 7, 2005, pp. 44-46. 65 Abu Abd al-Rahman Fauzi al-Atsari, Meredam Amarah terhadap Pemerintah, Pekalongan: Pustaka Sumayya, 2005 p. 49. 66 A famous hadith from Hudhaifa ibn Yaman says that a Muslim should listen to and obey his ruler even if the ruler intimidates him and appropriates his wealth. The hadith is narrated in the two foremost reliable hadiths books of Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim. See, Abd al-Rahman Fauzi al-Atsari, Meredam Amarah, p. 56. 67 Abd al-Rahman Fauzi al-Atsari, Meredam Amarah. p. 53. See also, Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas, Syarah ‘Aqidah, p. 573. 68 Abd al-Rahman Fauzi al-Atsari, Meredam Amarah, p. 68.

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With reference to the sources mentioned above, Salafis contend that Muslims are not allowed to rebel against a ruler as long as he allows Muslims to perform their religious duties, such as performing the five prayers, fasting during Ramadan, and paying alms. There are only two conditions that permit Muslims to rebel: if a ruler demonstrates his kufr (unbelief in God) and if he does not perform his prayers.69 However, it is a complicated matter to decide whether or not a ruler is a kafir (unbeliever). This status cannot be indicated by his sayings alone because his sayings and his acts may not constitute the essence of his belief. Furthermore, a ruler’s tyrannical and evil acts cannot make him a kafir. It is the duty of hadith ‘ulamas to decide whether or not a ruler may remain Muslim; ordinary people cannot accuse a ruler of being kafir.70 Salafis believe that fighting a Muslim ruler will result in more damage than the ruler himself ever could do.71 This appears to contradict the principle of commanding right and forbidding evil but Salafis argue that evil cannot be eliminated though committing other evil acts. Moreover, when applying the principle the potential gains and damages should be measured. In fact, Salafis have developed various guidelines for its implementation: first, if the application of commanding right and forbidding wrong outweighs the damage its application would cause, then it is demanded by religion. Second, and by contrast, if the application of the principle creates more damage than benefit, it is considered unlawful. Third, if the benefit is equal to the damage, the application of the principle is neither demanded nor prohibited so it is permissible. These guidelines are in line with the more general principle in Islam of “avoiding damage is preferable to acquiring benefit.”72 The Salafis have set up practical guidelines for the relationship between the ruler and the ruled: Muslims must honour the ruler, not criticize him publicly and not speak about his weaknesses. In addition, rather than advising a ruler in the public space, Muslims are required to advise him covertly. Muslims are obliged to display their support for their ruler by performing their religious 69 See, “Akhlak Kaum Muslimin Menghadapi Penguasa yang Dhalim,” in Salafy, Vol. 5, No., 7, 2008, p. 60. 70 Ja’far Umar Thalib, “Sikap Politik Ahlus Sunnah”, in tabloid Laskar Jihad, 20, June 2002, p. 5. Also, interview with Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin, the director of pesantren Imam Bukhari, Solo, February 21, 2009. 71 Yazid Jawas, Syarah ‘Aqidah, p 573. 72 Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas, Amar Ma’ruf Nahi Munkar Menurut Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’ah, Bogor: Pustaka At-Taqwa, 2009, pp. 214-225.

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duties such as paying alms (zakat), performing the pilgrimage and waging jihad.73 It should be noted that for Salafis, jihad is only valid if instructed by a legitimate imam. Muslims should also abide by the government’s decision concerning the arrival of Ramadan and the dates of the festivals of Id al-Fitr and Id al-Adha.74 As it happens, these important Islamic events have been the cause of recurrent disagreement among Indonesian Muslims. For many years, Muslims have used different methods to decide when the beginning of Ramadan should be. Similarly, different Muslims have celebrated Id al-Fitr on different days. In order to avoid this kind of disagreement, Salafis opt to follow the Indonesian government’s decision when Id al-Fitr should be celebrated, and they follow the decision of the Saudi government when the festival of Id al-Adha should be held. In the last case, they argue that the celebration of Id al-Adha relates to the ritual enacted during the pilgrimage which is performed in Saudi Arabia and thus the Saudi Government should decide when the ritual should be held. Id al-Adha occurs on the 10th of Dhulhijja, the last month of the Islamic calendar when large numbers of Muslims from all over the world perform the pilgrimage. The pilgrims gather in ‘Arafa to perform the wuquf, one of the hajj rituals on the 9th of Dhulhijjah or one day before the celebration of Id al-Adha. As the wuquf is held in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi government has the authority to decide on its date.75 To participate in demonstrations is perceived as bid’a. It contradicts the general principle that evil cannot be countered by another evil. Usually, demonstrations involve both women and men and this mixing of the sexes is not allowed. Moreover, large crowds may be seen as a possible catalyst and provoke other followers to act violently and to rebel against the legitimate ruler. For Salafis, participants in demonstrations find it difficult to control their statements and acts, which may humiliate the government and result in damage.76 C. Which Salafism?: Contesting Salafi Claims The term “Salafi” has become contested. On the one hand, Salafis are viewed as a safe and victorious group; holders of the Prophet’s assurance that they will be the only group to enter paradise. As such, every group of Muslims is likely to claim 73 Madawi Al-Rasheed, “The Minaret and The Palace”, 205. 74 Abu Abd al-Rahman Fauzi al-Atsari, Meredam Amarah, pp. 232-246. 75 Interview with Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin, Solo, February 21, 2009. Interview with Mubarak Bamualim, Surabaya, December 23, 2008. 76 Sheikh Su’ayyid ibn Hulaiyyil al-Umar, “Demonstrasi,…Solusi atau Polusi?”, in AdzDzakirah, Vol. 5, No. 5, 22 Rabi al-Thani 1428, pp, 10-15.

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that it follows the ahl al-sunna wa al-jama’a or the Salaf, the pious predecessors. Indeed, the Salaf generations are perceived as the communities to emulate. However, who the Salaf are and how they should be followed is contested. In fact, Salafis are far from monolithic; they are fragmented into a number of factions, each of which claiming to be the true and the most consistent one. The paragraphs below will discuss the various claims Islamist movements make. It was Quintan Wiktorowicz, an American political scientist, who first made a classification of Salafi movements into three factions: purist, politico and jihadi.77 All these groups share common values and have the same basic ideas such as observing strict monotheism and returning to the fundamental sources of Islamic teaching, the Qur’an and the hadith. The groups also emphasize the need to follow the example of the al-Salaf al-salih. The difference between the groups lies in the strategy they adopt for promoting Salafi tenets. The purists opt for disseminating the teaching through peaceful means, such as da’wa for the purification of the Muslim creed (tasfiya) and through education (tarbiya). The purist argument is based on the experiences of the Prophet during his stay in Mecca, when the Muslim community was still fragile. The purists believe that all political action will result in chaos, which, in turn, will harm Muslims. They consider opposition to the ruler unlawful and political parties are conceived as bid’a. Association with non-believers is restricted, and the adoption of Western precepts such as democracy is rejected. In sum, the purists focus their da’wa on purifying Muslim creeds, thought and behaviour from all elements that corrupt Islam. Bin Baz from Saudi Arabia is the most well-known representative of this faction.78 Unlike the purists, who appear to disengage themselves from politics and who emphasize unconditional submission to their ruler, the second faction – the politicos – are familiar with the political situation in the Muslim world. They received their political training from the Muslim Brotherhood, who fled Egypt in the 1960s and who were welcomed by the Saudi ruler to teach in Saudi universities. The politicos became acquainted with political affairs through their interaction with scholars of the Muslim Brotherhood. Armed with political rhetoric, they began to criticize the purists – who always supported the government – within their own circles. However, their dissatisfaction emerged in public when ‘ulamas issued the fatwa that legitimized the Saudi ruler’s policy of inviting the infidel American troops into the country. The politicos 77 Q. Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement”, in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 29:3, 2006, p. 217. 78 Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy”, pp. 217-218.

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believe that the American presence would result in more control over Saudi soil. For this reason, they criticized the purists for their ignorance of the fatwa’s political consequences. Thus, by engaging in political debates, the politicos want to expand their role to cover politics next to religion. They want to apply Salafi precepts in a modern context. Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-Awda are prominent figures of this faction.79 Their critique, however, does not extend to a discussion of the notion of takfir. It is to the jihadists, the third group of Salafis, to discuss the idea of takfir. As mentioned earlier, the Egyptian scholar Sayyid Qutb developed the concept of takfir. The jihadists espouse views and actions that are more radical than those of the politicos and they legitimate the use of violence in order to achieve their goal – the Islamic state. While the politicos criticize the purists for their support for their ruler and their ignorance of political issues, the jihadists go further, stating that any Muslim ruler who does not enact Islamic law is a kafir, and, therefore, subject to jihad.80 Osama bin Laden epitomized this type of jihadist. Various scholars have criticized this typology. Thomas Hegghammer, for example, remarked that the typology is inconsistent – as it mixes means and objections-- and incomplete – as it does not include other important groups of radical Muslims.81 He identifies five rationales behind Islamic activism and divides Islamic movements into “state-oriented”, “nation-oriented”, “ummaoriented”, “morality-oriented” and “sectarian-oriented”. The “state-oriented” type strives for changes in the social and political structures of the state. The “nation-oriented” model struggles to establish authority of specific territories in non-Muslim lands. The “umma-oriented” style supports the unity of all Muslim countries and their protection from non-Muslim threats. The “moralityoriented” group aims at changing Muslims’ attitude in accordance with scripturalist interpretations while the “sectarian-oriented” want to protect the group from competing sects. Hegghammer claims that these motives are behind the most important intentions of Islamist acts.82 This classification no doubt provides a wider scope to Islamic fundamentalism. More recent is Zoltan Pall’s critique. In his view, Wiktorowicz’s classification 79 Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy”, pp. 221-222. 80 Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy”, p. 230. 81 Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism” in Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism, London: Hurst and Company, 2009, p. 254. 82 Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi-Salafis”, p. 258.

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is too rigid, its distinction between the factions too sharp, and that it ignores the theological discourse that motivates these groups.83 Pall contends that theological doctrine plays an important role in determining their actions. He proposes a mixed category based on theology and preference. He classifies Salafis into two main factions: “purist” and “haraki” (activist). The purists are those who are unconditionally loyal to their ruler, while the “harakis” are those who object to absolute submission to a ruler. The “haraki” believe in the allinclusiveness of Islam: that Islamic doctrine not only deals with rituals, but also concerns politics. Within the purist group, Pall furthermore distinguishes “rejectionist purist” who totally repudiate engagement with political practices and only focus on da’wa activities, and “politically oriented purist” who view that to a certain degree involvement in politics is possible. Meanwhile, the “haraki” range from “politico” to “jihadi”. The “politico” support political engagement in order to change the community, while the “jihadi” advocate the use of violence in removing the government. The distinction between “politically-oriented purist” and the “politico” is that the former want to change daily life so that it accords with religious doctrines; the latter aim to change more, including international relations. Although Pall still uses Wiktorowicz’s terms (“purist”, “politico” and “jihadi”), he provides a clearer classification. However, this classification cannot be used to analyse Salafi movements in Indonesia. I agree with his suggestion to include theological motives in classifying the movement, but I disagree slightly with him when he includes the jihadi among the category of “haraki”. I would suggest that the jihadi group be distinguished from the “haraki”, because they resort to verbal opposition to the government and reject the use of violence. The “jihadi” go further by using violent actions against legitimate rulers. The majority of Salafis in Indonesia are categorized as purists. Noorhaidi Hasan has made the most widely accepted classification of Indonesia’s Salafism. He distinguishes Salafism into “Yemeni” and “haraki” or “Sururi”.84 The “Yemenis” are the followers of the great Yemeni Salafi sheikh, the late Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi’i. Prominent figures of this faction include graduates of Darul Hadith, a Salafi institution founded by Sheikh Muqbil in Dammaj, Yemen. Ja’far Umar Thalib, the former commander of the Laskar Jihad, was the leader of this faction. Currently, leading figures of this group are Muhammad al-Sewed 83 Zoltan Pall, Lebanese Salafis Between the Gulf and Europe, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012, p. 24. 84 Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad, pp. 80-83.

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from Cirebon, West Java and Luqman Ba’abduh from Jember, East Java. The second group includes the followers of Muhammad Surur ibn Nayef Zainal Abidin who criticized the official Saudi Arabian ‘ulama for legitimizing the Saudi government’s decision to invite American troops and their allies into the country in order to protect the holy land from Saddam Hussein. Thalib used the terms “haraki” or “Sururi” to label his critics. Prominent figures of this faction include Abu Nida from Yogyakarta, Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin from Solo, Abdul Qadir Yazid Jawas from Bogor and Abdul Hakim Abdat from Yogyakarta. I will return to this matter in more detail in Chapter Two on the origin and development of Salafi movements in Indonesia. Noorhaidi Hasan’s classification is no longer adequate in order to describe current Salafi movements in Indonesia. On the one hand, the so-called “Yemenis” are not merely “Yemeni” for they not only follow the late Sheikh Muqbil, but also emulate Sheikh Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali from Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, the so-called “haraki” or “Sururi” are not really “haraki” or “Sururi” in the sense that they do not criticize the government and do not engage in political movements. Moreover, the above category falls short because it does not include other variants of Salafism, such as the jihadist. I would therefore propose a new classification that meets current streams and comprises all variants of Salafism. I employ the categories used by Pall and Wiktorowicz. I propose to classify Salafism in Indonesia into three categories: “purist”, “haraki” and “jihadist”. All share similar ideas on the first three Salafi doctrines outlined above: tawhid, ittiba’ al-sunna and evading bid’a, and al-wala’ wa al-bara’. On the doctrine of tawhid, all groups agree to the first three dimensions of tawhid, (alrububiyya, al-uluhiyya and al-asma’ wa al-sifat), but they differ on the fourth element, tawhid al-mulkiyya. While the purists maintain that tawhid al-mulkiyya is included in the tawhid al-rububiyya, the haraki and jihadist go further by emphasizing the tawhid al-mulkiyya aspect. This dispute had led to diverse attitudes towards the government and about obedience to the ruler which constitutes the fourth basic doctrine of Salafism. While the purists maintain unconditional obedience to the ruler, the harakis and jihadis criticize state authority. The purists are those who advocate absolute compliance to the ruler and concentrate their activities in da’wa and education. They use peaceful means to achieve their goal, the Islamic community. Within this category, there are three sub-groups, which I call “rejectionist”, “cooperationist”, and “tanzimi”. Rejectionists are the so-called “Yemeni” group: they reject cooperation with other groups deemed hizbiyya such as the Ihya’ al-Turath. In education, this group

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rejects the national curriculum stipulated by the Ministry of National Education, or by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, preferring that of the Yemeni Darul Hadith institution and, hence, it does not participate in the national examination. The group also refuses to attend forums or panel discussions when non-Salafi figures are present. The “cooperationist” refers to the so-called “haraki” or “Sururi”. Contrary to the first sub-group, the “cooperationists” are more openminded in terms of collaboration with other groups. It accepts the national curriculum in education and participates in the national examination. The last sub-group in this category is the “tanzimi”. It adopts the form of a structural and hierarchical organization. Unlike “rejectionist” and “cooperationist” who consider the structural organizational form bid’a, the “tanzimi” faction believes that organization is needed in order to be able to cope with the current challenges da’wa faces. It sees the form of a mass organization as an instrument for the enhancement of Salafi da’wa. Included in this category are the Wahdah Islamiyyah from Makassar, South Sulawesi, and the Harakah Sunniyah untuk Masyarakat Islami or HASMI, which has its headquarters in Ciomas, Bogor, West Java. Both the Wahdah and HASMI are structurally organized from central boards to branches. Unlike other Salafi groups that use the term “Salafi”, the Wahdah and HASMI prefer to use the term “ahl al-Sunna”. The second type of Salafism is “haraki”. Unlike the “purists” who maintain unconditional obedience to the ruler, the “harakis” object to total submission to the government. The “harakis” believe that Islam is an all-encompassing world view that covers all aspects of life, including rituals, social norms, economics, and politics. Consequently, a ruler must implement Islamic norms and regulations and thus he has to submit to and enact Islamic laws. Failure to implement Islamic law results in criticism by the ruled. Pondok Pesantren Islam al-Mukmin, Ngruki, Surakarta, Central Java (well known as Pesantren Ngruki) is considered to belong to this category. The Center for Research and Development of the Ministry of Religious Affairs labels Pesantren Ngruki as “haraki” Salafi. The centre argues that the pesantren teaches Salafi concepts such as the adoption of strict monotheism, following the sunna and opposing bid’a, supporting a literal interpretation of Islamic law, and adhering to the ijtihad bi al-ma’thur, or ijtihad based only on the Qur’an and accepted hadith. The term “haraki” is perceived as a da’wa and educational movement.85 I agree with this label, but I disagree with the argument 85 Puslitbang Pendidikan Agama dan Keagamaan, Depag RI, Pondok Pesantren Islam al-Mukmin Ngruki Solo (Studi tentang Pendidikan, Faham Keagamaan dan Jaringan), Jakarta: Puslitbang Pendidikan Agama dan Keagamaan, Balitbang Agama dan Diklat

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put forward by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. If Ngruki’s engagement in da’wa and educational activities are the reasons for the use of this label, purist Salafis do the same. My argument is that Pesantren Ngruki has criticized the government and has thus stayed clear from total submission to the government. Pesantren Ngruki has developed theological arguments for this stance. Wahyuddin, Pesantren Ngruki’s director, criticizes the purists for their total loyalty to the government. For him, submission to the government is prescribed in Qur’an [4:59] but this must be read carefully and the content of the whole verse has to be considered: ulil ‘amr minkum (“the ruler among you”). The term “minkum” refers to believers. He, furthermore, maintains that a believer will make laws according to the laws of God. If the government produces laws that contradict God’s will, it does not meet the condition of “ulil ‘amr minkum”. As a result, Muslims must not necessarily always obey the government. Thus, if a Muslim has to choose between secular law and God’s law, Wahyuddin adds, he has to make a preference for God’s law.86 In line with this argument, according to Wahyuddin, participation in demonstrations can be considered part of al-amr bi al-ma’ruf wa al-nahy ‘an almunkar (commanding right and forbidding wrong) which is prescribed in the Qur’an. A widely accepted hadith, he continues, states that when a Muslim sees a reprehensible act, he must eliminate it. If he has the power to do so he has to do it by hand, if he cannot he can do it through giving advice. If that is also not an option he can pronounce the desire to do so in his heart. Thus, according to him, participation in a demonstration is a manifestation of the Islamic doctrine of al-amr bi al-ma’ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar. Criticism and demonstrations do not necessarily indicate opposition against the government or being antigovernment, but they oppose un-Islamic policies. When the intention of demonstrating and criticising is to tell the truth, they are considered jihad. Wahyuddin quotes a hadith that says that the highest jihad is telling the truth before a tyrannical ruler.87 Therefore, Pesantren Ngruki often backs its students when they get involved in rallies. Pesantren Ngruki also criticizes the purists’ tendency to emulate the Prophet in all aspects including jibillat. Jibillat means “natural disposition”, “nature”, and “temper.”88 This includes tradition, culture and personal interest. The purists, Keagamaan Departemen Agama, 2004, pp. 92-94. 86 Interview with Wahyuddin, September 27, 2012. 87 Interview with Wahyuddin, September 27, 2012. 88 Hans Wehr, A Dictionary, p. 111.

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for example, imitate the Salaf in ways of dress including style and colour. They wear a white jalabiya, and do not wear fabrics with pictures on it. According to Wahyuddin, dress falls into the category jibillat which is subject to personal taste, and therefore Muslims have no obligation to imitate. Because of this, Wahyuddin is of the opinion that Salafis do not distinguish between sunna and jibillat.89 In tandem with this criticism, Pesantren Ngruki students do not wear the jalabiya, but instead, they dress in the pesantren’s uniform. The last category of Salafism is the “jihadists”. In contrast to the “haraki” who criticize the government verbally and refrain from violent actions, the “jihadist” group goes further by taking up arms against Muslim rulers. The Bali bombing group, which is believed to be affiliated with al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, is one of the jihadist Salafi groups in Indonesia.90 The first Bali bombing, on October 12, 2002, killed more than 200 people, mostly foreigners, and injured scores of others. The action was supported by a fatwa issued by Bin Laden to kill infidel Americans and their allies and to attack their facilities. The bombing was an act of revenge for American control of the holy land and its attacks on the Taliban in Afghanistan.91 The Bali bombers claimed to be Salafis – followers of the al-Salaf al-salih.92 Imam Samudra contends that the people should emulate the Salaf and should follow the opinions of contemporary Salafi scholars. Samudra mentions great Salafi thinkers such as Nasiruddin al-Albani, Bin Baz, Muqbil al-Wadi’i, Rabi’ al-Madkhali, Muhammad al-‘Uthaymin, Safar al-Hawali, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden. In fact, Samudra is not a follower of one specific Salafi current, rather, he cherry-picks those fatwas issued by Salafi scholars that he agrees with. For example, he is in agreement with purist Salafi thinkers such as Ibn Baz and al-‘Uthaymin from Saudi Arabia regarding women’s dress; at the same time, he adopts the fatwas of Ayman al-Zahiri, Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam concerning jihad. For Samudra, all these people share the same ideas about the basic teachings on tawhid, the fundamental doctrines of Islam. However, they differ in furu’ (practical matters), which in Islam are believed 89 Interview with Wahyuddin, 27 September 2012. 90 One of the suicide bombers of the Bali bombings of 2002 was reported to have links with the DI/NII movement. See Quinton Temby, “Imagining the Islamic State in Indonesia”, Bachelor thesis, The Australian National University, 2007, p. 1. 91 Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, Senyum Terakhir Sang Mujahid, Jakarta: Ar-Rahma Media, 2009, p. 138. Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, Jakarta: Republika, 2007, p. 236. 92 See for example, Imam Samudra, Aku Melawan Teroris, Solo: al-Jazeera, 2004. p. 59; Ali Gufran, Mimpi Suci di Balik Jeruji Besi, Jakarta: Ar-Rahma Media, 2009, pp. 53-59.

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to be secondary.93 Unlike the purists who maintain total obedience to the ruler, Samudra believes that Muslims should protest and rebel against a ruler when is he is a tyrant. According to Samudra, total submission to the ruler, as outlined by early generations of Muslim scholars, means submission to the Muslim ruler of an Islamic state, such as Yazid ibn Mu’awiya. No matter how tyrannical Yazid was, he still remained a Muslim because he implemented Islamic law. This condition differs radically from the situation in Indonesia. Although governed by Muslim rulers, Indonesia is not an Islamic state because it applies secular law. Basing himself on the arguments of Ibn Taymiyya, Abdullah Azzam and others, which say that any ruler who fails to apply Islamic law is a kafir (unbeliever), Samudra concludes that all Indonesian rulers are kafir.94 He also refers to some of the Prophet’s Companions who rebelled against their rulers, including ‘A’isha (the Prophet’s wife) who fought against ‘Ali, the fourth caliph.95 After having studied early Islamic history and having contextualized the hadiths concerning obedience to the ruler, Samudra finally concludes that by the consensus of the Companions, “a coup d’état against a fasiq and tyrannical ruler of an Islamic state is forbidden, on the same grounds that it is also obligatory for Muslims to rebel against a ruler who falls into kufran bawwahan (genuine disbelief).”96 The three architects (Imam Samudra, Amrozi and Mukhlas) of the Bali bombings were sentenced to death and executed in 2008 while Ali Imron was sentenced to life imprisonment. While most Muslims denounced the group’s actions, other Muslims consider the men to be heroes and even martyrs. Their funerals were attended by hundreds of Muslims. Hermawan, an Islamist activist and the richest person in Cianjur, West Java, was happy to provide three hectares of land for the martyrs’ burial.97 Abu Jibril, a leading figure of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesian Council of Warriors), gives the following arguments for their martyrdom: 1) the martyrs’ manhaj was clear: the al-Salaf al-salih; 2) their principles in life were also clear; ‘ibada (to worship God); 3) there were obvious concepts of struggle; iman-hijra-jihad (belief, emigration and jihad); 4) there was a tangible target for the jihad – unbelievers; 5) there was an apparent desire of becoming a martyr; 6) their attitude was 93 Imam Samudra, Aku Melawan Teroris, p. 64. 94 Imam Samudra, Jika Masih Ada yang Mempertanyakan Jihadku, Surabaya: Kafilah Syuhada, 2009, pp. 34-40. 95 Imam Samudra, Sekuntum Rosela Pelipur Lara: Catatan Renungan dari Penjara, Jakarta: Ar-Rahma Media, 2009, pp. 47-66, 69-75. 96 Imam Samudra, Sekuntum Rosela, p. 65. 97 Interview with Hermawan, Cianjur, December 2008.

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firm and tough in terms of their reconciliation with the consequences of the jihad; and finally 7) there were signs of martyrdom after their execution.98 D. Salafism and Mainstream Islam in Indonesia Many Muslims in Indonesia affiliate themselves to religious-based mass organizations, such as the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam (Persis) and al-Irsyad. In spite of the absence of exact membership numbers, national surveys conducted in 2001 and 2002 by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) of State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta found the following figures: 50.3% and 44.9% of the surveyed people were, respectively, members or sympathizers of the NU; and 18.9% and 17.8% were, respectively, members or sympathizers of the Muhammadiyah.99 With organizational structures in all regions and organizational offshoots for different sexes, ages and roles, these organizations reach entire society. They provide a variety of education at all levels, from pre-school to higher institutions. While the NU, for example, runs religious educational institutions in the form of pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), the Muhammadiyah prefers to offer secular education with a religious component, healthcare institutions, orphanages and so forth. Leaders and activists of the organizations are active in teaching Islam to the community. Given these facts, for Muslims, the organizations have become points of reference in religious matters and they offer generally accepted Islam, which is moderate, tolerant and peaceful. The following discussion will deal with these Islamic mass organizations and their Salafi claims. The discussion will be limited to four Muslim organizations: NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis, and al-Irsyad. NU and Muhammadiyah are selected because they are the largest Muslim organizations in the country. Persis is essential because it is considered closest to Salafism, while al-Irsyad is included due to the fact that Salafis have flourished through this organization.

98 Abu Muhammad Jibril, “Kata Pengantar”, in Imam Samudra, Sekuntum Rosela Pelipur Lara: Catatan Renungan dari Penjara, Jakarta: Ar-Rahma Media, 2009, pp. 23-27. Abu Jibril published the same preface in books written by the three architects of the Bali bombings: Ali Gufran, Mimpi Suci di Balik Jeruji Besi, Jakarta: Ar-Rahma Media, 2009; and Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, Senyum Terakhir Sang Mujahid, Jakarta: Ar-Rahma Media, 2009. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir also wrote forewords to these books. 99 Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (eds), Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia, Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 2004, p. 230.

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Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) In response to the dynamics of modernist movements both at home and in the Muslim world, the Nahdlatul Ulama was established in 1926 by traditional ‘ulamas, in order to preserve and maintain traditional Islam. In Indonesia, traditional Islam was being challenged by the Muhammadiyah and Sarekat Islam, and by the Wahhabi movement after its successful seizure of Mecca in the early twentieth century.100 Since its establishment, the traditionalist NU has claimed to be the guardian of the ahl al-sunna wa al-jama’a, abbreviated to Aswaja. The Nahdlatul Ulama believes that the Aswaja School adopts moderate methods (tawassut) in the doctrines of Islam: ‘aqida, law and ethics. Indeed, Aswaja’s main characteristic is moderation; it has found a balance between the use of textual argument and the application of logic, and between blind imitation (taqlid) and ijtihad. It has thus adopted a moderate position between the two extremes of the qadariya and jabariya schools of thought. While the first school advocates the absolute free will behind human actions, the latter supports the notion of predestination. Confronted with these two extreme views, the NU follows the Ash’ariya school with its kasb theory. In kasb, a human being is neither free nor predestined, but has a significant role to play in his or her own actions.101 Unlike reformist Muslims who reject affiliation with any specific madhhab (school of Islamic law) in fiqh, the NU definitely confirms its affiliation to the four madhhabs: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali. For the NU, following a madhhab means the adoption of a moderate position between taqlid and ijtihad. As not every person is able to engage in ijtihad, the NU views adherence to a specific madhhab as a way of circumventing taqlid entrapment. Although they accept all four orthodox schools, only the Shafi’i school is taught in Salafiya pesantrens and, furthermore, most of these pesantrens do not teach al-Shafi’i’s essential work, al-Umm. 102 The NU also applies the Aswaja doctrine in its appraisal of local cultures. In this regard, it applies three maxims in its legal reasoning: 1) al-muhafaza ‘ala 100 Martin van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru, Yogyakarta; LKiS, 1994, pp. 28-34. See also, Andrée Feilard, NU vis-á-vis Negara: Pencarian Isi, Bentuk dan Makna, Yogyakarta, LKis, 1999, pp. 7-12. 101 Tim PWNU Jawa Timur, Aswaja An-Nahdliyah: Ajaran Ahlussunnah wa al-Jamaah yang Berlaku di Lingkungan Nahdlatul Ulama, Surabaya: Khalista, 2007, pp. 12-17. 102 Ahmad Zahro, Tradisi Intelektual NU: Lajnah Bahtsul Masa’il 1926-1999, Yogyakarta: LKis, 2004, p. 32. Martin van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, Yogyakarta; LKiS, 1994, p. 25.

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al-qadim al-salih wa al-akhdh bi al-jadid al-aslah (to maintain that which is old and good, and to embrace that which is new and better); 2) al-‘ada muhakkama (considering customs in the final conclusion of Islamic law); and 3) ma la yudrak kulluh la yutrak kulluh (when goals are not fully reached, what has been achieved is still valuable). It is from these points of view that the NU tries to view local cultures objectively. It values the content of local cultures. When a tradition contains something that is good and does not challenge Islamic values, it is absolutely accepted. This is the application of the principle of al-‘ada muhakkama. Similarly, when the NU is of the opinion that a tradition seems to contradict Islamic values, but still contains good elements, it does not abolish the tradition; rather, it takes into account its virtues and adjusts it to fit with Islamic values. This is the application of the principle ma la yudrak kulluh la yutrak kulluh. The tingkeban tradition (celebration of the seventh month of pregnancy) is a good example of this. While reformist groups condemn this tradition as bid’a – as it originates in Hindu customs – the NU views it in a different way. The tradition may contradict Islamic belief, but it also contains righteousness, such as praying to God, which is prescribed in Islam. This way of thinking follows that of the Wali Songo (the Nine Saints) who succeeded in preaching Islam in Java.103 As a rural-based organization, particularly in Java where Islamic syncretism spread, NU leaders came forward as the guardians of local traditions who fought against their opponents from reformist organizations such as the Muhammadiyah and Persis. With this view in mind, kyais try to maintain these traditions.104

Muhammadiyah Since its foundation, the Muhammadiyah (the second largest Muslim organization in the archipelago) has called on Muslims to purify their Islamic beliefs and rituals. Founded in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan, the Muhammadiyah was a response to what people considered widespread syncretism, such as organizing tahlilan for the dead which includes the recitation of parts of the holy Qur’an. Traditional Muslims believe that by reciting parts of the Qur’an the deceased will receive God’s reward.105 To do away with traditional practices, the Muhammadiyah calls on Muslims to engage in tadjid, which is defined as “purification” and “modernization”. 103 Ahmad Zahro, Tradisi Intelektual NU, pp. 31-35. 104 Martin van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, p. 20-23. 105 Achmad Jainuri, “The Muhammadiyah Movement in Twentieth Century Indonesia: A Socio-Religious Study”, Master Thesis, McGill University, 1992.

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While the first denotes the “maintenance of the content of Islamic doctrines on the basis of the Qur’an and true hadith”, the second means the “interpretation, application and manifestation of Islamic teachings on the basis of the Qur’an and the true sunna.”106 This, then, is the Muhammadiyah’s fundamental call: the return to the Qur’an and the sunna as the bases of its tajdid.107 This implies that it rejects the four madhhabs.108 Although theoretically, it is true to say that the opinion of the madhhabs may be taken into consideration before Islamic laws can be concluded, the examination of decisions taken by the Majlis Tarjih – the body of the Muhammadiyah responsible for tajdid – proves the opposite. According to the Muhammadiyah, it is the second meaning of tajdid, modernization, that it resorts to in the practice of ijtihad.109 While the first meaning of tadjid, purification, concurs with Salafi beliefs, the second meaning, modernization, is the cause of disagreement between the two groups. The Muhammadiyah classifies Islamic doctrines into creeds (‘aqida), rituals (‘ibada) and social interactions (mu’amalat). While it takes the view that these creeds and rituals have been fully prescribed in the Qur’an and the hadith, it believes that the last category of Islamic doctrines, social interactions, must be subject to ijtihad in order to make them meet the demands of the modern world. The advancement of technology has created cases that are totally new and which have no precedence in early Islam and therefore are in urgent need of religious guidance. Taking on this challenge, the Muhammadiyah tries to respond by interpreting the Qur’an and the hadith in the light of common good (maslaha), which it believes is the ultimate goal of Islamic laws.110 Again, in the 106 Fathurrahman Jamil, Metode Ijtihad Majlis Tarjih Muhammadiyah, Jakarta: Logos, 1995, p. 58. 107 The Muhammadiyah emphasizes the slogan “back to the Qur’an and the sunna” at any time, including in its Centennial Celebration that coincided with the 46th Conference of the Muhammadiyah that was held in Yogyakarta, July 3-8, 2010. See, Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, “Tanfidz Keputusan Muktamar Satu Abad Muhammadiyah (Muktamar Muhammadiyah ke-46)” in Berita Resmi Muhammadiyah, edisi khusus, 2010, p. 23. In a discussion with the Leiden Indonesian Student Association in October 2011, Din Syamsuddin, the current Muhammadiyah chairman, proclaimed that in the second century of the Muhammadiyah, the movement proclaims the second wave of tajdid. 108 Asjmuni Abdurrahman, Manhaj Tarjih Muhammadiyah: Metodologi dan Aplikasi, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2002, p. 9. See also, Mitsuo Nakamura, Agama dan Lingkungan Kultural Indonesia, Surakarta: Hapsara, 1983, p. 40. 109 Fathurrahman Jamil, Metode Ijtihad, p. 58. 110 Fathurrahman Jamil, Metode Ijtihad, pp. 60-61.

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Muhammadiyah’s view, this maslaha should not contravene Islamic laws. The Muhammadiyah believes that reason should play a role in the identification of this common good. Like the Salafis, the Muhammadiyah confirms the limits of reason. Ijtihad may be applied only in worldly matters. It also concurs with Salafism in the fields of ‘aqida and ‘ibada. For example, it believes that God has Attributes similar to those of human beings. However, according to the Muhammadiyah, Muslims should not think about His Attributes or the relationship between His Essence (Dhat) and His Attributes (Sifat), because they are unthinkable and beyond the capacity of reason.111 Despite some Muhammadiyah activists’ attempts to interpret some of God’s Attributes, such as God’s Hand as “His power”, the official view of the organization is that no attempt at interpretation should be made; the Attributes should be left as they are. While there are a number of areas of agreement, there are also many cases where the Muhammadiyah diverges from Salafis. One example is the case of images: Muhammadiyah views images of living creatures as permissible, unless they lead to cults.112

Persatuan Islam Muslims perceive the Persatuan Islam (Persis) as the most puritanical Islamic organization in Indonesia in terms of the acceptance and application of sound hadiths (al-ahadith al-sahiha). Given this reputation, it is no surprise that the organization claims to be the follower of the ahl al-sunna wa al-jama’a. In his foreword to the Persis’ book, Kumpulan Keputusan Sidang Dewan Hisbah, its former chairman, Shiddiq Amien, quotes from the same hadiths as those often quoted by Salafis, which relate to the ahl al-sunna wa al-jama’a as being the ‘victorious’ sect of Islam.113 Persis defines the ahl al-sunna wa al-jama’a as “a person or a group of persons 111 See, Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah Majlis Tarjih, Himpunan Putusan Tarjih, 3rd edition, n.d, p. 12. 112 For this reason, the Majlis Tarjih Muhammadiyah was of the opinion that putting Ahmad Dahlan’s picture on the wall is unlawful as it can lead to cult. However, this fatwa was abrogated by a later fatwa, which stated that displaying his picture is permissible. See, Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, Himpunan, pp. 281, 313. 113 Shiddiq Amien, “Kata Sambutan Ketua Umum PP Persis”, in Dewan Hisbah Persis, Kumpulan Keputusan Sidang Dewan Hisbah Persatuan Islam (Persis) tentang Aqidah dan Ibadah, Bandung: Persis Pers, 2008, pp. v-vii.

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who cling to the Qur’an and the sunna and reject polytheism and bid’a”.114 This definition differs slightly from that of the Salafis who add the further criterion that it is “in line with the Salafi manhaj”. Persis criticizes the Salafis for this addition on the grounds that the Prophet did not mention it.115 Persis views this new criterion as problematic because the Prophet’s Companions (the Salaf) held different opinions on a specific case – that Umar ibn Khattab, the second caliph, had a different opinion than his predecessor, Abu Bakr, regarding the distribution of the fay’ (spoils of war). Because of this difference, Persis asks two essential questions: who are the Salaf? And, whom should Muslims follow, Abu Bakr or ‘Umar?116 Persis criticizes the Salafis for their exclusive claim to Salafism. For Persis, any person or group can claim to be Salafi as the term does not refer to any specific group.117 This being so, Persis shares many views with the Salafis. It maintains that the Islamic creed is final and unchangeable and, therefore, any new thoughts and ideas on this matter are bid’a. In terms of the Islamic creed (‘aqida), Muslims must accept the literal interpretation of the texts and must not assume that these texts are allegories and thus to seek rational meanings in them, especially in matters of the supernatural. Consequently, Muslims are not to contest the texts on the ‘aqida as they are beyond the capacity of reason.118 Similarly, Persis accepts the doctrine of God’s Names and His Attributes as God Himself describes them, and on the basis of the Prophet’s explanation, without change, reduction, comparison and ta’wil.119 Moreover, Persis has similar views with the 114 Dewan Hisbah, Kumpulan Keputusan Sidang, p. 19. 115 The Regional Branch Office of Persis in West Java organized a dialogue with Salafis in March 27, 2007. The forum was attended by two Salafi teachers, Abdul Hakim Abdat from Jakarta, and Abu Qatadah of the pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah in Tasikmalaya. Abu Qatadah had attended the Persis pesantren in Bangil for seven years and taught at the pesantren before he eventually went to Yemen to study with Sheikh Muqbil. During the dialogue, the leaders of Persis raised a critical question to Salafis’ insistence on the obligation of Muslim to follow the path of Salaf (Salafi manhaj). Abdat repeats his answers to the criticism in a VCD distributed by a Salafi institution: Abdul Hakim bin Amir Abdat, Mereka Bertanya tentang Salafi, VCD, Jakarta: Yayasan Imam Bukhari. 116 Interview with Maman Abdurrahman, member of Persis’ central board, Bandung, February 10, 2010. 117 Aceng Zakaria, “Makna Ahlussunnah wal Jama’ah”, in Dewan Hisbah Persis, Kumpulan Keputusan, p. 21. 118 Dewan Hisbah Persis, Kumpulan Keputusan, p. 28. 119 Dewan Hisbah Persis, Kumpulan Keputusan, p. 29.

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Salafis on the ruqya, an alternative medical treatment, which asks for God’s protection with His Words. As this therapy was conducted by the Prophet and his Companions, Persis concludes that ruqya is permissible in Islam. According to Persis, ruqya is different from magic or the use of amulets; the latter is a sort of shirk (polytheism) even though it utilizes Qur’anic verses.120 Like Salafis, Persis denounces ritual traditions, such as the celebration of mawlid, which have no precedence in the early generations of Islam. It classifies them as bid’a.121 On takfir, like Salafis, Persis maintains that Muslims are not allowed to charge other Muslims with being kafir (unbeliever) unless they do not believe in the Qur’an and the Prophet and worship other gods, such as idols. That said, Persis differs from Salafis on some specific cases. For example, Persis argues that adhering to a different opinion of the Islamic creed does not necessarily lead to unbelief.122 And on the question of images, while most Salafis are of the opinion that reproducing images of living creatures is unlawful, Persis confirms its permissibility, unless the pictures lead to a cult or become idols.123

Al-Irsyad The Jam’iyya al-Islah wa al-Irsyad al-Islamiyya, abbreviated to al-Irsyad, was established in 1914 by Sudanese born Ahmad al-Surkati. In 1911, he was invited by the Arab organization, Jami’at al-Khayr, to teach at its school, and he joined the association. However, for some reasons he left the Jami’at al-Khayr and found a new organization, al-Irsyad.124 The new organization aimed at the enhancement of education among the Arab population. Consequently, the organization can only develop in regions where there is a significant Arab population.125 Al-Irsyad deals with the purification of religious beliefs, such as cleansing daily rituals from bid’a, and encourages Muslim to exercise ijtihad and oppose taqlid.126 120 121 122 123 124

Dewan Hisbah Persis, Kumpulan Keputusan, p. 86. A. Hassan, et al., Soal-Jawab, vol. 2, Bandung: Diponegoro, 1977, p. 795. A. Hassan, et al., Soal-Jawab, vol. 1, pp. 392-393. A. Hassan, et al., Soal-Jawab, Vol. 1, p. 356. Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 61-62. 125 Husein Haikal, “Pembaruan Islam Syaikh Ahmad Surkati dan Gerakan al-Irsyad”, in Ulumul Qur’an, No. 2, Vol. IV, 1993. 126 M. Mukhsin Jamil, et al., Nalar Islam Nusantara: Studi Islam ala Muhammadiyah, alIrsyad, Persis dan NU, Cirebon: Fahmina Institute, 2008, p. 115. See also, Pimpinan Pusat al-Irsyad al-Islamiyyah, Keputusan-Keputusan Muktamar ke-36 Al-Irsyad alIslamiyyah, Jakarta: PP al-Irsyad, 1996, p. 17.

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Surkati was very much influenced by the thought of Muhammad ibn Abd alWahhab, which is reflected in Surkati’s ideas regarding the religious practices of Muslims in Indonesia, as represented in his work, al-Masa’il al-Thalath.127 In this book, the author addresses widespread issues among the Muslim community: 1) taqlid and ijtihad; 2) sunna and bid’a; and 3) ziarah, tawassul (intercession) and shafa’a.128 He condemns taqlid and encourages ijtihad. In his inquiries, he found that the founders of the four madhhabs encourage adherents to examine their religious arguments. This means, for Surkati, that the gate of ijtihad is still open.129 On the second issue, the sunna and bid’a, Surkati maintains that Muslims can develop new methods of preaching Islam such as via the establishment of educational institutions, orphanages, hospitals and others. This effort can be classified as sunna hasana (good sunna).130 According to Surkati, this initiative should not be confused with new thoughts and practices in religious matters or bid’a, which is unacceptable in Islam.131 Muslims are not allowed to add new elements to religious doctrines. Surkati views that ziarah (shrine visitation) is not only permissible but recommended (sunna) as long as this action is free from prohibited deeds such as crying, asking the dead person’s help, and reciting the holy Qur’an directed to the dead. According to Surkati, all those deeds are bid’a.132 On the matter of tawassul, Surkati maintains that it is permissible when applied to living persons (or asking help from a person to pray) and previous good deeds.133 However, tawassul to the deceased, as practiced by many Muslims, is totally forbidden and is considered shirk. That Salafis have flourished through this organization is a worthy of notice here. As will be discussed later in Chapter Two, Pesantren al-Irsyad, Tengaran, Salatiga, Central Java inspired the spread of early Salafi pesantrens. Prominent Salafi figures such as Ja’far Umar Thalib and Yusuf Baisa taught at this pesantren. Moreover, Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam (STAI, Islamic College) Ali bin Abi Thalib has started its initiatives at the al-Irsyad educational institution in Surabaya, East Java. Concerning this phenomenon, I would argue that, in addition to similar notions of Islamic purification, another factor is the Arab ethnic background. Some leading Salafi figures, such as Thalib, Muhammad as-Sewed, Abdul Hakim 127 128 129 130 131 132 133

M. Mukhsin Jamil, et al., Nalar Islam Nusantara, pp. 141-142. Ahmad Surkati al-Anshari, Tiga Persoalan, Jakarta: PP al-Irsyad al-Islamiyyah, 1988. Ahmad Surkati al-Anshari, Tiga Persoalan, p. 39. Ahmad Surkati al-Anshari, Tiga Persoalan, p. 51. Ahmad Surkati al-Anshari, Tiga Persoalan, p. 56. Ahmad Surkati al-Anshari, Tiga Persoalan, p. 63. Ahmad Surkati al-Anshari, Tiga Persoalan, pp. 73-74.

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Abdat, Yazid Jawas, and Abdurrahman al-Tamimi, are from Arab ancestry. This brief discussion of the organizations makes it clear that the common interest of these reformist organizations and the Salafis is the call for the purification of the creed and the cleansing of rituals. They share a similar slogan; the return to the fundamental sources of Islam, i.e. the Qur’an and the hadith. The dispute lies in Salafis’ insistence that Muslims should follow the pious predecessors, the al-Salaf al-salih. While Salafis tend to absolutely emulate the examples of the Salaf in their daily life, the reformist groups try to grasp the spirit of the Salaf, and contextualize it in the modern era. The obligation of following the Salaf as demanded by Salafis also becomes a point of disagreement between them. The reformist groups, such as Persis, contend that the Prophet orders Muslims to firmly hold on to only the Qur’an and the hadith. On the contrary, Salafis argue that following the Qur’an and the hadith in insufficient, since Muslims could go astray from the true belief. History, the Salafis argue, tells how Islamic groups, such as the Kharijite and the Mu’tazilite, made use of the texts of the Qur’an and the hadith to support their movements and thoughts, while they were, in fact, deviant from the true manhaj. Salafis also refute the use of reason as promoted by the reformist groups. They contend that the use of reason will have results in two directions: the refutation of the revelation and allegoric interpretation. The first is evident in some Muslim groups that reject various illogical hadiths that contradict reason, while the second is proven in the opinions of rationalist groups of Muslims, such as the Mu’tazilite.134 According to the Salafis, religious teachings are not subject to reason. Revelation, and not reason, is at the basis of religion. Revelation emerges in two main sources: the Qur’an and the hadith. When the text seems to contradict reason, Salafis argue, Muslims should follow the text, since the capacity of reason is limited. This does not mean, as Salafis argue, that Islam has no respect for reason but Islam gives reason its proper place. Islam prerequisites sound reason in the application of religious duties.135 An insane man is not responsible for his actions. The argument of the text (nass) is superior to logic, and therefore some religious teachings are illogical. Moreover, Salafis criticize the reformist groups for their exclusiveness in religious doctrines. These groups, they argue, emphasize that their following has to refer to their official fatwas, such as those of the Majelis Tarjih for the Muhammadiyah and those of the Dewan Hisbah for Persis. The adherents who 134 Abdul Hakim Abdat, Hukum Tahlilan, p. 20. 135 Abdul Hakim Abdat, Risalah Bid’ ah, pp. 146-149.

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deviate from the official fatwas will be excluded from the group. Thus, the Salafis view these organizations as having become new Islamic schools that divide Muslims into factions.136 This means that taking the form of an organization is hizby (partisan) bringing about Muslims to divisions. While the Salafis view that organization as hizby and bid’a, they never label Muslim organizations like the Muhammadiyah, NU and Persis as hizby and bid’a as they did to other Salafi counterparts, the Wahdah Islamiyyah and HASMI. They may be reluctant to label these organizations as hizby and bid’a based on a careful calculation of the possibility of a counter attack launched against them. The fact that the NU, the Muhammadiyah and Persis are the largest and most influential organizations in the country drives the Salafis to carefully estimate the risk. Once the Salafis label these organizations hizby and bid’a, they may guess, they may encounter serious challenges that might determine their future. Salafis are, no doubt, more critical of traditionalist organizations, NU and the like, than of modernist groups. NU’s taking side with traditional practices has become the major focus of the Salafi attack against it. This criticism has raised controversies and opposition to Salafis, which, in some cases, involved violent actions in some villages. I will discuss this opposition later in Chapter Four. Concluding Remarks Salafism is a purification movement that calls Muslims to renew their religious creed and practices. Salafis call upon Muslim to return to the two fundamental sources of Islam, the Qur’an and the hadith with an understanding of the Salaf. Salafis contend that Muslims are obliged to follow the Salaf manhaj. The Salaf manhaj has become the third source of Islam, after the Qur’an and the hadith. It is at this point that Salafis differ from other modernist groups in Indonesia, the Muhammadiyah and Persis. They share a similar spirit in “the return to the Qur’an and the hadith”, but they differ in the method of applying this concept. Salafis criticize traditionalist NU for its support for rituals and religious practices that have no roots in the Qur’an, the hadith and or the practices of the Salaf. The question Persis raised “which Salaf should Muslims follow when Salaf differ” is important to analyse different groups of Salafi adherents. They are 136 Interview with Rasyid, teacher of Pesantren Al-Nur al-Atsari, Ciamis, January 22, 2010. Rasyid was a Persis cadre. He attended Persis pesantrens in Tasikmalaya for several years and was sent by Persis to al-Azhar, Cairo. He converted to Salafi after he returned home.

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fragmented into three mainstream groups, “purist”, “haraki” and “jihadist”. Within the purist we find “rejectionist”, “cooperationist” and “tanzimi”. What causes this fraction is the methodology they use in the application of Salafi doctrines, and the way they interpret the practices of the Salaf. While these groups share similar doctrines, they differ in the strategy they adopt in their da’wa. “Tanzimi” groups, such as Wahdah and HASMI, for example, view no theological constraints in the adoption of the form of an organization while other purist counterparts, the “rejectionist” and “cooperationist”, consider this form bid’a. This is also applicable in analysing another Salafi group, the “haraki” as represented by Pesantren Ngruki. Advocating its belief, Pesantren Ngruki finds strong arguments in the practice of the Salaf when it criticizes the ruler. A similar approach can be applied to assess the jihadist faction of the Salafis when they recount the case of the civil war between ‘Aisha and ‘Ali, the camel war mentioned above. The jihadist group finds theological and historical arguments for its rebellious attitude in this event.

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Chapter Two

The Salafi Movement in Indonesia: Development, Mobilization and Network

“In the 1990s, we had only a few centres of Salafi teaching in Jakarta. Now, we have so many centres, mosques, and offices that offer Salafi da’wa. Every day the Salafi teachers are busy in delivering their da’wa.”1

The above statement is taken from an interview with Abu Qatadah, director of Pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah in Tasikmalaya, West Java, describing the rapid development of the Salafi movement in Indonesia. Abu Qatadah is correct. He himself travels a lot, visiting various cities in Java to deliver lectures on the Salafi manhaj and almost every weekend he preaches about the Salafi manhaj in many places in Jakarta. At present, it is easy to find Salafi teachings in the capital city of Indonesia and in the areas surrounding Jakarta like Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi in West Java. Hundreds of followers attend Salafi religious teaching sessions and practice the Salafi manhaj with great enthusiasm. The followers move from one mosque to another, attending similar teaching sessions under different teachers. They have different backgrounds and include professionals, businessmen, university students, laymen, and unemployed people. On the other hand, there is an anxiety among the members and leaders of other Islamic mass organizations, particularly the Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam (Persis) and al-Irsyad. Their apprehension is caused not only by Salafi penetration among their followers, but also by Salafi co-optation of their assets, 1

Interview with Abu Qatadah, director of Pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah, Tasikmalaya, February 10, 2009.

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such as mosques and pesantrens. Some new Salafi leaders were previously members of these organizations and yet they do not hesitate to criticize their former organizations or their teachers. This chapter discusses the development of the Salafi movement in the country. I will also discuss the ways the Salafi movement grows: how Salafis make use of existing organizations; how they mobilize their resources after having gathered significant numbers of adherents; and how they develop their network. A. The Origins and Development of the Salafi Movement in Indonesia Many studies have been devoted to the development of contemporary Salafi movements in Indonesia.2 The most extensive research has been carried out by Noorhaidi Hasan.3 To avoid redundancy, I will here highlight only some important points concerning this matter. As Hasan’s study ends at the disbandment of the Laskar Jihad, in this section I will emphasize the events after Laskar Jihad’s dissolution, when Ja’far Abu Thalib, its commander in-chief was abandoned by his disciples. The puritan movement that glorifies the past of Islam by living according to the examples of the al-Salaf al-salih, as advocated by the contemporary Salafi movement in Indonesia is by no means new. In the early eighteenth century, pre-independent Indonesia saw the emergence of the Padri movement in West Sumatra.4 This movement called for Muslims to purify their beliefs from local customs. The movement led to civil war for years and resulted in the Dutch invasion of the region. In the early twentieth century, some reformist movements surfaced: the Muhammadiyah in 1912, al-Irsyad in 1914, and Persatuan Islam 2

3 4

See for example, Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, (eds), Gerakan Salafi Radikal, (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers & PPIM UIN Jakarta, 2004); Sukidi Mulyadi, “Violence under the Banner of Religion: The Case of Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus”, Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003, pp. 75 - 109; Muhammad Sirozi, “The Intellectual Roots of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia”, in The Muslim World, Vol. 95, January 2005, pp. 81-120; Saiful Umam, “Radical Muslims in Indonesia: The Case of Ja’far Umar Thalib and the Laskar Jihad”, Explorations in Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 2006, pp.1-26. Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia, New York: Cornell University, 2006. On the Padri movement, see for example, Jeffrey Hadler, “A Historigraphy of Violence and the Secular State in Indonesia: Tuanku Imam Bondjol and the Uses of History”, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 67, No. 3 (August), 2008, pp. 971-1010; Christine Dobbin, “Economic Change in Minangkabau as a Factor of the Rise of the Padri Movement, 1784-1830,” Indonesia, No. 23 (April), 1977, pp. 1-38.

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THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA

(Persis) in 1923. All these movements advocated a similar spirit, the return to the Qur’an and the hadith (al-ruju’ ila al-qur’an wa al-hadith), and opened the gate of ijtihad (independent reasoning). On the other hand, in order to maintain and protect local traditions from modernist Muslims’ attacks, traditional Muslim leaders formed Nahdlatul ‘Ulama in 1926.5 The emergence of the contemporary Salafi movement in the late 1980s was closely linked to the development of the religio-political ambition of the Saudi Government. Since its creation in the mid-eighteenth century and its reconstruction in the early twentieth century, the Saudi state has adopted Wahhabism as the state’s model of Islam. The Saudi Government has enjoyed Wahhabi support for social and political stability in the country as its ‘ulama have always issued fatwas legitimizing government policies. However, within the Muslim world, since the 1970s the Saudi Government encountered serious challenges from Jamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt with his Arab Socialism that came up in 1960s, and from the Shi’ism of the Iranian revolution in 1980s. Supported by the oil boom in the 1970s, the Saudi Government attempted to export its Wahhabi Islam to other places in the Muslim world in order to halt the influence of its rivals: Nasser’s Arab socialism and Shi’ism. The efforts had started before by the creation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1957, followed by the establishment of the Rabitat al-‘Alam al-Islami (RAI, the Muslim World League) few years later. While the first organization was aimed at formulating foreign policy for Muslim countries, the latter was intended to disseminate Saudi’s variant of Islam. Through the Rabitat, the Saudi Government poured large amounts of money into the Muslim world for various purposes such as building mosques, providing scholarships and supporting preachers. It was within this effort that the Saudi Government offered scholarships to Indonesian students to study at Saudi universities. In Indonesia, these scholarships were channelled through Saudi-linked institutions, such as the Dewan Da’wah Islamiyyah Indonesia (DDII, or Dewan Da’wah, Indonesian Council for Islamic Propaganda) and the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA, Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic). As will be described later, the pioneering Salafis in Indonesia were awarded scholarships by these institutions. In Indonesia, contemporary Salafis found fertile soil for their movement. Following the 1974 university students riot, well known as the Malari 5

On the modernist movements, see for example, Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973.

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(Malapetaka Limabelas Januari, 15th of January Disaster) case, four years later, in 1978 the government promulgated a new rule concerning student activities on campus. This rule, called Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kampus (NKK/BKK, Normalization of Campus Activities/Campus Coordinating Body), restricted the political engagement of students.6 Responding to this new regulation, in the early 1980s some students turned to religious activities, particularly to discussions of Islamic doctrines. Having started in the Salman mosque of the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), enthusiasm to study Islam soon became widespread in other campuses as well such as the Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB), Bogor, West Java, the University of Indonesia (UI) in Jakarta, Gadjah Mada University (UGM) in Yogyakarta, and Hasanuddin University (Unhas) in Makassar, South Sulawesi. The activists developed the so-called usra in their recruitment and study model.7 The Dewan Da’wah merits mention in this regard. Banned by the government from engagement in any political activities, Dewan Da’wah figures, particularly Mohammad Natsir, took this opportunity to disseminate its ideas through the campuses. As A.M. Lutfi, Natsir’s former secretary explained, the campus was the only place free from government control.8 The Dewan Da’wah encouraged Muslim intellectuals, notably Imaduddin Abdul Rahim, Ahmad Sadili and Nukman, to hold Latihan Mujahid Dakwah (LMD, Training for Preachers) at the ITB, inviting student activists from other campuses. LMD was a special training program for preachers in which students were trained in an all-encompassing Islam (Islam kaffa) in which Islam is perceived not only as a doctrine of worship but also of all other aspects of human life including economics and politics.9 These activists later developed similar programs on their own campuses. In the 1980s, Muslims witnessed the swing of the political pendulum of the New Order regime. In the first half of the decade, Soeharto proposed 6 7

8 9

Hasan, Laskar Jihad, p. 44. Usually an usra consists of 5 to 15 participants under the leadership of a naqib. Indonesian activists learned to use the method from their counterparts in Malaysia, where they had encountered government repression. See, Abdul Syukur, “Gerakan Usroh di Indonesia, Kasus Peristiwa Lampung 1989”, Master Thesis, Universitas Indonesia Jakarta, 2001, pp. 41-44. The Ikhwanul Muslimin movement in Egypt was the first to adopt this method in order to avoid the ruler’s repressive measures on the organization. Literally, the term ‘usra’ literally means ‘family’. Interview with AM. Lutfi, Jakarta, September 12, 2008. Ali Said Damanik, Fenonema Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia, Bandung: Teraju, 2002, pp. 68-69.

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the Pancasila as the sole foundation of all organizations, including mass organizations and political parties. Muslim figures were profoundly opposed to this idea, which culminated in the bloody Tanjung Priok (North Jakarta) tragedy in September 1984 in which hundreds of lives were lost and injury caused to many others.10 However, the regime’s repressive measures continued until all Muslim organizations had no choice but to accept the regime’s order. The two largest Muslim organizations, the Nahdlatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah, for example, accepted the Pancasila as their foundation in 1984 and 1985, respectively. The reluctant youth organizations were banned. For example, the Masyumi-affiliated student union, Pelajar Islam Indonesia (PII, Islamic Student Union), was dissolved in 1988.11 Having secured its ideology, the government moved to accommodate Muslims’ interests. This tendency became apparent in the promulgation of the Religious Court Law in 1989, the launch of the first Islamic Bank in Indonesia, the Bank Mu’amalat Indonesia, and the establishment of the Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI, Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) in 1990.12 Soeharto himself performed the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1991. Despite the fact that many scholars have viewed this as a ploy to gain Muslim support since support from the army had decreased, many Muslim leaders welcomed this new political change and some of them supported Soeharto’s candidacy for the next term of his presidency. It was within this socio-political setting that the Salafi movement started to emerge. The movement began in the late 1980s when enthusiasm for studying Islam had grown among university students. As Hasan has shown, this enthusiasm provided fertile soil for the emergence of Islamic global movements such as the Ikhwanul Muslimin and Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia.13 Later, in 1998 Indonesian Ikhwanul Muslim activists formed the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Justice and Prosperous Party). 10 See also Chapter six on this incident. 11 See Martin van Bruinessen, “Islamic State or State Islam? Fifty Years of IslamState Relations in Indonesia”, in Ingrid Wessel (ed.), Indonesien am Ende des 20. Jahrhundrets, Hamburg: Abera Verlag, 1996, pp. 19-34, available online at: http:// www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/Bruinessen_State_ Islam_or_Islamic_State.pdf 12 On ICMI, see for example, Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000, chapter six, pp. 128-166; Nasrullah Ali-Fauzi (ed.), ICMI Antara Status Quo dan Demokrasi, Bandung: Mizan, 1995; A. Makmur Dakka and Dhurorudin Mashad, ICMI: Dinamika Politik Islam Indonesia, Jakarta: Pustaka Cidesindo, 1997. 13 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, p. 45.

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The Salafis targeted university students in Yogyakarta. It was Abu Nida (Chamsaha Shofwan) who initiated da’wa among the university students. He was a cadre of the Dewan Da’wah and served as a preacher in rural areas in West Kalimantan. Through the Dewan Da’wah, he got a scholarship to study at the Jami’a Imam ibn Su’ud University in Riyadh. When he returned home, the Dewan Da’wah assigned him to teach at Pesantren Ngruki in Solo, where he taught for two years, from 1984-1986. He started to preach Salafism in Yogyakarta and made use of the networks of existing groups such as the Jama’ah Salahuddin (Salahuddin Community),14 a religious unit associated with the Gadjah Mada University, and the so-called tarbiyah movement. In these groups, he gave lectures on Salafism among the students. Together with the Ikhwanis, such as Dewan Da’wah activist Abu Ridlo, he managed dawras and halaqas (learning circles), championing the combined Salafi-Ikhwani slogan “‘Aqidah Salafi, Manhaj Ikhwani” (“Salafi creed, Ikhwani method”) to spread Salafi doctrines.15 He also expanded his da’wa to Solo, about sixty kilometres from Yogyakarta. In all of these occasions, Abu Nida found that students were very keen to attend his lectures. Later, when Abu Nida felt that he had gained a sufficient number of followers, he independently managed his own religious circles such as at the Mardiyah and Mujahidin mosques near the Faculty of Medicine and the Faculty of Engineering at Gadjah Mada University. Now, he collaborated with his companions, Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin and Aunurrafiq Ghufran who were cadres of the Dewan Da’wah and alumni of the University of Imam Ibn Su’ud in Riyadh. Like Abu Nida, Asifuddin was sent by the Dewan Da’wah to Pesantren Ngruki to teach and he taught there for two years. At the same time, they organized Salafi halaqas and dawras in Yogyakarta. In addition, the students were encouraged to study Arabic which, for Salafis, had become part of religion and an obligation for Muslims to study. They argued that understanding Islamic beliefs and doctrines is impossible without understanding Arabic.16 Furthermore, to accelerate the Salafi da’wa, in 1992 they established the As-Sunnah foundation, by which they organized serial workshops and dawras.17 14 On the Jama’ah Salahuddin, see Abdul Gaffar Karim, “Jamaah Shalahuddin: Islamic Student Organisation in Indonesia’s New Order”, in Flinders Journal of History and Politics, vol. 23 (2006), pp. 33-56. 15 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, pp. 52-53. 16 Aunur Rafiq bin Ghufran, Mukhtarat Qawa’id al-Lugha al-‘Arabiyya, Gresik: Pustaka al-Furqan, 2010, p. iii. 17 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, pp. 53-54.

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The return to Indonesia of three new graduates in the early 1990s, Ja’far Umar Thalib, Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawas and Yusuf Usman Baisa gave more impetus to the Salafi da’wa Abu Nida had started. These young figures were LIPIA alumni who had graduated from different Islamic institutions abroad. Thalib graduated from the al-Maududi Institute in Pakistan; Yazid Jawas studied at Muhammad Salih al-Uthaymin’s teaching centre in Najran; while Baisa completed his study at the Jami’a Imam ibn Su’ud University in Riyadh. The director of LIPIA assigned them to teach at Pesantren al-Irsyad in Tengaran, Salatiga, Central Java. The then LIPIA director, Abd al-Aziz Abd Allah al-Amr, contributed to the development of the pesantren. During the planning of its establishment, al-Amr recommended Umar Abdat, the founder of the pesantren, to meet a high official of the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Education, from which Abdat gained the Ministry’s financial support. When al-Amr became aware that the pesantren developed into teaching non-Salafi doctrines and to operate along non-Salafi lines, he sent his affiliates to teach at the pesantren in order to keep the pesantren on the right track of the Salafi manhaj.18 Although their presence at the pesantren drew opposition from teachers, these Salafi figures successfully changed the pesantren’s orientation to Salafism. It soon became the centre of Salafi da’wa and attracted many prominent Salafi figures who attended dawras in the pesantren. However, friction emerged among these figures. The conflict was triggered by the Thalib’s replacement by Baisa as the director of the pesantren. As Hasan has shown, this substitution was in response to protest by parents who witnessed their sons’ behaviour change towards militancy. The parents vented their anxiety to al-Irsyad’s official branch in Semarang and they demanded the official to control this current. Responding to this demand, al-Irsyad decided to replace Thalib with Baisa upon which Thalib left the pesantren and went to Yemen to pursue further study with Sheikh Muqbil Hadi al-Wadi’i. However, due to illness, Thalib spent only three months in Yemen. He also travelled to Saudi Arabia and met various Salafi sheikhs, such as Rabi ibn Hadi al-Madkhali. Upon his return, he cooperated with Abu Nida to preach Salafism under the umbrella of the As-Sunnah foundation. Again, friction between them surfaced, and Thalib established his own pesantren, Ihya al-Sunna, in Degolan, Kaliurang, Yogyakarta in 1994.19 The conflict between Thalib and Baisa persisted. It even worsened because of the visit of ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq from Ihya’ al-Turath to Pesantren 18 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, p. 74. 19 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, pp. 76-77.

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al-Irsyad in Tengaran, in 1996. Abd al-Khaliq was a prominent Salafi figure at the Ihya al-Turath, a Salafi charitable institution in Kuwait. Unlike purists who prohibit Muslim engagement in political practices, ‘Abd al-Khaliq maintained that Muslim involvement in politics is acceptable. For him, in Islam, politics and human enhancement are more important than mere ritual. Islam is an all-encompassing system of how to live in which politics has its part.20 He also supported the fourth pillar of tawhid, tawhid al-hukm, or hakimiyya (oneness of governance). This means that only God governs the world. Muslims have no right to produce new laws, but are obliged to implement God’s laws as prescribed by His Book and the hadith.21 In his lecture in the pesantren, ‘Abd al-Khaliq defended the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and criticized its opponents. Because of this, Thalib accused ‘Abd al-Khaliq and his followers, including Abu Nida and Baisa, of being Sururi, a term made after Muhammad ibn Surur al-Nayef Zainal ‘Abidin. Ibn Surur was a Syrian Salafi who had adopted the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1965 due to political pressure he moved to Saudi Arabia and lived there until 1973 when he was expelled and he migrated to Kuwait. From Kuwait, he headed for London in 1983 where he lived between London and Birmingham until 2004. Since 2004/2005 he has lived permanently in Amman, Jordan.22 He criticized the Saudi ruler for his invitation of the infidel US army to protect Saudi soil from Saddam Husein’s invasion. As Hasan has shown, this accusation incited the anger of Muhammad Sharif Fu’ad Haza, an Egyptian teacher sent by the Ihya al-Turath to teach at Pesantren al-Irsyad, Tengaran. He challenged Thalib to enact a mubahala which is a kind of prayer in which all conflicting parties meet and ask God for His verdict by casting His curse on lying participants. For Fu’ad Haza, the mubahala was aimed at muting Thalib’s criticism against his rivals. 23 This event exacerbated the conflict between the Salafis and they became irreconcilable, mainly between Ja’far Umar Thalib on one hand, and Abu Nida and Baisa on the other. It was from Pesantren al-Irsyad in Tengaran that other Salafi pesantrens started to spread across the country. They emerged in several cities in Java and in 20 Zoltan Pall, Lebanese Salafis between the Gulf and Europe, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012, pp. 87-89. 21 Zoltan Pall, Lebanese Salafis, p. 91. 22 Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 73-74; see also, Stéphane Lacroix, “Muhammad Surur Zayn al‘Abidin”, in Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism, London: Hurst and Company, 2009, pp. 435-436. 23 asan, Laskar Jihad, pp. 81-82.

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some of the outer islands. Thus, in West Java we find, for example, the following pesantrens: Minhaj al-Sunnah in Bogor, Ihya’ al-Sunnah in Tasikmalaya, Al-Nur al-Atsari in Ciamis, Al-Sunnah and Dhiya’ al-Sunnah in Cirebon; in Yogyakarta we find pesantrens Ihya al-Sunnah, Anshar al-Sunnah, Bin Baz, and Jamilurrahman; in Central Java, we find al-Irsyad in Tengaran, Imam Bukhari in Solo; in East Java, we find STAI Ali ibn Abi Thalib in Surabaya and al-Furqan in Gresik. In the outer islands we also find Pesantren Anshar al-Sunnah and SDIT (Sekolah Dasar Islam Terpadu/Integrated Islamic Elementary School) Fajar Ilahi in Batam, Riau Islands, Sumatra; in South Sulawesi we find Anshar al-Sunnah and Wahdah Islamiyyah in Makassar; Pesantren Abu Hurairah in West Nusa Tenggara, Lombok. Through the creation of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlusunnah wal Jama’ah (FKAWJ, Communication Forum for the Followers of the Sunna and the Jama’a) in 1999, followed the next year by its paramilitary wing, Laskar Jihad, Thalib gained his momentum to enter the national political arena. The launch of Laskar Jihad was in response to a continuous conflict between Christians and Muslims in Ambon that killed hundreds of Muslims. The conflict began when Muslims were attacked by Christians on the day of the ‘Id al-Fitr celebration on January 19, 1999. The conflict soon spread over the entire island. An official report stated that three days of conflict had brought about serious damage: it killed 22 and injured 147 people, and burned 107 houses, 7 houses of worship, 2 traditional markets, 33 shops, 12 stalls, 22 cars, 25 motorcycles, and 216 becaks (pedicaps).24 Many parties, individuals and groups urged the central government to put in every effort to end the conflict. The central government, however, seemed to have no intention of taking serious steps to end the clash. After waiting of a year, Thalib launched Laskar Jihad, calling Muslims to take part in a jihad in the Moluccas in order to defend Muslims from Christian attacks. Many Muslims enthusiastically responded to this call and many registered themselves to take part in the jihad. In the following months, Thalib occupied himself with mobilizing support from Muslims, most importantly financial back up, and the recruitment of the fighters. After mobilization, recruitment and training, during April and May 2000, Laskar Jihad dispatched about seven thousand fighters. They were welcomed by local Muslims and military personnel who sided with them. They served different tasks: they included combatants, health practitioners, and religious teachers. The presence of the Laskar Jihad in fact awakened the spirit of struggle among 24 Mohammad Shoelhi, Laskar Jihad: Kambing Hitam Konflik Maluku, (Jakarta: Puzam, 2002), h. 12.

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the native Muslims to take revenge on their Christian rivals. Together with local Muslim fighters, Laskar Jihad re-occupied Muslim areas. More interesting was Thalib’s determination to implement shari’a law, including rajm (stoning to death). He applied the rajm to a warrior who had committed adultery. It was reported that a member of Laskar Jihad, Abdullah, raped a thirteen year-old local girl on March 23, 2001. After careful investigation made by Laskar Jihad and the confession of the rapist, on March 27, 2001 Thalib pronounced the stoning sentence upon his warrior.25 Thalib was subsequently praised by many Muslim leaders for his consistency in the implementation of the shari’a. Thalib’s call for jihad was supported by fatwas from various Salafi sheikhs in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, including Sheikh Muqbil Hadi al-Wadi’i and Sheikh Rabi al-Madkhali.26 Before commencing the jihad, Thalib also tried to persuade President Abdurrahman Wahid to lead the jihad, but he refused. Wahid, furthermore, asked the military forces to make every effort to halt the Laskar Jihad’s arrival in the conflict areas. The jihad was sharply criticized by Thalib’s opponents. Faiz Asifuddin, for example, criticized it as invalid as it deviated from the true Salafi doctrine, arguing that the Salafi manhaj’s most fundamental doctrine is obedience to the ruler. According to him, a valid jihad must be made public by the legitimate ruler, and in the Indonesia context that was President Wahid. When the president refused to call Muslims to engage in jihad, Muslims must obey him.27 Thus, the jihad case no doubt sharpened the conflict between Thalib and his opponents. The change of the national political scene affected the Laskar Jihad. In August 2000, the central government declared the territory a civilian emergency zone and decided to send combined armed forces to the island. The task of this army was clear: to wipe out all civilian militia involved in the conflict. During the operation, the forces arrested armed militia groups and members of the armed forces who sided with the conflicting parties. Naturally, this action created tension between Laskar Jihad and the military forces which reached its peak in the bloody tragedy in Kebun Cengkeh in June 2001 when the military attacked the Laskar’s health centre. The attack killed dozens of fighters while many others were injured. 25 Soelhi, Laskar Jihad, pp. 72-77. 26 Ja’far Umar Thalib, “Menepis Rekayasa Fatwa Seputar Jihad di Maluku”, Salafy, No. 34, 2000, pp. 8-9. 27 Interview with Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin, director of pesantren Imam Bukhari, Solo, February 21, 2009.

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The event received enormous attention of different groups of Muslims many of whom demanded an exhaustive investigation into the tragedy and the replacement of the Commander of the combined armed forces. The tragedy caused the inner Laskar Jihad circle to become dissatisfied with Thalib, their commander in-chief. Some senior ustadhs vented their anxiety, since they viewed that the Laskar Jihad had moved too far from its original mission which was jihad against the Christians and instead waged jihad against the national military. During the presidency of Megawati Soekarnoputri who had succeeded Wahid, new attempts to end the conflict were undertaken. These included the Malino Agreement negotiations held on February 13, 2002 in Malino, South Sulawesi, chaired by Jusuf Kalla, the then Coordinating Minister of People Prosperity, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the then Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, where delegations of Muslims and Christians negotiated and agreed to end the conflict. The agreement implied that Laskar Jihad had to withdraw from the island. This agreement, however, left Thalib with a narrow space to manoeuvre in which he refused to leave the conflict area. In order to prolong his commando, he issued a declaration of war and accused the government and the military forces of being US agents. Thalib was subsequently detained by the police on May 4, 2002. The dissatisfaction of senior Salafi ustadhs with Thalib and Ayip Syafruddin, the chairperson of FKAWJ, continued to grow. According to them, Thalib had deviated from the spirit of Laskar Jihad. The case of Kebun Cengkeh and the war declaration were evidence of that as these had shown how the Laskar Jihad had moved from fighting against non-Muslims to confronting the army.28 Thalib was also charged with having exceeded his mandate by dispatching the Laskar Jihad to Ngawi, East Java, to deal with gambling activities there. This action resulted in a conflict both between local villagers and Laskar Jihad and Laskar Jihad with activists of political parties.29 Moreover, Laskar Jihad had also become active in other islands, from Aceh to Papua. The emergence of Laskar Jihad in these two conflict provinces started the rumour of the existence of possible coordination between Thalib and high-ranking military officers. Senior ustadhs demanded an explanation from Thalib, but he refused to 28 Interview with Ahmad Halim, former activist of Laskar Jihad, Yogyakarta, January 19, 2009. 29 http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2001/12/26/LU/mbm.20011226. LU86755.id.html, accessed on April 13, 2011.

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answer. They concluded that the Laskar Jihad had deviated from the true manhaj, and consequently, it must be dissolved. To support this step, they sent a letter to Sheikh Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali describing the current jihad situation. AlMadkhali was one of the senior Salafi sheikhs who had issued the fatwa on the obligation of engaging in jihad in the Moluccas. Furthermore, they also sent Usamah Faisal Mahri and Luqman Ba’aduh as their envoys to meet al-Madkhali in order to clarify the case. During the meeting, al-Madkhali criticized Thalib and concluded that under Thalib’s leadership, the jihad of the Laskar Jihad had deviated from the true manhaj. Responding to this meeting, senior ustadhs of the FKAWJ board organized a special meeting on 3-7 October 2002 in which they decided to disband the Laskar Jihad. Thalib rejected the decision, but was unable to sustain his leadership as all Laskar Jihad branches had accepted the decision. Finally, on October 16, 2002, a few days after the Bali bombing, Thalib emerged in a press conference declaring the disbandment of the Laskar Jihad.30 Most of his closest comrades subsequently abandoned him, including the Laskar’s vice commander, Muhammad Umar al-Sewed who acknowledged that the Laskar Jihad had made some serious mistakes which all ran against Salafi principles. They included: 1. the adoption of a commandment system and the use of bay’a (taking an oath as symbol of loyalty); 2. organizing demonstrations; 3. seeking political support from all parties including the people of ahl bid’a; 4. committing sinful acts such as ikhtilat (free social intercourse between men and women) and making photographs; 5. engaging in acts of violence; and, 6. fighting against the military and the government.31 Having been abandoned by his former pupils, Thalib tried to find new allies outside Salafis circles. He, for example, appeared with Arifin Ilham32 on the program Dzikir Bersama (to chant collectively God’s Names) broadcast live by a private television channel. On another occasion, together with Muchdi’s advocates, he appeared at a press conference defending Muchdi, a former official of Indonesia’s Intelligence Body, from the accusation that he had killed the human rights activist, Munir. Thalib was criticized for these actions. Responding to the first case, Thalib admitted that initially he was of the opinion that the Dzikir Bersama was bid’a. However, after further examination of various 30 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, pp. 211-213. 31 Muhammad Umar As-Sewed, “Rujuk kepada Kebenaran adalah Ciri Ahlus-Sunnah” in Sheikh Abu Abdirrahman Fauzi al-Atsari, Meredam Amarah terhadap Pemerintah, Pekalongan: Pustaka Sumayyah, 2006, pp. x-xii. 32 Arifin Ilham is a rising star preacher who frequently organizes the Dzikir Bersama that attracts many followers, mostly women.

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hadiths that supported the program, he claimed that he found it sahih (sound, and hence, accepted) and therefore it is not bid’a. In terms of the second case, Thalib replied that he had a very good relationship with Muchdi. He recalled that Muchdi had once saved his father’s life. In the 1980s, when the issue of wearing the jilbab was heatedly debated across the country, Thalib’s father was among the supporters of wearing the jilbab. He was accused by security officials of being a Darul Islam follower and detained. It was Muchdi, the then sub-district army chief in Malang, East Java, who released him. Thalib’s defence of Muchdi was therefore recompense. Thalib believed that Muchdi was being mistreated and was innocent of the allegations put forward against him.33 The abandonment of Thalib by his followers meant a lot to the Salafis. It proved that Salafis do not fall under the spell of the fanaticism of their leader; if a leader strays from the true manhaj, he will be abandoned. It also showed the emergence of newly arrived, more knowledgeable Salafi figures. Compared to Thalib, who studied for few months only with the founder of Salafism and the most influential Salafi teacher in Yemen, Sheikh Muqbil34, new figures, such as Luqman Ba’abduh, spent more time studying with the same sheikh. They used to be Thalib’s students whom he himself had sent to Yemen. When the now knowledgeable ex-students returned to Indonesia, the Salafis were keen to learn from them.35 Thalib tried to recapture his influence. In his magazine, Salafy, which appeared irregularly after Laskar Jihad’s dissolution, he wrote an article entitled “Saya Merindukan Ukhuwwah Imaniyyah Islamiyyah” [I pine for the Faithful and Islamic Brotherhood] in which he reflected on and evaluated his career in the Salafi da’wa.36 In this article, the author highlighted some essential Salafi da’wa issues. First, he reflected on his emphasis on teaching the true ‘aqida and he paid little attention to ethics. As a consequence, he recognized that Salafi da’wa seemed to be exclusive: the behaviour of his pupils towards other Muslims was rigid, strict and intolerant. His second reflection was his taqlid of the opinions of the Yemeni and Saudi Arabian Salafi sheikhs without further examination of their 33 Interview with Ja’far Umar Thalib, Yogyakarta, June 12, 2010. 34 On a brief biography of Sheikh Muqbil, see, Laurent Bonnefoy, “Muqbil ibn Hadi alWadi’i, Founder of Salafism in Yemen”, in Roel Meijer, Global Salafism, London: Hurst and Company, 2009, pp. 431-432. 35 Interview with Abu Abdillah, a senior teacher in Pesantren Dhiya’ussunnah, Cirebon. 36 Ja’far Umar Thalib, “Saya Merindukan Ukhuwwah Imaniyah Islamiyah”, in Salafy, Vol. 5, No. 5, 2006, pp. 3-23.

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arguments. Third, he emphasized the importance of proper conduct (al-akhlaq al-karima) in da’wa activities. Fourth, he stated the significance of Muslim unity and of the Islamic brotherhood. The fifth issue was the application of various da’wa methods using wisdom, advice and argumentation. Thalib acknowledged that his inadequacy in teaching these aspects had resulted in dissension and friction among the Salafis.37 Two years later, the article was followed by his declaration of repentance. The declaration was made in Medina, Saudi Arabia in 2008 when he performed the ‘umra, often called the small pilgrimage. It is said that Thalib was unable to perform the ‘umra until 2008 because of security reasons. From late 2002 to 2007, Thalib did not communicate with prominent Salafi sheikhs in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, including Sheikh Rabi al-Madkhali. However, during this period, the sheikh was well informed about Thalib’s actions and opinions, including his participation in the Majelis Dzikir of Arifin Ilham, a rising star preacher who organizes collective dhikr. It was also reported that he had been making some efforts to recapture his leadership position among the Salafis. Because of these reports, the sheikh accused Thalib of having abandoned the true Salafi manhaj, and, thus he excluded him from the Salafis. When Thalib finally had the opportunity to perform the ‘umra he tried to meet various Salafi sheikhs, particularly Rabi al-Madkhali. In Mecca, Thalib met al-Madkhali, and found that the sheikh was angry. The sheikh advised him as follows: to repent and then return to the true Salafi manhaj, but just as a member of the Salafis and not as their leader, and not to engage in political practices. When Thalib questioned the reasons behind his exclusion from being Salafi, the sheikh gave three reasons: Thalib’s denial of his mistakes committed during his leadership of the Laskar Jihad; Thalib’s disconnection with the “ulama; and Thalib’s improper accusation to other Salafis.38 Based on al-Madkhali’s clarification, Thalib made a declaration of repentance before a number of Indonesian Salafi students of the Islamic University of Medina at the residence of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab al-‘Aqil in Medina. Prior to the declaration, there was a discussion session between Thalib and the students on Thalib’s involvement in the Majelis Dzikir based on sound hadiths. However, the issue then moved to his attendance in discussion sessions with non-Salafi. Since these discussions were organized and attended by non-Salafis, 37 Ja’far Umar Thalib, “Saya Merindukan Ukhuwwah”, pp. 14-23. 38 http://salafiyunpad.wordpress.com/2008/08/21/walhamdulillah-pernyataanresmi-tentang-ruju-nya-ust-jafar-umar-thalib-hafizhohullah/, accessed on March 9, 2011.

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harakis and hizbys, his attendance could lead to the opinion that Salafis agree with their non-Salafi ideas and thoughts. Taking this into consideration, Thalib declared that he would no longer attend the program, and at the same time he resigned from the shari’a board of the Majlis al-Dzikra led by Arifin Ilham.39 Following the discussions in Medina, when he later returned home, Thalib reissued his declaration of repentance: In order to comply with Sheikh Rabi’ ibn Hadi al-Madkhali’s advice, in this writing I accomplish my declaration of repentance to God of my action of labelling the Salafis in Indonesia as ahl al-fitna wa alkhiyana (meaning artisans of libel and treason). Herewith I declare that I was guilty of such labelling, and thus revoke my statement. I humbly apologize as much as possible to all Salafis for all of my mistakes and oppression of their honour.40

In spite of this clear declaration, doubt among his former followers persisted. They believed that Thalib’s repentance was a trick aimed to recapture his leadership role among the Salafis. Moreover, they wanted to see if his repentance was real. However, some of his former comrades, such as Dzul Akmal from Riau, Sumatra, reconciled with their former teacher. It was reported that many Salafis sent short messages to their colleagues to welcome Thalib’s return. The spreading of these messages roused anxiety among prominent figures and made them consolidate their following. On February 2010, for example, under the guidance of the Yemeni Sheikh Abdullah ibn Umar ibn Burayk Mar’i on the occasion of the annual Salafi dawra, prominent Salafi teachers circulated advice for Salafis how to deal with rumours of Thalib’s repentance. In their advice, the teachers requested that the Salafis remain calm and not get in touch with Thalib by any means until he proved his repentance in practice.41 In April 2010, Thalib, accompanied by Dzul Akmal, and with the assistance of al-Madkhali’s closest students, namely Sheikh Ahmad al-Ghamidi from Jeddah, 39 http://salafiyunpad.wordpress.com/2008/08/21/walhamdulillah-pernyataanresmi-tentang-ruju-nya-ust-jafar-umar-thalib-hafizhohullah/, accessed on March 9, 2011. 40 http://salafiyunpad.wordpress.com/2008/08/21/walhamdulillah-pernyataanresmi-tentang-ruju-nya-ust-jafar-umar-thalib-hafizhohullah/, accessed on March 9, 2011. 41 This advice circulated among Salafis through the Internet and the pesantren network. When I visited the pesantren al-Anshar in Sleman, Yogyakarta, in June 2010, for example, I found a circular in the pesantren’s mosque. See, http://www. salafy.or.id/modules/artikel2/artikel.php?id=1619, accessed on March 9, 2011.

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Sheikh Usama ibn Ataya al-‘Utaybi from Medina, and Sheikh Abu Ishaq alJaza’iri, Thalib was at last welcomed by al-Madkhali. Before meeting him, these sheikhs had suggested that Thalib write a letter of repentance to al-Madkhali. In his letter, Thalib explicitly mentioned that he did not want any leadership role. Thalib also highlighted other issues. First, he himself was responsible for all his mistakes and those of his followers during the time of the jihad. Second, he admitted that his participation in heated debates with secularists in the presence of women contradicted the Salafi manhaj. Third, his taking part in the Majelis Dzikir of the Sufis opposed the manhaj. Fourth, his attendance in the dawra in the presence of hizbys disagreed with the manhaj. Fifth, his mislabelling of ‘ulama disputed the manhaj. Sixth, his attendance in debates in the presence of non-Muslim figures such as Christians and Buddhists was not in line with the manhaj. For all of these mistakes, he repented to God.42 After having accepted this letter, al-Madkhali welcomed Thalib and advised him to prove his repentance and maintain the unity of the Salafis in Indonesia. Thalib is currently busy with da’wa and teaching activities. He has more time to concentrate on his teaching activities in his pesantren, Ihya al-Sunnah, in Degolan, Kaliurang, Yogyakarta. The number of his students decreases to a dozen only. The majority of his students have moved to other pesantren, such as al-Anshar in Ngaglik, Sleman, located about five kilometres from Ihya alSunnah. Unlike their counterparts who suffered from frictions, the so-called “cooperationists” did not have this problem and remained united. They are consistent in preaching the Salafi manhaj by establishing pesantrens, creating Salafi foundations and launching radio channels. Apart from the above two groups, there are two other Salafi groups called the Wahdah Islamiyyah and the Harakah Sunniyah untuk Masyarakat Islamiyyah or HASMI, which are not considered to be Salafi either by the “rejectionist” or the “cooperationist” faction. They, however, share similar thoughts and ideas with the two factions about the basic doctrines outlined above: tawhid, following the sunna and opposing bid’a, al-wala’ wa al-bara’, and obedience to the government. The difference between them is that the last two Salafi groups, the Wahdah Islamiyyah and HASMI, have become mass organizations with official structures from central board to local branches. It is because of the similarity between them in the fundamental doctrines of Salafism that I call them Salafis. The Wahdah was founded by young Muhammadiyah activists who were disappointed by the organization’s acceptance of the Pancasila as the sole 42 http://alghuroba.org/front/node/r/184, accessed March 9, 2011.

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foundation (Asas Tunggal) of all organizations in 1985.43 The late Fathul Mu’in Daeng Ma’gading, a Muhammadiyah local leader from Makassar merits mention here. He was well-known for his radical opposition to government policies that he viewed as being in contradiction to Islamic law. In August 1968, for example, Daeng Ma’gading was arrested by the police for his participation in a movement against a “lotto”, a sort of Chinese gambling in Makassar. This movement was a protest against the government policy that legitimated gambling among the Chinese in the region.44 Later, when president Soeharto insisted that all organizations adopt the Pancasila as their ideological foundation, Daeng Ma’gading opposed this policy. He trained Muhammadiyah young activists to become preachers, mostly students from the secular Hasanuddin University in Makassar at the Takmirul Masajid Mosque located at Jalan Banda, Makassar, the centre of Muhammadiyah activities. Among his students were Zaitun Rasmin and Qasim Sagidu, the current chairperson and secretary of the Wahdah Islamiyyah in Makassar.45 When Mu’in died in 1985, these young activists founded the Yayasan Fathul Mu’in (YFM) focusing on da’wa activities, such as delivering Friday sermons, religious gatherings (majelis taklim), and mentoring university students about Islamic studies. In 1998, YFM changed its name into Yayasan Wahdah Islamiyyah (YWI) and no longer made reference to Mu’in in order to avoid him becoming the focus of a cult. Two years later, the Wahdah declared itself to have become a mass organization with an official structure, a national board and branch offices, and headquarters in Makassar.46 According to an official leaflet, at present the Wahdah has set up 35 branches, mostly in South Sulawesi, and planned to establish 34 more throughout the country.47 Like other Islamic organizations in the country, the Wahdah concentrates its activities on education, da’wa and social services. The transformation from a foundation to a mass organization was aimed at broadening its activities. However, as a result of this transformation, a number of Salafis refused to recognize the Wahdah as still being Salafi. For example, when asked during a Salafi teaching session in the Mubarok mosque about the position of the Wahdah in Salafi da’wa, Abdul Hakim Abdat, a prominent Salafi teacher, 43 Syarifuddin Jurdi, Sejarah Wahdah Islamiyyah, Yogyakarta: Kreasi Wacana, 2007, p. 107. 44 Muhammad Saleh Tajuddin, Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Sulawesi Selatan: Studi atas Gerakan Organisasi Wahdah Islamiyah, Makassar: Pukat, 2007, p. 16. 45 Interview with Qasim Saguni, Makassar, July 22, 2010. 46 Jurdi, Sejarah Wahdah Islamiyyah, p. 130. 47 DPP Wahdah Islamiyyah, Selayang Pandang Wahdah Islamiyyah, Makassar: DPP Wahdah Islamiyyah, n.d., p. 3.

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stated firmly that the Wahdah is hizby. Another reason for the exclusion of the Wahdah from the Salafi manhaj is that it calls on its members and sympathizers to vote in the general elections –clearly a political act. Wahdah considers participation in general elections as beneficial to Muslims, because they can vote for Islamic parties and for Muslim candidates who struggle for the interests of Islam. If Muslims do not participate in the elections, senior teacher Ikhwan Abdul Jalil argues, Muslims would have no representative in legislative bodies.48 As an organization, the Wahdah is active in recruiting a following. Campusbased student organizations in Makassar such as the Hasanuddin University and the Indonesian Muslim University (UMI) are claimed to be important venues for recruitment. Besides, the Wahdah also uses another method called “Satu Kader Satu” (SKS) in which obliges each member to recruit another member.49 The Wahdah has close ties with the Mua’assat Sheikh ‘Aid Al Thani al-Khayriyya (Sheikh Eid Charity Association), a Salafi charity foundation established by the Emir of Qatar in 1995. Some Wahdah buildings have been constructed using financial support from this foundation. In addition, the ‘Aid foundation has also helped various Salafi sheikhs to visit the Wahdah to deliver lectures on specific dawras. In July 2010, for example, the Wahdah held a Salafi dawra on the Qur’an in the presence of Mahmud ibn Ahmad ibn Salih al-Dausary, a Salafi sheikh from the Islamic university of Medina. All the expenses of the sheikh during this visits were borne by the ‘Aid foundation. During my visit, I learned that the Wahdah had covered all pictures of living creatures. Currently, the Wahdah offers integrated Islamic education from kindergarten up to high levels. It adopts the national curriculum in secular sciences, combined with its own curriculum in religious subjects. In 2010, there were more than 1300 students studying at the Wahdah’s educational institutions. In addition to this, the Wahdah also runs a program called “Pondok Pesantren Salafiyah” for students who want to study religion only. The program includes Tahfiz al-Qur’an or memorizing the Qur’an. On a higher level, the Wahdah manages the Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Islam dan Bahasa Arab (STIBA, College for the Study of Islam and Arabic), focusing on the comparative study of Islamic Laws and the Arabic Language. The Harakah Sunniyah untuk Masyarakat Islami or HASMI has its headquarters in Ciomas, Bogor, West Java. Unlike other Salafi groups that use 48 Interview with Ikhwan Abdul Jalil, a senior teacher at Wahdah Islamiyyah, Makassar, July 21, 2010. 49 Interview with Nur Salam Sirojuddin, a senior teacher at Wahdah Islamiyyah, Makassar, July 24, 2010.

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the term “Salafi”, HASMI prefers to use the term “ahl al-Sunna” as reflected in its name “Harakah Sunniyah”. According to Sarbini, HASMI’s chairperson, HASMI emerged in response to current Islamic movements dealing with the decline of Muslims in Indonesia in a number religious, social, political and cultural aspects. In his view, there are currently two kinds of Islamic movements. The first type sees that Muslims in Indonesia only suffer from spiritual defects. As a result, these movements try to purify Islamic doctrines, particularly tawhid. It believes that adherence to the true and pure ‘aqida will lead to Muslims’ victory. The second type sees that Muslims suffer from both spiritual and material defects. It considers that the role of Muslims in politics has been marginalized. This model moves in two diverse directions: political participation in parliament and jihad against the government. HASMI agrees with the second view in understanding the decline of Muslims, but it differs in its da’wa strategy: It opts to emerge as an Islamic organization that organizes social and educational activities, and refutes political participation in parliament and engaging in violent actions.50 HASMI aims at the creation of an Islamic community, which is defined as “a community which is collectively and individually covered and guided by Islamic norms.”51 The establishment of HASMI was initiated by the foundation of Pesantren ‘Alam al-Sunnah in Leuwiliang, Bogor, West Java, in 1996. Two figures merit mention here: M. Sarbini and Abdul Malik. Sarbini went to Pesantren al-Nida’ alIslami in Bekasi, West Java, where he completed his elementary and secondary schooling. He continued his studies at Syarif Hidayatullah State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) and got his bachelor’s degree in Islamic law in 1995. Ten years later, in 2005, he gained his master’s degree in Islamic Economics from the Ibnu Khaldun University (UIKA) in Bogor, West Java. He finished his doctoral study on Islamic Education from the same university in 2012. When he was a student at IAIN he became aware that he had to live according to Islamic teachings more strictly like observing the daily prayers on time and such more. It happened when one time he was sitting and talking with friends in a musalla (a small prayer house) of the institute while the noon prayer were about to start. Someone came up to him, perhaps a member of the Tablighi jema’at who warned him to stop talking, and said, “This campus is an Islamic campus. Why do you keep talking while we are about to pray?” According to Sarbini’s account, this remark made him aware that he had to observe Islamic teachings more 50 Interview with Sarbini, chairperson of HASMI, Bogor, March 19, 2013. See also, DPP HASMI, Sebuah Gerakan Kebangkitan, Bogor: Pustaka MIM, 2008, pp. 67-70. 51 DPP HASMI, Kebangkitan Sejati, Bogor: DPP HASMI, 2010. p. 21.

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seriously. Then, he started to look for true Islam and became acquainted with some LIPIA students who introduced him to Salafism. This friendship led him to study Salafism intensively with Abdul Qadir Jawas in 1998-1999 at his residence in the Cimanggu compound in Bogor, West Java. Later, in the early 2000s, Jawas charged him of being hizby after Sarbini had established the HASMI.52 Abdul Malik, a senior HASMI teacher, went through senior high school in Purwokerto, Central Java. He continued his studies at the Bandung Institute of Education and Teaching (IKIP) from 1981-1983. During this period, he was active in the Lembaga Pengembangan Pondok Pesantren Kilat (Institute for the Development of the Lightning Pesantren, LP3K). This movement was a neo-NII movement aspiring for the creation of the Islamic state of Indonesia. After the Indonesian military’s capture of the leaders of the Darul Islam (DI)/Negara Islam Indonesia (NII, Islamic State of Indonesia) in the 1960s, the movement perished. However, the DI/NII ideology continues to live on and has been adopted by young activists in new forms. These movements adopted several names such as usrah, ashab al-kahfi, pesantren kilat, and ribat sari’. All of them remained underground and their activists were united under the name Ikhwan al-Shahidin. In the late 1980s, these movements sent warriors to Afghanistan, and when they returned home, they brought Salafi books with them. These Salafi books caused divisions among Ikhwan al-Shahidin activists: some insisted in continuing their struggle through existing movements while others turned to Salafism. Abdul Malik was active in the pesantren kilat movement until the early 1990s.53 The Salafi da’wa these activists promulgated became more visible with the visit of Abd al-Karim al-Katiri, an Indonesian of Arab descent from Yemen who owns a big company in Saudi Arabia. In the early 1990s, he frequently visited Indonesia and made contact with Indonesian activists. Assisted by Yazid alTamimi who worked with him in Saudi Arabia, he visited Indonesia to meet Ikhwan al-Shahidin activists, including Abdul Malik, Ali Hijrah and Yazid alTamimi. In these meetings, they discussed the formulation of Salafi da’wa in Indonesia. Following this meeting, Abdul Malik went to Saudi Arabia to work with al-Katiri from 1992-1993. During this period, he often discussed the formulation of Salafi da’wa in Indonesia. Before leaving for Indonesia, Abdul Malik paid a short visit of three months to Yemen to witness Salafi da’wa there. In Indonesia, he had intense discussions with his colleagues and with al-Katiri about possible ways to accelerate Salafi da’wa. They finally established Pesantren ‘Alam al52 Interview with Sarbini, Bogor, March 19, 2013. 53 Interview with Abdul Malik, Bogor, March 19, 2013.

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Sunnah which received financial support from al-Katiri.54 Pesantren ‘Alam al-Sunnah ran one year training programs for preachers (du’at) that taught Arabic and da’wa methodology. Included in the teaching materials were books on Salafism, particularly those authored by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. In 1999, HASMI activists founded Pesantren al-Akhwayn in Cimanglid in Ciomas, Bogor, West Java, under the banner of Yayasan al-Huda. The pesantren ran a two year program for preachers, and focused on Arabic, tahfiz (memorization of the Qur’an), and da’wa methods. Al-Huda also managed similar pesantrens such as al-Anshar in Bandung, West Java. Due to financial constraints, however, only Pesantren al-Akhwayn continues to exist. At present, Pesantren Al-Huda runs formal educational institutions from kindergarten to higher education. With the support of Saudi donors, it builds hundreds of mosques in Java, mostly in West Java. After the building of the mosques, it sends its da’i to these mosques to preach Salafism among the community. Now, al-Huda also operates a Salafi radio station, Fajri 99, 3 FM.55 With the diverse activities they do and the expansion of the area they operate in, the activists needed a new “umbrella” to manage their activities. They felt that the organizational form of a yayasan (foundation) was insufficient to be able to organize their activities. Thus, in 2003, they changed into a much wider mass organization and adopted the name HASMI. From then on, the new name was brought under the attention of its members, and in 2005, HASMI was officially registered at the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. HASMI actively recruits its member in many ways, such as through discussions on the book entitled Shiratul Mustaqim published by the HASMI central board which contains explanations on the true and straight path to paradise. As an introduction to Salafism, the book discusses the basic Salafi doctrines, such as sunna, ahl al-sunna, bid’a, and al-firqa al-najiya. After the discussion, the activists offer membership to the participants.56 HASMI also employs another method of recruitment by organizing Halaqah Bimbingan Islam (HBI, Islamic Guidance Circle) sessions, where 3-5 potential members are invited to join the halaqah for studying religion. Each halaqah is supervised by a murabbi (mentor). This method is considered more effective than the first, since it reaches Muslim grassroots.57 54 Interview with Abdul Malik, Bogor, March 19, 2013. 55 Interview with Cepi Burhanuddin, murabbi of al-Huda, Parung, Bogor, March 15, 2013. 56 Lajnah Ilmiah HASMI, Shirotul Mustaqim, Meniti Jalan yang Lurus, Bogor: Pustaka Sunni, 2012. 57 Interview with Supendi, member of Departemen Dakwah Umum, Dewan Dakwah

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The transformation into a mass organization was not without risks. As mentioned above, other Salafi groups (“rejectionist” and “cooperationist”) no longer consider HASMI to be Salafi. They argue that a mass organization is bid’a and hizby. HASMI, of course, refutes this charge. It contends that the form of a mass organization is not prohibited but allowed and even recommended in Islam. It points to a number of arguments from the Qur’an and the practices of the Prophet. The Qur’an [61:4] says: “Truly Allah loves those who fight in His Cause in battle array, as if they were a solid cemented structure”. This verse means that God loves Muslims who practice collective rather than individual da’wa. For HASMI, collective da’wa needs proper management and a proper organizational format. Another Qur’anic verse [5:2] reads: “Help ye one another in righteousness and piety, but help ye not one another in sin and rancour.” assistance can be given. It concludes that to initiate religious establishments is an order of God. The aim of creating an organization is to achieve a common goal.58 HASMI also refers to the practice of the Prophet and his Companions who often gathered at Dar al-Arqam to discuss various matters. Before the Badr War, the Prophet made a list of his warriors and their weapons, and he checked their presence in order to check their availability in the jihad. Moreover, the Prophet also often sent his preachers to targeted areas. These practices required coordination and a certain strategy to achieve their goals. Thus, the form of a mass organization is necessary. For HASMI, in the modern era the da’wa movement urgently needs to adopt the format of a mass organization because it needs to fight many challenges, such as the spread of liberal thought and Christianization.59 Furthermore, HASMI criticizes its opponents’ inconsistency because despite their criticism of the organizational format, they also adopt it. Those Salafis who say they reject this form, in fact, adopt the organizational format but much more simple ones by establishing pesantrens and foundations. If the form of an organization were prohibited, Sarbini adds, all organizations in Saudi Arabia such as the Lajna al-Da’ima and the Rabitat al-‘Alam al-Islami should be dissolved.60 Abdul Malik, a senior HASMI ustadh, refutes the view that organization will lead to fanaticism and hizbyiyya. In practice, Salafis are hizby when they only attend Hasmi, Bogor, March 19, 2013. 58 http://dpdhasmibogor-depok.blogspot.com/2011/05/harakah-bidah.html, accessed March 18, 2013. 59 http://dpdhasmibogor-depok.blogspot.com/2011/05/harakah-bidah.html, accessed March 18, 2013. 60 Interview with Sarbini, HASMI chairperson, Bogor, March 19, 2013.

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religious gatherings when presided over by a certain ustadh. They will keep far from another Salafi as soon as they learn he does not belong to their group.61 Any discussion on Salafism in Indonesia is incomplete if it does not pay attention to Pondok Pesantren Islam al-Mukmin, Ngruki in Surakarta, Central Java (shortly well known as Pesantren Ngruki). Pesantren Ngruki was founded in 1972 by a group of Muslim activists including: Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Abdullah Baraja, Yoyok Rosywadi, Abdul Qohar Daeng Matase and Hasan Basri.62 The diverse backgrounds of the founders and senior teachers determine the pesantren’s orientation that is to combine elements they consider good from three educational institutions: Pondok Modern Gontor, al-Irsyad, and Pesantren Persatuan Islam (Persis) Bangil. Gontor (represented by Ba’asyir, Rosywandi, Wahyuddin and Farid Ma’ruf) provides open-minded intellectual thinking; al-Irsyad (reflected by Sungkar and Baraja) supports the purification of Islamic education and thought; and Persis Bangil (figured by Ahmad Husnan, Muhammad Ilyas and Suwardi) contributes to adherence to the use of a strict methodology in understanding Islamic law.63 More important is the support of the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyyah Indonesia (DDII, Indonesian Council for Islamic Propaganda) in which Sungkar was the head of its Surakarta office branch. In spite of its adoption of modern thought in politics, the Dewan Dakwah encourages a literal interpretation of Islam. Bearing this legacy, the institute has developed into a modern pesantren with a strict interpretation of Islam. It aims at the production of ‘ulama and a Muslim generation devoted to the belief in Islam kaffah.64 Islam kaffah means that Islam is conceived as an all-encompassing ideology covering religion and politics. The Dewan Dakwah fully supported the foundation of the pesantren. It was founded after Natsir’s speech in Surakarta in which he expressed his intention to build pesantrens and hospitals in order to counter the rise of communism and the Javanese spiritual movement.65 The Dewan Dakwah, for example, sent it teachers 61 Interview with Abdul Malik, a senior teacher at HASMI, Bogor, March 19, 2013. 62 Pondok Pesantren Islam al-Mukmin, Sekilas Profil, Ngruki: n,d., p. 15 63 Puslitbang Pendidikan Agama dan Keagamaan, Depag RI, Pondok Pesantren Islam al-Mukmin Ngruki Solo (Studi tentang Pendidikan, Faham Keagamaan dan Jaringan), Jakarta: Puslitbang Pendidikan Agama dan Keagamaan, Balitbang Agama dan Diklat Keagamaan Departemen Agama, 2004, pp. 103-104. 64 Pondok Pesantren Islam al-Mukmin, Sekilas Profil, p. 17. 65 Interview with Wahyuddin, the director of pesantren Ngruki, 27 September 2012. See also, Muhammad Wildan, “Mapping Radical Islam: A Study of The Proliferation of Radical Islam in Solo, Central Java”, in Martin van Bruinessen (ed.), Contemporary

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to the pesantren including Abu Nida, Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin, and Syafruddin who were later to become leading personalities of the Salafi da’wa, to teach. However, later they left the pesantren. Probably, Ngruki’s attitude towards the government may have been the reason behind their departure. Pesantren Ngruki often criticizes the government about the implementation of Islamic law. Pesantren Ngruki has long been alleged to be the centre of the jihadist movement in Indonesia.66 The involvement of its founders (Sungkar and Ba’asyir) in the Darul Islam movement and the engagement of various alumni in terrorist attacks are the reasons behind this accusation. In 1978, Sungkar and Ba’asyir were arrested for their involvement in the Komando Jihad. In 1985, they fled to Malaysia and in 1995 founded the Jama’ah Islamiyyah (JI) which was believed to have links with al-Qaeda. Upon the New Order collapse, they returned to Indonesia, but Sungkar died soon in November 1999. In 2000, Ba’asyir furthermore founded the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesian Council for Warriors) that struggles for the implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia, in which he became its amir.67 He departed from MMI, and in 2008 established a new organization called the Jama’ah Anshar Tauhid (JAT, Community for the Helpers of Tawhid). Recently, Ba’asyir was sentenced to imprisonment, for his support in JAT terrorist activities in Aceh. Moreover, some of its alumni were engaged in terrorist attacks, such Asmar Latif Sani, the suicide bomber who tried to blow up the Australian Embassy in Jakarta on 9 September 2004. Because of these activities, pesantren Ngruki is still regarded as a jihadist centre. B. Mobilization and Network Classic theories on social movement have relied on the psychological aspect of the actors. This approach posits that the driving force of people’s participation in social movements is psychological. The psychological discontent with the existing socio-political order and economic problems has deprived and marginalized the people. This psychological anxiety in turn leads them to Developments in Indonesian Islam, Singapore: ISEAS, 2013, pp. 195-201. 66 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the ‘Ngruki Network’ in Indonesia”, Indonesia Briefing, Jakarta/Brussels, August 8, 2002. 67 On biography of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, see, Irfan S. Awwas, Dakwah dan Jihad Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2003, pp. 29-85. On the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, see Irfan S. Awwas, Kongres Mujahidin I dan Penegakan Syari’ah Islam, Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2001.

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participate in social movements striving for better circumstances.68 This approach is insufficient to explain the absence of protests in places where injustice exists. Injustice is present everywhere, so why do some people participate in social movements while others do not? What factors are missed by the non-participants? To answer these questions, scholars have developed a new theory, known as the Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT). According to this theory, beliefs (ideology) and psychology alone are insufficient to mobilize participants.69 RMT states that the silent people lack the resources that would enable them to mobilize and unite into action. In contrast with the classic theory that stresses psychological aspects, RMT explains that resources can be mobilized, referred to as mobilizing structures, in order to attract participants.70 Doug McAdam and colleagues have defined mobilizing structures as “those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which the people mobilize and engage in collective action”.71 This includes middle-level groups, organizations and social networks. Formal organizations, like NGOs, religion-based organizations, student organizations, professional organizations, political parties and labour organizations provide a good repertoire for resource mobilization. To recruit followers, some formal organizations have developed branches in many cities and have semi-autonomous bodies for different sexes and ages. Informal organizations, such as mosques are frequently used to mobilize the masses. In addition to their function as centres of Islamic learning and preaching, some activists use mosques as a place to engage in social activism. Hamas in Palestine and students group activists in Indonesia have utilized mosques as their centres for recruitment.72 The availability of funds and the time given by the followers 68 John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, No. 6, 1977, p. 1214. 69 Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan, New York: State University of New York Press, 2001, p. 7. 70 Bert Klandermans and Sidney Tarrow, “Mobilization into Social Movement: Synthesizing European and American Approaches”, in Bert Klandermans, et al., From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research Across Cultures, London: JAI Press Inc., 1988, p. 4. 71 Doug McAdam, et al., “Introduction: Opportunity, Mobilizing Structures, Framing Processes – toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movement”, in Doug McAdam, et al., Comparative Perspective on Social Movement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 3. 72 For Hamas, see, Glenn E. Robinson, “Hamas as Social Movement”, in Quintan

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are essential to the recruitment process and to achieving the movement’s goals. Other informal networks including family (kinship) and friends play significant roles in resource mobilization. These networks can work well for “micromobilization”.73 Many studies on social movements show that participants are most likely to join a movement through relatives and friendship connections.74 Underground organizations often adopt this type of network in developing their movements. David A. Snow and his colleagues have identified common patterns of strategy by which organizations recruit new participants. These patterns encompass the following methods: (1) using direct encounters with others in public places; (2) utilizing “institutionalized mass communication mechanisms”; (3) meeting with others in private places, such as the door-to-door method; and finally (4) recruiting new followers through “members’ extra-movement social networks”.75 The following paragraphs will discuss some institutions from which the Salafis have benefited. Salafis make use of existing religious organizations, such as the Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia and al-Irsyad, by grafting activities upon them. Vast network of these organizations has paved the way for Salafis to grow and develop. After Salafis found their following, they started to establish their own foundations to strengthen the networks among them.

Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia (Dewan Da’wah), Jakarta Founded by Mohammad Natsir in 1967, the Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, or Dewan Da’wah)76 was intended to be a vehicle through which former Masyumi leaders and activists could actualize their political interests through da’wa. Since its establishment, the Dewan Da’wah has not drawn a clear distinction between politics and da’wa. The famous saying of its founder,

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Wiktorowizc, Islamic Activism, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004, pp. 126-127. For a study of student group activists, see for example, Hilman Latief, “Youth, Mosques and Islamic Activism: Islamic Source-Books in University-based Halaqah” in Kultur, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2010, pp. 63-88. John D. McCharty, “Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, Adapting, and Inventing”, in Doug McAdam, et al. (eds), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, pp. 142-143. David A. Snow, Louis A, Zurcher, JR. and Sheldon Ekland-Olson, “Social Networks and Social Movements: A Microstructural Approach to Differential Recruitment, American Sociological Review, 1980, 45, (October), p. 781. David A. Snow, Louis A, Zurcher JR. and Sheldon Ekland-Olson, “Social Networks” p. 795. For a comprehensive account of the Dewan Da’wah, see, for example, Asna Husin, “Philosophical and Sociological Aspects of Da’wah: A Study of Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia”, PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 1998.

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“previously we carried out dakwa through politics, and now we run politics through dakwa”,77 represents the Dewan Da’wah’s vision of politics and da’wa. For the Dewan Da’wah, da’wa encompasses all social aspects including culture, economics, education, politics, and science and technology.78 Moreover, it describes its roles as follows: to be a centre for Islamic da’wa; the guardian of the Islamic faith; and the unifier of the Islamic community (umma).79 Keeping these roles in mind, one can understand that the Dewan Da’wah has facilitated the birth of many Islamic organizations, such as the Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (KISDI, Indonesian Committee for Islamic Solidarity), and the Komite Penanggulangan Krisis (KOMPAK, Crises Rescue Committee). KISDI was established in 1988 by prominent Muslims including Ahmad Sumargono in order to support the struggles of the Muslim world. In the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, KISDI supported the Saudi government, requested that the American troops leave Saudi and urged Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait.80 On other occasions, KISDI often managed tabligh akbar (massive religious gatherings) to recruit volunteers to support Muslims in Palestine, Bosnia, and Afghanistan.81 Meanwhile KOMPAK has dealt with ethno-religious conflicts in the archipelago. Moreover, it should be noted here that the Dewan Da’wah has become the entry point of the Ikhwani’s thought which was introduced by ex-Masyumi figures who had studied in Cairo. In the two decades following the Independence of Indonesia, these figures were intensely occupied with political activities causing them to ignore Islamic thought. After the new Soeharto regime had banned them from political activities, they turned to the dissemination of Islamic ideas. Thus in the 1980s, through its publishing house, Media Da’wa, works authored by Ikhwani figures namely Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Said Hawa were translated into Indonesian and published. However, these ideas did 77 Quoted from Muhammad Wildan, “Mapping Radical Islam: A Study of The Proliferation of Radical Islam in Solo, Central Java”, p. 196. 78 Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia, Khittah Da’wah Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia, Jakarta: 2005. 79 H.M. Misbach Malim, Sibghah Da’wah: Warna, Strategi dan Aktivitas Da’wah Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia, Jakarta: Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia, 2008, pp. 16-20. 80 http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/1990/08/25/NAS/mbm.19900825. NAS19301.id.html, accessed on 19 March 2011. 81 See, for example, http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/1994/02/26/NAS/ mbm.19940226.NAS1663.id.html, accessed on 19 March 2011.

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not implant a revolutionary spirit in Dewan Da’wa’s leading figures. The Saudi’s effort in exporting a non-revolutionary model of the Muslim Brotherhood’s thought was the rationale behind this.82 Consumed by university students, particularly on secular campuses, the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood soon became widespread. Inspired by these thoughts, campus-based Muslim activists managed Islamic study circles that supported the idea of comprehensive Islam (Islam kaffah) as discussed earlier in this chapter. During Natsir’s leadership from 1967-1993, the Dewan Da’wah enjoyed a privileged relationship with the Saudi government. The Saudi government is unique: it trusts individuals more than institutions or organizations. Being one of the vice presidents of the Rabitat al-‘Alam al-Islami (The Muslim World League), Natsir was without doubt a committed and trustworthy person. The Rabitat accepted his recommendation for scholarships, grants and financial support for Islamic educational institutions. Through his assistance, the establishment of LIPIA became viable. Here we understand why the Saudi Government supported all the activities of the Dewan Da’wah. When Natsir died, the Saudi Government’s trust weakened, and consequently, the flow of money to the Dewan Da’wah decreased. However, the emergence of new Salafi foundations may have been another factor in this. With regard to the Salafi movement in Indonesia, the Dewan Da’wah has played a significant role in its rise and development; not only did it pave the way for the birth of the Salafi movement in Indonesia, but it also provided fertile soil. Salafi teachers including Dewan Da’wah’s preachers were sent to Saudi Arabia for further study at the Jami’a al-Imam ibn Su’ud University in Riyadh. Thanks to Natsir, the Rabitat had awarded them scholarships. These students, for example Aunurrafiq Ghufran, Abu Nida, and Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin, became Salafi da’wa’s pioneers in Indonesia and therefore left the Dewan Da’wah. Ghufran is currently the director of al-Furqan, a Salafi pesantren in Sidayu, Gresik, East Java. I will discuss his role in Salafi da’wa below in Chapter Four. Abu Nida, who is currently the director of Pesantren Bin Baz in Bantul, Yogyakarta, merits mention here. Like Ghufran, Abu Nida was a Dewan Da’wah preacher in a rural area in West Kalimatan, and he received a scholarship from the Rabitat. He studied at the Jami’a Imam Muhammad ibn Su’ud University in Riyadh from 1979 to 1984. Having completed his studies in Saudi Arabia, he returned to Indonesia and started to preach Salafi da’wa. He spent some years teaching at Pesantren al-Mukmin, Ngruki, Solo, before he departed and 82 Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in the Post-Suharto Indonesia”, South East Asia Research, 10, 2, 2002, pp. 124-125.

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commenced his da’wa in Yogyakarta.83 Ahmad Faiz Asifudin is another Salafi preacher who benefited from the Dewan Da’wah. Unlike the two preachers mentioned earlier, before going to Saudi he was not a Dewan Da’wah preacher. He was granted a scholarship from the Rabitat to study at Jami’a Imam ibn Su’ud University, Riyadh, from 1979 to 1984. He returned to Indonesia, served as a Dewan Da’wah preacher and taught at the Madrasah Wathaniyyah Islamiyyah (MWI), a traditional pesantren established by his father, in Petanahan, Kebarongan, Central Java. His efforts to reform the MWI were repudiated by his colleagues. In 1984, together with Abu Nida, the Dewan Da’wa assigned him to teach at Pesantren Ngruki. After two years, he left Ngruki and started to preach Salafi teachings in Solo. He finally established his own Pesantren, Imam Bukhari in Solo, Central Java. Since the 1980s, the Dewan Da’wah has developed further steps in its cadre production by establishing an educational institution. In the 1980s, it founded the Akademi Bahasa Arab (ABA, Arabic College). Although ABA’s main concern was teaching the Arabic language, it is certain that ABA also paid particular attention to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s thoughts.84 Saudi financial support to the Dewan Da’wah may be the reason of the Dewan Da’wah leaning to spread the ideas of Wahhabism. This institution was subsequently transformed into the Lembaga Pendidikan Da’wah Islam (LPDI, Institute for Islamic Da’wa) in the 1990s. ABA and LPDI produced Salafi leaders such as Zainal Abidin, the leader of the Salafi community in Tanah Baru, Depok, West Java, and Arman Amri, the director of Pesantren Minhajus Sunnah in Bogor, West Java. Both leaders were first introduced to Salafi teachings when they were students at LPDI.85 A prominent Salafi preacher, Yazid Jawas taught Salafi tenets at the LPDI. The LPDI has now been transformed into Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Da’wah (STDI) to incorporate a wider range of disciplines. The students are recruited from all regions in Indonesia through the regional representatives of the Dewan Da’wah. In practice, the Dewan Da’wah collaborates with reformist organizations like the Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam (Persis). As an Islamic da’wa institution with a close relationship to the Saudi Government, the Dewan Da’wah is very critical of Shi’ism86 which it sees as a 83 M. Imdadun Rahmat, Arus Baru Islam Radikal, Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 2005, p. 103. 84 Interview with Zainal Abidin, Depok, October 29, 2008. 85 Interview with Zainal Abidin, Depok, October 29, 2008, and with Arman Amri, Bogor, September 5, 2008. 86 Zulkifli, “The Struggle of Shi’ism in Indonesia”, PhD Dissertation, Leiden University, 2009, p. 261.

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heterodox and deviant Islam against which the Dewan Da’wah’s activities are directed.87 Zainal Abidin, a prominent Salafi figure in Depok, West Java, is a good example in this regard. Before attending ABA, he very much admired the success of the 1979 Islamic Iranian Revolution and he wrote his bachelor thesis on “The Impact of the Iranian Revolution to the Monarchies in the Middle East” in 1982. While he attended ABA, lecturers soon alerted him that the revolution was not Islamic but Shi’ite causing him to radically change his ideas (see for more Chapter 6).88 The existence of a Salafi-oriented institution within the Dewan Da’wah, and the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA) located not far from the Dewan Da’wah, created Salafi teaching centres around the two institutions. Some LPDI and LIPIA students attended Salafi religious gatherings in a small prayer house (musalla) in Pramukasari Street in Jakarta. As the number of participants increased, this Salafi circle was moved to the larger Nurul Iman Mosque in Pramuka Street, Matraman, Central Jakarta. Teaching was delivered by Abdul Hakim Abdat, another prominent Salafi preacher. The affiliation of the Dewan Da’wah with the Salafi movement was strengthened by the fact that it allowed the Salafis to make use of its grand al-Furqan Mosque in Kramat Raya, Jakarta. For several years, Yazid Jawas had used this mosque to teach Salafi doctrines on Tuesday afternoons. The Dewan Da’wah finally banned this instruction after its senior leaders felt that the teaching had deviated from the aims of Dewan Da’wah. The main reason of the dissolution was that Yazid Jawas contended that Muslim engagement in political parties is unlawful, which is a problem as the Dewan Da’wah has supported Muslim participation in political parties since its inception. For example, Natsir used to be the leader of Masyumi, and Anwar Haryono was one of the prominent leaders of the Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), the party that claims to be an incarnation of the Masyumi. Moreover, Dewan Da’wah leaders often approached the government, especially in the last years of the Soeharto and Habibie administrations when the government showed more inclination to accommodate Muslim interests. After the New Order regime’s long suppression of Muslim interests, in the 1990s, the Dewan Da’wah saw an opportunity to bring Muslim aspirations under the attention of the government. Concerning this development, the Salafis denounced the ‘ulama who approached the government as su’ (bad) ‘ulama. As discussed in Chapter One, the Salafis indeed highlight that obedience to the ruler is one of the main Salafi doctrines. However, 87 Asna Husin, “Philosophical and Sociological Aspects”, p. 140. 88 Interview with Zainal Abidin, Depok, October 29, 2008.

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loyalty is different from nearness. Loyal people will display obedience to the ruler even though they are oppressed, while those close to him will stay away from the ruler when they receive unjust treatment. Taking into account the difference in political stance between the Dewan Da’wah and the Salafis, one cannot consider the Dewan Da’wah to be a Salafi institution. Dewan Da’wah’s personnel call themselves Salafi in a different sense to Salafi preachers. For them, Islam is inseparable from politics. Misbach Malim, Natsir’s former personal secretary prefers to call the Dewan Da’wah ikhwani rather than Salafi.89 Ghufran considers Natsir to be a haraki.90 To borrow a Salafi term, the Dewan Da’wah could be best described as “Salafi ‘aqidatan, ikhwani manhajan” (Salafi creed, ikhwani method). As mentioned earlier, the Salafis used the slogan in their initial da’wa when they collaborated with Ikhwani activists. To compete with the liberal tendency among Muslim thinkers, in 2006, the Dewan Da’wah created a program called “1000 intellectuals”. The program was expected to be accomplished in five years. The program was to produce one thousand Muslim intellectuals consisting of 200 PhD, 400 Master and 400 Bachelor graduates. To achieve this goal, the Dewan Da’wah collaborated with the Ibn Khaldun Islamic University (UIKA) in Bogor, West Java, and the Muhammadiyah University of Surakarta (UMS) in Solo, Central Java. In 2008, 25 Bachelor and 8 PhD students were in training at UIKA, while another 40 master students were in training at UMS Solo. This program was part of the “ghazw alfikr”, a cultural invasion to compete with Western thought and ideas, and was directed by the young Muslim thinker, Adian Husaini, one of the chairpersons of the Dewan Da’wah’s central board. It was a response to a government program sending young lecturers of state–owned Islamic higher institutions to study Islam in the West. To broaden the analysis on their Islamic knowledge, since the mid-1980s, the Ministry of Religious Affairs has sent significant numbers of lecturers to study in the West. In addition, the Dewan Da’wah also had and still has other programs to support Islamic da’wa. For example, it employed 324 preachers in rural areas in Indonesia by granting them a monthly allowance.91 The concept of “ghazw al-fikr” emerged in Islamic discourse among fundamentalist activists in response to the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The defeat introduced the notion of the domination of one culture over another. A fundamentalist journalist, Muhammad Jalal Kishk, for example, contended 89 Interview with H.M. Misbach Malim, Jakarta, September 23, 2008. 90 Interview with Aunurrafiq Ghufran, Gresik, December 26, 2008. 91 Interview with Avid Sholihin, the Secretary of Dewan Da’wah, Jakarta, September 23, 2008.

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that the notion of dominant culture was not neutral, but intentional to incite in the minds of people that one culture is superior while others are inferior. He considers this idea a new form of crusade. He identified three waves of war in his analysis of the history of the wars between Muslims and the West or Christianity. The first was the medieval crusader; the second wave was colonialism that began with Napoleon’s occupation of Egypt and ended with decolonization; and the last wave is a cultural invasion that penetrates Muslim’s minds on the supremacy of the West over Islam. For Kishk, Muslims are now facing the last type of crusade.92 Muslim activists in Indonesia soon adopted this concept.

Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA) Studies on Islam in Indonesia in general, and on Islamic movements in particular did not pay any attention to the role of the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA, Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic) until Hasan noticed its significant influence on the Salafi movement in Indonesia. Hasan explored the material taught at this institution and its contribution to Indonesian Islam through its alumni.93 The LIPIA was established in 1980 as a branch of the Jami’a al-Imam Muhammad ibn Su’ud in Riyadh. Natsir of the Dewan Da’wah played a significant role in its foundation. Prior to its inception, the university sent Sheikh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ‘Abd Allah al-‘Ammar, a student of the well-known Salafi teacher, the late Bin Baz, to Jakarta. Bin Baz asked his pupil to meet Natsir and subsequently Natsir mediated between the Indonesian Government and the Saudi Government about the possibility of founding an institution to teach Arabic.94 As the Ministry of Education and Culture was reluctant to issue a permit, the license was eventually issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 95 92 Ghazwul fikri or Arabisation? Indonesian Muslim responses to globalisation’, in: Ken Miichi and Omar Farouk (eds), Dynamics of Southeast Asian Muslims in the era of globalization, Tokyo: Japan International Cooperation Agency Research Institute (JICA-RI), 2013, pp. 47-70. 93 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, pp. 47-52. 94 Imdadun Rakhmat, Arus Baru, p. 100. 95 This was the only foreign educational institution operated under the license of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. The permit was made available thanks to the then Minister of Religious Affairs, Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara. See, Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam, (eds), Menteri-Menteri Agama RI: Biografi Sosial Politik, Badan Litbang Agama Departemen Agama RI and PPIM IAIN Jakarta, 1998, p. 344.

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From 1980 to 1986, the institute focused on Arabic studies under the name Lembaga Pengajaran Bahasa Arab (LPBA, Institute for Teaching Arabic), but in 1986 was changed into LIPIA in order to include more subjects in more faculties, such as the Shari’a faculty. However, since the beginning, that Salafi propaganda is disseminated in the institution was evident. The students not only receive Salafi doctrines in classrooms but also outside campus. In the classroom the students learn, understand and memorize Salafi precepts. If a student espouses a rational interpretation of Islamic doctrine, it may result in getting a low grade or even to failure. In the dormitory, the students are under surveillance by their seniors. Senior students hold a regular halqa, and see to it that the conduct of their juniors conforms to Salafi manhaj.96 The institute provides scholarships for its students, and this attracts fresh pesantren graduates to enrol. Up to 2009, LIPIA produced 8,604 graduates.97 LIPIA is planning to accept more students by establishing new branches in Semarang (Central Java), Makassar (South Sulawesi) and Padang (West Sumatra). The availability of scholarships is not the only reason for the students’ interest; there is also the attraction of support from pesantren leaders, kyais, and notable Muslim leaders. Some kyais I met during my visit to pesantrens were reluctant to let their students study at state-sponsored Islamic higher educational institutions such as State Islamic Universities (UIN), the State Institutes for Islamic Studies (IAIN) or the State Colleges for Islamic Studies (STAIN). The works of Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, “Ada Pemurtadan di IAIN” (“Apostasy at IAIN”),98 and of Adian Husaini99 of the Dewan Da’wah very much influenced the kyais’ view that UINs, IAINs and STAINs are Islamic institutions that spread liberal thought. In his work, Jaiz highlights the rational and liberal approach to Islamic studies in the state-sponsored Islamic institutions. According to him, this approach is a systematic effort leading the students to polytheism.100 He 96 Imdadun Rakhmat, Arus Baru, p. 101-102. 97 http://www.republika.co.id/berita/31004/LIPIA_Lahirkan_Kader_Muslim_ Moderat, accessed on May 23, 2009. 98 Jaiz is critical of the methodology of Islamic studies developed at UIN/IAIN/ STAIN, and has written several books on the subject. See, Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, Ada Pemurtadan di IAIN, Jakarta: Pustaka al-Kautsar, 2005; Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, et al., Islam dan Al-Qur’an pun Diserang: Gejala Bahaya Laten Neo-Komunisme di UIN, Jakarta: Pustaka Nahi Munkar, 2009. 99 See, Adian Husaini, Virus Liberalisme di Perguruan Tinggi Islam, Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2009. 100 Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, Ada Pemurtadan, p. ix.

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furthermore mentions some UIN/IAIN-based scholars who promote secularism and pluralism, such as Harun Nasution, Nurcholish Madjid, Kaustsar Azhari Noer, and Zainun Kamal. Likewise, Adian Husaini criticizes the liberal method of Islamic studies developed in these institutions. This liberal tendency, according to him, is visible in the approaches they use to the three essential doctrines of Islam: deconstruction of Shari’a, de-sacralization of the Qur’an and the hadith, and deconstruction of ‘aqida (tawhid). The first deals with questioning clear-cut Islamic laws and interpreting them in line with the time; the second concerns the application of a hermeneutical method to the Qur’an; while the last deals with inserting an idea of religious pluralism that sees all religions as similar.101 LIPIA’s in disseminating Salafi da’wa is certain. The Saudi Government established LIPIA among other things to halt the influence of the Iranian revolution by spreading Wahhabi doctrines in many parts of the Muslim world, including Indonesia. Through this institute, the Saudi government grants scholarships to young students to study at the Jami’a al-Imam Ibn Su’ud in Riyadh. After the completion of their studies, many of these graduates go on to teach in existing pesantrens, or establish their own pesantrens as Abu Nida, Aunurrafiq Ghufron, and Ahmas Faiz Asifudin did. Some others preach Salafi teachings among Muslims. A significant number of LIPIA graduates teach at Salafi pesantrens. The similarities in spirit and mission of LIPIA and pesantrens in the propagation of the Salafi manhaj is the main reason pesantrens accept LIPIA graduates. Abdul Hakim Abdat is one of the notable Salafi teachers to have graduated from LIPIA. He is currently busy in Salafi da’wa. He lectures on Salafi precepts in various musallas including those of the Jakarta Stock Exchange (BEJ), the Astra Company, and also in the al-Mubarak Mosque. In the last place, he teaches the Sahih alBukhari every Saturday morning attracting large audiences of more than 700 participants. He often travels to other cities in Indonesia to give lectures on the Salafi manhaj, and he is also frequently invited to Malaysia to give lectures as well.

The Religious Attaché of the Saudi Embassy, Jakarta As the official representative of the Saudi Government, the Religious Attaché of the Saudi Embassy in Jakarta without doubt has played a significant role in 101 Adian Husaini, “Dari ‘Yahudi Liberal’ ke ‘Islam Liberal’”, in Budi Handrianto, 50 Tokoh Islam Liberal Indonesia, Jakarta: Hujjah Press, 2007, pp. xxiii-xxxvi.

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disseminating Salafi teachings. The embassy is very active in promoting Salafi teachings in Indonesia by way of supporting prominent preachers such as Yunahar Ilyas and Chalil Ridwan. Both scholars are graduates of the Jami’a Imam Ibn Su’ud, Riyadh, and the Islamic University of Medina, respectively. Ilyas is a member of the central board of the Muhammadiyah where he belongs to the hardliner faction that promotes a literal interpretation of Islam.102 Ridwan is currently a member of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Council of Ulama) and the director of Pesantren Husnayain in Jakarta. From 1990 to 2000, he chaired the Badan Kerjasama Pondok Pesantren (BKSPP, Coordinating Body of Cooperation of Pondok Pesantren). They are called “the Attaché’s preachers” and get a salary from the Saudi embassy.103 In spite of this, the staff members of the Attaché’s office, which has its own office outside the Embassy’s residence, do not strictly practice the precepts of Salafi teachings, particularly those dealing with their physical appearance. They do wear trousers that reach below the ankle (isbal) and do not sport long beards. Salafis are easily identified by their isbal and their beard. Salafism prohibits the practice of isbal and shaving the beard. However, when I visited the Attaché’s office in March 2009, I saw many staff members wearing long trousers below the ankle and Shobahussurur, for instance, who has worked at the office for many years, does not let his beard grow. For him, isbal and long beards have nothing to do with religion, because they are Arab habits. Only those who emulate Arabs hold the opinion that isbal and cutting beard are not allowed in Islam.104 The religious attaché’s office also offers native teachers of Arabic for Islamic educational institutions such as Salafi pesantrens and Islamic universities. These teachers live on the campuses and all expenses, including their salaries, are borne by the office. The recipient institution only has to provide facilities such as housing and transportation. The teachers are contracted by the office for a period of four years, after which they may be replaced by others or their contract may be extended. Pesantren Al-Irsyad in Tengaran, Salatiga, Central Java, has received two teachers since 1995. Although the teachers are assigned to teach Arabic, in practice they also teach other matters in accordance to their expertise, particularly Salafi doctrines in ‘aqida. To some extent, these teachers 102 On the rise of conservatism within the Muhammadiyah, see Ahmad Najib Burhani, “Liberal and Conservative Discourse in the Muhammadiyah: The Struggle for the Face of Reformist Islam in Indonesia”, in Martin van Bruinessen (ed.), Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam, Singapore: ISEAS, 2013, pp. 105-144. 103 Interview with Shobahussurur, Jakarta, March 6, 2009. 104 Interview with Shobahussurur, Jakarta, March 6, 2009.

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function as agents who oversee the implementation of Salafi teachings in the recipient institutions. The office of the religious attaché also distributes Salafi books and Qur’ans to ‘attaché preachers’ and to other parties. When I visited the office, for example, I met Ahmad Romli, a fresh graduate from Pesantren Minhaj al-Sunnah in Bogor, who was there to ask for books and Qur’ans. He would then return to his hometown to assist and teach in the newly founded Salafi Pesantren al-Hidayah, in Tanggamus, Lampung. Besides this, the office also builds many mosques. In the last ten years, the office has constructed more than 150 mosques throughout the country. This includes the renovation of the Arif Rahman Hakim mosque, and the University of Indonesia mosque in Salemba, Central Jakarta.

Al-Irsyad In early 1990, the Salafis utilized the vast network of al-Irsyad, an organization established by Ahmad Surkati in 1913. As noted earlier, in 1989, almost all leading Salafi figures, such as Ja’far Umar Thalib, Yusuf Usman Baisa and Yazid Jawas, gathered at Pesantren al-Irsyad in Tengaran, and turned it into a centre for Salafi teachings from which the Salafis spread out. I will return to this pesantren in another chapter. The Sekolah Tinggi Ali bin Abi Thalib (STAI, Islamic College) in Surabaya is another institution that benefits from a connection with al-Irsyad. It was established in 1996, under the name Ma’had ‘Aly al-Irsyad al-Salafi and it ran its program on the al-Irsyad campus in Surabaya. It adopted the curriculum of the Jami’a Imam ibn Su’ud University in Riyadh.105 Later, the relationship between the Ma’had Aly and al-Irsyad deteriorated because of Ma’had’s persistence in supporting Salafi tenets. In 2006, the Ma’had was transformed into STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib with a new campus in Sidotopo Kidul Street No. 51, Surabaya, East Java. However, the institution maintained the al-Irsyad emblem. Its statutes states that STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib is under the supervision of the Yayasan Universitas Islam al-Irsyad Surabaya. This is ironic, since de facto the STAI has separated from al-Irsyad. STAI Ali ibn Abi Thalib’s director, Abdurrahman al-Tamimi, told me that the use of the name al-Irsyad is merely for strategic reasons; to make it easier to get a government permit.106 Abu Haidar, a prominent Salafi 105 Buku Panduan Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Ali Bin Abi Thalib, Surabaya: STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib, 2008, pp. 5-6. 106 Interview with Abdurrahman al-Tamimi, the director of STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib, Surabaya, December 22, 2008.

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figure from Bandung, claims that the use of the name al-Irsyad aims to counter resistance and the criticism of the community against it. In addition to the fact that the majority of Muslims in Surabaya are affiliated to the Nahdlatul Ulama and the location of Sunan Ampel’s shrine next to the institute may become a central point in the institute’s criticism against them.107 Sunan Ampel was one of the nine saints who successfully preached Islam in Indonesia, and therefore many Muslims visit his shrine. By consistently using the name al-Irsyad, which traditionalist Muslims still honour, STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib aims to evade the community’s criticism. Similarly, the use of the name Ali bin Abi Thalib is aimed at preventing criticism from Arab descendants. Some Arabs claim that they are descendants of the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima and her husband, Ali ibn Abi Thalib. In Indonesia, these Arabs are called habib. Because they claim this lineage, habibs demand the respect of indigenous Muslims as they claim that the spread of Islam in Indonesia is due to their role in da’wa. As a result, habibs enjoy a privileged position among Indonesian Muslims who kiss their hand (taqbil) when they meet them. On the other hand, Salafis criticize this attitude arguing that Islam teaches the equal position of all Muslims. Responding to this, the habibs criticize the Salafis in their turn and accuse them of hating the Prophet’s descendants. Through using the name Ali bin Abi Thalib, the Salafis want to show that they do not oppose Arabs.108 The use of the name al-Irsyad helps the pesantren and the al-Irsyad connection benefits the Salafis. Many students I met during my fieldwork in the pesantren are alumni of al-Irsyad schools from many regions, such as al-Irsyad in Tegal and Pekalongan, Central Java.

Pondok Modern Darussalam, Gontor, Ponorogo, East Java In spite of the valuable contribution of Pondok Modern Darussalam, Gontor (hereafter referred as Gontor) in colouring Indonesian Islam through its alumni, little research has been devoted to its study.109 Pondok Gontor was established 107 Interview with Abu Haidar, Amsterdam, May 1, 2009. 108 Interview with Mubarak Bamualim, vice director of STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib, Surabaya, December 23, 2008. 109 A classic study on Gontor was made by Lance Castles, “Notes on the Islamic School at Gontor”, in Indonesia, No. 1 (1966), pp. 30-45. See also, Ali Saifullah HA, “Darussalaam, Pondok Modern Gontor’, in M. Dawam Rahardjo, Pesantren dan Pembaharuan, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1995, pp.134-154. A more recent work was done by Martin van Bruinessen,

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in 1926 by three bothers. This “trimurti” consists of Ahmad Sahal, Zainuddin Fannani, and Imam Zarkasyi. Unlike other pesantrens that belong or are affiliated to certain Muslims organizations, Pondok Gontor’s founders wanted the pesantren to be able to unite the entire Muslim community as expressed in its motto “di atas dan untuk semua golongan”, (above and for all groups). Bearing this motto and combined with its five pillars, keikhlasan (sincerity), kesederhanaan (modesty), berdikari (self-reliance), ukhuwwah Islamiyyah (Islamic brotherhood) and kebebasan (freedom),110 Gontor has produced thousands of alumni who all went their own ways, ranging from becoming fundamentalist literalist, to moderate and liberal.111 Some alumni have emerged as national figures who coloured the Islamic discourses in the country. To name a few, we can mention Nurcholish Madjid who was in favour of a liberal interpretation of Islam, the chairman of the Muhammadiyah M. Din Syamsuddin, former chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama Hasyim Muzadi, former Minister of Religious Affairs, Maftuh Basyuni, former speaker of the People’s Assembly, Hidayat Nur Wahid. However, we should not forget to mention Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as an alumni at the other end of the spectrum. Since its inception, Gontor has applied modern teaching methods and has adopted a grading system. It has taught both religious knowledge and secular sciences. Arabic and English are used in daily conversation among students and teachers. Many alumni have continued to study at Middle Eastern universities, particularly at the al-Azhar University in Cairo and the Islamic University of Medina. Gontor teaches its students the ‘aqida of the ahlu al-Sunna wal al-jama’a, which resembles that of the Ash’arite. In their study of this subject, the students read the work of Imam Zarkasyi, Ushuluddin, followed by the Kitab al-Sa’ada by Abdul Hamid Hakim, and the al-Din al-Islami by Sheikh Hasan Mansur, Abd alWahhab Khayruddin and Mustafa al-‘Inani. All these works teach theological tenets resembling those of the Ash’arite school. Moreover, in the fifth year of ‘Divergent Paths from Gontor: Muslim Educational Reform and the Travails of Pluralism in Indonesia’, in: Freek L. Bakker and Jan Sihar Aritonang (eds), On the Edge of Many Worlds [Festschrift Karel A. Steenbrink], Zoetermeer: Meinema, 2006, pp. 15262 (available online at: http://www.hum.uu.nl/medewerkers/m.vanbruinessen/ publications/Bruinessen_Divergent_paths_from_Gontor.pdf); and Din Wahid, “Pendidikan Islam di Jawa Timur: Kecenderungan dan Variasi”, in Jajat Burhanudin and Dina Afrianty (eds), Mencetak Muslim Modern: Peta Pendidikan Islam Indonesia, Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada, 2006, pp. 72-83. 110 http://www.gontor.ac.id/panca-jiwa, accessed on August 26, 2013. 111 See Martin van Bruinessen, “Divergent Path from Gontor” .

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their study, students are introduced to the comparative study of religion, as they study Mahmud Yunus’s work, al-Adyan (‘Religions’). The last subject, combined with Ibn Rushd’s “Bidayat al-Mujtahid” provides a basis for an inclusive attitude towards other Muslim groups and even to non-Muslims. However, a significant change took place in 2000. In order to maintain its accreditation from the Islamic University of Medina, Gontor was required to incorporate Salafi books, particularly on ‘aqida. Thus, since 2000 Gontor has taught its students the works of Salih Fawzan al-Fawzan, the multiple volume Kitab al-Tawhid. The students have to study these books in the fourth, fifth and sixth year classes. Since they have been introduced to Salafism, it is no wonder that many Gontor alumni currently turn into Salafi activists. However, the interest in Salafism of some Gontor alumni is not merely caused by the introduction of Salafi teachings at Gontor but due to their study in Salafi learning centres. Gontor alumni Mubarak Bamualim from Surabaya and Khatib Muwahhid from Banjarsari, Ciamis, for example, have become leading Salafi ustadhs in their regions. Bamuallim studied Salafism at the Islamic University of Medina, while Muwahhid learned Salafism in Darul Hadith, Yemen. It is in this context that Gontor contributes to the spread of Salafism in the country. Gontor’s close relationship with the Saudi government dates back to earlier times before it included Salafi books in its curriculum. One of Gontor’s founders, Imam Zarkasyi, together with M. Natsir of the Dewan Da’wah and Ahmad Syaichu of the Nahdlatul Ulama, became close counterparts of the Rabita al-‘Alam alIslami.112 Given this fact, it was no surprise that Gontor received and probably still does receive large amounts of money from the Saudi Government. The threestorey “Saudi buildings” comprising a students’ dormitory, classes, bathrooms and toilets were constructed with financial support from the Saudi Government. Moreover, Gontor often welcomes teachers from Saudi Arabia to teach Arabic for short periods of time (two to three weeks). The Saudi ambassadors and high official of the Saudi Government often pay a visit to Gontor. My experience when I studied at Gontor may describe how Gontor welcomes such distinguished guests. I studied at Gontor from 1981-1987, and taught there for another two years during my dedication period (masa pengabdian) from 1987-1989. During this period, I saw how Gontor tried to please these guests satisfactorily. Under 112 ‘Ghazwul fikri or Arabisation? Indonesian Muslim responses to globalisation’, in: Ken Miichi and Omar Farouk (eds), Dynamics of Southeast Asian Muslims in the era of globalization, Tokyo: Japan International Cooperation Agency Research Institute (JICA-RI), 2013, pp. 47-70.

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normal circumstances, Gontor prohibits immature students from smoking, but allows it for adult ones. Likewise, Gontor normally has pictures of people or animals on its wall magazine. During the visit of such important figures (Saudi sheikhs and high officials), Gontor temporary banned its students from smoking and covered all drawings of living creatures. All the above organizations and institutions have attributed in one way or another to the spread of Salafism. As discussed above, the Salafis have benefited much from these institution’s vast networks. After having gained significant numbers of followers, Salafis continue to start to establish their own foundations, to create publishing houses, and to create radio stations. Salafis mobilize all these resources in order to disseminate the Salafi da’wa. The following paragraphs will discuss the ways Salafis mobilize their resources.

Lajna Khayriyya Mushtaraka, Jakarta The Lajna Khayriyya Mushtaraka in Jakarta is a representative office of the Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath al-Islami (The Revival of the Islamic Heritage Society) in Indonesia. The Jam’iyyat Ihya al-Turath is a charitable institution that was founded in Kuwait in 1981 amongst others by leading Salafi figure Abd alRahman Abd al-Khaliq. Rich individuals donated money to the institution after which it awarded enormous grants to Salafi institutions worldwide, including Indonesia.113 The Lajna is now located in Kampung Melayu, East Jakarta. Since 1986, the Kuwaiti government has donated grants to the Muslim community in Indonesia. After the Gulf War in the 1990s, wanting to know what happened to their donations, some individual donors began to ask for financial reports from the Kuwaiti Government, which it was unable to provide. For this purpose, the Lajna Khayriya in Jakarta was founded in 1992 and it was first housed in the Gedung Pusat Da’wah of the Muhammadiyah Central Board in Menteng, Jakarta. Despite the fact that it was placed in the Muhammadiyah’s building, it was independent from the organization, although some Lajna personnel were, indeed, members of the Muhammadiyah. The placement of the Lajna in the Muhammadiyah building was related to the fact that the Muhammadiyah had received enormous grants from Kuwait. The Lajna subsequently moved to the Muhammadiyah-owned YARSI University in Cempaka Putih, Central Jakarta. As the Lajna’s activities increased, the office provided by the Muhammadiyah was no longer sufficient and in 2002, it moved to its own office, a four-story building 113 On the Ihya al-Turath, see Pall, Lebanese Salafi, pp. 87-97.

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in Kampung Melayu, East Jakarta. As the representative office of the Jam’iyat Ihya’ al-Turath, the Lajna is the only channel for grants from the Ihya’ al-Turath. Some Salafi pesantrens have received large amounts of money from the Ihya al-Turath, such as Biz Baz in Yogyakarta, Imam Bukhari in Solo, al-Irsyad in Tengaran, Salatiga (all three in Central Java), As-sunnah in Cirebon, and Ihya al-Sunnah in Tasikmalaya (both in West Java). To get a grant, a pesantren has to submit a proposal to the Lajna office in Jakarta after which the Lajna seeks donors within the Ihya al-Turath in Kuwait. Generally, pesantrens propose projects for the building of an Islamic Center consisting of a mosque, classes, and a student dormitory.114 In Indonesia, an Islamic Center is usually a government-funded institution that carries out the Islamic activities, mainly the da’wa. However, in the context of the Ihya alTurath’s project, the proposed Islamic Center may consist of a pesantren and a madrasah. Likewise, teachers’ housings are constructed under the project “sakan al-fuqara’” or “house for the poor.” Teachers in Salafi pesantrens devoted their time and energy in teaching students. The low salary the pesantrens provide makes them unable to buy or build their own house. In this sense, teachers are poor and deserve adequate housing. The projects are classified as either large or small projects. However, the implementation of the projects depends on the local situation and currency rate. In the case of Pesantren Imam Bukhari in Solo, for instance, due to the Indonesian economic crisis, the grants, originally proposed for construction only, also had to cover the buying of land. Imam Bukhari, Bin Baz and Ihyaussunah are among the pesantrens that received large donations from the Ihya al-Turath through the Lajna Khayriyya in Jakarta. At the end of the project, the pesantren is obliged to provide a report of the project. In addition to channelling funds to pesantrens, the Lajna Khayriyya also directly manages three pesantrens for orphans: Pesantren Ibn Taymiyya in Bogor, West Java, hosts about 500 students; Pesantren al-Maqtu’ in Sukabumi, West Java, hosts 80 students; and Pesantren Imam Syafi’i in Aceh provides education for 100 students. The Lajna appoints the directors of the pesantrens and all expenses are borne by the Lajna. All the costs of the students are paid for, including meals and books. Minor changes have recently taken place in Pesantren al-Maqtu’ in Sukabumi, and due to local demand, it now accepts nonorphan students with some payment.115 It is interesting to highlight the Lajna’s policy in granting donations for 114 Interview with Zarkasyi, secretary of the Lajna, Jakarta, March 17, 2009 115 Interview with Zarkasyi, secretary of the Lajna, Jakarta, March 17, 2009.

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institutions. Before the emergence of Salafi pesantrens, as mentioned earlier, the Kuwaiti government had already granted a large amount of money to Indonesia. Some Islamic organizations, particularly the Muhammadiyah, benefited greatly from these grants. Consequently, the Lajna was placed for a while in Muhammadiyah-owned buildings. The policy of the Lajna for granting donations is that the recipient institutions should deal with Islamic da’wa, focusing on the purification of tawhid, and fight against superstitions and innovation. When the Lajna saw that the Muhammadiyah was no longer strict in its stance against religious innovations and superstitions, and as Salafi pesantrens began to emerge following the return of Saudi graduates and Salafi oriented preachers, these grants began to be transferred to Salafi pesantrens. The Lajna views the Muhammadiyah and other reformist organizations such Persatuan Islam and al-Irsyad as too rational and too secular. This change in grant recipients does not diminish the Lajna’s concern with the activities of its own organization. It still keeps in touch and cooperates with the personnel of the Muhammadiyah in continuing da’wa activities in mosques built by the Lajna or by the Kuwaiti Government. Nevertheless, this cooperation has shifted from institutional to individual cooperation. At present, the Lajna has built about 1000 mosques throughout Indonesia and has granted funds to about 120 imams and preachers. Initially, it had recruited various Persis teachers to work for it but later dismissed them in favour of true Salafi followers. UU Suhendar, the head of Persis’ Kotamadya Tasikmalaya Branch, for instance, told me that he used to be a Lajna preacher. His career, however, had ended with the emergence of larger numbers of Salafi ustadhs who took over preaching from non Salafi preachers while a Salafi sheikh, he does not remember who, charged him of being “partly Salaf” (nisf al-Salaf).116 The Lajna also distributes books to its preachers, institutions and pesantrens. As mentioned earlier, the grants the Ihya al-Turath provided caused friction among the Salafis.

Economic Resources The discussion of the Lajna brings us to another essential element of the movement, its economic resources. It is not an easy task to investigate the sources of finance of the Salafi movement because almost all organizations are reluctant to disclose this matter. Another reason is that the donors, especially local ones, do not want their donation made public. Given this fact, I have attempted to find ways of discovering the financial sources of the pesantrens. 116 Interview with UU Suhendar, Tasikmalaya, February 11, 2010.

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One possible way appeared to be by looking at the inscriptions on the walls that usually disclose the name of the donor. By using this method during my fieldwork I found that Salafi pesantrens receive money from at least two charitable foreign foundations: the Jam’iyyat Ihya al-Turath al-Islami from Kuwait and the Mu’assasat Sheikh ‘Aid Al al-Thani al-Khayriyya from Qatar. Both are Salafi institutions that support Salafism worldwide, including in Indonesia. The Mua’assat Sheikh ‘Aid Al Al-Thani al-Khayriyya (Sheikh Eid Charity Association) was founded by the Emir of Qatar in 1995.117 As Zoltan Pall has shown, its establishment was aimed at establishing the authority of the Emir of Qatar against that of the Saudi Government. In 1995, the Qatari Government hosted the Sahwis (young Salafis who criticize official Saudi ‘ulama who legitimize government policies and interests) from Saudi and gave them any positions available such as those of preacher and teacher, and they were bound by this association. Unlike the Ihya al-Turath that granted many to so-called “cooperationist” Salafi pesantrens, the role of the Qatari foundation is more limited. I found that only the Wahdah Islamiyyah in Makassar has received a significant grant from the foundation for the construction of all kinds of buildings. Other Salafi groups, such as the Bin Baz Islamic Center in Yogyakarta received support from this foundation to carry out certain activities including organizing Salafi dawra. Apart from these two foundations, I believe that many other charity foundations give financial aid to Indonesian Salafis, for instance the Mu’assasat al-Haramayn al-Khayriyya (al-Haramayn Charity Foundation). However, Salafi figures acknowledged that following the 9/11 attack and due to strict control by Western authorities, currently less money flows to them. Many individuals have also donated money to assist the spread of Salafism in the country but not as much as before. Salafi foundations such as the al-Huda in Bogor and the Ihya alSunnah in Tasikmalaya have channelled donations from individual Saudi donors for the building of mosques. Attention must also be paid to local donors. For instance, Ahmad Bawazir, a businessman from Arab descent who owns various companies in Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, deserves mention here. He is the main donor of the STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib in Surabaya. All the buildings at this college were funded by his grants. Moreover, he has allocated all profits from the 117 http://eidcharity.dyndns.info:81/eidweb/about.aspx, accessed on September 1, 2013.

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Andalusia hotel in Surabaya to support the operational costs of the college.118

Religious Teachings in Mosques Salafis are active in preaching Salafi da’wa in pesantren surroundings making use of existing public mosques in many regions. In Jakarta, the Salafis organize regular public lectures at the al-Mubarak Mosque in North Jakarta, the Dewan Da’wah’s grand mosque al-Furqan in Kramat Raya Central Jakarta, the alTien Mosque in Taman Mini, East Jakarta, and the al-I’tisham Mosque in South Jakarta. In Bogor, the Salafis run regular religious meetings with the prominent Salafi teacher Yazid Jawas in the Ahmad ibn Hanbal Mosque. In Yogyakarta, the mosques most frequently used by Salafis are the al-Hasanah Mosque, Masjid Kampus of Gadjah Mada University, and the Pogung Raya Mosque. In Surabaya, the Salafis use the Jami’ Mekkah Mosque. In Cirebon, the Salafis use the grand mosque al-Taqwa. The availability of Salafi teaching at these mosques does not indicate that they are Salafi controlled. In fact, they are managed by other groups and every group of Muslims is welcome to carry out da’wa. The al-Tien Mosque, for example, was built by former president Soeharto and is controlled by leading Muslim scholars such as Quraish Shihab. Likewise, the grand mosque al-Taqwa in Cirebon is managed by the government and all groups, including Islamists, can hold religious teachings there. What makes it interesting is that the Salafis try to attract more adherents by organizing regular religious lessons in strategic areas. In these places, the lectures are regularly delivered by national Salafi figures such as Yazid Jawas, Abdul Hakim Abdat, Luqman Ba’aduh, and Muhammad AsSewed. These ‘great’ teachers (kibar al-asatidh as-Salafi) frequently travel to other cities to deliver lectures outside their hometowns. Interestingly, in some cases Salafis take over public mosques or mosques belonging to other organizations. The conquest of these mosques has in some cases led to conflicts with the existing management of the mosque. In the Dewan Da’wah al-Furqan Mosque, as described earlier, the Salafis were pushed out by its official. The teaching was then moved to the al-Tien Mosque at Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, East Jakarta, where they were able to hold some meetings before being driven out by the al-Tien management. Although Yazid Jawas is now seeking permission to hold religious gatherings there, he is pessimistic about obtaining consent. In order to give their permission, the officials at the al118 Interview with Abdurrahman al-Tamimi, Surabaya, December 22, 2008; interview with Mubarak Bamualim, Surabaya, December 23, 2008.

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Tien Mosque must first ask the opinion of the imams, including Quraish Shihab. Shihab, the former rector of IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta and at one time Minister of Religious Affairs, is a prominent Muslim intellectual who specializes in tafsir and who maintains close ties to the Cendana family of former president Soeharto. He has authored a number of works including his multi-volume masterpiece, Tafsir al-Misbah. Moreover, because the Salafis severely criticized Shihab because of his opinions on the Shi’a it was almost predictable that the Salafis would never get permission to use the mosque for their purposes. Another example is the Salafi teaching at the al-Taqwa Mosque in Gresik where Mubarak Bamualim, one of the Salafi teachers from Surabaya, gives weekly lectures on Riyad al-Salihin. The mosque belongs to the Gresik branch of the Muhammadiyah. Some Muhammadiyah officials have voiced their objections to the Salafi lectures at the mosque and have asked Mubarak to end them. Since one of the participants of the Salafi teaching is the foremost donor of the mosque and of the Muhammadiyah organization, the Salafi teachings continue. The donor has threatened to stop his grants to the Muhammadiyah if the Muhammadiyah terminates the Salafi teaching at the mosque. The books used in the above mentioned teaching centres are the same as those studied in Salafi pesantrens. Some are books on the Salafi creed such as Kitab al-Tawhid, al-Usul al-Thalatha, Kasyf al-Shubuhat authored by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab; while others deal with hadith, such as Riyad al-Salihin, al-Arba’in al-Nawawi, Bulugh al-Maram, Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim. While the tawhid books are exclusively used by Salafis, the hadith books are used also by other groups of Muslims. Thus, these hadiths collections are also taught in other majlis taklim (religious gathering), usually in the mosque. Unlike religious teaching conducted by other organizations that usually take elements from various books, Salafi teaching teaches books from beginning to end. The teaching usually begins with the reading of the text by a teacher, followed by the Indonesian translation of the text and an explanation of its content. Commentaries on the books are provided by Salafi sheikhs such as Sheikh al-Uthaymin, from which the explanation is taken. Only in rare cases do teachers express their own interpretations. Regarding hadith material, the teachers clarify the status of the hadith under discussion to convince the participants that the hadith is sahih. At the end of the session, participants have the opportunity to ask questions. The questions may deal with previous sessions or may concern other common and practical religious issues, ranging from ritual matters to mu’amalat (social interactions), including a Muslim’s attitude to the government and to non-

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Muslims. The teachers’ explanations and answers basically consist of Qur’anic verses, hadiths and the opinions of the ‘ulama. Only in a rare cases do the teachers express their own opinions. This method distinguishes Salafi teaching from that of others. Dewan Da’wah activist Misbach Malim, for example, teaches the Riyad al-Salihin to his neighbours taking a different approach using his own logic to explain the hadiths, which may result in different conclusions from those of the Salafis.119 The participants come from different backgrounds: university students, professionals, government employees, private businessmen, and unemployed people. In large mosques, many people participate in the teachings. In these mosques, the teachings take place in the morning or in the afternoon. In the al-Mubarak Mosque in North Jakarta, for example, where Abdul Hakim Abdat regularly teaches the Sahih al-Bukhari on Saturdays from 9 to 11 a.m., more than seven hundred participants attend. Some participants attend teaching in many mosques, moving from one mosque to another seeking more knowledge about Salafi tenets. They are interested in the Salafi da’wa because the Salafi doctrines are simple, and based on the Qur’an, the hadith and the sayings of Salafi ‘ulama. In small mosques where the teaching takes place after Maghrib prayers, only a small number of people attend. In the al-Taqwa Mosque in Gresik, for instance, where Mubarak Bamualim gives lectures on the Riyad al-Salihin on Tuesdays, only some 20 people attend. The teaching start after Maghrib prayers and continues until Isha’ prayers. After performing the Isha’ prayers, the participants have the opportunity to ask questions. When I attended the teaching delivered by Mubarak Bamualim in the mosque on 23 December 2008, a participant asked the teacher about interactions between Muslims and non-Muslims. As the Christmas celebration was approaching, the participant, a tailor, described his own experience: he was once asked by a Christian to make an overcoat for a Christmas celebration. On another occasion, a Christian came to him to hire an overcoat for Christmas. In the latter situation, the tailor did not show the best coat he had to the Christian in the hope that he would not rent it. The participant asked the teacher’s opinion about this. The teacher’s answer was interesting. He said that a Muslim should not burden his life by further questions unless he faces a difficult situation. In fiqh, this case is categorized as ta’annut, seeking a further question that results in difficulty, and this is prohibited in Islam. In the case of the tailor, the teacher said that he should not ask his customer questions 119 Interview with H.M. Misbach Malim, Jakarta, September 23, 2008.

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about the customer’s intentions when renting or buying a coat, and thus the tailor would avoid a complicated situation. Generally, the motive of the participants attending Salafi circles is to seek religious knowledge. The participants express boredom with existing religious teachings delivered by other groups or organizations that emphasize reason and do not convince the participants in religious matters. The teachers of these teachings usually answer the questions of the audience by starting with “according to my opinion”, which quite often conflicts with the opinions of other teachers. This situation is totally different from the teachings conducted by Salafi groups. The Salafi teachers do not espouse their own opinions but the opinions of Salafi ‘ulama, which do not contradict the opinions of other Salafi teachers. As a result, according to some participants, the Salafi teaching is more interesting and convincing than that of the others.120

Dawra Apart from the regular religious teaching at mosques, Salafis run dawras as a means of consolidating the movement, disseminating Salafi teachings, and recruiting new followers. Unlike religious gatherings that last only a few hours, dawras range from three days to three weeks. Dawras are classified into three categories: for teachers, for followers, and for prospective Salafis. In the case of dawra for teachers, the organizer requests the attendance of pesantren leaders and Salafi figures or their representatives. During the dawras the lectures are delivered by Salafi sheikhs from abroad, mostly from Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. From 20 February – 12 March 2009, for example, Pesantren Jamilurrahman held a dawra on the Sahih Muslim for Salafi teachers lasting over three weeks at the Kana hotel, Kaliurang, Yogyakarta. I was present for two days. This dawra was jointly organized by Pesantren Jamilurrahman, the Jam’iyya ‘Aid ibn Muhammad Al Thani al-Khairiyya from Qatar and the al-Hilal foundation from Malaysia. Some sixty-five teachers were present at the dawra, examining the Sahih Muslim under the supervision of Sheikh Walid Saif al-Nasr from the Islamic University of Medina. The dawra began each day in the early morning after performing the dawn prayers (subh) and ended in the late evening. During the dawra, Sheikh Walid reviewed all hadiths providing explanations when needed. The participants had the opportunity to ask questions related to the 120 Informal conversation with Saeful Hidayat, a Salafi activist from the Jami’ Mekkah Mosque, Surabaya, December 22, 2008.

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hadiths during the sheikh’s explanation. Although the aim of a dawra is to provide the proper understanding of the hadiths included in the Sahih Muslim, dawra also has a strategic role in the consolidation of the Salafi movement. During the program, the participants have the opportunity to share their experience in broadening their da’wa, and the development of their da’wa and their pesantrens. This exchange of information can result in mutual assistance among the participants and can encourage teachers to move to other cities or pesantrens. Similarly, the Salafi pesantrens pay much attention to other Salafi activists by organizing special dawras. They design particular materials with special references, mostly on ‘aqida, such as al-Usul al-Thalatha and Kitab al-Tawhid by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and the Salafi manhaj. The Salafi activists who want to understand Arabic are encouraged to take part in a special dawra on Arabic. Pesantren al-Furqan in Gresik, East Java, holds an annual dawra for Arabic language that lasts more than a month. Aunurrafiq Ghufran, the director of the pesantren, published a special book on Arabic language for the training. Salafis are highly encouraged to mastering Arabic in order to be able to understand Islam from its primary sources. The participants in the Arabic language training are mostly university students or fresh graduates. To disseminate Salafi ideas among new participants, the Salafis also carry out special dawras for potential participants. Unlike the longer dawras for Salafi teachers, the dawras for potential participants last for a few days only and target senior high school students. The dawras are held during school holidays. The materials covered in the dawras are introductory matters in the Salafi manhaj, ‘aqida and akhlaq. Pesantren Imam Bukhari in Solo and Pesantren As-Sunnah in Cirebon are among the Salafi pesantrens that regularly organize these dawras.

Radio In spite of Salafi restrictions on the use of technological means like television and radio for recreational purposes, Salafis are progressive in the use of technology for da’wa, such as creating websites, recording lectures on MP3, CD, and DVD formats and so on. Aware of the influence of the electronic media, particularly television and radio, Salafis try to compete in and get a hold of the public sphere by establishing their own radio stations broadcasting their own da’wa. Salafis believe that the electronic media has been dominated by non-Muslims wishing to destroy Islamic values, to turn Muslims away from the

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shari’a and to lead Muslims to a false ‘aqida.121 In short, through establishing radio stations, Salafis aim to defend the ‘aqida and the morality of Muslims. Owing to Salafi awareness of the negative impact of existing radio stations, many Salafi pesantrens have established their own da’wa stations, such as Radio Assunnah (which belongs to Pesantren as-Sunnah), Radio Dhiya’ussunnah (which belongs to Pesantren Dhiya’ussunnah) in Cirebon, Radio Muslim in Yogyakarta, Radio Hang in Batam, and Radio Rodja in Cileungsih, Bogor, West Java. Common features of these stations are Qur’anic recitation and Salafi lectures in the form of both live and recorded programs. Most of these radio stations have also created their own websites; Radio Assunnah Cirebon at www.radioassunah. com; Radio Hang at www.hang106.com; Radio Muslim at www.radiomuslim.com; and Radio Rodja at www.radiorodja.com. The websites are intended to reach a wider audience as Salafis can access these websites and follow their programs. Moreover, some of these radio stations have a streaming channel that enables Muslims all over the world to listen to their broadcasts. Some of the stations are still amateurish, such as community stations, while others are professional, using both AM and FM frequencies. In Indonesia, Radio Rodja is the leading Salafi radio station. It is broadcasted from Cileungsih, Bogor, West Java, at 756 AM and has a streaming channel. Established in 2005, it was a community radio reaching a radius of only two kilometres. In 2007, Radio Rodja was upgraded to AM frequency and can be heard by people living in Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi. The people living outside this area can access the station through a streaming channel at www. radiorodja.com. It is on air almost all day long, from 3:30 in the early morning to 12 midnight broadcasting various programs ranging from recitations of the holy Qur’an, Arabic language lessons and lectures (live and recorded), to fatwas of Salafi ‘ulama, and health consultations. Islamic teachings include ‘aqida, fiqh, tafsir, hadith, prayers, and tazkiya al-nufus (soul purification), and are delivered by leading Salafi teachers like Yazid Jawas, Abdul Hakim Abdat, Abu Haidar, Badrussalam, Arman Amri, Abu Qatada and Ali Musri. Radio Rodja also broadcasts live lectures from the Jakarta Islamic Centre while a live lecture from Medina is delivered weekly by Firanda Andirja, a Salafi teacher who is currently undertaking his doctoral program at the Islamic University of Medina. Aside from on-air programs, Radio Rodja’s website provides recorded lectures in MP3 and e-book format, which can be downloaded so that Salafis can catch 121 http://ww.radiorodja.com/visi-misi, accessed on May 21, 2009.

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up with missed lectures. Salafis can also post comments and suggestions on the website. The comments and suggestions vary. On May 16, 2009, for example, Ummu Sakinah wrote a message in the guest book suggesting that the teachers frequently remind female Muslims to wear true Muslimah attire in accordance with the shari’a. Ummu Sakinah saw many female Muslims, akhwat, who attended Salafi teachings and dawras but still wear inappropriate Muslimah dress and use lipstick and other cosmetics.122 Visitors can also pose questions through the website. These include questions on Salafi tenets, Islamic law and daily life issues. On May 10, 2009, a visitor, Faurizki, asked about attending liqa’, a gathering for the purpose of religious indoctrination conducted by Islamist movements such as Ikhwanul Muslimin. Responding to the question, the teacher explained that liqa’ is usually held by people who lack knowledge of Islam and who are loyal and committed to their group. The teacher, furthermore, quoted a hadith saying that one of the signs that the Hereafter is imminent is the study (Islam) from the asaghir, the people who committed bid’a and have a lack of knowledge. The teacher suggested that the visitor should study with the ‘ulama and teachers with the true manhaj.123 Another visitor, Rezalul Haq, on April 19, 2009, raised a question about his job. He worked for a private television company. Since the company broadcasts programs that he sees as creating more negative effects than positive ones, he asked the teacher whether he should give up the job. Responding to this question, the teacher said that working for the television company is categorized as contributing to committing a ma’siat (a small sin), which is prohibited in Islam. The teacher quoted a Qur’anic verse stating one should not help others commit sin and enmity. The teacher also reminded the man that God will provide him with a livelihood.124 At the end, the teacher, nonetheless, did not advise the man to resign. It is interesting to carefully examine the teacher’s responses. To the first question, he gave a firm opinion that the man should abandon the liqa’. Contrastingly, in the second question, the teacher did not firmly suggest that the man should resign and he did not provide any solution. Although the answer implies that the man should give up his job, it was not explicitly stated. The teacher seemed to be ambiguous, as he could not provide the man with a new job. 122 http://www.radiorodja.com/buku-tamu, accessed on May 21, 2009. 123 http://www.radiorodja.com/tanya-jawab-ustadz, accessed on May 21, 2009 124 http://www.radiorodja.com/tanya-jawab-ustadz, accessed on May 21, 2009.

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To attract listeners, Salafi radio stations emulate similar programs created by other radio companies. The Assunnah radio in Cirebon, for example, created “byrequest” programs as its trademark. These programs are “al-Qur’an by request”, “hadith and du’a (prayer) by request” and “tadarus by phone” (“Qur’anic recital by phone”). While the first two programs are directed to all listeners, the last one is aimed at children only. Through these programs, listeners can request any Qur’anic verse, hadith or du’a (prayer) on a specific issue. Upon request, the broadcaster will put the Qur’anic verse, hadith or du’a on air. According to the radio’s manager, Diding, by-request programs are popular. They were invented to compete with other radio stations who broadcast by-request programs, such as “song by request”.125 The radio stations are also used to inform listeners about the activities conducted by Salafis. Radio Assunah, for example, is used to broadcast the pesantren’s activities, such as general lectures, new student enrolment, and even to advertise Salafi business, such as herbal products and Salafi books.

Periodicals: Magazines, Bulletins and Pamphlets Aware of the influence of printed media, Salafis produce monthly magazines, weekly bulletins and occasionally pamphlets and leaflets. The magazines are mostly produced by Salafi pesantrens, and include: Assunnah (published by Pesantren Imam Bukhari, Solo), Salafy (published by Pesantren Ihyaus Sunnah, Yogyakarta), Fatawa (produced by Pesantren Bin Baz, Yogyakarta), al-Furqan and al-Mawaddah (issued by Pesantren al-Furqan, Gresik, East Java), Adz-Dzakhiirah (issued by STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib, Surabaya, East Java), Asy-Syari’ah (published by Oase Media, Yogyakarta). The content of the magazines commonly includes Salafi manhaj, hadith, tafsir, fatwa, fiqh, and Muslim figures (mostly the Companions of the Prophet). Although in some cases the main issues in the magazines are similar, Salafi participants eagerly consume them. The number of copies of each magazine ranges from 3,500 to 24,500. Al-Furqan and al-Mawaddah, for example, reach 19.000 and 12.000 copies per issue respectively. Among these magazines, Assunnah is the most influential magazine and has become the barometer of the Salafi discourse in Indonesia. It was the first Salafi periodical to be published and has now reached a print run of 24.500 copies per issue. The magazines are distributed through the Salafi networks: pesantrens, religious gatherings, bookshops, and individuals. Pesantrens or pesantren teachers usually serve 125 Interview with Diding, manager of Assunnah Radio, Cirebon, 2009.

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as marketing agents. The magazines are also available in every mosque where the religious gatherings take place: small traders using motorcycles display the Salafi magazines, books and compact disks in the courtyards of the mosques. As the Salafi magazines are distributed and consumed by Salafi activists throughout Indonesia, they have become a good media for advertisement. Pesantrens use the magazines to advertise activities, especially when they open new enrolment. During my fieldwork in the pesantrens, I found many students who had found out about the pesantren from these magazines. Many Salafis also use the magazines’ advertising space to promote their products, such as herbal medicine, books and Muslim fashion. In addition to monthly magazines, the Salafis produce weekly bulletins. These are usually published on Friday and are distributed in mosques free of charge. In order to avoid people reading the bulletin during the Friday sermon, they are distributed after Friday prayers, as the people are leaving the mosque. Salafis also use pamphlets, leaflets and banners to announce their activities. Important events such as dawras and special lectures by national Salafi figures are advertised through pamphlets and leaflets left in strategic places like mosques and campuses. Likewise, the use of banners and leaflets to announce new enrolment at pesantrens is also common. C. Strengthening Transnational and Developing Regional Networks As part of the Salafi global movement, Indonesian Salafis have developed strong links with their counterparts abroad. Traditional links are maintained with Yemen, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, as many Indonesian Salafis have graduated from universities in these countries and continue to receive their support. To sustain and strengthen these links, Salafis send their cadres to Yemen and Saudi Arabia for further study. Khatib Muwahhid, for example, sent one of his students to Yemen, while Asifuddin sent his son-in-law to Saudi Arabia. Through these students, Salafis often acquire a fatwa concerning a specific case in Indonesia. Salafis also often manage dawras, inviting Salafi teachers from these countries. By so doing, the ties between the Salafis and these countries are maintained. Apart from this traditional network, the Salafis in Indonesia have successfully developed a regional network with their colleagues in Singapore and Malaysia. The existence of foreign students in some Salafi pesantrens and the travels of Salafi figures to other countries to preach Salafi doctrines have confirmed this connection. In some pesantrens, such as Imam Bukhari in Solo, Bin Baz and Jamilurrahman in Yogyakarta, and al-Irsyad in Tengaran Salatiga, there 106


are some students from Malaysia. These students typically have found the pesantrens through the Internet, through alumni or through teachers. When I visited the Bin Baz pesantren in January 2009, for example, I met a Malaysian Salafi teacher, Fathul Bari, who was visiting the pesantren and who had brought three prospective students with him from his home state, Perlis, in Malaysia. Fathul Bari is a graduate from the Islamic University of Medina and a student of various Salafi sheikhs in Yemen. While he was a student in Medina, he was a friend of Arif Syarifuddin, a teacher at Pesantren Bin Baz. In Perlis, he founded the Salafi foundation, Pertubuhan al-Qalam, and currently he acts as the official representative of Pesantren Bin Baz in Malaysia responsible for new enrolment. During his visit, Fathul Bari introduced his three students to Pesantren Bin Baz and Pesantren Imam Bukhari to let them decide at which pesantren they wanted to study. In its leaflet, Pesantren Bin Baz also mentions having an official representative in Singapore, thus showing the pesantren’s extensive network. Salafis in Batam are a good example of the connection between Salafis in Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. Like Salafis in other cities, the Salafis in Batam are divided into two factions, “rejectionist” and “cooperationist”. While the first group is cantered at Pesantren Anshar al-Sunnah in Central Batam, the latter centres its activities at the Hang Radio station in Central Batam and at Sekolah Dasar Islam Terpadu (SDIT, Integrated Islamic Elementary School) Fajar Ilahi in Batuaji, some 30 kilometres from the city. The Anshar al-Sunnah educates some students from Singapore. Some Salafis from Singapore attend the dawra in the pesantren. Moreover, some ustadhs frequently visit Singapore and Malaysia to deliver lectures.126 Wildan, the director of Anshar al-Sunnah, and Dzul Akmal from Pekanbaru often visit Kuala Lumpur, while Adil Harahap and Abu Fairus from Radio Hang often visit Singapore to give lectures among migrant workers in Kampung Siglap. Another Salafi teacher who often visits Malaysia is Muhammad Arif. Unlike other teachers who visit Malaysia for da’wa only, Arif visits Malaysia and Singapore also for business. He sells honey in Malaysia and while he is there he is often asked to give lectures.127 Hang Radio plays a significant role in the Salafi da’wa in Batam. Initially, it was a music radio station owned by Zain al-Attas. The radio was transformed into Salafi da’wa radio in 2000 when the owner converted to Salafism. It is broadcast as far away as Singapore, and many Salafis in Singapore listen to it. Unlike other Salafi radios, Hang Radio is a commercial station that has advertisements on air. 126 Interview with Zainal Arifin, teacher of Anshar al-Sunnah, Batam, June 26, 2010. 127 Interview with Muhammad Arif, Salafi ustadh, Batam, June 28, 2010.

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However, as a Salafi station, the advertisements must meet Shari’a criteria, and are under observation of some teachers. The radio, for example, will not accept advertisements from conventional banks or cigarette companies as bank interest and cigarettes are forbidden (haram) in Islam. The radio organizes a regular Salafi class every Sunday and occasionally holds Salafi dawras. The dawras are frequently attended by Salafis from Singapore and Malaysia. During my visit to Batam, for example, I met three Salafis from Johor attending the dawra. From the perspective of Singaporean Salafis, Rasul Dahri merits mention. Rasul Dahri is a senior Salafi teacher in Singapore who often delivers lectures on Hang Radio station. He is Singaporean, married to a Malaysian woman and lives in Johor, Malaysia. He is very busy with his da’wa activity. Four times every week he comes to his native country to deliver Salafi teachings in the evening from 9 p.m. to 11 p.m. Once I attended his teaching at Wisma Indah, Kembangan. About 35 male followers attended the lesson during which I saw two boxes for donations circulate among the followers: the first was for da’wa activity, and the second was for Hang Radio. These donations confirm the close relationship between Salafis in Singapore and Batam. Some Salafi teachers frequently travel abroad for Salafi da’wa. Yazid Jawas, for example, has travelled several times to Malaysia and Japan to give lectures as part of Salafi dawras. During his visit to Malaysia in early March 2009, he delivered Salafi tenets in Perlis for four days among Malaysian citizens. The dawra was held and organized by the Pertubuhan al-Qalam. The content of the dawra was interchangeably delivered by three teachers: Jawas, Fathul Bari and Muhammad Fadlan. Jawas has stated that Salafi da’wa in Perlis has started to become widespread, and more importantly, is now acknowledged by the local government. Concluding Remarks The emergence of contemporary Salafi movements in Indonesia is a part of global Salafism. It is part of the Saudi project to export its variant of Islam to the Muslim World in countering revolutionary ideologies, such as Nasserism and Shi’ism. The abundance of wealth he enjoys enables the Saudi ruler to undertake all necessary efforts for this project, including providing scholarships, building mosques, publications, grants for Islamic educational institutions, and supporting Salafi preachers. Salafis have adopted a certain pattern in their spread of the Salafi da’wa: in the early period, they made use of existing fast networks, groups and institutions. 108


Later, they departed from these institutions when they had gained more followers and felt more confident. The Salafis had, for example, benefited from the huge networks of the Dewan Da’wah and al-Irsyad when they surfaced, but they abandoned them when they had developed new institutions themselves, such as the Lanja Khayriyya Mushtaraka. With enormous financial support from Saudi and Kuwaiti donors, they established foundations and institutions to mobilize followers in order to accelerate the speed of their da’wa. Informal networks through various media, including religious gatherings, radio stations, and publications are essential in the mobilization of Salafi da’wa. As part of global Salafism, Indonesian Salafis have successfully set up a regional Southeast Asian network comprising of Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. Pesantrens, radio stations, and the Internet are instrumental in the development of the Salafi network. The Hang radio station in Batam that reaches audiences in Singapore and the widely spread of the Internet have done away with territorial borders. Through these instruments, the Salafis exchange and share information about each country in order to collaborate in da’wa. The presence of students from Malaysia and Singapore in Salafi pesantrens in Indonesia, and the frequent travels of Indonesian Salafi teachers to Malaysia and Singapore confirm this network.

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Chapter Three

Salafi Leaders: The Emergence of New Religious Authorities

Religious leaders (kyai, ‘ulama, and muballigh) play significant roles in the Muslim community. Having deep knowledge of religion and displaying proper conduct, they grow into charismatic leaders. They are the ones whose commands the people obey; people listen to their advice and emulate their behaviour. Although they are specialists in religion, their role goes beyond this expertise. People come to visit them for a number of purposes, ranging from asking for religious guidance and spiritual advice for family or social matters, to business affairs and politics. The American anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, highlights the significant role of kyai in the transformation of society as cultural brokers. He argues that, as a person of deep religious knowledge, a kyai transforms universal religious doctrines and values as prescribed in the Qur’an, the hadith and the books on Islamic law in the different madhhabs (schools of Islamic law), and adjusts them to local practices. In this regard, the kyai interprets the abstract, universal and systematic doctrines of Islam in the context of local beliefs and traditions. It is the kyai, Geertz claims, who determines whether or not local practices are Islamic.1 Many ordinary Muslims even believe that a kyai has supra–natural power that enables him to see evil spirits and to forecast future fortune. Congruent with the animistic belief of villagers, some kyais act as 1

Clifford Geertz, “The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 2, No. 2 (January 1960), p. 236.

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dukun (traditional medical practitioners) in curing diseases. Observing this phenomenon, Geertz concludes that “the kijaji [kyai] thus brings together the general moral doctrines of Islam and the specific animistic notions of local tradition, the fragmented, barely conceptualized, practical religion of the ordinary peasant...”2 A similar assessment is given by Hiroko Horikoshi. Relying on her research on the role of kyais in Garut, West Java, she maintains that kyais play a significant role in preserving traditional practices. They filter out the negative values of modernization and have become agents of change. Thus, they provide the community with educational and economic opportunities.3 In short, kyais function as key agents of change and modernization, who actively introduce modern values to the villagers.4 Along with the changes in social and political conditions in post–Independence Indonesia, the mediatory role of kyais shifted from being bridges between what Geertz called ‘Meccan’ universal notions of Islam and ‘Javanese’ beliefs and practices, to a link between Jakarta and the village. This transformation occurred when the idea of an Indonesian nation state emerged and needed to be communicated and understood by villagers. Because a modern nation needs the political engagement of all its citizens through, among others means, their participation in political parties, many kyais were involved in supporting the traditionalist Islamic party, the Nahdlatul Ulama. Through this party, as the ‘owners’ of the umma at the grassroots level, kyais were active in mobilizing the umma via public gatherings. On these occasions, kyais tried to translate modern ideas of development into religious terminologies and did so by talking to the umma in the local languages. Thus, Geertz concludes that as cultural brokers, kyais shifted from brokers for Islamic civilization to brokers for the national government.5 Since the last decade of the twentieth century, Indonesia has witnessed the emergence of new Salafi ustadhs. They graduated from Salafi learning centres in the Middle East, such as Darul Hadith in Dammaj, Yemen, Jami’a Imam Ibn Su’ud in Riyadh and the Medina Islamic University in Saudi Arabia. Some of them are alumni of Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Arab dan Islam (LIPIA, Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies), a Saudi–sponsored higher education centre in Jakarta. 2 3 4 5

Clifford Geertz, “The Javanese Kijaji”, pp. 238-239. Hiroko Horikoshi, Kyai dan Perubahan Sosial, Jakarta: Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat (P3M), 1987, p. 6. Horikoshi, Kyai dan Perubahan Sosial, p. 5. Clifford Geertz, “The Javanese Kijaji”, p. 247.

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They focus their activities on teaching students in pesantrens and delivering religious lessons in public mosques, offices or private houses. Their religious gatherings have attracted a following. Some of their followers have converted from previous affiliations, having been members of Nahdlatul Ulama or the Muhammadiyah. Thus, they are becoming new religious leaders who challenge existing religious authorities, such as kyais, ‘ulama and the religious leaders of mass organizations, who are acutely aware of the challenge of Salafism. M. Din Syamsuddin, the current Muhammadiyah chairman, at the opening ceremony of the International Research Conference on the Muhammadiyah during the organization’s Centennial Celebration stated that the Muhammadiyah was fully aware of new challenges from Islamic radical movements, including infiltration by Salafis. It is a fact that the Salafi movement has attracted young Muhammadiyah activists. Similar things have happened in the Nahdlatul Ulama and Persatuan Islam, with many of their followers converting to Salafism. The phenomenon of this conversion has alarmed these organizations and resulted in them fortifying themselves from Salafi attacks. The task of this chapter is to show how these new religious leaders emerge and challenge existing religious leaders. A. Defining Religious Authority Authority, which Weber refers to as imperative coordination or imperative control, is defined as “the probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) from a given source will be obeyed by a given group of persons.”6 Authority is different from power, which is defined as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.”7 While power may make use of force and coercion, authority emphasizes voluntary submission. The submission to authority, as Gaborieau explains, is based on the “common values and rules of conduct” between the two parties: those who hold authority and people who submit to it.8 Weber, furthermore, elaborates a 6 7 8

Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, New York: Free Press, 1964, p. 324. Weber, The Theory of Social, p. 152. Marc Gaborieau, “Redefinition of Religious Authority among South Asian Muslims from 1919 to 1956”, in Azyumardi Azra, Kees van Dijk, and Nico J.G. Kaptein, (eds), Varieties of Religious Authority, Singapore and Leiden: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), and International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS), 2010, p. 1.

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number of factors concerning obedience to authority: habit; tradition; material interest; ideal motives. It is tradition or habit that make people respect and obey their informal leaders. The compliance of the people with the orders and commands of their superiors, however, is motivated by material calculation. Meanwhile, people who submit to a visionary political leader may be motivated by the leader’s ideals on certain aspects. There are different kinds of authority. Weber divides authority into three types: legal; traditional; and charismatic. Legal or rational authority is based on formal and normative rules that endow the person the right to issue commands to be obeyed by his followers. Authority of this type is given by the rules and norms to a certain person with s qualifications and requirements. Loyalty to this authority is based on impersonal order and not on the person who holds authority. When the authority is taken away from the person, or the position of the person is removed, he becomes powerless and authority’s influence decreases. Submission to this authority is, therefore, motivated by rational calculation, which may be based on material interests and advantages. Opposition to this command results in punishment. Bureaucratic staffs who obey their superiors are good example of this type of authority.9 The second type is traditional authority. Traditional authority belongs to a person who holds a traditional position of authority. Traditional authority is bound by personal loyalty. Obedience to the authority is not developed and cultivated by rules, but bound by personal legitimacy on the basis of tradition. Traditional authority is inherited from the previous holder, usually handed down to the closest relatives, such as a son or daughter, as the successor. In some cases, it is handed down through designation when a successor is not found among relatives. Unlike rational authority that claims the legitimacy of power in the office, traditional authority has no office.10 In some cases, obedience to personal loyalty is unlimited as seen in the case of a ustadh who serves his kyai in almost all aspects, from teaching assistance, welcoming guests and cleaning the house. The third type is charismatic authority. Weber defines charisma as a “certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.”11 All these sources, Weber explains, are unattainable by ordinary people and regarded as being from divine origin or a divine gift. Due to these qualifications, charismatic authority is 9 Weber, The Theory of Social, p. 328. 10 Weber, The Theory of Social, p. 341. 11 Weber, The Theory of Social, p. 358.

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irrational in the sense that it is against natural rules and laws to gain. Typically, a charismatic leader must prove that as a person he is sent by God to the people, and that he is able to undertake his duties. If he fails to prove this, his charisma disappears and his authority decreases.12 Charismatic leaders often emerge during revolutionary periods when people expect the coming of a leader who promises the glory of the struggle and the achievement of improvements in life. The case of Ratu Adil in Java, or other millenary movement, is a good example of this type of authority.13 Charismatic leaders are born and not produced by an institution. However, the meaning of charisma has changed recently. It does not denote the specific qualities regarded as supernatural or “gifts” from God, but refers to a leader with certain characteristics such as a deep knowledge, vision and good behaviour. Their followers believe that some kyais are charismatic leaders endowed with supernatural power. Kyai Salman Dahlawi, the head of the Naqshabandiyah order in Pesantren al-Manshur in Popongan, Central Java, and Kyai Haji Muslim Imampura (Mbah Lim), of Karang Anom in Klaten, are believed by their respective communities to be charismatic leaders.14 Khaled Abou el-Fadl distinguishes between “coercive authority” and “persuasive authority”. Coercive authority refers to “the ability to direct the conduct of another person through the use of inducement, benefits, threats, or punishment so that a reasonable person would conclude that for all practical purposes they have no choice but to comply”.15 Coercive authority involves the power by which the holder can force the people to obey his command. On the contrary, persuasive authority involves “the exercise of influence and normative power over someone.”16 It includes the essential element of honesty that directs people to believe and act to surrender by persuasion and argument. It supports the people to value the arguments, distinguishing good and sound reasons from weak ones, and concluding to accept or to refute the arguments as the basis for final action: obedience or rejection.17 12 Weber, The Theory of Social, pp. 358-360. See also, Max Weber, “The Sociology of Charismatic Authority” in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, (eds), From Max Weber: Essays on Sociology, London: Rutledge, 1991, p. 249. 13 On Ratu Adil movements, see A.P.E. Korver, Sarekat Islam, Gerakan Ratu Adil, Jakarta: Grafitipers, 1985. 14 On the account of these two venerable kyais, see for example, M.C. Ricklefs, Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java c. 1930 to the Present, Singapore: NUS Press, 2012, pp. 346-349. 15 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, Oxford: Oneworld, 2001, p. 18. 16 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, p. 22. 17 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, p. 22.

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To borrow R. B. Friedman’s terminology, the above distinction runs parallel with the difference between “being in authority” and “being an authority”. “Being in authority,” means having an official position in the bureaucracy of a structural organization that enables a person to issue orders or guidelines. This implies that people obey a person “in authority” because of his position. It suggests that people may disagree with the order, but they have no possibility to contest.18 In contrast, “being an authority” means having certain requirements of knowledge and expertise recognized by the people. Obedience to this authority denotes the acknowledgment of the people to the authoritative person that he has more knowledge and insight.19 Both types of traditional and charismatic authorities appear in religious authority or leadership. Gaborieau defines religious authority as “the right to impose rules which are deemed to be in consonance with the will of God.”20 This implies that the fundamental source of religious authority is God. Islam teaches that God has prescribed laws and rules for human beings through revelation to His messenger. The Prophet is the most authoritative person in religion because he knows the true meaning of the revelation. After the Prophet died, according to a frequently cited hadith, the ‘ulama inherit religious authority. However, in the Muslim world there is a debate on what it is that makes a person authoritative in religion. While there are numerous religious sciences, common people usually refer to only certain kinds of knowledge, namely hadith (Prophetic tradition), fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), usul al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory), and tafsir (Qur’anic exegesis). Only those who have mastered these sciences are usually called ‘ulama. People who have knowledge in other fields of Islamic studies, such as Sufism (Islamic mysticism), ‘ilm kalam (Islamic theology) and falsafa (philosophy) are not considered to belong among the ‘ulama. In tandem with this view, we see that there is tension and contestation in religious authority between ‘ulama and Sufi masters and, throughout history of Islam, between ‘ulama and philosophers. In the Medieval period, the conflict between Abu Hamid al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd is a fine example of this case.21 18 19 20 21

Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, p. 19. Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, p. 19. Marc Gaborieau, “Redefinition of Religious Authority”, p. 1. Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “The Ulama and Contestation on Religious Authority,” in Muhammad Khalid Masud, et al., (eds), Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates, Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 2009, pp. 210-212.

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However, in the Muslim world we find no single religious authority. Gaborieau distinguishes three types of religious authority in Islam: Sufi; ‘ulama; and political leader (king or sultan). Unlike the ‘ulama who put emphasis on the exoteric aspects of religion, a Sufi stresses the esoteric dimensions of religion through certain exercises in order to sense the presence of God inside one’s heart. A Sufi begets his religious authority through immediate access to God by mystical experience and illumination called unveiling (kashf) or inspiration (ilham). The ‘ulama, however, are those who master religious knowledge in hadith, fiqh, usul al-fiqh or tafsir. According to Abou el-Fadl, the ‘ulama bases his authority on his capacity to read, understand and interpret the Will of God as expressed in the holy text.22 Yusuf Qardawi defines ‘ulama by the institutions that produce them. They are “the graduates of shari’a faculties and departments of Islamic Studies, as well as everyone who has a [serious] interest in the shari’a sciences and Islamic culture and is active and productive as a scholar.”23 The main roles of ‘ulama, according to Gaborieau, include transmitting religious knowledge, leading rituals in mosques and managing justice in court. A sultan or king is believed to be God’s vicegerent or God’s shadow on earth, and therefore, holds religious authority. The king or sultan appoints the mufti of the state to issue fatwas, and designates the qadi (judge) to implement Islamic laws in court.24 In Indonesia, religious authority is usually attributed to the positions of kyai, ‘ulama and ustadh. Different Muslim communities refer to these types differently. The Sundanese of West Java call him kyai ‘ajengan’, while the Acehnese use the word teungku for such scholars.25 They are the specialists in religious sciences, and capable of offer guidance to the people on religious matters and good conduct in line with religious injunctions. The term kyai is a title given by the community to scholars of Islam who usually lead a pesantren.26 A person must pass a hard and difficult path in order to become a kyai. On this path, they will study religion in pesantren for a number of years and assist the kyai in teaching junior students until he assigns them with the task of building and managing a new pesantren. People distinguish between senior and junior kyais. Traditionally, a junior kyai is a young kyai who establishes a new pesantren with the support of a senior kyai. A junior kyai may be the son of a senior kyai or a 22 23 24 25

Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, p. 12. Quoted from Zaman, “The Ulama and Contestation”, p. 222. Marc Gaborieau, “Redefinition of Religious Authority”, pp. 2-3. M. Iskandar, et al., Peranan Elit Agama pada Masa Revolusi Kemerdekaan Indonesia, Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan Nasional, 2007. 26 Zamaksyari Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren, Jakarta, LP3ES, 1982, p. 55.

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senior knowledgeable ustadh who is designated by the kyai to move to a remote village in order to establish a pesantren there. Moreover, the senior kyai sends some ustadhs with the junior kyai.27 The term ‘ulama is more general, and includes kyais and non-kyais. ‘ulama28 is a title given to scholars of Islam who do not lead pesantren. Literally, the term ‘ulama connotes people with a broad knowledge. In its original meaning, that knowledge is universal, covering both secular and religious knowledge. However, this broad sense changed and narrowed to refer to a limited amount of people: those who possess a good command of Islamic knowledge, particularly in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and the hadith.29 Thus, the term denotes a wider coverage than the term ‘kyai’. However, these terms are often used interchangeably. Like kyai, the title ‘ulama is given by the community. Broad knowledge of Islam, ethics and good conduct are the main considerations behind the acknowledgment.30 Horikoshi views kyai as being higher than ‘ulama. She argues that a kyai is more capable than an ‘ulama in exercising ijtihad (independent reasoning). For her, an ‘ulama still holds on to taqlid (blind imitation) to the opinions of earlier ‘ulamas. A kyai is also perceived to be more charismatic than an ‘ulama in the eyes of the community. ‘ulamas function as religious officials in religious institutions such as madrasahs and pesantrens.31 In practice, the title kyai is also awarded to the chairmen of mass Muslim organizations. In the Nahdlatul Ulama community, leading figures like Muchith Muzadi, are called kyai although they do not head a pesantren. A similar tradition occurs in the Muhammadiyah. Since its foundation in 1912, the chairmen of the Muhammadiyah have also been called kyai. For example, Abdul Razak Fachruddin (chairman 1971–1985) and his successor Azhar Basyir (chairman, 1995–1998) were called kyai even though they did not lead a pesantren. Nevertheless, people simply called them “Pak AR” and “Pak Azhar” respectively. People call them “kyai” only in formal announcements. This title, however, ended with Azhar Basyir who was the last chairman of the Muhammadiyah 27 Zamaksyari Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren, p. 59. 28 Although in Arabic, the term ‘ulama is a plural form of ‘alim, in Indonesian, the term ‘ulama is singular. In this chapter, in line with Indonesian, the term ‘ulama connotes the singular. 29 Azyumardi Azra, “Biografi Sosial-Intelektual Ulama Perempuan: Pemberdayaan Historiografi”, in Jajat Burhanudin, (ed.), Ulama Perempuan Indonesia, Jakarta: Gramedia and PPIM UIN Jakarta, 2002, p. xxx. 30 Azyumardi Azra, “Biografi Sosial-Intelektual Ulama Perempuan”, p. xxxi. 31 Horikoshi, Kyai dan Perubahan Sosial, pp. 1-3.

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to have had a traditional Islamic education. Basyir got his Master degree from the al-Azhar University in Cairo. The change was caused by the domination of Muslim intellectuals in the top leadership of the Muhammadiyah after Basyir. This included Amien Rais (chairman 1995–1998), Syafi’i Maarif (chairman 1998– 2005) and M. Din Syamsuddin (chairman from 2005 - present). Rather than being representations of traditional kyais, these figures are Muslim intellectuals who graduated in social sciences from American universities. Rais graduated in political science at the University of Chicago, Maarif graduated in the history of political Islam at the University of Chicago, while Syamsuddin graduated in political Islam at the University of California at Los Angeles.32 They indeed have a good understanding of religion because they went to Islamic education institutions before their study abroad. Syamsuddin, for example, went to the famous modern pesantren of Gontor, East Java. Moreover, he graduated in the comparative study of religions at the State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN, now the State Islamic University, or UIN) in Jakarta. Thus, since the last decade, the Muhammadiyah has been led by Muslim intellectuals, or ‘ulama in a broader sense. Besides kyai and ‘ulama, the terms ‘ustadh’ and ‘muballigh’ are commonly used for a man of religion. The term ustadh connotes a teacher of religious knowledge. Santris and the surrounding community call the teachers of pesantren, regardless of the subjects they teach, ustadh. In practice, a person who frequently delivers religious lessons in mosques is also called ustadh. Another label for these religious men is muballigh (preacher). In addition to religious lessons taking place in mosques, offices, and houses, ustadhs and muballighs deliver Friday sermons. They get paid for these activities, and even nowadays, we find professional ustadhs and muballighs who earn their daily living this way. It is worth mentioning here that, unlike the heads of traditional NU pesantrens who are called kyai, the leaders of Muhammadiyah pesantren are simply called ustadh. The same label is found in Persatuan Islam (Persis), another puritan reformist organization. The leaders of this group are called ustadh while the leaders of Persis’ pesantrens are called ustadh as well.

32 For a brief account on Amien Rais, see, http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/id/ content-167-det-prof-dr-h-amien-rais.html; on Syafii Maarif, see, http://www. muhammadiyah.or.id/id/content-168-det-prof-dr-ahmad-safii-maarif.html, and on Din Syamsuddin, see, http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/id/content-169-detprof-dr-h-m-din-syamsuddin.html, accessed on January 2, 2012.

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Salafi teachers are called ustadh. The head of a Salafi pesantren is simply called ustadh or mudir al-ma’had (director of the pesantren). This title reflects the equality among the Salafis. It is easy to find ustadhs of Salafi pesantrens talking to the mudir freely without being nervous. During my fieldwork in Pesantren Assunnah in Cirebon, for example, I frequently witnessed Thaharah, the then mudir, sitting in the mosque’s corridor and talking to the ustadhs. Similarly, this scene occurs in the Salafi religious gatherings where some followers move closer to the teacher after religious gatherings in mosques. They ask the teacher about religious matters which have not been addressed during the session. This equality seems to be attractive for new adherents or sympathizers of the Salafi movement. An administrative staff member at the Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Ali bin Abi Thalib in Surabaya told me that one of the reasons he joined Salafism was the sense of equality Salafi teachers display. He compared the kyais of traditional pesantrens affiliated with the NU with the mudir of Salafi pesantrens. While the ustadhs of Salafi pesantren can approach the mudir easily, the ustadhs of traditional pesantrens respect their kyais excessively, and show this by means such as kissing their hand (taqbil), fetching his sandals when the kyai wants to leave the mosque and massaging the kyai before he commences his teaching.33 These attitudes are aimed at acquiring the kyai’s berkah (Ar., baraka means God’s blessing). The students believe that through respecting and serving the kyai, they will receive God’s blessing. The ustadhs’ attitude towards their kyai has its roots in the traditional doctrine of the student’s etiquette towards the teacher, the Ta’lim al-Muta’allim Tariq al-Ta’allum34 of Burhan al-Islam al-Zarnuji. This work deals with a number of instructions and learning methods. It is divided into 13 chapters, and the subjects range from the nature and merit of knowledge, the intention of study, the choice of subject matters of knowledge, the need to respect knowledge and those who possess it, while there are also chapters on the choice of teachers, colleagues and permanent association. Most important in this work is the pupil’s attitude towards his teacher. The author maintains that students should fully respect their teachers. A student is not allowed to walk in front his teacher, nor sit on his chair. They are also not to start talking with the teacher without 33 Interview with Muhammad Ali, administration staff of STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib, Surabaya, December 23, 2008. 34 Imam Burhan al-Islam al-Zarnuji, Ta’lim al-Muta’allim Tariq al-Ta’allum, Surabaya: Benkul Indah, n.d. The work has been translated into English by G.E. von Grunebaum and Theodora M. Abel. See, Az-Zarnuji, Ta’lim al-Muta’allim – Tariq al-Ta’allum, Instruction of the Student: The Method of Leaning, New York: King’s Crown Press, 1947.

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his permission and are not to talk much with the teacher without his consent.35 Moreover, the students have to respect the teacher’s relatives and colleagues. For example, students have to rise when the son of a teacher arrives simply in order to show their respect for their teacher.36 Based on these teachings, students of traditional pesantrens fully respect their teachers. Although Salafis simply call all their teachers ustadh, there exists social stratification among them. Thus, some prominent Salafi ustadhs may be classified as senior ustadhs such as Muhammad as-Sewed and Luqman Ba’abduh among the so-called ‘rejectionist’ Salafis in Indonesia. These two figures are regarded as the leaders who replaced Ja’far Umar Thalib. As-Sewed is the mudir of two pesantrens: Dhiya’ussunnah in Cirebon, West Java and al-Anshar in Sleman, Yogyakarta. Meanwhile, Ba’abduh is currently the director of Pesantren Salafiya in Jember, East Java. Before heading this pesantren, he studied with Sheikh Muqbil al-Wadi’i in Darul Hadith, Dammaj, Yemen. Other Salafi teachers are located at the second level like Afifuddin from Sidayu, Gresik, and Abdul Mu’thi from Yogyakarta. In the other so-called “cooperationist” Salafis group, more senior figures are found. They include the leading ustadhs Abdul Qadir Jawas from Bogor, West Java, Abdul Hakim Abdat from Jakarta, Abu Nida from Yogyakarta, Aunurrafiq Ghufran from Gresik, Abdurrahman al-Tamimi from Surabaya and Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin from Solo. Both Jawas and Abdat studied Salafism at LIPIA in Jakarta and currently they teach at Pesantren Minhaj alSunnah in Bogor, West Java. Meanwhile, Abu Nida and Asifuddin graduated from the Jami’a Imam Muhammad ibn Su’ud in Riyadh. Asifuddin currently leads Pesantren Imam Bukhari in Solo, Central Java, while Abu Nida heads the Bin Baz Islamic Center in Yogyakarta. At the lower level, other figures emerge, including Abu Qatadah from Tasikmalaya, Abu Haidar from Bandung and Mubarak Bamualim from Surabaya. In the modern era, religious authority is institutionalized in the form of modern organizations. The wave of modernization and the advance of technology created new problems that seem to contradict Islamic doctrine. As they appear to be more sophisticated and more complex, individuals are unable to provide satisfactory solutions to these problems and in order to cope with them, religious institutions endowed by religious authority are required. Corresponding with this demand, the Indonesian government established the Council of Indonesia 35 Az-Zarnuji, Ta’lim al-Muta’allim, pp. 16-17. 36 Az-Zarnuji, Ta’lim al-Muta’allim, p. 17.

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Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) in 1975,37 aiming at mobilizing its support for the government’s policies and planning.38 The members of the council are drawn from all Muslim mass organizations. It grasps the grassroots by setting up branches in the provinces, districts and sub-districts. It has a special fatwa commission which is responsible for issuing fatwas. The fatwa commission is the most important one since it is likely to function as the MUI’s mouthpiece in dealing with prevailing religious issues in the community. A recent study by Moch Nur Ichwan has shown the tendency of the MUI to shift from moderate Islam to puritanical moderate Islam. This puritan tendency is apparent in its fatwas on religious liberalism, secularism, and pluralism. Ichwan observed that one of the reasons for this change is the recruitment of hard-line figures such as Adian Husaini, Chalil Ridwan and Amin Djamaluddin as MUI members.39 In addition to the MUI, each mass Muslim organization has created its own special fatwa commission. Thus, the NU established its Lajna Bahth al-Masa’il, the Muhammadiyah established its Majelis Tarjih and Persatuan Islam established its Dewan Hisbah. The MUI and other similar religious institutions were established to indulge in collective ijtihad. Exercising collective ijtihad is proposed to respond, at least, to two contemporary phenomena: firstly, the lack of ‘ulama with sufficient capacities to perform individual ijtihad; secondly, the emergence of increasingly more sophisticated problems in society. In many cases, these problems involve specialists in secular subjects who provide objective explanations of the cases so that the ‘ulama understand the problems proportionally. Given this, collective ijtihad is seen as a viable, if not the only, solution for ‘ulama to deal with societal problems. According to Zaman, the institutionalization of religious authority can halt political intervention in religious matters.40 37 On the Council of Indonesian Ulama, see Mohammad Atho Mudzhar, Fatwa-Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia: Sebuah Studi tentang Pemikiran Hukum Islam di Indonesia, 19751988, Jakarta: INIS, 1993. 38 See Martin van Bruinessen, “Islamic State or State Islam? Fifty Years of Islam-State Relation in Indonesia”, in Ingrid Wessel (ed.), Indonesien am Ende des 20. Jahrhundrets, Hamburg: Abera Verlag, 1996, pp. 19-34; available online at: http://www.let. uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/Bruinessen_State_Islam_ or_Islamic_State.pdf 39 Moch Nur Ichwan, “Towards a Puritanical Moderate Islam: The Majelis ‘Ulama Indonesia and the Politics of Religious Orthodoxy’, in Martin van Bruinessen, (ed.), Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the “Conservative Turn”, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013, pp. 61-64. 40 Zaman, “The Ulama and Contestation”, p. 228.

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B. The Social and Political Role of Religious Leaders It is understood that the primary activity of religious leaders is da’wa: to preach the messages of Islam and to call upon Muslims to live in conformity with Islamic principles. This impresses that the role of religious leaders is merely religious. However, observation in the Muslim community finds that their role expands beyond religious matters. People visit them for different purposes like asking for religious guidance, acquiring a solution to family problems, economic consultation and even political support. In short, the role of religious leaders is central. Kyais, ‘ulamas and ustadhs deliver religious lessons in many places like mosques, majelis taklim (religious gatherings) and in open public fields. In the mosques, Friday sermons become an effective medium for delivering religious messages to the umma. In these weekly events, the khatib addresses a number of issues ranging from ethics to social and political affairs. We frequently hear the khatib address sensitive issues, such as criticizing government policies. Kyais and ‘ulamas also often deliver public speeches in front of wider forums, such as tabligh akbar (great public sermon) and mujahadan. To attract more people, charismatic kyai and popular muballigh are often invited to these happenings. On a smaller scale, the majelis taklim is instrumental for transferring religious messages. As the majority of participants of majelis taklim are women, the most popular subjects are those concerning family life, such as the relationship between husband and wife and between parents and children, and also attitudes toward neighbours. Thus, these occasions are an effective medium for communication between kyais, ‘ulamas and ustadhs, and the umma.41 The above method of da’wa is called the da’wa bil lisan (oral da’wa). It is a conventional form of da’wa in which religious leaders deliver religious lessons in front of the jama’ah (congregation or followers). Muslims have also developed another type of da’wa called da’wa bil-hal (da’wa with deeds or da’wa with examples). The notion behind the development of this kind of da’wa was to accomplish the da’wa bil lisan with concrete activities that can improve the quality of life. In addition to providing religious lessons, the da’i (preacher) equips the community with vocational skills such as repairing electrical devices, 41 Moh. Sobary, “Agama dan Perubahan Sosial: Kewibawaan Dunia Pesantren dan Kepatuhan Massa”, paper presented at the Seminar Hasil Penelitian 1996/1997, Pengkajian Masalah-masalah Strategis di Bidang Sosial Politik, Pusat Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kemasyarakatan dan Kebudayaan (PMB-LIPI), Jakarta, 25-27 February 1997.

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making handicrafts and farming. The aim of this da’wa is twofold: on the one hand, it provides the da’i with an additional income so that he does not rely solely on the salary of his da’wa activities and on the other hand, it provides the community with skills to improve their life. The da’wa bil-hal was initiated by the government when it wanted all citizens, including religious leaders to support its development policy. Following the collapse of the Old Order regime, the New Order made national development focusing on economic growth its prime policy. To support this policy, in the 1970s the government introduced what was called “Dakwah Pembangunan” or “development da’wa”. The term “pembangunan” related to the government policy of sustainable development. Within this agenda, the Ministry of Religious Affairs was assigned to provide the spiritual and ethical foundation for the development.42 Thus, the program aimed at engaging religious leaders in the process of sustainable development. The concept of da’wa then soon emerged in combination with rural development. The aim of the da’wa was not only the spread of Islamic teachings and calling Muslim to live conform religious doctrines, but also to improve the quality of life of the poorest and the most marginal in society. The da’wa had to be combined with real measures to improve everyday life. In the 1980s, the term “dakwah pembangunan” was changed into the more acceptable term, da’wah bil-hal that had the same contents. To support this program, the Ministry of Religious Affairs trained religious leaders involving 144 associations mostly from mosques and majelis taklim.43 Thus, to cover community development, the da’wa included a wider range of tasks than the mere call to accept God’s will. In tandem with this development, Muslim organizations, such as the Muhammadiyah and NU, took part in this process. The NU, for example, in collaboration with the Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES, Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information), and with financial support from the German international NGO, Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, in the early 1970s initiated a pilot project on pesantren and community development. Pesantren figures were trained to become the motivators and locomotives for urban and human resources development. The project continued in the 1980s and 1990s under supervision 42 Johan Meuleman, “Dakwah, Competition for Authority, and Development”, BKI, Vol. 167, No, 2-3, 2011, p. 254. 43 Johan Meuleman, “Dakwah, Competition for Authority, and Development”, pp. 260261.

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of a new NGO, the Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat (P3M, Center for the Study and Development of Pesantren and Society).44 In addition to religious matters, people also consult the kyai, ‘ulama, or ustadh in matters pertaining to social life. For example, they ask them to officiate at traditional ceremonies such as ‘aqiqa (to commemorate the birth of a baby), khitan (circumcision), wedding ceremonies and deaths. In the ‘aqiqa, the kyais, ‘ulamas or ustadhs lead the ritual by reciting the Barzanji (the story of the Prophet’s birth), salawatan (chanting religious formula in praise of the Prophet) and other prayers. For wedding ceremonies, kyais, ‘ulamas and ustadhs are often requested to deliver the tawsiya (religious advice). On this occasion kyais and ‘ulamas give religious advice on love and passion for the bride to sustain the marriage. Although the content of tawsiya is in particular directed to the bride, people attending the ceremony can benefit also. Moreover, people ask for advice to decide on a good time to marry or to commence business. Aware of the potential power of the kyais and ‘ulamas in the community, the government makes use of their influence to support its programs. Such support takes a number of forms, including explaining programs using religious terminology and the issuance of fatwas. The case of the family planning program is a good example. Faced with a rapid increasing population, the government launched its family planning (Keluarga Berencana) program in 1968, which suggested parents to have two children only. However, the government faced a serious challenge when in 1971, a group of leading ‘ulama issued a fatwa stating that the use of IUDs (Intra Uterine Devices) was forbidden in Islam (haram). The fatwa indeed halted the government’s effort to control population growth. An intolerable increase in population would create social problems, such as poverty and insufficient education, health and food. The government did not give up, and sought another way to persuade the ‘ulamas. In order to give a comprehensive account of IUDs as a medium of contraception and to gain a new fatwa on the family planning program, the government held a National Conference for ‘ulama on Population, Health and Development in Jakarta in October 1983. The conference was attended by 50 ‘ulamas, four doctors and high-ranking government officials. At the end of the conference, a new fatwa on family planning was issued. It mentioned the permissibility of using IUDs

44 Martin van Bruinessen, “Post-Soeharto Muslim Engagement with Civil Society and Democratization”, in Hanneman Samuel and Henk Schulte Nordholt (eds) Indonesia in Transition, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2004, p. 47.

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as a tool of contraception. Having this support, the government succeeded in implementing its family planning program without any constraints.45 The role of religious leaders in politics is evident. Suffice it to mention here their recent engagement in the era of Reformasi (Reformation). Following the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998, the era of Reformasi has provided greater opportunities for Muslims to express their political interests. This era has changed the country’s political landscape; a number of political reforms have been concluded, including the freedom to create new political parties. Subsequently, many Muslims have enthusiastically founded political parties, such as Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, Nation Awakening Party), the Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, National Mandate Party), Partai Nahdlatul Ulama (PNU, Nahdlatul Ulama Party), Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, Crescent Star Party) and Partai Keadilan (PK, Justice Party), now Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperity and Justice Party). Related to the ‘ulamas’ engagement in politics, the PKB deserves particular attention here. The party was founded by Abdurrahman Wahid, the former chairman of the executive body of the NU, and it received full support of the NU. Although the executive body was led by Matori Abdul Djalil, the former general secretary of the PPP while the consultative body was directed by Ma’ruf Amin,46 Wahid held a decisive position in deciding the party’s orientation. Thus, the party was in fact directed by ‘ulama. Moreover, with the support of the coalition of Poros Tengah (Middle Axis), a political block created by Amien Rais, the then chairman of PAN and the speaker of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR, People Consultative Assembly), Wahid became the first ‘ulama to hold the presidency of the largest Muslim country in the world. Unlike other groups that engage themselves in community development, Salafis focus their activities on da’wa and education. The education sector is no doubt essential for community development. I will discuss Salafi activities in education in Chapters Four and Five. For now, I will discuss their activities in da’wa. Salafi da’wa falls into conventional da’wa, that is da’wa bil-lisan. In their da’wa, Salafis put strong emphasis on the purification of ‘aqida and the ritual practices of the Muslim community. They contend that false beliefs and incorrect ritual practices are widespread among the Muslim community and need purification. 45 Mohammad Atho Mudzhar, Fatwa-Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia, pp. 108-114. 46 Unlike the executive body, which was led by politicians, the consultative board is occupied by kyais of the NU. See, Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (DPP) Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), Garis Perjuangan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Jakarta: DPP PKB, 1998.

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For Salafi, the purification of ‘aqida and ritual practices has become the priority in their da’wa, rather than other aspects, including community development. They believe that true ‘aqida and the proper rituals will result in a strong and developed community. Given this reason, Salafi da’wa targets the Muslim community, leaving aside the issue of Kristenisasi (Christianization) to which other Muslim groups such as the Dewan Da’wah Islamiyyah Indonesia (DDII) and the Muhammadiyah pay much attention.47 In tandem with the above leaning, Salafis try to ‘Islamize’ popular expressions of Islam such as wirid, dzikir, and ruqya. Wirid and dzikir are common practices among Muslims. On particular occasions, wirid and dzikir are read and directed at certain saints or pious Muslims by sending prayers, particularly by reciting the first sura of the Qur’an, al-Fatiha. Recently, as mentioned earlier, dzikir bersama (collective dzikir) has become widespread among Muslims, especially in urban communities. Some rising young preachers such as Arifin Ilham and Abdullah Gymnastiar have organized regular ‘dzikir bersama’ programs that attract thousands of Muslims. Private television channels take part in blowing up the program through live broadcasts. The programs take place in big mosques, including the biggest mosques in Indonesia, the Istiqlal Mosque. Alternative healing using magic and amulets are also commonplace. They are used, for example, to expel the spirit of the devil from the human body. These popular practices receive much attention of Salafis. For Salafis, wirid and dzikir are accepted in Islam, but some prayers and formulas the people chant are not. For this reason, they want to purify or “Islamize” dzikir by providing accepted formulas. In their attempt, Salafi ustadhs collect daily prayers based on accepted hadiths. Mubarak Bamualim, for example, made a compilation of various selected daily prayers and distributes them among his audiences during his religious gatherings. Abdul Qadir Jawas authored works on daily prayers and alternative Islamic healing. Do’a dan Wirid48 provides daily prayers based on the Qur’an and Hadith. It also guides the readers about how to reject the use of magic and amulets, and alternative methods of healing (ruqya). This work received a wide readership and was reprinted nine times between 2002–2009. He also produced a smaller pocket-size Dzikir Pagi Petang dan Sesudah Shalat Fardu.49 47 Martin van Bruinessen, “Post-Soeharto Muslim Engagement”, p. 39. 48 Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawwas, Do’a & Wirid: Mengobati Guna-guna dan Sihir menurut al-Qur’an dan As-Sunnah, Jakarta: Pustaka Imam Syafi’i, 2005. 49 Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas, Dzikir Pagi Petang dan Sedudah Shalat Fardu menurut alQur’an dan as-Sunnah yang Shahih, Bogor: Pustaka Imam Asy-Syafi’i, 2005.

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What distinguishes the Salafis from other groups is its rejection of association, such as the Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI). As Ichwan has shown, the MUI has become an assembly where almost all Muslim organizations have their representatives. Recently, it has accommodated the interest of militant Muslim groups such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Forum Umat Islam (FUI).50 In spite of the growing number of Salafi adherents, Salafis have no representative in the MUI, both on the central and local boards. However, Tasikmalaya is an exception in this case. In Tasikmalaya, I found a Salafi representative at the local MUI office. Maman Suratman, a teacher in Pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah in Tasikmalaya, was designated by the pesantren to become a member of the local MUI. Being a native of Tasikmalaya, Suratman was appointed by the pesantren as spokesman responsible for social relationships. Moreover, he is also assigned as the pesantren’s representative in the Forum Pengajian Pondok Pesantren (Pondok Pesantren Study Forum). The forum comprises of pesantren leaders (kyais) and holds weekly study sessions on Saturday evenings, taking place from one pesantren to another in the city. Suratman is often present at these gatherings. Despite his presence, Pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah is reluctant to host the forum. This rejection surprises other kyais. Normally, a kyai will be honoured when his pesantren is selected to host such a distinguished forum.51 Aside the Ihya al-Sunnah, I found no other Salafi figure or pesantren involved in such local forum and association. The reason of the rejection to associations is Salafi’s belief it is tanzim, which is regarded as bid’a and causes the fragmentation of Muslims. The rejection confirms the widespread image of Salafism, that is, that Salafis are anti-social, unwilling to communicate or associate with the surrounding community. However, the community’s impression that Salafis are anti-social is not entirely right. To a certain extent, Salafis are engaged in social services. They often distribute zakat (alms tax), iftar (meals for fast breaking) and qurban (slaughtered animals on the Feast of Sacrifice). In 2009, Pesantren Sulalatul Huda, which is near Pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah, for example, received 3 goats as qurban. Similarly, Pesantren al-Furqan in Sidayu often distributes zakat, iftar and qurban to the surrounding community. Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari engaged in a more tangible social service for the community. It widened the access road to the pesantren from 0,5 to 3 meters making the village much more accessible; it built a toilet for a mussalla located near the pesantren, and finally it hardened the road up to 3 kilometres surrounding the pesantren. 50 Moch Nur Ichwan, “Towards a Puritanical Moderate Islam”, p. 64. 51 Interview with Aminuddin Bustami, Tasikmalaya, February 15, 2010.

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It is clear that a basic Salafi principle is its prohibition of its adherents to participate in political practices. This attitude is based on the Salafi perception that participation in political parties is not allowed because it will cause the fragmentation of the umma. Because of this, Salafis do not vote in elections, do not support candidates, and do not criticize the government. In spite of this clear position, Salafis are far from monolithic. For example, Wahdah Islamiyyah in South Sulawesi supports and advises its members to vote in elections. Voting is acceptable for certain reasons. Abu Qatadah from Tasikmalaya, for example, admitted that he personally did not vote in the presidential election in 2004, but he did vote in the governorate election in 2008. His argument revolves on the legal maxim of “akhaff al-dararayn” (the lesser of two evils). According to this maxim, if a Muslim encounters two evils that cause damage, he must choose the one that creates the less damage. In the West Java governorate election, he argued, Muslims, or at least, he himself, encountered the dilemma between going to the polls or residing at home. To vote meant to violate a Salafi principle. On the other hand, his absence in the polls might give way for a candidate to hold power other than the one he liked. For this reason, he finally went to the poll and voted for a devout Muslim candidate. For him, this action caused less damage than to abstain.52 Moreover, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, we also witnessed another testimony of Salafi involvement in the politics. Under the banner of Laskar Jihad and its umbrella organization the Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jama’ah (FKAWJ), as discussed above, Salafis were tempted to and indeed did engage in politics. Some involved themselves in the jihad in Ambon and Poso, Central Sulawesi, where local conflicts between Muslims and Christians raged. However, from out of this case Salafis have returned to activities, which are solely religious: teaching and preaching. C. Salafi Ustadhs: Challenging Religious Authority In West Java, Salafis teachers have made many efforts to establish their religious authority. Through these attempts, Salafis frequently oppose or challenge established religious leaders. One of the ways to do so was to organize public debates, mubahatha. As will be shown below, in one of these debates, Salafi ustadhs contested leaders of Persis, the puritan modernist movement that shares similar ideas with Salafism in struggling against bid’a and kharafat, 52 Interview with Abu Qatadah, Tasikmalaya, February 10, 2009.

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and calling on Muslims to return to the fundamental sources of Islam doctrines, the Qur’an and the hadith. The mubahatha clearly shows two different styles of Salafi thought and action. The mubahatha was entitled ‘Mengungkap Gerakan Salafy di Indonesia [Discovering the Salafi Movement in Indonesia]’ and was conducted on March 27, 2007, in Bandung, West Java, initiated by the head of Persis in West Java. It was attended by leading Persis figures, including Siddiq Amien (the then Persis chairman), Aceng Zakaria (the then head of Pesantren Persis in Garut, West Java), Usman Sholehuddin (head of Dewan Hisbah Persis) and Maman Abdurrahman. In addition to these prominent Persis figures, the forum was also attended by Persis delegations from every district in West Java. On the other side, the Salafis were represented by Abdul Hakim Abdat from Jakarta and Abu Qatadah from Tasikmalaya, West Java. Other Salafi activists, such as Tonari (Cirebon), Yunus Anis and Ayip Saefuddin were also present. During the discussion, representatives of the Salafis and Persis discussed arguments and examined the dalil of the obligation of following the Salafi manhaj (path). The following account is based on a CD recording of the event. As a part of their da’wa strategy, the Salafis recorded the event, transferred it onto CDs and distributed them among followers and sympathizers, including researchers. Abdat gave me one of these CDs when I visited Pesantren Minhajussunnah in Bogor in October 2008.53 The discussion was opened by a welcoming speech by the committee and a brief speech by the head of Persis of the West Java region. Following these speeches, Siddiq Amien, as keynote speaker, presented his paper on ‘Fenomena Gerakan Dakwah Salafy di Indonesia dan Menimbang Argumentasi Manhaj al-Salaf al-Salih sebagai Dasar Ketiga sesudah al-Qur’an dan al-Sunnah’ (The Phenomenon of the Salafi Da’wa Movement in Indonesia and an Examination of the Arguments [in favour of accepting] the Salaf Manhaj as the Third Source after the Qur’an and Sunna). In his talk, Amien highlighted various essential aspects of the Salafi movement in Indonesia. Firstly, he gave a definition of Salafism, elaborating on the meaning of ‘Salaf ’ and its derivatives. He explained that ‘Salaf ’ literally means ‘the predecessor’, and the ‘al-Salaf al-Salih’ denotes the first three generations of Muslims, consisting of the Companions, the Followers, and the Followers of Followers. Meanwhile, ‘Salafi’ connotes a person who follows the path of Salaf. To this point, Amien’s definition of Salafism is quite similar to that of the Salafis. Amien then continued his presentation with his observations on the 53 “Mereka Bertanya tentang Manhaj Salaf ”, CD circulated among Salafis.

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rise of Salafi movements in Indonesia. For him, Salafism had inspired various religious movements to emerge in the country. The Wahhabi movement had inspired the Paderi movement in Minangkabau, West Sumatra, in the 19th century. In the 20th century, Salafi ideas influenced the advent of a number of reformist religious movements, including the Jami’at Khayr in 1905 in Jakarta, al-Irsyad in 1913 in Jakarta, the Muhammadiyah in 1912 in Yogyakarta and Persatuan Islam in 1923 in Bandung. These organizations called on Muslims to: return to the Qur’an and Sunna; support jihad and ijtihad; fight against bid’a, kharafat, takhayul. They utilized various da’wa methods, including education, preaching and publications. In Amien’s understanding, all these organizations are Salafi, because they follow the path of al-Salaf. The second issue Amien highlighted was the fragmentation of the current Salafi movement in Indonesia. Quoting the work of Abu Abdurrahman al-Thalibi, Dakwah Salafiyah Dakwah Bijak,54 he explored the division into ‘Yemeni’ and ‘haraki’ Salafis. The first faction refers to former Laskar Jihad activists under the leadership of Ja’far Umar Thalib, the followers of Sheikh Muqbil al-Wadi’i from Yemen and the followers of Sheikh Rabi ibn Hadi al-Madkhali from Saudi Arabia. The second group is associated with the Ihya’ al-Turath al-Islami and the al-Muntada al-Islami. While the first group rejects the haraki da’wa method, the second maintains that the haraki method is needed in order to apply da’wa in the modern era. Moreover, Amien mentioned individual conflicts between various Salafis. The last matter Amien addressed was the debate over the nature of the difference between the Salaf across the first three generations of Muslims. Amien agreed with the Salafis that, besides the Prophet, Muslims must take into account the examples and opinions of the Salaf on religious matters. However, it is a fact that the Salaf differed among themselves on a number of issues. To give an example, he elaborated on the difference between Abu Bakr al-Siddiq and ‘Umar ibn Khattab on the one hand, and ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan on the other, concerning the issue of adhan (call for prayer) for the Friday prayers. Following the Prophet, the first two caliphs implemented the rule of only one adhan before the prayers, while the third caliph added one more. Therefore, there were two adhans during the reign of ‘Uthman. Taking this case as an example, Amien asked the question “whom Muslims should follow: Abu Bakr and ‘Umar, or ‘Uthman”? According to Persis, the rationale of following ‘Uthman was clear: as the Muslim’s territory expanded, Muslims were widespread and, therefore one more adhan was 54 Abu Abdirrahman al-Thalibi, Dakwah Salafiyah Dakwah Bijak, Jakarta: Hujjah Press, 2007.

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added to signify prayer time. Thus, following this example, Persis contended that the Salaf exercised rational thinking. Taking this difference into account, together with the Prophet’s last message on the necessity of maintaining the two fundamental sources of Islam, the Qur’an and Sunna, Amien concluded that Persis found no clear or sound argument for the obligation of Muslims to follow the Salaf manhaj as advocated by Salafis. After Amien, two Salafis, Abdul Hakim Abdat and Abu Qatadah, presented their speeches. Abdat is among the top senior Salafi ustadhs, while Abu Qatadah is a middle-level ustadh. Abdat started and the focus of his presentation was the religious arguments of the obligation of Muslims to follow the Salaf manhaj. Before discussing this issue, he first took the opportunity to refute the analysis and the remarks Amien made concerning the frictions among Indonesia’s Salafis and the absence of a clear and sound argument for the necessity of emulating the Salaf. On the first issue, he denied the frictions among Indonesia’s Salafis and their division into “Yemeni” and “haraki”. According to him, this fragmentation only exists in the opinion of outsiders and observers, but is far from the truth. On the contrary, he claimed that Salafis are monolithic and do not recognize these factions. In order to understand the issue correctly, Abdat suggested that the analysis must be applied to the manhaj but not to individuals. On the second issue, Abdat maintained that Persis’ incapability to find a clear and sound argument for Muslims’ obligation to follow the Salafi manhaj does not denote the absence of the argument. This, Abdat further explained, might be caused by the fact that Persis has not observed the dalil. Abdat took this opportunity to present a number of religious arguments. Abdat elaborated on arguments of the obligation for Muslims to follow the Salafi manhaj from the Qur’an, and the hadith. He presented five dalils from Qur’anic verses 9:100, 9:119, 12:108, 2:136–137 and 1:6. Because of the limited space here, I would like to present the arguments concerning only the initial two. The first verse, 9:100, reads as follows: “The vanguard (of Islam), the first of those who forsook (their homes) and of those who gave them aid, and (also) those who follow them in (all) good deeds, well pleased is Allah with them, as are they with Him: for them hath He prepared Gardens under which rivers flow, to dwell therein forever: that is the supreme triumph.”

As explicitly mentioned in the verse, Abdat said that the muhajirun (emigrants) and the ansar (helpers) were pleasing to God and that God loved their deeds and actions. According to Abdat, the verse implies an order from God to Muslims to 132

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follow the Prophet’s Companions in order to obtain God’s satisfaction. The order emerges in the form of khabar (news), not in the form of an ordinary command. The second verse, 9:119, reads as follows: “O, ye who believe! Fear Allah and be with those who are truthful.” According to Abdat, the term ‘al-sadiqin’ (truthful) referred to the Prophet’s Companions. Like the first verse, according to Abdat this verse implies an order for Muslims to imitate the Companions. In addition to Qur’anic verses, Abdat mentioned the most-often quoted hadith that tells of the best three generations of Muslims: the Companions; the followers; and the followers of followers. Relying on these dalils, Abdat concluded that to follow the Salaf manhaj is obligatory for Muslims. Here, we see how the Salafis play with logic in responding to Persis questions and remarks. The answer saying that ‘finding no clear and sound argument on the obligation of Muslims to follow the Salaf and the third source of Islamic doctrine does not mean the absence of argument’ is acceptable to rationale. This points to Persis’ ignorance and inability to find the dalil. Due to this logic, the Salafi attempts to expose the dalil. Here we see how the Salafis incorrectly understood Persis’ argument. For Persis, the statement means that after careful examination, it concludes that the Salafi’s notion on the matter discussed is not based on the dalil. Or, there are no dalils in the Qur’an and the hadith to support the idea. The second Salafi speaker was Abu Qatadah. On commencing his talk, he acknowledged humbly that he had grown up in the Persis community and that he had been a Persis activist. He had been at a Persis pesantren for seven years before his conversion to Salafism. His talk focused on three issues: (1) the sources of Islamic doctrines; (2) divergent opinions of the Companions; (3) the possibility of being deviant from the truth without following the Salaf manhaj. Concerning the first issue, he explained that the sources of Islamic doctrine are the Qur’an, the hadith, sound ijma’ (consensus) and sound qiyas (analogy). On the second issue, he acknowledged that the Companions had differed in a number of religious matters. Responding to these dissimilarities, he maintained that Muslims can follow one of these opinions but are not allowed to resort to other opinions. Concerning the third issue, Abu Qatadah argued that a Muslim may fall into making a mistake if he or she follows only the Qur’an and the hadith. To strengthen his argument, Abu Qatadah recalled the history of Islam and, especially, the case of the assassination of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, the fourth caliph, by Ibn Muljam, a Khawarij adherent. Upon murdering the caliph, Ibn

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Muljam read Qur’anic verse 5:44: “If any do fail to judge by (the light of) what Allah hath revealed, they are unbelievers.” Referring to this, Abu Qatadah raised the provocative question: “Look at this case! How did the murderer read the Qur’an when he murdered the caliph?” Based on this case, he maintained that the Qur’an and the hadith alone are insufficient as the sources of Islam. Muslims must follow the Salafi manhaj in understanding these sources. Moreover, he added that all deviating sects in Islam, such as Khawarijite, Mu’tazilate and Shi’ite Islam, armed their arguments with the Qur’an and the hadith, but interpreted them in line with their reasoning. The next session appeared to be more interesting than the previous one since it included discussion, dialogue, questions and answers between Salafis and leading Persis figures. The main question the participants raised concerned the Salafis’ claim that the Salafi manhaj was the true one. Maman Abddurahman, a member of Persis’ central board, asked whether Salafism was a method of thought or the name of a group. If it is a method of thought, Abdurrahman added, many Muslim thinkers, such as Muhammad ‘Abduh, supported the Salafi method. In his opinion, the core spirit of the Salafi method is encapsulated in is reform movement, a movement dealing with the purification of ‘aqida (Islamic faith), the purification of ‘ibada (rituals) and the reform of mu’amalat (social interactions). In line with this, Abdurrahman maintained that a number of Muslim organizations in Indonesia, such as al-Irsyad, Muhammadiyah and Persis, have adopted the Salaf method. Consequently, they can also be considered Salafi, meaning that they are adherents of the Salaf ’s method of thought. If Salafism is accepted as a way of thought, Abdurrahman continued, why must a group of Muslims claim to be the truest Salafis? Yuyu Wahyu, a participant in the discussion from Tasikmalaya, West Java, asked a similar question in challenging the validity of the Salafis’ arguments. In a direct manner, he asked: “Who are the Salaf? Are Muhammad ‘Abduh and his disciple, Rashid Rida, Salaf?” He challenged the arguments for the obligation to follow the Salafi manhaj. He argued that before the Prophet died, he advised Muslims to hold on to two sources only, the Qur’an and the hadith. The Prophet promised that Muslims would not deviate from true Islam if they strictly obeyed the instructions contained in these fundamental sources. It is true that to understand the two sources correctly Muslims must learn some methodological approaches, which, in turn, will result in a number of laws. However, Wahyu added, Persis examines not only the products (thought and laws) but also the process (method) and the rationale behind the products. This approach confirms a maxim in Islamic legal

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theory that “the law revolves with the availability and absence of the reason” (alhukm yadur ma’a al-‘illa wujudan wa ‘adaman). The third participant, Zae Nandang, questioned the Salafis about the different opinions among the Companions. When the Companions differed on a matter, Nandang asked, who must Muslims follow? Responding to these questions, Abdat replied that the focus of the discussion was on the Salafi manhaj as a method of thought and a way of religious life. He avoided particular issues of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) in which the Salaf had differed in a number of issues. Abdat contended that the Salaf had agreed on the essential teachings of Islam; the Salaf believed in God’s punishment in the grave after death, God’s pre-destination, God’s occupation on His Chair (‘arsh), God’s Face and Hands being different from those of humans and, also, in the eternality (qadim) of the Qur’an. The Salaf, Abdat explained, did not differ on these matters. On the obligation of following the Salafi manhaj, Abdat argued that the Qur’an and the hadith are true (haqq). However, he continued, not all the people who argue with Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions are correct. He mentioned a number of Muslim groups, such as the Mu’tazilite, who rejected some hadiths because they contradicted the Qur’an. According to Abdat, the Mu’tazilite and Muslim philosophers refer to the Qur’an and hadiths to support their thought, but they interpret them in line with their rationalism and, as a result, deviate from true Islam. In order to avoid making similar faults, Abdat argued that to follow the Salaf manhaj is necessary in order to understand the Qur’an and the hadith. Thus, the Salafi slogan “the return to the Qur’an and the hadith”, as advocated by a number of reformist Muslim organizations, must be accomplished by “understanding of the Salaf”. In his reply, Salafi representative Abu Qatadah highlighted the characteristics of the Salaf. Referring to Yahya Abd al-Mu’in, he elaborated on a number of ahl al-sunna beliefs. These included the belief in: pre-destination; giving precedence to Abu Bakr and ‘Umar ibn Khattab in faith and the caliphate; punishment in the grave; the Day of Resurrection. Moreover, he mentioned a number of Salafi methods of deriving laws (istidlal): firstly, the return to the Qur’an and the hadith; secondly, understanding the Qur’an and the hadith in line with the Salafi manhaj; thirdly, preferring the texts (nass) over ratio (‘aql); fourthly, interpreting the mutashabih texts (allegorical texts that have more than one and uncertain meanings) to confirm the muhkam texts (texts that have accurate and precise meaning); lastly, reconciling arguments in the case of different dalils. Based on these criteria, Abu Qatadah suggested each individual, group or organization should decide for itself whether or not it or he/she is a Salafi.

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The discussion continued with the second question–and–answer session, in which four participants asked questions. Almost all of them inquired about the validity of the Salafis’ arguments about the necessity to follow the Salaf manhaj. They also questioned the speakers about whom they must follow when the Salafs differed on a number of issues. Uus, for example, severely criticized Salafis for their insistence on following the manhaj. He armed his argument with the widely accepted hadith telling of a dialogue between the Prophet and Mu’adh ibn Jabal before the Prophet sent him to Yemen. The Prophet was reported to have asked his envoy about the sources of religious matters. Ibn Jabal replied that he would rely on the Book of God and the Sunna. If he could not find answers in these two fundamental sources, he would exercise ijtihad by using his reason (ajtahid bi ra’yi) and the Prophet agreed. Relying on this story, Uus continued that the hadith does not tell us to follow the opinion of the Companions. Faced with these questions, the Salafis maintained their positions. Abdat, for example, repeatedly argued that the dialogue should be focused on the Salaf manhaj as a method of thought and a way of conduct in religious matters. For him, the different opinions between the Salaf was not an issue, since they appeared in particularities and disputed matters (juz’iyyat and khilafiyat) and not in the foundational doctrines of Islam, the ‘aqida. It appeared that during the mubahatha, Salafis and Persis members remained in dispute on several aspects. On the one hand, since the beginning Persis raised questions about the differences among the Companions of the Prophet in regard to a number of issues. Learning from these differences, Persis suggested Muslims grasp the ‘spirit’ of the texts and not on ‘the’ texts in order to cope with modern demands.55 On the other hand, Salafis tried to avoid discussing the differences among them but, instead, looked for similarities. The Salafis argued that even though they differed in details, they agreed on essential doctrines. Because of these different stand points, Persis and Salafis did come to agreement on this fundamental issue. This subject is crucial since the Salafis made the Salaf their point of reference, and when some questions concerning the dissimilarities among the Salaf are asked, the Salafis refuse to discuss the matter. They leave the nature of the diversity among the Salaf as it is, without attempting to go into a deep analysis of these divergences in order to draw conclusions. Both Salafis and Persis agreed that the Salafi manhaj is a method of thought in concluding Islamic law. Both also agreed that the Salaf are the best generations 55 See, Dewan Hisbah Persatuan Islam, Thuruq Istinbath Dewan Hisbah Persatuan Islam, 2007: Bandung, n.p., pp. 66-71.

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of Muslims because they are considered the people who understand the religion following the Prophet’s life. At the heart of the debate, however, Salafis and Persis disputed the obligation of Muslims to follow the Salaf manhaj. As shown in the Salafis’ arguments, this obligation is inferred from and indirectly ordered by Qur’anic verses and the hadith. Salafis understand and interpret God’s satisfaction with the Salaf — the anointed three superior generations of the Muslim community — to be an order for Muslims to follow their way. Persis refutes this rationale and believes that there are no clear and sound religious arguments in the Qur’an and the hadith that obligate Muslims to follow the Salafi manhaj. Two famous hadiths are cited in this matter. Firstly, there is the hadith telling of the Prophet’s last advice to Muslims to follow the Book of God and the Sunna. Secondly, there is the hadith of Mu’adh ibn Jabal. Both hadiths do not urge Muslims to follow the Salaf manhaj. This dialogue reveals how Salafis and Persis examined their religious arguments. The two groups based their arguments on two fundamental sources of Islam: the Salafis quoted dalils from the Qur’an and the hadith, while Persis referred to hadiths. Each party also complemented the dalils with stories dating back to early Islam; Salafis recounted the case of the assassination of the fourth caliph by a Khawarij adherent, while Persis narrated the case of assignment of Mu’adh ibn Jabal by the Prophet to Yemen. By the use of all these arguments, each party challenges the conviction of its counterpart by questioning the validity of its dalils and by defending its religious belief. Thus, by examining and contesting each other’s religious arguments, each party attempted to acquire, establish and confirm its authority. The authority was derived from the ability of presenting religious arguments and a proper understanding of religion. In addition to examining religious arguments, during the mubahatha the Salafis also tried to demonstrate their religious authority by their physical appearance and their way of presentation. Appearing with a long beard, Abdat talked to the audience with a different intonation. He spoke loudly and clearly at one moment, but then continued slowly and calmly at another. On a specific matter, he repeated his arguments, highlighting important aspects of his speech. Through the use of these rhetoric means, he tried to convince the audience that he was authoritative in religion. Abu Qatadah looked different from Abdat and the other participants. Dressed as an Arab, he wore a red-white blocked kafiyya. Also, he began his presentation in Arabic and then translated it into Indonesian. Although the audience most probably understood Arabic well, he felt he needed to translate his speech and to repeat precisely what he had said

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earlier. Moreover, his speech also was full of quotations from the opinions of Salafi scholars. His approach endeavoured to impress upon the audience that he was in possession of all the requirements of religious authority, good command of Arabic and deep knowledge of religion. Thus, the mubahatha case shows many of ways the Salafis establish their religious authority. Firstly, good command of Arabic and foundational religious texts. Abu Qatadah confirmed this way; he persuaded his audience in Arabic, followed by translation. Before his teachers and colleagues in Persis, he also exposed his deep knowledge of religion by referring to fundamental texts on the subject. Secondly, dress and style of speech. Again, Abu Qatadah attempted to confirm his religious authority by wearing Arab garb. Abdat managed his rhetoric by speaking loudly and by repeating two or three times what he had said about the specific matters he emphasized. Another way of constructing religious authority is by writing commentaries (sharh) on earlier works. Qasim Zaman notes that this method is distinctive of Muslim scholarly works. Writing commentaries is considered a method of adjusting earlier works to modern-day needs and of presenting them to different audiences. In other words, writing a commentary is a way of presenting earlier works to the present.56 Thus, Salafi sheikhs from Saudi Arabia commented on the earlier works of Muslim scholars, in particular those by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. As the founder of Wahhabism, all his works have been the focus of commentaries by Salafis. Thalatha al-Usul and Kitab al-Tawhid have been annotated by Muhammad ibn Salih al-‘Uthaymin in his Sharh Thalatha alUsul57 and al-Qawl al-Mufid ‘ala Kitab al-Tawhid.58 Al-Uthaymin also considered alNawawi’s work, al-‘Arba’in al-Nawawi,59 and the work of Ibn Taymiyya, al-’aqida al-Wasitiyya.60 Another Salafi figure, Sheikh Salih Fawzan al-Fawzan analysed the work of ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Masa’il al-Jahiliyya in his Sharh Masa’il al-Jahiliyya.61

56 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 38. 57 Muhammad ibn Salih al-‘Uthaymin, Sharh Thalatha al-Usul, Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al‘Ilmiyya, 2006. 58 Muhammad ibn Salih al-‘Uthaymin, al-Qawl al-Mufid ‘ala Kitab al-Tawhid, Riyad: Dar Ibn al-Jawziyya, 2003. 59 Muhammad ibn Salih al-‘Uthaymin, Sharh al-‘Arba’in al-Nawawi, Riyad: Dar al-Thurayya, 2003. 60 Muhammad ibn Salih al-‘Uthaymin, Sharh al-Aqida al-Wasitiyya, Riyad: Dar Ibn alJawziyya, 2003 61 Salih Fawzan al-Fawzan, Sharh Masa’il al-Jahiliyya, Riyad: Dar al-‘Asima, 2001.

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Salafi ustadhs in Indonesia have not commented on the works of earlier Salafi scholars. Instead, they have followed and repeated the commentaries of their masters from Saudi Arabia. What has been done by Indonesian Salafis is translating these works into Indonesian, and teaching them to followers. Many have written textbooks on Salafi doctrine, such as Abdul Qadir Jawas and Abdul Hakim Abdat. During the past decade, Indonesian Muslims have witnessed a contest of religious authority. Traditional religious authorities (kyai and ‘ulama) recently have been challenged also by the newly emerging and popular muballighs (preachers) and da’is (proselytizers), such as Arifin Ilham and Abdullah Gymnastyar (popularly known as ‘Aa Gym). Supported by electronic media, particularly national television channels such as TV One, Metro TV, Surya Citra Television (SCTV) and Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia (RCTI), these young figures have attracted large numbers of Muslims and have become national muballighs. This phenomenon can be observed from the participants attending the religious lessons they deliver. Arifin Ilham’s ‘Majelis Zikir’, for example, was attended by thousands of Muslims. The participants, mostly women, wear long white dresses and chant special formulas in remembrance of God. What is interesting about these Majelis Zikir is that many participants cry during the program. In addition to the zikr, the content of the lessons Ilham delivers includes daily duties, such as prayers.62 The other rising preacher whom women loved very much was Abdullah Gymnastyar from Bandung, West Java. He developed religious programs and adopted the name ‘Manajemen Qalbu’ (Heart Management). Like Arifin, Aa Gym’s sermons were attended by thousands of Muslims, mostly women. His fame, however, declined significantly after he took a second wife. This decline, according to Hoesterey, was due to the fact that Aa Gym’s authority did not stem from his deep knowledge of Islam, but from his image as an ideal husband. His followers saw Aa Gym as a representation of a husband who was good to his wife and a good father to his children. Thus, his image fell to pieces when Aa Gym took his second wife.63 Popular preachers are not novel. Before the emergence of these new raising preachers, we already witnessed senior preacher Zainuddin MZ who was very 62 Andree Feillard, “From Handling Water in a Glass to Coping with an Ocean: Shifts in Religious Authority in Indonesia”, in Azyumardi Azra, Kees van Dijk, and Nico J.G. Kaptein, (eds), Varieties of Religious Authority, p.168. 63 James B. Hoesterey, “Marketing Morality: The Rise, Fall and Rebranding of Aa Gym,” in Greg Fealy and Sally White, Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia, Singapore: ISEAS, 2008, pp. 95-112.

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popular among Muslims: common people, Middle class, and high ranking government officials. His sermons, particularly those he delivered in the open field were attended by thousands of Muslims. He was called “da’i sejuta umat”, meaning “the preacher with one million people.” In addition to the content of his sermons, his rhetoric received much attention from the Muslim community as he inserted jokes about and directed mild criticism to the community as well as to the government. His criticism did not make the government allergic to his sermons. Compared to Arifin Ilham and Aa Gym who emphasize the coolness of Islamic teaching, Zainuddin’s sermons covered various matters of Islamic teachings, ranging from family affairs, to social and political affairs. Unlike Aa Gym who does not read Arabic fluently, Zainuddin was eloquent in Arabic and highly knowledgeable in Islam. Zainuddin’s lectures always included dalils from Qur’anic verses, hadith and the opinions of great scholars such as al-Ghazali. In addition to professional preachers, there are also intellectual preachers like Nurcholish Madjid. Madjid delivered his religious lectures to a limited audience, mostly university students. For example, Madjid was often invited by officials of the Mas Agung mosque in Kwitang, Central Jakarta, to give lectures on Sunday mornings from 10.00 to 12.00. Moreover, with the support of his colleagues, he established the Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina (Paramadina Foundation) in 1986. The foundation is located in Pondok Indah, South Jakarta, one of most expensive areas in Jakarta. The foundation aimed at providing urban Muslims with an inclusive method of thought in interpreting Islamic doctrines in order to meet the demands of the changing world.64 The foundation organized monthly religious lectures called Klub Kajian Agama (Religious Study Club) during which various aspects of Islamic teachings were discussed. The Paramadina Foundation also held courses on specific aspects of Islamic doctrine, such as Islamic philosophy and Sufism. All these programs attracted middle class Muslims who wanted to study Islam. Some of them were executives and businesspersons who turned to religion to escape the hustle and bustle of their occupations. In addition to individual and independent preachers, the Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama also countered the challenges posed by new mass organizations like Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Justice Prosperity Party (PKS). The PKS claims to be a da’wa party of and attracts many fresh graduates from Middle Eastern universities. It often produces religious fatwas. In 2005, for example, the PKS declared publicly that the celebration of ‘Id al-Adha should be celebrated one day earlier than the official day set by the government.65 64 http://paramadina.or.id/?page_id=169, accessed on September 7, 2013. 65 Andree Feillard, “From Handling Water” p.168.

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Notwithstanding these challenges, traditional religious leaders, kyais and ‘ulamas, remain influential among the Muslim community. It is true that in urban communities, people may attend the religious events of Aa Gym or Arifin Ilham while HTI and PKS members, mostly university students, indeed refer to their ustadhs or murabbis (mentors) on religious matters. However, the majority of Muslims continue to consider traditional kyais and ‘ulamas as their references. They still consult them on religious issues. D. The Social Background of Salafi Leaders The case of the mubahatha saw two prominent Salafi figures on stage: Abdul Hakim Abdat and Abu Qatadah. It is not clear how Persis delivered the proposal of the program or how the Salafis chose their representatives to join the discussion. As the initiative came from the Persis head of West Java, it is assumed that it proposed to organize the program to Abu Qatadah, the director of Pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah in Tasikmalaya, and that the latter subsequently discussed it with his senior, Abdul Hakim Abdat who often visits the pesantren to deliver public lectures. It is quite likely that this assumption is true for it is the easiest way to contact Salafi ustadhs. The Ihya al-Sunnah is the Salafi pesantren located closest from Bandung, and the two ustadhs are popular among Salafis in West Java. It is crucial to understand the long path by which the Salafis establish their religious authority. Unfortunately, I have no sufficient information about Abdat. What is publicly known is that he is of Arab descent. After finishing high school, he enrolled in the Lembaga Pengajaran Bahasa Arab (LPBA, Institute for the Arabic Teaching, now LIPIA). His uncle played a significant role in his study at this Saudisponsored institution. At the time of its inception in the early 1980s, LPBA did not have its own building, but rented one at Jalan Raden Saleh, Central Jakarta. It was fortunate that this building belongs to Abdat’s uncle. When Abdat told his uncle about his willingness to study at the institute, his uncle called the director recommending his nephew. According to Abdat, the call made him accepted at LPBA. Having graduated from LPBA, Abdat spent much time and energy to study hadith by himself, using the books available in the institute’s library.66 This habit continues to date. He is well known as the most authoritative Salafi ustadh in 66 Conversation with Abdul Hakim Abdat, Bogor, 2008. I made many attempts to interview him, but I failed. I met him on many occasions as I attended his lessons in classrooms and his religious lessons in mosques. However, I had no chance to explore his biography in detail.

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‘ulum al-hadith (hadiths sciences) among the Salafis. Currently, Abdat is regarded as one of the most senior Salafi ustadhs in Indonesia. He keeps himself busy with da’wa, teaching and writing Salafi books. He teaches hadith and Islamic sects (al-firaq al-Islamiyya) in Pesantren Minhaj al-Sunnah in Bogor, West Java. In Jakarta, he holds religious lessons in various mosques and offices, including the al-Mubarak Mosque in West Jakarta, and in the musalla of the Jakarta Stock Exchange (BEJ). As a senior ustadh, he is often invited by Salafis from outside Jakarta, including Bandung, Tasikmalaya, Surabaya, and Solo. He also initiated Salafi da’wa in Batam, Riau islands. Abdat is one of the most prolific Salafi writers. He has authored a number of books, including the nine volumes of the al-Masa’il, Tafsir al-Kawakib, Lau Kaana Khairan La Sabaquunaa Ilaihi, Risalah Bid’ah, besides pocket-sized booklets. At the local level, there are also a number of Salafi ustadhs who devote their time to Salafi da’wa. They come from different backgrounds. Some of them are former activists from Islamic movements before they converted to Salafism. Many of them come from low-income families and, for that reason, were unable to continue their education. Typically, however, scholarships helped to secure their education. The majority of Salafi ustadhs graduated from Middle Eastern universities such as the Jami’a Imam Ibn Su’ud, Riyadh, and the Islamic University in Medina, Saudi Arabia, while others are LIPIA alumni. The following section discusses the social backgrounds of a number of selected Salafi figures from Tasikmalaya, Cirebon, and Surabaya.

Abu Qatadah Abu Qatadah is a younger brother of Abu Rizal, another prominent Salafi activist from Tasikmalaya, West Java. In my discussion of the different types of Salafi conversions in Chapter Six, I shall note Abu Qatadah’s role in the conversion of his older brother. Both are currently active in Pesantren Ihya alSunnah in Tasikmalaya: the older brother is the chairman of the Yayasan Ihya al-Sunnah under which the pesantren operates, while the younger one acts as the pesantren’s director. They work together in the spread of Salafi da’wa: the former focuses his da’wa on his native town, Tasikmalaya, while the latter extends his da’wa to Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi. Abu Qatadah was born in Cipatujah, Tasikmalaya, where he spent his childhood and finished elementary school in 1986. He went to Pesantren Persis in Cempaka Warna, Tasikmalaya, for his secondary school education (Preparation, Tsanawiyah and Mu’allimin) for seven years from 1986 to 1993. Having graduated 142

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from Pesantren Persis, he spent some years teaching at his alma mater. This background led him automatically to become a young Persis activist (Pemuda Persis). He organized religious classes in various mosques inviting Persis figures from other cities. In addition to his association with Persis, he was active in the Islamist movement, Ikhwanul Muslimin (IM). He joined this movement in 1990 when he was a student of Mu’alimin at Persis, and he took the oath of loyalty to the imam (leader). The IM’s goal of the comprehensive implementation of the shari’a (Islamic laws) fascinated him. The movement charged the ruler of being kafir (unbeliever) for his failure or resistance to implement the shari’a. Subsequently, the movement wanted to overthrow the existing ruler and replace him with an Islamic one.67 While he was a student at the pesantren, he kept a low profile and hid his active involvement in the clandestine organization. In 1995, Abu Qatadah moved to Jakarta and studied at LIPIA. As discussed in Chapter Two, LIPIA had become a centre for the spread of Salafi da’wa. Thus, it was not surprising when he was introduced to the Salafi manhaj. Here, he met early prominent Salafi figures such as Farid Uqba and Abdul Hakim Abdat. However, by his own account, at this time he was not interested in Salafi da’wa. Instead, he advocated the Ikhwan movement as did LIPIA personnel at the time. His acquaintance with followers of the Tarbiyah movement intensified his activism: he recruited new followers by persuading his juniors to join the movement and by taking the oath from them. In 1996, Abu Qatadah was sent by his brother, Abu Rizal, to Yemen to study with Sheikh Muqbil at the Darul Hadith in Dammaj. Abu Rizal knew of this Salafi learning centre from Husein, a medical doctor and the owner of Holistik hospital in Purwakarta, West Java. This action was part of his attempt to prepare a cadre responsible for the development of newly established pesantren. operating under the Bina Insan Kamil foundation. Abu Rizal established this foundation to provide religious instruction to his followers in the NII movement. It held religious discussions in mosque and managed pesantren. Abu Qatadah admitted that he did not understand Salafism at the time and still held on to his ikhwani thought. Only after two months studying at Darul Hadith did he understand Salafism. In this institution, he knew that Qutb’s works which he had read and praised very much were considered to spread a deviant interpretation of Islam. He spent five years studying at Darul Hadith and returned home in 2000. 67 Interview with Abu Qatadah, director of Pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah, Tasikmalaya, February 10, 2009.

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Soon after his return, Abu Qatadah initiated the establishment of the Salafi Pesantren Ihya as-Sunnah in Tasikmalaya. With the financial support of donors, mainly the Ihya al-Turath al-Islami, the pesantren developed rapidly and became one of the leading Salafi pesantrens in the country. Presently, the pesantren offers various programs: Kindergarten, Madrasah Ibtida’iyah (MI), Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs), Madrasah ‘Aliyah (MA), Tadrib al-Du’at (TD), Tarbiyat alNisa’ (TN), and Tahfiz al-Qur’an. In 2009, the number of students reached 749, consisting of 323 female and 426 male students. Abu Qatadah is now busy in directing the pesantren and teaching the students. He is, however, still active in Salafi da’wa. His da’wa goes beyond the boundary of his native town and includes Bandung and Jakarta. He regularly teaches Salafi instruction in Jakarta at mosques and on the premises of the Jakarta Stock Exchange, Toyota Federal, Setia Budi building, Jakarta Islamic Center, Lippo Cikarang, and others. He often appears on air at the Marta FM radio channel in Tasikmalaya, and the Rodja radio station in Cileungsih, Bogor, West Java.68 It is unusual that a Darul Hadith graduate associates himself with the so-called “cooperationist” faction like Abu Qatadah. Abu Qatadah was a student of Sheikh Muqbil, but he collaborates with “cooperationist” groups and disassociates himself from its critics, the “rejectionist” wing. According to his own account, he used to participate in the religious gatherings of both groups as he saw that both share a similar manhaj. Later, when his “rejectionist” colleagues learned of his attendance in “cooperationist’s” religious gatherings, they warned him for this ambiguous affiliation, and subsequently followed it up by tahdhir69 because of which he was disassociated from the Yemeni group, and he decided to join the “cooperationist” group.70 As a man trained in the Persis’ circle, Abu Qatadah knows Persis’s ideas and thought quite well. He admits that Persis and Salafism share similar ideas on ‘aqida (Islamic faith). However, he views that Persis has become a fiqh-oriented organization, adopting the opinions of the Dewan Hisbah as its standard. As a result, any member who contests the opinion of the Dewan Hisbah will be excluded from Persis. It is true that Persis is more literalist than other reformist organizations, such as al-Irsyad and the Muhammadiyah. Persis is more rigid in selecting accepted hadiths. However, according Abu Qatadah, Persis still 68 Interview with Abu Qatadah, Tasikmalaya, February 10, 2009. 69 Tahdhir means strong warning to remind the followers to disassociate with a person because the person is accused being the adherent of deviant Islam or hizby. 70 Interview with Abu Qatadah, Tasikmalaya, February 10, 2009.

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resorts to rationale. That is to say that after making references to the Qur’an and the hadith, Persis draws its conclusion on the basis of its own understanding and interpretation of these sources, instead of taking the example of the early generations of Muslims (the Salaf).71

Thaharah Thaharah is one of the leading Salafi figures in Cirebon. Currently, he is a member of the advisory board of the Yayasan Assunnah Cirebon (YAC), a foundation under which Pesantren Assunnah operates. He has served in a number of positions in the foundation, including as head of the da’wa department (1999–2004) and as the foundation’s chairman (2004–2009). Being the only graduate from Saudi Arabia, he plays a central role in the pesantren and is considered its kyai. In addition to his daily activities at the pesantren, he is active in preaching Salafi doctrines in Cirebon and the neighbouring districts Kuningan, Majalengka and Indramayu. Thaharah went to elementary and secondary schools in his native village in Cirebon. He started to become active in the Islamic movement when he was a senior high school (SMA 2) student in Cirebon from 1986–1989. As will be discussed later in Chapter Four, SMA 2 became the centre of Islamic student activism. During this period, he was active in the Kerohanian Islam section, a special unit to undergo Islamic activities in the Intra-School Organization (OSIS). OSIS is a student organization at secondary school level responsible for carrying out extracurricular student activities at school. It has separate sections for sport, the arts, and religious activities. The religious unit, called Kerohanian Islam, organizes serial discussions and tutorials on Islam under the supervision of senior students and teachers of religion. His senior, Ali Hijrah, organized a series of discussions and training programs for the students under the banner of the Talaba Islamiyya (Islamic Students) organization. Thaharah joined the Lembaga Pengembangan Pondok Pesantren Kilat (LP3K, Institute of Development of Lightning Pesantren), an underground organization established by Ali Hijrah. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the LP3K was a neo-NII movement that struggled for the creation of the Islamic State of Indonesia. The LP3K held a radical interpretation of Islam and considered the existing government as un-Islamic and hence, must be replaced by an Islamic one.

71 Interview with Abu Qatadah, Tasikmalaya, February 10, 2009.

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Having graduated in senior high school, the low income of his parents prevented Thaharah from progressing in his studies. He herded goats for two years (1989–1991), while at the same time he took part in a private Arabic course organized by LP3K. The conversion to Salafism of the movement’s leader Ali Hijrah, resulted in Thaharah being introduced to Salafi doctrine. He further learned about Salafism from other Salafi figures like Yusuf Baisa and Yazid alTamimi. In contrast to the Islamic doctrine he learned about at LP3K which viewed rulers as taghut, Salafism taught people to maintain a good relationship with the government. This teaching allowed Salafi adherents to be more open in holding their religious lessons. This contrasted with LP3K’s religious gatherings, which were conducted in secret.72 Armed with his knowledge of Arabic that he had learnt at LP3K, Thaharah took part in the muqabala (student enrolment) program of the Islamic University of Medina held at Pesantren al-Irsyad Tengaran, in 1991, and he passed the examination. In 1993, he went to Medina, studied Arabic there over a two- year period (1993–1995), and continued his studies at the Faculty of Da’wa and Usul alDin. In 1999, he completed the program and returned to Indonesia. After that, he joined the Yayasan Assunnah Cirebon (YAC) and taught at Pesantren Assunnah. He has since been active in Salafi da’wa. In Cirebon, for example, he is busy delivering Salafi instruction in many mosques, such as the al-Taqwa Grand Mosque. His da’wa activities cover various areas in Cirebon, including Gegesik, Gebang, Gunung Djati and Losari. In Kuningan he has delivered public lectures in Cihideung.73 In line with Assunah’s aspiration to cultivate Salafism in the northern part of West Java, Thaharah plays a significant role in the realization of this ambition. In his native village, Bondet, North Cirebon, he established the ‘Umar ibn Khattab Foundation. The foundation currently runs a kindergarten, elementary school and religious gatherings. In these schools, teachers from Pesantren Assunnah, including Thaharah, regularly teach at the ‘Umar ibn Khattab Mosque.74 The foundation is now led by Bahruddin and is under Assunnah supervision. Assunnah also supported the establishment of Pesantren Nasir al-Sunnah in Indramayu, and Minhaj al-Muslim in Subang, West Java. The Nasir al-Sunnah organizes Arabic courses and lessons on the Salafi manhaj. In addition to this, the pesantren hosts so-called ‘Pesantren Sabtu Ahad’ weekend sessions, abbreviated 72 Interview with Thaharah, Cirebon, November 19, 2008. 73 Interview with Thaharah, Cirebon, April 26, 2010. 74 Interview with Bahruddin, teacher of pesantren ‘Umar ibn Khattab, Cirebon, January 24, 2010.

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as ‘Petuah’, to accommodate busy people who want to study religion. Unlike the relationship between Assunnah to Nasir al-Sunnah that seems to be based on collaborative and mutual support, Assunnah totally supports Minhaj al-Muslim. This support is evident in the establishment of a mosque and the appointment of Salafi teachers to teach in this newly established pesantren.

Mubarak Bamualim Mubarak Bamualim was born in Sumba, East Nusa Tenggara where he grew up and where he completed elementary school. With the financial support from Amin Ja’far ibn Abdat, a man of Arab descent from Bogor, he went to Pondok Modern Darussalam, Gontor to study religion from 1981–1987. At this modern pesantren, he spent three more years teaching (1987–1990). In 1990, he spent ten months in Pesantren Dar al-Huffad in Bone, South Sulawesi, to memorize the Qur’an. Memorizing a number of chapters (juzs) of the Qur’an is a requirement to enrol in Saudi Arabian Universities. From January 1991 to October 1992, he taught at Pesantren al-Irsyad in Salatiga, Central Java. Al-Irsyad was established by Abdat’s family who provided him with the financial support during his study at Gontor. Thus, his teaching at this pesantren was to compensate for the grant. At al-Irsyad Tengaran, he got to know about Salafism for the first time. At the time the pesantren had become the centre of Salafi da’wa in Indonesia. During his teaching period at al-Irsyad, Bamualim, assisted by his colleague Mudzakkar Idris from Mataram, Nusa Tenggara Barat, tried to obtain a scholarship from the Islamic University of Medina. From 1992–1996, Bamualim was indeed granted a scholarship to study at the Faculty of Islamic Law (shari’a). Having graduated in Saudi Arabia, he taught Arabic at the Ma’had ‘Aly of al-Irsyad, an Islamic institution of higher education that belongs to al-Irsyad in Surabaya, East Java. The Ma’had ‘Aly provided a two-year program focusing on Arabic and Islamic studies. Some alumni of this program have enrolled in LIPIA or the Islamic University of Medina. In 2006, due to internal conflicts with the officials of al-Irsyad, the Ma’had ‘Aly moved to a new location in Sidotopo Kidul, Surabaya. In 2007, the Ma’had ‘Aly was transformed into the Ali bin Abi Thalib Institute of Islamic Studies (STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib).75 The institute is led by Abdurrahman al-Tamimi, while Bamualim currently serves as its deputy director. The aim of this institution is to produce teachers for Salafi pesantrens. The institute focuses on the study of Islamic law. 75 Buku Panduan Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Ali Bin Abi Thalib, Surabaya: STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib, 2008, p. 5.

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Bamualim is currently continuing his studies in a graduate program at IAIN Sunan Ampel, Surabaya, and takes fiqh as his major. This step has been criticized by his opponents, those Salafis who are affiliated with the “rejectionist” faction. The critics condemn his study at a secular institution, which, they believe, will introduce him to secular and liberal ideas. Answering this critique, Bamualim clarifies that this study is an endeavour to secure the future of his institution, STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib. The government regulates that a lecturer must hold at least a master degree, and consequently, he has to undergo a master program. He choose IAIN Sunan Ampel because of the absence of a Salafi institution in Indonesia that runs a graduate program. Thus, according to Bamualim, he attends IAIN Surabaya for pragmatic rather than ideological reasons: that is, to obtain a master’s degree in order to secure his institution. Moreover, Bamualim argues that this study is useful in explaining Salafism correctly. During the lectures, he can communicate and discuss Salafism with his colleagues. This opportunity can be used for da’wa.76 Like other Salafi teachers Bamualim is busy with da’wa, taking it throughout Surabaya and its neighbouring city, Gresik. Almost every day he delivers lectures in mosques and other places of religious gathering. His lectures include hadith, tafsir and fiqh. He uses widely accepted books such as al-Arba’in al-Nawawi, Riyad al-Salihin and Tafsir Ibn Kathir. Bamualim has published some books of his own on Islamic rituals in accordance with the Salafi manhaj, such as Meneladani Manasik Haji dan Umrah Rasulullah77 and Manasik Umrah dan do’a menurut al-Qur’an dan asSunnah.78 From the discussion of the three figures above it becomes clear that Salafi teachers come from various backgrounds. Socially, they come from ordinary families in villages such as in the cases of Thaharah and Bamualim. Economically, they come from low-income families, and this usually prevents them from having continued their studies. Only scholarships enabled them to further their education. At the secondary level, they went to different schools: Thaharah went to a public senior high school; Bamualim studied in Gontor; Abu Qatadah was educated at a Persis pesantren. Being pesantren students, Bamualim and Abu Qatadah received a sufficient basic knowledge of Islam and Arabic. In contrast, 76 Interview with Mubarak Bamualim, Surabaya, December 23, 2008. 77 Mubarak bin Mahfudh Bamualim, Meneladani Manasik Haji dan Umrah Rasulullah, Bogor: Pustaka Imam Asy-Syafi’i, 2007. 78 Mubarak bin Mahfudh Bamualim, Manasik Umrah dan do’a menurut al-Qur’an dan asSunnah, Bogor: Pustaka Imam Asy-Syafi’i, 2007.

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Thaharah went to public school where he learned secular subjects. However, his activism in the Kerohanian Islam unit and LP3K drove him to study religion. In tertiary education, Thaharah and Bamualim studied at the Islamic University of Medina, Saudi Arabia, while Abu Qatadah went to LIPIA, a branch of the Jami’a Imam Ibn Su’ud in Jakarta, and then continued to Darul Hadith in Yemen. Tertiary education is what made them Salafi ustadhs. The case of Bamualim is interesting to highlight for at least two factors: 1) he is of Arab descent; 2) he is a graduate of Gontor. Concerning the first factor, many Salafi ustadhs are of Arab descent. They become leading figures in Salafi movements such as Ja’far Umar Thalib, Abdul Qadir Jawas, Abdul Hakim Abdat and Abdurrahman al-Tamimi. In a wider spectrum, we also find some figures of Arab descent who lead radical Islamic movements, for instance, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the former leader of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesian Holy Warriors’ Council) and currently the amir of the Jama’a Ashar al-Tawhid (JAT), and Habib Muhammad Rizieq, the leader of Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defender Front). These organizations attract young activists to join their movements. Given this, it could be said that Arab origin has become a factor in the success of recruitment processes. It is common among Muslims to respect Arabs as the descendants of the Prophet. The second factor is Gontor. As one of the older pesantrens in Indonesia, Gontor has produced alumni with various orientations. Gontor’s motto “di atas dan untuk semua golongan” (above and for all sects) and its curriculum drive its alumni to take various paths: liberalist; traditionalist; fundamentalist.79 We can mention here Nurcholish Madjid, Hasyim Muzadi and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as representing these different paths respectively. As far as spreading Salafism is concerned, Gontor has become a factor. As mentioned in Chapter Two, since 2000, Gontor has taught its students the work of Salih Fawzan al-Fawzan, Kitab al-Tawhid. Moreover, some Gontor alumni enrolled at the Jami’a Imam Ibn Su’ud, the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia, and LIPIA in Jakarta, all of which provide their students with Salafi doctrines. As a result, various Gontor alumni have become Salafis. Some Salafi ustadhs have become active members of radical Islamic movements before their conversion to Salafism, such as in the case of Thaharah and Abu Qatadah. Both participated in clandestine organizations striving for the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia before their conversion to 79 Martin van Bruinessen, “Divergent Paths from Gontor: Muslim Educational Reform and the Travail of Pluralism in Indonesia”, pp. 192-194.

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Salafism. In the case of Thaharah, he moved to Salafism after his mentor, Ali Hijrah, had accepted Salafism and dissolved the LP3K. Thus, in this case the role of his leader and friend was crucial in his conversion. Meanwhile, Abu Qatadah accepted Salafism when he studied with Sheikh Muqbil at his centre, Darul Hadith in Yemen. Their experience in radicalism enables Thaharah and Abu Qatadah to compare between the two and make them strongly belief in Salafism. Concluding Remarks Salafi ustadhs come from diverse social backgrounds. In spite of economic constraints, they successfully finished higher education which led them to occupy top rank positions, both on national and local levels. There are at least three higher learning institutions abroad from which Salafis graduated: the Jami’a Imam ibn Muhammad in Riyadh, the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia, and the Darul Hadith, Dammaj in Yemen. In Indonesia, the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies (LIPIA) has produced a significant number of Salafi da’wa proponents. Some Salafi leaders have been involved in radical Islamic movements or in mass Muslim organizations, such as Persis. The emergence of Salafi ustadhs has challenged established religious authorities, including the most puritan Muslim group Persis. This challenge takes various forms including their presence in public debates as in the case of the mubahatha. In a debate, each party exposes and examines its religious argument of the very basic doctrine of Salafism concerning the obligation of Muslims to follow the Salafi manhaj. Through this debate, Salafis try to confirm their authority. For them their authority derives from their correct understanding of Islamic teachings in accordance with the understanding and the example of the Salaf. Unlike other Muslim groups who engage themselves in political practices, Salafi ustadhs keep away from politics. They instead focus their activities on da’wa which mostly centres on the purification of Islamic beliefs and ritual practices. Thus, through da’wa, Salafis want to “Islamize” popular Islam. Despite the clear Salafi restriction concerning involvement in politics, some Salafis have engaged in politics under certain conditions.

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Chapter Four

Salafi Pesantren: Development and Community’s Responses

Since their emergence in the late 1980s, the Salafis have actively spread their Salafi da’wa among the community. University students in Yogyakarta were among the first the Salafi targeted for their da’wa. Following their success in recruiting a following, the Salafis started to establish pesantrens in order to be able to provide a more systematic way of studying Salafism, and to train Salafi cadres (teachers and preachers) to transfer their knowledge to the community. At present, Salafi pesantrens are spread throughout Indonesia, although most are located in Java.1 They differ in many respects from both traditional and modern pesantrens that belong to Indonesia’s largest Muslim organizations, the Nahdlatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah. The most distinctive feature of Salafi pesantrens is their teaching of Salafi doctrines that mostly derive from the works of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism. Consequently, many people call the Salafi movement Wahhabism. The rapid development of the Salafi pesantrens in Indonesia has faced opposition within local communities, varying from verbal resistance to violent actions. Pesantren Imam Bukhari in Solo, for example, had to move several times before finally establishing itself in its current location along the Solo-Purwodadi main road. The community’s resistance to the pesantren was mainly in reaction 1

See the report of the International Crisis Group (ICG), Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix, ICG Asia Report No. 83, 13 September 2004, pp. 36-47.

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to what was seen as offensive Salafi preaching that criticized the beliefs and practices of the Muslims. No single group is excluded from Salafi criticism: the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama, the reformist Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam, and al-Irsyad. This chapter discusses community responses to Salafi pesantrens in Indonesia. The chapter mainly focuses on pesantrens, especially Pesantren alFurqan in Gresik (East Java), Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari in Ciamis (West Java) and Pesantren Assunnah in Cirebon (West Java). These were chosen for specific reasons. Firstly, they represent the main Salafi groups in Indonesia with regards to their attitude towards the Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath al-Islami in Kuwait, which according to Ja’far Umar Thalib is a Sururi, or a follower of Muhammad ibn Surur Nayef Zainal Abidin, who criticized the Saudi government when it called in the American troops to protect Saudi soil during the Gulf War.2 Thalib argues that the Ihya’ al-Turath supports the ideas of the Ikhwanul Muslimin, particularly the tawhid al-hukm or hakimiyya which is categorized as bid’a (a religious innovation), and Muslims are not allowed to associate with ahl al-bid’a (people who commit bid’a). Following a fatwa from the late Sheikh Muqbil ibn Hadi alWadi’i from Yemen, Sheikh Muqbil’s Indonesian students who fall under the tutelage of Thalib do not accept grants from this foundation. Those who follow Muqbil have come to be known as ‘rejectionist’ Salafis. Another Salafi group, led by Abu Nida, a Salafi teacher who initiated the Salafi da’wa in Yogyakarta holds no objections to these grants. This attitude is supported by a fatwa by Bin Baz, a prominent Salafi sheikh from Saudi Arabia. This group is often called ‘haraki’ or ‘Sururi’ Salafis by their ‘rejectionist’ critics, because of their association with the Ihya’ al-Turath. I call this group “cooperationist.” Between these two extremes, there is another Salafi group that holds a neutral position: it neither receives grants from the foundation, nor condemns recipients who do. This group is led by Aunurrafiq Ghufran and Abdul Qadir Jawwas. Despite their neutrality, Thalib also accuses this group of being ‘Sururi’. The three pesantrens discussed in this chapter represent these three groups: al-Nur al-Atsari, Assunnah and al-Furqan stand for ‘rejectionist’, ‘cooperationist’ and impartial Salafis respectively. Despite the fact that Salafis reject these labels, the classification is useful for the purpose of analysis.

2

On the factions within the Salafi movement in Indonesia, see Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia, New York: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 2006.

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SALAFI PESANTREN: DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY’S RESPONSES

Related to this fragmentation, the second reason these pesantrens were selected is that they are different in terms of size and facilities: small, medium, and advanced. As will be explored below, al-Nur al-Atsari is a small and modest pesantren with minimum facilities; al-Furqan is a large pesantren with limited facilities; while Assunnah is a large with advanced facilities. A. Early Wahhabi-influenced Pesantrens As the origin of Islam, Saudi Arabia has always had a central place for Muslims. Millions of pilgrims visit the country each year. Throughout history, it is evident that the pilgrimage has been instrumental in the transmission of religious reform: pilgrims see Saudi’s Islam as authentic and they try to emulate what they have seen there during their pilgrimage. Besides, Mecca and Medina have been centres of Islamic learning for centuries and many Indonesians have studied Islam in these places.3 Some pilgrims stayed longer in the holy lands to study with prominent ‘ulamas in the two holy cities.4 When they returned home, they made great efforts to spread the doctrines they had learned in Saudi Arabia. It is through this way that Wahhabi doctrines reached Indonesia, as is clearly evident in the case of the Padri movement in the Minangkabau in West Sumatra.5 The movement was started upon the return of three pilgrims from the holy land in the early nineteenth century. Back home, they saw Muslims practicing local customs, which were considered non-Islamic, and bid’a. They denounced these traditions as un-Islamic and called on the Muslims to purify their ‘aqida (creed) and ‘ibada (rituals). As I will discuss below, early traditional pesantrens were influenced by Wahhabi doctrines through similar methods. To explain this in more detail I will start with Madrasah Wathaniyyah Islamiyyah.

Madrasah Wathaniyyah Islamiyyah, Kebarongan, Banyumas, Central Java The Madrasah Wathaniyah Islamiyyah (MWI) Kebarongan, also well known as Pesantren Kebarongan, in Kebarongan, Banyumas, is an old pesantren in Central Java. It was founded in 1878 by Muhammad Habib, a teacher of the 3 4 5

For information on the network between Indonesian and Middle East Ulama, see, Azyumardi Azra, The Origins of Islamic Reformism in southeast Asia, Leiden: Asian Studies Association of Australia and KITLV, 2004. Martin van Bruinessen, Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat: Tradisi-Tradisi Islam di Indonesia, Bandung: Mizan, pp. 42-48. See for example, Taufik Abdullah, “Adat and Islam: An Examination of Conflict in Minangkabau” in Indonesia, 2, 1966, pp. 13-17.

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Naqshabandiyah order in Banyumas.6 He had spent two years in Mecca7 and studied with Sulaiman Zuhdi from whom he was given the ijaza (certificate) to spread the Naqshabandiyah order.8 What Habib’s activities dealing with this Sufi order were is not clear. However, a teacher of a Sufi order usually performed certain rituals in his pesantren, such as chanting particular wirid and dhikr, and the organization of tawajjuh.9 The pesantren taught the traditional doctrines of Islam and held on to traditional religious practices. A shift from traditional to puritan Islam occurred when Abdullah Zawawi Habib, the founder’s youngest son, led the pesantren from 1911 to 1938. Zawawi spent many years in Mecca. Upon his return to Kebarongan, he called on the community to purify their Islamic creeds in line with the Qur’an and the hadith. He criticized the existing practice of tawassul (intercession) or mediation between humans and God. In traditional Islam, Muslims believe that the dead are alive, and the pious dead are believed to be very close to God and therefore can function as mediators between living Muslims and God. Because of this belief, many Muslims visit the shrines of saints and ask the dead or help. Traditional practices such as two adhans (call for prayers) for the Friday prayers and performing twenty bows during tarawih (recommended prayer at night during Ramadan) were replaced by one adhan and eight bows respectively. Although the works of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab were not taught, Zawawi often referred to his thoughts in his teachings on tawhid. Zawawi was also an activist in a political movement. He established contacts with the newly established modernist organization in Solo, the Sarekat Islam (SI), the first nationalist movement to emerge. It was reported that various SI prominent leaders such as H.O.S. Cokroaminoto, Agus Salim and R.M. Soerjo Pranoto, visited the pesantren. A new SI branch in Kebarongan was soon established and Zawawi Habib became its leader.10 This resulted in the 6

Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, “Pengurusan Dakwah Aktivis Islam di Indonesia (Kajian tentang Dakwah Salafi di Banyumas, Jawa Tengah, Indonesia)”, PhD thesis, Institut Alam dan Tamadun Melayu, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, 2008, p. 91. 7 Panitia HUT se-Abad Pondok Pesantren MWI, “Pondok Pesantren Wathoniyah Islamiyah Kebarongan” in Marwan Saridjo, et al., Sejarah Pondok Pesantren di Indonesia, Jakarta: Dharma Bhakti, 1980, p. 142. 8 Martin van Bruinessen, Tarekat Naqsyabandiyah di Indonesia, Bandung: Mizan, 1992, p. 164. 9 Martin van Bruinessen, Tarekat Naqsyabandiyah, p. 157. 10 Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, “Pengurusan Dakwah”, pp. 93-94. See also, Panitia HUT seAbad, “Pondok Pesantren Wathoniyah”, p. 145.

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introduction of the classical system in teaching and the inclusion of non-religious subjects like reading and writing using the Latin alphabet, mathematics, and Indonesian language into the pesantren’s curriculum. It was Cokroaminoto who suggested the name of the madrasah, Madrasah Wathaniyyah Islamiyyah (MWI), a name that connotes an Islam-based nationalist movement.11 The puritan tendency of the pesantren became more apparent during Asifuddin Zawawi’s leadership which lasted thirty years (1950-1980). During this period, the Fath al-Majid sharh Kitab al-Tawhid by Abd al-Rahman ibn Hasan Ali Al-Sheikh, the grandson of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab , was taught to the students. Through this book, the students were directly introduced to ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s thoughts. This subject remains compulsory for students to date.12 However, Wahhabi thoughts were not wholly absorbed. Mark Woodward and his colleagues observed that the pesantren has tried to domesticate the Wahhabi doctrines by situating them in “the context of local culture, tradition and Indonesian nationalism.”13 This implies that the pesantren only denounced those practices that definitely contradict tawhid while maintaining practices that bear no direct relation to tawhid. Thus, for example, the pesantren still keeps a bedug (a big drum hit to indicate the coming of prayer times) and participates in takbir keliling to celebrate Islamic feasts (Id al-Fitr and Id al-Adha).14 Takbir is to chant “Allahu Akbar” (Allah is the Great), while keliling means ‘to go around’, and so takbir keliling is a procession around the village or city while people chant “Allahu Akbar”. The procession is often enlivened by people carrying torches, the use of loud speakers and the use of vehicles of any sorts and sizes. While the Salafis see this tradition as bid’a, the pesantren continues its participation. These were the conditions that Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin, a son of Asifuddin Zawawi, wanted to reform. Asifuddin got his secondary school education at MWI Kebarongan, and in 1979 was awarded a scholarship through the Dewan Da’wah to continue his education at the Jami’a Imam Ibn Su’ud University in Riyadh. Upon his return from Saudi Arabia, he taught for three years at his alma mater, the MWI Kebarongan. While teaching, he observed a huge discrepancy between knowledge and practices within the pesantren’s community. It was 11 Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, “Pengurusan Dakwah” p. 94. Panitia HUT se-Abad, “Pondok Pesantren Wathoniyah”, pp. 145-147. 12 Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, “Pengurusan Dakwah”, p. 95. 13 Mark Woordward, et.al., “Muslim Education, Celebrating Islam and Having Fun as Counter-Radicalization Strategies in Indonesia”, in Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 4, Issue 4, 2010, p. 41. 14 Mark Woordward, et al., “Muslim Education,” p. 43.

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true, Asifuddin admitted, that the pesantren taught its pupils the Fath al-Majid. However, knowledge alone was insufficient; its total implementation should follow. Thus, he proposed the adoption of the Salafi manhaj in the students’ daily life. He also suggested introducing more Salafi books, particularly the introductory works by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, al-Usul al-Thalatha and Kashf alShubuhat. His colleagues resisted and as a result in 1988 he moved to another branch of MWI at Karangduwur, Petanahan, Solo, where he received a more positive response from the madrasah. Here he ran a special class, later called the khitta, where the students were only taught Islamic knowledge. When these students began to display radical behaviour and held uncompromising views on local practices, the villagers resisted it and in 1992, the group was dissolved by the madrasah which forced Asifuddin to move to Solo.15 With the financial support of the Ihya al-Turath, Faiz successfully established a modern Salafi pesantren, Imam Bukhari, in Solo. Currently, this is one the most popular Salafi pesantrens in Indonesia.

Pesantren Maskumambang, Dukun, Gresik, East Java Established in 1859 by the notable Abdul Jabbar,16 in Dukun, about 10 kilometres from Sidayu, Pesantren Maskumambang was among the first Islamic institutions in Indonesia that promoted Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s ideas. It was a traditional pesantren that taught the doctrines of the ahl al-sunna wa al-jama’a, the school that almost all Indonesian Muslims affiliate with, including the Nahdlatul Ulama. In practical life, the school adopted the Ash’ariya and Maturidiya schools in theology, and the Shafi’iyya school in fiqh. The students were taught classical books such as Safinat al-Najat, Fath al-Qarib, Fathul Mu’in, I’anat al-Talibin and Fath al-Wahhab in fiqh; Nayl al-Awtar and Riyad al-Salihin in hadith; Tafsir al-Jalalayn in tafsir; Ihya’ ‘ulum al-din in Sufism; and ‘Aqidat al-‘Awwam in ‘aqida.17 In the pesantren, students and teachers practiced traditional religious rituals such as paying visits to shrines, tahlilan (to utter “la ilaha illa Allah” and other religious formulas) and khaul (the commemoration of the death of a pesantren leader). The move to a Wahhabi orientation took place when the pesantren was under the direction of Ammar Faqih, a grandson of its founder. Ammar learned 15 Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, “Pengurusan Dakwah”, pp. 97-102. 16 M. Dawan Rahardjo, “The Kyai, the Pesantren and Village: A Preliminary Sketch” in Prisma, Vo. 1, No. 1, 1975, p. 36. 17 Mundzier Suparta, Perubahan Orientasi Pondok Pesantren Salafiyah terhadap Perilaku Keagamaan Masyarakat, Jakarta: Asta Buana Sejahtera, 2009, p. 128.

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Wahhabism from ‘Umar Hamdan al-Mahrasi (1875-1949) in Mecca while he was performing the hajj. Al-Mahrasi was considered great scholar who mastered religious sciences, including tawhid, fiqh, tafsir, tasawuf, nahw and sarf.18 Ammar stayed in Mecca from 1926 to 1928.19 Fascinated by Wahhabi ideas, he began to spread Wahhabism when he returned to Dukun. However, he encountered opposition from both inside and outside the pesantren. In the pesantren, the opposition came from his father, Muhammad Faqih, for example, who saw the Wahhabi doctrines as deviations from the ahl al-sunna wa al-jama’a. The son, nevertheless, succeeded in convincing his father. Likewise, the challenge to Wahhabism emerged from local religious leader outside the pesantren who held similar views as Faqih on Wahhabi ideas.20 The fact that the pesantren had so far produced great leaders of the traditional Islamic organization, the Nahdlatul Ulama, fuelled the opposition. Having gained his father’s approval, Ammar now started gradually to teach Wahhabi doctrines in his pesantren. The classical books of fiqh were still taught to the students, but he replaced the ‘aqidat al-‘awwam with his own books, Hidayat al-Umma, and Tuhfat al-Umma fi al-‘aqa’id wa Radd al-Mafasid. These books deal with the purification of Islamic creeds with reference to Wahhabi thought. Traditional practices, however, such as tahlilan were still accepted.21 Outside the pesantren, Ammar disseminated Wahhabi doctrines through his political activism. In the Masyumi, the Islamic political party in which traditional (NU) and reformist (Muhammadiyah) Muslim figures were active members, Ammar actively promoted Wahhabi ideas to his puritan Muhammadiyah friends. Representing the Masyumi, he became a member of the local parliament (DPRD, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah) of the district of Surabaya, and subsequently a member of national House of Representatives (DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat). He left the Masyumi in 1952 when the party suffered from conflicts, and he began to preach Wahhabi doctrines through the Muhammadiyah, in which he was the chairman of the Dukun branch in Gresik.22 18 http://syeikhyasinalfadani.blogspot.sg/2012/11/syeikh-umar-hamdan-almahrasi-1875-1949.html, accessed on September 7, 2013. 19 Suparta, Perubahan Orientasi. pp. 130-131. 20 Nadjih Ahjad “Ta’thirat Kitab al-Tawhid Ta’lif al-Muslih al-‘Azim al-Shaykh Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab fi al-Harakat al-Islahiyya al-Diniyya bi Indunisiya”, paper presented in the “Week of Shaykh Muhammab ibn Abd Wahhab, Riyad, 1980, p. 12. 21 Suparta, Perubahan Orientasi. p. 149. 22 Suparta, Perubahan Orientasi. pp. 133, 145.

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A radical move to Wahhabi orientation occurred when the pesantren leadership was handed over to Nadjih Ahjad who led the pesantren from the early sixties up till now. In this period, the work of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was taught for the first time to the students at Maskumambang. In the 1960s, Ahjad established a Madrasah Tsanawiyah within the pesantren and he invited teachers from Pesantren Kebarongan, Banyumas, Central Java. These teachers introduced Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s work, Kitab al-Tawhid, to Ahjad.23 At that time, senior students of the Madrasah ‘Aliyah studied the Kitab al-Tawhid, while junior students at the Madrasah Tsanawiyah read the al-Tibyan fi al-‘Aqa’id, a book written by Ahjad that was very much inspired by the ideas of the Wahhabi founder. In tandem with curriculum reform, traditional religious practices were also abandoned. This shift to the Wahhabi orientation was not without its effect. Students left the pesantren, and many parents withdrew their children from the pesantren as they were afraid they were being trained in deviant Islam.24 Despite the fact that the pesantren tended towards Wahhabi thought, the current leader, Nadjih Ahjad, is reluctant to accept either the Wahhabi or the Salafi label. He also repudiates the Muhammadiyah label as the people brand it. Instead, he rather calls his orientation Islam qabl al-tafarruq (Islam before the fracture), that is, Islam of the period of the Prophet and the Companions. He agrees with the Wahhabi on some parts of its doctrines. For example, he denounces tahlilan as bid’a and tawassul as polytheist (shirk). However, he differs from the Wahhabis in various other issues, such as isbal and wearing a beard. In his opinion, isbal is only applicable to sarongs, but not too long trousers. He believes that the reason behind the Prophetic tradition of letting the beard grow is to distinguish Muslims from Jews. Since this is no longer an issue, the order is no longer applicable.25 Like his predecessor, Ahjad had once been active in politics. In 1999, politicians of the Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, Star Crescent Party) approached him to join them and he accepted. From 1999-2004, he was a member of the House of Representatives for the PBB. Ahjad’s political orientation was clear. The party he joined was an Islamic political party, PBB, a party that claims to be a new incarnation of the Masyumi. He refused to join secular or inclusive political parties that included the involvement of non-Muslims, like the 23 Rofhani, “Konstruksi Faham Wahhabi pada Santri di Pesantren Maskumbambang”, Laporan Penelitian Individual, IAIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya, 2004, pp. 28-30. 24 Suparta, Perubahan Orientasi, p. 176. 25 Interview with Nadjih Ahjad, Gresik, May 11, 2010.

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National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN). According to him, this involvement falls within the category of muwalat ghayr al-Muslim (taking a non-Muslim as protector or ruler), which is prohibited in Islam because it could harm Muslims and Islam.26 Furthermore, he sees two types of cooperation between political parties. The first is collaboration between Islamic political parties and non-Islamic political parties in the interest of common goals. This cooperation is permissible in Islam. The second is cooperation between Muslims and non-Muslims in one political party. This type of cooperation is prohibited in Islam.27 He refers to Qur’anic verse 3:28 that reads: “Let not the believers make unbelievers their protectors rather than the believers; anyone who does so will have nothing to hope for from Allah, except if you do so as a precaution to guard yourself against their tyranny.” Here we see Ahjad’s consistency in applying the al-wala’ wa al-bara’ concept, one of the essential Salafi doctrines as discussed in Chapter One. According to this concept, Muslims are not allowed to make a non-Muslim their ruler. Thus, the inclusion of non-Muslims as members of the House of Representatives as done by the inclusive PAN party, can be categorized as muwalat ghayr al-Muslim. The House of Representatives, together with the ruler, has the right to issue new regulations governing important aspects that deal with common interest, and the right to control the government. It has also the right to approve the state annual budget proposed by the government. Given these tasks, a member of the House of Representatives holds a strategic position in the political arena: he or she will contribute to and orient national politics. It is assumed that non-Muslim members of the House of Representatives will strive for their own interests in agreement with their own beliefs. Through his fraction in Parliament, Ahjad strove for the implementation of the shari’a during the Amendment sessions in the People’s Consultative Assembly. Following the collapse of the Soeharto regime, between 1999 and 2004, the People’s Assembly held annual sessions to amend the 1945 Constitution. One of the sensitive matters to amend was Article 29 of the Constitution on religion. The existing version of the article reads “Negara berdasar atas ketuhanan yang Maha Esa” (“The State is founded on the Oneness of God”). This article is a copy-paste version of the Pancasila state ideology, of which the first pillar reads “Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa” ([the belief] in the Oneness of God). In spite of the 26 Nadjih Ahjad, Partai Politik Lintas Agama dalam Perspektif Islam, Surabaya: Tri Bakti Offset, 1998, p. 19. 27 Nadjih Ahjad, Partai Politik Lintas Agama, pp. 21-22.

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fact that the majority of Muslims has accepted this formulation, a small number of them want to return to the Jakarta Charter in their attempt to implement the shari’a. In the Jakarta Charter, the formulation of the first pillar from which later the Pancasila was derived sounded: “Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari’at Islam bagi pemeluknya” ([the belief] in the Oneness of God with the obligation of the enforcement of the shari’a for its adherents). For some Muslims, the Jakarta Charter has become the basis for the demand to implement the shari’a. Whenever they saw the opportunity, Muslim figures tried to revive the Jakarta Charter. Thus, when they saw the opportunity to realize this constitutional right in the process of the amendment of the Constitution, they tried to revive the Jakarta Charter and to include it the amendment of Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution. In 2002, during the Annual Session of the People’s Consultative Assembly, the Islamic parties namely Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, United Development Party), Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, Crescent and Star Party), and Partai Keadilan (PK, Justice Party, now PKS, Justice and Prosperity Party) proposed to amend article 29 of the 1945 Constitution by returning to its original formulation as included in the Jakarta Charter. The coalition of Islamic parties failed due to majority opposition. However, Ahjad’s role it is worth noting here. During the Session, he became the spokesperson of the PBB fraction at the People’s Consultative Assembly. In the last session, he stood on the podium saying that his party, PBB, would not give up the struggle for the implementation of the shari’a by reviving the Jakarta Charter. He concluded his speech by saying that the PBB fraction was not responsible for the final formulation of Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution.28 Having ended his assignment in the House of Representatives, in 2004 Ahjad resigned from the political party and returned to Pesantren Maskumambang. Taking the leadership of the pesantren was the reason for his resignation. He acknowledged that during his active role in the political party, he often left the pesantren to its own devices, and consequently, the pesantren declined. At present, in addition to his activities in the pesantren, Ahjad is active in the Dewan Da’wah and the Muhammadiyah. He has written a number of books to be used as teaching materials in pesantrens, including three volumes on ‘aqida, al-Tibyan fi al-‘Aqa’id,29 and three 28 Saiful Mujani, Muslim Demokrat, Jakarta: Gramedia, in collaboration with PPIM, Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina, Freedom Institute and Danish Embassy, 2007, pp. 72-73. 29 Nadjih Ahjad, al-Tibyan fi al-‘Aqida, Vol. 1, Gresik: Pondok Pesantren Maskumambang, 2006; Nadjih Ahjad, al-Tibyan fi al-‘Aqida, Vol. 2, Gresik: Pondok Pesantren Maskumambang, 2009; Nadjih Ahjad, al-Tibyan fi al-‘Aqida, Vol. 3, Gresik: Pondok Pesantren Maskumambang, 2009.

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more volumes on fiqh, al-Tibyan fi al-Ahkam al-‘Amaliyya.30 All these books are taught to the students of Madrasah Tsanawiyah in his pesantren. In addition to teaching materials, he authored various other books for general readership, including Iman Jalan menuju Hidup Sukses,31 Kitab Haji: Tuntunan Menunaikan Haji dan Umrah menurut Sunnah Rasulullah SAW,32 and Kitab Jazanah.33 B. The Development of Contemporary Salafi Pesantrens The first Salafi pesantren to emerge in Indonesia was Pesantren Al-Irsyad in Tengaran, Salatiga, Central Java, as mentioned above.34 It was established in 1988 by Umar Abdat, an al-Irsyad official from Semarang. Initially, the pesantren was designed to adopt the system and the curriculum as used in Pesantren Gontor in Ponorogo, East Java, which uses the grade system and teaches both religious and secular subjects.35 The founder sent his son, Tariq Abdat, to study at Gontor, and asked Gontor to send its fresh graduates to teach at al-Irsyad. Emulating Gontor, the pesantren applied a six-year program called Kulliyat al-Mu’allimin al-Islamiyya (KMI, Training for Islamic Teachers), a program aimed to produce Islamic teachers equivalent to senior high school education. Under the direction of Ja’far Umar Thalib who came to teach in the early 1990s, the pesantren veered towards a Salafi orientation. Thalib replaced the 30 Nadjih Ahjad, al-Tibyan fi al-Ahkam al-‘Amaliyya, Vol. 1, Gresik: Pondok Pesantren Maskumambang, 2006; Nadjih Ahjad, al-Tibyan fi al-Ahkam al-‘Amaliyya, Vol. 2, Gresik: Pondok Pesantren Maskumambang, 1990; Nadjih Ahjad, al-Tibyan fi alAhkam al-‘Amaliyya, Vol. 3, Gresik: Pondok Pesantren Maskumambang, 2009. 31 Najih Ahjad, Iman Jalan menuju Hidup Sukses, Surabaya: Bina Ilmu, 1991. 32 Najih Ahjad, Kitab Haji: Tuntunan Menunaikan Haji dan Umrah menurut Sunnah Rasulullah SAW, Gresik: Jama’ah Haji Maskumambang, 2000. 33 Najih Ahjad, Kitab Jazanah, Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1991. 34 Contrary to Indonesian scholar Noorhaidi Hasan’s observation that the first Salafi pesantren to emerge was Pesantren Ihya’ al-Sunnah of Ja’far Umar Thalib which was founded in 1994, I found two Salafi pesantrens whose establishment dates from before Thalib’s established his pesantren: al-Irsyad in Tengaran and al-Furqan in Gresik. They were founded in 1988 and 1989 respectively. See Noorhaidi Hasan, “The Salafi Madrasas of Indonesia” in Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand and Martin van Bruinessen (eds), The Madrasa in Asia: Political Activism and Transnational Linkages, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008, p. 254. 35 For more information on Gontor, see Lance Castles, “Notes on the Islamic School at Gontor”, Indonesia, 1, 1966, pp. 30-45; Ali Saifullah HA, “Darussalam, Pondok Modern Gontor”, in Dawam Rahardjo (ed.), Pesantren dan Pembaharuan, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1974, pp. 134-154.

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materials on Islamic knowledge used at the time with those in line with the Salafi manhaj. This resulted in a conflict between Gontor-oriented and Salafi-oriented teachers. Having been through the pesantren in its early stages, the first group did not want to hand over the pesantren to a party with a different orientation.36 Ultimately, the Salafi group won, and it was during Thalib’s management that the pesantren became the centre of Salafi activism, where prominent Salafi teachers, such as Abdul Qadir Yazid Jawas and Yusuf Usman Baisa gathered and with whom many Salafi teachers studied. Even though predominantly managed by Indonesian Arabs, the pesantren has also attracted students of non-Arabic descent. However, the conflict over the orientation remained. This led to Thalib’s replacement by Baisa, who had been invited by Thalib to teach in the pesantren. In addition to neutralizing the conflict, the replacement was aimed at achieving wider interest in the pesantren to get more funds from Saudi donors. From the point of view of the pesantren board, Thalib’s inflexible style would not achieve this goal.37 Disappointed by this replacement, Thalib established his own pesantren in 1994, the Ihya al-Sunnah, in Degolan in Kaliurang, Yogyakarta. This conflict marks the beginning of the frictions within the Salafi movement. The Salafi-orientation of the pesantren, however, raised another conflict between the pesantren and al-Irsyad. On the one hand, the Salafis who ran the pesantren believed that al-Irsyad has gone too far beyond its spirit of reformation when it was established by Ahmad Surkati. Salafis regard al-Irsyad as a secular organization that deviates from its original goal: the purification of the Islamic beliefs. On the other hand, al-Irsyad claims that the pesantren belongs to alIrsyad, since it had been established under the supervision of the Semarang alIrsyad branch. Meanwhile, Umar Abdat, the founder of the pesantren felt that al-Irsyad had not given him enough support when he founded the pesantren. Abdat continued to label his pesantren ‘al-Irsyad’ because of his affiliation to the organization. The conflict between Pesantren al-Irsyad and the Semarang branch office of the national al-Irsyad worsened for at least two reasons. First, the new Yayasan Pesantren al-Irsyad Semarang foundation was established and the management of the pesantren had been transferred from the Semarang al-Irsyad branch office to the new foundation. This shift made the conflict more complicated because 36 Interview with Thoyyib, a teacher of pesantren and a party activist, PKS, Tengaran, February 23, 2009. 37 Interview with Yazid Jawwas, Bogor, March 13, 2009.

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the officials of the foundation comprised of both conflicting parties. Second, a new Salafi-oriented organization called the Perhimpunan al-Irsyad (Al-Irsyad Association) was created by Baisa, the former director of Pesantren al-Irsyad Tengaran. Baisa did not only keep the name al-Irsyad, but also used the al-Irsyad emblem. Geis Ammar, the then chairman of the national al-Irsyad board, reacted to the creation of this new Perhimpunan al-Irsyad by taking the case to court because it used the same emblem. The Supreme Court decided in favour of the national al-Irsyad and as a consequence, the pesantren was to belong to the national al-Irsyad organization. Responding to the defeat, the Perhimpunan alIrsyad left the Pesantren al-Irsyad Tengaran just as it was and did not change anything because it did not want to lose its assets in the pesantren.38 In effect, the decision of the Supreme Court was all but ignored. For Baisa, using the name al-Irsyad was advantageous because it attracts many students and, indeed, many students whom I met during my fieldwork in the pesantren were alumni of alIrsyad schools originating from many cities. Later Salafi pesantrens developed out of Pesantren al-Irsyad. After the return of Saudi, Yemeni and Pakistani graduates to Indonesia, and together with LIPIA alumni, the Salafi da’wa gained momentum and also the number of Salafi pesantrens multiplied and spread to many regions in Indonesia.

Pesantren al-Furqan, Srowo, Sidayu, Gresik, East Java In Gresik, the Salafis have their roots in Pesantren Maskumambang as discussed above and in the Muhammadiyah reformist movement. Two figures merit mention in this regard: Nadjih Ahjad who we have seen before, and Madjid Ilyas from Muhammadiyah Surabaya. In the early 1960s, Ilyas and Ahjad were often invited to visit the sub district Sidayu in Gresik to deliver religious teachings among the activists of Hizbul Watan, the Muhammadiyah’s scouting movement. The lessons were held at the al-Furqan Mosque, an old mosque founded in 1926 and many Hizbul Watan activists lived in the vicinity of this mosque. Both Ilyas and Ahjad called for the cleansing of Islamic doctrines from religious innovation and superstition. Under their influence, the Hizbul Watan, for example, performed the Idul Fitri and Idul Adha prayers in the open field rather than in a mosque as other people did. At that time, holding these prayers in the open field was, and still is, an act of Islamic reformism as it follows the practice of the Prophet. 38 Interview with Nafi’ Zainuddin, director of pesantren al-Irsyad Tengaran, Salatiga, February 25, 2009.

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Pesantren al-Furqan was founded in 1989 by Aunurrafiq Ghufran, an activist of the Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia Young Ghufran was a cadre of the Muhammadiyah. He attended the Muhammadiyah secondary school called Pendidikan Guru Agama 4 Tahun (PGA, School of Religious Teachers lasting four years) in Sidayu, and then continued at the PGA Muhammadiyah 6 Tahun (adding two years to PGA4) at Paciran in Lamongan. He then joined the Dewan Da’wah to preach Islam in the rural areas among the migrant people in West Kalimantan. After serving da’wa for two years, the Saudi Government granted him a scholarship to study at the Jami’a al-Imam Muhammad ibn Su’ud University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, from 1977 to 1982. Having graduated in Riyadh, Ghufran spent some years teaching in his colleague’s pesantren, Darul Islah, in Kediri, East Java. He then left the Darul Islah and returned to his native village, Sidayu where he was appointed teacher at Perguruan Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah schools) before eventually founding his own pesantren, alFurqan, in Srowo village, Sidayu, Gresik, East Java. Muhammadiyah figures had invited Ghufran to Gresik to provide better education in his hometown. At the time, the Muhammadiyah was looking for someone who could direct the newly established Pesantren al-Hikmah. The pesantren was aimed at complementing the education of the students of the Muhammadiyah senior high school with Islamic knowledge out of school hours. Ghufran was appointed to take charge of daily matters in the pesantren. When the Muhammadiyah launched its new program, the Pondok Pesantren Ilmu Dakwah dan Teknologi (PPIDT), Ghufran was made its director. PPIDT was a program in which the students were taught Islamic knowledge and trained in simple crafts such as sewing, and technical skills such as installing and repairing electrical appliances. The program aimed to endow the students with skills so that they would not have to be solely reliant on the income they would get from their da’wa activities. In the meantime, Ghufran taught religion at the Perguruan Muhammadiyah. Already at this early stage, Ghufran’s teaching raised controversy among Muhammadiyah activists. For example, he taught his students not to salute the national flag, nor put the picture of Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of the Muhammadiyah, on the wall. He also asked female students not to join parades on occasions where male and female students would usually mix. Influenced by this teaching, some students were reluctant to attend the weekly flag-raising ceremony when the students usually salute the national flag. This created discomfort between the Muhammadiyah and the government. Moreover, Ghufran’s harsh criticism of traditional religious practices heightened

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tensions between the Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama. In the end, the Muhammadiyah dismissed Ghufran from his teaching posts at its schools and from his role as pesantren director. Ghufran then established Pesantren al-Furqan in Srowo village located about 500 meters from Pesantren al-Hikmah. Aided by a grant from a Saudi donor to the amount of 10,000 riyal, he started to erect some buildings on land he had inherited from his parents.39 The name al-Furqan was borrowed from the existing foundation, Yayasan Masjid al-Furqan. Currently, the foundation runs a Kindergarten, a Taman Pendidikan al-Qur’an (TPQ, Qur’anic Learning Center for Children), and a Madrasah Ibtida’iyah. Ghufran used this foundation to obtain a government permit for his new pesantren. Later, when the new pesantren expanded, officials from Yayasan Masjid al-Furqan suggested him to establish his own foundation. Pesantren al-Furqan looks plain. The buildings are made of concrete (not bamboo like in Pesantren Al-Nur al-Atsari), and many are two stories high, yet still insufficient to properly accommodate all students. Students live densely packed in rooms with minimal facilities and some even sleep in the mosque. The courses take place everywhere: in classrooms, corridors in the student housing facilities, offices, the mosque and the library. This condition is related to the availability of funds to finance the pesantren. Unlike other Salafi pesantrens that receive donations from foreign donors through the Ihya’ al-Turath, this pesantren prefers to mobilize local funding. Ghufran refrains from asking any donations that require proposals and issuing reports. During my visit to this pesantren in December 2008, I found only one inscription on the wall that identified a donor, Barida bint Khalaf al-‘Utaybi from Saudi Arabia, next to the drilled well in front of the student accommodation. During my second visit in May 2010, the pesantren was constructing a new and large mosque with financial support from a Saudi donor. Other buildings are constructed with local funding from participants and Salafi da’wa sympathizers. In addition to donations, Pesantren al-Furqan mobilizes other sources to finance its expenses. These sources include tuition fees, a publishing house and a fishery. The students pay IDR 150.000 (about US $15.00) each month for accommodation, tuition fees and food. The pesantren also publishes the monthly Salafi magazines, al-Furqan and al-Mawaddah with 19,000 and 12,000 copies per issue respectively. While the former is directed to a general public, 39 Interview with Aunurrafiq Ghufran, founder and director of al-Furqan, Gresik, December 26, 2008.

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the latter is especially directed to women readers. The magazines are circulated through Salafi marketing agencies across the country. Complementary to these periodicals, the pesantren established the Pustaka al-Furqan publishing house to produce Salafi books. Fishery is another source of income. The pesantren manages 28 hectares of fishponds, containing fish and shrimps, under the management of senior teachers. Usually the teachers employ villagers to work so that they can concentrate on teaching at the pesantren In addition to al-Furqan, another Salafi pesantren has emerged. Al-Bayyinah was officially founded in 1998 and directed by the young Muhammadiyah cadre Agus Su’adi with the assistance of his brother, Afifuddin. While the former was a student of the Muhammadiyah’s school at Paciran, the latter was a student of Ghufran at al-Furqan. In 1994, after attending al-Furqan for one and half years, Ghufran had sent Afifuddin to study with Thalib when Thalib had opened the Tadrib al-Du’at program at his pesantren, the Ihyasussannah. In early 2001, he went to Yemen to enrol at the Darul Hadith, Sheikh Muqbil’s Salafi learning centre. In 2004, Affifuddin completed his studies and returned home to teach in his brother’s pesantren, al-Bayyinah. Tension between the two Salafi pesantrens is apparent. As his former student, when a dispute between the Salafis comes up, Afifuddin takes Thalib’s side. He criticizes what he sees as Ghufran’s inconsistency. For example, he is critical of Ghufran’s collaboration with the Muhammadiyah and his readiness to attend a panel also attended by hizby people such as Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. In the first case, Afifuddin criticizes Pesantren al-Furqan’s involvement in Pesantren al-Hikmah that belongs to the Muhammadiyah. Some al-Furqan ustadhs teach at this institution. While in the second case, on one occasion Ghufran was invited by Nasir Mansur to attend the wedding ceremony of his first son. Nasir Mansur was a political activist who had converted to Salafism. He sent his children to Pesantren al-Mukmin, Ngruki, and then to al-Furqan. For the occasion of his son’s wedding party, he had invited three figures from different backgrounds: Ba’asyir, Ahjad and Ghufran.40 Ba’asyir is the spiritual leader of Pesantren al-Mukmin, Ngruki, a pesantren that has been alleged by many parties to have linkage with terrorist networks. As said above, Ahjad is the leader of Pesantren Maskumambang, and former member of the House of Representatives; and Ghufran is the leader of al-Furqan. These persons reflect the various phases of Mansur’s life from having being a Muslim activist to being a Salafi adherent: as an Islamic activist, Mansur sent his children to Pesantren al-Mukmin, Ngruki and he had joined the Partai 40 Interview with Nasir Mansur, Gresik, May 14, 2010.

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Bulan Bintang (PBB), the party to which Ahjad was affiliated; later when he had converted to Salafism, he sent his daughter to al-Furqan. During the wedding ceremony, the three figures appeared on the stage with different tasks: Ba’asyir was to deliver a speech on behalf of the host; Ghufran was to deliver the khutbah nikah (advice and guidance for the new couple); and finally, Ahjad was to lead the prayers. Afifuddin sharply criticized Ghulfran’s presence together with Ba’asyir. He acknowledged that he himself attended the party but did not sit on the same panel. According to Afifuddin, Ghulfran’s presence violated the true Salafi manhaj that prohibits Muslims from attending a panel in the presence of hizby figures. His presence would, Affifuddin argued, lead ordinary people to suggest that Salafis agree with the thoughts and actions of the Muhammadiyah and Ba’asyir.41 The conflict between the two pesantrens is also visible among their teachers and students: they hardly communicate or interact.

Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari, Banjarsari, Ciamis, West Java Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari was established in 2001 by Khatib Muwahhid, a son of Nunung Muhiddin, a notable local kyai and founder of the old Pesantren al-Nur. Muwahhid established his own pesantren after a conflict with his brothers about leadership and the curriculum reform of the old pesantren. After the death of the founder of the old pesantren and during Muwahhid’s absence for study, his brotherin-law, Ajengan42 Ade Hanan, took over the pesantren leadership. The old pesantren provided religious instruction for adults and Qur’anic recitation for children in the afternoon. In an effort to create a cadre that would continue his religious institution, Muhiddin sent his son Muwahhid to pesantren Gontor where he was introduced to Salafi teachings for the first time. Muwahhid spent 6 years in Gontor, and in 1991, he continued his studies in Pesantren Darul Huffaz in Bone, South Sulawesi, to memorize the Qur’an. Darul Huffaz is a special pesantren for memorizing the Qur’an. It was established in 1975 by Lanre Sa’id, a former prominent activist of Kahar Muzakkar’s NII movement in South Sulawesi. The presence of Sa’id’s sons at Gontor in the 1980s and their reputation for memorizing the Qur’an made the pesantren famous among Gontor students who wished to memorize the Qur’an. Since the late 1980s, supported by Hasan Abdullah Sahal, one of Gontor’s kyais, many Gontor alumni have enrolled in Pesantren Darul Huffaz. Muwahhid spent two years at Darul Huffaz. From 1993 to 1994, he was involved in educational institutions 41 Interview with Afifuddin, Gresik, May 12, 2010. 42 “Ajengan” is a Sundanese term that denotes religious teacher or ustadh.

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like Ulumul Qur’an in Sawangan in Depok, West Java. In 1994, he met Husein, the owner of the Holistik hospital in Purwakarta, West Java, from whom he discovered the Salafi institution of Sheikh Muqbil from Yemen. At the time, the hospital was developing an alternative non-chemical and herbal form of medication that focuses on food intake.43 Muwahhid eventually decided to go Yemen and studied with the sheikh from 1996 to 2000.44 In 2000, Muwahhid returned to Indonesia. As the only son expected to continue his father’s struggle in da’wa, the family and local people enthusiastically welcomed him. However, they were shocked by his Salafi teachings. He called for the purification of tawhid and religious practices. He began reforming materials taught in the pesantren and incorporated Salafi books into the curriculum, particularly those of Muhammad ibn Abd Wahhab on tawhid such as the Kitab al-Tawhid and Kashf al-Shubuhat. His reform initiatives were challenged by his family who feared the loss of the pesantren’s assets, as, for example, his uncle had endowed lands to it. Another uncle was aware of this endowment and was scared by Muwahhid’s dominant control of this asset. In 2000, Indonesian Muslims witnessed the emergence of the Laskar Jihad that called Muslims for jihad in Ambon and Maluku on the ground of protecting local Muslims. Muwahhid joined this group and was appointed head of the West Java region of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jama’ah (FKAWJ, Forum for Communication of the Community of Ahlussunnah), an umbrella organization of the Laskar Jihad. He mobilized the people to join the Laskar Jihad and even used the pesantren as the centre for the physical training of combatants. Muwahhid’s activities in the Laskar Jihad made him famous among the Salafis. He travelled a lot to mobilize the people to join the Laskar. When he returned to the pesantren, he was often accompanied by Salafis willing to study with him. In 2000, some 20 students from other cities were accommodated in the old Pesantren al-Nur. The Salafis used the village’s mosque in front of the pesantren for study, and thus it turned into a place where Salafis and villagers mixed during collective prayers. Here the differences between the Salafis and the villagers became apparent. Local people saw different physical gestures of prayer, which were alien to them. Muwahhid’s denouncement of local practices as bid’a added to the people’s anxiety about the 43 http://pro-sehatalami.com/topik/148-rs-holistic-antara-dicerca-dan-dicari, accessed on February 2011. Many Salafis run small businesses in herbal medicines to earn a living. Some even do cupping (hijama), a traditional medical method claiming to originate from the Prophet. This method is now widespread in Indonesia. 44 Interview with Khatib Muwahhid, director of Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari, Ciamis, January 25, 2010.

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Salafis. The tension flared up when the people celebrated the Prophet’s birthday in 2002 in the village mosque. On the day of the celebration, the Salafis went out in the early morning to avoid attending the celebration, and returned to the pesantren when the people were tiding up. This enraged the people and they caused damaged to the student’s accommodation. Following the conflict, a dialogue between the Salafis and the people was held in the mosque. The forum was attended by the Musyawarah Pimpinan Kecamatan (Muspika, a council consisting of the head of the sub-district, the police, and the army). Various prominent figures, such as Abdul Rasyid and Khalil Chaidar (the then chairman and vice-chairman of MUI, respectively), and Hisyam Ahyani, the leader of the traditional Pesantren Nahdlatul Fatah, attended the meeting. Some rumours had been spreading among the people that Muwahhid had prohibited the utterance of salawat (prayers to the Prophet), that he had thrown the classical books of the Shafi’ite madhhab away, that he banned performing the hajj and that he had called his father kafir (unbeliever). These accusations were put to him during the meeting. It was not Muwahhid himself who answered the accusations but Amung Ma’mun, the person Muwahhid’s father most trusted to manage the old pesantren. 45 This position gave him credibility among the local people. In his clarification, Ma’mun refuted all rumours. Ma’mun said that Muwahhid did not forbid the people to chant the salawat as it is prescribed in the holy Qur’an. Similarly, Ma’mun said that Muwahhid did not throw away the Shafi’ite books. It was discovered that a student had found a Shafi’ite book on the bank of the river near the pesantren. He had reported his discovery to his teacher, Ajengan Yayan who reported it to Ajengan Ade Hanan. In the following days, Ade Hanan told the people that Muwahhid had thrown the book away. According to Ma’mun, it was not clear if Muwahhid had done it. On the prohibition of the hajj, Ma’mun also refuted the charge. What was true was that Muwahhid’s aunt had visited him telling him that she would go on the pilgrimage. Muwahhid had replied that his aunt should go with her mahram (lit. means one who is not eligible to marry. In this case, the mahram serves as protector) or otherwise she could not perform the hajj. It could not be inferred from this statement that Muwahhid had banned the hajj. The last accusation was also incorrect. Muwahhid fully respected his father, and it was impossible that he would have labelled his father kafir. For Salafis, a Muslim cannot charge another Muslim of being kafir on the grounds of outer appearances. At the end of the meeting, the MUI declared that Muwahhid was clear of all accusations. Nevertheless, the dialogue did not solve 45 Interview with Amung Ma’mun, Ciamis, January 23, 2010.

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all problems, it only temporary put an end to the tension within the community. The neutral position of the MUI and the police during the meeting played an important role in cooling down the community’s anger. This first dialogue resulted in momentary tranquillity in the community. When the tension resurfaced in 2003, a second dialogue was held at the Kantor Urusan Agama (KUA), a sub-district office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs responsible for marriage and divorce registrations. Similar to the first dialogue, the second dialogue was attended by the Muspika, the MUI, and the conflicting parties (traditional religious leaders and Salafis). Unlike in the previous meeting when the MUI had remained impartial, now the MUI did take sides with the traditionalists opposing the Salafis. This shift was caused by the traditionalist affiliation of the new MUI chairman MUI, Khalil Chaidar (who was vice chairman during the first meeting). The meeting resulted in an agreement to separate the two parties: Muwahhid should move to another place to avoid the continuation of the conflict. Following the agreement, Muwahhid built a new mosque on his father’s land, about one kilometre from the old pesantren at the westernmost point of the village. The mosque became the centre of his new Pesantren al-Nur alAtsari. While the name ‘al-Nur’ was kept to keep the historical link with the old pesantren, the term ‘al-Atsari’ was added to indicate the pesantren’s new Salafi orientation. The term ‘atsari’ is derived from the word ‘atsar’ which has a similar meaning to sunna or hadith, Prophetic tradition. Salafis are often associated with ahl al-hadith or ahl al-atsar, a group that advocates the sunna. Many Salafi pesantrens include ‘sunna’ or ‘atsar,’ in their name such as the Ihya al-Sunnah in Tasikmalaya (West Java) and Yogyakarta, and the Darul Athar in Lamongan (East Java). Muwahhid’s patience in teaching Salafi doctrines in the village promotes his pesantren and Salafi da’wa among the community. The villagers no longer resist his da’wa . His family, who used to resist his da’wa, currently supports it by sending their children to the pesantren. The buildings of the old pesantren are now used by the new pesantren as student dormitory. Although it has not grown rapidly, the Salafi da’wa continues to exist and keeps expanding. The fact that Muwahhid is a native of Ciamis and the son of the respected kyai contribute to his success in developing Salafi da’wa there. The pesantren grows slowly and looks very poor. The buildings are made of bamboo and wood, and include a classroom, a dormitory and a kitchen, and are built semi-permanently on the bordering paddy fields. The classroom is

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integrated with the dormitory in the same construction: the ground floor is used as student accommodation, while the second floor is used as a classroom. The upstairs classroom is open without partitions, and many groups of students occupy part of the hall-like room. The only permanent buildings are the girls’ dormitory and the mosque, both of which have not yet been finished. The girls’ dormitory and the classes are located separately, about 500 meters from the pesantren’s main complex. In addition to students, some 60 Salafi families live around the pesantren. Some of them are former Laskar Jihad activists who migrated to this village longing for companionship and to learn about religion and in order to practice the Salafi manhaj in daily life. They come from various cities in Java (Bandung, Yogyakarta and others) and from outer islands, such as Kalimantan and Sumatra. Richer families built new houses or bought existing ones, while poorer families rented houses from the villagers. Others are the local villagers who are interested in Salafi da’wa and who converted to Salafism. While precise data on the Salafi composition between migrant and indigenous converts is unavailable, one informant told me that half of the Salafis are local, while the other half are former Laskar Jihad activists from outside. If this is true, it shows the present success of the Salafi da’wa in Banjarsari, after it had been rejected by the local community. To take another Salafi enclave as a comparison, in Tanah Baru, Depok, West Java, which comprises of 250 Salafi families, almost all are former Laskar Jihad activists who migrated to this urban area and created the enclave. During my visits to this enclave, I found only two local families who had converted to Salafism.

Pesantren Assunnah Cirebon Unlike the two pesantrens discussed above, Pesantren Assunnah Cirebon represents a more developed Salafi pesantren in terms of facilities and the educational system it adopts. It applies a grade system and employs competent and skilful teachers complemented by advanced teaching media, such as audio visual appliances and computers. The buildings for classrooms, offices, student accommodations, the canteen, bookstore and others are permanent, and some are two-story high. The mosque, the first building that was erected, is a twostory construction. The ground floor is used for daily prayers and religious instruction, while the upper floor is used for student accommodation. The pesantren was established in 1993 under umbrella of the Yayasan Assunnah Cirebon (YAC) by three young people: Ali Hijrah, Agus Setiawan and 171


Andi Sutoro. In the 1980s, they were prominent young activists of the Islamic movement in the region, who regularly ran religious courses for senior high school students in Cirebon. These courses were later called pesantren kilat (lightning pesantren), short and intensive courses or indoctrination in Islamic studies. More than just a program, pesantren kilat was designed as a sustainable Muslim leadership training program with three levels: elementary, intermediate and advanced. Like many other activists, Ali Hijrah became an activist when still in senior high school. Between 1981 and 1984, when he studied at the Sekolah Menengah Atas Negeri 2 (SMAN 2, State Senior High School) in Cirebon, he was active in the Unit Kerohanian Islam of the official Intra-School Student Organization (Organisasi Siswa Intra Sekolah [OSIS]) Each secondary school has an OSIS that takes care of extracurricular activities, with sections for sports, the arts, and religious activities. The Unit Kerohanian Islam (Rohis for short) organized study and discussion sessions in the school’s mosque at six o’clock in the morning before school began and after class hours in the afternoon. Additional lessons on natural sciences such as chemistry and physics were also given to attract more students to join the program. The study group that was thus established adopted the name Talaba Islamiyya, ‘Islamic Students’, and included Rohis activists from other schools. Their studies and discussions focused on how to live as a good Muslim, and one issue in particular came to dominate discussion and action: the adoption of Islamic covering or jilbab by female students.46 The Talaba Islamiyya was supported by graduates of SMAN 2 who were studying at the Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB), one of the major centres of Islamic student activism who often organized leadership training programs for senior high school students in Cirebon, Majalengka, Kuningan and Indramayu. The training paid special attention to Islamic teachings stressing a comprehensive Islamic way of life. Among the trainers were Malam Sabat Ka’ban, former Minister of Forestry and the current chairperson of the national board of the Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, the Crescent and Star Party), and Eggy Sujana, an activist of the Muslim Defenders Team (Tim Pembela Muslim, TPM). In late 1984, while he was in the third grade of senior high school, Ali Hijrah joined the underground organization, the Lembaga Pengembangan Pondok Pesantren Kilat (LP3K, Institute for the Development of Lightning Pesantren) that regularly organized pesantren kilat programs for senior high school students in many cities including Cirebon. Established in 1983, the institute was established 46 Interview with Ali Hijrah, Cirebon, November 21, 2008.

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by activists including Mursalin Dahlan, Rizal Fadillah, Syarif Hidayatullah, and Yazid al-Tamimi. The first three were activists of the Darul Islam (DI)/Negara Islam Indonesia (NII, Islamic State of Indonesia) movement in Bandung,47 while the last was a member of al-Irsyad. They established a new institution after they had become disappointed with the existing student organizations like Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (IMM, Muhammadiyah Students Association) and Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI, Islamic Students Association). Supported by his colleague, Yazid al-Tamimi, Ali Hijrah set up an LP3K branch in Cirebon. Through this institute, he carried out pesantren kilat programs. The first pesantren kilat program was held in 1984 at the campus of the al-Irsyad Junior High School. Another centre that was frequently used for pesantren kilat was the al-Nur Mosque in the so-called Kampung Arab (Arabs village), Panjunan. At al-Nur, Ali Hijrah was recruited in the mosque’s Dewan Kemakmuran Masjid (DKM, Mosque Management Board) and he lived there from 1984 to 1986. From 1987 to 1989, he was active in al-Irsyad, where he taught in the Madrasah Diniyyah Islamiyyah (Islamic elementary school) and in the al-Nur kindergarten. From 1989 to 1990, he moved to the al-Shafi’i Mosque, an old mosque where Salim Bajeri, a Muslim intellectual activist, delivered his regular teaching on tafsir (Qur’anic exegesis). Ali Hijrah’s activism for LP3K made him travel a lot to cities in Java to train and monitor his juniors who continued to study at institutions of higher education. All costs for his activities were borne by LP3K. Yazid al-Tamimi, the then LP3K treasurer, was active in raising funds from Arabs in Indonesia.48 The return of various colleagues in 1990, like Yazid al-Tamimi from Saudi Arabia, and Bintoro and Salim from Afghanistan introduced Ali Hijrah, Agus Setiawan and Andi Sutoro to Salafi teachings. Yazid al-Tamimi was an activist in the Pemuda al-Irsyad and LP3K. Having graduated from senior high school, he continued his studies at LIPIA. In 1986, LIPIA awarded him a scholarship to study in Pakistan. After studying in Pakistan for one year, he moved to Saudi Arabia to work and returned to Indonesia in 1990. Meanwhile, Bintoro and Salim were Afghanistan combat veterans who had joined the faction of Jamilurrahman, a leader of the Jama’at al-Da’wa ila al-Qur’an wa Ahl-i Hadith during the Afghan war.49 Discussion with Salafis particularly on the ideals of Islamic da’wa and the Salafi position towards the government led Ali Hijrah and friends to become 47 See ICG, Asia Report, N0. 92, Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing, 22 February 2005, pp. 12-13. 48 Interview with Ali Hijrah, Cirebon, November 21, 2008. 49 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, p. 71.

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aware of what they saw as their false understanding of Islamic doctrines. Moreover, they attended the Salafi i’tikaf50 in Pesantren al-Irsyad Tengaran and other dawras carried out by Salafi foundations such as al-Shafwa, Lajna Khayriyya Mushtaraka, and al-Haramayn in Jakarta. They were interested in the teaching on Salafism and eventually converted to Salafism and dissolved the LP3K. From then onwards, they became involved in Salafi da’wa in Cirebon. Before the establishment of YAC, from 1990 to 1993, the Salafis had started to gradually buy land in Kali Tanjung, Cirebon, where the pesantren is now located. This was followed by the establishment of YAC in 1993 and the building of the mosque in 1994. Sukardjo Renggo played an important role in this. He is the former Regional Head of Bina Marga, a state-owned construction company in Cirebon. He started to study religion in 1989 and became a committed Muslim. In the early 1990s, he was introduced to Salafism and soon became a sympathizer of the Salafi da’wa. When the Salafis encountered financial problems in order to buy land to base their activities, he collected donations from his colleagues and associate Bina Marga companies.51 The mosque became the centre of Salafi da’wa in Cirebon. In the following years, the pesantren grew rapidly through opening educational programs. The programs start from a very basic level, kindergarten, and go on to higher educational levels. Besides the Assunnah, there is another Salafi pesantren in Cirebon, Dhiya’us Sunnah. This pesantren is led by Muhammad As-Sewed, a former Laskar Jihad deputy commander. The pesantren was established in 2003 after Laskar Jihad’s dissolution. Compared to the Assunnah, the pesantren looks much simpler: two permanent classrooms, one rented semi-permanent house and a small mosque that functions as the centre of learning. The pesantren offers the Tadrib al-Du’at (Training for Preachers) and Tahfiz (Memorizing Qur’an) programs, with 10 and 37 students respectively. In 2010, the pesantren received a grant amounting to IDR. 1,6 billion (US $170,000.) to build a huge mosque. When I visited the pesantren in 2010, the mosque was under construction and looked luxurious. These two Salafi groups are in dispute. As-Sewed from Dhiya’us Sunnah accused the Assunnah, of being Sururi or haraki. The fact that Assunnah accepted a grant from the Ihya al-Turath was the reason for their criticism. Since Ihya alTurath was charged with being ahl al-bid’a, Assunnah was also categorized as 50 I’tikaf literally means to seclude or isolate one’s self in a mosque to worship God. The term here includes attending Salafi teaching given by Salafi scholars. 51 Interview with Sukarjo Renggo, Cirebon, November 20, 2008.

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ahl al-bid’a, on the basis of their cooperation. Responding to this accusation, the Assunnah group remained calm. Thoharah, the leader of the pesantren, said that Assunnah is more open than the Dhiya’us Sunnah. He also refuted As-Sewed’s argument, saying that the cooperation was aimed at accelerating Salafi da’wa and to oppose bid’a practices in the Muslim community.52 In addition to these Salafi pesantrens, there is another Salafi-inspired pesantren in Cirebon, al-Muttaqien, which was established in 1995 by Salim Bajeri, a prominent Muslim figure from Cirebon.53 This pesantren offers an integrated school program that combines the national and the pesantren curriculum. The students have to study Salafi works such as the Kitab al-Tawhid of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Tafsir ibn Kathir. Although not Salafi, the pesantren adopts and applies the Salafi manhaj including avoiding isbal, not saluting the national flag, the prohibition of music and television, and wearing the niqab for female students. The pesantren also calls on Muslims to purify their creeds. Due to their similarity with Salafi pesantren, the Assunnah welcome al-Muttaqien’s teachers and students. Abdul Mu’ith, a senior teacher at al-Muttaqien, for example, often meets Assunnah’s teachers.54 This does not mean that the two groups are in harmony. They differ in their attitude towards the government. While the Salafis emphasize total submission to the government, al-Muttaqien sees that in specific cases Muslims are allowed to criticize it. Therefore, in some cases, al-Muttaqien students are mobilized for demonstrations.55 Because of this, Bajeri criticizes Ali Hijrah, his former student , for his lack of jihad spirit. Despite the fact that the Salafis criticize traditional Muslims for their taqlid (blind imitation), Bajeri believes that Salafis also hold on taqlid in relation to their sheikhs in Saudi Arabia.56 The previous discussion on the development of Salafi pesantrens evidences the Middle Eastern influence on the making of contemporary Indonesian Islam and confirms Islamic transnational networks. Muwahhid, the founder of al52 Interview with Thaharah, director of Assunnah, Cirebon, November 20, 2008. 53 Salim Bajeri is an activist in various Muslim organizations: he is a member of the ahl al-hall wa al-‘aqd of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), member of the Cirebon branch of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Council of Ulama), member of al-Irsyad Cirebon, and currently chairman of the Forum Ukhuwwah Islamiyya (FUI, Forum for Islamic Brotherhood). 54 Interview with Abdul Mu’ith, senior teacher of pesantren al-Muttaqien, Cirebon, April 17, 2010. 55 Interview with Abdul Mu’ith, April 17, 2010. 56 Interview with Salim Bajeri, April 16, 2010.

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Nur al-Atsari, and Ghufran, the founder of al-Furqan, studied Salafism directly with their Salafi masters in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, Ali Hijrah, the founder of Pesantren Assunnah in Cirebon, studied Salafism with his colleagues who had just returned from Saudi Arabia as migrant workers and from Afghani veterans. As Peter Mandaville has shown, studying abroad and labour migration, together with two other elements, new media and pilgrimage, have become crucial instruments in the development of global networks.57 Studying religion in the Middle East has become an objective to achieve by Islamic students. As the place where Islam grew, the students think that Saudi Arabia represents authentic Islam. The Malay world and Saudi Arabia have been connected since before the seventeenth century, with Mecca and Medina as major destinations for study.58 However, the emergence of Islamic reformism in Egypt in the late nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century led Indonesian students to study in Cairo, particularly at al-Azhar University.59 Moreover, in the second half of the last century, supported by the oil boom, Saudi Arabia provided scholarships attracting students to study at Saudi universities and some grants were also available for those who wanted to enrol in Pakistan. Migrant labour has become an important phenomenon since four decades ago. The rich Gulf countries have become more and more reliant to migrant workers from South and Southeast Asia, and their number multiplies every year. In addition to earn their livelihoods, they are exposed to the religious practices in the country. When they return home, many of them try to emulate the religious practices they saw in the Middle East. New media, especially satellite television and the Internet contribute to accelerate the spread of religious messages. We now find global preachers, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi broadcasting on television channels delivering religious lectures. The common use of the Internet has made the world borderless and we can easily find religious lectures on YouTube. Similarly, the annual pilgrimage plays an important role in disseminating Salafi doctrines. Although the performance of the pilgrimage is currently rather short, about forty days only, this ritual is without doubt impressive. It has become a source of inspiration for Muslims in evaluating their conduct. The short 57 Peter Mandaville, “Transnational Islam in Asia: Background, Typology and Conceptual Overview”, in Peter Mandaville, et al., Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks and Conflict Dynamics, Washington, NBR Project Report, April 2009, p. 13. 58 Azyumardi Azra, The Origins of Islamic Reformism, p. 1. 59 Mona Abaza, Islamic Education, Perceptions and Exchanges: Indonesian Students in Cairo, Paris: Cahier d’Archipel 23, 1994, p. 39.

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experience they gain during the pilgrimage contribute to their new religious understanding.60 In Indonesia, it is common that women change their outlook by using the veil after having performed the hajj. C. Community Responses All the pesantrens discussed here have grown in the heartlands of the Nahdlatul Ulama, to which a large number of Indonesian Muslims are affiliated. NU followers maintain Islamic practices like slametan, tahlilan, and ziarah which are common in Muslim societies. Clifford Geertz noted that the slametan had become the focal point of the Javanese religious system.61 The slametan ritual is held almost every time when a Javanese traditionalist Muslim makes a wish or has a specific need (hajat, from Arabic, haja, and the host is called sahibul hajat), ranging from celebrating life cycle rituals to starting a business. Taking into account slametan’s different events and objectives, Geertz classified them into four types: 1. those related to accompany the commemoration of life cycles; 2. those concerned with festival days of the Islamic calendar; 3. those that deal with rural social integration; 4. irregular slametan at a specific occasion such as moving to a new house and getting a new job.62 The term “slametan” is a Javanese adoption of Arabic “salama” that means “peace” or “safety”. Through the slametan ritual, the host hopes for good fortune and safety in his or her life. During the rite, the host invites relatives, neighbours, and friends to pray to God led by someone believed to have a good command of Islamic knowledge such as a kyai, an ustadh, or a modin (official religious functionary). Food and beverages are served to be consumed on the spot and to be taken home by the people who pray. The slametan ceremony is usually held to commemorate a life cycle, such as a tingkeban (to celebrate seven months’ pregnancy), birth, circumcisions, marriage and death. By carrying out the slametan, the individual concerned is expected to pass this life in a peaceful and safe manner. Apart from this, the slametan ritual is conducted for other purposes as well, such as moving to a new house and to commence rice cultivation.63 When a family occupies a new 60 Peter Mandaville, “Transnational Islam in Asia”, p. 13. 61 Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1960, p. 11. 62 Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java, p. 30. 63 A.G. Muhaimin, The Islamic Tradition of Cirebon, Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006, pp. 136137; Ridin Sofwan, “Interelasi Nilai Jawa dan Islam dalam Aspek Kepercayaan dan Ritual” dalam Darori Amin (ed.), Islam dan Kebudayaan Jawa, Semarang: Pusat Kajian

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house, the family members expect that by organizing a slametan they will live peacefully and safely. Similarly, in the case of rice cultivation, the farmer hopes for a good and fruitful harvest. Tahlilan is a part of the slametan rituals held after a person’s death. It is usually held during the first seven days following the death, and then held intermittently in the 40th, the 100th, and 1000th day. The commemoration of these days is believed to have a relation with the decaying stages of the dead body.64 Literally, tahlilan means “to utter ‘la ilaha illa Allah’” [“there is no god but God”]. Like in other slametan rituals, during the tahlilan, invited guests also chant specific prayers led by a specialist of religion. They read some Qur’anic verses: the whole Suras of Yasin, al-Fatiha, al-Ikhlas, al-Nas and al-Falaq, followed by other verses and certain formulas to invoke God’s Name. In the end, they pray for the dead person and the family. Tahlilan are also held weekly on Thursday evenings in mosques or in private houses. Ziarah constitutes one of the main traditions traditionalist Muslims practice. The ziyarat al-qubur (tomb visit) is, no doubt, allowed or recommended in Islam, because it reminds Muslims of death. However, in practice many people pay visits to graves, especially those of saints (wali) or pious dead, for different purposes: to pray, to recite the Qur’an, to make requests to God through the dead person’s intercession, or to share his blessing (berkah). The last two objections are based on the belief that the pious dead are alive and are in near proximity to God and therefore they can mediate between the visitor and God. Although making the visit to a grave is possible at any time, most visitors prefer to do so on certain days which are considered to be the most blessed times to pay such a visit, such as on jum’at kliwon (kliwon Friday).65 In the pesantren tradition, ziarah is a reflection of the teacher-disciple relationship. Students must display feelings of high respect to their teacher; this attitude should continue even after the teacher’s death by paying a visit to his grave. This is why some pesantrens

Islam dan Budaya Jawa IAIN Walisongo Semarang, in collaboration with Gama Media, 2000, pp. 130-136. 64 A.G. Muhaimin, The Islamic Tradition of Cirebon, pp. 151-152. 65 In addition to the seven-day week, Javanese people also have another week consisting of five days called Pon, Wage, Kliwon, Legi, and Pahing. Multiplying these two weeks creates a thirty-five-day month. James J. Fox, “Ziarah Visits to the Tombs of the Wali, the Founders of Islam on Java,” in M.C. Ricklefs, Islam in the Indonesian Social Context, Annual Indonesian Lectures Series No. 15, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991, p. 20.

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regularly organize the annual khaul of their founders.66 The great kyai Chudlori, the founder of Pesantren Tegal Rejo, Magelang, Central Java, for example, in his testament asked his students to recite the whole Qur’an at his grave at least once in their lives.67 There are many other traditions in traditionalist Muslim communities in Indonesia, such the celebration of Islamic holy days. The students of traditional pesantrens learn all these traditions in order to keep them alive. In Sidayu, there are various traditional pesantrens associated with the NU, such as Al-Munawwar and Manba’ul Hisan. Established in the 1970s, Al-Munawwar is a pesantren specially known for memorizing of the Qur’an (tahfiz). Currently it educates some fifty students.68 The other pesantren, Manba’ul Hisan, established in 1950, was well known because of its tahfiz program in which thousands of children were trained in memorizing the Qur’an. As many methods of Qur’anic learning developed and spread across the country, the number of students decreased. In 2000, K.H. Abdul Muqsid Muhammad transformed his pesantren by setting up a Kindergarten, Madrasah Ibtida’yah (MI), Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs) and Madrasah Aliyah (MA) and by transforming his programs accordingly.69 Another educational institution associated with the NU is the Yayasan Kanjeng Sepuh that manages Islamic schools that educates more than 2000 students. It started to gain significance in the village after the decline of Manba’ul Hisan. There are also less important pesantrens in Sidayu, such as Qiyamul Manar for tahfiz and Darul Ikhlas for kindergarten.70 Similarly, Cirebon is an area of traditional Muslims and has hundreds of traditional pesantrens.71 Some pesantrens, like Pesantren Buntet, Pesantren Kempek, Pesantren Gedongan and Darut Tauhid, are influential in shaping the 66 Martin van Bruinessen, “Traditions for the Future: The Reconstruction of Traditionalist Discourse within NU”, in Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds), Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia, Victoria: Monash Asia Institute, 1996, p. 170. 67 M. Bambang Pranowo, “Traditional Islam in Contemporary Rural Java , the Case of Tegal Rejo Pesantren”, in M.C. Ricklefs, Islam in the Indonesian Social Context, Annual Indonesian Lectures Series No. 15, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991, p. 47. 68 Interview with K.H. M. Syafiq Munawwar, leader of pesantren al-Munawwar, Gresik, May 8, 2010. 69 Interview with K.H. Abdul Muqsid Muhammad, leader of Pesantren Manba’ul Hisan, Gresik, May 8, 2010. 70 The Ministry of Religious Affairs records 102 pesantrens in Gresik district. 71 According to current record of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, there are 351 pesantrens in Cirebon.

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religious thought and behaviour of the community. Pesantren Buntet, for example, has a significant role in sustaining the Shatariyya and Tijaniyya Sufi orders.72 Moreover, as in other cities in Java, the people in Cirebon usually celebrate life cycle events and Islamic Holy Days. Of these events, the commemoration of the Prophet’s birthday (mawlid al-nabiy) on 12 Rabi’aul Awwal, receives enormous attention from the community.73 The celebration centers on the Kasepuhan, Kanoman and Kecirebonan Palaces. The existence of the palaces, which combine Islamic beliefs and Javanese spirituality, has contributed to the rise of Islamic syncretism. The palaces regularly hold mawlid al-nabiy celebrations by displaying sacred objects called the panjang jimat (lit. means “long amulets”), the public parading of sacred heirlooms (pusaka) such as keris, plates, etc. As Muhaimin has described in detail, the panjang jimat festival starts with a ceremony in the palace, followed by a parade exposing the panjang jimat and other heirlooms from the Bangsal Agung Panembahan to the Langgar Agung at 9.00 p.m. and back to the Bangsal Agung at 11.00. p.m. In the Langgar Agung, the penghulu (religious official) leads the recitation of the Arabic poem “ashraqalan”, followed by serving the sega rasul (literally means “Messenger’s rice”, cooked yellow and spicy rice) to those who attend the ceremony. Thousands of people from all social levels in Cirebon and surrounding cities come to attend the festival. Some of them scramble to get some of the food.74 They believe that the food will bring good luck and fortune for their future. In addition to this kind of celebrations, there are many shrines, such as the Astana Gunung Djati, where people go for many purposes including seeking blessing (baraka).75 Likewise, the majority of Muslims in Banjarsari are affiliated with the Nahdlatul Ulama. Yet, the NU has only two pesantrens there, Pesantren Nahdlatul Fatah led by Hisyam Ahyani and Pesantren Ihya’ al-‘Abidin led by Abdul Rasyid. While the first has deteriorated, the latter has improved significantly and offers various programs. Apart from these institutions, traditional Muslim leaders are active in regular religious gatherings in mosques. Other famous pesantrens 72 A.G. Muhaimin, “Pesantren and Tarekat in the Modern Era: An Account of the Transmission of Traditional Islam in Java,” in Studia Islamika, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1997, pp. 16.24. Ahmad Zaeni Hasan, Perlawanan dari Tanah Pengasingan, Kyai Abbas, Pesantren Buntet dan Bela Negara, Jakarta: Lembaga Studi Agama dan Sosial (ELSAS), 2000, p. 84-85. 73 On the traditions of Cirebon, see A.G. Muhaimin, The Islamic Traditions of Cirebon, Jakarta: Center for Research and Development of Socio-Religious Affairs, Ministry of Religious Affairs Republic of Indonesia, 2004, pp. 178-180. 74 A.G. Muhaimin, The Islamic Tradition of Cirebon, p. 128. 75 A.G. Muhaimin, The Islamic Tradition of Cirebon, pp. 259-268.

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are located outside Banjarsari, such as Pesantren Darussalam in Ciamis. Other Muslims are affiliated with the Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam, and Persatuan Umat Islam (PUI). These organizations manage educational institutions: the Muhammadiyah and PUI run their institutions from kindergarten to senior high school levels, while Persis runs Pesantren Persis 100. Banjarsari has also witnessed the emergence of a radical Islamic movement, the Front Hizbullah, an organization established in 1994 by Cecep Bustomi in Pandeglang, Banten. Like the Front Pembela Islam (FPI, the Islamic Defender Front), a radical organization in which Bustomi was one of the co-founders, the Front Hizbullah often perpetrates acts of violence in applying the idea of amar ma’ruf nahy munkar (enjoining good and forbidding wrong).76 Under the leadership of Mujahid, a local Muslim activist, the front is said to have taken actions against alcoholic beverages and prostitutes.77 Many hardliner Muslim figures like Bustami himself, Habib Rizieq,78 the commander of the FPI, and Ja’far Umar Thalib, the former commander of the Laskar Jihad, have visited the site to deliver lectures. Given these social and religious circumstances, the emergence of Salafi pesantrens in Gresik, Ciamis and Cirebon has brought about controversy, tension and conflict among the people. The opposition is mainly caused by two factors: Salafi teachings and attitudes. The Salafis, bearing puritan ideas, call upon Muslims to cleanse Islam by purifying their tawhid from shirk (polytheism) and their religious practices from bid’a. For Salafis, pristine Islam is completely described in the Qur’an, in the hadith and in the practices of the al-Salaf al-salih (the pious predecessors, the first three generations of Muslims). Emulating the pious predecessors is essential and obligatory for Salafis, as they are seen as the people who understand the religion best. For this reason, the Salafis believe that a return to the Qur’an and the hadith alone is insufficient, as Muslims could still stray from the true Islam.79 The necessity of 76 http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/2000/08/13/0029.html, accessed on February 2011. 77 Interview with Mujahid, Ciamis, January 24, 2010. 78 Habib Rizieq was born in the ahl al-bayt (descendants of the Prophet) family. He went to elementary and secondary schools in Jakarta. He enrolled in LIPIA in preparation for study at the Faculty of Islamic Law in the Jami’a Imam ibn Su’ud in Jakarta. For a brief biography of Rizieq, see Jajang Jahroni, Defending the Majesty of Islam: Indonesia’s Front Pembela Islam, 1998-2003, Chiang Mai: Asian Muslim Action Network and Silkworm Books, 2008, pp. 13-17. 79 The Salafis have posed some arguments on the necessity of emulating the pious predecessors. See, for example, Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawwas, Mulia dengan Manhaj Salaf, Bogor: Pustaka al-Taqwa, 2008, pp. 55-158; Abdul Hakim bin Amir Abdat, Lau

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emulating the pious predecessors has become point of dispute between Salafis and reformist Muslim groups, the Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam. The reformist groups argue that in the last speech before his death, the Prophet warned Muslims to refer to the Qur’an and the hadith only for religious guidance. The Salafis severely target all religious traditions that are alien to Islam. The religious traditions practiced by other Muslims, mostly by traditionalists, such as mawlid, tahlilan, ziarah, and istighatha (common religious gathering to chant dhikir or the Names and Attributes of God, and praying to God in order to reach certain aims) are subject to the Salafis harsh criticism. The Salafis frequently condemn these traditions as being practices that have no roots in Islamic doctrines, and even charge actors to have deviated from true Islam. The Salafis argue that “was the act good, the Companions would have enacted it before us.”80 Local people perceive Salafis as an exclusive group. Interaction between Salafis and the rest of community is limited. It is common that the pesantren regulates the students’ life by limiting or even prohibiting them to interact with the local people. This is aimed at minimizing the local community’s influence on the students. Apart from students, Salafis act in a number of ways towards the local community. While some Salafis act in a friendly manner, many others are hostile to the extent that they do not even greet villagers. Ade Abdurrahman, the Persatuan Islam Chair in Banjarsari, Ciamis, told me that his former student, Undang Herwaman, who had converted to Salafism, greeted only him but refused to greet other teachers. He observed similar behaviour from other of his former followers who had converted to Salafism: they did not greet him and even tried to avoid meeting him.81 This attitude very much relates to one of the most fundamental doctrines of the Salafi manhaj, al-wala’ wa al-bara’ meaning ‘alliance and disassociation.’ Although the doctrine, as clearly mentioned in Qur’an [3:28], is exclusively directed at unbelievers and infidels, the Salafis apply this doctrine in a strict way: they limit their association with Muslims outside their group in order to preserve their true manhaj. They are afraid of becoming contaminated by incorrect beliefs through contact with other groups. In Sidayu, in its earlier phases Salafism gave rise to religious disharmony. In addition to internal conflicts within the Muhammadiyah as mentioned earlier, the traditionalist NU objected to Ghufran’s lessons. The tension peaked in 1994, Kaana Khairan Lasabaquunaa Ilaihi, Jakarta: Pustaka Mu’awiyah bin Abi Sufyan, 2007, pp. 118-125; 155-162. 80 Abdul Hakim bin Amir Abdat, Lau Kaana Khairan. 81 Interview with Ade Abdurrahman, Ciamis, January 25, 2010.

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when a medical student, Awan Widodo, who studied at al-Furqan, destroyed a tomb in Kanjeng Sepuh’s shrine, which is located in front the grand Kanjeng Sepuh Mosque. Kanjeng Sepuh was the eighth Lord (Adipati) in Sidayu who ruled the region between 1816 and 1855. It is said that during his rule, Kanjeng Sepuh took sides with the interest of the people and opposed the Dutch colonialist.82 In addition to the annual commemoration of his death (haul), the shrine is frequently visited by Muslims to pray or to ask for God’s mercy through his mediation (tawassul). As Salafis and other reformist Muslims consider these acts shirk (polytheism), Awan Widodo demolished the tomb. The action enraged traditional Muslims in the district who highly respected Kanjeng Sepuh and who carried out rituals at the shrine. The people urged Ghufran to close the pesantren and some even called for it to be burned down. This action was blocked by K.H. Muhammad Suhail, a highly respected NU leader. Asked by the police to intervene, Suhail came to the pesantren, calmed down the crowd and sent Ghufran to the police station.83 Following the incident, the Muspika, the local Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Council of Indonesian Ulama) and members of the police office decided to dissolve the pesantren on the grounds of community rejection. The students were asked to return to their hometowns. Moreover, the case of the tomb destruction was then brought to court. Based on a psychological analysis confirming the mental depression of the suspect, the court held him not responsible and cleared him of all charges. The Salafis in Cirebon face serious, although not violent, challenges from other groups of Muslims. Mustafa Aqiel of Pesantren Kempek considers the Salafi criticism of traditional religious practices as proof of their failure to properly understand and appreciate the tradition of da’wa. The nine walis (saints) adopted local traditions to make their da’wa more acceptable to the local people. As the traditions were adopted they became permeated with Islamic values. As they are Islamized, in his view, these traditions do not contradict Islamic tenets.84 Yahya Zainul Arifin (popularly called Buya Yahya) of Pesantren al-Bahja sharply criticizes the Salafi methodological approach to the manhaj. Generally, the Salafis would say that if someone is a Salafi he should follow the al-Salaf al-salih by emulating all the attitudes and thoughts of the Salaf in understanding the Qur’an and the hadith. This argument, according to Buya Yahya, is problematic, since the Salaf did not set 82 http://lovesidayu.blogspot.com/2009/03/bupati-kanjeng-sepuh-Sidayu-dikenal. html, accessed on September 20, 2009. 83 Interview with K.H. Muhammad Suhail, a respected NU leader, Gresik, May 9, 2010. 84 Interview with Mustafa Aqiel, leader of pesantren Kempek, Cirebon, April 21, 2010.

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up the methods for approaching the two principle sources of Islamic teachings, the Qur’an and the hadith. It was Imam Shafi’i who first set up this method in his al-Risala. A true Salafi is therefore, for him, a person who follows al-Shafi’i’s method and those who do not are false Salafis.85 The Radio Assunnah radio station is very popular among the people in Cirebon. It broadcasts Salafi da’wa through various programs: tartil or Qur’anic recitation, hadith by request, religious talks and Salafi lessons. It reaches a broad audience in the Cirebon, Kuningan and Majalengka regions, which would otherwise be difficult to reach. Instead of listening to other commercial radio stations that are seen to air anything, including idle gossip, the emergence of Salafi radio is perceived as a good alternative. Didin Nurul Rasyidin, a lecturer at the Institute Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN, State Institute for Islamic Studies) Sheikh Nurjati Cirebon, for example, often listens to this channel when he drives on his way home from Cirebon to Kuningan. He himself is not a Salafi, but he turns on the radio so as not to have to listen to inappropriate gossip broadcasted by other channels.86 Yet the Salafi da’wa on the radio has also raised concern, as it often publicly criticizes religious traditions as practiced by traditional Muslims. Countering on-air da’wa, NU leaders have launched similar radio stations, Radio Qu and Al-Kisah FM, aimed at protecting the beliefs of their community. While the first radio is managed by the rising young preacher, Buya Yahya, the latter is run by the Lembaga Dakwah Nahdlatul Ulama (Institute for Da’wa of the Nahdlatul Ulama) in Cirebon. The NU has also formed the Forum Santri Cirebon (Forum of Pesantren Students in Cirebon) which aims, yet again, at protecting the students’ beliefs from Salafi attacks. Unlike the traditionalist NU, the modernist Muhammadiyah is more open to Salafism. As discussed in Chapter One, the Muhammadiyah and the Salafis share the identical slogan that reads: al-ruju’ ila al-Qur’an wa al-hadith (back to the Qur’an and the Prophetic tradition). The Muhammadiyah often ignores the opinion of the four acceptable madhhabs in Islam and goes directly to the Qur’an and the hadith in formulating their fatwas (legal religious opinion). Like the Salafis, the Muhammadiyah criticizes the religious traditions of traditional Muslims. Thus, it is logical that many Muhammadiyah activists view the Salafis as their partners in da’wa, particularly in combatting religious innovations and superstitions. Moreover, many Muhammadiyah active members have converted 85 Cahaya Nabawy, No. 82, April 2010, pp. 105-106. Interview with Buya Yahya, Cirebon, April 21, 2010. 86 Interview with Didin Nurul Rasyidin, lecturer at IAIN Nurjati, Cirebon, April 22, 2010.

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to Salafism. However, the Muhammadiyah and the Salafis are sharply divided in their application of the idea of al-ruju’ ila al-Qur’an wa al-hadith. While the Muhammadiyah tries to grasp the spirit of Islam by exploring the asbab al-nuzul (reasons behind the revelation) of the Qur’an and asbab al-wurud (reasons of occurrence) of the hadith, the Salafi takes all texts as they are without further interpreting or questioning them.87 The dispute between the Muhammadiyah and the Salafis is more apparent in practical life. The tension between them heightens when the Salafis take over Muhammadiyah assets like mosques and pesantrens and indeed, the Salafis have seized some Muhammadiyah mosques. They, for example, have succeeded in capturing the Abu Bakr Mosque in Palimanan, Cirebon and converted 20 Muhammadiyah followers to Salafism.88 The way they take assets over is rather clear. To start, the Salafis ask the official of the Dewan Kemakmuran Masjid (DKM, Board of Mosque Management) to give them the opportunity to hold religious gatherings in the mosque. In this phase, the teaching is only attended by their own followers. When the Salafis have succeeded in attracting new followers from the jama’a (that particular mosque’s congregation), especially DKM officials, there is no doubt they have taken over the mosque.89 The takeover means that the Salafis have penetrated the DKM, dominate the activities in the mosque, and censor preachers. As the owner of the mosque, the Muhammadiyah indeed continues to use it. However, as the most active jama’a have converted to Salafism, the activities in the mosque are mostly organized by Salafis. Muhammadiyah figures have long perceived that this reformist organization has suffered from the absence of ‘ulamas qualified to teach classical Islamic knowledge such as fiqh, hadith and tafsir. This deficiency lies behind this takeover. The Muhammadiyah is too busy managing and running its educational institutions, hospitals and other social institutions such as orphanages. The Muhammadiyah often neglects conventional da’wa in the form of religious gatherings. It only manages its monthly religious gatherings through its branch offices. The infrequency of their religious gatherings has led some activists to turn to other groups, including Salafis.90 87 Fathurrahman Jamil, Metode Ijtihad Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah, Jakarta: Logos Wacana Ilmu, 1995, pp. 58-59. 88 Interview with Chafifuddin, head of the Majlis Tabligh, Pimpinan Daerah Muhammadiyah (PDM) Cirebon, April 20, 2010. 89 On the takeover, see Abdurrahman Wahid, (ed.), Ilusi Negara Islam, Jakarta: Gerakan Bhineka Tunggal Ika, The Wahid Institute, and Maarif Institute, 2009, pp. 171-220. 90 Interview with Mukhlas, head of the Muhammadiyah branch in Banjarsari, and Ujang Bazari, Muhammadiyah Activists, Ciamis, February 2, 2010.

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The case of Pesantren al-Hikmah represents the best example of the shortage of ‘ulamas within the Muhammadiyah. As mentioned earlier, the Muhammadiyah established the pesantren in 1985. However, the position of directors was given to Salafi figures: Ghufran, ‘Abid Radli and Ma’ruf Nur Salam. In his clarification of the Muhammadiyah’s acceptance of the Salafi presence at al-Hikmah, Nawawi Bakri, chair of the Muhammadiyah branch in Sidayu, recognized that the Muhammadiyah was suffering from a lack of human resources. The Muhammadiyah had no cadres who were able and ready to teach religion. To illustrate this, he gave the following example: when a khatib to deliver the Friday sermon was unable to come, the easiest thing to do was to ask a Salafi to replace him. However, he said that the Salafi presence within the Muhammadiyah pesantren would only be temporary. The moment cadres would be ready, the pesantren would be taken back from the Salafis. Nevertheless, I see a more fundamental reason for this condition: the congruity between Muhammadiyah and Salafi ideas. Personally, Bakri has no objection to Salafi ideas on the purification of religion. According to him, any teaching that corresponds to the sunna is in line with Muhammadiyah notions as it fights bid’a and kharafat (superstition).91 Thus, Salafis can act as the Muhammadiyah’s Companions in fighting bid’a and kharafat. Personally, although he himself is not Salafi, he grows his beard long and practices isbal. Viewing Salafis as the Muhammadiyah’s partners in da’wa, is common among Muhammadiyah activists. Usman Saleh,92 former chair of the Muhammadiyah branch in Banjarsari, Cimais, and Ahmad Dahlan,93 chair of the Muhammadiyah in Cirebon, confirm this view. It goes without saying that anxiety about the pesantren exists among Muhammadiyah figures. During my talk with Yunus Mansur, the person in charge of the foundation of the pesantren, this uneasiness cannot be denied. According to him, the identity and the modern values of the Muhammadiyah will disappear in the religious teachings the Salafis deliver in the pesantren.94 The Salafis do not refer to Muhammadiyah sources, although they teach in a Muhammadiyah centre. Thus, the Muhammadiyah provides ample opportunities for the dissemination of Salafi doctrines. Arif Radhi, head of Sekolah Dasar (SD, Elementary School) Muhammadiyah, suggested a more concrete action to halt Salafi influence in Muhammadiyah schools. He recommended expelling all Salafi teachers from all Muhammadiyah educational institutions in Sidayu. 91 92 93 94

Interview with Nawawi Bakri, Gresik, May 9, 2010. Interview with Usman Saleh, Banjarsari, January 22, 2010. Interview with Ahmad Dahlan, Cirebon, April 16, 2010 Interview with Yunus Mansur, Gresik, May 9, 2010.

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The Salafis’ questioning of religious traditions popularly practiced by Muslims indeed disrupts the established religious authority enjoyed by religious scholars (kyai, ajengan, ustadh). They derive their authority from many sources: intellectual lineage, kinship and knowledge.95 Having this privileged position, the people referred to religious scholars to consult them about every aspects of their life: social, economics and politics. They are invited to give religious sermons on many occasions, such as religious celebrations and life cycle events. For example, in the month Rabi’ul Awwal of the Islamic calendar in which Muslims commonly celebrate the mawlid al-naby, kyais and ustadhs have a full schedule of public lectures. They receive money for their public sermons. The payment varies corresponding to the level of kyai or ajengan, and size of the gathering. A senior kyai or ustadh will be paid more than a junior one. Similarly, kyais or ustadhs who deliver sermons in larger public gatherings will get more money than if they do so in smaller ones. In addition to cash, food and meals will be sent to their residences for the family. Thus, when Salafis start to question the tradition of the mawlid celebration, the question in fact shakes religious authority and sources of income. Having deep knowledge of Islam, kyais and ustadh are undeniably authoritative. According to the findings of the Lembaga Survey Indonesia (LSI), the majority of Muslims still recognize their authority. In its 2006 survey, it was revealed that the majority of Indonesia Muslims agreed with the activities and agendas of the NU, the MUI and the Muhammadiyah (71.7%, 59.1% and 54.1% respectively).96 As these organizations are institutions where religious scholars gather, the trust in these organizations reflects the trust in religious scholars. The critical point in this matter is that Salafis seem to have no trust in the existing religious authorities in Indonesia. This is evident as they request fatwas from their sheikhs in the Middle East. They do not take into account the domestic fatwas of existing Indonesian institutions such as the Bahth al-Masa’il of the NU, the fatwa committee of the MUI, the Muhammadiyah’s Majelis Tarjih and Persatuan Islam’s Dewan Hisbah. The decline of traditional institutions may turn the prejudice of local religious leaders towards the Salafis. Whereas Salafi pesantrens have persisted and developed, traditional pesantrens have started to decline. As noted earlier, 95 Martin van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru, Yogyakarta: LKIS, 1994, p. 152-153. 96 Cited from Jajat Burhanudin, “Islamic Knowledge, Authority and Political Power: The ‘Ulama in Colonial Indonesia”, PhD Thesis, Leiden University, 2004, p. 2.

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all traditional pesantrens in Sidayu are far behind al-Furqan, a situation similar to that in Banjarsari. The old pesantren, al-Nur, which is currently run by Ade Hanan, Muwahhid’s brother-in-law, educates some 30 children only. The other pesantren, Nahdlatul Fatah, led by Hisyam Ahyani, educates 20 children. It is assumed that this decline is not caused by the presence of Salafi da’wa only, but also by the effects of the modernization policy of the government.97 Salafi students who attend the pesantren come from other cities. The development of this Salafi pesantren, however, raises anxiety among religious leaders because their activists convert to Salafism. In addition to negative reactions, Salafis also get positive responses. In Banjarsari and Sidayu, they have won the people’s sympathy through their social activities. Contrary to the villagers, the Salafis in these places are active in performing community services, such as cleaning the environment (kerja bhakti). Moreover, the pesantrens often distribute zakat al-mal (alms) qurban (meat of sacrificed animals such as beef and goat) and provide food for iftar (meal for breaking the fast) to the poor.98 Pesantren al-Nur has widened and hardened 300 meters of access road to the pesantren and hardened another road along 3 kilometres surrounding the pesantren. The villagers are quite happy with this, as the road to their village is no longer muddy when the rain falls. This environmental improvement has raised the value of the land surrounding the pesantren. Moreover, Pesantren al-Nur also built a toilet in the langgar (a small prayer house) of the village.99 Salafis have been renowned for their morality, in particular their honesty. This has led some ordinary people to trust them. Haji Itin, the owner of a clothes store in Banjarsari, for example, trusts Salafis to guard his warehouse. Itin himself is not an adherent of Salafism, but he trusts Salafis more than he trusts others. Before, he had employed non-Salafis for this task and found he could not trust them as he lost some clothes. Since five years, he has employed Salafis to guard his warehouse. In addition to honesty, according to Itin, Salafis are hard workers, sincere and do not demand a high salary. He often goes out leaving his store for a couple of days, but he now feels 97 On the modernization of Islamic institutions, see, Karel Steenbrink, Pesantren, Madrasah and Sekolah, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986; Azyumardi Azra, Pendidikan Islam, Tradisi dan Modernisasi Menuju Milennium Baru, Jakarta, Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2002. 98 Interview with Ahmad Yasa, secretary of village Srowo, Sidayu, Gresik, May 12, 2010. 99 Interview with Karli, chief of Rukun Tetangga, (RT, Neighbourhood Association, the smallest unit of citizen association consisting of some, at least, forty houses), Banjarsari, February 2, 2010.

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secure.100 For ordinary people, the Salafis’ attitude towards the government creates tranquillity and certainty in managing their business. A coffee kiosk owner in Sidayu, for example, told me that he loves Salafism because it prohibits demonstrations and open criticism to the government. This teaching, according to him, results in no threats to his economic activities. Mamay, a salt retailer in the traditional market in Banjarsari, has the same perception. What makes Salafism interesting, according to him, is its religious argument: every action and each ritual Salafis enact is based on the Qur’an and the hadith. He also observes that Salafis are very steadfast in running their business even though they only earn small profits.101 Concluding Remarks Salafi pesantrens have passed the most difficult phase in their early development during which local people resisted them, particularly the elites and religious leaders. The most fundamental reason for this resistance was Salafi’s criticism of existing religious traditions through questioning their roots in Islam and condemning them as religious innovations. While traditionalist religious leaders maintained and preserved these traditions, questioning the religious roots of these traditions means challenging their religious authority. As these traditions form sources of their income, so, to some extent, this challenge also poses a threat to their livelihood. However, Salafis have secured their da’wa, and have gained the sympathy of the villagers. As the Salafi da’wa spreads in Banjarsari and Sidayu, the villagers became more familiar with Salafism and do not oppose Salafi da’wa unless they bother them. The people are accustomed to the Salafis’ presence and they let them spread their da’wa. There are two factors in this achievement. First, the origins and the inherited charisma of its leaders. Ghufran is a native of Sidayu, while Muwwahid was born in Banjarsari. Muwahhid has inherited the charisma of his father, Ajengan Nunung Muhiddin. Their origins and charisma has turned into social capital for Salafis in the spread of their da’wa. Second, the Salafis’ perseverance in da’wa and social activities has won the sympathy of the people in their neighbourhood.

100 Interview with Itin, owner of ACB shop, Banjarsari, February 3, 2010. 101 Interview with Mamay, a salt retailer, Banjarsari, January 15, 2010.

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Chapter Five

Salafi Pesantren: Nurturing the Salafi Manhaj

A pesantren is usually defined as a religious institution that specifically teaches religious knowledge. Physically, a pesantren can be described as follows: it is a separate complex consisting of various buildings: the house of the kyai (the pesantren’s founder and leader), a mosque, classrooms and a students’ dormitory. Kyai and ustadhs (teachers) teach in the mosque and during class, the ustadhs (pesantren students) listen to the explanations of their teacher while sitting in a circle around him. They perform their daily prayers collectively under the guidance of their kyai or his substitute. At a certain times, usually after sunset or during dawn prayers, the kyai or a senior ustadh delivers a public lecture. These activities look simple. However, through these routine activities a pesantren creates what Abdurrahman Wahid, former chairperson of the executive body of the Nahdlatul Ulama, calls a “sub-culture.”1 He refers to the distinctive values and culture of the pesantren, which are very different from those outside. Wahid explains that a sub-culture must consist of at least three elements: a way of life, values or a worldview, and a hierarchy of authority.2 To support his argument, he highlights some important traditions and living values that prevail in their pesantrens, such as the concept of time, its curriculum, sincerity and authority.

1 2

Abdurrahman Wahid, “Pesantren sebagai Subkultur”, in Dawam Rahardjo, Pesantren dan Pembaharuan, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1995, pp. 39-61. Abdurrahman Wahid, “Pesantren sebagai Subkultur”, p. 43.

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A pesantren community has a special way of denoting time. Each activity is conducted at a certain time. It is hard to understand how Muslims can meet their religious obligations without deciding on the exact time. To determine prayer times and the moment of breaking the fast (iftar), a definite time scheme is required.. Various Qur’anic verses remind Muslims to be careful with specific times such as al-fajr (dawn), al-duha (sunrise), al-‘asr (afternoon), and al-layl (night). People in a pesantren have a specific method of organizing and scheduling their activities. Instead of mentioning the exact time, they prefer to link their activities to obligatory prayers’ times. Thus, for example, rather than say that they have a class at one o’clock in the afternoon, they will say that the class will be held ba’da zuhr (after noon prayer). This implies that time in a pesantren is relative rather than exact. Ba’da zuhr covers a long period of time: from 12.30 to 15.00. Its specific curriculum constitutes the next distinctive feature of a pesantren. It depends highly on the kyai and is managed in a less systematic way. The students study their subjects starting with explanations that are simple in the first year but become increasingly sophisticated in the years to come. For example, in fiqh, students starts with the Kashifat al-Saja Sharh Safinat al-Naja written by Muhammad Nawawi al-Jawi to continue with the Fath al-Qarib and subsequently the Fath al-Mu’in. Due to this unsystematic method of instruction, a student spends a long period of study in the pesantren. In some cases, a student also moves from one pesantren to another to pursue specific knowledge, such Arabic and tasawuf (Sufism). The duration of study depends very much on the kyai and the student. When a student thinks that he has mastered enough knowledge, he may decide to move to another pesantren or return home. Abdurrahman Wahid maintains that together, the activities in a pesantren create a fundamental value in life, ikhlas (sincerity). In Javanese, the term “ikhlas” is best described as “nerimo” (to accept with pleasure) or “sepih ing pamrih rame ing gawe” (“to work diligently without expecting return”). Ikhlas means to accept everything (bad and good fortune, livelihood) that God gives with equanimity. Thus, in a pesantren studying and teaching should be based on ikhlas. Kyais and ustadhs are happy to teach, while students are glad to learn. Teachers are paid little but are happy with their modest salary because they believe that a small amount of money earned with berkah (God’s blessing) will be sufficient to sustain their life. A pesantren community believes that a person’s fate has been determined by God. This implies that every activity should be done in order to gain God’s blessing and satisfaction (rida’). Ikhlas, no doubt, directs a pesantren

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SALAFI PESANTREN: NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ

community to the world hereafter. All activities in this world should be oriented to life in the Hereafter. The kyai he holds absolute authority in his pesantren. He is the one who decides everything also whether or not he accepts changes in the educational system he uses in the pesantren. With his deep religious knowledge, a kyai emerges as a charismatic leader. Many people believe that a kyai is endowed supernatural power that enables him to see unseen matters and to be able predict the future. Because of his charisma, a student is bound to his kyai for all his life; he often consults his kyai in practical matters, such as choosing a spouse or whether or not to accept a job.3 A pesantren has thus three main roles in Muslim society: the production of ‘ulamas, the transmission of religious knowledge, and preserving the Islamic tradition.4 As discussed in Chapter Three, an ‘ulama is a person knowledgeable in religion. Although recently some popular preachers with a secular educational background have emerged, pesantrens continue to produce ‘ulamas in the traditional meaning of the word: religious specialists. This production of ‘ulama relates to a pesantren’s second role, the transmission of religious knowledge. The major subjects taught in a pesantren concern religious sciences, mainly ‘aqida (Islamic creed), fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), hadith (Prophetic tradition), tafsir (Qur’anic exegesis), and tasawuf (Islamic mysticism). The Arabic language as a requirement to master these sciences, no doubt, is necessary as well. The last role, preserving Islamic tradition is undeniable. Islamic traditions, such as khaul, tahlilan, qira’a (methods of reciting the Qur’an) are kept alive in pesantren. In sum, a pesantren functions as a bastion in which Islam is guarded. The above description of pesantren sketches the old perception of pesantren. With few exceptions, since a few decades, pesantren have changed through the adoption of the graded educational system and the inclusion of secular sciences. The pesantren’s role has also expanded to include community development. These changes have caused pesantren to be more inclusive in accepting new ideas and teaching methods as well as in the contents of the curriculum. Have these trending changes also affected Salafi pesantren? How does Salafi pesantren respond to these changes? These questions will be addressed in this chapter. The idea behind the founding of Salafi pesantrens was to nurture a Salafi generation capable of preaching the Salafi manhaj. This aspiration is apparent, 3 4

Wahid, “Pesantren sebagai Subkultur”, pp. 40-42. Azyumardi Azra, Pendidikan Islam, Tradisi dan Modernisasi Menuju Milenium Baru, Jakarta, Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2002, p. 104.

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for example, in the goal of Pesantren Imam Bukhari, “to create a generation of knowledge seekers (talib ‘ilm) who adhere to the Salafi manhaj in faith, rituals, ethics, social interactions, and da’wa.”5 Through the pesantren system, Salafis educate their ustadhs all day long. The pesantren creates an environment conducive to learning: the ustadhs live on campus under the control of the kyai, teachers, administrators and senior ustadhs. Here, the students can see for themselves examples of good conduct, such as performing collective prayers, reading the Qur’an, and wearing appropriate clothing. Thus, educators can implant Islamic values in their students and control their behaviour. When a student behaves improperly or contradicts the Salafi manhaj, his teachers will remind him instantly. It is through this mechanism that the students internalize the Salafi manhaj in their daily lives. In Chapter Four, we have discussed how Salafi pesantrens developed and how local people respond to the rise of pesantrens. In this chapter, I will look at the “contents” of the Salafi pesantrens by exploring their educational programs, curricula, textbooks, and students’ activities. This chapter will also discuss the ways in which pesantrens instil Salafi doctrines into their students, and support them in their practice of the Salafi manhaj in daily life. A. Educational Programs Salafi pesantrens offer all levels of education, from pre-school to university. Pesantrens affiliated with so-called ‘rejectionist’ Salafis usually have less programs, comprising Tahfiz (memorizing the Qur’an), Tadrib al-Du’at (Preacher Training) and Tarbiyat al-Nisa’ (Women’s Education), while those associated with the so-called ‘cooperationist’ Salafis offer a wider range of programs from kindergarten to university. However, some pesantrens offer specific programs only. Pesantren Minhajus Sunnah in Bogor, for example, only runs the Tadrib al-Du’at program. In general, pesantrens affiliated with ‘cooperationist’ Salafis are more flexible in accommodating the national curriculum and include general subjects into their curriculum. This policy aims at gaining government recognition for their programs. In contrast, pesantrens associated with ‘rejectionist’ Salafis are more exclusive, focussing on teaching religious knowledge only. Secular subjects taught in the latter group are limited to Indonesian language and mathematics. The methods of learning also sharply 5

“Membentuk generasi Thalibul ‘Ilmi yang bermanhaj Salaf dalam Berakidah, Beribadah, Berakhlaq, Bermu’amalah dan Berdakwah”, see, http://www. Bukhari. id/, accessed on 17 October, 2011.

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differ between these two types of pesantrens: while the former applies a grading system, the latter employs the halaqa method. Pesantren al-Furqan offers all levels of education: kindergarten, Tahfiz, Mutawassitah (junior high school), Tsanawiyah (senior high school),6 Takhassus (special program), and Ma’had ‘Aly (Islamic higher school). The Tahfiz is a six-year program that focuses on memorizing the Qur’an, and is equivalent to elementary school. Established in 1999, the program was initially open to santriwatis (female students) only, but since 2003, the program has started to accept santris (male students) as well. The program aims to produce graduates who have memorized the Qur’an. In addition to this, elementary religious knowledge, such as ‘aqida (Islamic creed), akhlaq (ethics), hadith (Prophetic tradition) and fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), are taught. The only secular sciences taught are Indonesian language and mathematics. However, the demands of some parents who are anxious about their children’s future education have brought about significant changes. Some parents proposed the incorporation of more general subjects into the curriculum so that their children can obtain certificates and enrol at higher education levels. Accordingly, male students who used to only memorize the Qur’an (Tahfiz) and to study religious knowledge have recently also been taught general subjects, such as basic social and natural sciences, mathematics, Indonesian language and civic education. The textbooks for these materials are the same as those used in public schools. However, the female program retains its original design and is only complemented by mathematics and Indonesian language. This different policy reflects a different educational orientation between boys and girls, as the latter are educated only to be ‘good girls’. The inclusion of secular knowledge, though limited, puts a heavier burden on pesantren students than on those of public schools. While students of public schools only study secular subjects and one obligatory religious subject, called the Pendidikan Agama Islam (Islamic Knowledge Education), pesantren students have to study both religious and secular sciences. In the final examination, they should pass in all subjects. A lack of competent teachers able of teaching secular sciences, together with the minimum facilities and teaching media available 6

Some Salafi pesantrens utilize the Middle Eastern nomenclatures for the educational programs. They prefer to use the terms Ibtida’iyyah, Mutawassitah and Tsanawiyyah, instead of Ibtida’iyyah, Tsanawiyyah and ‘Aliyah which are officially used by the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. In addition to this indicating a Middle Eastern influence, the use of Middle Eastern nomenclature is intended to avoid administrative confusion, since these pesantrens expect mu’adala (recognition) from Middle Eastern universities.

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often causes pesantren students’ to have an inadequate command of secular subjects.7 Despite the factors described above, the Ministry of Religious Affairs has recognized that Pesantren al-Furqan’s Tahfiz program is a Salafiya8 institution that runs a basic education program. Responding to the rapid growth of pesantrens that exclusively offer programs teaching religious subjects, the Ministry of Religious Affairs has recently incorporated these programs into the national programs of the Salafiya Ula (traditional elementary school), Salafiya Wusta (traditional junior high school), and Salafiya ‘Ulya (traditional senior high school). These are equivalent to Madrasah Ibtida’iyyah, Madrasah Tsanawiyah and Madrasah Aliyah through the Package A, B, and C programs respectively. The Package A, B and C programs are non-formal educational programs equivalent to elementary school, junior high school, and senior high school, respectively. The programs are managed and supervised by the Ministry of National Education. They were initially created to accommodate adults who had no opportunity to go to school in their childhood and when they were in their teens, and school-aged teenagers or drop-outs who cannot enrol in the formal education system for whatever reason. Subsequently, however, the scope of the programs expanded to include special programs on certain subjects, such as the Tahfiz program. Through these Packages, pesantrens can maintain their characteristic teaching of religious knowledge while adopting the more general subjects of the social and natural sciences, mathematics, Indonesian language, English, and civic education.9 Hence, the alumni of the Tahfiz program are equivalent to the graduates of the Madrasah Ibtida’iyah through the Package A program.10 The higher programs (Mutawassitah, Tsanawiyah, and Ma’had ‘Aly) at al-Furqan are solely devoted to Islamic subjects. The Mutawassitah program is designed to last two years and is equivalent to junior high school. Students who wish to study 7

This describes the general condition in Islamic educational institutions. Generally, Islamic educational institutions suffer from a shortage of financial means, facilities and teaching staff. See for example, Elisabeth Jackson and Lyn Parker, “‘Enriched with knowledge’: Modernisation, Islamisation and the Future of Islamic education in Indonesia”, Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2008), pp. 28-29. 8 Here, “Salafiya” means “traditional”, in contrast to modern educational institutions with a grade system. Thus, Salafiya institution means “traditional institution”. 9 For more details on the curriculum of the Packages, see, Acuan Kurikulum Pendidikan Kesetaraan, Program Paket A, B dan C, Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan Nasional, 2006, pp. 14-76. 10 Interview with Anwari Ahmad, deputy director of Pesantren al-Furqan, Gresik, December 24, 2008.

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at this level are not required to bring any entry certificate. The Tsanawiyah is a three-year program and is equivalent to senior high school. Having graduated from the Tsanawiyah, male students continue to the highest program, the Ma’had ‘Aly, a three year program, while female students do not continue but are awarded the pesantren’s certificate. In addition, the pesantren provides a special program (Takhassus) to prepare non al-Furqan alumni who wish to study in the Tsanawiyah. In fact, many students of this program are alumni of public Senior High Schools, or university students who want to pursue religious studies. The program focuses on teaching Arabic and Islamic knowledge. In 2008, the total number of students reached more than 500. Each student has to pay IDR. 150.000 (US $ 15.00) per month for tuition fees, accommodation and meals.11 Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari in Ciamis offers four programs: Kindergarten, Tahfiz, Tadrib al-Du’at and Tarbiyat al-Nisa’. The Salafi kindergarten is just like any public one, except that the Salafi kindergarten teaches Salafi doctrines in a very simple way: memorizing some important prayers based on accepted hadiths only; prohibiting children from drawing living creatures, such as people and animals; prohibiting children from singing songs; and separating girls from boys and putting them in separate classes. These children are taught by female teachers who wear a niqab (headscarf covering their face), but take the niqab off during their teaching in the classroom. During my visit to the pesantren, I saw one girl wearing a niqab, while the rest sported a simple jilbab (veil). In December 2008, 70 children attended the program. Each student had to pay IDR 125,000 (about US$ 14.00) for enrolment and IDR 10,000 (about US$ 1.00) as monthly tuition fee. The Tahfiz program of Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari is the same as that at Pesantren al-Furqan. The only difference is that al-Nur al-Atsari does not award certificates to its alumni. By adopting this policy, the pesantren wants to emphasize that the objective of study is to seek knowledge and not to obtain a certificate. For further study, the students can continue at few other Salafi pesantrens such as Pesantren Ansharus Sunnah in Batam, Riau islands, and Pesantren Salafiya in Jember, East Java which provide higher levels of study, and which do not require any certificate. The students of the Tahfiz program are taught by senior students of the Tadrib alDu’at program. When I visited the pesantren in December 2008, the program was attended by 32 students. Each of them paid IDR 170,000 (US$ 19.00) monthly for tuition fees, meals and accommodation.12 11 Interview with Ahmad Sabiq, senior teacher at Pesantren al-Furqan, December 25, 2008. 12 Interview with Malik al-Banjari (Agus Iskandar), a teacher of the Tahfiz program, Banjarsari, December 12, 2008.

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The Tadrib al-Du’at (Training for Preachers) seems to be the main program of the pesantren. It is open for teenagers who have completed the Mutawassitah program, and adult students. Many are alumni of senior high schools. The pesantren does not set a specific time to join the program and thus a student can start and leave the program at any time. A new student can simply join the lessons given by the teachers without the requirement of having attended earlier courses. Senior students eagerly help new ones, especially in Arabic. Abdurrahman, a senior student from Tangerang, Banten, who has attended the program for four years, tells me that he often temporarily leaves the pesantren to work in his hometown. When he has a sufficient amount of money, he returns to the pesantren to continue his studies.13 Students usually leave the pesantren for a number of reasons, such as being satisfied with their knowledge and feeling ready to preach the Salafi manhaj in their community, or to move to another pesantren. In December 2008, there were 35 participants of the program comprising of four batches. Most students came from Ciamis and surrounding districts, while others came from other islands such Lampung (Sumatra), Ambon and Pontianak (Kalimantan). Although students of Tadrib al-Du’at pay only IDR 35,000 (about US $ 4.00) per month, many of them cannot afford even this. Those who cannot afford it can do some extra work, such as growing vegetables in the rice fields, cooking, and assisting the pesantren staff with administrative affairs. The low cost and flexibility of this pesantren attract many students.14 The Tadrib al-Du’at program has no specific curriculum. The curriculum is decided upon by each teacher personally. Usually, the teacher teaches two or three subjects using a textbook. The pesantren applies the mulazama method, in which students meet the teacher for specific lessons. The teacher reads the books from the beginning to the end and gives his own explanation. Meanwhile the students listen to the teacher’s explanation and write important comments in their own textbooks. Because of the adoption of the mulazama method, the courses depend on the availability of teachers: when a teacher is absent for whatever reason, the class will automatically be cancelled. This system makes it uncertain when the students can finish the program. The objective of the Tarbiyat al-Nisa’ program is to prepare female students to become good wives for their husbands, so that they can support their husband’s activities, particularly in preaching Salafism. In general, subject matters for 13 Interview with Abdurrahman, a senior student, Banjarsari, December 12, 2008. 14 Interview with Abdul Hakim, a senior student of Tadrib al-Du’at, Banjarsari, December 11, 2008.

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female students are similar to those of male students. However, the pesantren teaches female students on specific issues on womanhood, by using Sheikh Muqbil’s ‘Nasiha li al-Nisa’ (Advice for Women). The gender relationship between wife and husband is essential in this matter. Moreover, the pesantren also trains the girls various skills such as sewing and cooking. The subject on womanhood receives great attention. The Salafis allocate special space for women affairs in their magazines. The oldest Salafi magazine, Assunnah, for example, has a special supplement for women. Articles for women include various rubrics, such as ‘Shakhsiyya’ (‘Personality’) and ‘Baytuna’ (‘Our Home’). The first rubric presents various female figures like the Companions’ wives; the second discusses topics such as family affairs and children’s education. The Fatawa magazine, published by the Bin Baz Center, has the ‘Keluarga Sakinah’ (‘Harmonious Family’) rubric, Salafy magazine publishes materials for women under the ‘Muslimah’ heading, and Asy-Syari’ah has the ‘Sakinah’ (‘Harmony’) rubric. Since 2007, Pesantren al-Furqan has published al-Mawaddah (‘Love’), a special magazine for women. All these rubrics discuss issues dealing with women, ranging from the Salafis’ views on women to creating a harmonious family, to rituals practices and child education. Salafis’ perception on women is recurrent theme of discussion. In general, Salafis view that Islam truly respects women. This respect takes various forms, including regulating relationships between men and women, and special women’s dress. In the al-Furqan magazine, Ahmad Sabiq, for example, wrote an article ‘Keagungan Wanita dalam Naungan Islam’ [Grandeur of Women in the Shadow of Islam], where he refutes the notion that Islam does not respect women. His argues that Islam rejects the pre-Islamic tradition of killing daughters at birth.15 To respect them, Islam orders women to cover their ‘awra (parts of the body that should be covered). Discussion on this matter often appears in Salafi periodicals.16 To build a ‘harmonious family’, a good relationship between husband and wife is essential and in this context, the wife’s obedience to her husband is of paramount importance. Submission to her husband leads a wife to enter paradise.17 Moreover, when a wife encounters the dilemma between dedication to her parents and submission to her husband, she must choose 15 Ahmad Sabiq bin Abul Lathif Abu Yusuf, “Keagungan Wanita dalam Naungan Islam,” Al-Furqan, No. 09, Vol.VI, 2007, pp. 57-58. 16 See, for example, “Aurat Wanita di Hadapan Laki-laki Asing (Bukan Mahram)”, Salafy, No. 7, Vol. 5, pp. 77-81. 17 See for example, Ahmad Sabiq bin Abul Lathif Abu Yusuf, “Ukhti…Raihlah Surgamu”, Al-Furqan, No, 7, Vol. 5, 2006, pp. 57-61.

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compliance to her husband.18 In their argumentation, Salafis refer to a hadith narrated by Ibn Majah and al-Tirmidhi which says: if human beings were allowed to bow to other creatures than God, the Prophet would have ordered a wife to bow to her husband.19 Unlike the other two pesantrens, Pesantren Assunnah is managed professionally, employing qualified teachers in general subjects and using advanced teaching instruments such as multi-media. In 1996, it launched its first program, Taman Kanak-kanak Islam Terpadu (TKIT, Integrated Islamic Kindergarten), followed by Sekolah Dasar Islam Terpadu (SDIT, Integrated Islamic Elementary School) in 1998. These two take the form of full-day school programs where the pupils study in the classroom from seven in the morning to twelve o’clock midday. After this, they have lunch together, pray collectively, and take a rest. The full-day school was a response to the change of working hours of private employees and some civil servants from six days to five days a week. As a consequence, the daily working hours were changed from eight o’clock in the morning until two o’clock in the afternoon, to seven o’clock in the morning until four o’clock in the afternoon.20 The kindergarten program fully adopts the national curriculum as provided by the Ministry of National Education, combined with Salafi doctrines. Similarly, the SDIT curriculum is set in line with the national curriculum of the Ministry of National Education in terms of general knowledge and Salafi elements in religious subjects. In religious subjects, the pesantren adopts the curriculum developed by Salafi institutions, such as the al-Irsyad schools in Semarang and Purwokerto, and the al-Safwah foundation in Jakarta.21 Al-Safwah is a Salafi foundation that supports the spread of Salafi teachings by producing Salafi textbooks for Salafi pesantrens. Like other Salafi institutions, al-Safwah often holds Salafi dawras (workshops) for Salafi teachers.22 The TKIT and SDIT programs are so attractive that many parents who are not Salafis send their children to the pesantren. In November 2008, there were 220 18 See, Ummu Isqah al-Atsariyah, “Antara Berbakti kepada Orang Tua dan Taat kepada Suami”, Asy-Syariah, No. 45, Vol. IV, 2008, p. 75. 19 Ahmad Sabiq, “Ukhti…”, p. 60. 20 Interview with Sukarjo Renggo, Cirebon, November 20, 2008 21 Interview with Muhyiddin, teacher at Pesantren Assunnah, Cirebon, November 18, 2008. 22 Noorhaidi Hasan, “Saudi Expansion, the Salafi Campaign and Arabised Islam in Indonesia”, in Madawi al-Rasheed (ed.), Kingdom without Borders: Saudi political, religious and media frontiers, London: Hurst and Company, 2008, p. 273.

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children in the TKIT program and 670 students in the SDIT program. Compared to other private educational institutions in the region, Assunnah’s TKIT and SDIT are quite expensive. To enrol in Kindergarten, parents have to pay IDR 150,000 (US$ 16.50) in monthly tuition fees and an extra IDR 90,000 (US$ 10.00) for lunch per month, whereas to attend the SDIT, the students have to pay slightly less for tuition fees but the same amount for their lunch each month. While state schools do not charge any tuition fees, other private schools require less payment, ranging from IDR 30,000 (US $ 3.25) to IDR 80,000 (US$ 9.00) per month. The parents’ interest in the pesantren is not only ideological but also pragmatic. They may not care about the pesantren’s Salafi doctrines, but they take into account the quality of the program and the ethics adopted in the schools. Living in an urban city like Cirebon, though not a metropolitan, parents still worry about their children’s morals. The parents are afraid that their children may become ensnared by moral ‘diseases’, especially drugs abuse and free sex. For this reason, rather than sending them to public schools and leave them unattended at home after school hours, they prefer to send their children to the pesantren, leaving them there all day under the teachers’ control. By doing so, the parents indirectly control their children and secure their proper behaviour. On their way to the workplace in the morning, the parents take the children to the pesantren and in the evening on their way back after work, they take their children back with them. In this way, the pesantren functions as a childcare institution. Notwithstanding the pesantren’s efforts to introduce and accustom the students of Kindergarten and SDIT with the Salafi manhaj, the teachers believe that Salafi educational program’s goal cannot be achieved by a full-day school program. The objective of the Salafi educational program is to produce a Salafi generation and to encourage the practice of the Salafi manhaj in daily life. It also aims to prepare Salafi teachers and preachers to disseminate the Salafi tenets among the community. In the full-day school programs, where students attend from morning to afternoon, the internalization of the Salafi manhaj among the students cannot be ensured as this process is interrupted if the students are not supported in their practice of the Salafi manhaj at home. To give an example, in the pesantren, students are not exposed to songs and are not allowed to watch television. The continuation of this habit cannot be guaranteed when the students have returned to their homes where they can watch television, listen to the radio or a tape recorder, browse the Internet, and read newspapers and magazines. The majority of the parents are not Salafis and they have no intention to let their children become Salafis. The goal of these parents in sending their

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children to the pesantren is that their children become armed with religious knowledge so that they behave well. In addition to a proper command of general and religious knowledge, a child’s ‘good’ lifestyle, such as performing daily prayers and reading the Qur’an are sufficient to represent its piety. Aware of the weaknesses of the full-day school program, in 2004 the pesantren opened a new program, Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs), followed by Madrasah Aliyah (MA) three years later in 2007. Unlike the TKIT and SDIT programs, MTs and MA programs are boarding school programs where all students live in the pesantren. They not only receive instruction in Salafi doctrines but also practice the Salafi manhaj in their daily lives. Thus, the pesantren begins preparing Salafi cadres at the level of MTs and MA. With few exceptions, most parents of MTs and MA pupils are Salafis. Recently, a significant change has occurred in the MTs program. In the new enrolment for 2010, the pesantren has set up a non-boarding MTs program. This policy is based on the assumption that more students would attend the program if it were not a boarding program. As the SDIT has numerous alumni, many teachers worry about their future if they are not accommodated by the Assunnah. The objective was to attract as many students as possible to enrol in the pesantren, In 2008, there were 41 male students and 56 female students in the MTs, and 5 male students and 32 female students in the MA. Students at the MTs and the MA pay IDR 450,000 (US$ 50.00) per month for tuition fees, food, accommodation, and health services. In 2007, Pesantren Assunnah established a new program, Ma’had Aly. It is designed to take two years to complete and annually accepts 10 students only. This program targets the alumni of public senior high schools who want to intensively study religious knowledge. While in the first year, they are taught Arabic and its tools (‘ilm al-alat) such as nahw (grammar) and sarf (morphology), religious knowledge and the Salafi manhaj. In the second year, they practice da’wa in mosques in Cirebon. The majority of the alumni of this program continue their study at the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahun Islam dan Arab (LIPIA, Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies) in Jakarta. The educational fee gives us an indication of the social and economic background of the students’ families. In low cost pesantrens, such as al-Nur alAtsari and al-Furqan, the majority of students come from lower class families. Some parents cannot afford it even though they are inexpensive.23 Abdul Hakim, who has studied at Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari for three years, for example, could 23 Interview with Abdul Malik al-Banjari, teacher of the Tahfiz progam, Banjarsari, December 12, 2008.

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not pay because he comes from a very poor family. However, he feels very happy that he could study in Pesantren al-Nur. To compensate, he helps the pesantren in running its administrative affairs.24 Contrarily, the students in expensive pesantrens come from middle class families. In Pesantren Assunnah, for example, I found a student whose parents are lecturers at the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN). A lecturer, though not rich, can be categorized as middle class. It is interesting to discuss why Pesantren Assunnah prefers to adopt the integrated Islamic school rather than the traditional pesantrens al-Furqan and al-Nur al-Atsari that specifically teach religious knowledge. In general, the emergence of integrated Islamic schools in Indonesia is a response to the discontent with the national educational system, which is regarded insufficient to meet the current demand of grasping the advancement of technology and science. It is also a reaction to the failure of the national educational system to shape the students’ morality and protect them from vices, such as free sex and drugs abuse.25 In order to solve these problems, Muslim activists offer a solution by creating integrated Islamic schools. Some of these schools adopt the boarding system, such as Madania and Dwi Warna in Parung, Bogor, West Java, while others emerge in the form of full-day schools, such al-Azhar, al-Izhar and Labs School in Jakarta. These schools arm their students with science and technology, and religious knowledge, putting emphasis on ‘aqida (Islamic theology), ‘ibada (ritual) and akhlaq (Islamic ethics). However, the establishment of these schools was also driven by other motives: ideology and economics. Before the emergence of these schools, it was common among middle class Muslims to send their children to non-Muslim schools, such as Penabur, Tarakanita, Kanisius and Santa Ursula. The good education these schools offer was the reason why parents send their children there. Along with the expansion of urban middle-class Muslims, their awareness of providing their children with better education grew. Thus, they started to found integrated Islamic schools to compete with their Christian counterparts, and targeted children of middle-class Muslims.26 As Hasan has shown, the mission of integrated Islamic school is adopted from the ideas of Hasan al-Banna, the founder of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, in creating 24 Interview with Abdul Hakim, senior student of the Tadrib al-Du’at program, Banjarsari, December 11, 2008. 25 Noorhaidi Hasan, “Education, Young Islamist, and Integrated Islamic Schools in Indonesia”, Studia Islamika, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2002, p. 86. 26 Ismatu Ropi, “Sekolah Islam untuk Kaum Urban: Pengalaman Jakarta dan Banten”, in Jajat Burhanudin and Dina Afrianty (eds), Mencetak Muslim Modern, Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada in collaboration with PPIM UIN, 2006, pp. 246-248.

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a “rabbani” generation, a generation that is fully aware of the existence of God as the Creator of the universe. Al-Banna believes that only through a long process of education a “rabbani” generation can materialize. Young Muslim students in Indonesia have studied al-Banna and his movement’s ideas since the 1980s to date. These young activists formed the so-called Tarbiyah (education) movement, in which they held religious discussions on campuses. Later, the movement transformed into an Islamic party, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Justice and Prosperity Party).27 These activists have found Islamic integrated schools, such as Nurul Fikri in Bandung, West Java, al-Syifa in Subang, West Java and al-Bayan in Sukabumi, West Java. In the light of this movement, we understand why Pesantren Assunnah adopts the integrated Islamic school system. I would argue that Assunnah figures’ engagement in Islamic activism is the reason behind this choice. Two figures deserve special attention in this context: Ali Hijrah and Muhyiddin. As discussed in Chapter Four, Ali Hijrah, the founder of Pesantren Assunnah, participated in the Islamist movement before he converted to Salafism. He was the leader of the Lembaga Pengembangan Pesantren Kilat (LP3K), an underground neo-Negara Islam Indonesia (NII, Islamic State of Indonesia) movement, in Cirebon. Being an activist of this Islamic radical movement, Ali Hijrah became familiar with alBanna’s ideas. Another important figure at Pesantren Assunnah is Muhyiddin who currently serves as the head of the department of education at the Yayasan Assunah Cirebon (YAC), a foundation under which the pesantren operates. Like other teachers at Pesantren Assunnah, in the seventies and the eighties, Muhyiddin participated in different Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, NII and the Pesantren Kilat movement. In 1990, he converted to Salafism following the conversion of his leader, Ali Hijrah. He then attended Salafi ‘itikaf in Pesantren Tengaran and studied Salafism under Ja’far Umar Thalib, Yusuf Baisa and Yazid Jawas. He learned Salafism in Pesantren Alamus Sunnah in Bogor from 1996-1997. Before joining Pesantren Assunah, he worked at the al-Azhar integrated Islamic school in Cirebon for 12 years, from 1992 to 2004, in which in the last four years of that period he served as al-Azhar’s vice head.28 His experience at al-Azhar was essential in setting up a new integrated Islamic school and developing the curriculum at the pesantren. 27 On the transformation from the Tarbiyah movement to Partai Keadilan, see Ali Said Damanik, Fenonema Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia, Bandung: Teraju, 2002; and Imdadun Rahmat, Ideologi Politik PKS: dari Masjid Kampus ke Gedung Parlemen, Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2008. 28 Interview with Muhyiddin, teacher of pesantren Assunnah, Cirebon, November 2008.

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B. Curriculum: Between Middle Eastern Orientation and National Demands Its curriculum is one of the most important elements of an educational institution. It reflects the pesantren’s vision and goal. It directs the teachers and the administrative staffs to achieve the educational objective. The vision of the pesantren, the national policy on education, and the interests of stakeholders such as parents and the market, all contribute to the model of the curriculum developed by education institutions. In the case of a pesantren, the vision of the pesantren’s founder is influential. It could be said that the type of pesantren’s curriculum reveals the ideals, way of thinking, and aspirations of its founder. Salafi pesantrens are no exception. Traditionally, a pesantren is an Islamic education institution characterized by some features: a kyai-cantered institution, Islamic-oriented teaching, the use of halaqa as method of learning without a grading system, and the absence of a systematic curriculum.29 Responding to the demands of the era, pesantrens have made reforms as regards curriculum, institution, methods and function. A number of reasons lie behind the central role of kyais in pesantrens. First, a pesantren is usually founded by a kyai at his own expense. It may be established on land that the kyai inherited from his parents or that has been endowed to him. Second, a kyai’s expertise in religious matters makes him the only authoritative person in the pesantren. Third, a kyai’s humble appearance. Although some kyais now live in luxury because of their participation in politics and business, the majority of kyais still maintain a humble lifestyle which relies on the essential living value of the pesantren, ikhlas. Last, the community believes a kyai has supernatural power enabling him to cure diseases with prayers, or to see the future of one’s fate. With this capital, kyais have become the most charismatic persons in their pesantrens and in the villages where they live, and they have the respect of the people.30 Throughout history, Islamic educational institutions in general and pesantren in particular have encountered serious challenges from public schools and government policies. In the colonial period, in the 1870s, the Dutch government introduced public schools, called volksschoolen, which focused on secular sciences to educate the indigenous peoples and to prepare them for work in government offices. When the colonial government wanted to expand public schools by transforming existing Islamic schools, Muslims responded in different ways. 29 See, for example, Abdurrahman Wahid, “Pesantren sebagai Subkultur”, p. 40. 30 Nurhayati Djamas, Dinamika Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia Pascakemerdekaan, Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2009, pp. 21-24.

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Muslims in West Sumatra, for example, responded positively to the policy. On the contrary, Muslims in Java gave a negative response, accusing the government of taking Muslims away from their religion. In the early twentieth century, moreover, pesantrens encountered the internal challenge posed by modernist Muslims who established modern schools in the form of public schools with religious subjects, and modern madrasahs (Islamic schools). In the face of these challenges, pesantrens had no choice but to adjust their systems by adopting a grading system and by including secular sciences in their curriculum. Some general subjects, such as English, mathematics and history, were included in some curricula.31 More secular sciences were added into the curriculum in the 1950s, when the government introduced a new educational policy to incorporate general sciences into the educational system. In the following years, the pesantrens started to establish madrasahs on their campuses.32 In 1975, through the Joint Decree of three Ministers (Minister of Education and Culture, Minister of Religious Affairs, and Minister of Home Affairs) the government imposed the rule that all basic educational institutions should provide their students with general sciences. The decree explicitly regulated the madrasah curriculum: they were to offer 70% general sciences and 30% religious knowledge. The aim of this decree was to lift the quality of the madrasah to the same level as that of public schools, and hence, madrasah graduates could continue their education at a higher level at public schools.33 The joint decree was a response to Muslims’ harsh criticism towards a previous Presidential Decree (Keputusan Presiden or Keppres), No. 34 of 1975, and Presidential Instruction (Instruksi Presiden or Inpres), No. 15 of 1974, which proposed the integration of all educational institutions under the Ministry of Education and Culture. The joint decree thus secured the position of Islamic education under the authority of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. It was followed by another joint decree by two Ministers (Minister of Education and Culture, and Minister of Religious 31 See, Karel Steenbrink, Pesantren, Madrasah and Sekolah, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986, pp. 23-25; Azyumardi Azra, Pendidikan Islam, p. 97-100; Robert W. Hefner, “Islamic Schools, Social Movements and Democracy in Indonesia”, in Robert W. Hefner (ed.), Making Modern Muslims: the Politics of Islamic Education in Southeast Asia, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009, pp. 62-63. 32 Azyumardi Azra, Pendidikan Islam, pp. 101-103. 33 Azyumardi Azra, Dina Afrianty and Robert W. Hefner, “Pesantren and Madrasa: Muslim Schools and National Ideals in Indonesia”, in Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (eds) Schooling Islam: the Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 186.

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Affairs) in 1984 that provided further regulations for the national curriculum in public and Islamic schools. It stipulated that the curriculum of Islamic schools should be similar to that of public school in general subjects. In 1989, the National Educational System Law (Undang-Undang Sistem Pendidikan Nasional), incorporated madrasahs into the national education system as public schools with Islamic characteristics. Following this law, the government produced the 1994 curriculum, allocating religious subjects to range from 16 per cent to 18 per cent of the school hours. Madrasah students should learn all general subjects. In the new the National Educational System Law of 2003, madrasahs became part of the national educational system. Responding to these regulations, pesantrens no doubt had to make adjustments and had to adapt in order to survive. Pesantrens have made reforms in terms of curriculum, methodology, institution and function. They continue to include more subjects, such as social and natural sciences, mathematics, the Indonesian language, and even vocational subjects, in their curriculum. Endowment Boards (Badan Wakaf) or Foundations (Yayasan) have been established, which are responsible for the future of pesantrens, and for establishing madrasahs and Islamic schools within pesantrens. Although the role of the kyais have remained central in pesantrens, the presence of Endowment Boards or Foundations has distributed the authority over many people: a pesantren no longer exclusively belongs to a kyai as its founder. In terms of the method of teaching and learning, pesantrens have also adopted the grading system so that the students can finish their studies within a given time. The role of pesantrens has expanded beyond their traditional role of transmitting religious knowledge, producing ‘ulama (religious scholar), and preserving Islamic traditions. The pesantrens now cover community development as well as economic development.34 Thus, to follow the assessment of Robert Hefner, an American anthropologist who currently pays much attention to Islamic education in Indonesia, the government’s decrees on education have changed the orientation of Islamic educational institutions from producing religious scholars to producing pious labour in line with market demands.35 While most pesantrens accommodate national interests by the inclusion of non-religious subjects in their curriculum, some pesantrens have remained 34 Azyumardi Azra, Pendidikan Islam, Tradisi dan Modernisasi Menuju Milenium Baru, pp. 104-105. 35 Robert W. Hefner, “Islamic Schools, Social Movements and Democracy in Indonesia”, p. 66; Muhaimin AG, et.al., Madrasah Tafaqquh Fiddin, Jakarta: Gaung Persada Press, n.d, p. 1.

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consistent in their nature. These have ignored the grading system and focused on religious knowledge only. Among these few pesantrens is Pesantren Lirboyo in Kediri, East Java. Although the pesantren has independently developed new schools and madrasahs within the pesantren compound to teach non-religious subjects, Pesantren Lirboyo itself still maintains its original program and teaches only the religious subjects. This program remains at the core of the pesantren. However, this choice is not without consequences. The spectrum of jobs available for the alumni of this pesantren will mainly be in religious positions, such as preachers and teachers. How have Salafi pesantrens responded to the government policies regarding the educational system? In general, the Salafi pesantrens can be classified into two currents. The first is represented by pesantrens which are affiliated with socalled ‘cooperationist’ Salafis, such as Pesantren Assunnah in Cirebon, Pesantren al-Furqan in Gresik, Pesantren Imam Bukhari in Solo, and Pesantren al-Irsyad Tengaran in Salatiga. This group of pesantrens has adopted the national policy of education by the inclusion of non-religious subjects. They not only include non-religious subjects in their curriculum, but also apply a grading system. This adoption of national policies aims at gaining the government’s recognition of their programs. In order to get government legitimacy, the pesantrens furthermore have to take part in national examinations. Thus, for example, Pesantren Assunnah takes part in the national examination held by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, while the students of Pesantren Imam Bukhari participate in the national examination provided by the Ministry of National Education. On the other hand, these pesantrens have adopted religious materials from Saudi Arabia. Again, the adoption of these materials aims at obtaining mu’adala (accreditation) from Saudi Arabian universities. To obtain this recognition, the pesantrens have to teach some of the materials taught in Saudi Arabian madrasahs. For this purpose, some Salafi pesantrens, such as Pesantren Imam Bukhari, use textbooks published by the Saudi Arabian Wazarat al-Ma’arif (Ministry of Education). This effort has resulted in receiving mu’adala from the Islamic University of Medina (Saudi Arabia) on July 31, 2011.36 A more pragmatic reason lies behind this adoption: to pursue financial support from Middle Eastern countries. Many Salafi pesantrens have received significant amounts of money from charitable foundations in the Middle East, particularly the Jam’iyya Ihya’ al-Turath in Kuwait, and the Mu’assasat ‘Aid Al Thani in Qatar. 36 http://www.bukhari.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=36, accessed on November 9, 2011.

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The second current is represented by pesantrens associated with ‘rejectionist’ Salafis, or former Laskar Jihad activists, such as Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari in Ciamis, Pesantren al-Anshar in Yogyakarta, and Pesantren al-Bayyinah in Gresik, East Java. This group of pesantrens has retained their original pesantren style that teaches religious subjects only. Instead of adopting the national curriculum, these pesantrens preferred to adopt the Darul Hadith curriculum of Sheikh Muqbil in Dammaj, Yemen. These pesantrens even try to imitate the Dammaj model of learning, including materials and methods. Viewed from the perspective of educational system reform, this type of Salafi pesantren can be considered a setback. However, this type of pesantren can also be understood as an effort to revitalize pesantrens’ traditional roles: transmitting religious knowledge, preserving the Islamic tradition and producing ‘ulama. As noted earlier, the pesantren’s adoption of a grading system with the inclusion of religious subjects, as many scholars see it, has changed the ustadh’s orientation from mastering religious teachings to simply obtaining a certificate. The burden of the students has doubled and makes them inadequate in mastering both religious and secular sciences. Thus, in the decrease of the student’s command of religious sciences, the emergence of Salafi pesantrens with a focus on religious subjects may be seen as an attempt to revitalize pesantrens’ core role. It is clear from the discussion above that the curriculum in Salafi pesantrens is a mix of a Middle Eastern orientation and national demands. The orientation towards the Middle East is not merely encouraged by ideological considerations but also by pragmatic ones. This means that the adoption of Middle Eastern curricula aims to not only disseminate Salafi doctrines, but also to achieve mu’adala and financial grants. Meanwhile, the adoption of national curricula is intended to attract more students to enrol. The discussion of the curriculum of Salafi pesantrens shows that these pesantrens function as “hub[s] in a transnational network.”37 As a hub, a pesantren has become an axis where many currents of religious thoughts and ideas meet and then spread to diverse directions. A pesantren has become a place where students from different regions come to learn, and then depart to wider areas. A pesantren is connected to its counterparts both inside and outside the country through many ways of affiliations, such as teacher-disciple or disciple-alma 37 Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand and Martin van Bruinessen, “Behind the Walls: Re-Appraising the Role and Importance of Madrasas in the World Today”, in idem (eds), The Madrasa in Asia: Political Activism and Transnational Linkage, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008, p. 17.

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mater relations, and collegial affiliation. Salafi teachers at the pesantren often require fatwas from their sheikhs in the Middle East, and send their students to pursue higher education in their alma mater. Salafi sheikhs from the Middle East and Salafi teachers attend annual dawra held by every Salafi group throughout Indonesia which is another form of this transnational network. Attendance in such annual dawra gives a strong feeling to those present that they belong to transnational Islam. Collegial bonds create mutual support between Salafi pesantrens through teacher and student exchange. Thus, it is hard to imagine in today’s connected world that pesantrens are isolated religious institutions. Pesantren and madrasah are always linked to other educational institutions. To provide a different perspective on pesantrens, a comparison with modern pesantrens, namely Pondok Gontor and Pesantren Ngruki, is needed. Though Gontor is not a Salafi pesantren, as discussed in Chapter Two, it has become an important factor in the spread of Salafism. Meanwhile, Ngruki is “haraki” Salafism. Pondok Gontor offers the Kuliyyat al-Mu’allimin al-Islamiyyah (KMI, Islamic Teachers Training), a six-year program equivalent to the Madrasah Tsanawiyyah and Madrasah Aliyah programs. Since its establishment, Gontor has applied a graded system and has incorporated general sciences in its curriculum. Pondok Gontor initially educated only male students, but since 1990, Gontor has accepted female students as well who are trained in a special campus located far away from the male one, in Mantingan, Ngawi, East Java, about 100 kilometres from Gontor. In 1963, Gontor established the Insititut Pendidikan Darussalam (IPD, Darussalam Institute of Education) which was later transformed into the Institut Studi Islam Darussalam (ISID, Darussalam Institute for Islamic Studies) and has three faculties: Education, Theology and Shari’a. Like other pesantrens, Gontor teaches all religious subjects such as fiqh, usul al-fiqh, hadith, tafsir, and ‘aqida. Arabic has become its benchmark, and hence it teaches Arabic tools such as nahw, sarf, and balagha. However, Gontor uses books, which is unusual in traditional pesantrens, such as al-Fiqh al-Wadih, and al-Nahw al-wadih. Because of this, many people criticize Gontor as it does not use the so-called ‘Kitab Kuning’ (‘Yellow Books’, classic textbooks printed on yellow paper). Countering this critique, Gontor remains consistent. General sciences such as basic social and natural sciences, mathematics, and English are taught to the students. Concerning religious subjects, some materials namely fiqh, usul al-fiqh and aladyan deserve particular attention. After the introductory books learned in the first two years, students in third and fourth year classes read the Bulugh al-Maram

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by Ibn Hajr al-‘Asqalani, a hadith-based book. The book provides the students with dalils from hadiths. Moreover, in the fifth and sixth year classes, students study Ibn Rushd’s work, Bidayat al-Mujtahid, which introduces the students to the different opinions of Islamic jurisprudences from different schools. By reading this book, Gontor introduces the students to a broader perspective on Islamic jurisprudence. Complementary to this subject is usul al-fiqh where pupils study al-qawa’id al-fiqhiyya (Islamic legal maxims) by which they can put forward arguments in support of their opinions. Through all these subjects, Gontor has provided its students with the foundations of Islamic knowledge so that they can substantiate their opinions and arguments. More important is the subject of aladyan (religions) in which students are introduced to the comparative study of religions. Although this subject aims at strengthening students’ belief in Islam, the material used presents a wider perspective of religions. However, as mentioned earlier, a minor but significant change occurred in 2000. In order to maintain its accreditation from the Islamic University of Medina, Gontor was forced to incorporate Salafi books. Thus since 2000, Gontor has taught textbooks written by the Salafi Sheikh Salih Fawzan al-Fawzan, Kitab al-Tawhid, to the students in classes four, five and six. As a consequence, teachers and students of Gontor currently have become more familiar with the idea of Salafism. Pesantren Ngruki wants to combine the good aspects of three Islamic educational institutions, namely Gontor, Persis Bangil and al-Irsyad. The pesantren aims at producing so-called ‘ulama ‘amilin fi sabilillah, or Muslim scholars who believe in a comprehensive teaching of Islam (Islam Kaffa) and implement these teachings in daily life. Ngruki alumni should have the following characteristics: 1. True ‘aqida (creed); 2. Correct rituals; 3. Deep knowledge of Islam (tafaqquh fi al-din); 4. Good conduct; 5. Broad knowledge; 6. Health; 7. Skills and self-reliance; and 8. Ready to carry out the jihad fi sabil Allah.38 In order to realize this objective, the pesantren pays particular attention to the following matters: 1. True ‘aqida (Islamic creed); 2. Good command of religious knowledge based on the Qur’an, the hadith and the practice of the al-Salaf al-salih; 3. Good command of Arabic; 4. Self-reliance.39 Pesantren Ngruki offers various programs: Kulliyyat al-Mu’allimin/alMu’allimat al-Islamiyyah (KMI), Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs), Madrasah ‘Aliyah 38 http://www.almukmin-ngruki.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article &id=53&Itemid=66, accessed on September 11, 2013. 39 Puslitbang Pendidikan Agama dan Keagamaan, Depag RI, Pondok Pesantren Islam al-Mukmin Ngruki Solo (Studi tentang Pendidikan, Faham Keagamaan dan Jaringan), Jakarta: Puslitbang Pendidikan Agama dan Keagamaan, Balitbang Agama dan Diklat Keagamaan Departemen Agama, 2004, pp. 25-28.

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(MA), Takhassus, and Ma’had ‘Aly. The KMI has become the pesantren’s core program. Initially, it was designed to last six years, but it changed to a three-year program in 1995, and is equivalent to the Madrasah Aliyah. As a result, Ngruki accepts alumni from secondary schools outside the pesantren. Non-Ngruki alumni who want to enrol in the pesantren must undertake a one year special program (takhassus) for matriculation in Arabic and religious knowledge. The Madrasah Tsanawiyah and the Madrasah Aliyah programs are the same as those outside the pesantren. The programs accommodate the national curriculum in general sciences, combined with the pesantren’s curriculum in religious knowledge. What distinguishes Ngruki from Gontor? Ngruki no doubt offers more diverse programs than Gontor. Like Gontor, Ngruki emphasizes Arabic: Ngruki uses some Gontor books on Arabic and students and teachers practice it in daily conversation. Following Persis Bangil, Ngruki replaced the materials on fiqh with Qur’an and the hadith studies.40 Moreover, Ngruki teaches its students the doctrines of Salafism, particularly its tawhid and the concept of al-wala’ wa albara’. The division of tawhid into tawhid al-rububiyya, al-uluhiyya and al-asma’ wa al-sifat is also taught to the students. The pesantren adopts materials provided by the Institute of the Study of Islam and Arabic (LIPIA).41 However, Ngruki, or more precisely Ba’asyir, has spent some more thought on what full belief in tawhid entails, in particular with regards to God’s governance on earth. First, God is the Creator of the universe, and hence all power belongs to God only. Second, governance on earth should be based on divine laws. Third, all man-made laws violate God’s laws. Fourth, making references to man-made laws in finding answers and solutions for governance amounts to assigning God’s positions and His Laws to a lower level. Finally, political association and mobilization that are not intended to maintain the basic doctrine of tawhid is similar to demoting God’s position to a lower level and is considered an act of shirk (polytheism) and hence un-Islamic.42 Considering these implications, I would say that Ngruki 40 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Divergent Paths from Gontor: Muslim Educational Reform and the Travails of Pluralism in Indonesia’, in: Freek L. Bakker and Jan Sihar Aritonang (eds), On the Edge of Many Worlds [Festschrift Karel A. Steenbrink], Zoetermeer: Meinema, 2006, note number 25, p. 197, available online at: http:// www.hum.uu.nl/medewerkers/m.vanbruinessen/publications/Bruinessen_ Divergent_paths_from_Gontor.pdf. 41 Interview with Wahyuddin, 27 September 2012. 42 Farish A. Noor, “Ngruki Revisited: Modernization and Its Discontent at Pondok Pesantren al-Mukmin of Ngruki, Surakarta”, Working Paper Series at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, No. 139, October 2007, pp. 19-20.

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adopts the fourth aspect of tawhid, tawhid al-mulikiyya or hakimiyya. As discussed in Chapter One, tawhid al-mulikiyya means that only God governs the earth and a ruler has no choice but to implement God’s laws. The doctrine of al-wala’ wa al-bara’ (loyalty and disavowal) is one of the main differences between Ngruki and Gontor. While Gontor does not specifically teach this concept, Ngruki pays special attention to this matter. In Ngruki, the students read “al-Wala’ wa al-Bara’ fi al-Islam by M. Sa’id al-Qahtani.43 As discussed in Chapter One, al-wala’ wa al-bara’ is one of the basic Salafi doctrines. It teaches Muslims to love and help fellow Muslims and to work in the interest of Islam while at the same time, Muslims should display their hatred of non-Muslims. Wahyuddin admits that pesantren Ngruki not only teaches this doctrine to the students, but also encourages them to implement it in daily life.44 As a result, students reject Western cultures and other symbols associated with the West. One student of Ngruki, for example refuses to eat at Kentucky Fried Chicken, a widespread American franchise restaurant in Indonesia.45 Pesantren Ngruki also puts strong emphasis on jihad, and supports its students to carry out it. In the mid-1990s, the students read the work of Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Sa’id Hawwa, ‘Jund Allah’ (Warriors of God). The book provides Muslims with arguments of the necessity of establishing an Islamic State.46 Quotations from the Qur’an and short expressions by Muslim activists that encourage jihad are easily found on the campus. For example, a short expression of three key words is written on the wall of one building and reads ‘iman, hijrah, jihad’. The three key words derive from the Qur’an 8:72 that reads “Those who believed and emigrated and fought for the faith with their property and their persons, in the cause of Allah, as well as those who gave (them asylum) and aid. These are (all) friends and protector one of another”. Referring to this verse and other similar verses in the Qur’an, one may relate ‘iman to the idea of jihad. Although the term ‘jihad’ has a broad meaning, its specific meaning referring to the holy war is inevitable. Ba’asyir, in his textbook on ‘aqida, for example, writes: “We have to form a well-organized army…We must prepare weapons… Fight against satanic human beings is compulsory and must be carried out seriously with a willingness to sacrifice property and soul. A fighter 43 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Divergent Paths from Gontor,” p. 197. 44 Interview with Wahyuddin, 27 September 2012. 45 Jajang Jahroni, “Merumuskan Modernitas: Kecenderungan dan Perkembangan Pesantren di Jawa Tengah”, in Jajat Burhanudin and Dina Afrianty (eds), Mencetak Muslim Modern, Jakarta: Rajawali Pers in collaboration with PPIM UIN Jakarta, 2006, p. 130. 46 Van Bruinessen, ‘Divergent Paths from Gontor”, p. 197.

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has only two intentions in carrying out the jihad: glory and becoming a martyr.”47

Thus, the difference between Gontor and Ngruki on the one hand and Salafi pesantrens on the other hand is clear. Gontor’s tendency of teaching the Salafi ‘aqida is motivated by pragmatism, that is acquiring the mu’adala from the Islamic University of Medina. While Ngruki’s leaning to Salafism is driven by its tendency to militant Islam. Ngruki’s adoption of the tawhid al-mulkiyya distinguishes Ngruki from other Salafi pesantrens. C. Kitabs Used and Basic Materials

Kitabs (books) Used As noted earlier, Salafi pesantrens have developed their own curricula, combining general subjects from the national curriculum with religious matters adopted from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The textbooks used in Salafi pesantrens are very different from those studied in traditional pesantrens.48 However, like in traditional pesantrens, Arabic with its instrumental sciences (‘ilm alat) like nahw (Arabic grammar) and sarf (morphology) remain essential in their teaching. Comprehensive modules on Arabic language, the Silsilat Ta’lim al-Lugha al-‘Arabiyya and al-‘Arabiyya li al-Nashi’in, provided by Saudi Arabia are used in the pesantrens. Besides the famous books on nahw and sarf such as al-Ajurrumiyya by Muhammad ibn Daud al-Sanhaji, the work of Ghufran, Talkhis Qawa’id al-Lugha al-‘Arabiyya is also used in Salafi pesantrens. These instrumental sciences are essential requirements for students in order to understand religious texts correctly. Unlike the traditional pesantrens of the Nahdlatul Ulama that put more emphasis on fiqh, Salafi pesantrens prioritise Islamic faith (‘aqida). The texts used in this subject are mainly the works of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, such as alUsul al-Thalatha (Three Principles), Kitab al-Tawhid (Book of Islamic Monotheism), Kashf al-Shubuhat (Disclosure of Dubious Faith and Practices) and Masa’il al-Jahiliyya (Problems of Ignorance) and their commentaries written by Salafi scholars such as Muhammad ibn Salih al-Uthaymin and Salih ibn Fawzan ibn ‘Abd Allah alFawzan. In addition to these books, pesantrens use al-‘Aqida al-Wasitiyya (Creed of Moderation) by Ibn Taymiyya, and its commentary by al-Uthaymin, Sharh al-‘Aqida 47 Quoted from Jajang Jahroni, “Merumuskan Modernitas”, p. 129. 48 For the books used by the traditional pesantrens, see Martin van Bruinessen, “Kitab Kuning: Books in Arabic Script used in the Pesantren Milieu” in BKI 146, 1990, pp. 226-269.

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al-Wasitiyya, and al-‘Aqida al-Tahawiyya by al-Imam al-Tahawi and its commentary by Ibn Abi al-‘Izzi. The subject of hadith is seen as second only to ‘aqida. Some hadith books learned in the Salafi pesantren are similar to those in traditional pesantrens. Thus, students also read al-Arba’in al-Nawawiya (Forty Hadiths by alNawawi). Where these pesantrens differ from more traditional ones, is that Salafis select books with commentaries authored by Salafi scholars, such as al-‘Uthaymin. The two most authoritative hadith collections, the Sahih al-Bukhari and the Sahih Muslim, are also studied. By emphasizing hadith, Salafi pesantrens teach hadithbased fiqh texts. The works al-Wajiz fi Fiqh al-Sunna wa al-Kitab al-‘Aziz by ‘Abd alAzim ibn Badawi, and ‘Umdat al-Ahkam by Ibn Qudama, with its commentary Taysir al-‘Allam by ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Salih Alu Bassam, have become the most widespread reference books for Salafis. Other courses like akhlaq (Islamic ethics) and Sirat al-Nabiy (History of the Prophet) are also studied. Some pesantrens also use the famous book on akhlaq, Ta’lim al-Muta’allim by Al-Zarnuji, while for Islamic history, the Khulasat Nur al-Yaqin by ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Jabbar is read.49

Basic Material and Texts This section will outline some of the fundamental doctrines of the Salafi manhaj, which appear in the textbooks used by pesantren students. It also identifies how the pesantrens teach these doctrines to their students, from an elementary program to higher ones, ranging from the simplest method of teaching to the most complicated. Due to the limited sources available, I have chosen the textbooks used at Pesantren Imam Bukhari in Solo, Central Java. As mentioned earlier, this pesantren uses materials published by the Wazarat al-Ma’arif in Saudi Arabia. Although Pesantren Imam Bukahri is not the main pesantren I have studied in this research as a whole, the textbooks used, particularly for ‘aqida, are similar to those of other Salafi pesantrens. I have selected only materials on certain subjects: ‘aqida, hadith and fiqh. The reason for this selection is that these subjects remain the most important subjects to learn in the pesantren. 1. ‘aqida The texts the students use for this subject derive from the works of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, namely al-Usul al-Thalatha, and Kitab al-Tawhid. 49 The first overview on books learned in the Salafi madrasah was made by Noorhaidi Hasan. See, Noorhaidi Hasan, “The Salafi Madrasas of Indonesia”, in Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand and Martin van Bruinessen (eds), The Madrasa in Asia, Amsterdam: ISIM and Amsterdam University Press, 2008, pp. 260-263.

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The first work is studied by Madrasah Ibtida’iyyah students study the first work, while the second is studied by the students at the Mutawassitah level. Since these works have been commented on by numerous Salafi scholars, it is not certain whose commentary the students learn. What is clear is that the pesantren adopted the materials provided by the Wazarat al-Ma’arif (Ministry of Education) in Saudi Arabia. These materials are introduced to the students of Salafi pesantrens in the early years of their study. The first grade students of the Madrasah Ibtida’iyyah learn al-Usul al-Thalatha. The first material they learn is al-Masa’il al-Arba’ (the Four Subjects). These subjects include al-‘ilm (knowledge), the implementation of knowledge, the call to this knowledge, and the patience in calling (da’wa) to this knowledge. The first subject, al-‘ilm, includes three essential objects: God, His religion, and His messenger (Muhammad).50 The three domains of knowledge are called al-Usul al-Thalatha (the Three Principles) which, Salafis argue, Muslims are to know correctly. The first principle is Allah. He is the only God to worship (al-ma’bud) and the Creator (al-Khaliq) of the universe. The second principle is religion. This knowledge has three levels: Islam, Iman (faith) and Ihsan (beneficence). Islam is defined as submission to God with full obedience and free from any act of polytheism.51 It has five pillars: confession of monotheism, prayer, alms giving, fasting during Ramadan, and pilgrimage to Mecca.52 Iman is the belief in God. It has more than seventy manifestations; the highest aspect of which is the confession that “There is no god to worship but Allah”, and the lowest is to remove a harmful object from the street.53 Meanwhile, ihsan can be defined in Islamic ethics as the manifestation of the true way of worshiping God.54 These basic principles, alUsul al-Thalatha, are repeatedly taught to the students of Madrasah Ibtida’iyyah in the subsequent second, third, fourth and fifth grades.55 50 See, Ma’had Imam al-Bukhari, Muqarrar al-Tawhid wa al-Fiqh li al-Saff al-Awwal alItbida’i, Solo: n.d., p. 1. 51 Ma’had Imam al-Bukhari, Muqarrar al-Tawhid wa al-Fiqh li al-Saff al-Awwal al-Itbida’i, p.12. 52 Ma’had Imam al-Bukhari, Muqarrar al-Tawhid wa al-Fiqh li al-Saff al-Awwal al-Itbida’i, p.12. 53 Ma’had Imam al-Bukhari, Muqarrar al-Tawhid wa al-Fiqh li al-Saff al-Awwal al-Itbida’i. P. 15. 54 The textbook does not provide a clear-cut definition of ihsan. Quoting a famous hadith on the coming of the angel Gabriel to the Prophet asking about these three principles (Islam, Iman and ihsan), the text simply describes the term ihsan by the following explanation: “To worship God as if you see Him, or if you do not see Him, He truly sees you.” Ma’had Imam al-Bukhari, Muqarrar al-Tawhid, p. 16. 55 Ma’had Imam al-Bukhari, Muqarrar al-Tawhid , pp. 1-4.

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This subject is addressed through a very simple method: a short and brief explanation, like a definition, followed by dalil (argument) from the Qur’an and the hadith. In some cases, the lesson is formulated as a dialogue, with questions and answers. To give an example, when describing the first principle, God, the text reads as follows: If you are asked: “Who is your God?” Say, “My God is Allah who educates me and all creatures with His blessing. Allah is my Lord, and I have no lord but Him.” The argument is the Qur’an [1:2] that reads: “Praise be to Allah, the Cherisher and Sustainer of the worlds”

The text follows: If you are asked: “How do you know your God?” Say: “From His signs and creatures. Among His signs are night, day, sun, moon. Whereas among His creatures, are the seven heavens and earth, and whoever lives between these heavens and earth and whatever is available on them.” The dalil is the Qur’anic verse: among His Signs are the Night and the Day, and the Sun and the Moon. Prostrate not to the Sun and the Moon, but prostrate to Allah, Who created them, if it is Him ye wish to serve.56

The lesson for the students of the first year class is complemented by pictures, such as those of the moon and the stars. The teachers require students to memorize the lesson. To evaluate the students’ adequate command of what is taught, some questions are posed at the end of each lesson. The content of tawhid (Islamic monotheism) for the students of the first year class to the fifth year class is quite similar. It consists of the al-Masa’il al-Arba’ and the al-Usul al-Thalatha. The difference appears in the method of teaching. The move to further lessons on tawhid takes place in the sixth grade of the Madrasah Ibtida’iyyah. The students at this level learn the division of tawhid into tawhid al-rububiyya, tawhid al-uluhiyya and tawhid al-asma’ wa al-sifat.57 Furthermore, they learn about shirk (polytheism), kufr (unbelief), nifaq (hypocrisy) and their models. Shirk, the antonym of tawhid, is divided into three types: hidden shirk, lesser shirk, and greater shirk. Hidden shirk is unseen and insensible. To say: “if God wishes and if you wish” is included in this type of shirk. The true statement that 56 Ma’had Imam al-Bukhari, Muqarrar al-Tawhid , p. 6. 57 For an explanation on this division, see Chapter one, on the basic principles of the Salafi tenets.

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must be made is “if God wishes” without the additional phrase “and if you wish”. Adding the additional phrase would imply that God alone would not be sufficient. Riya’ (‘to be seen’) is included in lesser shirk. The greater shirk is classified into four categories: shirk caused by praying to something or someone other than God (du’a), shirk caused by intention, will and aim (niyyat, iradat, maqsud) that are directed to other than God; shirk of obedience (al-ta’a); and shirk caused by loving other entities (mahabba) and thus directing feelings of love away from God. Similarly, kufr (unbelief) falls into two categories: lesser and greater kufr. While the first type does not exclude the perpetrator from being a Muslim, the second kufr does. Nifaq (hypocrite) is also classified into two: i’tiqadi (dogmatic) and ‘amali (practice). Included in the dogmatic nifaq are the denial of the Prophet, and the denial of some of the doctrines of the Prophet.58 Another work by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Kitab al-Tawhid, is taught to the students of the Mutawassitah program (equivalent to junior high school). The students in the first year class begin theirs with the division of tawhid into tawhid alrububiyya, uluhiyya and al-sifat wa al-asma’,59 and continue with related themes, such as shirk, and the implementation of tawhid in daily practices. Unlike the material of tawhid for Ibitida’yyah students, the lesson is presented through a more advanced method. The lesson starts with quotations from Qur’anic verses or from the Prophetic tradition, and continues to explain critical words. Substantial discussions and explanations of the theme come after an explanation of the vocabulary. The lesson ends with some questions, posed to examine whether or not the students have understood the lesson. More forms of the manifestation of tawhid in daily life are taught in subsequent years. In the second year, students study materials about the prohibition of shafa’a (asking help from saints and pious Muslims). According to Salafis, asking shafa’a from the saints and the dead is considered prayer to another god, and an effort to compare God with other creatures.60 Meanwhile, in the third year, in the pesantren the students learn about the urgency of the application of Islamic law in governing society. The textbook, for example, calls on Muslims for total submission to God, by obeying all His laws from the Qur’an and the hadith. Belief in Islam is imperfect unless Muslims resort to the 58 Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiya al-Su’udiya, Al-Tawhid wa al-Fiqh wa alHadith li al-Saff al-Sadis al-Ibtida’i, n.p.: 1995, pp. 5-13. 59 Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiya al-Su’udiya, al-Tawhid li al-Saff al-Awwal al-Mutawwasit, Riyad: 1998, pp. 9-10. 60 Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Tawhid li al-Saff al-Thani al-Mutawwasit, , p. 9.

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Qur’an and the hadith in all aspects of their life: in faith, ‘ibada (rituals), ethics, mu’amalat (social interactions), and everything else.61 Adopting Islamic laws will result in fortunes in this world.62 Furthermore, the book says that to judge by using other laws amounts to judging with taghut (tyrant), and this is a sign of hypocrisy. Muslims should judge with the shari’a (Islamic law) and be pleased with this judgment. Any person who does not judge with the shari’a is a kafir and a mushrik (polytheist). Rather than being beneficial, judging with other laws will result in damage. The book says that the virtues of human beings and all other creatures will materialize only when the laws of God as set down in the Qur’an and the hadith are followed.63 Furthermore, Muslims are not allowed to humiliate religion and its attributes, such as, for instance, the Qur’an, the hadith and other religious symbols. Anyone who denigrates the religion is considered a kafir. Included in this category is to think that the shari’a will not bring human virtues, mocking men with long beards and women in niqab, and insulting the Companions of the Prophet. Outside of the classroom, the students also read other books on tawhid, such as the Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s Masa’il al-Jahiliyya. The term jahiliyya derives from the term “jahl” (ignorance), which is the opposite of “ilm” (knowledge). In this book, matters that have no roots in the Qur’an and the sunna are discussed64. It also refers to the era before Muhammad’s Prophethood. The work contains a hundred and twenty eight aspects of the Salafi doctrines, particularly tawhid. These issues are the beliefs and practices of the Arabs before Islam, which the Prophet challenged. The first issue, for example, discusses the practice of the Arabs to ask the pious dead65 to act as mediator between them and God. According to the author, this practice is considered shirk. The discussion above shows how Salafi pesantrens introduce the strict doctrines on tawhid to the students from the very start. The students have to know all subjects by heart, particularly those on argumentation (dalil). Through this method, it is not surprising that the students grow capable of providing these arguments whenever they want. In addition to this, the students should follow up the lessons by practicing the Salafi creeds in daily life. Thus, as mentioned in the guidelines for the teachers, the aim of the learning process is not limited to 61 62 63 64

Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Tawhid li al-Saff al-Thalith al-Mutawwasit, p. 26. Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Tawhid li al-Saff al-Thalith al-Mutawwasit, p. 25. Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Tawhid li al-Saff al-Thalith al-Mutawwasit, p. 30. Salih ibn Fawzan ibn ‘Abd Allah Fawzan, Sharh Masa’il Jahiliya, Riyad: Dar al-‘Asima, 2001, pp. 9-10. 65 Salih ibn Fawzan ibn ‘Abd Allah Fawzan, Sharh Masa’il Jahiliya, pp. 20-21,

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merely knowledge transfer, but includes the habituation of practicing what the students have learned. The general content of the subjects learned in the Salafi pesantren meet the basic standards set up by the government. However, the details of the contents differ. The Ministry of Religious Affairs sets the basic competences for ‘aqida for students of the Madrasah Diniyyah (religious education institution held in the afternoon) at the level of Awwaliyah (Elementary level), for example, students have to understand the six pillars of the Islamic faith (arkan al-iman). The students’ understanding of these principles must be verified by certain indicators, including the students’ ability to state these principles with their arguments (dalil). The national standard of the Madrasah Diniyyah curriculum continues that students must know the twenty Attributes of God, such as God is Omnipresent, The One, and The Greatest.66 At the Wusta (Secondary) level, which is equivalent to the Mutawassitah program in Salafi pesantrens, students continue to learn, in detail, the other pillars of the faith (arkan al-iman): belief in God’s Messengers, His Books, His Angels, the Hereafter, and Qada and Qadar (predestination).67 Meanwhile, at the Ulya (high) level, the students learn the divisions of tawhid into tawhid uluhiyya, rububiyya and ubudiyyah. The students are also introduced to the schools of Islamic theology, such as Qadariya, Jabariya, Ash’ariya and Mu’tazila, and Islamic mysticism (Sufism).68 2. Hadith Hadith is the second most important subject taught in Salafi pesantrens. Although some pesantrens use the textbooks published by the Ministry of Education of Saudi Arabia,69 close examination of these materials shows that there is no significant difference with those learned in non-Salafi pesantrens. What is distinctive is that the hadith materials are integrated into other lessons, particularly in tawhid. Thus, 66 Direktorat Pendidikan Keagamaan dan Pondok Pesantren, Direktorat Jenderal Kelembagaan Agama Islam Departemen Agama, Standar Nasional Kurikulum Diniyah (Berbasis Kompetensi) Mata Pelajaran Aqidah Akhlaq Tingkat Awwaliyah, Wustha dan Ulya, Jakarta: 2003, pp. 23-62. 67 Direktorat Pendidikan Keagamaan dan Pondok Pesantren, Standar Nasional Kurikulum Diniyah, pp. 65-86. 68 Direktorat Pendidikan Keagamaan dan Pondok Pesantren, Standar Nasional Kurikulum Diniyah, pp. 88-103. 69 Pesantren Imam Bukhari in Solo adopted these materials for the students. See for example, Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiya al-Su’udiya, al-Hadith li al-Saff al-Awwal al-Mutawwasit, Riyad: 1988; Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Hadith li al-Saff al-Thani al-Mutawwasit, Riyad: 1988; Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Hadith li al-Saff al-Thalith alMutawwasit, Riyad: 1988.

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the selected hadiths are very much related to the basic tenets of Salafism in general, and to tawhid in particular. The first year students of the Mutawassitah program, for example, learn hadiths on shirk, such as the three greatest sinful acts: shirk, humiliating one’s parents and false oath.70 In the second year, the lessons continue with the matters of iman and riya’.71 Other materials include a variety of Islamic tenets, such as Muslims’ ethics in dealing with other Muslims and non-Muslims, the right conduct during rituals, daily prayers and others. A lesson starts with the presentation of a hadith and continues with a short biography of the main rawi (transmitter), the meaning of important words and phrases, and an explanation of the hadith’s essential contents. The lesson ends with some questions. It is interesting that a lesson briefly discusses the transmitter’s biography. Although the explanation is far from perfect and lacks critical analysis, it contributes to the tradition of hadith critique (naqd al-hadith), especially of the transmission (naqd al-isnad). For example, on the Muslim obligation to obey the ruler, the hadith reads: “Muslims should listen to and obey (the ruler) in what he loves and hates as far as the ruler does not order to disobey God. If the ruler orders Muslim to disobey God, he is not entitled to listening and obedience.” The text explains that the hadith contains some essential doctrines: the obligation of Muslims to appoint a ruler, and the obligation of Muslims to obey the ruler as far as the ruler orders them to do good actions. The text, furthermore, elaborates the benefits of the obedience: the unity of the umma, and living in harmony and peace.72 The main transmitter of the hadith is ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Umar. When describing this transmitter, the textbook says as follows: “He is an honoured Companion of the Prophet, the son of ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab al-Qurayshi, may God be pleased with them. He became a Muslim in Mecca, migrated to Medina, and participated in the Uhud War and subsequent wars. He was considered an ‘alim and a jurist among the Companions. He was among the Companions who frequently transmitted the hadiths of the Prophet.”73 In addition to the materials discussed above, the work of Muhyi al-Din Abu Zakariya Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi (well-known as al-Nawawi), al-Arba’in alNawawiya, receives much attention. This collection of forty-two hadiths is widely accepted by Muslims in Indonesia and is taught in most pesantrens and mosques. 70 71 72 73

Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Hadith li al-Saff al-Awwal al-Mutawwasit, p. 8. Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Hadith li al-Saff al-Thani al-Mutawwasit, p. 6. Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Hadith li al-Saff al-Thani al-Mutawwasit, p.18. Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Hadith li al-Saff al-Thani al-Mutawwasit, p. 17.

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However, Salafis have selected this work together with a Salafi commentary. Thus, Salafis read the commentary by Muhammad Salih al-‘Uthaymin in which he maintains that al-Nawawi is a mujtahid (Muslim scholar capable of formulating independent legal reasoning). As a mujtahid, al-Nawawi could be right or mistaken. According to the sheikh, al-Nawawi was mistaken in interpreting alsifat wa al-asma’ (God’s Attributes and Names). He, for example, interpreted the Qur’anic verse “istawa ‘ala al-arsh” (God sits on the Chair) as “God occupies (rather than actually sit on) the Chair”. However, al-‘Uthaymin maintains that although al-Nawawi used a different interpretation, he did not reject the term “istawa” (sit) but accepted the notion.74 Any Muslim who would reject the idea of “istawa’”, al‘Uthaymin continues, would be considered a kafir (infidel), because God Himself used the term ‘istawa’. Thus, although al-Nawawi is incorrect in his interpretation, being a mujtahid, he will still receive God’s reward. 3. Fiqh Like the subject of hadith, there is no significant difference between the materials on fiqh taught in Salafi pesantrens and those studied in non-Salafi pesantrens.75 Like other books on fiqh, the subject begins with cleanliness (tahara), prayer (salat) and other Muslim obligations (zakat, fasting during Ramadan and the hajj). Other materials on mu’amalat (social interactions), such as the Islamic laws concerning meals, ways of dress, slaughtering, and promises (al-ayman) follows lessons on rituals. Each subject begins with a definition, and moves on to what Islamic law has to say on the subject, dalil, and then to a discussion of materials related to the subject. Salafis pay particular attention to the subject of salat. It is one of the most important subjects taught not only in the classroom, but also in regular religious gatherings in mosques. The work of Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Sifat Salat al-Nabiy (Attributes of the Prophet’s prayer),76 is the main reference for 74 Shaykh Muhammad ibn Salih al-‘Uthaymin, Sharh al-Arba’in al-Nawawiya, Unayza: Dar al-Thurayya, 2003, p. 7-8. 75 See, Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiya al-Su’udiya, al-Fiqh li al-Saff al-Awwal al-Mutawwasit, Riyad: 1988; Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Fiqh li al-Saff al-Awwal al-Mutawwasit, Riyad: 1988; Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Fiqh li al-Saff al-Awwal al-Mutawwasit, Riyad: 1988 76 This work has been translated into the Indonesian language and appears in many editions, from paper back to hard cover editions. This book seems to receive a wide readership and is displayed in many bookstores, including the Gramedia, the bookstore with the largest network in the country. See, Muhammad Nasiruddin AlAbani, Sifat Shalat Nabi, Yogyakarta: Media Hidayah, 2000.

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this subject. Al-Albani wrote the work in response to a widely accepted hadith which states that Muslims should perform their prayers in accordance with the practice of the Prophet. Al-Albani elaborates on the way the Prophet performed his prayers using this sahih (sound and accepted) hadith. He describes every gesture and invocation of the prayers. Having mastered this book, Salafis adopt the way the Prophet prayed in their daily practice. When they perform their prayers collectively, for example, Salafis rigidly adhere to the practice that during prayers, the toes of the men have to touch those of their neighbours when they are standing. In individual prayer, Salafis also use a ‘shield’ (sutra), such as a wall, a person or any other physical object to indicate to other people not to pass in front of them.77 As mentioned above, the works of ‘Abd al-‘Azim ibn Badawi, al-Wajiz fi Fiqh al-Sunna wa al-Kitab al-‘Aziz, and of Ibn Qudama, ‘Umdat al-Ahkam, as well as its commentary, Taysir al-‘Allam by ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Salih Alu Bassam, have become the books most Salafis most refer. Unlike other works on fiqh that discuss the subjects at length, these works provide a brief discussion on the subject and they stress the dalil in the Qur’anic verses and the hadith. ‘Abd al-‘Azim ibn Badawi provides a definition of the subjects and their legal status, followed by arguments (dalils) from the Qur’an and the hadith.78 Thus, this work integrates two branches of Islamic knowledge: fiqh and hadith.79 Meanwhile, the ‘Umdat al-Ahkam contains selected hadiths from the two most authoritative hadith books, Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim, which are structured in line with the fiqh subject matters. In its commentary, the Taysir al-‘Allam, the author provides the reader with an explanation of some vocabulary and important phrases in the hadith, and continues to explain the general meaning (al-ma’na al-ijmali), followed by a discussion of the laws included in the hadith. When different opinions exist on the subject discussed, the author presents them, followed by his preference.80 77 Muhammad Nasiruddin Al-Abani, Sifat Shalat Nabi, pp. 94-98. 78 See, for example, the author’s explanation on the first chapter, al-Tahara (cleanliness). ‘Abd al-Azim ibn Badawi al-Khalafi, al-Wajiz fi Fiqh al-Sunnah wa alKitab al-‘Aziz, al-Mansura (Egypt): Dar Ibn Rajb, 2001, p. 23. 79 See the “preface” by Muhammad Safut Nur al-Din, Chairman of the Jama’a Ansar alSunna al-Muhammadiya (Society of Helpers of the Sunna of Muhammad) in Egypt, in Ibn Badawi al-Khalafi, al-Wajiz, p. 10. 80 For a discussion of different opinions and author preference, see ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Salih Alu Bassam, Taysir al-‘Allam, Sharh ‘Umdat al-Ahkam, Riyad: Maktaba al-Rush, 2006, p. 16-19.

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D. Internalizing the Salafi Manhaj in Daily Practice: the Students’ Lives Character building is one of the characteristics of the education pesantrens offer. A pesantren does not limit its education to transferring only knowledge to the students, but it also instils the right conduct and behaviour into them. Through diverse activities, pesantrens implant the values of life into their ustadhs. Salafi pesantrens make every effort to accustom their students to live in line with the Salafi manhaj. In addition to mastering religious knowledge, the students are encouraged to put the Salafi doctrines into practice. They also observe the examples their teachers display. This section will discuss how students internalize Salafi doctrines in their daily activities. Some basic tenets on behaviour will be presented before a discussion of the students’ lives is presented. At the end of this section, an evaluation will be given as to how influential the Salafi manhaj is on students’ behaviour.

Rejecting Entertainment (Music, Radio and Television) In general, Salafis view music as haram (unlawful)81 because it causes Muslims to neglect their duties and to waste time. Salafis distinguish between religious music and religious songs. Al-‘Uthaymin contends that religious music, such as nashid, was created by Sufis, and therefore, he considered it bid’a and thus prohibited in Islam. Religious songs without musical accompaniment are permissible under specific conditions. First, the song should be sung spontaneously, without rhythm. Second, singing is not a hobby. Third, the song does not cause a person to think that he will benefit only from the music. Fourth, it does not contradict the shari’a.82 Based on these criteria, the use of musical instruments, except the tambourine (rebana), is strictly prohibited. The tambourine can only be played by and before women during a wedding party or a celebration.83 This belief is based on various hadiths, including a hadith that reads: “Two voices are damned in this world and the hereafter: music during pleasure and a crying during disaster.” Moreover, Salafis contend that listening to music and other entertainment such as listening to radio or tape recorders and watching television are haram. As a technological advancement, these devices are neutral, that is, they can be utilized for either good or bad purposes. However, Salafis view that the programs 81 Bin Baz, for example, says that music is haram. See, Zainal Abidin, “Canda di Panggung Hiburan”, Majalah As-Sunnah, no. 9, vol. XI, 2007, p. 26. 82 Majalah As-Sunnah, no. 9, vol. XI, 2007, pp. 5-6. 83 Majalah As-Sunnah, no. 9, vol. XI, 2007, p. 6.

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on the television result in more damage than advantages. There is also a number of fatwas (legal opinions) that support this opinion. The late Abdullah ibn Baz, a great sheikh from Saudi Arabia, for example, states that watching television is dangerous because television channels feature dangerous programs. Programs such as films, music shows and family dramas cause more damage than good and Muslims, he stresses, reap no benefits from watching these programs.84 A similar fatwa was issued by Nasir al-Din al-Albani. In his fatwa, he asserts that watching television is haram because it presents awful and terrible programs that contradict the shari’a. Furthermore, he maintains that if the government was to present good television programs, Muslims could watch them.85 Al-Uthaymin supports this view. For him, it is preferable and safer for Muslims to avoid watching television. He presents three different laws regarding watching television. First, watching news programs on television is permissible. Second, watching television programs that contain bad elements and inspire people to conduct crime is haram. Lastly, watching television programs that have no bad content just to waste time could be haram, because it consumes electricity and wastes money.86 Referring to Al-Uthaymin’s fatwa, Salafis still tend to watch television to watch the news. Abu Rida Ahmad Sunanto, a temporary resident from a Salafi enclave in Depok, West Java, for example, acknowledges that he keeps a television in his home in Bintaro. He only switches it on for watching the news. He also tries to implement the Salafi manhaj in his family. When I visited his house in October 2008, I did not find any pictures hanging on the wall, although he did have a picture of his family. This picture was taken before he converted to Salafism.87 When he showed me the picture, I saw a handwritten note on its back that reads “For family documentation only, not to be hung on the wall” dated February 9, 2003. Congruent with this belief, Salafis contend that using entertainment, such as drama in any da’wa activity is regarded bid’a. Drama is categorized as tashabbuh (imitation) of non-Muslim culture.88 Salafis believe that da’wa methods are not ijtihadi but tawqifiyya matters (matters that have been agreed on), which have been clearly formulated by the Prophet and the Salaf generation. The argument departs from the belief that Islam is a comprehensive and all-encompassing religion; Islam has prescribed all aspects of human life, and therefore, it does not 84 85 86 87 88

Fatawa, no. 2, vol. II, 2004, p. 12. Fatawa, no. 2, vol. II, p. 13. Fatawa, no. 2, vol. II, p. 27. Interview with Abu Rido Ahmad Sunarto, Bintaro, October 14, 2008. “Sinetron Islami?”, Risalah Dakwah al-Hujjah, leaflet, no. 9, vol. VIII, Rabi’ul Akhir 1426.

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need any additional doctrines or practices.89 Salafis reject the opinion that da’wa methods fall into the ijtihadi category, which states that in line with the principle of common good (maslaha mursala), the preacher can innovate any method suitable to the recipients of the da’wa (mad’u). Salafis criticizes this stance, because they believe that it leads to a principle of legitimating all methods to achieve goals. Salafis believe that God, not human beings, determines the common good. Quoting Ibn Taymiyya’s opinion, Salafis argue that God has laid down the common good in religious doctrines. Consequently, Salafis do not accept man-made religious practices based on common good and consider them bid’a.90 According to Ibn Taymiyya, every action has harmful and beneficial effects. When the advantages outweigh the damage, God will obligate it. On the contrary, when damage prevails, God will outlaw it. Based on this belief, Ibn Taymiyya argues, God will not ignore matters or actions that contain benefit for human beings. When God does not prescribe it, it will cause more damage than benefit.91

Isbal, Jalabiya, Lihya, and Niqab Salafis pay special attention to dress. As I will describe in Chapter Six, their dress has become one of the most distinguishable elements of Salafi identity. People can easily recognize them from their clothes. Isbal, jalabiya and niqab are worth discussing here in more detail. Isbal means to let clothes hang beneath the ankles. Arguing on the basis of various hadiths, Salafis believe that isbal is forbidden in Islam. The Prophet is reported to have said “A sarong that hangs beneath the ankles is in hell.” Another hadith says “God will not look at a person who drags his clothes for arrogance, in the hereafter.”92 Applying the example of the Salaf, Salafis avoid isbal in their daily life. They believe that isbal prevents Muslims from entering paradise. Therefore, their trousers, etc. are short and never cover the ankles. Closely related to the doctrine of isbal is the jalabiya, a long and loose cloth covering the body until the knee. There is no specific Salafi doctrine concerning the type of cloth, except for the principle that it should cover the ‘awra (genitals, part of the body that should be covered). In order to meet this condition, Salafis 89 Shaykh Abd al-Salam ibn Barjas bin Nasir Abd al-Karim, Menyingkap Syubhat Dakwah, Tegal: Maktabah Salafy Press, 2003, pp. 25-35, 87-94. 90 Shaykh Abd al-Salam, Menyingkap Syubhat, pp. 72-73. 91 Shaykh Abd al-Salam, Menyingkap Syubhat. pp. 76-77. 92 Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Hadith li al-Saff al-Thani al-Mutawwasit, p. 111.

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choose a loose cloth that conceals the body’s shape. Moreover, following the hadith that orders Muslim to use white cloth, Salafis prefer white cloth.93 In addition to clothing, Salafi men grow their beard long. This is based on various hadiths that instruct Muslims to shave their moustaches and to let their beard grow.94 According to another hadith, this is to distinguish Muslims from adherents of Mazdaism,95 and polytheists. Salafis argue that shaving the beard is an effort to change God’s creation and to adopt the appearance of a woman.96 Based on these hadiths, Salafis make every effort to differentiate themselves from non-Muslims. In practice, some Salafis, for example, use their wristwatch on their right wrist, because non-Muslims usually wear it on their left. Salafis’ literal interpretation of these texts has resulted in different attitudes to those of other Muslims. Using the same hadith, the Muhammadiyah, for example, contends that the ‘illat (rationale) of the prohibition of isbal is arrogance (khuyala’). Isbal was the tradition of the Arabs of the time. They dragged their clothes on the street to demonstrate their wealth and their social status. If this ‘illat disappears, the Muhammadiyah argues, Muslims are allowed to indulge in isbal. A similar argument is applied to the lihya (long beard). According to other groups of Muslim, such as Persis, the Prophet’s instruction to keep the beard is to distinguish Muslims from the adherents of Mazdaism. When this difference is no longer important, Muslims have no obligation to wear their beards long. As nowadays adherents of other religions can have long beards too, Persis sees no urgency in keeping the lihya.97 Reformist Muslim groups, such as the Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam, apply the maxim in legal reasoning that reads “al-hukm yaduru ma’a al-‘illa wujudan wa ‘adaman” (“the law revolves around the availability and the absence of rationale”). Confronted with this rational way of thinking, Salafis argue that religion is not subject to reason. They maintain that their attitudes are manifestations of following the sunna of the Prophet. In addition to wearing long and loose clothes, female Salafis wear a niqab. The basic argument for this is the Qur’anic verse “And say to the believing women 93 The hadith reads: “Use white cloth, because it is cleaner and better, and death is wrapped in white cloth.” Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Fiqh li al-Saff al-Thalith al-Mutawwasit, p. 68. 94 Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Fiqh li al-Saff al-Thalith al-Mutawwasit, p. 62. 95 Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Fiqh li al-Saff al-Thalith al-Mutawwasit, p. 62. See also, Abu Ubaidah Yusuf bin Mukhtar bin Munthohir as-Sidawi, Bangga dengan Jenggot, n.p.: Pustaka An-Nabawi, 2009, pp. 20-35. 96 ‘Abd al-Azim ibn Badawi al-Khalafi, al-Wajiz p. 30. 97 Interview with Maman Abdurrahman, Chairman of Central Board of Persatuan Islam, Bandung, 10 February, 2010.

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that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty; that they should not display their beauty and ornaments except what (ordinarily) appear thereof; that they should draw their veils over their bosoms.”

Kunya Name A Kunya name is a given name or an alias. This pseudonym usually refers to the name of the first son or daughter, by adding the term ‘Abu’ (‘father’) for the child’s father, or ‘Ummu’ (‘mother’) for the child’s mother. When a Salafi has a child named ‘Fauzan’, for example, people will call the father ‘Abu Fauzan’, and the mother ‘Ummu Fauzan’. Single Salafis or married Salafis without children can use a kunya name as an expectation or du’a (prayer). Indeed, a kunya name is unofficial. This name is not written in official documents and Salafis keep their original names on their passports and identity cards. Salafis believe that a kunya name is sunna. The Prophet was reported in a hadith to have asked Abu al-Hakam to change his name, using the name of his oldest son. The hadith continues: Then the Prophet said: “Indeed, God is the only Judge (al-Hakam), to Him we ask judgment.” Abu Shuraih said: “My community always asked me for a judgment when they disputed a matter, and they would be pleased by my judgment.” The Prophet said: “How wonderful it was! Who are your children?” I answered: “Shuraih, Muslim and ‘Abd Allah”. The Prophet asked: “Who is the oldest?” I replied: “Shuraih.” The Prophet said: “Then, you are Abu Shuraih”.98

The kunya name is an Arabic cultural tradition that was adopted by Islam. Thus, the Prophet Muhammad was often called Abu al-Qasim, referring to his son, al-Qasim. In addition to having a name related to a son or a daughter, references can also be made to the general habits of a person. Some Companions are thus famous for their nicknames, such as Abu Bakr al-Siddiq Thus, Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, the first caliph, is named so because he domesticated bakr (young camels). Similarly, Abu Hurayra is so called because he used to raise kittens (hurayra). Ali ibn Abi Talib was often called Abu Turab, because he used to sleep on the floor (turab).99

98 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Salafi-Indonesia/message/1175, accessed on 10 November, 2011. 99 http://blogal-furqon.blogspot.com/, accessed on 10 November, 2011.

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Having Meals Salafis pay much attention to the etiquette of eating and drinking. The Prophet has set various practical guidelines for having meals: using the right hand and utilizing three fingers (thumb, index finger and middle finger).100 The Prophet also encourages Muslims to have meals together because God’s blessing lies in togetherness. The argument for this is the hadith that reads “Meals which are enough for one person will be enough for two persons, meals for two persons will be enough for four people, and meals for four people will be enough for eight people”.101

Following this hadith, Salafis usually eat collectively from one big tray for three to five people. They sit together in a circle. In addition to following the sunna, they argue, this way of having meals instils companionship among them. However, not all Salafi pesantrens implement this way of consuming meals. In Pesantren Assunnah in Cirebon, for example, the students eat from a small container provided by a catering company. Similarly, the students of Pesantren al-Furqan in Gresik eat from their own plates. Simplicity and hygiene seem to be the reasons behind this choice. Students’ Lives Normally, students start their activities in the early morning before the dawn prayer by memorizing Qur’anic verses or hadiths in the mosque. Memorizing the Qur’an is one of the benchmarks of Salafi pesantrens for all students. In Pesantren Assunnah, for example, MTs and MA students have to memorize 5 juzs and 6 juzs (chapters) respectively, out of the 30 juzs that make up the Qur’an. Following the prayer, certain teachers deliver general lectures on ‘aqida or other Salafi doctrines. After breakfast, the formal class begins at seven o’clock in the morning. It usually ends with the noon prayer. After noon prayer, while the students of Tahfiz or its equivalent, MI or SDIT, rest until the afternoon prayer, MTs and MA students have additional courses in secular sciences. After the afternoon prayer, the students have the opportunity to pursue their own interests. In pesantrens with good facilities, such as Pesantren Assunnah in Cirebon, Pesantren Imam 100 Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Fiqh li al-Saff al-Thalith al-Mutawassit, Riyad: 1988, p. 38. 101 http://kaahil.wordpress.com/2008/12/19/adab-makan-minum-bg11-makanberjamaah/, accessed on 10 November, 2011.

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Bukhari in Solo, Pesantren Ihya Assunnah in Tasikmalaya and Pesantren alIrsyad in Tengaran, the students spend this leisure time exercising, such as playing football and volleyball. There are no so-called “Islamic sports” in the pesantren: horse riding, swimming and archery. Horse riding and archery are expensive so that they are rare in Islamic education institutions. Although swimming is affordable and common among students, the students of Salafi pesantrens usually do not swim. The unavailability of a swimming pool in the pesantren and the use of swimsuits may be the reasons behind this. Meanwhile, students of modest pesantrens spend this free time in their own way: the pupils of Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari, for example, have fun in the paddy field or cultivate vegetables. However, other students spend this time learning or memorizing the Qur’an. At Pesantren Assunnah in Cirebon, for example, students sit individually or collectively in the mosque and memorize the Qur’an. They sit in groups listening to someone’s recitation from memory and correct him if they hear a mistake. After the sunset prayer, another general lecture is usually delivered in the mosque where students stay until evening prayer. After evening prayer, the students have to study individually or collectively. At Pesantren al-Furqan in Gresik, the students have evening classes from eight until nine o’clock. The students are accustomed to living in compliance with the Salafi manhaj. They are not allowed to watch television programs, read magazines, listen to radio, or have electronic devices such as a mobile phone or MP4 player. Walkman and MP3 players are allowed for limited purposes only: listening to Qur’anic recitation and Salafi da’wa. Apart from incidental inspection by teachers, it is not clear how the pesantren controls that these devices are used for the correct use only. Internet access is strictly prohibited. Adult students (students of Ma’had ‘Aly at Pesantren al-Furqan, students of Tadrib al-Du’at at Pesantren Assunnah and Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari), however, are permitted to have mobile phones and can access the Internet to run their businesses. These adult students are usually university students or married Salafis who attend takhassus (special program for preparation) programs or regular lessons in mosques. They live outside the pesantren and have their own business to support their family. Male students have to wear a loose t-shirt (jalabiyya or baju kokoh), a Muslim cap and trousers above their ankles. They have long beards and have their moustaches cut. This Salafi style constitutes the pesantren uniform. Interestingly, at Pesantren Assunah in Cirebon, the students, particularly Kindergarten and SDIT pupils, wear a modified national uniform. Thus, SDIT students wear long red trousers and a white T-shirt. The adoption of the national uniform reflects

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this pesantren’s flexibility to accommodate to national interests as far as they do not contradict the Salafi manhaj. Likewise, female students at Salafi pesantren normally wear a niqab. Again, Pesantren Assunnah in Cirebon is an exception as wearing a niqab is not mandatory . The girls are free to choose whether they want to wear a jilbab or a niqab. During my visits to the pesantren in November 2008 and April 2010, I found many female students wearing a jilbab, while others wore a niqab. Among Salafi scholars, there are two opinions concerning the niqab. According to Bin Baz, the former Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, wearing a niqab is mandatory, while al-Albani, a Jordanian great Salafi scholar, sees it as not compulsory. In the face of these different opinions, Indonesian Salafis accept both as valid and students are allowed simply to wear either one. However, as the majority of Salafis consider that a woman’s face is the source of calamity, they prefer to adopt Bin Baz’s opinion rather than that of al-Albani. Ja’far Salih, the director of a Salafi pesantren in Depok, for example, argues that a woman’s face can tempt and encourage men to sexual harassment.102 Female students are separated from males under tight surveillance of the director or teachers. At Pesantren al-Furqan, female students live in their own buildings surrounded by a high wall separating them from male students. At Pesantren al-Nur in Ciamis, they live on a different campus built especially for them. Ideally, they are taught by female teachers but due to the limited number of female teachers, they are also taught by male teachers, and are separated from them by a curtain. When the teacher needs to write something, he writes on a white board and places it in front of the curtain so that the students can see and copy what he has written. The students’ lives may seem relaxed, but they abide to strong discipline. During my visits to various pesantrens in Java from September 2008 to April 2009, it was not uncommon to see students coming late to the mosque to perform their daily prayers collectively. This is in total contrast to modern pesantrens, such as Pondok Modern Gontor, where the students do their daily activities under strict surveillance. Pesantren al-Irsyad in Tengaran, Central Java, applies even stricter regulations. At al-Irsyad, senior ustadhs stand in front of the doors of the mosque to record students who come late to perform the sunset prayer. After the prayer, the students who came late are invited to stand in front of the audience and are punished. In general, the Salafi pesantrens attempt to accustom the students with the practice of the Salafi manhaj by making them conscious of their duties. In the classrooms or during religious instruction in 102 Interview with Ja’far Shalih, director of Madrasa Salafiya, Depok, 10 September, 2008.

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the mosques, the teachers explain the religious doctrines to make the students aware of their religious duties.

The Influence of Salafi Doctrines on the Students’ Behaviour It is not easy to measure the influence of Salafi tenets on children’s behaviour. Although students are accustomed to practice the Salafi manhaj in their daily lives within the pesantren, the atmosphere at home and in their neighbourhoods also play a crucial role in building their characters. A few cases show that Salafi doctrines change students’ behaviour. As mentioned earlier in Chapter Two, the parents of some students in Pesantren al-Irsyad in Tengaran, complained about the changes in their sons’ attitude towards militancy. After having returned home, the students appalled their parents by removing pictures and electronic devices, such as televisions and radios, from their homes.103 The case of Fawaz, a fifth year class student of SDIT Assunnah Cirebon, is interesting to consider. His parents, Wawan Ridwan and Rina Rindana, are lecturers at Sheikh Nurjati State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) in Cirebon and affiliated with the Nahdlatul Ulama. Rina’s father is the kyai of the traditional Pesantren ‘Ulum al-Din in Karang Mulya, Cirebon, West Java. Having this background, they were aware of the possible problems they might face if they decided to send their son to Pesantren Assunah. The Salafi tendency to condemn traditionalist beliefs and practices could cause serious problems within their wider family. Rina’s parents objected to the plan to send Fawaz to a Salafi pesantren. However, Rina and her husband persisted and explained to them that they were motivated by the high quality of the education the pesantren offers. In addition to Islamic knowledge, the pesantren also provides the students with secular subjects. Finally, Rina and her husband successfully convinced their parents.104 In the first few years, the parents had no problems with their son. In order to become familiarized with the practices of Islam common among traditionalist Muslims, the parent advised their son to memorize some du’as (prayers) such as qunut, (a special formula chanted at dawn prayer). However, Fawaz has recently come to try to limit his mother’s activities. He always questions his mother whenever she goes out for any purpose, especially when she goes to campus to 103 Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia, New York: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 2006, p. 76. 104 Interview with Wawan Ridwan and Rina Rindana, lecturers of IAIN Cirebon and parents of student of SDIT As-Sunnah, Cirebon, April 16, 2010.

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teach or engage in other activities. He poses curious, but suspicious-sounding, questions: “Where are going?” “For what purpose?” “Who are you going to meet?” “What time will you be back?” Moreover, Fawaz has started to scrutinize his mother’s mobile phone. When he finds short messages from male colleagues, he always asks her who they are. He also tries to tell his mother not to leave the house without being accompanied by a mahram (relatives who are forbidden from marring her). Surprisingly, the influence of the Salafi tenets appears only in his perception of the role of women in public. He still keeps his other habits, such as singing popular songs, watching television, drawing living creatures and so on. Encountering this problem, his father explained to his son that he has permitted his mother to go out, and the reason for going out is good: to teach students. However, the son’s conduct remains a problem. His parents complained several times to the pesantren about this, asking the teachers about their son’s possible misunderstandings. The parents wondered if the teachers incorrectly taught the students about the role o women in public life. However, they have had no response from the pesantren. Despite this complaint, the parents have no intention of withdrawing their son from the pesantren as they still believe that the quality of education at Pesantren Assunnah is worth the problem, and that Fawaz’s perceptions may yet change over time.105 Fawaz’ questions suggest how Salafi students internalize the Salafi manhaj, particularly concerning the relationship between men and women. According to Salafis, female Muslims are prohibited from meeting men unless they are guarded by their mahram. For Salafis, the safest place for women is in their homes, and their best role is to act as their children’s educator. If women are to teach children at school, they should teach female students only. The case also shows that the influence of Salafism on elementary school pupils does not extend to their hobbies or other pleasures, such as singing and watching television. This is understandable because a child of this age is fond of entertainment. The influence of Salafis on hobbies will start to appear in students at higher levels, at the Madrasah Tsanawiyah or Madrasah Aliyah, as in the case of the students of Pesantren al-Irsyad, Tengaran. While we cannot generalize the influence of Salafi doctrines on students from the single case discussed above, it may be used as evidence of the influence of Salafism on pupils. If the process of teaching and familiarizing Salafism continues, the pesantren will, no doubt, produce devoted Salafis. 105 Interview with Wawan Ridwan and Rina Rindana, Cirebon, April 16, 2010.

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Concluding Remarks Salafi pesantrens provide educational programs at all levels, ranging from preschool to higher education. They have developed their own curriculum, varying from total emulation of the Middle Eastern curriculum to a combination of elements of Middle Eastern and national curricula. Those pesantrens associated with the “rejectionist” faction, such as Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari, represent the old type of pesantren that specifically teach religious subjects. Educational programs in these pesantrens are managed less systematically, without a clear curriculum and utilizing the halaqa method instead of the graded system. While other pesantrens affiliated to the “cooperationist” faction adopt the national curriculum, teach both religious knowledge and secular subjects, and utilize the graded system. The adoption of Middle Eastern contents in religious subjects is intended to acquire mu’adala or the recognition of certain higher education institutions, such as the Islamic University in Medina. Salafi pesantrens have imparted Salafi doctrines to their students from their childhood on by using very simple ways, such as the prohibition of singing songs and making picture of living creatures. In the pesantrens, the students are not only introduced to the tenets of Salafism, but also exposed to the practice of the Salafi manhaj. The pesantren milieu has created an environment conducive for the application of the Salafi manhaj, such as performing collective prayers, avoiding isbal, wearing the jalabiya and having meals together eating from one big plate. These practices become habits in the student’s attitudes. In some cases, the influence of Salafism in the children cause problem to their parents, as in Fawaz’ case.

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Chapter Six

Transforming Individuals and Society

So far, in Chapters Four and Five, I have discussed a number of issues directly related to Salafi pesantrens: their history, educational programs, teachers, subjects of study and student activities. Although the main objective of these pesantrens is to provide religious education in accordance with the Salafi manhaj and to produce a Salafi generation, Salafi pesantrens have also changed individuals’ lives – they start a new life, which is definitely different from the one they had before their conversion to Salafism. Conversion of individuals takes various forms: ‘retreat’ from the world, being a ‘reborn’ Muslim, and change in personal attitude towards the government from ‘radical’ to ‘moderate’. Such individuals feel that they have been reborn in order to become good and true Muslims. They reject their previous beliefs, habits, behaviour, and religious practices. In some cases, converts live together in one area, creating an enclave where they can freely observe and practice the Salafi manhaj. This chapter will discuss modes of individual conversion to Salafism and how this process changes converts lives. As discussed in earlier chapters, in addition to formal programs and regular religious teaching both in the pesantrens and other places such as mosques, Salafi pesantrens provide a special program named Tadrib al-u’at, to train Salafi preachers. While religious learning in the pesantrens is usually attended by students and other Salafis, teaching in mosques is open to the general public. The aim of providing religious teaching in public places is to introduce Salafi doctrines to the wider community. Moreover, the establishment of da’wa radio in a number of pesantrens also extends the reach of 235


Salafi da’wa to a wider audience. There is a pattern to conversion: Once attracted by Salafi da’wa, sympathizers will seek out further instruction in a pesantren. As this process continues, they will become fascinated by and finally convert to Salafism, ultimately rejecting their old ways and starting a new life. In its wider manifestation, conversion leads to the creation of an enclave where Salafis can put the Salafi manhaj into practice. Below, I will discuss the framing process by which Salafis try to convince potential members to become adherents. A. Framing: Struggle against bid’a, opposing the West, and back to ‘true’ Islam. In the discussion in Chapter Two of the growth and development of the Salafi movement and its networks, I employed the Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT). In that chapter, I demonstrated that Salafis have two strategies in building up their network: using existing institutions and creating new ones. In addition, I also analysed the emergence of the Salafi movement in the global and local social and political contexts, applying the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) theory. However, these approaches are insufficient for understanding how the movement attracts more followers, and converts bystanders into potential activists. The recruitment of new participants follows a process called framing, which plays crucial role in converting potential members and sympathizers of the movement and turning them into active participants. Framing functions as a guide for activists and directs their actions. In order to attract new recruits, the framing process involves local and indigenous languages and symbols. Framing is defined as meaning construction.1 It is the process of constructing the values of those involved in a movement. The framing process begins with a participant’s interpretation of his beliefs and values with respect to his involvement in the movement. It is followed by the dissemination of these values to others in order to attract them to and engage them in the movement. Framing has three main tasks: diagnostic, prognostic and motivating.2 Diagnostic framing aims at the identification of the problems an individual community faces and their attributions (social, political, economic). At this point, an activist usually blames parties or individuals he believes to be responsible for causing these 1 2

Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment” in, Annual Review Sociology, 2000, Vol. 26, p. 614. David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, Ideology, “Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization”, in Bert Klandermans, et al., From the Structure to Action, Greenwich: JAI Press, 1988, pp. 199-204.

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TRANSFORMING INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY

problems. Prognostic framing attempts to find solutions to these problems. At this level, framing not only offers solutions but also elaborates on strategies, tactics and targets. Using diagnostic and prognostic framings, an activist tries to make outsiders realize the presence of injustices and accept that other parties are part or even the source of the problems. As Klandermans et al. argue, diagnostic and prognostic framing is an effort to reach consensus mobilization.3 One more step in the framing process, motivational framing, is required. This framing attempts to provide a rationale and an argument for further participation in the movement. Being merely an observer is ineffective in terms of changing the condition. Participation in the movement is required to transform injustices. The framing process raises the question of how Salafis view the current condition of Muslims. It is widely accepted that the Muslim world is in a state of backwardness. Poverty is a serious and widespread problem in many Muslim countries. As a result, illiteracy, malnutrition and unemployment are common in the Muslim world. From the political perspective, Salafis believe that the Muslim world is dominated by the West. At the heart of this lies the problem of Israeli-occupied Palestine, an issue which has fragmented the Muslim world. Salafis identify two factors they think are responsible for Muslim backwardness: internal and external. The chief internal cause they identify is the spread of bid’a (religious innovation); the major external cause of the decline of Islam is the West. Bid’a is defined as new creation in religious matters. All bid’as are bad and deviant.4 This view is based on the belief that Islam is a comprehensive religion. Islam has prescribed all fundamental doctrines: ‘aqida (beliefs) ‘ibada (ritual), law and behaviour. The basic tenets of Islam have been laid down in the Qur’an and the hadith. These two sources have not only decided ‘aqida and ‘ibada (beliefs and ritual), but also mu’amalat (social interactions between human beings). As a way of life, Islam has set all essential guidelines pertaining to the system of Islamic government and even decides simple daily practices such as etiquette for entering a house, eating and drinking, and ways of dress. This implies, Salafis argue, that Islam has prescribed all aspects of human life.5 Consequently, Islam needs no additional doctrines or rituals. All 3 4 5

Bert Klandermans, “The Formation and Mobilization of Consensus” in Bert Klandermans, et al., From the Structure to Action, pp. 178-183. Abdul Hakim Abdat, Risalah Bid’ah, Jakarta: Maktabah Mu’awiyah bin Abi Sufyan, 2004, pp. 29-31. Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas, Prinsip Dasar Islam menurut Al-Qur’an dan As-Sunnah yang Shahih, Bogor: Pustaka At-Taqwa, 2007, p. 151. See also, Abdul Hakim bin Amir Abdat, al-Masa’il (Masalah-Masalah Agama), Vol. 1, Jakarta: Darus Sunnah Press, 2005,

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doctrines and rituals have been clearly laid down by God through His messenger, the Prophet. However, Salafis believe that bid’a has spread over all aspects of Muslim beliefs and rituals. The presence of bid’as pollutes the true religion and contaminates the community.6 The practice of bid’a makes Islam vulnerable, which, in turn, results in the absence of a spirit of struggle, jihad. Furthermore, Salafis believe that bid’a is the source of all evil and responsible for all the disasters befalling Muslims. The only solution for this condition is a return to sound faith as described by the Prophet.7 For example, Malik al-Banjari, a teacher at Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari in Banjarsari, Ciamis, West Java believes that if Muslims will hold on to the true ‘aqida and practice true rituals, they will regain their past glory. He frequently speaks about the glorious periods in early Islamic history and, according to him, the early generations of Muslim were able to conquer the Byzantium and Roman Empires as a result of their true Islamic beliefs (‘aqida). Consequently, Salafis believe that Muslims can only win battles if they adhere to the true ‘aqida.8 Salafis perceive the West – the external factor – as an enemy willing to destroy Islam and Muslims, or at least, to weaken the Muslim world. This view of the West can perhaps be illustrated by an experience I had once had when I wanted to pay a visit to Pesantren Salafiya in Jember, East Java. This pesantren is led by Luqman Ba’abduh, a prominent Salafi teacher and a former Laskar Jihad activist. Ba’abduh was a student of Sheikh Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi’i in Yemen. In my initial telephone contact, I introduced myself and expressed my intention to visit the pesantren for the purpose of academic research. After briefly outlining my research, including the details of my study in the Netherlands, he granted me permission to visit his pesantren. He even informed me that there is a Salafi of Dutch origin at the pesantren, although he did not mention his name. Furthermore, Ba’abduh asked me to send him an official letter from my institution including a short version of my research proposal and a recommendation letter from my supervisor, Martin van Bruinessen and they were duly sent. As a member of the board of directors of the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM), Van Bruinessen wrote his recommendation letter on ISIM-headed paper.

6 7 8

pp. 84-97; Shaykh Abd al-Salam ibn Barjas ibn Nasir Abd al-Karim, Menyingkap Syubhat Dakwah, Tegal: Maktabah Salafy Press, 2003, pp. 25-35. Ali bin Hasan Abdul Hamid al-Halabi al-Atsary, Mengupas Tuntas Akar Bid’ah dalam Timbangan al-Qur’an dan Sunnah, Bekasi: Pustaka Imam Adz-Dzahabi, 2009, p. 267. Ali bin Hasan al-Atsary, Mengupas Tuntas Akar Bid’ah, p. 266. Interview with Malik al-Banjari, Ciamis, February 2010.

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Then a problem emerged. On the eve of my departure to Jember, East Java, Ba’abduh called me and told me that he had revoked his permission. The reason for this cancellation was clear; my study in the West (the Netherlands), and my association with the West. During the telephone conversation, he explained that he had searched the Internet for information on my supervisor, Van Bruinessen, and his institute, ISIM. He concluded that my supervisor and his institute were working in the interest of Christian missionaries. However, Ba’abduh could not elaborate on what he meant by these ‘Christian missionaries’.9 Ba’abduh refused to accept my explanation that my research on Salafi pesantrens was for an academic purpose, a PhD thesis. His argument was simple: at present, I study in the Netherlands, which is a part of the West; hence, I am associated with the West. He was absolutely convinced that the West would make use of my research findings in order to destroy Islam. For him, the West is simply against Islam. He cannot distinguish between academic purposes and political interests. At the end of our conversation, Ba’abduh said that he would be happy to welcome me in his pesantren on the condition that I am a true Muslim and free from any association with the West. Furthermore, he asked me not to disrupt Salafi pesantrens by visiting them. As the man who is supposed to replace Ja’far Umar Thalib among the so-called “rejectionist” Salafis, he is influential. Indeed, he used his position to warn the leaders of other pesantrens not to allow me to conduct research in their institutions.10 The story above demonstrates Salafis’ anti-Western attitude. For them, the West is synonymous with Christianity, a religion adhered to by the majority of the people in the West. Salafis quote the famous Qur’anic verse 2:120, which states that ‘the Jewish and the Christians will never be pleased with you, until you follow their faith’, in order to contend that the Jews and Christians (the West) are true enemies of Islam and are determined to destroy it. They argue that the West, represented by the United States and the United Kingdom, always supports Israel, which is responsible for the death of Muslims in Palestine.11 They 9 Personal communication with Luqman Ba’abduh, December 15, 2008. 10 I discovered this warning when I visited Pesantren Dhiya’ al-Sunnah in Cirebon and interviewed the chairman of the Dhiya’ al-Sunnah foundation, Abu Abdillah. In fact, Abu Abdillah and Muhammad As-Sewed, the director of the pesantren, still allowed me to carry out research in the pesantren as they saw a positive side to my work. According to Abu Abdillah, this research would be helpful in disseminating the information of Salafism in general, and on the pesantren in particular. Interview with Abu Abdillah, Cirebon, 2010. 11 Fatawa, no. 11, vol. II, 2006, p. 8.

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point to incidents such as the cartoons of the Prophet published in a Danish newspaper as evidence of the West’s hostility towards Islam. Muhammad ibn Musa Alu al-Nashr, a Salafi sheikh from Saudi Arabia, relates this case to the spirit of the crusaders and their hostility towards Islam. Moreover, according to him, the only way to defeat non-Muslims is a return to true Islam and the application of Islamic law in Muslim society.12 Salafis’ view on the West, as represented by Ba’abduh and others, resembles Huntington’s analysis on the relationship between the West and Islam. In 1993, Huntington published a provocative article, ‘The Clash of Civilizations’,13 in which he predicted a future global conflict. His main thesis is that ‘the central and the most dangerous dimensions of emerging global politics would be the conflict between groups from differing civilizations’.14 He argues that the end of the Cold War, marked by the collapse of Communism, will enable another power to emerge and will create a new balance. His analysis points out that that power is most likely to emerge from within Islam and Confucianism. Although he acknowledges the two civilizations (Islam and Confucianism) are different in their manifestations (religion, culture and social structure), they could coalesce in order to create a new balance block against Western domination. Thus, he predicted that future global conflicts would be between Islam and China, on the one hand, and the West on the other. 15 In recent decades, the world’s politics has moved to confirm Huntington’s analysis. This is evidenced by bloody tragedies such as the attack on the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001, the subsequent US policy on the war against terrorism, and the attack by the Western allies on Iraq. Ba’abduh’s objection not only represents the Salafis’ view of the West, but also displays the view of the Muslim majority in Indonesia. A survey conducted by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta in 2005 revealed that the majority of Muslims in Indonesia were not in favour of the West, particularly not of the United States and Australia. It found that 66.2 per cent and 50.5 per cent of Muslims hate the United States and Australia, respectively. Moreover, the survey also exposed that 54.9 per cent and 33.1 per cent and 35.6 per cent of Muslims believe that the US, Australia and the United Kingdom are against Islam, respectively. Muslims 12 “Sikap atas Penerbitan Karikatur Nabi”, Majalah As-Sunnah, no.1, Vol. X, 2006, p. 51-53. 13 The article was first published in Foreign Affairs, and reprinted in his extensive book, Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, pp. 183-206. 14 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, p. 13. 15 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, p. 185.

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(41 per cent) also believe that the attack against Afghanistan equates an assault against Islam. They (37 per cent) believe that the war on terrorism is, in fact, a war against Islam. The survey also found that 40 per cent of the Muslims support the idea of demonstrations against the US, while 30 per cent of them agree with boycotting American products. Another 20 per cent suggest cutting diplomatic ties with United States.16 Anti-American sentiment is stirred in particular by the US foreign policy that projects itself as the only world power. This policy, in many cases, shows double standards, especially when dealing with Israel.17 The study of Islam in the West stirs controversy among Indonesian Muslims. Although research on Muslim perceptions of the study of Islam in the West has not yet been conducted, there are indicators to suggest that the majority of Muslims in Indonesia are against it. The objectives of such study are questioned. Many Muslims believe that Islamic studies in the West are motivated by political interests and by orientalism that still dominates the Muslim world. There is certainly some evidence of misconceptions on Islam and the Muslim community in Western studies.18 For the Muslim majority, the right place for Islamic studies is Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, not Western countries. Interestingly, in spite of this criticism, the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Indonesia continues to send lecturers from IAINs/STAINs to study Islam in Western countries. This policy was restarted by Minister of Religious Affairs, Munawir Sjadzali.19 Since the 1970s, Muslim intellectuals have been involved in heated debates about the study of Islam in non-Muslim countries. These debates were driven by the ‘liberal’ ideas advocated by Western graduates, namely Harun Nasution20 and Nurcholish Madjid,21 in order to instil progressive Islamic thought. Nasution, for 16 Saiful Mujani, et al., Benturan Peradaban, Jakarta: PPIM UIN Jakarta in collaboration with Freedom Institute and Nalar, 2005, pp. 42-49. 17 Saiful Mujani, et al., Benturan Peradaban, p. 17. 18 Azyumardi Azra, “Studi Islam di Timur dan Barat: Pengalaman Selintas”, Ulumul Qur’an, No. 3, Vol. V, 1994. p. 9. 19 Bahtiar Effendy, et al., “Munawir Sjadzali, MA; Pencarian Ketegasan Ideologis”, in Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam, (eds), Menteri-Menteri Agama RI, Biografi Sosial Politik, Jakarta: Badan Litbang Agama Departemen Agama RI, in cooperation with PPIM-IAIN Jakarta, 1998, pp. 403-404. 20 On Harun Nasution, see for example, Saiful Muzani, “Mu’tazilah Theology and the Modernization of the Indonesian Muslim Community: An Intellectual portrait of Harun Nasution”, Studia Islamika, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1994, pp. 91-131. 21 On Nurcholish Madjid, see for example, Greg Barton, “Indonesia’s Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual ‘Ulama: The Meeting of Islamic Traditionalism and Modernism in Neo-Modernist Thought”, Studia Islamika, vol.4, no.1, 1997, pp. 29-81.

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example, consistently promoted rational methods in the interpretation of Islamic sources and he introduced the early rationalist school of Islamic theology, the Mu’tazila,22 as a subject of teaching at the then Syarif Hidayatullah State Institute of Islamic studies (IAIN), Jakarta. He later wrote a book on this subject. He also wrote a book entitled ‘Islam ditinjau dari Berbagai Aspeknya’23 [Islam Viewed from a Variety of its Aspects], which introduced a new approach to Islamic studies. Both approaches to Islamic doctrine are compulsory for all IAIN students throughout Indonesia. Meanwhile, Madjid’s slogan ‘Islam yes, Partai Islam no!’ [Islam yes, Islamic party, no!] was designed to encourage Muslims to adopt secularization. While the usual meaning of secularization suggests a total separation between religion and the state, Madjid’s views infer a place for both religious and mundane matters.24 Without doubt, the ideas of both Nasution and Madjid triggered controversy among Muslim intellectuals. One prominent figure who sharply criticized this progressive point of view was Muhammad Rasjidi, the first Minister of Religious Affairs.25 With regards to Nasution, for example, he directed his criticism to the concept of monotheism (tawhid). According to Rasjidi, Nasution had a tendency to judge all religions (Islam, Christianity and Hinduism) as equal. He accused Nasution of instilling doubts about the Islamic faith among students.26 He also criticized Madjid’s interpretation of secularism for being different from that in the West. For Rasjidi, secularization is the application of secular ideas resulting in the separation between state and religion.27 The majority of Muslims believed that Nasution’s and Madjid’s ideas were influenced by the rational and secular approaches prevalent in the West. This was despite the fact that when Madjid launched his ideas about secularization he had not yet studied in the West.28 22 At least, Nasution wrote two books on this subject; Harun Nasution, Teologi Islam: Aliran, Sejarah, Analisa, Perbandingan, Jakarta: UI Press, 1978; Ibid, Muhammad ‘Abduh dan Teologi Rasional Mu’tazilah, Jakarta: UI Press, 1987. 23 Harun Nasution, Islam ditinjau dari Berbagai Aspeknya, Jakarta: UI Press, 1979. 24 Nurcholish Madjid, Islam: Keindonesiaan dan Kemodernan, Bandung: Mizan, 1987, p. 207. 25 On Rasjidi’s criticism to Harun Nasution and Nurcholish Madjid, see H. M. Rasjidi, Koreksi terhadap Dr. Harun Nasution tentang “Islam Ditinjau dari Berbagai Aspeknya”, Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1977; Ibid, Koreksi Prof. Dr. HM. Rasjidi terhadap Prof. Dr. Harun Nasution dalam Uraiannya: Ajaran Islam tentang Akal dan Akhlaq, Jakarta: Fajar Shadiq, 1985; Ibid, Koreksi Terhadap Drs. Nurcholish Madjid tentang Sekularisasi, Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1972. 26 Rasjidi, Koreksi terhadap Harun Nasution, p. 24. 27 Rasjidi, Koreksi terhadap Drs. Nurcholish Madjid, pp. 17-18. 28 Fuad Jabali and Jamhari (eds), IAIN dan Modernisasi Islam di Indonesia, Jakarta: Logos, 2002, p. 43.

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If the majority of Muslims in Indonesia perceive the study of Islam in the West negatively, Salafis prohibit it categorically. Salafis contend that learning about Islam from the people of bid’a is forbidden, let alone studying Islam from infidel scholars in Western universities.29 On this basis, many Salafis have asked me why I choose to study Islam in the West. Even though I have repeatedly explained that I am not studying Islam per se, but rather that I am learning methodological approaches to Islam and Muslim societies, Salafis remain sceptical of my study. It could be said that they do not fully understand the difference between Islam as a doctrine, on the one hand, and Islam as a social phenomenon practiced by Muslims, on the other. For Salafis, Islam is one; a normative Islam, the doctrine. The existence of different Muslim societies does not represent Islam as a doctrine. The anxiety about studying Islam in the West is apparent in the rhetoric of a number of leading Salafi figures. Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin, the leader of Pesantren Imam Bukhari in Solo, for example, asked me during my interview with him; ‘why do you study Islam in the West?’30 These two factors can be seen as contributing to the decline of the Muslim world. To follow Benford and Snow on framing, Salafis have diagnosed the problem of Muslims: They charge the West and Muslims themselves with being the sources of the problem. The only solution to remedy this decline, according to Salafis, is to reject all forms of bid’a and to return to true Islam. This call is the second task of framing, the prognostic framing. The question, then, is what is true Islam? The question of true Islam is an enduring dilemma encountered by Muslim thinkers. It has been central to discussions about how to cure the Muslim ailments of poverty and underdevelopment. A number of great thinkers, such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh, Rashid Rida,31 Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Abul A’la al-Maududi, to mention some, have addressed this problem and have offered their solutions. Muhammad ‘Abduh, for example, provides a theological foundation for the rational interpretation of Islam in order that Muslims can develop and move towards progress. All these scholars claim that their interpretation of Islamic doctrine is in line with the spirit of Islam and is thus true Islam. 29 See for example, Abu Isma’il Muhsin al-Atsari, “Jangan Mengambil Ilmu Agama dari Ahli Bid’ah”, Majalah As-Sunnah, no. 3. Vol. X, p. 31. 30 Interview with Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin, Solo, February 21, 2009. 31 On Jamaluddin al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Ridla, see for example, Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in Liberal Age, 1798-1939, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

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How, then, do Salafis view true Islam? As Abu Rizal, the prominent Salafi figure from Tasikmalaya, West Java, reveals, Salafis believe that Islam is a complete and all-encompassing religion. Therefore, Islam does not need any interpretation or additional doctrines concerning ‘aqida and ‘ibada. As Islam was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, Muslims should accept the Prophet’s explanations – and reject any other explanations – because Muhammad is the person who knows the religion best. Following the Prophet, and based on the accepted hadith, the first three generations of Muslims (the Salaf) were the people who best understood religion; hence, Muslims should follow their examples.32 This argument leads Salafis to conclude that true Islam is Islam as practiced by the Prophet and the Salaf (Companions, Followers and Followers of the Followers). At this point, following the framing process, Salafis come to the third process of framing – motivational framing – which calls on Muslims to follow the Salafi manhaj. B. Being Salafi: Retreat from the ‘World’ One of the most radical changes in the life of persons who have become Salafis is a change of attitude that may be called a “retreat from this world”. This refers to a situation in which a Salafi ‘withdraws’ from this worldly existence: he leaves his previous activities behind, starts a new life, isolates himself in a place far from the hustle and bustle of the modern world, and focuses his activities on religious activities such as teaching and learning. In short, he changes his entire life. Salafism does not demand this kind of extreme attitude towards this worldly life, since it also supports its adherents in preaching its doctrines, which requires social contacts. Abu Musa is a good example. He was born into a Muhammadiyah family in Klaten, a small city between Yogyakarta and Solo, Central Java. He went to high school in his hometown between 1998 and 2001. In his teenage years, he actively attended religious lessons provided by the local Muhammadiyah branch. He then continued his education, studying veterinary medicine at Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta. As shown in Chapter Two, Yogyakarta has become a centre of the Salafi movement in Indonesia. Consequently, it was no surprise that Abu Musa encountered Salafi da’wa in the early years of his study at Gadjah Mada University. In 2002, He began to attend Salafi religious gatherings on campus, including those held at the al-Hasana Mosque. Furthermore, he studied Arabic in order to be able 32 Interview with Abu Rizal, Tasikmalaya, February 10, 2009.

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to understand the Islamic tenets from their original sources.33 It seems that his previous activism in Muhammadiyah religious circles led him to seek out religious teachings. During his search, he discovered that Salafi doctrines are close to those of the Muhammadiyah, particularly with regard to the cleanse of Islamic beliefs and ritual practices. In 2005, Abu Musa completed his study and obtained his bachelor’s degree in veterinary medicine. In order to become a veterinarian, he was required to pass a co-assistance program, which usually takes one to two years. However, it was at this point that he made an astonishing decision: he left campus, ignoring his ambitions and those of his parents to become a veterinarian, and focused his attentions on the study of Salafism. This decision was made in order to avoid sinful deeds (ma’siya), such as the mixing of men and women (ikhtilat), which was very common on campus.34 As a student, it was inevitable that Abu Musa mixed with women in the classroom, the canteen and in other places. In order to avoid this sinful deed, he decided to end his study and leave campus. This decision disappointed his parents and aroused their anger. He had to explain the reasons for his decision to his parents and to convince them that he had made the right choice. In 2006, Abu Musa moved to Pesantren Dhiya’ al-Sunnah in Cirebon in order to pursue religious studies. As his parents were no longer willing to support him, one of his colleagues provided him with financial assistance. When this support came to an end, he started teaching students in the Tahfiz program in the pesantren. According to Abu Musa himself, when he is in the pesantren he refrains from leaving the compound, except in an emergency. He also refrains from associating with people outside the pesantren. Once again the reason for such isolation is the desire to avoid ma’siya. When reminded that Indonesia is not an Islamic state and, therefore, it is impossible to avoid mixing with women wherever he goes, Abu Musa responds that he seeks out the virtues of life (fada’il) for the sake of the afterlife. He adds that life in this world is temporary, whereas life in the hereafter is eternal.35 It is interesting to analyse Abu Musa’s line of reasoning. A number of factors contributed to his decision. First, Salafi teachers encourage university students to abandon their campuses because campus life is perceived as un-Islamic. Ahmad Halim, a student of Universitas Islam Indonesia (UII) in Yogyakarta confirmed this pressure. He, for example, refused to participate in his own graduation 33 Interview with Abu Musa, Cirebon, November 26, 2008. 34 On ikhtilat, see for example, Ummu Ishaq al-Atsariyyah, “Ikhtilath antara Lawan Jenis”, Asy-Syari’ah, No. 45, Vol. IV, 2008, pp. 81-87. 35 Interview with Abu Musa, Cirebon, November 26, 2008.

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ceremony, because in his view, the event stems from a Western tradition which was implanted in the Muslim world. Consequently, although he completed his study at the UII, he does not hold a bachelor’s certificate. Instead, he went to live in the Salafi enclave located in the veteran compound in Ngaklik, Sleman, Yogyakarta, where he attended Salafi religious teachings in Pesantren al-Anshar. He sold mineral water and gas to earn money.36 Currently, Halim studies Salafism in Dammaj, Yemen. Second, Salafism is appealing as it is a new doctrine. It attracts adherents like magic and influences followers to change their lives. It is a common phenomenon that new thoughts fascinate adherents. The case of Abu Musa is evidence that participation in a strict religious movement like the Salafi requires total commitment. Indeed, committed Salafis dedicate their energy, time and money to the movement. They also make every effort to live in accordance to the Salafi manhaj, such as praying collectively and regularly attending Salafi religious gatherings. In some cases, like in Abu Musa’s case, they limit their communication with the outside community and even with their own family members. Certainly, such behaviour invites stigma from society. Despite this, many people participate in the movement. This raises the question as to what attracts people to join such a strict movement. Lawrence Iannaccone’s analysis of strict churches and sects is relevant here. His starting point is Dean Kelley’s research on the steady growth of conservative churches in the United States. In this study, Kelley concludes that conservative churches grow consistently, whereas mainstream churches lose adherents. He argues that the key factor in this growth is the demand for absolute loyalty, unquestionable faith and strict observance and practice, something with often means adopting a particular lifestyle.37 Kelley identifies three characteristics of strict churches: absolutism, conformity and fanaticism. These traits differ from those of moderate and liberal churches: relativism, diversity and dialogue. According to him, strict churches claim exclusive truth – closed, all-encompassing and eternal doctrines. They demand distinctive ways of behaviour and lifestyles. They condemn outside communities as deviant; consequently, outsiders are shunned. The followers of these churches maintain unusual characteristics such as sporting a particular kind of dress, adopting specific diets and resort to isolation. 36 Interview with Ahmad Halim, Yogyakarta, January 19, 2009. 37 Laurence R. Iannaccone, “Why Strict Churches are Strong”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 99, No. 5, 1994, p. 1182.

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Corresponding to this finding, Iannaccone’s study finds that although members of sects are poorer and less educated, they demonstrate greater commitment, including contributing more money to organizations, attending more religious rituals and services, maintaining stricter beliefs, engaging in more religious groups and avoiding participation in secular activities.38 Following Kelley’s argument, Iannaccone analyses religious movements by using an economic approach – i.e. in terms of producer and consumer, supply and demand, cost and benefit. According to Iannaccone, churches, sects and other religious movements are producers that supply commodities to the market, while adherents are consumers who buy these products, weighing up the costs they pay with the benefits they receive.39 Unlike physical goods, such as computers, or services, such as banking, which are based on the quality of the products, religious commodity is classified in a third category – ‘household commodities’, which offer both materials benefits, such as meals, as well as abstract ones, such as love.40 In this regard, religion not only relates to what individuals feel, but also to what others sense. This deals with the situation and feelings of adherents when they perform rituals. In Muslim communities, for example, this relates to the calmness and quietude in a mosque when believers listen to recitations of the Qur’an; to the peace they feel when they listen to a sermon; to the warmth they receive when greeting each other (saying ‘al-salam ‘alaykum’), shaking hands, and receiving a hug from fellow Muslims; and to the spiritual satisfaction they feel when performing prayers. Moreover, religious commodities are based on supernatural forces, promising eternal life, a peaceful life on earth, and lasting perfect happiness. Utilizing the language of economics, Iannaccone posits a cost-based analysis of strict sects. He defines a sect as ‘a religious organization with a highly committed, voluntary, and converted membership, a separatist orientation, an exclusive social structure, a spirit of regeneration, an attitude of austerity and demanding strict asceticism’.41 A sect is different from a church, which is defined as ‘a religious organization that accepts the social environment, embracing the norms and values of the prevailing culture’. 42 His main argument is that 38 Iannaccone, “Why Strict Churches”, p. 1194. 39 Iannaccone., “Religious Markets and the Economics of Religion”, Social Compass, 39 (1), 1992, p. 123. 40 Iannaccone, “Religious Market”, p. 125. 41 Iannaccone, “Why Strict Churches”, p. 1192. 42 Iannaccone, “Why Strict Churches”, p. 1194.

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‘strictness increases commitment, raises levels of participation, and enables a group to offer more benefits to current and potential members’.43 Iannaccone also argues that strict religious demands – such as diet, dress, isolation, and other restrictions – often limit the social interaction of participants. This behaviour frequently causes stigma and makes engagement in other activities outside the group costly. Faced with this condition, there are only two possibilities available to potential members: full participation or rejection. While doubtful adherents will be eliminated, only members with total commitment will participate in strict religious movements. Consequently, Iannaccone argues that ‘perfectly rational people can be drawn to a decidedly unconventional group’.44 Stressing this aspect of rational choice, Iannaccone refutes the popular view that conversion to fundamentalist groups is caused by psychological alienation. He argues that ‘a high-cost group maintains its strict norms of conduct precisely because they limit participation in competing activities and thereby raise levels of participation within the group’.45 Iannaccone also notes that if a strict group is to be successful, it must provide its members with an alternative ‘close substitute’, something that compensates for the sacrifices they have made for the movement. A devoted member will have to sacrifice many things and endure harsh conditions including living in an isolated place deprived not only of material pleasures such as meals, but also of family, friends, and other associates. Consequently, a group must provide its members with alternative networks that offer a new family, friends and colleagues.46 Abu Musa’s case indeed displays an extreme conversion to Salafism. Like joining a sect in Christianity, to follow Salafism is voluntarily. It demands the adherents to follow the sunna in their daily life such as sporting a long beard, wearing certain dress (jalabiya), and avoid isbal. Abu Musa strictly practices these common features of Salafism. Moreover, he isolates himself in the pesantren focusing on studying religion and teaching children. Although Salafism does not demand sacrifices like disassociating from this world, he sacrificed his future career as a veterinarian which would have provided him with good living. Consequently, he disappointed his parents, and lost his cheerful classmates in the university. Abu Musa may suffer from social stigma. However, he feels 43 44 45 46

Iannaccone, “Why Strict Churches”, p. 1182. Iannaccone, “Why Strict Churches”, p. 1188. Iannaccone, “Why Strict Churches”, p. 1197. Iannaccone, “Why Strict Churches”, p. 1204.

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happy with this choice. This is because he found what Iannaccone calls a “close substitute” for his lost family and friends. In his pesantren, he found a new “family”, that is his teachers, colleagues, and students. C. Being Salafi: ‘Reborn’ Muslim Adherents react differently to Salafism. In addition to retreating from the world, as in the case of Abu Musa, others see adherence to Salafism as having been ‘reborn’ as a true Muslim. This implies that a Salafi acknowledges that he previously adhered to a false understanding and the wrong practice of Islam, and that now he has found true and authentic Islam. Unlike those Salafis who make the decision to retreat from the world, another type of followers maintains their activities and businesses in order to sustain themselves. That said, they make major adjustments to their businesses in order to make them compatible with Islamic law (shari’a), such as avoiding bank interest, as Salafis believe that bank interest is riba’ (usury) and forbidden in Islam. Heriyanto provides us with a good example. In 1993, he obtained his bachelor’s degree in Islamic Education from the Faculty of Education at the Wali Songo State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN), Semarang in Central Java. As a governmentsponsored institution, the IAIN teaches a rational interpretation of Islamic doctrines and contextualizes them to modern conditions. Furthermore, since the 1980s there has been a shift in Islamic studies at the IAIN from a normative approach, which supports an idealistic Islam, to historical, sociological and empirical approaches, which incorporate social and historical realities in the interpretation of Islamic doctrines.47 By maintaining this course, the IAIN has established itself as the basis for moderate and mainstream Indonesian Islam. As a student of the IAIN, Heriyanto was occupied with the rational interpretation of Islam. However, his religiosity changed in 1992. In his last year of study at the IAIN, a friend of his introduced him to Salafism. His friend who had been active in Salafi religious gatherings took him to Salafi gatherings at a mosque in Semarang. This provided him with a new interpretation of Islam, diametrically different from what he had studied at his alma mater. While the IAIN advocates a rational interpretation of Islam, the Salafi manhaj supports a scriptural interpretation of Islamic doctrines. For a while, Heriyanto was ambiguous about these two approaches. However, intensive attendance during Salafi religious gatherings, complemented by discussions with 47 Azyumardi Azra, “The Making of Islamic Studies in Indonesia”, in Abd, Samat Musa, et al, (eds), Islamic Studies in World Institutions of Higher Learning, Kuala Lumpur: Islamic University College of Malaysia, 2004, pp. 32-33.

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Salafi teachers, has driven him to follow the Salafi manhaj. He believes that the Salafi approach to Islam is the true one. He argues that the religion of Islam was revealed to and practiced by the Prophet, and consequently, Muslims should first follow the explanation and the practices of the Prophet, and second the examples of the early generations of Muslims who knew Islam best. Accordingly, Muslims have no right to interpret the Prophet’s saying according to their own rationale. Religion, he argues, is not a subject of rationale, but a subject of faith.48 After completing his study at the IAIN, Heriyanto did not try to find a white collar job, but started earning money as a petty trader, selling eggs to villagers. This choice was not unrelated to his Salafi worldview and his desire to stay aloof from all that was not halal. Initially, people ridiculed him for doing such lowly work as a Bachelor Degree holder, but he persevered. After some months selling eggs, it was clear to Heriyanto that the egg business was totally dominated by Chinese businessmen. He deduced that he could not achieve the necessary progress in his business because of that. After a considered market analysis, he decided to change his business into selling rice to the same customers who had earlier bought his eggs. He started off by selling rice from Kendal but when a number of customers complained about the quality he switched to rice from Solo. Heriyanto’s network of Salafi friends proved extremely useful in expanding his business for it provided him with trustworthy and hardworking collaborators. His business flourished and soon he was able to manage to controle the entire rice business: from production to distribution. Indeed, he began to produce rice; to collect rice from farmers, and to package and distribute it to a number of sales points. Today, his rice production is based in Semarang from where he distributes the rice to other cities. Heriyanto learned a great deal from observing Chinese businesses, including the need to secure his own business from sabotage by his competitors. That said, he still feels that the rice industry is insecure and fragile. According to his estimation, 80 per cent of his market is vulnerable. This is the portion managed and run by distributors and clients whose loyalty he still doubts. To counter this, Heriyanto secures the remaining 20 per cent of his market by allocating this portion to the people he can rely on most - his Salafi colleagues. This strategy is twofold: securing 20 per cent of his business and providing opportunities for Salafis with job. Heriyanto believes he can rely on Salafis. According to him, his business is doing well. He claims that his production has reached 60-100 tons of rice per month.49 48 Interview with Heriyanto, Solo, February 22, 2009. 49 Interview with Heriyanto, Solo, February 22, 2009.

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Allocating certain portions of the business to the most trusted people is a rational strategy. Trust is one of the main factors of successful business. In his study on the relationship between Protestant sects and the spirit of capitalism,50 Max Weber found that adherents of some strict sects in the United States, such as Baptists and Methodists, were successful in managing their business because of trust. The key factor of this success was membership in sects that demanded special traits. In order to become a member of a sect one would have to meet certain requirements: he or she must undergo probation, a trial period when he or she should behave correctly in accordance with the ethical principles outlined by the sect. During this period, the moral qualities of the prospective member, especially those related to business matters would be scrutinized. Once he or she passed the probation, he or she would be admitted into the sect, and hence, would be granted a membership certificate. Thus, admission to a specific sect became the guarantee of good conduct and a certificate of moral qualification.51 Furthermore, Weber found that the members of a sect took their certificate with them when they moved or travelled to other cities. Having this certificate would grant them good business opportunities, for it made them not only welcomed by other members of their sect, but also gave them credit. Creditors believed that the sect guaranteed certificate holders. When they faced financial difficulties caused by external factors beyond their responsibility and caused not by their own fault, the sect settled the problem by issuing a letter of guarantee to the creditors, and made every effort to help them. Thus, creditors felt secure when they gave credit to sect members.52 The sect members’ work ethos no doubt contributed to the success they had in their business. Weber found that members of puritan sects, especially Calvinist, were hard workers, displaying their strong desire to be successful in their entrepreneurship. Weber noted that this ethos has its roots in their religious doctrine of “calling.” The term “calling” is a translation of a Germany term “beruf”, which denotes “task set by God” to fulfil a humane mission in this worldly life. This “calling” is “the life-task” to work,53 which had become the 50 Max Weber, “The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism”, in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, (eds), From Max Weber: Essays on Sociology, London: Routledge, 1991, pp. 302-322. 51 Max Weber, “The Protestant Sects”, pp. 305-306. 52 Max Weber, “The Protestant Sects”, pp. 305. 53 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism, London and New York: Routledge, 1992, p. 39.

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highest form of the moral obligation an individual had in the fulfilment of God’s task in this worldly life. The concept of “calling” relates to another religious teaching: predestination. Protestant sects, such as the Baptists, the Methodists and the Calvinists, doctrine says that only few people are chosen and will be saved by God from entering hell. In order to avoid damnation, human beings have to prove themselves as having been elected by God. To be chosen, believers must have a “sign” consisting of having a good life and being prosperous in this world. This “sign” can only be achieved by hard work. To show a living acceptable to God, believers should work hard in this world.54 Salafis are strict adherents of Islam. Although Salafism has no specific doctrine of working such in the Protestant sects, Salafis are well known to have moral qualities which are essential in running business, such as honesty, reliability, responsibility and dedication. Having these traits, Salafis are good collaborators to work with and reliable. Once they get job or are given an opportunity to work, they will work patiently and dilligently. They are hard workers even though they do not make much money. They are content with the small salary they get or with the little profit they make. They really believe in predestination (taqdir): that human fate has been destined by God; that what humans can do is only make an effort (ikhtiyar). In certain cases, this kind of interpretation undermines their work ethos. Heriyanto tries to run his business in line with Islamic law (shari’a). This includes not accepting bank interest. Conventional banking charges, including interest, are an inevitable aspect of running a big business. However, according to his own account, Heriyanto only engages in conventional banking when absolutely necessary, i.e. when it is impossible to avoid bank administration charges for transfers, etc. However, he will not take a bank loan. For example, when he needed a distribution truck, but had insufficient funds to buy one, he did not borrow money from a bank, but instead he rented one. He only bought a truck when he had enough money to do so. Heriyanto does not spend all his time on business activities. He also devotes time for Salafi da’wa activities in his hometown, Karanganyar, Central Java. He manages regular Salafi religious gatherings at the public al-Furqan Mosque in Karangpandan, Karanganyar, where some forty Salafis usually attend. In addition, he manages a Kindergarten. He often invites well-known Salafi teachers from other cities, such as Abu Qatadah from Tasikmalaya and Abdul Hakim Abdat from Jakarta, to deliver public lectures in Karanganyar. 54 Anthony Giddens, “Introduction”, in Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic, pp. xii-xiii.

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As a Salafi, Heriyanto believes that he is now reborn as a true Muslim. He often recalls his religious attitude when he was an IAIN student. At that time, he tried to interpret religious doctrine according to his own rationale; he sought a rational foundation for every doctrine. He now believes that religion is not subject to rationality. Rather, he believes that religion is a matter of belief and sometimes goes beyond human rationale. As a result of this belief, Heriyanto claims to have found serenity, peace and satisfaction when he performs his religious duties; a feeling that he never knew in the past. D. From radical to ‘moderate’: a life history At the individual level, the change to a Salafi attitude occurs not only in terms of a person’s orientation towards the world, but also in his or her orientation towards the movement. The change takes place in individuals who were members or even leaders in radical organizations, such as Darul Islam (DI) or Negara Islam Indonesia (NII, Islamic State of Indonesia) movement. Prior to conversion to Salafism, these DI or NII activists demonstrated a radical attitude towards the government. Indeed, they perceived the Indonesian Government as un-Islamic and tyrannical and had to be replaced by an Islamic alternative. The basic argument behind this attitude is the Qur’anic verse that stipulates that any ruler who fails to implement Islamic laws is a kafir. The thought of Sayyid Qutb, the ideologue behind Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood is influential in this regard. However, conversion to Salafism results in a change of this radical view and their. attitude towards the government shifts from one of confrontation and opposition to onr of loyalty. The following paragraphs discusses the life history of Abu Rizal, a former NII activist who converted to Salafism. It presents his personal journey and demonstrates his shift in attitude towards the government – from radical to moderate.

Abu Rizal, Tasikmalaya, West Java Abu Rizal is currently the chairperson of the Yayasan Ihya’ussunnah, Tasikmalaya, West Java, under which Pesantren Ihya’ussunnah operates. Like other children in his village, he was schooled in a traditional environment, taught to recite the Qur’an and to perform prayers. Having completed his education at an Agricultural Secondary High School (SPMP, Sekolah Pertanian Menengah Pertama), between 1982 and 1984, he moved to Jakarta where he attended religious lectures given by prominent preachers, such as Abdul Qadir Jaelani and

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Mawardi Noor who belonged to the radical wing of the Dewan Da’wah, which is close to the NII. Abu Rizal also attended a three-day dawra Islamiyya organized by the Korps Muballigh (Preachers Corp) DKI Jakarta. It was during this time that he learnt about religion. However, the religion that he learnt was a radical version of Islam, one which views the ruling Indonesian government as un-Islamic.55 As will be discussed later, tensions between Muslims and the government in the early 1980s affected the relationship between Muslims and the state. In 1984, Abu Rizal returned to his home town of Tasikmalaya and joined the Persatuan Islam (Persis), a purist reformist organization. He became active in the da’wa movement, giving religious lectures and organizing religious gatherings with preachers from outside the city. Persis calls on Muslims to return to the Qur’an and the sunna; it is strictly against bid’as in Islamic doctrines and practices. Abu Rizal admits that Persis has shaped the way he performs his religious rituals. After having been active in Persis for three years, Abu Rizal was drawn into the NII movement without however giving up his affiliation with Persis. The NII is a separatist movement, originally founded by Kartosoewirjo at the time of Indonesia’s independence struggle that aims to establish an Islamic state. He was recruited to this clandestine movement by his Persis teacher, Basuni, in Tasikamalaya. Abu Rizal joined the Komando Wilayah 01 (Regional Commandment) that covers West Java. For him, of the various factions into which the NII had split, this was the one considered closest to the original movement. It was also the faction that well-known radical personalities such as Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, H. Ismail Pranoto (well-known as Hispran), and Abdul Qadir Jaelani joined. Abu Rizal developed his career in this clandestine organization and was appointed as a non-territorial leader. This position enabled him to travel to cities such as Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya and Majalengka to supervise and monitor cadres. Friction within this faction emerged when Abdullah Sungkar accused its leader, Ajengan Masduki, of engaging in deviant religious practices. Sungkar and Ba’asyir warned that the movement was vulnerable because its leader had deviated from true Islam. The two men accused Masduki of committing shirk (polytheism). This accusation led to the split of the movement into two: one faction sided with Sungkar and Ba’asyir, while the other remained loyal to Masduki. Encountering this situation, Abu Rizal refrained from taking sides and instead opted to become inactive in the movement. As a result of this decision, he was demoted from his position as non-territorial chief and repositioned as 55 Interview with Abu Rizal, Tasikmalaya, February 16, 2010.

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regional preacher. This move aimed to isolate him from NII members. However, the action failed because he remained in touch with his cadres in the cities. Already at this time, Abu Rizal was critical of the movement. At a meeting with his colleagues, he criticized it for its vague goals. According to him, the movement would perish unless it met certain requirements: it must have a goal (ghaya), a creed (‘aqida), and a method (manhaj). The movement’s goal should be achieving God’s satisfaction (rida Allah). There are two ways to achieve this: being sincere and following the Prophet. With regards to ‘aqida, he contended that the movement should adhere to the true faith – the faith of the Salaf. Likewise, the movement should adopt the manhaj of the Salaf. 56 At this juncture, the influence of Salafi doctrines on Abu Rizal is obvious, but he rejects this. Instead, he says he was influenced by Abdullah ‘Azzam’s thought,57 a Palestinian jihadist ideologue, and specifically by his work, ‘Aqida al-Jayl al-Awwal’ (Creed of the First Generation). ‘Azzam played an important role in mobilizing people to engage in the jihad in Afghanistan; he established a coordination office for the Afghan jihad in Pakistan. His work on the obligation of jihad in Afghanistan attracted thousands of Muslims, including some activists from Indonesia’s Darul Islam, to take part in the jihad against the Soviet Union.58 As an NII activist, Abu Rizal held a militant view of Islam. Indonesia is considered dar al-harb (the abode of war) and not dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam). He perceived the Indonesian government as the enemy – an enemy he should fight against. Other Muslims outside NII are regarded as kafir (unbelievers).59 As previously mentioned, Abu Rizal was also a Persis member. This activism led him to adopt other ideas, including those of the Ikhwanul Muslimin. He claims that he read the works of Ikhwanul Muslimin figures, particularly Sayyiq Qutb, Hasan al-Banna, and Said Hawwa. Furthermore, he frequently organized religious gatherings and discussions on Islamic doctrines in the small mosque he had built in 1990. He also established an Islamic foundation called Yayasan Bina Insan Kamil that runs a small pesantren. As part of his work in preparing cadres responsible for the pesantren’s future, he sent his younger brother, Abu 56 Interview with Abu Rizal, Tasikmalaya, February 16, 2010. 57 On brief biography of Abdullah ‘Azzam, see for example, Thomas Hegghammer, “‘Aballah ‘Azzam”, in Roel Meijer, Global Salafism, (ed.), London: Hurst & Company, pp. 443-444. 58 Sholahuddin, NII Sampai JI, Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia, Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2011, p. 22. 59 Interview with Abu Rizal, Tasikmalaya, February 10, 2009. See also, Sholahuddin, NII Sampai JI, p. 53.

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Qatadah, for study to Yemen in 1996. At the end of his first year, Abu Qatadah sent a letter to the Yayasan Bina Insan Kamil telling his brother and other colleagues about the true Islam according to the Salafi manhaj, and explaining what he believed to be the deviations in NII teachings. He was also keen to point out a number of deviant ideas held by Ikhwanul Muslimin thinkers, in particular Qutb. This last point is critical because, as an activist, Abu Rizal had adopted Qutb’s ideas in his own works, specifically in Fi Zilal al-Qur’an and Ma’alim fi al-Tariq. Abu Qatadah went on to suggest that his brother should meet some prominent Salafi preachers, such as Farid Uqba, Abu Haidar and Abu Nida. Abu Rizal took this advice and met with Farid Uqba, who went on to introduce him to the Salafi manhaj. The initial meetings between the two men were characterized by heated debates on Salafi teachings. Uqba suggested that Abu Rizal read three books on the Salafi manhaj: al-Usul al-Thalatha by Muhammad ibn Abd Wahhab; al-Firqa alNajiya by Sheikh Muhammad Jamil Zainu, and al-Ba’ith al-Hathith by Ibn Kathir. His curiosity led Abu Rizal to meet and talk with other Salafi preachers, such as Abu Haidar and Abu Nida. His interest in the Salafi manhaj had been sparked and he now started to attend lectures given by Abdul Hakim Abdat.60 Fascinated by the Salafi doctrines, Abu Rizal discussed them with his colleagues in the NII. He urged them to arm themselves with religious knowledge in order to achieve the movement’s goals as the spirit of jihad alone is insufficient to reach them. He criticized other leaders for their religious ignorance. Consequently, he was marginalized within the NII. However, he maintained his alliance with the movement. He continued to hold discussions on religious matters with his loyalist comrades. He eventually converted to Salafism and in 2000 he left the NII movement for good. He declared his conversion before his loyalists and called on them to join him in the new movement. Thanks to his charisma, some of his followers, including Maman Suratman and Kosasih, joined him. Upon the return of his younger brother, Abu Qatadah, in 2000, he established a new foundation, the Yayasan Ihya al-Sunnah, which also runs Pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah in Tasikmalaya.61 Kosasih owns a large clothing store in Tasikmalaya and he has become one of the foremost donors of the pesantren. The first buildings of the pesantren were constructed on the land endowed by Kosasih.62 60 Interview with Abu Qatadah, the director of pesantren Ihyaussunnah, Tasikmalaya, West Java, February 10, 2009. 61 Interview with Abu Rizal, Tasikmalaya, February 10, 2009. 62 Kosasih is one of the main donors of Pesantren Ihya’ussunnah in Tasikmalaya, West Java. Interview with Kosasih, Salafi activist in Tasikmalaya, February 16, 2010.

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Main argument: Loyalty to the Government Abu Rizal explains that the goal of the NII movement is to replace the government. The reason for such a rebellious aim is the government’s resistance to implement shari’a law. This reluctance means that the government is regarded as kafir, and therefore should be overthrown and replaced by an Islamic government. As an NII member, Abu Rizal shared this radical attitude to the government. However, this changed when he converted to Salafism. As a Salafi, Abu Rizal shows no hostility to the regime; on the contrary, he demonstrates his loyalty to the government. This radical change leads to a critical question: what is the reason for this shift from his radical, activist attitude to moderation? According to Abu Rizal, the key factor that drove this change is the Salafi doctrine on obedience to the government. As discussed in Chapter One, this doctrine says that Muslims must obey the ruler; they have no right to rebel against the ruler, even if the ruler is repressive and tyrannical (zalim). This dogma also stipulates that fighting against an existing ruler is forbidden, because it will result in more damage to a country than any ruler could do. Muslims are prohibited from criticizing the ruler in public arenas, such as in sermons, public lectures and demonstrations. Based on this doctrine, Salafis oppose any idea of confronting the government. Salafis criticize those Islamist movements that criticize the government publicly, such as Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defender Front), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesian Mujahidin Council) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). The Salafis accuse these groups of mobilizing unrest via demonstrations, or by their sporadic cleansing actions to rid the country of, for example, foreigners or alcohol consumption. According to Salafis, the aim of Islamic da’wa is to call upon Muslims to return to true Islam. The task of a preacher is to deliver (tabligh) the message of Islam, and not to mobilize the masses. Mobilization via demonstrations and cleansing actions is not a true method of Islamic da’wa and will result in damage to the country. In tandem with this principle, Salafis also oppose terrorist acts such as the Bali bombings that killed hundreds of people. Although the perpetrators of the Bali bombings claim to be Salafis, Salafis criticize their actions. According to Ba’abduh, a leading Salafi figure, such action is influenced by the idea of takfir (labelling other Muslims as kafir). The basic argument of takfir is rooted in Qur’anic verse [5:44], which reads: ‘Those who do not judge by the law which Allah has revealed are indeed kafirs (unbelievers)’. The Kharijite used this verse to charge Ali ibn Abi Talib and Mu’awiya of being kafir. In modern times, radical Muslim thinkers 257


have used this verse, such as Sayyid Qutb, to accuse Muslim rulers who do not implement Islamic laws of being kafirs. Radical groups in Indonesia have adopted this idea. Quoting the opinion of Ibn ‘Abbas, the early Qur’an exegete and cousin of the Prophet, Ba’abduh maintains that the term ‘kufr’ referred to in the Qur’an [5:44] is the lesser kufr. Consequently, the person accused of being kafir is not necessarily seen as an unbeliever.63

Social and Political Context In addition to the above religious arguments the Salafis use, it is worth discussing the social and political conditions in Indonesia. This examination will locate the Salafis’ changing attitude in the context of the social and political discourse from the period when Abu Rizal participated in the NII movement to his conversion in the late 1990s. I would argue that the shift in government policies towards Muslim interests had contributed to the Salafis’ changing attitude. It is widely accepted that Muslims contributed to the emergence of the New Order. Nevertheless, Indonesian Muslims have suffered from state repression since the late 1970s. The Indonesian Government argued that political stability was necessary to achieve economic growth and consequently opted to marginalize political Islam. As an ideology, the New Order viewed Islam as a threat to political stability. The government adopted a number of important measures in this regard, including the fusing of political parties and the indoctrination of the national ideology, Pancasila. All political parties, except the ruling party Golkar, were forced to merge. Islamic parties were integrated into the United Development Party (PPP), and nationalist into the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). While there was little resistance to the fusion of political parties, Muslim activists strongly opposed the policy of Pancasila indoctrination which started in the late 1970s and involved all segments of society, from civil servants, students and young leaders to political and community leaders. The government organized various indoctrination programs, called Penataran Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila (P4, State Pancasila Ideology Indoctrination), with programs lasting from 25 to 200 hours. The Pancasila was also incorporated into school and university curricula.64 63 Ba’abduh, Mereka adalah Teroris: Sebuah Tinjauan Syari’at, Malang: Pustaka Qaulan Sadida, 2005, pp. 505. 64 Martin van Bruinessen, “State-Islam Relations in Contemporary Indonesia; 19151990”, in C. van Dijk and A.H. de Groot, State and Islam, Leiden: Research School CNWS, 1995, p. 105.

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In spite of the Muslims’ rejection of the P4 program, the government persisted with the indoctrination and, in fact, developed it further by proposing Pancasila as the sole foundation for all organizations in 1984. This meant that all organizations, whether a political party or a mass organization, had to discard their own foundations and replace them with the Pancasila or face being banned. After much deliberation, mass Muslim organizations, including the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the Muhammadiyah, accepted the policy. However, some Muslim youth organizations such as Pelajar Islam Indonesia (PII, Islamic Student Association) and Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI, Muslim Student Association) refused and faced a ban. The former was banned in 1988, while the latter split into two factions: one faction that adopted the Pancasila as its foundation, while the other, HMI Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi (MPO, Assembly of the Saviours of Organization) resisted it. Without doubt, the policy aroused resistance at the grassroots level. Noncompliance took many forms and often emerged during Friday sermons and via underground leaflets. The protests reached a peak in the riot in Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta in September 1984, in which, according to unofficial reports, hundreds were killed. During the 1980s the government was troubled by several violent actions run by radical Islamic movements or by oppositional groups. These actions included the Komando Jihad, the Borobudur temple bombing, and the case of Talangsari, Lampung, in 1989.65 On the other side, there were lessons to be learnt from the failure of the various attempts to create an Islamic state. This period witnessed the emergence of new intellectual Muslims, namely Nurcholish Madjid, Djohan Effendi, Dawam Rahardjo and Abdurrahman Wahid, who changed the discourse from one of Islamic ideology to one of cultural and substantial Islam. Instead of struggling for a formalistic and legalistic approach to Islam, as represented in the notion of the Islamic state, these new emerging intellectuals asserted that Islamic values should be absorbed in daily life and in behavioural patterns. Thus, the struggle for Islam was oriented to universal values (rahmat li al-‘alamin), such as social justice, human rights and equity which are not exclusively Muslim.66 In the meantime, Muslims witnessed a shift in the government’s policy. From the late 1980s the Indonesian regime changed its policies from repression of Islam to accommodating approaches towards Muslims. Bahtiar Effendy notes four categories of government policies: structural, legislative, infrastructural and 65 Martin van Bruinessen, “State-Islam Relations”, pp. 107-110. 66 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, Singapore: ISEAS, 2003, p. 150.

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cultural accommodations. 67 Of these categories, the legislative accommodations were the most relevant to Muslim interests. First, the Law of National Education (UUPN 1989) incorporated lessons on religion into the national curricula. It also acknowledged the right of students to receive religious instruction in accordance with their religion. Second, the promulgation of the Religious Court Law (UUPA 1989), followed by the Compilation of Islamic Laws (KHI 1991),68 empowered the religious court and upgraded it to a level equal to other civil courts. Before the enactment of the new law, the religious court had less authority and its verdicts required validation by a public court before implementation. Related to the issue of the religious court was the fact that until the KHI was introduced, there had never been a single source or text for religious judges to refer to when considering their verdicts. The acceptance of the KHI filled this gap. Third, in 1991, there was a revision of the edict on school uniforms to include the jilbab (veil). Before this law, female students were not allowed to wear the jilbab in public schools; those who flouted this rule faced intimidation. The last significant legislative change was the withdrawal of the Sumbangan Dana Sosial Berhadiah lottery (SDSB, Philanthropic Donation with Prizes) in 1993. In addition to Muslim’s belief that SDSB was gambling and therefore prohibited in Islam, the lottery led to a number of social, economic and moral problems. As a direct result of the harsh criticism by Muslims, the government terminated the lottery at the end of 1993.69 In addition to the legislative reforms, as early as 1990, Muslims observed more signs of the government’s acceptance of Islam. In 1990, the government permitted the establishment of the Association of Muslim Intellectuals of Indonesia (ICMI) headed by B.J. Habibie. In the following year, the first Islamic bank, Bank Mu’amalat Indonesia (BMI) was established. President Suharto’s pilgrimage to Mecca in 1991 was of huge symbolic importance. In addition to this demonstration of piety by the president, for many Muslims it marked the peak of the government’s acceptance of Muslim interests. Some scholars view these fundamental changes of the New Order regime towards Islamic interests in different ways, in particular to the emergence of ICMI. The American anthropologist Robert W. Hefner, who paid much attention 67 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State, p. 151. 68 On the practice of KHI, see, Euis Nurlaelawati, Modernization, Tradition and Identity: The Kompilasi Hukum Islam and Legal Practice in the Indonesian Religious Courts, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010 69 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State, pp. 154-167.

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to political Islam in Indonesia, sees it as the success of middle-class Muslims in convincing the government that Islam could no longer be conceived as an ideological threat to the state, and hence, the government accommodated Muslim interests. It was the result of a long process of Islamization within the bureaucracy and the urban middle class that changed the perception of higher level officials towards Islam.70 However, critical views on the emergence of the ICMI also appeared. The American political scientist R. William Liddle, for example, views that the ICMI cannot be understood as “an expression of demands of the Indonesian Muslim community,” but it is a part of Soeharto’s political strategy and tactic in controlling political Islam and sustaining his power.71 He argues that the nature of Soeharto’s political strategy was the promotion of individual piety and resistance to political Islam. In this rationale, he understands why Soeharto depoliticized political Islam. Liddle sees that the roots of Soeharto’s political supports were anchored in the armed forces and the Golkar. Soeharto always put control on these two political sources. However, when he saw that he lacked army support, he turned to the Muslim community to gain the massive support he needed for his re-election as president.72 Given this social and political context, it is reasonable to argue that the 1990s provided solid grounds for the behavioural change of radical Muslim activists towards the government. This is reflected in our case study. Abu Rizal held a radical view towards the government in the 1980s and moved to a more accommodating position by the end of the 1990s, in response to the shifting government policy. E. Creating a Salafi enclave: Imagining and practicing the model of the early Islamic community Perhaps even more successful than its conversion of individuals, has been Salafism’s ability to create communities in the form of enclaves where Salafis collectively and freely practice the Salafi way of life. Through the creation of these enclaves, they try to emulate the early Islamic community. The dwellers comprise of a number of families, mostly immigrants who moved to the sites to live together with their fellow adherents. Some enclaves take the form of a compound, while others merge with villages. 70 Robert W. Hefner, “Islam, State and Civil Society: ICMI and Struggle for Indonesian Middle Class”, Indonesia, 56, (October 1993), p. 32. 71 R. William Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation”, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Aug., 1996), p. 631. 72 Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia”, p. 625.

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The aim of creating an enclave is to provide an environment conducive to the free and daily practice of Salafi doctrines. To realize this atmosphere, the enclave is often complemented by a mosque and a madrasah, or a pesantren, where Salafis receive religious instruction. In fact, mosques are central to the Salafi community. Besides being places of worship, mosques are centres of activities, and venues where religious instruction takes place. Madrasahs and pesantrens provide a more systematic method of learning Salafi doctrines. Not just adults, but also children in the enclaves are accustomed to put the Salafi manhaj in practice. Zainal Abidin, the leader of the Salafi enclave in Depok, West Java, talks of the enclave as ‘an incubator for the next Salafi generation’.73 As an incubator, the enclave will produce Salafi generation willing to support Salafi da’wa. Emmanuel Sivan has identified a number of characteristics of an enclave. Life in the enclave is voluntary; members of the community can come and go at any time without punishment. The only bond that ties members is morality, and moral reward often goes hand in hand with economic advantages. Loyalty to the leader is another trait of the enclave. The leader obtains his authority through charisma and knowledge.74 These characteristics demonstrate the strong bonds that bind community members. Sivan also notes that the enclave offers an imagined boundary, a ‘wall of virtues’.75 This ‘boundary’ separates the community from life outside. Life in the enclave is based on morality, virtue and kindness. This is believed to be in contrast with life outside, which is deemed immoral and evil. Inside the community, life is seen as pure, good and safe, whereas life outside is ‘polluted, contagious, dangerous’.76 Therefore, it is crucial to limit contact with outsiders. The following paragraphs discuss the Salafi enclave in Depok, West Java. As a comparison, global information about the Salafi enclave in Sleman, Yogyakarta, will be provided.

The Salafi Enclave in Beji, Depok, Bogor, West Java This enclave is located in the village of Tanah Baru, Beji, Depok, West Java, and is home to about 250 Salafi families. The centre of this Salafi enclave is 73 Interview with Zainal Abidin, Depok, September 5, 2008. 74 Emmanuel Sivan, “The Enclave Culture”, in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, Fundamentalisms Comprehended, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995, pp. 17-19. 75 Sivan, “The Enclave Culture”, p. 17. 76 Sivan, “The Enclave Culture”, p. 18.

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the Fatahillah Mosque, which was founded by the Dewan Da’wah Islamiyyah Indonesia (DDII) using a grant from Saudi Arabia. The community members live among the local villagers. Some buy plots of land from the villagers and build new houses, while others rent their homes. Although they mix with the villagers, Salafis are easily distinguished from the rest because of their appearance: the men have long beards and wear jalabiya, while the women wear the niqab. Living together in the enclave creates a collective identity among these Salafis. This collective identity refers to ‘a shared definition of a group deriving from common interests, experiences, and solidarity, involving wefeeling, constructed, activated, and sustained through interaction in movement communities’.77 As Snow and McAdam have indicated, the essence of collective identity resides in ‘a shared sense of ‘one-ness’ or ‘we-ness’ among those individuals who compose the collectivity’.78 Salafis began to occupy this area in Depok in 2000. Zainal Abidin, the leader of the enclave, made the decision to live in this particular village. Abidin received a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations from the School of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Sekolah Departemen Luar Negeri, or Sesdelu) in Jakarta in 1981. He wrote his undergraduate thesis on the Impact of the Iranian Islamic Revolution on the Monarchies in the Middle East. Like other Muslim activists at the time, he was fascinated by the revolution. He believed that the Iranian revolution was an Islamic revolution and would affect other monarchies in the region. Rather than continue his career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abidin turned to the Islamic da’wa movement. In 1982, he attended the Academy of Arabic Studies (Akademi Bahasa Arab, ABA) of the Dewan Da’wah, but he did not complete his study. He continued at the Institute of Education for Islamic Da’wa (Lembaga Pendidikan Da’wah Islamiyah) of the Dewan Da’wah.79 Again, he did not finish his course. It was at these institutes that he was first introduced to Salafi doctrines. Influenced by lecturers at the institutes, he began to change his view of the Iranian revolution being an Islamic revolution to believing that it had, in fact, been a Shi’ite one. The close relationship between the Dewan 77 Sheldon Stryker, “Identity Competition: Key to Differential Social Movement Participation?”, in Sheldon Stryker, et al., Self, Identity and Social Movements, Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000, p. 23. 78 David A Snow and Doug McAdam, “Identity Work Processes in the Context of Social Movements: Clarifying the Identity/Movement Nexus” in, Sheldon Stryker, et al., Self, Identity and Social Movements, Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000, p. 42. 79 Interview with Zainal Abidin, Depok, September 5, 2008.

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Da’wah and the Saudi government had resulted in tensions with the Shi’ite community. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the Dewan Da’wah views Shi’ism as a deviant variation of Islam. Abidin became an activist of the da’wa movement as a student at ABA. In this period, he started to persuade children living around the Dewan Da’wah’s headquarters in Kramat Raya, Central Jakarta, to come and learn how to recite the Qur’an. The magnificence of the al-Furqan Mosque proved to be a draw and the children came to the mosque and joined the program. His experience in teaching children contributed to his method of teaching the Qur’an when he moved to Depok, West Java, and established ‘Rumah Belajar Ibn ‘Abbas’ (the Ibn ‘Abbas House of Learning). In the second half of the 1980s, Abidin moved to Srengseng Sawah, Lenteng Agung, South Jakarta, and initiated the preaching of Salafi doctrines among university students at the Academy of Company Leadership (Akademi Pimpinan Perusahan, APP) and the National Institute of Science and Technology (Institut Sains Teknologi Nasional). In order to earn money, he ran a small catering business for students. While delivering meals, he discussed religious matters with the students and called on them to attend his religious gatherings on Salafi doctrines. Through this approach, he succeeded in attracting a number of students and families around the campuses to join his program. In 1990, he began to teach children to read the Qur’an at the Fatahillah Mosque, outside of Lenteng Agung. Abidin found many children willing to attend his program. Furthermore, in 1998, he founded the abovementioned Ibn ‘Abbas House of Learning. Abidin considered Depok a good site to conduct his da’wa. In recent years, Depok has transformed into an urban centre comprising of newly established housing compounds and shopping malls. Consequently, it has become a busy and polluted area. The site of the enclave, by contrast, offers a different environment. Located in the village, it has a cool and calm atmosphere, surrounded by green trees and with fresh air. In 2000, Abidin, together with a number of Salafi families from Srengseng Sawah, moved to the area. Keen to avoid demographic turbulence and social shock at the new site, he managed the Salafis’ migration to this village carefully, bringing in new residents to the enclave only every six months. The influx of Salafis occurred after the dissolution of the Laskar Jihad in October 2002 after which Abidin asked the Dewan Da’wah if he could use the Fatahillah Mosque for Salafi activities. The Dewan Da’wah gave its consend under the condition that the Salafis would not make any changes to the mosque. Ever since, increasing 264


numbers of Salafis have come to live in the area surrounding the mosque. According to Abidin, currently more than 250 Salafi families live in the enclave. To prevent infiltration by other parties, Abidin has adopted a ‘one gate’ system: anyone who wishes to migrate to the area must first seek his permission. This policy means that Abidin gets to know the community members well and ensures that unexpected incidents, such as the infiltration of terrorists, can be avoided.80 The Ibn ‘Abbas House of Learning is an educational institution equal to an elementary school. It focuses on religious subjects with particular attention to memorizing the Qur’an. Indeed, after six years of study, students are expected to have memorized the entire Holy Book. In terms of religious subjects, students are trained in basic religious knowledge such as ‘aqida, hadith, Islamic history, Islamic ethics and Arabic. In addition, they are taught mathematics and the national language. After graduation, the students continue to study in other Salafi pesantrens, which provide higher levels of education, such as Pesantren As-Sunnah in Batam, Riau Islands, and Salafi Madrasah in Jember, East Java. The trademark of the Ibn Abbas House of Learning is its integration with the environment; the learning process takes place not only in the classrooms, but also in the open spaces of the compound. More importantly, parents are also expected to learn what their children study at the school. Consequently, parents, too, are required to memorize the Qur’an, under the supervision of Abidin and other Salafi teachers. In order to achieve this, Abidin insists that parents who send their children to study at the Ibn ‘Abbas House of Learning move to the village. In turn, this policy encourages more Salafis to migrate to and live in the enclave. In addition to this program, Salafis have established another educational institution, Pesantren Salafiya led by Ja’far Salih. Salih completed his senior high school education in Jakarta. While he was a student, he was active in the Islamic section (Unit Kerohanian Islam) of the school’s students association. In addition, he also attended the religious gatherings organized by activists of the Tarbiyah movement. Such activities were keys in transforming his studies from secular to religious. He then studied Arabic at the al-Manar institute, an Arabic learning centre founded by LIPIA alumni. In 1997, he went to Cairo and studied Arabic for one year in preparation to study at al-Azhar University. However, he was disappointed by his al-Azhar colleagues. He felt that they did not behave in a truly Islamic way, for example they neglected the obligation to pray five times a day on time. Consequently, he decided not to study at al-Azhar. In the last six months of his stay in Cairo, he attended Salafi lectures delivered by Usamah al80 Interview with Zainal Abidin, September 5, 2008.

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Qushi at ‘Ain al-Shams. In the year that followed, he went to Yemen to study with Sheikh Muqbil, and returned to Indonesia in 2001. Upon his return, he was asked to join and teach at the Salafi community in Depok. In 2003, together with his colleague, Yuswaji, he established a Salafi pesantren in Depok.81 The pesantren provides a six-year program for teenagers and adults, and focuses on religious subjects, in particular ‘aqida, fiqh and Arabic. Like other Salafi pesantrens, the works of Salafi scholars such as Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Taymiyya are taught. In fact, many university students attend this program. Some of the alumni have gone on to study in Yemen, such as Ayub. Ayub was a student of Electrical Engineering at the prestigious Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta between 1998 and 2000. He went to Ambon for a year when Ja’far Umar Thalib called on Muslims to join the jihad. After the jihad, he attended the Salafi madrasah in Depok and went to Yemen in 2004. In 2008, he returned home and started to teach Salafi tenets in the Salafi community in Depok.82 In 2008, an internal rife between leading figures led to the temporary closure of the pesantren. Recently, the madrasah was moved to Parung, West Java. In addition to these education institutions, Salafis in Depok organize daily religious teaching at the Fatahillah Mosque, in the evening after the ‘Isha prayer. The lectures, which were organized by the Yayasan al-Muhajirin wa al-Ansar, discuss various aspects of Islam, in particular ‘aqida, hadith and fiqh. Primary Salafi texts such as the Kitab al-Tawhid and Thalathat al-Usul by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Lum’at al-‘I’tiqad, ‘Umdat al-Ahkam, Kitab al-Ad’iyat wa al-Adhkar, Tafsir al-Sa’di, and Tarbiyat al-‘Abna’ are studied. Some other famous books on hadith such as al-‘Arba’in al-Nawawi and Riyad al-Salihin are also included in the lectures. Lectures are delivered by Salafi teachers, including Ja’far Salih, Asasuddin, Abdullah Sya’roni, Abdul Barr, Barmen and Ayub. Despite the fact that this version of Salafism has attracted people to migrate to the area, it clearly does not attract local people. In fact, only a few local families practice the Salafi manhaj. The presence of Salafis at this site does not appear to affect the villager’s level of religious piety. For example, while female Salafis wear the niqab, female villagers do not. This suggests that Salafis have no influence on local people, or, to put it in other words, the Salafi da’wa has failed. When asked about this failure, Salih, replied that the success of Salafi da’wa cannot be measured by the number of adherents. For him, it is enough that local people allow Salafis to practice their manhaj in their environment.83 81 Interview with Ja’far Salih, director of Salafi madrasah, Depok, September 10, 2008. 82 Interview with Ayub, a Salafi teacher, Depok, August 27, 2008. 83 Interview with Ja’far Salih, director of Salafi madrasah, Depok, September 10, 2008

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Like Salafi communities in other cities, the Depok Salafis restrict their interaction with local people. This behaviour causes tension with the villagers. Tension can be triggered by trivial issues, such as not greeting. For example, Salafis usually greet people when they meet in the street. However, some local people refuse to respond to this greeting. This, in turn, led to Salafis withholding their greetings. This change in attitude aroused the anger of the local people, who felt the Salafis were behaving arrogantly. Another source of tension was the Salafis’ resistance to take part in the village activities commemorating Independence Day. To celebrate this historic day, local people usually put on a variety of fun activities for everyone. At the peak of these activities is a collective prayer, usually held in the evening at an open area, such as a field. Every person is supposed to attend this ritual. The villagers offer meals, including yellow rice. Salafis believe that these activities are a waste of time, energy and money, and hence, are prohibited by religion. Indeed, they consider many of these activities as bid’a, and so they refuse to engage in them. This resistance has caused conflict between Salafis and local people who accuse the Salafis of being antinationalist. These conflicts can generally be resolved through dialogue between Salafi figures and village leaders. There are a number of jobs Salafis undertake in order to earn money. They range from casual jobs to permanent ones, such as teaching or being street vendors. The essential criterion in selecting a profession is its compatibility with the shari’a. As a result, many Salafis abandon their job when they realize that it contradicts Islamic law. Maman Sumanta, who converted to Salafism in 2001, left his job in the sales and marketing of insurance and credit cards. He realized that this job related to riba’’. Now, he sells Salafi books, VCDs, and CDs.84 Other Salafis sell herbal life medicines such as habbat al-sawda, Salafi uniforms, honey and nonalcoholic perfumes. They usually display their merchandise in front of mosques after Friday prayers, or in small stalls. Others choose to be vendors of ice cream and bakso (meatball). Because these jobs are considered halal (lawful) they are not embarrassed to do them. Salafis claim that these casual jobs give them the space to manage their time flexibly, allowing them to collectively perform their daily prayers. Abu Hafsah, for example, sells ice cream in the school from 09.00-12.00, and from 13.00-15.00. He returns home for noon and afternoon prayers.85 A similar scene can be found in another Salafi enclave in Ngaklik, Sleman, Yogyakarta. Unlike the Salafi enclave in Depok, where Salafis live among 84 Interview with Maman Sumanta, Salafi follower, Depok, September 10, 2008. 85 Interview with Abu Hafsah, Salafi follower, Depok, September 8, 2008.

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villagers, this enclave is a separate compound. The compound comprises one hundred small houses, which the government had initially provided veterans of the war of independence. When the owners left these houses, Salafis rented or bought them. The influx of Salafis to this compound occurred after Laskar Jihad’s disbandment in October 2002. Recently, Salafis have occupied 83 per cent of the houses. As in other enclaves, the Salafis in this compound face no constraints in terms of putting Salafi doctrines into daily practice. Salafis need educational institutions when their children reach school age. Sending the children to existing madrasahs or schools is problematic because they do not meet Salafi conditions. Thus, the Salafis in Ngaklik have established the new Pesantren al-Anshar. It was founded in 2004, with the support of Sugiharto, a Salafi sympathizer, who endowed 1000 square meters of land to the Salafi pesantren. Currently, the pesantren provides a program for children (Tarbiyat al-Awlad), a special program for women (Tarbiyat al-Nisa’) and a training program for preachers (Tadrib al-Du’at). In addition to these educational programs, the pesantren is often used for national Salafi dawra. In these annual dawras, Salafis usually invite Salafi sheikhs from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. As mentioned earlier, the enclave provides Salafis with the opportunity to put Salafi doctrines into daily practice. The religious atmosphere is tangible when one visits the enclave in Depok. Women wearing the niqab, men sporting long beards and wearing the jalabiya and children reading the Qur’an, are common sights. In the Fatahillah Mosque, one can often see a man reading religious books or the Qur’an. This is in sharp contrast to the scene found on the other side of the village, which is only few meters from the mosque, the centre of Salafi activities. There, women are not veiled; some even wear miniskirts. Clearly, Salafis use their dress to create an imagined boundary. This is what Emmanuel Sivan calls the ‘wall of virtue’;86 it is a boundary that is based on morality. Through this imagined boundary, Salafis set a clear-cut distinction between themselves and others. In addition to their dress, Sivan notes, the distinction is apparent in their conversations and sermons.87 Thus, specific phrases such as “qadara Allah” (meaning, ‘God decided’) and “jazakum Allah”88 (may God reward you) are 86 Sivan, “The Enclave Culture”, p. 17 87 Sivan, “The Enclave Culture”, p. 18. 88 During my fieldwork, Salafis often advised me to say “jazaka/jazakum Allah” instead of saying “shukran”, when I should thank someone for any help. Although the two phrases convey the same meaning, Salafis argue that saying the first phrase will provide the actor with two rewards; one from thanking and the other one from following the sunnah. Meanwhile, the second phrase will give the actor only one reward.

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frequently heard in their conversations. While in terms of their sermons, Salafis usually begin by warning Muslims to avoid bid’a, which will lead Muslims to hell. Concluding Remarks Salafism has transformed individual lives and society. Individual changes appear in three forms: “retreat” from the world, being “reborn” Muslims and changes in individual attitudes towards the ruler from opposition to cooperation. In the first case, a Salafi totally changes his life by abandoning previous habits and activities, and starts a new life in a new environment. In the effort of making a clear demarcation between past and new lives, Salafis of this type limit themselves by reducing contacts with outside community and preferring to live in isolated areas. Unlike the first of type of conversion, the second model of Salafis maintains their activities in this world and changes occur in their religious thought and practices. However, these changes in turn lead Salafis to adjust their activities to Salafi doctrines. The third variety of conversion appears among Salafis who were active in militant movements and who opposed the government. Salafis changes their attitude towards the ruler from strong resistance to acceptance. Meanwhile, the transformation of society takes place in the creation of enclaves in which Salafis live together and practice the Salafi manhaj freely. Life in these enclaves is characterized by morality and good conduct, which contrasts with life outside the enclaves. The enclaves create “imagined boundaries” or “walls of virtue” between living in the community within the enclaves and society outside.

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Conclusion

Salafism is an Islamic religious movement that calls on Muslims to purify their Islamic belief and their rituals from bid’as and kharafat through the return to the Qur’an and the hadith, and the examples of the al-Salaf, the first three generations of Muslims. A Salafi is a person who follows the manhaj (path) of the Salaf. For Salafis, this path is the third source of Islamic doctrines after the Qur’an and the hadith and therefore to follow the examples of the Salaf is obligatory for Muslims. They argue that for Muslims to return to the Qur’an and the hadith alone is insufficient since they may still deviate from true Islam, unless they follow the manhaj of the Salaf in understanding the Qur’an and the hadith. It is on this matter, the obligation of Muslim to follow the Salaf that Salafism differs from other reformist organizations in Indonesia, such as the Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam and al-Irsyad. Although all Salafis agree on the basic principles of the Salafi manhaj, they are far from monolithic. As I have discussed in this book, there are three main tendencies in the Salafi movement, “purist”, “haraki” and “jihadi”. The main difference between them concerns their attitude towards the ruler or the government. The key problem concerning this matter is to what extent Muslims should obey the ruler. Purists urge Muslims to surrender to the ruler unconditionally, while the “haraki” contend that loyalty to the government is not without conditions. For them, loyalty to the government is conditional on its submission to God’s law. When the government fails to apply the shari’a, Muslims have are not obliged to obey. This means that “haraki” Salafis leave room 271


for disobedience to the government. However, Muslims can only demonstrate this disloyalty through peaceful means like verbal criticism and organizing demonstrations on the streets. Meanwhile, the “jihadi” faction goes further by legitimizing the use of violent actions against the authorities and ultimately to topple the ruler. The difference between “haraki” and “jihadi” is slight, and therefore, a “haraki” Salafi may easily move and turn into a “jihadi” Salafi. The majority of Indonesian Salafis fall into the first “purist” category. Within this category, I further divide them into “rejectionist”, “cooperationist” and “tanzimi”. “Rejectionist” purists are exclusive because they reject all collaboration with hizby (partisan, causing divisions) people and organizations. In education, it rejects the national curriculum. Laskar Jihad’s former activists fall into this category. “Cooperationist” purists are more inclusive in their collaboration with other Muslim groups and the government. Abu Nida and his group who receive grants from the Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath may be classified among this faction. The “tanzimi” is a Salafi group that adopts an organizational format, such as the Wahdah Islamiyah in Makassar. In addition to the purist, there is a small number of Salafis who can be identified as “haraki” or “jihadi”. Pesantren Ngruki is categorized as a “haraki” group, while the Bali bombers fall into the “jihadi” category. Ngruki, for example, often criticizes the government because it refuses to implement the shari’a. Salafi pesantrens have developed rapidly; their numbers keep increasing, and so do the numbers of their students. Salafi pesantrens differ from other pesantrens because they teach Salafism, which mostly derives from Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s works such as the al-Usul al-Thalatha and Kitab al-Tawhid. They use both classical and mulazama methods of instruction. The first is applied in grading programs, such as Tahfiz (memorization of the Qur’an), Tsanawiyah and Aliyah, while the mulazama is commonly used in the Tadrib al-Du’at (Preachers Training) program. The mulazama method is similar to the bandongan method traditional pesantren use, in which a group of students sits in front of their kyai or ustadh, and listens to his lesson. Salafi pesantrens offer various educational programs from Kindergarten up to the tertiary level, and they have developed their own curriculum. There appear some differences between them. Pesantrens associated with “rejectionist” Salafis offer less programs, notably Tahfiz, and Tadrib al-Du’at. They have adopted their curriculum from Yemen and only teach religious subjects. Through these programs they want to duplicate the Darul Hadith, a Salafi learning centre founded by Sheikh Muqbil in Damaj, Yemen, where many “rejectionist” Salafis have graduated. The only secular subjects these pesantrens

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CONCLUSION

teach to their students are the national language and mathematics. These subjects are needed because Indonesian is a tool for communication, while mathematics is important in doing business. On the other hand, pesantrens associated with “cooperationist” Salafis offer a wider range of programs: Kindergarten, Elementary School, Tsanawiyah, Aliyah, and Ma’had ‘Alyi. These pesantrens, such as al-Furqan and Assunnah, show a more inclusive tendency than their “rejectionist” Salafi counterparts. They have adopted the national curriculum for secular subjects, combining this with the Saudi curriculum for religious subjects. They teach all secular subjects outlined by the government and let their students participate in national examination so that they can continue their studies at higher levels in public schools. The methodology used to teach Salafism varies in line with the ages of the students. Children at kindergarten and elementary school levels, for example, are introduced to Salafism in a simple way, such as by memorizing prayers based on accepted hadiths and not allowing them to sing songs or to draw living creatures like animals and people. Meanwhile, students at higher levels learn Salafism by studying textbooks and they have to memorize the lessons, especially the dalils (religious arguments). More importantly, Salafi pesantrens not only teach their students about Salafism but also stimulate them to practice Salafi manhaj in daily life such as by wearing the jalabiya, sporting a long beard, avoiding isbal, and having meals together eating from one big tray. All these practices aim at accustoming them to the Salafi manhaj so that they become true Salafis (Salafi kaffa). The good education (some) Salafi pesantrens offer motives non-Salafi parents to send their children there, as in the case of Pesantren Assunnah in Cirebon. It offers a full-day study program in the form of an integrated Islamic school. The pesantren teaches both religious and general sciences and employs professional teachers. In spite of the low costs, the quality of education is relatively good and therefore non-Salafi parents send their children there to study, not because they are driven by Salafism, but because of the quality of the education. Moreover, ethical consideration becomes another reason of these non-Salafi parents. They are afraid that their children will be entrapped in moral diseases, such as indulging in free sex, using drugs and drinking alcoholic beverages. Rather than sending their children to public schools and leaving them at home unattended after school, they prefer to take them to pesantren on their way to work, leaving there all day long under the control of their teachers, and picking them up on their way back home. Thus, they do not want their children to become Salafis; instead, they just want them to become good Muslims. Likewise, the parents

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are not influenced by Salafism, as in the case of Fawaz’s parents. They remain affiliated with the traditionalist NU. However, not all Salafi pesantrens offer good education, as in the case of Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari in Ciamis. The pesantren is very poor in term of facilities and does not organize educational programs well. Despite this fact, it attracts students to study there mainly because it is cheap and flexible. Because of the limited capacity of education at cheap public schools and because education at private schools is expensive, Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari is a good alternative as it offers inexpensive educational programs; the pesantren provides education for the poor. The quality of the educational facilities at Salafi pesantrens very much depend on the grants the pesantren receives. Pesantrens that receive financial support from international donors, such as the Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath, look good and more developed. On the contrary, pesantrens that have no access to international donor funds look poor and plain. However, as the grants of international donors are meant for building constructions only, pesantrens have to mobilize other sources to generate income. General sources of income are students’ payments for tuition fees, meals and accommodation, besides money brought in by local donors. The pesantren can also create programs that generate income, such as publishing publications. Pesantren al-Furqan in Gresik is a good example of mobilizing local economic resources. In addition to publications, Pesantren alFurqan manages 28 hectares of fishponds producing shrimp and fish. The flow of international donors to Salafi pesantren proves the existence of pesantren transnational networks. The Salafis and Salafi pesantrens are connected to their counterparts in the Middle East, notably Saudi Arabia and Yemen, from which Indonesian Salafis graduated. Like Salafis worldwide, Indonesian Salafis maintain their traditional networks that connect them with their sheikhs in the Middle East through various means, such as seeking their fatwas on specific matters, asking them to deliver religious lessons in their dawras, and sending students to study with them. Moreover, as indicated in this study, Indonesian Salafis have developed regional networks in Southeast Asia, especially between Salafis in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Salafi pesantrens, dawras and radio stations are instrumental in establishing and maintaining this network. The presence of some students from Malaysia and Singapore at Salafi pesantrens in Batam and Solo, and the invitation of Indonesian Salafi ustadhs by their counterparts in Singapore and Malaysia to deliver Salafi lessons confirm this network. Hang radio station in Batam deserves particular attention in this connection. It broadcasts religious lectures to which Salafis in Singapore listen.

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CONCLUSION

Muslim communities have responded in various ways to the emergence of Salafi pesantrens in their areas. Traditionalist Muslims from the NU show strong opposition to Salafism which ranges from verbal attacks to violent actions. The main reasons of their opposition are the Salafis’ critique of their religious practices which they consider bid’as; and the Salafis’ attitude towards other Muslims. The Salafis’ criticism of the religious beliefs and practices of the local community has aroused the anger of the community and especially of its religious leaders. For these leaders, Salafis’ questioning of the religious arguments behind their practices means challenging their religious authority. Moreover, as I have indicated, local religious leaders who maintain these traditions benefit economically. Thus, Salafis’ questioning of their religious arguments poses a threat to their religious authority and thus to their economic resources. Moreover, some Salafis limit their social interaction to their own circles and therefore local people perceive them as anti-social, exclusive and arrogant, which, in some cases, also invokes the local people’s anger. A more positive response comes from the local leaders of reformist Muslim organizations, the Muhammadiyah and Persis. Although they disagree with the Salafis on the obligation of Muslims to follow the examples of the Salaf, these organizations view them as their partners in combating the spread of bid’as. This assessment is obvious from the arguments of Nawawi Bakri, the chair of the Muhammadiyah branch in Sidayu, and Ade Abdurrahman, the chair of the Persis branch in Banjarsari. Both leaders voice their appreciation of Salafism in its struggle against bid’as. However, conflict between them flares us when Salafism takes over their assets, such as seizing mosques and pesantrens. The case of Pesantren al-Hikmah in Sidayu reflects the Muhammadiyah’s view towards Salafism. The pesantren belongs to the Muhammadiyah but its management is assigned to Salafis due to lack of Muhammadiyah figures to lead it. Despite the fact that Bakri has no objection to this assignment, other Muhammadiyah figures show their anxiety. However, Salafi pesantrens have passed this difficult period and survived. There are at least two factors that play a role in this survival: strong personal roots in the village, and the Salafis’ passion and dedication they display in their da’wa. The case of Khatib Muwahhid, the founder of Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari in Banjarsari, and Aunurrafiq Ghufran, the founder of Pesantren al-Furqan in Sidayu, confirm this. Muwahhid and Ghufran are natives of Banjarsari and Sidayu, respectively. Moreover, Muwahhid inherited the charisma of his father, Ajengan Nunung Muhiddin, the founder of the old Pesantren al-Nur. Strong opposition of the local community cannot expel them from their native villages.

275


In addition to offering educational programs, Salafi pesantrens have become centres of Salafi da’wa. They organize both da’wa bi al-lisan (oral da’wa) and da’wa bi al-hal (da’wa by deeds and examples). The pesantrens usually hold regular religious lessons in mosques located near the pesantren. For example, teachers from Pesantren Assunnah in Cirebon teach Salafism at the Taqwa Grand Mosque and in the Pertamina Hospital Mosque; teachers from Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari teach Salafism at the Banjarsari Grand Mosque; and teachers of Pesantren alFurqan teach Salafism in all the mosques around the pesantren. Moreover, almost all Salafi pesantrens have established da’wa radio stations, such as Assunnah radio owned by Pesantren Assunah and Salafiya da’wa radio of Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari. A shared feature of these Salafi radio stations is that they broadcast Salafi lectures, both recorded and live, tartil (Qur’anic recitation) and religious consultations. However, some of them have created other programs as well, including health consultation by Salafi medical doctors. With these radio stations, Salafi da’wa reaches more audiences in more areas. More importantly is the da’wa bil hal carried out Salafi pesantrens for the benefit of local communities. The three pesantrens (al-Furqan, al-Nur al-Atsari and Assunnah), for example, often distribute zakat al-mal (religious alms), iftar (meals for fast breaking), and qurban (slaughtered animal) meat. Moreover, Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari has helped local community with more concrete actions: widening the access road to the village where the pesantren is located, building a toilet next to a musalla (small prayer house) close to the pesantren, and hardening the roads around the pesantren. These actions invoke more sympathy of the villagers than mere words (da’wa bi al-lisan) can ever do. Because of this da’wa, perhaps, some people have become interested in Salafism. As indicated in this book, there are some sixty Salafi families living around Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari, half of whom consist of local villagers who have converted to Salafism. While, the local people in Sidayu have become more familiar with Salafism, they do not accept nor oppose it but let it spread. Considering the activities Salafi pesantrens carry out, especially in teaching Salafism to their students, I conclude that Salafi pesantrens tend to revive pesantren’s traditional roles: transferring religious knowledge, and the production of ‘ulamas. This role was in danger to disappear since traditional pesantrens started to adopt the madrasah and Islamic school systems where students learn less religious subjects and more secular sciences.

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Bahruddin, teacher of pesantren ‘Umar ibn Khattab, Cirebon, January 24, 2010. Buya Yahya, young kyai of pesantren al-Bahja, Cirebon, April 21, 2010. Cepi Burhanuddin, murabbi of al-Huda, Parung, Bogor, March 15, 2013. Chafifuddin, head of the Majlis Tabligh, Pimpinan Daerah Muhammadiyah (PDM) Cirebon, April 20, 2010 Didin Nurul Rasyidin, lecturer of IAIN Nurjati, Cirebon, April 22, 2010. Diding, manager of Assunnah Radio, Cirebon, 2009. H.M. Misbach Malim, Dewan Dakwah Islamiyyah Indonesia, Jakarta, September 23, 2008 Heriyanto, Salafi activist, Solo, February 22, 2009. Hermawan, local informal leader, Cianjur, December 2008. Ikhwan Abdul Jalil, senior teacher at Wahdah Islamiyyah, Makassar, July 21, 2010. Itin, owner of ACB shop, Banjarsari, February 3, 2010. Ja’far Salih, director of Salafi madrasa, Depok, September 10, 2008. Ja’far Umar Thalib, senior ustadh, Yogyakarta, June 12, 2010. K.H. Abdul Muqsid Muhammad, leader of Pesantren Manba’ul Hisan, Gresik, May 8, 2010. K.H. M. Syafiq Munawwar, leader of pesantren al-Munawwar, Gresik, May 8, 2010. Karli, Chief of Rukun Tetangga, Banjarsari, February 2, 2010. Khatib Muwahhid, director of Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari, Ciamis, January 25, 2010. Kosasih, Salafi activist, Tasikmalaya, February 16, 2010. Luqman Ba’abduh, Salafi ustadh, December 15, 2008. Maman Abdurrahman, Chairman of Central Board of Persatuan Islam, Bandung, February 10, 2010. Maman Sumanta, Salafi activist, Depok, September 10, 2008. Mamay, salt retailer, Banjarsari, January 15, 2010. Mubarak Bamualim, vice director of STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib, Surabaya, December 23, 2008. 299


Muhammad Ali, administration staff of STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib, Surabaya, December 23, 2008. Muhammad Arif, Salafi ustadh, Batam, June 28, 2010. Muhyiddin, teacher of pesantren Assunnnah, Cirebon, November 18, 2008. Mujahid, local religious leader, Ciamis, January 24, 2010. Mukhlas, head of Muhammadiyah branch in Banjarsari, February 2, 2010. Mustafa Aqiel, kyai of pesantren Kempek, Cirebon, April 21, 2010. Nadjih Ahjad, kyai of pesantren Maskumambang, Gresik, May 11, 2010. Nafi’ Zainuddin, director of pesantren al-Irsyad Tengaran, Salatiga, February 25, 2009. Nasir Mansur, Muhammadiyah activist, Gresik, May 14, 2010. Nawawi Bakri, head of Muhammadiyah Sidayu, Gresik, May 9, 2010. Nur Salam Sirojuddin, senior teacher at Wahdah Islamiyyah, Makassar, July 24, 2010. Qasim Saguni, secretary of Wahdah Islamiyyah, Makassar, July 22, 2010. Rasyid, teacher of Pesantren Al-Nur al-Atsari, Ciamis, January 22, 2010. Rina Rindana, lecturer of IAIN Cirebon and parent of student of SDIT As-Sunnah, Cirebon, April 16, 2010. Salim Bajeri, religious leader, Cirebon April 16, 2010. Sarbini, chairperson of HASMI, Bogor, March 19, 2013. Shobahussurur, staff of Religious Attaché of the Saudi Embassy, Jakarta, March 6, 2009. Sukarjo Renggo, senior Salafi activist, Cirebon, November 20, 2008 Supendi, member of Departemen Dakwah Umum, Dewan Dakwah Hasmi, Bogor, March 19, 2013. Thaharah, director of Assunnah, Cirebon, November 20, 2008 Thoyyib, teacher of pesantren and a party activist, PKS, Tengaran, February 23, 2009. Ujang Bazari, Muhammadiyah Activists, Banjarsari, Ciamis, February 2, 2010.

300

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Usman Saleh, Muhammadiyah activist, Banjarsari, January 22, 2010. UU Suhendar,head of Persis Tasikmalaya, February 11, 2010. Wahyuddin, director of Ngruki, Surakarta, September 27, 2012. Wawan Ridwan, lecturer of IAIN Cirebon, parent of student of SDIT Assunnah, Cirebon. April 16, 2010. Yazid Jawwas, senior ustadh, Bogor, March 13, 2009. Yunus Mansur, Muhammadiyah activist, Gresik, May 9, 2010, Zainal Abidin, senior Salafi activist, Depok, October 29, 2008; September 5, 2008. Zainal Arifin, teacher of Anshar al-Sunnah, Batam, June 26, 2010. Zarkasyi, secretary of the Lajna Khayriyya Mushtaraka, Jakarta, March 17, 2009 C. Magazines and Tabloid Adz-Dzakirah Al-Furqan Al-Mawaddah Assunnah Asy-Syari’ah Cahaya Nabawy Fatawa Laskar Jihad Salafy E. Websites: http://alghuroba.org/front/node/r/184 http://blogal-furqon.blogspot.com/

http://dpdhasmibogor-depok.blogspot.com/2011/05/harakah-bidah.html http://eidcharity.dyndns.info:81/eidweb/about.aspx http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Salafi-Indonesia/message/1175 http://kaahil.wordpress.com/2008/12/19/adab-makan-minum-bg11-makanberjamaah/

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http://lovesidayu.blogspot.com/2009/03/bupati-kanjeng-sepuh-Sidayudikenal.html h t t p : / / m a j a l a h . t e m p o i n t e ra k t i f . c o m / i d / a r s i p / 1 9 9 0 / 0 8 / 2 5 / N A S / mbm.19900825.NAS19301.id.html http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2001/12/26/LU/mbm.20011226. LU86755.id.html http://paramadina.or.id/?page_id=169 http://pro-sehatalami.com/topik/148-rs-holistic-antara-dicerca-dan-dicari http://salafiyunpad.wordpress.com/2008/08/21/walhamdulillah-pernyataanresmi-tentang-ruju-nya-ust-jafar-umar-thalib-hafizhohullah/ http://syeikhyasinalfadani.blogspot.sg/2012/11/syeikh-umar-hamdan-almahrasi-1875-1949.html http://www. Bukhari.or.id/ http://www.almukmin-ngruki.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=art icle&id=53&Itemid=66 http://www.bukhari.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=36 http://www.gontor.ac.id/panca-jiwa http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/2000/08/13/0029.html http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/id/content-167-det-prof-dr-h-amien-rais. html http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/id/content-168-det-prof-dr-ahmad-safiimaarif.html http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/id/content-169-det-prof-dr-h-m-dinsyamsuddin.html http://www.republika.co.id/berita/31004/LIPIA_Lahirkan_Kader_Muslim_ Moderat http://www.salafy.or.id/modules/artikel2/artikel.php?id=1619

302

List of Abbreviations

ABA ANU BEJ BMI DDII DKM DPR DPRD FKAWJ FPI FUI HASMI HBI HMI HTI IAIN ICG

Akademi Bahasa Arab (Arabic College) Australian National University Bursa Efek Jakarta (Jakarta Stock Exchange) Bank Mu’amalat Indonesia Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Council for Islamic Propaganda) Dwan Kemakmuran Masjid (Mosque Management Board) Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (National House of Representatives) Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Local House of Representatives) Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jama’ah (Communication Forum for the Followers of Sunna and the Jama’a). Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front) Forum Umat Islam (Islamic Community Forum) Harakah Sunniyyah untuk Masyarakat Islami (Sunni Movement of Islamic Community) Halaqah Bimbingan Islam (Islamic Guidance Circle) Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic Student Association) Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Institut Agama Islam Negeri (State Institute for Islamic Studies) International Crisis Group 303


ICMI IKIP IM IMM IPB ISIM ITB IUDs JAT JI KHI KISDI KMI KOMPAK KUA LIPI LIPIA LMD LP3ES

LP3K LPBA LPDI MA

Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan (Institute for Education and Teaching) Ikhwanul Muslimin Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Students Association) Institut Pertanian Bogor (Bogor Institute of Agriculture) International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World Institut Teknologi Bandung (Bandung Institute of Technology) Intra Uterine Devices Jama’ah Anshar Tauhid (Community for the Helpers of Tawhid) Jama’ah Islamiyyah (Islamic Congregation) Kompilasi Hukum Islam (Compilation of Islamic laws) Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (Indonesian Committee for Islamic Solidarity) Kuliyyat al-Mu’allimin al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Teachers Training) Komite Penanggulangan Krisis (Crises Rescue Committee) Kantor Urusan Agama (Sub-district Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs) Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Institute of Science) Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic) Latihan Mujahid Dakwa (Training for Preachers) Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information) Lembaga Pengembangan Pondok Pesantren Kilat (Institute for the Development and Lightning Pesantren) Lembaga Pengajaran Bahasa Arab (Institute for Teaching Arabic) Lembaga Pendidikan Da’wah Islam (Institute for Islamic Da’wa) Madrasah Aliyah (Senior High School)

304

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Malari MI MMI MPR MTQ MTs MUI MWI NII/DI NKK/BKK

NTU NU OIC OSIS P3M

PAN PBB Persis PGA PII PKB PKS PNU POS PPIDT PPIM PPP PUI RAI

Malapetaka Lima Belas Januari (15th of January Disaster) Madrasah Ibtida’iyah (Elementary School) Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesia’s Council of Warriors) Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly) Musabaqa Tilawat al-Qur’an (Qur’anic Recitation Competition) Madrasah Tsanawiyah (Junior High School) Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Ulama) Madrasah Wathaniyyah Islamiyyah Negara Islam Indonesia/Darul Islam (Indonesian Islamic State/Abode of Islam) Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kampus (Normalization of Campus Activities/Campus Coordinating Body) Nanyang Technological University, Singapore Nahdlatul Ulama Organization of Islamic Conference Organisasi Siswa Intra Sekolah (Instra School Student Organization) Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat (Center for the Study and Development of Pesantren and Society) Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandat Party) Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent and Stars Party) Persatuan Islam Pendidikan Guru Agama (School of Religious Teachers) Pelajar Islam Indonesia (Islamic Students Union) Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (Nation Awakening Party) Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Justice and Prosperity Party) Partai Nahdlatul Ulama (Nahdlatul Ulama Party) Political Opportunity Structure Pondok Pesantren Ilmu Dakwah dan Teknologi Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (Center for the Study of Islam and Society) Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party) Persatuan Umat Islam Rabitat al-‘Alam al-Islami (The Muslim World League)

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RCTI RMT SCTV SDIT Sesdelu SMA STAIN STDI STIBA TKIT TPQ UGM UI UIKA UIN UMI UMS Unhas YAC YFM YWI ZMO

Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia Resource Mobilization Theory Surya Citra Televison Sekolah Dasar Islam Terpadu (Integrated Islamic Elementary School) Sekolah Departemen Luar Negeri (School of Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Sekolah Menengah Atas (Senior High School) State Islamic College Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Da’wah (College for Islamic Da’wa) Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Islam dan Bahasa Arab (College for the Study of Islam and Arabic) Taman Kanak-kanak Islam Terpadu (Integrated Islamic Kindergaten) Taman Pendidikan al-Qur’an (Qur’anic Learning Center for Children) Universitas Gadjah Mada (Gadjah Mada University) Universitas Indonesia (University of Indonesia) Universitas Ibnu Khaldun (Ibn Khaldun University) Universitas Islam Negeri (State Islami University) Universitas Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim University) Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta (University of Muhammadiyah Surakarta) Universitas Hasanuddin (University of Hasanuddin) Yayasan Assunnah Cirebon (Cirebon Assunnah Foundation) Yayasan Fathul Mu’in (Fathul Mu’in Foundation) Yayasan Wahdah Islamiyyah (Wahdah Islamiyyah Foundation) Zentrum Moderner Orient (Center for Modern Oriental Studies)

306

Glossary

‘Aqida ‘Aqiqa ‘Awra ‘Ibada ‘Illat ‘Ilm Kalam ‘Ulama Adhan Ahl al-Athar or Ahl al-Hadith Ahl al-ittiba’ Ahl al-ra’y Ahlu al-Sunna wa al-Jama’a Ajengan Akhlaq Al-Amr bi al-Ma’ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar Al-Firqa al-Najiya Al-Ghuraba’ Al-Jama’a Al-Salaf al-Salih

Creed ommemorating the birth of a baby Parts of the body that should be covered Ritual Rationale slamic Theology Religious scholar Call for prayer Followers of the Prophetic tradition Followers Followers of rational judgment People who follow the Prophet and who belong to the Congregation. Religious leader Islamic ethics Commanding right and forbidding wrong Saved group Strangers Congregation The pious predecessors consisting of the first three generations of Muslims 307


Al-Ta’ifa al-Mansura Al-Wala’ wa al-Bara’ Ansar Asas Tunggal Badan Wakaf Bandongan

Bay’a Berdikari Berkah Bid’a Bid’a ‘amaliya Bid’a haqiqiya Bid’a i’tiqadiya Bid’a idafiya Da’i Da’wa bil hal Da’wa bil lisan Dalil Dar al-harb Dawra Dukun Dzikir Bersama Fatwa Fiqh Furu’ Ghaya Ghazw al-fikr Halaqa Hijra Hizby Iftar Ihsan Ijma’ Ijtihad

The victorious group Loyalty and disavowal Supporters in Medina The sole foundation Endowment Board Collective study in which a group of students sit in front of a kyai or an ustadh listening to his instruction Oath of loyalty Self-reliance God’s blessing Religious innovation Bid’a of religious practice or ritual Essential bid’a Creedal bid’a Additional bid’a Proselytizer Da’wa with deeds or examples Oral da’wa Religious argument The abode of war Training for studying religion ranging from three days to three weeks. Traditional medical practitioner To chant God’s Names collectively Religious opinion from a religious scholar Islamic jurisprudence Practical matters Goal, aim Cultural invasion Learning circles Migration Partisan, causing division Meal for fast breaking Beneficence Consensus Independent reasoning

308

GLOSSARY

Ikhtilat Ikhtiyar Ilham Iman Isbal Islam kaffa Istighatha

Jahiliyya Jalabiya Jibillat Jilbab Kebebasan Keikhlasan Kesederhanaan Khatib Khaul Khitan Khurafat Khuruj ‘ala al-hakim Khutbah Nikah Kitab Kuning Kufr Kufran Bawwah Kyai Langgar Lihya Ma’siya Madhhab Madrasah

Free social intercourse between men and women Making an effort Inspiration Faith Wearing trousers that reach bellow the ankle Comprehensive Islam Asking for help from God; common religious gathering to chant God’s Names and Attributes and to pray to God in order to achieve certain aims. The age of ignorance Long and loose men’s dress covering the body until the knee Natural disposition or temper Veil Freedom Sincerity Modesty Preacher Commemoration of one’s death Circumcision Superstitions Rebellion against the ruler Advice and guidance for a new couple “Yellow books”, classic textbooks printed on yellow paper Unbelief Genuine disbelief Religious scholar usually who leads a pesantren Small prayer house Beard Sinful deed School of Islamic law Islamic school

309


Mahram Majelis Taklim Manhaj Maslaha mursala Modin Mu’adala Mu’amalat Mubahala

Mubahatha Muballigh Mudir Mufti Muhajir Mujtahid Murabbi Musalla Mushrik Nahw Nerimo Nifaq Panjang Jimat Pesantren Kilat

Pesantren Pusaka Qadi Qurban Rajm Rebana Riba’

One who is not eligible to marry Religious lesson, usually held in mosques Path or method Common good functionary Accreditation Social interactions A kind of prayer in which all conflicting parties meet and ask God for His verdict by casting His curse on a lying participant. Dialog, discussion Preacher Director of a pesantren Religious scholar who issues fatwas Emigrant who follows the Prophet from Mecca to Medina Muslim scholar capable of formulating independent legal reasoning Guide, mentor Small prayer house Polytheist Arabic grammar To accept with pleasure Hypocrisy Lit. “long amulets”; public parading of sacred heirlooms. Lightning Pesantren, short and intensive courses or indoctrination in Islamic studies Islamic boarding school Heirlooms Religious judge in an Islamic court Slaughtered animal on the Feast of Sacrifice Stoning to death Tambourine Usury

310

GLOSSARY

Ruqya Salaf Salafi Salawatan Santri Santriwati Sarf Sekolah Sepih ing pamrih rame ing gawe Shafa’a Shahada Shirk Slametan

Sorogan

Sururi Ta’assub madhhabiy Ta’til Tabligh Akbar Tadrib al-Du’at Tafsir Tafwid

Taghut Tahfiz Tajdid Takfir Takyif

Alternative medical treatment, which asks for God’s protection with His Words The first three generations of Muslims Person who follows the path of the Salaf Chanting religious formulas in praise of the Prophet Male student Female student Morphology Public school To work diligently without expecting return Asking help from saints and pious Muslims Islamic confession Polytheism Special ritual at certain events by reciting the Qur’an and chanting some religious formulas to ask good fortune from God Individual consultation in which a student, usually an advanced one, comes to a kyai or a senior ustadh to learn certain books. Follower of Muhammad ibn Surur Nayef Zainal Abidin Fanatically following a particular school of thought Negation or denial of some of God’s Attributes Massive religious gathering Training for preachers Qur’anic Exegesis Not to decide the meaning of God’s Attributes as prescribed in the Qur’an and in accepted hadith. Tyrant Memorization of the Qur’an Religious reformation or modernization Excommunication Posing further questions about what God’s Attributes are. 311


Taqbil Taqdir Taqlid Tarbiya Tarbiyat al-Nisa’ Tarekat Tartil Tasfiya Tashabbuh Tashbih Tawassul Tawhid Tawhid al-asma’ wa al-sifat Tawhid Mulkiya or hakimiya Tawhid Rububiya Tawhid Uluhiya Tawqifiya Tawsiya Tharif or Ta’wil

Tingkeban Ukhuwwah Islamiyyah Umma Usra

Ustadh Ustadha Usul al-Fiqh Wali Zakat Ziara

Kissing the hand Predestination Blind imitation Education Women’s Education Sufi order Qur’anic recitation Purification Imitation Comparing the Attributes of God to those of living creatures such as human beings. Intercession Monotheism Oneness of God’s Names and Attributes Oneness of Governance Oneness of Lordship Oneness of Godship Matters that have been agreed upon Religious advice Changing or interpreting the literal meaning of God’s Attributes into other more rational meanings Celebration of the seventh month of pregnancy Islamic Brotherhood Islamic community Family, a small group consisting of five to ten people to study religion as method of recruitment in the movement Religious teacher Female religious teacher Islamic legal theory Saint Alms tax Shrine visitation

312

Samenvatting

Deze studie handelt over de rol van Salafi pesantrens (Islamitische kostscholen) in Salafi da’wa in Indonesië. Een Salafi pesantren is een pesantren die onderwijs verzorgt in het Salafisme zoals die met name is verwoord in de werken van Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, de grondlegger van het Wahhabisme in Saudi Arabië. De oorsprong van de Salafi doctrine gaat terug op een oudere periode en is gebaseerd op de leerstellingen van Ibn Taymiyya en Ahmad ibn Hanbal. Tegenwoordig worden Abdul Aziz Abdullah bin Baz en Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani gerekend tot de invloedrijkste Salafi auteurs. Salafi teksten, zoals de Kitab al-Tawhid and al-Usul al-Thalatha van Ibn Abd al-Wahhab en de al-‘Aqida alWasitiyya van Ibn Taymiyya behoren tot de belangrijste leerboeken die in Salafi pesantrens worden gebruikt. Salafi pesantrens kwamen op in the late tachtiger jaren van de twintigste eeuw en werden gesticht door pas afgestudeerden uit Saudi Arabië en Jemen terwijl ze ondersteund werden door het Instituut voor de Studie van Islam en de Arabische Taal (LIPIA) in Jakarta. Als onderdelen van de wereldwijde Salafi beweging zijn Salafi pesantrens de moeite van bestudering meer dan waard. De opkomst van de Salafi beweging in het grootste Islamitische land ter wereld veroorzaakt spanningen en conflicten in de maatschappij. In Mataram op Lombok, bijvoorbeeld, ontstonden in April 2006 conflicten tussen Salafis en traditionele moslims toen traditionele moslims een musalla (klein gebedshuis) van de Salafis beschadigden. Andere conflicten traden op onder meer in Banjarsari in Ciamis, West Java en in Sidayu in Gresik, Oost Java. Een ingrijpend fenomeen van de Salafi beweging die veel 313


wetenschappelijke aandacht kreeg was de opkomst van de Laskar Jihad. Onder leiding van Ja’far Umar Thalib mobiliseerde deze paramilitaire groep de steun van moslims en riep hen op zich aan te sluiten aan de jihad in de Molukken om de moslims aldaar te verdedigen tegen christelijke aanvallen. Deze ontwikkeling veranderde het imago van de islam in Indonesië van the smiling face of Islam zoals Martin van Bruinessen het verwoordde tot conservative Islam. In deze studie concentreer ik me op drie pesantrens: al-Nur in Ciamis, Assunah in Cirebon (beiden in West Java) en al-Furqan in Gresik in Oost Java. Ik heb ze gekozen omdat ze representatief zijn voor drie verschillende stromingen binnen het Salafisme in Indonesië. Ik analiseer een aantal aspecten van deze onderwijsinstellingen: hun historische ontwikkeling, de reacties van de omliggende gemeenschap, netwerken en fondsenwerving. Ik besteed ook speciale aandacht aan de wijze waarop studenten de Salafi manhaj in hun dagelijkse leven toepassen. De vraag die zich hierbij voordoet is hoe Salafi pesantrens hun studenten bijbrengen hoe te leven volgens deze Salafi manhaj, hoe ze deze internaliseren en analyseer ik de dynamiek van het studentenleven in de pesantrens. Ook besteed ik aandacht aan de interactie tussen de mudir (directeur), ustadhs (onderwijzers) en santris (studenten) en de interactie tussen individuen in de pesantrens met personen buiten de kostscholen. Om data te verzamelen heb ik zeventien maanden veldwerk verricht verdeeld over twee perioden waarin ik het gemeenschappelijke leven binnen pesantrens heb geobserveerd, heb meegedaan aan allerlei activiteiten en heb ik onderwijzers, studenten en lokale religieuze leiders geinterviewd. De Salafi beweging roept moslims op om hun geloof en hun religieuze optreden te ontdoen van bid’as door terug te keren naar de Koran en de Hadith en te leven naar het voorbeeld van de al-Salaf al-salih, de eerste drie generaties moslims. Islam zoals voorgeschreven in de Koran en Hadith wordt beschouwd als autenthiek en onbedoezeld door lokale tradities. De hedendaagse Salafi beweging in Indonesië is onderdeel van de globale Salafi beweging die volledig wordt gesteund door de regering van Saudie Arabië. De Saudi regering spande zich op allerhande wijze in om de Saudi variant van de Islam in te voeren in de rest van de islamitische wereld om de voortschrijdende invloed van het Arabische socialisme in Egypte en van de Iraanse revolutie van het eind van de zeventiger jaren een halt toe te roepen. Deze pogingen omvatten ook uit het verlenen van studiebeurzen aan jonge moslims om te studeren aan Saudi universiteiten, het bouwen van moskeeën in islamitische landen, het publiceren en gratis verspreiden van leerboeken en het ondersteunen van islamitische organisaties.

314

SAMENVATTING

In Indonesië ondersteunde de Saudi regering de Dewan Da’wah Islamiyyah Indonesia (DDII of Dewan Da’wah, de Indonesische Islamitische Da’wa Raad), een islamitische organisatie die veel aandacht schenkt aan het verzorgen van islamitische propaganda op het platteland in de archipel. Via de DDII verstrekte de Saudi regering studiebeurzen aan haar kameraden die geinitieerd waren in de Salafi da’wa in Indonesië. Belangrijker was het Saudi initiatief om de Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA) in Jakarta, een tak van de Jami a Imam Ibn Su’ud in Riyadh, op te zetten. De Salafi beweging werd levendiger door de ondersteuning van LIPIA afgestudeerden. De Dewan Da’wah was echter niet de enige islamitische organisatie die de weg vrijmaakte voor de opkomst van het Salafisme in Indonesië. Reformistische islamitische organisaties, zoals de Muhammadiyah en al-Irsyad droegen ook bij aan de verspreiding van het Salafisme. Indonesische Salafis zijn verre van monolithies. Ik onderscheid in Indonesië drie categorien: “puristen”, “haraki” en “jihadisten”. Puristen zijn zij die volstrekte volgzaamheid aan de heerser propageren en die hun activiteiten concentreren op da’wa en onderwijs. Ze gebruiken vreedzame middelen om hun doel, de islamitische gemeenschap, te bereiken. Binnen deze categorie zijn drie subgroepen aan te wijzen die ik “afwijzers”, “cooperatisten”, en “tanzimi” noem. “Afwijzende” puristen zijn exclusief; ze wijzen elke vorm van samenwerking af met groepen en organisaties die zij als hizbi (partizaan) bestempelen – en ze bedoelen hiermee vrijwel iedereen. In het onderwijs wijzen zij het nationale currculum af. Binnen deze categorie vinden we de voormalige Laskar Jihad activisten. “Cooperatieve” puristen zijn meer inclusief; ze zijn, onder speciale omstandigheden, bereid tot samenwerking met andere islamitische groeperingen en met de regering. Abu Nida en zijn groep die beurzen ontvangen van de Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath vallen onder deze groep. Ik gebruik de term “tanzimi” (van Arabisch tanzim, “organisatie”) voor die quiëtistische Salafis die het toelaatbaar vinden om formele organisaties op te zetten. De Wahdah Islamiyah in Makassar in Zuid Sulawesi en de Harakah Sunniyah untuk Masyarakat Islami (HASMI) in Bogor in West Java die beiden zijn georganiseerd kompleet met hoofdbestuur en lokale besturen, behoren tot deze categorie. Verschillend van “afwijzers” en “cooperatisten”, die een structurele organisatievorm afwijzen als zijnde bi’da, geloven de “tanzimi” dat een organisatorische vorm nodig is om de uitdagingen die de da’wa ondervindt het hoofd te bieden. De tweede soort Salafis zijn de “haraki” (van Arabisch harakah, “beweging”), ook “politicos” genoemd. Verschillend van “puristen” die onvoorwaardelijke

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gehoorzaamheid aan de heerser voorstaan, verzetten de “harakis” zich hiertegen. Zij geloven dat islam een allesomvattende wereldbeschouwing is die alle aspecten van het leven omvat inclusief rituelen, sociale normen, ekonomie en politiek. Een heerser dient dus islamitische normen en regelingen door te voeren en hij dient zich dus te onderwerpen aan islamitisch recht. Indien hij de islamitische wet niet invoert kan een heerser becritiseerd worden. Pondok Pesantren Islam al-Mukmin, Ngruki in Surakarta, Midden Java wordt geachte te behoren tot deze groep. De laatse Salafi categorie is die van de “jihadisten”. Verschillend van de “haraki” die de regering verbaal en zonder geweld bekritiseren gaan de “jihadisten” verder door tegen islamitische heersers de wapens op te nemen. Salafi pesantrens bieden verscheidene onderwijsprogramma’s aan van kleuterschool tot het tertiaire niveau en ze passen hun eigen curriculum toe. Er zijn verscheidene verschillen tussen pesantrens. Pesantrens die worden geassocieerd met “afwijzende” Salafis bieden een minder breed programma aan namelijk Tahfiz (Uit het hoofd leren van de Koran) en Tadrib al-Du’at (Priestertraining). Ze passen het curriculum uit Jemen toe en beperken zich tot religieuze onderwerpen. Via hun programma’s proberen ze de Darul Hadith, een Salafi onderwijscentrum gesticht door Sjeik Muqbil in Damaj, Jemen te repliceren waar veel “afwijzende” Salafis zijn afgestudeerd. De enige seculiere onderwerpen die deze pesantrens aanbieden zijn de nationale taal en rekenkunde die nodig zijn omdat kennis van het Indonesisch nodig is voor communicatie en rekenkunde van belang is voor handel. Pesantrens die worden geassocieerd met “cooperative” Salafis bieden een wijder spectrum aan programma’s: Kleuterschool, Basisschool, Tsanawiyah, Aliyah, en Ma’had ‘Aly. Deze pesantrens, zoals al-Furqan en Assunah vertonen een meer inclusieve neiging dan hun “afwijzende” Salafi tegenhangers. Ze passen het nationale curriculum toe voor seculiere onderwerpen en combineren dit met het Saudi curriculum voor religieuze onderwerpen. Ze onderwijzen alle seculiere onderwerpen zoals die door de regering zijn vastgesteld en laten hun studenten meedoen aan het nationale examen zodat ze hun studie kunnen voortzetten op hogere onderwijs niveaus op openbare scholen. De onderwijsmethodes die gebruikt worden om het Salafisme to onderwijzen hangen af van de leeftijden van de leerlingen. Kinderen op kleuter- en basisschool niveaus, bijvoorbeeld, worden op een eenvoudige manier onderwezen in het Salafisme bijvoorbeeld door het memoriseren van gebeden gebaseerd op geaccepteerde Hadith en door hen te verbieden liedjes te zingen of tekeningen te

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maken van dieren en mensen. Studenten op hogere niveaus leren over Salafisme door leerboeken te bestuderen waarbij ze de lessen uit het hoofd moeten leren, met name de religieuze argumenten (dalils). Belangrijk is dat pesantrens niet alleen onderwijs geven over het Salafisme maar hun studenten ook aansporen te leven volgens de Salafi manhaj bijvoorbeeld door een jalabiya en een lange baard te dragen, vermijden van isbal (dragen van broeken die tot onder de enkels vallen) en door gezamenlijk te eten van een grote schotel om hen aan te sporen waarlijke Salafis te worden (Salafi kaffa). De stroom van internationale donoren bewijst de aanwezigheid van Salafi pesantren netwerken. Mijn onderzoek toonde aan dat de meeste Salafi pesantrens finacieel worden ondersteund door internationale donoren zowel door charitatieve instellingen als door individuen. De belangrijkste donor blijft de Koeweiti Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turatch al-Islami die grote sommen geld geeft aan Salafi pesantrens en andere instellingen. Kleinere bedragen worden geschonken door de Qatari Sheikh Eid Charity Foundation. Salafis en Salafi pesantrens zijn nauw verbonden met hun tegenhangers in het Midden Oosten, met name in Saudi Arabië en in Jemen waar Indonesische Salafis zijn afgestudeerd. Net als Salafis elders ter wereld onderhouden Indonesische Salafis hun traditionele netwerken die hen verbinden met hun sjeiks in het Midden Oosten. Zij doen dit door hen te verzoeken om fatwas over speciale gevallen, door hen te verzoeken religieuze lessen te verzorgen in hun dawras en door studenten te zenden om bij hen te studeren. Indonesische Salafis hebben bovendien een regionaal netwerk opgezet in Zuidoost Azië, met name tussen Salafis in Indonesië, Malaysië en Singapore. Salafi pesantrens, dawras en radiozenders zijn van het grootste beland in het opzetten en onderhouden van dit netwerk. De aanwezigheid van verscheidene studenten uit Malaysië en Singapore in Salafi pesantrens in Batam en Solo en de uitnodiging van Indonesische Salafi ustadhs door hun tegenhangers in Singapore en Malaysië om Salafi lessen te verzorgen bevestigen het bestaan van dit netwerk. In dit verband verdient de Hang radiozender in Batam, Riau speciale aandacht. Het verzorgt religieuze lezingen waar Salafis in Singapore naar luisteren. Islamitische gemeenschappen reageren gemengd op de opkomst van Salafi pesantrens in hun omgeving. Traditionele NU moslims vertonen een sterke afwijzing van het Salafisme en zij uiten dit door verbale aanvallen en soms door geweldadige acties. De voornaamste reden dat zij het Salafisme afwijzen is dat de Salafi kritiek hebben op hun religieuze praktijken die zij zien als bid’a (religieuze vernieuwingen) en de Salafi houding ten aanzien van andere

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moslims. Salafi kritiek op de religieuze overtuigingen en praktijken van de lokale gemeenschappen wekt de woede van de gemeenschap en vooral van hun religieuze leiders. Voor hen betekenen de vraagtekens die Salafis zetten bij de religieuze argumenten achter hun praktijken een aantasting van hun religieuze autoriteit. Bovendien hebben ze ekonomisch voordeel door het handhaven van deze tradities. Salafi twijfel aan hun religieuze argumenten bedreigt dus hun religieuze autoriteit en dus hun bron van inkomsten. Bovendien beperken Salafis hun sociale omgang tot hun eigen kringen zodat de lokale bevolking hen beschouwd als anti-sociaal, exclusief en arrogant waardoor, in sommige gevallen, ook de woede van de lokale bevolking wordt gewekt. Lokale leiders van reformistische islamitische organisaties zoals Muhammadiyah en Persis reageren meer positief. Hoewel zij het niet eens zijn met de Salafis aangaande de plicht van moslims om het Salafi pad te volgen zien ze hen toch als partners in de bestrijding van bid’as. Dit blijkt overduidelijk uit, bijvoorbeeld, de argumenten van Nawawi Bakri, de voorzitter van de Muhammadiyah afdeling in Sidayu en van Ade Abdurrahman, de voorzitter van de Persis afdeling in Banjarsari. Beiden uiten hun waardering jegens het Salafisme vanwege haar strijd tegen bid’as. Confict tussen hen en Salafis komt echter op wanneer de Salafis proberen hun bezittingen zoals pesantrens en moskeeën over te nemen. De kwestie van Pesantren al-Hikah in Sidayu weerspiegelt de Muhammadiyah’s visie op het Salafisme. De pesantren is het bezit van de Muhammadiyah maar wordt geleidt door Salafis omdat de Muhammadiyah niet genoeg leiders heeft. Hoewel Bakri hiertegen geen bezwaar heeft hebben andere Muhammadiyah leiders hun zorgen hierover. Ik concludeer dat Salafi pesantrens een belangrijke rol spelen in de verspreiding van het Salafisme. Behalve dat ze studenten onderwijzen in het Salafisme, prediken Salafis ook op andere wijzen tot de lokale gemeenschap onder meer door het verzorgen van religieuze lessen in moskeeën en door het opzetten van Salafi radiozenders.

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Quaestiones Infinitae Publications of the department of philosophy and religious studies

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D. van Dalen, Torens en Fundamenten (valedictory lecture), 1997. J.A. Bergstra, W.J. Fokkink, W.M.T. Mennen, S.F.M. van Vlijmen, Spoorweglogica via EURIS, 1997. I.M. Croese, Simplicius on Continuous and Instantaneous Change (dissertation), 1998. M.J. Hollenberg, Logic and Bisimulation (dissertation), 1998. C.H. Leijenhorst, Hobbes and the Aristotelians (dissertation), 1998. S.F.M. van Vlijmen, Algebraic Specification in Action (dissertation), 1998. M.F. Verweij, Preventive Medicine Between Obligation and Aspiration (dissertation), 1998. J.A. Bergstra, S.F.M. van Vlijmen, Theoretische Software-Engineering: kenmerken, faseringen en classificaties, 1998. A.G. Wouters, Explanation Without A Cause (dissertation), 1999. M.M.S.K. Sie, Responsibility, Blameworthy Action & Normative Disagreements (dissertation), 1999. M.S.P.R. van Atten, Phenomenology of choice sequences (dissertation), 1999. V.N. Stebletsova, Algebras, Relations and Geometries (an equational perspective) (dissertation), 2000. A. Visser, Het Tekst Continuüm (inaugural lecture), 2000.

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H. Ishiguro, Can we speak about what cannot be said? (public lecture), 2000. W. Haas, Haltlosigkeit; Zwischen Sprache und Erfahrung (dissertation), 2001. R. Poli, ALWIS: Ontology for knowledge engineers (dissertation), 2001. J. Mansfeld, Platonische Briefschrijverij (valedictory lecture), 2001. E.J. Bos, The Correspondence between Descartes and Henricus Regius (dissertation), 2002. M. van Otegem, A Bibliography of the Works of Descartes (1637-1704) (dissertation), 2002. B.E.K.J. Goossens, Edmund Husserl: Einleitung in die Philosophie: Vorlesungen 1922/23 (dissertation), 2003. H.J.M. Broekhuijse, Het einde van de sociaaldemocratie (dissertation), 2002. P. Ravalli, Husserls Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität in den Göttinger Jahren: Eine kritisch-historische Darstellung (dissertation), 2003. B. Almond, The Midas Touch: Ethics, Science and our Human Future (inaugural lecture), 2003. M. Düwell, Morele kennis: over de mogelijkheden van toegepaste ethiek (inaugural lecture), 2003. R.D.A. Hendriks, Metamathematics in Coq (dissertation), 2003. Th. Verbeek, E.J. Bos, J.M.M. van de Ven, The Correspondence of René Descartes: 1643, 2003. J.J.C. Kuiper, Ideas and Explorations: Brouwer’s Road to Intuitionism (dissertation), 2004. C.M. Bekker, Rechtvaardigheid, Onpartijdigheid, Gender en Sociale Diversiteit; Feministische filosofen over recht doen aan vrouwen en hun onderlinge verschillen (dissertation), 2004. A.A. Long, Epictetus on understanding and managing emotions (public lecture), 2004. J.J. Joosten, Interpretability formalized (dissertation), 2004. J.G. Sijmons, Phänomenologie und Idealismus: Analyse der Struktur und Methode der Philosophie Rudolf Steiners (dissertation), 2005. J.H. Hoogstad, Time tracks (dissertation), 2005. M.A. van den Hoven, A Claim for Reasonable Morality (dissertation), 2006.

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C. Vermeulen, René Descartes, Specimina philosophiae: Introduction and Critical Edition (dissertation), 2007. R.G. Millikan, Learning Language without having a theory of mind (inaugural lecture), 2007. R.J.G. Claassen, The Market’s Place in the Provision of Goods (dissertation), 2008. H.J.S. Bruggink, Equivalence of Reductions in Higher-Order Rewriting (dissertation), 2008. A. Kalis, Failures of agency (dissertation), 2009. S. Graumann, Assistierte Freiheit (dissertation), 2009. M. Aalderink, Philosophy, Scientific Knowledge, and Concept Formation in Geulincx and Descartes (dissertation), 2010. I.M. Conradie, Seneca in his cultural and literary context: Selected moral letters on the body (dissertation), 2010. C. van Sijl, Stoic Philosophy and the Exegesis of Myth (dissertation), 2010. J.M.I.M. Leo, The Logical Structure of Relations (dissertation), 2010. M.S.A. van Houte, Seneca’s theology in its philosophical context (dissertation), 2010. F.A. Bakker, Three Studies in Epicurean Cosmology (dissertation), 2010. T. Fossen, Political legitimacy and the pragmatic turn (dissertation), 2011. T. Visak, Killing happy animals. Explorations in utilitarian ethics. (dissertation), 2011. A. Joosse, Why we need others: Platonic and Stoic models of friendship and self-understanding (dissertation), 2011. N. M. Nijsingh, Expanding newborn screening programmes and strengthening informed consent (dissertation), 2012. R. Peels, Believing Responsibly: Intellectual Obligations and Doxastic Excuses (dissertation), 2012. S. Lutz, Criteria of Empirical Significance (dissertation), 2012 G.H. Bos, Agential Self-consciousness, beyond conscious agency (dissertation), 2013. F.E. Kaldewaij, The animal in morality: Justifying duties to animals in Kantian moral philosophy (dissertation), 2013.

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R.O. Buning, Henricus Reneri (1593-1639): Descartes’ Quartermaster in Aristotelian Territory (dissertation), 2013. I.S. Löwisch, Genealogy Compostion in Response to Trauma: Gender and Memory in 1 Chronicles 1-9 and the Documentary Film ‘My Life Part 2’ (dissertation), 2013. A. El Khairat, Contesting Boundaries: Satire in Contemporary Morocco (dissertation), 2013. A. Krom, Not to be sneezed at. On the possibility of justifying infectious disease control by appealling to a mid-level harm principle (dissertation), 2014. Z. Pall, Salafism in Lebanon: local and transnational resources (dissertation), 2014. D. Wahid, Nurturing the Salafi Manhaj: A Study of Salafi Pesantrens in Contemporary Indonesia (dissertation), 2014.

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Curriculum Vitae

Din Wahid was born in Indramayu, West Java in 1968. He is a lecturer at the Faculty of Islamic Theology and Philosophy, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta, and a researcher at the Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM, Center for the Study of Islam and Society) UIN Jakarta. He went to Pondok Modern Gontor for his secondary school where he studied Arabic and basic Islamic doctrines (1981-1987), and taught there for two years (19871989). In 1994, he graduated in Islamic Theology and Philosophy at IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, and got his Master in Islamic Studies from Leiden University in 1999. From February 2008 to January 2012, he was granted a scholarship for his doctoral program at Utrecht University, The Netherlands, under framework of “Training Indonesia’s Young Leaders Program”. His interest includes modern thought in Islam, and contemporary Islamic movements in Indonesia. His published articles include: “Pentas Jihad Gerakan Salafi Radikal Indonesia”, Studia Islamika, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2007, pp. 343-362; “Negara Islam atau Masyarakat Islam?” in Rizal Sukma and Clara Joewono, (eds), Gerakan dan Pemikiran Islam Indonesia Kontemporer [Islamic Movements and Thoughts in Contemporary Indonesia], Jakarta: CSIS, 2007, pp. 73-112; and “MMI dan Penegakkan Syari’at Islam di Indonesia” in Mimbar, Jurnal Agama dan Budaya, vol. 23, no. 4, 2006, h. 385-400.

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