Cont Islam (2011) 5:1–17 DOI 10.1007/s11562-010-0145-4
Goliath and David in Gaza: Indonesian myth-building and conflict as a cultural system Ronald A. Lukens-Bull & Mark R. Woodward
Published online: 1 December 2010 # Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
Abstract The ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is a well established part of Indonesian religio-political discourse. Anti-Zionism if not outright anti-Semitism is foundational; Israel has few friends in Indonesia. Various media reactions to the 2008–2009 Gaza attacks are placed within wider ethnographic and linguistic contexts to explore how news is spun in a cultural system of conflict. In becoming part of a cultural system of conflict, discourses about Israel take on the properties of myth. Keywords Palestine-Israel . Indonesia . Journalism . Myth-building
Introduction This essay concerns Indonesian responses to and interpretations of the 2008–2009 war in Gaza and the ways in which they are framed by more general understandings of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as an aspect of a global struggle between Zionism and Islam. It focuses on two graphic images. The first is the front page of Sumatra Utara Pos (The North Sumatra Post), a daily paper from Medan, the third largest city in Indonesia. On January 7, 2009 the front-page headline read: “Israel Uses Nuclear Bomb.” The second is a set of collages depicting the Gaza conflict made by children and posted on a bulletin board at Pondok Pesantren Pabelan, a Muslim school in Central Java that we both saw a few weeks later.
R. A. Lukens-Bull (*) Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of North Florida, 1 UNF Drive, Jacksonville, FL 32224, USA e-mail:
[email protected] M. R. Woodward School of Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies, Tempe, AZ 85287-4302, USA e-mail:
[email protected]
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Medan is located in the province of North Sumatra. It is a major commercial and industrial center and with a population of approximately 2.5 million, is Indonesia’s third largest city. It has a religiously and ethnically diverse population, The North Sumatra Post is among the city’s most popular daily papers. Ron saw it, jumped out of a taxi, and bought a copy. That is where this story begins. It continues with our discovery of the collages at Pabelan. Analysis of these images and associated narratives suggest that, even when based on reasonably accurate information, partisan conflict narratives are socially, politically and religiously constructed and reflect “cosmological archetypes” as much as they do “facts on the ground.”
Methodology This paper is part of larger research agendas on Islamic discourse in Indonesia which the authors have engaged in for nearly 20 years and over 30 years respectively. Our research agendas have focused on topics including traditional Islamic schools, Islamic higher education, Javanese and contemporary Indonesian state systems, ritual performance, relationships between text based and local understandings of Islamic teachings and contemporary Islamic popular culture.1 The data considered here were collected when the authors were each engaged in research as well as teaching at Islamic colleges in Medan and Yogyakarta respectively. The data and its analysis represents the strength of the phenomenological approach in participant observation; insights often come from quite accidental encounters. In this case, the SUMUT Pos headline was encountered while riding in a taxi to campus and seeing the newspaper’s front page prominently displayed on a newsstand. Likewise, the poster in Magelan was encountered when investigating the place of a religious pluralism curriculum in an Islamic boarding school (pesantren). Our analysis of Indonesian representations of the Gaza war resembles Rojo’s account of the “demonization of Saddam Hussein” by the Spanish press in the period immediately prior to the First Gulf War (1990–1991).2 Such demonization occurs on both sides of the conflict in Palestine; Lukens-Bull and Fafard examine how a proIsrael ministry uses the combination of an Orlando theme park and publications to spin a two pronged myth. The first makes the love of Israel an important part of Christianity and the second demonizes Muslims.3 Our analysis expands on the methodology Rojo employs in two respects. We locate our analysis of conflict narratives and images in a more general ethnographic context. We also employ a broader range of analytic tools. Rojo relies almost entirely on Foucault’s concepts of separation and othering and Lakoff’s analysis of metaphor (Foucault 1969, 1971; 1
See Lukens-Bull (2000a and b, 2001a and b, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008) and Woodward (1989, 1988, 1996, 2006, 2008a and b, 2010) 2 Rojo (1995). The similarities between the demonization of Saddam Hussein in the western press and the demonization of Zionism and Israel in the Muslim world indicate that this mode of symbolic discourse transcends cultural and religious differences. There are an untold number of pro-Israeli publications and web-sites produced by Christians and Jews that employ the same logic to demonize Muslims. 3 Lukens-Bull and Fafard (2007). For another examination on how American Christians demonize Muslims, see (Cimino 2005).
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Lakoff 1987). We will be concerned with the ways in which a combination of analytic approaches drawn from Cultural Anthropology, Religious Studies, Psychology and Linguistics can aid in the understanding of local variants of the global discourse concerning the 2008-2009 Gaza War and the broader Middle Eastern conflict.4 More specifically we draw on Anthropologists Clifford Geertz’s understanding of “Religion as a Cultural System,” and Dan Sperber’s theory of symbolization and Historian of Religions Mircea Eliade’s understanding of relationships between mythic and historical narrative in the analysis of the cultural artifacts considered here (Geertz 1966; Sperber 1975, 1985; Eliade 1959). This paper is not intended as a general treatment of the history of Judaism and anti-Semitism in Indonesia. It is rather an account of the representation of the 2008 Gaza conflict in terms of Indonesian discourse concerning what Siegel terms the “Mediatic Jew,” and the symbolic and cognitive processes through which these representations are constructed. Our purpose is to explore the cultural and religious logic of seemingly irrational beliefs including the claim that Israel employed nuclear weapons in the Gaza War. This requires both the enumeration of factual errors and elucidation of how they can be understood as accurate representations of events given epistemological assumptions that are widely, but by no means universally shared in Indonesia and elsewhere in the Muslim world. It is argued that in this and similar case sensationalistic journalistic accounts of world events have the epistemological status of myth. They present culturally and religiously plausible accounts of “historical” events. In the current global information environment in which accounts of distant events are instantly globalized, the mythification of history follows at a similar pace.
Gaza and Indonesia: political and religious contexts Indonesia is an archipelagic nation spanning the equator in Southeast Asia. It is the world’s most populous Muslim nation and one in which Islam is an increasingly salient factor in political life. Between 1965 and 1998 it was governed by an authoritarian military regime.5 Since the democratic transition of 1998, Islamist political parties and social movements, some violent, others committed to the establishment of Islamic social norms through democratic means, some “home grown” and others with close ties to Wahhabi groups in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Middle East have become increasingly vocal (Diederich 2002; Heffner 2000; Hasan 2008; Woodward 2008a). The democratic transition did not cause the development of Islamist sentiments but allowed them to emerge from the shadows. Groups promoting Islamist agendas that would have been outlawed little more than a decade ago are now accepted as legitimate political players (Van Bruinessen 2002; Effendy 2003; Hasan 2005; Woodward 2008b). Islamist political parties have had 4
For a detailed account of the conflict see the report of the United Nations fact finding mission on the Gaza conflict. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/FactFindingMission.htm (last accessed on November 1, 2010) In the Israeli press this conflict was often referred to as “The War in the South.” In the Arab and other Muslim countries it was often called the “Gaza Massacre.” 5 On the Indonesia governance during the New Order and the democratic transition of 1998 see: 2001D (Emmerson 1999; Heffner 2000; O’Rourke 2003; Schwarz 1999; Van Dijk 2000).
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limited success outside Jakarta and other areas where they have strong historical roots.6 None the less, Islamist discourse has become a recognized and legitmate component of the national political conversation. The emergence of Islamists as legitimate political players has led to a shift in the tone of Indonesian discourse. What would have been considered radical polemics during the New Order period (1965–98) are now seen as mainstream opinion. This is especially true in the case of foreign affairs. Opposition to Israeli policies and to Zionism more generally have long been components of Indonesian foreign policy and political discourse (Barton and Rubebstein 2005; Sukma 2003). Israel and Zionists are easy and politically safe targets and outlets for Islamist sentiments because they have no domestic political constituencies. There are at most a handful of Jews in Indonesia.7Judaism is not among the officially recognized religions entitled to protection and support from the state.8 There is a substantial (approximately 10 per cent) Christian minority. In Indonesia, Evangelical Christians, who in the United States are among the most vocal supporters of Israeli policies, have not made support for Israel an element of Indonesian religio-political discourse at least in part because to do so would further strain relations with the Muslim majority. The Indonesian experience of Jews is filtered through media that often appeals to stereotypes that equate Judaism and Zionism and, as Burhan has observed, depict both as the nearly omnipotent “enemy other” of Indonesia and Islam (Burhanuddin 2007). Indonesian experience of Palestinians is similarly mediated, though far more Indonesians have had personal encounters with Palestinians and other Arabs than with Israelis and other Jews. Palestinians are often represented as brother and sister Muslims and as beleaguered comrades in the defense of Islam. Indonesia has a significant Arab, but not Palestinian, population. Indonesians of Arabic descent are almost exclusively Hadramis, many of whom maintain close family, economic and religious ties with communities in Yemen, but do not have historical links or close ethnic affinities with Palestinians (Jacobsen 2009; Ho 2006). They are also greatly respected because many are or at least claim and are believed to be, descendents of the Prophet Muhammad. However, Habib, as they are known, are much indigenized. Few speak Arabic as a native language and most identify themselves as Indonesians of Arab descent. Their trans-national connections are primarily with their historic homeland in the Hadramout and with other diaspora communities instead of with the larger Middle East in which the Arab-Israeli conflict is situated. These Christian and Arab Muslim communities do not figure significantly in shaping Indonesian public opinion about the Gaza conflict or Middle Eastern Affairs more generally. Rather, opinion is shaped by a combination of media coverage and views that Islam constitutes a global community and consequently that events on the global stage require local responses. Support for Palestinian and other Middle Eastern Muslim causes and movements is rooted almost entirely in religious 6
Despite a well financed, high visibility, campaign the Islamist party PKS received only 8 per cent of the vote in the 2009 national election (Mujani and Liddle 2009). 7 http://www.geschichteinchronologie.ch/as/indon/EncJud_juden-in-Indonesien-ENGL.html (last accessed on November 1, 2010) 8 On Indonesia’s “religion policies” see: (Hidayah 2007).
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solidarity and typically understood as fard kifayah, a religious obligation incumbent on the community as a whole. Conflicts in the Middle East are understood in religious terms as struggles between Muslims on one side and a coalition of Christians and Jews on the other. Few Indonesians other than academics specializing in politics and international affairs and some diplomats are aware of the secular nationalist dimension of the Palestinian movement or that historically it has included Christians as well as Muslims among its leaders and supporters. Even if we were to attribute such an understanding more broadly to the middle class in general, for which there is no published evidence, the middle and upper class in Indonesia do not constitute a majority. Indonesia does not have diplomatic relations with Israel and has been a consistent supporter of the Palestinian cause in world forums including the United Nations. Indonesia does have diplomatic relations with Palestine. Support for the Palestinians and denunciations of Israel are potent symbolic features of domestic political discourse.9 These sentiments are rooted primarily in feelings of trans-national and trans-cultural Islamic solidarity. Supporting Palestinian causes establishes Islamic credibility for political actors without committing them to domestic Islamist causes that are more controversial. Support for the Palestinians takes many forms, ranging from contributing to charities, offering the annual feast of sacrifice by proxy in Palestine, anti-Israel and pro-Palestinian demonstrations, to videos encouraging young Indonesians to join the “Jihad against Zionist brutality and aggression.”10 The Islamist group Front Pembela Islam promised to recruit fighters to join in the struggle in Gaza and to provide them with one-way tickets.11 For the majority of Indonesian Muslims, of whom there are more than two hundred million, support for the Palestinians and disdain for Israel is deep seated and unquestioned. A significant minority is prepared to believe almost anything negative that is said, or written about Israel. Students at the State Islamic Institute in Medan, North Sumatra were unimpressed with claims about Hamas attacks on civilians and saw Israel’s attacks as a naked land grab. Those at the secular Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta voiced similar opinions. Israel has precious few friends in Indonesia. When former president Abdurahman Wahid suggested constructive engagement with Israel and even visited there, he was roundly criticized (Cooper 2010). The conflation of Israel with Zionism and Judaism has led to increasingly vocal anti-Semitic sentiments in some quarters. Indonesian anti-Semitism has deep historical roots. Hadler has argued that anti-colonial discourse is among the sources of Indonesian anti-Semitism. European anti-Semitic thinking has also reached
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Perwitz (2007). Indonesian leaders have sometimes attempted to justify pro-Palestinian policies on the basis of commitment to anti-colonialism and the principle of self determination when addressing Western audiences. 10 The feast of sacrifice or Id al-Adha is conducted in conjunction with the pilgrimage to Mecca. Unlike other components of the pilgrimage it can be conducted anywhere. Muslims sacrifice goats, sheep and cattle to commemorate the Quranic and Biblical story of Abraham who was willing to sacrifice his son as a demonstration of his faith in God. Most of the meat is distributed to the poor and needy. It can be offered anywhere and need not involve the actual participation of those offering it. Today, it can be arranged by text messaging a local or trans-national agency. 11 Al Jazeera.Net December 30, 2008, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2008/12/20081230317 16382336.html. (last accessed on November 1, 2010)
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Indonesia by way of the Arab Middle East.12 After Indepedence, Muhammad Natsir was a significant figure in the Indonesian discourse about Jews. Natsir (1908–1993) was one of the most prominent leaders of the Islamic political party Masyumi that was a major force in Indonesian politics until it was outlawed in 1960. He founded Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Society for the Propagation of Islam) in 1967. While it was not one of the major themes in his writing, Natsir made virulently Anti-Semitic comments in his discussions of the plight of the Palestinians (Natsir 1970). DDII consistently indulges in Anti-Semitic conspiracy theorizing (Burhanuddin 2007). Anti-Semitism has become more common and intense since the 1998 democratic transition. It globalizes local conflicts between Muslims and Christians, by portraying them as a local case of a global struggle between Muslims on the one hand, and a purported international conspiracy of Christian Crusaders 13 and Zionist Jews dedicated to the destruction of Islam. The Gulf War, along with the occupation of Iraq, Afghanistan the West Bank and Gaza Strip, are cited as illustrations of the effort to destroy Islam, as are the U.S. inclusion of Iran and Iraq in the “axis of evil.” Recent events in Gaza, the Israel-Lebanon War and threats against Iran’s nuclear program are understood as elements of this global conspiracy. The popular Islamist magazine Sabili, available for purchase on newsstands and in mainstream and Islamic bookstores, describes the “invasion” of the Islamic World, liberalism, ridicule of the Prophet Muhammad (a reference to the Danish cartoon crisis), conversion to Christianity and pornography as efforts to destroy the morality of the Muslim community by colonialist Crusader forces, against whom it is necessary to conduct jihad. 14 For many, the Gaza War, with its civilian casualties and the enormous material damage inflicted validated this understanding of the world order. While images discussed here are especially graphic, they are not atypical. They did not serve to demonize Israel. That was accomplished long ago. Rather they interpreted current events in ways that made them correspond with existing collective representations of the demonic Zionist. In this case the process of division and rejection that Foucault isolates as central to the definition of the absolute other as an evil inversion of the moral principles employed in self definition are not at work. The categorical structure that is the output of this process has been established as an enduring collective representation of the world order. All that was required to make sense of the Gaza War was to bring events into correspondence with these representations. Rojo’s observation that the othering and demonization of Saddam Hussein corresponds closely with Foucault’s depiction of the insanity of the other does not apply in this case. The Zionist other of Sumatra Utara Pos is not a passion driven mad man but rather a rational, scientific, heartless killer. There is a counter discourse that distinguishes between Judaism and Zionism in both intellectual and popular levels. In June of 2008 the progressive Muslim magazine Madina published a lengthy interview with the American Orthodox Rabbi Yisroel Weisse in which he presents a Jewish religious critique of Zionism. The 12
Hadler (2004). On the development of anti-Semitism in the Arab Muslim World, see Greenberg (2001). On Indonesian Anti-Semitism more generally, see van Bruinessen (1994); Siegel (2000). 13 For an analysis of the role of anti-Semitism in contemporary Indonesian Islamist discourse, see Woodward (2010). 14 Majalah Islam Sabili June 29th 2006, pp. 60–61.
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distinction between Judaism and Zionism is sometimes mentioned in sermons and religious lessons (pengajiaan) by Muslim scholars from pesantren (conservative Muslim boarding schools) backgrounds. It is beyond the scope of this analysis to fully explore this strain of the discourse. The Sumatra Utara Pos and Israeli “Nukes” The Sumatra Utara Pos is a respected daily newspaper published by the Jawa Pos Group, Indonesia’s largest newspaper chain. It is less prone to sensationalism than many of the tabloids that have appeared in the last decade. Like the Spanish paper El Pais, on which Rojo bases her analysis of the demonization of Saddam Hussien, it is an “objectivist” paper. Its style is generally restrained and free from strong emotions. This enhances the credibility of reportage, such as that discussed here, that departs from these norms.15 On January 7, 2009 the entire front page (see Fig. 1), with the exception of a short article about a popular Indonesian actress, a political ad and one for a cell phone service was devoted to the conflict in Gaza. There were two major themes. The first was the alleged nuclear attack; the second was Palestinian fighters attacking Israeli tanks with stones and slingshots. Together they portray valiant Palestinians fighting bravely against seemingly insurmountable odds. The imagery evokes the shared Jewish, Christian and Muslim narrative of the diminutive but virtuous David confronting the gigantic, monstrous Goliath. Except in this version of the tale, Goliath is a Jew and David is a Palestinian Arab. The articles were replete with scientific and other evidence that lent credibility to the lead story. Some, but not all, of this evidence actually was credible. But in assessing the significance of the reportage it is not the credibility, but the seeming plausibility of the headlines, and the political and religious “spins” it put on them that are important. As Van Dijk observes, the addition of plausible supporting evidence enhances the credibility of otherwise implausible claims. In the case of modern technological warfare, “scientific” forensic evidence is especially significant because of the supposed objectivity and political neutrality of scientific discourse (van Dijk 1988). Other news coverage on the same day also emphasized the uneven nature of the conflict. A TV news program aired in both Medan and Yogyakarta reported that during the conflict 600 Palestinians had been killed and 3000 were wounded. On the other hand, only 9 Israeli soldiers were reported killed. After the basic statistics were delivered, the news program showed a music video with images of the killed and wounded on both sides set to the R.E.M. song “Everybody Hurts”16 with the lyrics, in English, “everybody cries, everyone hurts sometimes.” At the beginning of the video there was a “split screen” showing both sides, the Palestinian side took 70% of the screen and Israel took 30% of the screen. The way the numbers were presented suggested that there were no civilian loses on the Israeli side. Other news reports suggested there were some (3) Israeli civilian fatalities. To deny or minimize civilian causalities of Hamas actions further established Hamas as without blame and 15
For a more general discussion of linguistic style and credibility in news reporting, see Fowler (1991). Interestingly the same song is used in a Humane Society commerical in the US with a montage of animal cruelty. It seems to have become emblematic of cruelty inflicted on the powerless.
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Fig. 1 Sumut Pos front page, January 7, 2009
woefully overpowered. There were also demonstrations in support of the Palestinian cause throughout the country. Returning to the Sumatra Utara Pos front page, beneath the opening paragraphs there was a small image of an obviously US made jet fighter (F-16?) firing a rocket labeled DIME. This is an U.S. Department of Defense acronym for “Dense Inert Metal Explosive”. It is a weapon developed by the United States Air Force for use against “terrorist” targets that could not be struck by other means. It is exceptionally lethal, but has very limited, usually no more than twenty five feet, range. The bomb is said to have contained “Heavy Metal Tungsten Alloy” (HMTA). This is a carcinogenic substance used in powdered form as a substitute for and “improvement” on conventional shrapnel.17 The article claims, incorrectly, that it has been outlawed by the international community. Together they are labelled, in a side bar, as a “Zionist Weapon.” Elsewhere the weapon is described as including depleted uranium. Depleted uranium is an extremely dense metal and a by-product of uranium enrichment for weapons purposes and from spent nuclear reactor fuel. It is not explosive but can ignite on impact when temperatures exceed 600 degrees Celsius. With a half life of more than four billion years it is only mildly radioactive. 17
http://www.onlinejournal.com/artman/publish/article_1507.shtml. (last accessed on November 1, 2010)
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According to a World Health Organization report it is 60% less radioactive than naturally occurring uranium.18 It has approximately twice the density of lead and is commonly used for radiation shielding in medical devices and in containers designed to store and transport radioactive materials. Its military uses include armor plating and armor piercing ordinance. It has been used routinely in many conflict environments. While there is no scientific evidence that exposure to depleted uranium poses a public health risk, there is an enormous body of alarmist, pseudoscientific literature, much of it also available on the Web, claiming that those exposed to even small amounts are at great risk of cancer and other diseases. This literature is most frequently produced and cited by opponents of conflicts in which it is used and governments that include it in their arsenals.19 In these reports depleted uranium is often linked with white phosphorus, the use of which against human targets is banned by international law. On January 19 2009, the Christian Science Monitor reported that the Arab League announced plans to refer Israel to the International Criminal Court for War Crimes prosecution for alleged use of these munitions in the Gaza conflict.20 The Sumatra Urara Pos story also includes reports of injuries inflicted by these weapons and medical evidence that “proves” they were used. These include reports by Norwegian medical teams that were in turn attributed to an otherwise unidentified “Dr. Gilbert” who worked at the al Shifa Hospital in Gaza during the conflict, that traces of depleted uranium were found in the wounds of the dead and injured. Mads Gilbert is in fact a Norwegian Medical Doctor and a well known advocate of the Palestinian cause. CNN, BBC news and other Western media have interviewed him concerning the war in Gaza. Pro-Israel US Christian groups describe him as a “terrorist apologist.”21 The article also refers to statements by the Dutch Jewish organization Een Ander Joods Geluid (Another Jewish Voice) according to which the majority of Palestinian casualties have been civilians and that many more have lost their homes and become internally displaced persons as a consequence of Israeli military action. Een Ander Joods Geluid is a Dutch anti-Zionist Jewish organization22 founded in 2001 to promote criticism of Israeli policy and the search for a just peace with the Palestinians. Like other anti-Zionist Jewish organizations it is often mentioned by mainstream Indonesian Muslim intellectuals who reject Islamist antiSemitism as proof that Judaism and Zionism are not one and the same.23 Other front page stories concerned Palestinians attacking Israeli tanks with slingshots, the plight of Palestinian children, the geography of the Gaza Strip and the World Health Organization Media Center, “Depleted Uranium,” http://www.who.int/mediacentre/ factsheets/fs257/en/ (last accessed on November 1, 2010) WHO also conducted a survey of scientific literature on depleted uranium that is available on the Web at http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/env/ du/en/index.html. (last accessed on November 1, 2010) 19 See, for example, “DEPLETED URANIUM BURNING: AN E T E R N A L MEDICAL DISASTER. Issues on the Use and Effects of an ILLEGAL RADIATION Weapon,” http://www.xs4all.nl/~stgvisie/ ud_main.html. (last accessed on November 1, 2010) 20 http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090119/ap_on_re_eu/eu_nuclear_israel_gaza. (last accessed August 17, 2010 but as of November 1, 2010 this is already defunct) 21 http://article.feeds4all.nl/Media-Uses-Terrorism-Apologist-as/1718061285.aspx. (last accessed August 17, 2010 but as of November 1, 2010 this is already defunct) 22 http://www.eajg.nl/index.asp?navitemid=12&type=3&item=808. (last accessed on November 1, 2010) 23 Publicization of these groups and their activities is among the most effective modes of “counter-discourse” in an environment where Islamist appropriation of European anti-Semitic discourse is increasingly common. 18
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history of Zionism. All are supported by reference to “authoritive” sources including the United Nations, The European Union, Save the Children and even Dr. Shaul Dollberg, Professor of Pediatrics at Tel Aviv University who is quoted as saying: “The children of the Gaza Strip are at risk for hypothermia, especially newborn babies.” The account of the history of Zionism, which cites WIKIPEDIA as a source, describes it as a continuation of the Crusades.24 It describes the establishment of Israel as the product of an Anglo-Zionist conspiracy and quotes British General Edmund Allenby who after the conquest of Palestine during the First World War stated: “Only now have the Crusades ended.”25 Another article discussing the small size of the territory being fought over suggests that Israel has little to gain in a material sense and suggests other, more sinister motives. A commentary on Yogyakarta television made the point more explicitly. It raised the question of how it could be that “The grandchildren of the Holocaust are repeating it in Gaza?” This is a theme that has been repeated and distributed over supposedly academic e-mail lists (
[email protected], January 2009). Together these stories paint a portrait of determined, just resistance to barbaric aggression. The word jihad is not mentioned; it does not need to be. The “facts” speak for themselves. But if the term. “jihad” were used, the “facts” clearly suggest that the form of jihad at play is the fully justifiable defensive war against an aggressor bent on destroying the Muslim community or a local sub-set thereof. The dynamic of self-valorization and dehumanization of the “enemy other” characteristic of ethic and religious violence is clearly at work in this discourse. The “facts” reported in these articles are well within the range of global discourse, even if they are not entirely accurate. All of the information mentioned above is available on the Web and is easily accessible from Indonesia.26 The account is, therefore, clearly not a fabrication in the sense that the Sumut Pos editors did not create the narrative. What must be explored are questions concerning why the editors chose the “spin” or interpretation they did and how it was constructed and more specifically why they should have chosen to make the seemingly absurd claim that Israel has used a “nuclear bomb.” There are several possibilities, more than one of which may have been in play. The description of a DIME as a “nuclear bomb” can be understood as the output of a mode of symbolic logic, or what Dan Sperber calls “symbolization” shared by many Indonesian cultures and languages. For Sperber, symbolization is the cognitive process through which representations of events (encyclopedic knowledge) are brought into correspondence with the conceptual categories (symbolic knowledge) of particular cultures (Sperber 1975). There are at least two principles at work here. The first is that when English and other non-native terms are used in Indonesian discourse, there is often a shift in, or widening of, meaning. For example, the Indonesian (as opposed to the English) word “primadona” has exclusively positive 24
Woodward, op. cit, has argued that tropes of the Crusades and their purported links to Zionism are important elements of Indonesian Islamist discourse. 25 Translation of the Indonesian text. 26 The Web browsing on which this account is based was done in Indonesia with locally purchased equipment: a four year old laptop computer and a cell phone modem.
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meanings. To call someone a “primadona” is to say only that he/she is the best in her/his field. Moreover, “primadona” can be used for inanimate objects as well as for humans. To call a computer, or an automobile, “primadona” is to say that it is the best in its class. Reflecting on the linguistic shift that might be at work in this case, it is common to hear the term “Senjata Nukilir,” or Nuclear Weapons used to describe Weapons of Mass Destruction in a generic sense. The second is the tendency to assume that if two lexical fields share a salient intersection then they also share deeper, underlying meanings. The facts that there is credible evidence that the United States and Israel have used depleted uranium ordinance in previous conflicts, that nuclear explosives are made from uranium and that both countries have nuclear weapons, support the view that such principles are operative here. It is, however, clear that Israel did not use a “nuclear bomb” in the literal sense of the word. The editors were also certainly aware of this. It is likely that they used a commonly understood symbolic mechanism to make a sensationalist claim to amplify the points they wanted to convey, and to sell papers. These symbolic transformations also work in reverse. The fact that a respected news source stated, in a symbolic sense, that Israel had used a “nuclear bomb” may well have led some people to believe that they had used an actual nuclear bomb. This is all the more likely because many can not afford the price of the paper, and were able to read only the headline. Such a partial reading, in conjunction with the oversized photo of a Palestinian firing a slingshot reinforces the David/Palestinian versus Goliath/Israel theme. An alternative interpretation is, of course, that the headline was a deliberate misrepresentation intended to incite Islamist sentiments—and/or to sell papers. Even if that was the case, the symbolic logic of the narrative is the same. As a whole the narrative dehumanizes Jews, Israelis and their allies. Bernard, Ottenberg and Redl distinguish between self and object directed dehumanization (Bernard et al. 2002[1965]). Self directed dehumanization is characterized by a sense of powerlessness and corresponding absence of agency in situations in which individuals and communities confront overwhelming destructive force, including the threat of nuclear war. Object directed dehumanization involves the characterization of enemy others as lacking “the attributes considered to be most human.” Woodward (2010) has argued that the symbolic processes of object directed dehumanization involve the projection of deeply seated fears or archetypes of evil onto opponents. Bernard, Ottenberg and Redl suggest that object directed dehumanization promotes and legitimizes violence because it allows individuals and social groups to bypass “those psychic inhibitions against taking life that have become part of civilized man.” They understand the two modes of dehumanization as interdependent. They were particularly concerned with the psycho-dynamics of the Cold War era in which “mutually assured destruction” in the event of nuclear conflict was an axiomatic principle of the international order and in which potential conflict was between roughly equal “super-powers.” Their argument is that in this context potential victims engaged in self-dehumanization while employing object directed dehumanization strategies in their interpretation of the other. Demonization carries the process of object directed dehumanization a step further. It defines the other as not only less than human, but as evil in the religious sense of the term.
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This combination of self-victimization and demonization of opponents is apparent in discourse about communal violence in Indonesia and elsewhere.27 It is also present in the hyperbolic rhetorical exchanges between Iranian and US presidents Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and George W. Bush concerning Iran’s nuclear program (Beeman 2008). The narrative of dehumanization and demonization constructed by Sumatra Utara Pos differs in several respects. The most important is that it depicts an asymmetrical conflict in which one participant has an overwhelming military and technological advantage. References to “nukes” magnify these asymmetries. Israel is depicted as the archetype of the horror of modern technological warfare and the Palestinians as innocent victims. However, the symbols and rhetoric of self-directed dehumanization are strikingly absent. Alon and Omer have argued that demonization can also function as theodicy and “offers a solution to the paralysis of fear.” It explains suffering as the consequence of evil and at the same time cloaks violent acts perpetrated by victims in an aura of sanctity (Alon and Omer 2006). It motivates resistance, even in the face of insurmountable asymmetries.
And from the mouths of babes: Indonesian Muslim children and the Gaza conflict On the 30th of January both of us visited a pesantren (Islamic boarding school) in the Indonesian town of Magelan in south central Java together with a colleague from Universitas Islam Negri Sunan Kalijaga (Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University).28 Our purpose was not to investigate responses to or interpretation of the violence in Gaza. It was very nearly the opposite, to examine the ways in which Islamic education in Indonesia promotes religious pluralism and counters violent extremism.29 This pesantren is well known for its efforts to promote inter-religious understanding, harmony and cooperation. Comparative Religion is part of the curriculum beginning at the elementary school level. A brief examination of the curriculum suggests that it is even-handed and fairly represents an emic (or insider) perspective of other religions. Other activities intended to foster inter-religious harmony include exchanges with local Roman Catholic schools and inter-religious football (soccer) matches. Near the end of our visit we encountered a set of collages, obviously constructed by young children, posted on a bulletin board (see Fig. 2). The themes were remarkably similar to those of articles in the Sumatra Utara Pos and other media intended for adults. There is a Palestinian flag on one side, an Israeli flag the other. A Palestinian city is bombarded by Israeli jets and missiles. These images were
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Woodward, op. cit. Pesantren are, in most respects similar to Middle Eastern and South Asian madrahsa. The terms “pondok” and “pesantren” or a combination of them are used throughout Muslim Southeast Asia. On the pesantren tradition see (Djajadiningrat 1977; Dhofier 1999; Yunanato et al. 2005). On the modernization of the pesantren tradition see: (Lukens-Bull 2005, 2006). 29 The tendency of the western press to depict pesantren as “terrorist training camps” employs symbolic operations similar to those used by the Sumatra Utara Pos in its account of “Israeli Nukes.” See (Woodward et al. 2010). 28
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Fig. 2 Indonesian Muslim children’s art about Gaza 2009 attacks
accompanied by hand written notes expressing sympathy for the plight of children in Gaza and asking God to bless them in their time of need. Some may not find this image and its accompanying notes to be particulary disturbing because they do not include direct representation or linguistic references to death and human suffering. They do show that the themes discussed previously in this paper occupy the minds of children as well as adults. The collage becomes disturbing because of its stunning similarity to images produced by children in actual conflict situations. Children’s conflict art is tragically similar, whether it is from the Spanish Civil War, Bosnia, Darfur or a Javanese pesantren touched by conflict only indirectly and through the media.30 It is not subtle. It clearly demarcates victims from perpetrators, depicts the suffering of victims and the means through which pain is inflicted. This image depicts a bipolar Palestinian-Muslim/Israeli-Jewish world in which Gaza is destroyed by fighter jets and missiles chillingly similar to those depicted in the Sumatra Utara Pos. Pesantren Pabelan is not a “radical” academy. It is not a “terrorist training camp.” It is exactly the opposite. It is a school that roots trans-human values of inclusiveness, peace and justice in the transcendental values of the Qur’an. This is the conflict in Gaza as seen through the eyes of Muslim children in one small town in Indonesia who are being educated in an environment stressing religious pluralism. The children who produced these images are too young to have fully constructed archetypes of evil like those employed by adult parties to this conflict. Unless the world changes, they soon will. Nothing more need be said.
Constructing the enemy other: theoretical reflections Much more can be and must be said about the symbolic processes through which media and its consumers construct “enemy others” because these constructions are blockades that make the “road map to peace” almost impossible to read, let alone traverse and they become the realities on which people base their actions. Our purpose here is not to single out Muslims or Indonesians as being especially inclined towards this variety of symbolic thought. Far from it, these are seemingly universal aspects of what, following Clifford Geertz, can be called “Conflict as a Cultural 30
On children’s conflict art see: (Geist and Carrol 2002).
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System.” We have used Indonesian examples because both of us are Indonesia specialists and happened to be “in country” during the recent conflict. The images described here are what Lévi-Strauss calls bricolage.31 In French this term referred originally to unforeseen and unpredictable events and subsequently to objects produced by craftsmen working with only the tools and materials at hand. Lévi-Strauss describes bricolage as being among the ways in which mythological principles are used in the interpretation of nature. To this we would add only that his observation applies to the interpretation of human events, and the construction of historical narratives. He describes the process as follows: The characteristic feature of mythological thought is that it expresses itself by means of a heterogeneous repertoire which, even if extensive, is never the less limited. It has to use this repertoire, however, whatever the task in hand because it has nothing else at its disposal. Mythological thought is therefore a kind of intellectual ‘bricolage’—which explains the relation which can be perceived between the two. Like bricolage of the technical plane, mythical reflection can reach brilliant unforeseen results on the intellectual plane (LéviStrauss 1966, p. 117). This process is far from random. Eliade has observed that in the construction of mythic and historical narratives what he terms archetypes are used to bring order and meaning to the vicissitudes of human experience. He argues that in traditional societies acts are meaningful only if they replicate cosmic archetypes and that in the construction of mythologies, historical events are transformed to bring them into accord with these archetypes (Eliade 1959, p. 39). It would appear that Eliade’s supposition that this principle is no longer operative in the modern world was incorrect. It is clearly apparent in rhetoric surrounding the Gaza conflict. In cultures of conflict, each side employs archetypes of violence to demonize their opponent and to establish their own righteousness. In the process of demonization, opposing sides project archetypes of evil on to others. The other is transformed, becoming what is most feared. Self identification is with archetypes of virtue and martyrdom. It is a process of valorization. This enables communities to define their own violence as defensive and justifiable. This cycle of projection and denial combined with the psychological trauma experienced by victims contributes to what Stanely Tambiah calls the ritualization of violence (Tambiah 1999). Those who have endured the trauma of conflict, even at a distance, are destined to repeat it as long as underlying conditions and archetypes of evil persist. The images of conflict presented in the Sumatra Utara Pos are examples of the intertwined processes of demonization and valorization. The children’s conflict art we encountered in Magelan is the first stage in the repetition of this archetype of horror. Magelan and Medan are geographically far removed from the conflict in Gaza. But in the era of globalization, local and regional conflicts are rapidly globalized and may have unexpected consequences far from their points of origin.32 In this world the children of Indonesia, and the world, like those of Palestine and Israel, are at risk Lévi-Strauss (1966). “Shade tree mechanics” are a contemporary American example. Burmese mechanics, who seem to do everything with anything, including installing a 1970’s Toyota transmission in a 1951 English Ford are an even better example. 32 On the globalization of local and national level conflict see (Woodward 2006). 31
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of being drawn into a cycle of what Mark Juergensmeyer calls “cosmic conflict” that is not of their own making (Juergensmeyer 2003).
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