and coverage for opposition political parties in the mainstream media. 4. In August 2004,. 'TV3' ...... return',. Media Monitors Network. 15 November. Available at:.
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2 Introduction Malaysian politics is at a crossroads at the moment. The incumbent Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi handed over the reins of Malaysian government to his deputy Najib Tun Razak on 3 April 2009. The son of Tun Abdul Razak, Malaysia’s second prime minister, Najib, an economist, comes from one of the oldest Malay aristocratic families, long acquainted with the vicissitudes of the country’s convoluted politics. The leadership of United Malays National Organization (UMNO)1, the party in power, has also changed when for the first time in UMNO’s history; all the office-bearers except the party president have been elected through a widely contested election. This changeover is marked by high hopes but is also fraught with uncertainties. Najib steps into political centre-stage at a time when the country is facing political and economic challenges and when his party, UMNO, faces unprecedented demands to reform and redefine itself. UMNO has been characterized by undemocratic practices, money politics, nepotism, and cronyism. The party has faced challenges from other smaller parties and has even suffered defeat in several states in the last general election held in 2008 as well as byelections held in recent times, in Permatang Pauh on 26 August 2008, Kuala Terengganu on 17 January 2009, and Bukit Gantang together with Bukit Selambau on 7 April 2009. The ruling party, Barisan Nasional2, managed to retain only one by-election in Batang Ai on 7 April 2009 since the 12th general election. In the backdrop of the facts stated above, Najib now has the challenging task to introduce a new political culture in UMNO although doing so may weaken his power base in the party. Najib’s predecessor Badawi had initiated certain reform measures, particularly in the judiciary and in curbing unbridled corruption, which were much needed and long overdue. It is imperative that Najib continues with these reforms but that would also mean that he would be running the risk of earning the wrath of many who have vested interests and would want the reforms to be halted. This paper will endeavour to synthesize the inner dynamics of Malaysian politics in order to explain why Najib has not only to carve a new identity for his party and establish his
1
UMNO was formed by Dato Onn bin Jaafar, then Prime Minister of Johore, in 1946 in response to British attempts to form the Union of Malaya. UMNO's aim was to fight for national independence and protect the interests of the indigenous Malay population. Since independence in 1957, UMNO has been the dominant party in forming the cornerstone of successive electoral alliances. For details, see: Cheah, 2002; Milne and Mauzy, 1999. 2
Barisan Nasional (Malay for National Front and commonly abbreviated as BN) is a major political coalition in Malaysia. Formed in 1973, it has been Malaysia’s ruling political coalition since independence. Although the BN registered as a political party, membership was only possible indirectly through one of the constituent parties. One cannot hold direct membership of the BN. It defines itself as a confederation of political parties which subscribe to the objects of the BN. Although in elections, all candidates stand under the BN symbol, and there is a BN manifesto, each individual constituent party also issues its own manifesto, and there is intra-coalition competition for seats prior to nomination day. BN holds several seats in every state in Malaysia. The vast majority of BN’s seats are held by its three largest race-based parties — the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) — each of which is sectarian in nature, though officially supporting racial harmony. See: Cheah, 2002; Milne and Mauzy, 1999.
3 credibility and personal integrity but also to continue with the reforms initiated by his predecessor, Badawi, whatever the political fallout might be for him and his party.
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and the Winds of Change in Malaysia Abdullah Ahmad Badawi became the Prime Minister of Malaysia in October 2003, when Mahathir Mohamad, Asia’s longest-serving elected leader, retired after 22 years of authoritarian rule (Sani, 2006; Osman, Mahmood and Liow, 2008). In contrast to his predecessor, Badawi has been described by the political commentators in Malaysia as self-effacing and has been called ‘Mr. Nice Guy’ of Malaysian politics (Mohamad, 2004: 26; Funston, 2006: 142-143). Param Cumaraswamy, a founding member of Malaysia’s Human Rights Committee, has acknowledged that Badawi “has allowed for greater public dialogue regarding promotion of human rights….The climate has been more open and we’re seeing more discussions between the government and civil-society groups” (Gatsiounis, 2006: 1). There was more openness in the governance of the state of affairs with reporters having greater access to officials, MPs, and police; this was true even for the Internet news portal ‘Malaysiakini’ reporters who were generally critical of the government.3 His government has, at least, admitted the need for political reforms, the battle cry of the opposition. The government-controlled media picked up the issues related to the reform only during Badawi’s premiership; prior to that it would have landed any person who espoused such thoughts behind bars. The government also allowed hard-hitting editorials, investigative reports, fresh layouts and coverage for opposition political parties in the mainstream media. 4 In August 2004, ‘TV3’, a government-backed station, even aired a by-election result showing the government losing a key constituency. Further, opposition leader and former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim was unexpectedly released on 2 September 2004 when Malaysia’s highest court upheld his appeal. It is widely believed that Anwar was sacked and sentenced to six years in prison on alleged sexual misconduct and corruption charges in 1999 after his popularity seemed to threaten Mahathir’s position (Saravanamuttu, 2003: 6-14; IPI, 2004: 3). The release followed Prime Minister Badawi’s repeated calls to the country’s ‘tarnished’ judiciary to be more independent.5 Anwar, who was barred from standing for political or 3
Malaysiakini (http://www.malaysiakini.com), according to Tumber (2001:21), is the best example of the Internet news portal that has gained increasing importance in Malaysia both as an arena for battling out political confrontations and as a locus for pushing government accountability since its inception prior to the 1999 general election. His assertion is correct because, over the years, despite various government imposed restrictions, Malaysiakini has emerged as a ‘virtual civil society’, providing a much required space for articulating a wide range of socio-political views. 4
For instance, the newspaper ‘New Straits Times’ published a full-page interview with Parliamentary opposition leader Lim Kit Siang. In the interview, the politician took the opportunity to attack the government for detaining people without trial. This would have been unthinkable in Mahathir’s times. For further details, see (IPI, 2004: 1-6). 5
In the late 1980s, as the internal struggle within UMNO intensified, Mahathir launched an unprecedented assault on the independence of Malaysian judiciary. The reason for this was that Mahathir was incensed by a number of important Supreme Court decisions in 1986 and 87 which went against the government. As his initial response, Mahathir went to great lengths to criticize the judges who, he thought, were acting beyond the limits of their responsibility. Soon
4 parliamentary office until April 2008, although permitted to make public speeches, immediately started campaigning for scrapping the Internal Security Act (ISA). Hopes Withered? Despite a visible change in the attitude of the government, by the time Badawi left office many of the repressive laws were still in place, ignoring strong pressure by local and international rights advocates (Sani, 2006: 37-58). In the early days Badawi’s reign, hopes ran high among the general population that he would allow for more political and social openness through abolishing several repressive laws on human rights, political freedom and freedom of speech such as the ISA, Official Secret Act (OSA), Sedition Act (SA), Printing Presses and Publications Act (PPPA), and the University and University College Act (UUCA).6 After more than four years as Malaysia’s premier, those once-high hopes of greater freedom especially freedom of speech in Malaysia had started to wane as Badawi chose to leave in place many of the strictures such as those repressive laws that characterised Mahathir’s rule. One of the reasons for Badawi’s apparent failure to initiate any meaningful policy change in this regard is that, as Ioannis Gatsiounis (2006: 1-5) has rightly pointed out, government officials were still grappling with one of the most fundamental dilemmas of a semi-authoritarian regime: how to allow greater freedom to citizenry without relinquishing absolute control. At the same time, class disparity was widening, corruption ran rampant and many, particularly from the oppositions, argued that the courts and police had long ago lost their moral legitimacy as impartial arbiters (Gatsiounis, 2006: 1-5). After years of affirmativeaction programmes, race relations between the majority Muslim Malays and minority Chinese and Indians were also on the edge.7 For example, during the UMNO general thereafter, however, he decided to delineate the specific roles for the executive, legislature and judiciary. The fact which particularly disturbed Mahathir was that the opposition parties were frequently using the Supreme Court to challenge his government’s policies. After UMNO had been declared illegal by the Supreme Court and Mahathir had successfully registered his new party UMNO Baru, the ousted leaders of old UMNO filed an appeal in the Supreme Court to legalize the old UMNO. In response, Mahathir pushed through the Parliament, without much debate, the Federal Constitution (Amendment) Act 1988 which stipulated that the powers of the judiciary would no longer be embedded in the Constitution; rather those powers would be conferred by the Parliament through statutes. By this Act, the Supreme Court, along with the State High Courts, was stripped of the power of judicial review previously granted in the Constitution. The Act also provided the Attorney-General with the power to instruct both the Supreme Court and the State High Courts on which cases they could hear and which they could not. The responsibility for judicial assignments and the transfers of judges was also assigned to the Attorney-General. Further attacks on the judiciary was launched in early May 1988 when the Lord President (Chief Justice) of Malaysia issued a restraining order on the Malaysian government and set the date for the Supreme Court to hear the crucial UMNO appeal by the full bench of all nine judges. However, on 26 May, the Lord President, Tun Salleh Abbas, was suspended for “gross misbehaviour and misconduct” over a letter he had written to the King, in which he had complained about the Prime Minister’s attacks on the judiciary. The Lord President was accused of breaching the so-called protocol for allegedly by-passing the Prime Minister. The same day, a so-called tribunal, comprising local and foreign judges, was constituted to adjudicate the matter related to the Lord President. Four days later, five Supreme Court judges were also suspended for “gross misbehaviour” for issuing an order to block the tribunal. The tribunal, subsequently, found the Lord President Tun Abbas guilty and he was dismissed by the King in due course. Thereafter a reconstituted Supreme Court, under the new President Tan Sri Abdul Hamid - a school friend of Mahathir and said to be an interested party because he was a member of the tribunal which recommended the dismissal of Tun Salleh Abbas - set aside the restraining order. The Supreme Court later rejected the UMNO appeal, giving Mahathir his critical victory. These various actions including Tan Sri Abdul Hamid’s appointment drew strong condemnation from local lawyers, especially from the Malaysian Bar Council, which refused to recognize his appointment. For details, see: Cheah, 2002: 217-218. 6
For interesting debates on the efficacy of these Acts, see Sani 2006; Salleh 2004; Cheah 2002.
5 assembly in December 2006, despite Badawi’s urging his party members to tone down on the rhetoric of race and religion - two extremely sensitive issues in multiracial Malaysia – those two issues still featured prominently in shrill tones in successive speeches by UMNO delegates, stirring unease among locals and foreigners. Hasnoor Hussein- a delegate from Malacca, for example, in his 15-minute address to UMNO members said: “UMNO is willing to risk lives and bath in blood to defend the race and religion. Don’t play with fire. If they messed with our rights, we will mess with theirs” (Cited in Lopez, 2006: 1). At the same time, there were doubts among the opposition leaders such as Anwar Ibrahim and Lim Kit Siang whether Badawi had the political will to put his more liberal rhetoric into action (Fuller, 2006: 1-5; Lim, 2004: 1-2). With many promises remaining unfulfilled and new political, economic and social problems emerging in Malaysia, the country’s voters delivered an unprecedented blow to the ruling BN in the 12th general election on 8 March 2008 (Welsh 2008: 1-4). The BN lost five (out of Malaysia’s 13) state governments (states of Kelantan, Kedah, Perak, Penang and Selangor) and eighty-two seats from a total of 222 seats in the Parliament (Election Commission, 2008). It also received 51 percent popular votes compared to 49 percent received by the opposition and witnessed a major swing against the non-Malay component parties within the multi-ethnic coalition (Koshy, 2008: 1). The severe losses of the incumbent coalition meant that the election marks a new political chapter in Malaysian history. The loose alliance of Islamic Party (PAS), Democratic Action Party (DAP) and People Justice Party (PKR), (the Keadilan party changed its name to PKR after merging with PRM) had formed a coalition called the Pakatan Rakyat (PR, People’s Alliance) soon after the election in order to coordinate policy and decision-making especially in the states won by PR. According to Bridget Welsh (2008: 1-3), the reasons for the BN setback had more to do with the coalition’s lacklustre performance under Badawi than the strength of the opposition. She argues that in his four years in office, Badawi has managed to maintain the economic growth but he was ineffective in channelling the benefits to ordinary citizens. Ordinary Malaysians were squeezed, as economic gains were seen to be disproportionately directed toward the increasingly arrogant political elite, notably leaders of UMNO (Welsh, 2008: 1-3). Malaysians began to feel insecure and anxious with the price spiral of fuel and essential goods.8 These bread-and-butter issues
7
The most contentious issue affecting the race relations in Malaysia is linked to the pro-bumiputera privileges and quotas. It is alleged that the special privileges provided to the majority Muslim Malays under the pro-bumiputera policy directly discriminate against the minority non-Muslim Chinese and Indians. The concept of a “bumiputera” race in Malaysia was coined by Tunku Abdul Rahman and has its roots in the recognition of the “special position” of the Malays given by the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, in particular Article 153. However, the constitution does not actually use the term “bumiputera”, it only contains the definitions of “Malay” and “aborigine” [Article 160(2)], “natives” of Sarawak [Article 161A(6)(a)], and “natives” of Sabah [Article 161A(6)(b)]. Thus, there are a number of definitions of “bumiputera” in public use, varying among different institutions, organizations or other government departments and agencies. Certain pro-bumiputera policies exist as a means of affirmative action for bumiputeras. Such policies include quotas for admission to government educational institutions, qualification for public scholarships, positions in government and ownership in business. 8
For instance, since taking over as Prime Minister, Abdullah had increased the price of petrol five times from RM1.35 per litre in 2003 to RM2.70 per litre in 2008, exactly a 100 percent increase in just less than five years (Harakah, 2008: 2). In fact, the record levels of inflation in 26 years is at 7.7 percent and transport prices rose 19.6 percent in June 2008 as compared with a year before. Food and non-alcoholic beverages rose 10 percent, and, in first half of the year 2008, consumer prices rose 3.7 percent from the same period the year before. All these happened after the fuel prices hike in
6 influenced the voters to sway toward the opposition in the election. Furthermore, comparatively lower wages, increased lack of confidence in Badawi’s administration, and persistent corruption translated into massive disgruntlement among Malaysians of all races. This declining economic situation was compounded by a shocking record of managing ethnic relations9, particularly of the concerns of the non-Malays (Welsh, 2008: 1-3). Chinese, Indian and East Malaysian voices were ignored and often insultingly dismissed as rising Malay chauvinism went unchecked within Badawi’s’s party (Lopez, 2006: 1). In fact, Badawi harnessed racial identity to buttress his position within the party, rejuvenating the racially implemented affirmative action policy of the ‘New Economic Policy’ (NEP) and lost the confidence of the non-Malay community in handling the sensitive expansion of Islamic governance through the concept of Islam Hadhari (Civilisation Islam or Moderate Islam). This is clear in the 12th general election when the Chinese and Indian votes have decisively swung to the DAP and PKR, causing Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), Malaysian Indians Congress (MIC) and Gerakan to lose massive support (ASLI, 2008: 2). MCA only won 37.5 percent of parliament seats contested. Gerakan was totally wiped out in Penang – its stronghold. The DAP campaigned that a vote for MCA or Gerakan is a vote for UMNO to capitalize on the anger of the Chinese community over UMNO. MIC weaks due to HINDRAF’s ‘Makkal Sakhti’ (people power) movement. The Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF), a coalition of 30 Hindu non-governmental organizations (NGOs) committed to the preservation of Hindu community rights and heritage, had organised a rally turned riot of 10,000 people on 25 November 2007 to submit a petition to the British High Commission. The group had led agitations against what they saw as an ‘unofficial policy of temple demolition’, marginalization of Indian community, and concerned about the steady encroachment of shariah-based law (The Star Online, 2007: 1; ASLI, 2008: 3). Former Finance Minister, Daim Zainuddin, in an interview with the magazine ‘Dewan Masyarakat’, while expressing his views on why the BN did not farewell in the election has categorically mentioned two reasons. First, instead of concentrating in winning the June 2008 in order for the government to cut the country’s subsidies bill, which would have reached RM50 billion in 2008 (AFP, 2008: 1). 9
Malaysia is a plural society with different races, languages, and cultures. The Barisan Nasional government in the 70s and early 80s propagated the "One Language, One Culture" policy. But in his opening speech during the 19th delegates conference of the Sarawak United People's Party in Kuching, the then Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad had said that the government will not assimilate the people into a single race as it believes in integration where no race is superior to another. The concept of a "Bumiputra" race in Malaysia was coined by Tunku Abdul Rahman and has its roots in the recognition of the "special position" of the Malays given by the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, in particular Article 153. However, the constitution does not actually use the term "bumiputra", it only contains the definitions of "Malay" and "aborigine" (Article 160(2)), "natives" of Sarawak (161A(6)(a)), and "natives" of Sabah (Article 161A(6)(b)). Thus, there are a number of definitions of "bumiputra" in public use, varying among different institutions, organizations or other government departments and agencies. The word "Bumiputra" was first used in Parliament in 1965 during the debate of the act which would create the Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA), a government agency formed to preserve Bumiputra interests. Certain pro-bumiputra policies exist as a means of affirmative action for bumiputras. Such policies include quotas for the following: admission to government educational institutions, qualification for public scholarships, positions in government and ownership in business. Bumiputra privileges and quotas are based on article 153 of the constitution. Despite calls from Badawi and, his predecessor, Dr.Mahathir Mohamad for Malays to depend less on government handouts and subsidies, there is no evidence to show that the special privileges enjoyed by the Bumiputra will be taken away any time soon or at all.
7 election, UMNO leaders were over confident due to a big win in the 2004 election and concentrated their efforts on UMNO party election scheduled for December 2008, later changed to March 2009. Second, the 12th general election was held at the wrong time. This was because the government still did not resolve many sensitive issues such as the racial issues and HINDRAF riot case. According to Daim, it would have been better if the government resolved these cases or issues before dissolving the Parliament and facing the election (Dewan Masyarakat, 2008: 22). Badawi, however, attributed the election debacle to the failure to utilize the modern communication tools such as the Internet and the cell phones and continued dependence on the print and electronic media for election campaigns (Sani, 2009: 146).10 Leadership Under Challenge Unlike his predecessors, Badawi’s political honeymoon period seems to have been very brief. Not long after his induction, he faced an onslaught of critics, the most prominent among them the former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and his son Mukhriz Mahathir, who have openly called for him to step down as prime minister and UMNO president for causing the worst election debacle for BN since Malaysia’s independence (Forward, 2008a: 40). Mahathir, followed by his wife and another son Mokhzani quit UMNO protesting Badawi’s refusal to relinquish his position in the government and the party. During the election season, Mahathir’s dissenting voice was welcomed by the opposition as proof of Abdullah’s weak leadership. Ironically, Mahathir is now embraced by the independent and opposition media which he once tried to stifle during his premiership.11 Beside Mahathir, there were other dissenting voices among UMNO’s leaders and members in Sabah, Perak, Kedah, Penang, Selangor and Johor who expressed their unhappiness with Badawi and asked him either to resign soon or set a time table to pass the premiership to his deputy, Najib Razak, who Badawi had anointed as his successor. However, Badawi insisted on extra time to resolve UMNO’s problems and leave a stronger party to his successor. This rather cryptic refusal on his part to relinquish office was met by a stinging response from Muhyiddin Yassin12, one of the party’s influential vice-presidents. Muhyiddin, in an interview on 11 April 2008, told Mingguan Malaysia newspaper that the time for change is now and not later. He felt that the rot is so serious that it was no time to have pity for one man (implying Badawi). He further argued that any delay in fulfilling the demand of the grassroots for Badawi’s resignation may have further and stronger reactions from the party members. The dissenters in the party were joined, in due course by Najib as well, who told the media that he would discuss a seamless succession plan with Badawi. The latter responded by saying that ‘succession 10
On 25 March 2008, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi acknowledged, at the opening of Invest Malaysia 2008, that the BN government lost the online war in the general election. He said that: “We didn’t think it was important. It was a serious misjudgement. We thought that the newspapers, the print media, the television were important but young people were looking at text messages and blogs. (The influence of alternative media) was painful. But it came at the right time, not too late” (New Straits Times, 2008: 2). 11
Internet news portal Malaysiakini, which suffered much harassment during his day, is now one of his ways of getting his views to the Internet savvy masses. 12
Later, Muhyiddin was voted as Deputy President by UMNO’s representatives in the UMNO’s general assembly in March 2009 and was appointed as Deputy Prime Minister in Najib’s Cabinet in April 2009.
8 can wait’ and that he would defend his presidency in the UMNO polls in December 2008 (Forward, 2008b: 22-23). After persistent pressure from the BN component parties and UMNO’s leaders and grassroots, Badawi finally announced on 10 July 2008 that he will resign as Prime Minister of Malaysia and President of UMNO in June 2010 and hand over power to his deputy, Najib soon after (Utusan Malaysia 2008: 3). During a meeting on 5 April 2008, leaders from the traditional UMNO stronghold of Johor expressed their unhappiness with Badawi but held out an olive branch: they would support him if he gives up his job soon. The day after the meeting, the mainstream media painted a very media are to be believed, it appeared that UMNO Johor had thrown all their weight behind the embattled premier but it did not take long for the division chiefs to start highlighting the defining clause to the public (Forward, 2008b: 22). Anwar: Bluffing or Brilliant Strategist? One of the beneficiaries of the dissension within UMNO was the opposition, especially its leader, Anwar. Although it was not Anwar who was instrumental in the poor election results for BN, yet it was he who seized the opportunity to unite the opposition in the aftermath of the election and formed the Pakatan Rakyat (PR) alliance, thus creating a new two-party system (Lau, 2008a: 1). Since the 2008 elections, Anwar has been seen by his supporters in the alliance Pakatan Rakyat as a vulture waiting to pounce upon the carcass of a dying UMNO (Koya, 2008: 1-5). As the opposition’s parliamentary leader, Anwar serves as a reminder to government backbenchers about the opposition’s seriousness to take over even at the federal level. Anwar, as reported by opposition parties’ newspapers (such as Harakah and Suara Keadilan) as well as mainstream media, has been courting support in the Malaysian part of Borneo, hoping that some of the gaggle of pro-government parties there – on which the ruling coalition now depends for its majority – might defect en masse (The Economist, 2008: 1). On 18 June 2008, Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP), one of the BN component parties, announced its intention to issue a vote of no-confidence in the Parliament against the Prime Minister Badawi if he failed to step down. SAPP later announced its withdrawal from BN and two of its members of parliament became independent. This is an indication of the tight rope Badawi has been walking in keeping the BN component parties together in post-election period. It is the prime ministerial aura Anwar carries with him that has made the opposition coalition durable, lasting longer than expected, in spite of ideological differences, particularly between the PAS, and the Chinese-dominated DAP which strives for a secular Malaysia (Koya, 2008: 1). The Malaysian opposition’s readiness to take over would be the envy of opposition parties in many countries. This readiness reached a climax on 16 September 2008, the date mentioned by Anwar and parroted by other opposition leaders to signal the end of the UMNO-led National Coalition’s half-a-century grip on power. Malaysia’s former deputy prime minister threatened that the PR coalition would take power by engineering a series of mass defections from BN. The public, supporters and detractors alike, were clearly captivated by Anwar.
9 In July 2008, the drama that has become Anwar’s life reached new heights when news broke of a new sodomy allegation against him. However, against all odds, Anwar won a landslide in a by-election in his old constituency of Permatang Pauh on 26 August 2008 and returned to Parliament. He stepped up his rhetoric that the PR alliance would take power by 16 September 2008 and caused such unprecedented panic among BN leaders that the backbenchers’ group organised a “tour” of Taiwan in September 2008 to prevent their lawmakers from defecting. But 16 September 2008 came and went without incident. There were no defections and BN remained in power. Events unfolding later showed that something seriously went wrong with Anwar’s takeover plan as he, belatedly, in an anti-climax, tried to explain away the turn of events as happening due to “technical glitches” (Koya, 2008: 1-5). He has repeatedly claimed he wants to ensure a smooth transition and is weighing several options, which includes talking to the King who can ask the prime minister to step down provided Anwar can prove he has the requisite numbers through defectors from the ruling parties. But signs of weariness emerged on 22 October 2008 when Anwar conceded for the first time that he was running out of options to unseat the government. He told Bloomberg, “I am not saying we have no options left, but I’m saying it’s getting to be much more difficult” (Koya, 2008: 1). That is what the rumour had been all along that although Anwar may have had enough defectors, he probably did not have the royal consent to form a government. Many people in Malaysia were disappointed with the non-event of 16 September. None of the so-called defecting government lawmakers – supposedly more than 30 – have had the courage to identify themselves publicly. Opposition quarters have offered the excuse that it could be due to their fear of government action under such draconian laws as the ISA. If that is a risk the lawmakers are not prepared to take, many wonder if these defecting MPs are indeed suitable to effect change in the first place. Regarding his failure to meet his self-imposed deadlines, Anwar blamed Badawi for refusing to meet him and for jeopardising his plans. As he explained later: “They have called me a lot of things before (but) the point is, if they really believe I am a liar then put me to (the) test and have a (no-confidence) vote taken (in parliament)” (Yoong, 2008: 1). In this context it would be fair to say that though Anwar failed to topple the government he, nevertheless, succeeded in forcing UMNO to dislodge Badawi as prime minister much earlier than it had at first planned. Now, with no two-year transition period to stabilize UMNO as had been originally hoped, the party is being forced to go through a complete makeover than it otherwise would. Perceived this way, Anwar’s “16 September offensive” is not really a total failure. After all, by doing so, he has been able to throw UMNO’s ranks into great disarray, and, in turn, put the party on the defensive. At any rate, hit by the biggest fuel price hike of any petroleum-exporting country, there was a chain reaction in Malaysia of rising cost of living, unemployment, and all the accompanying ills. Anwar’s promise to slash petrol prices to its former level was virtually the single most important issue used to garner public support for his September plan. Yet, it is also true that a large segment of the population was convinced that a new government with a new approach to governance might just be the answer to many of the country’s problems. Thus, when the government hurriedly brought down the price of
10 petrol just two days before the Permatang Pauh by-election that Anwar won on 26 August 2008, it had less effect on voters compared to Anwar’s repeated promise to become the Prime Minister in three weeks. He went on to win by a big margin in what is seen as a dramatic comeback almost ten years after he was arrested, tortured and jailed on, allegedly according to his supporters, trumped-up charges (Yoong, 2008: 1; Koya, 2008: 1-5). Besides, as Ooi Kee Beng (2008: 1-2) points out, judging from the bad shape UMNO has been in, perhaps Anwar has been smarter than assumed. According to Ooi (2008: 1-2), Anwar’s failure to topple the government on 16 September is seen as a brash move by an otherwise masterful political strategist. Indeed, his seeming hurriedness to become the Prime Minister has been criticized by friends in the Pakatan Rakyat and foes in the BN alike as being indicative of his major failing– impatience. As a PR insider recently mentioned: “16 September is not a date, but a concept” (Ooi, 2008: 1-2). To understand this point, in place of “concept”, one should perhaps read “strategy” (Ooi 2008: 1-2). One may legitimately be tempted to assume that Anwar has been employing the tactic of continuous harassment of UMNO on a short-term political calculation. It certainly looks that way if we consider how bad UMNO and the BN have been in regrouping their troops into a useable formation in response to Anwar’s ploy. When Anwar won the Permatang Pauh by-election, the rural Malays demonstrated surprising political acumen by voting for a man facing sodomy charges who was representing a multiracial party. This bodes ill for UMNO, a party dependent on rural votes. What may also be upsetting the ruling coalition is the fact that the opposition parties seem to be settling in very well in the northern states that the BN has been ruling. Furthermore, as some UMNO leaders like to describe it, the “unholy alliance” of the social-democratic DAP, the Islamist PAS, and the multiracial PKR has survived even after the elections. Apart from the smart move by UMNO to try to split the PR by holding talks with PAS on the issue of “protecting Malay interest”, no PR split large enough to raise BN spirits has appeared. Reforms: Better Late Than Never Badawi had earlier promised to hand over power to his deputy Najib in 2010 in a move to appease heightened criticism from his own party and the ruling coalition over his leadership. Then on 9 October 2008 he announced that he would step down in April 2009. His decision to resign early was seen as a blow to the anti-Mahathir faction in the party that wanted to end Mahathir’s legacy which the faction believed sowed the seeds of UMNO’s growing unpopularity (Koya, 2008: 1). However, Badawi had promised to introduce a series of reforms before he leaves office. Badawi made his resignation conditional on allowing him time to reform the three pillar institutions – the judiciary, Anti-Corruption Agency and the police. In January 2009, he tabled a legislation setting up the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) and the Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) which was passed by the Dewan Rakyat (the parliament) within record time. The main motivation for this legislation is to ensure that Mahathir’s legacy will end forever and forestall any effort by Najib to bring Mahathirism back in Malaysian politics (My Sinchew, 2009: 1). In fact, Badawi in his farewell UMNO Presidential Speech on 23 March 2009, warned against return of
11 Mahathirism, by saying: “If we revert to the old path (Mahathirism) I believe we are choosing the wrong path; one that will take us to regression and decay. It is a path that I fear will hasten our demise. If we do not take courageous steps to reform in the face of this dynamic transformation of society and the radical global changes taking place, then we shall live to witness the end of our beloved UMNO” (My Sinchew, 2009: 1). Furthermore, Witness Protection Bill is designed to provide legal protection that would encourage witnesses to come forward in corruption and other serious cases. Although there were concerns with several provisions of the above-mentioned Bills, Anwar welcomed the MACC.13 However, he expressed some reservations as it does not hold any prosecution power and wanted clearer provisions to protect whistleblowers. Anwar told Parliament that the issue at stake is the integrity, authority, and qualification of the Attorney-General and the judiciary, claiming the Attorney-General held too much power, to the point that he could decide if a case would be taken to court or simply closed (The Malaysian Insider, 2008: 1). Also the DAP parliamentary leader, Lim Kit Siang, said that the two reform Bills may not restore public and investors confidence as promised by Badawi. Lim argued that “…the signs are not there that this will be the case, with big question marks about the professionalism and integrity of key institutions remaining unanswered – including those concerning the Inspector-General of Police and the Attorney-General” (Zalkapli, 2008: 1). Lim further argued that the Chief Commissioner of the new anti corruption body be given powers similar to those of the Deputy Public Prosecutor, adding that the influence of the Prime Minister in the commission shows that the body is not independent. Badawi’s proposed reforms evoked skepticism from opposition and ruling party alike. A significant number of BN lawmakers were uncomfortable with the speed with which the Bills were being rushed through Parliament. While they accepted the need for reform, especially in the fight against graft, they were concerned that the MACC was being given powers which were too wide and arbitrary (Lau, 2008b: 1). A Fork in the Road for Najib Badawi’s rush to introduce reforms before his resignation on 3 April 2009 is interpreted by some as not only a way to establish his own legacy but also to take revenge on UMNO leaders, including Najib, who were pressuring him to step down early.14 Although Najib rarely went public with his demand for Badawi’s resignation, he and his supporters were definitely the dominant factor in speeding up the change in national leadership. Najib is going to assume power in very trying times with a resurgent opposition and a political climate that seems beset with problems of race and religion. Unfortunately for him, soon after taking over, he will surely face a major dilemma with regards to the reform agenda initiated by Badawi. He would have to make a very difficult choice in this regard: whether to continue with and/or strengthen the reforms started by his predecessor or, to retract all reforms and bring back Mahathirism.
13
The MACC is modelled on Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption, a highly-respected watchdog and role model for the region. 14
This is a widely held view among the detractors of Badawi within UMNO. Most of them preferred to remain anonymous during their informal discussions with one of the authors.
12
Either way, he is expected to face stiff resistance from various factions within UMNO. If he carries on with Badawi’s reform agenda, not only will he be playing a leading role in establishing a legacy for Badawi as a leader who initiated courageous changes under difficult circumstances, but will also be undermining Mahathir given the fact that Badawi’s judicial reform agenda has inextricable links to Mahathir’s subjugation of judiciary. On the other hand, if Najib tries to retract or slow down the reform process, he will be giving the impression of a leader incapable of making difficult policy decisions. Some might even interpret his unwillingness to follow through on reforms as pettiness, which will be seen as indicative of his envy of his predecessor’s successful reform initiatives. This will endear Najib neither to his fellow party colleagues nor to his countrymen. Besides, in order to attract popular support for him and his party, Najib will urgently need to dismantle the culture of ‘money politics’ which has been so prevalent inside UMNO for quite some time.15 He will have to balance championing Malay interests and governing multiracial Malaysia, and it is not at all clear if he can pull it off given the increasingly strident noises emanating from UMNO for the protection of Malay rights. More specifically, it is not clear if UMNO wants to transform itself from a sectarian party to a more inclusive one that caters to all Malaysians. In his press interviews so far, Najib has made all the right noises about UMNO having to “reinvent itself to stay relevant” and that the party “has to recognise that Malaysia is getting increasingly race blind”. But it is difficult as long as race-based political parties continue to exist. Najib’s Crown of Thorns Family connections and history aside, it is perhaps the longevity of Najib’s association with power that bedevils him at present. For the older UMNO elite, his standing is determined by the fact that he comes from one of the oldest ruling families of Malaysia. But this social capital is useless in the context of a new Malaysia, where an entirely new generation of younger voters has come to the fore. They know they can determine their own fate at the ballot box. The recent by-election result in Kuala Terengganu, Bukit Gantang and Bukit Selambau indicates not only UMNO’s unpopularity but also Najib’s standing and credibility with Malays at the moment.16 Najib who led the BN campaign in Kuala Terengganu, dismissed suggestions that BN defeat in the Kuala Terengganu byelection was a personal setback, insisting instead that it was the collective responsibility
15
Newspapers regularly publish stories elaborating on how huge sums of money are required to secure party posts, even at the branch level. It is alleged that money culture has become so pervasive within UMNO that while trying to meet the party delegates - who are responsible for electing the members of the Supreme Council and other party positions – party candidates often face a blunt question: Sek Kebangsaan atau Sek Inggeris? Sek Kebangsaan – SK for short – means salam kosong, which literally translates to “empty handshake” meaning no money, while Sek Inggeris – or SI – stands for salam isi or “handshake with contents” meaning there is money. 16
The voting pattern in the recent by-election in Kuala Terengganu sounded like a wake-up call for the senior leadership of the ruling UMNO. As the votes were being counted, it became evident that the PAS candidate was winning with a 2,000-vote majority and that the opposition coalition PR would add one more to its parliamentary number. It was the swing among the predominantly Malay-Muslim population that led to the PAS victory. This clearly indicates growing dissatisfaction with UMNO rule among the Malays who traditionally were the mainstay of UMNO support.
13 of his party. However, Najib also suffered a blow just four days after he was sworn as the sixth Malaysia’s Prime Minister when his BN party failed to capture Bukit Gantang and Bukit Selambau from the opposition PAS and PKR. The losses in the by-elections more or less weaken Najib’s credibility and image. Najib believes that BN could ill afford to allow disconnectedness to exist between the needs of the people and government policy. Najib argues that “BN must win the hearts of Malaysians by ensuring all government programmes are in line with the aspirations of the people” (Spykerman and Sani, 2009: 1). Najib said that BN had no choice but to change, explaining that “Malaysians are now more matured and no longer interested in rhetoric’s or empty promises. They want results and leaders who are responsible” (Spykerman and Sani, 2009: 1). However, changing UMNO, a party that lives on patronage and claims to represent the core interests of the majority Malay community, will not be an easy task. It will require a new social contract by rewriting race relations and ensuring a clean sweep of corrupt practices (Ahmad, 2009: 1-4). Although Najib has had vast experience in government and politics spanning three decades, he has always been in the shadows of Mahathir and Badawi. His views and policies on dissent, human rights, and the political opposition are relatively unknown. Nevertheless, he is said to be excellent at breaking down complex issues into manageable bits. He is patient and not easily ruffled. These are qualities that have helped him survive the cutthroat world of UMNO politics and recent confrontations with the opposition. Ramon Navaratnam sounds quite optimistic when he says: “It will most likely be a year of reforms … the reforms that Badawi started and Najib has promised to carry on….I see in 2009 the start of the reform process in the ruling Barisan coalition. Reform of the ISA, press laws and election rules are all included” (Kuppusamy, 2008a: 1). Others especially in the opposition parties seem to be less optimistic, afraid that Najib will be selective in his reform plans so as not to upset the political establishment and entrenched forces in UMNO (Kuppusamy, 2008a: 1). If Najib carries on the reforms introduced by Badawi, he will definitely lose a significant number of supporters because the reform measures will expose political leaders who practise “money politics”, a term that has almost become synonymous with UMNO politics. Najib seems to have his work cut out for him already – reforms, winning back lost political support, re-strengthening UMNO, and getting BN united and going again. While promoting further democratisation and multiracialism at the national level, he will have to simultaneously convince UMNO’s rank and file to abandon its neo-feudal political culture and to do away with the archaic notion of consolidating ‘Malay supremacy’. An unfortunate fact is that Najib is being prejudged even before he took over prime ministership.17 For example, Anwar believes that it would be an “unmitigated disaster” for Malaysia if Najib becomes prime minister. He argued that “Najib has given no indication of his commitment to judicial reform and corruption. These are issues that the Malaysian people expressed deep concerns over…. Malaysians fear that under Najib 17
Najib has to work overtime to build his image. This became evident when in his first address after becoming UMNO President, he had to plead with the Malaysian people to judge him by his actions and not to prejudge him based on what he called “perceptions and lies”. For details, see “Najib: Judge me by my actions”, Nation, 29 March, 2009.
14 democratic freedoms will be curtailed and the use of draconian laws such as the ISA would be extended” (Kuppusamy, 2008b: 1). However, the real Najib will only be known after he formally takes over as Prime Minister. Exorcising Mahathir’s Ghost Abdur Rahman Koya (2008, 1) argues that with Najib as prime minister, the ghost of Mahathir will be resurrected. With Badawi out and Najib in, it is feared that the vulture may turn out to be the eighty-something Mahathir, dying to have the last laugh. That is a scenario most Malaysians would want to avoid, at any cost. Critics said Najib’s rise to power would also see the return of Mahathir to political centre-stage, probably as a tenured advisor to the government. The former Prime Minister had all along treated the prime minister’s office as his private property, naming candidates who were more eligible to become the next prime minister. Najib, tainted by numerous scandals and unanswered accusations, is seen as the man who would dance to Mahathir’s tune. Mahathir even told local reporters: “I welcome the departure of Badawi and am ready to give advice to the new government” (Kuppusamy, 2008b: 1-5). Mahathir even rejoined UMNO on 5 April 2009, one day after Najib sworn in as Prime Minister and two days after Badawi resigned, in supporting Najib’s leadership. According to a diplomat with a European mission, “Najib is a carbon copy of Mahathir and we fear in his rise to power a possible return of iron-fisted rule and intolerance for dissent and curbs on the political opposition” (Kuppusamy, 2008b: 1-5). Joseph Liow, on the contrary, believes that despite perceptions of being Mahathir’s proxy, Najib will be his own man. Liow says, “Overall, I’m not sure if it would be a wholesale return to Mahathirism, though we will see glimpses of it. After all, Najib matured basically under that system” (Kala, 2008: 3). Shamsul Amri Baharuddin agrees with Liow, saying UMNO cannot go back to its old ways, and especially not Mahathir’s way, which is viewed by many within the party as divisive (Kala, 2008: 4). Conclusion The point of departure of this article was whether Badawi’s passing on the baton to Najib would augur positive changes in UMNO and the government. Najib’s ability to usher in a new era in the party and governance would spell the difference between fundamental and superficial changes. Not least, of great significance is Najib’s personal vindication of all accusations against his integrity and character. Najib’s scorecard ratings will depend on how well he deals with the following: How to cushion the impact of global economic crisis on Malaysian economy, how to infuse new life into a government weakened by years of authoritarianism and crony capitalism, how to revitalize and rejuvenate UMNO, how to smoothen racial divisions and bring in harmony in multiracial Malaysia thereby accommodating majority-minority aspirations by revisiting the implementations of Bumiputera policy, and how quickly he can salvage his personal reputation which seems to have been tarnished due to persistent allegations against his character.
15 Firstly, the fear of business collapses, job losses, depletion of savings and rising cost of living is already manifest among Malaysians and is expected to deepen in the coming months. The resulting negative impact will significantly alter national politics and the daily life of the people. It is imperative that Najib tackles the economic down turn by providing jobs for the people especially the unemployed youth, more business opportunities, and reduced cost of living for the ordinary Malaysians. Secondly, as the Prime Minister is obliged to form his cabinet with only UMNO highups, the abolition of the quota system would allow him to bring new blood in the administration and in the process he can get rid of those who have overstayed in the cabinet, are perceived to be corrupt, are dogged with controversies, and have not performed. Thirdly, Najib can change the faulty nomination process of UMNO. As a matter of fact, Najib, in his inaugural speech in the recently held UMNO general assembly, has promised to do just that. The process of nomination was designed specifically to discourage or, more correctly, to prevent challengers. Requiring that candidates be nominated by at least 30 percent of the party’s 191 divisions means that at most there can only be three nominees. This is meant not to get the best talent but to protect the incumbent. If Najib succeeds in abolishing the “quota rule,” in the next general assembly, the party would benefit by opening up the process and the delegates getting to preview many more potential candidates. Such an open process would also effectively blunt the current corrosive influence of “money politics” as there would be no need to bribe divisional leaders in order to secure one’s nomination (Musa, 2009: 1-5). And at the party’s elections, with over 2,000 delegates, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to bribe them all. Even if the assembly were to vote against Najib’s proposal for abolishing the quota system, it would still enhance his image for being a visionary leader ready to ring in changes against all odds. Fourthly, the Bumiputera privileges and quotas designed to protect the interests of indigenous Malays have resulted in deep-seated feelings of alienation among the minority ethnic groups. Since curtailing Bumiputera privileges is not an option given the risk of backlash from the ethnic Malays, Najib must devise affirmative actions not only to distribute the benefits of economic prosperity but also to bring equity in admission to government educational institutions, qualification for public scholarships, positions in government, and ownership in business. This policy shift would also help to retain the best talents in the country for the growth of ‘knowledge economy’ as envisaged by Najib. Finally, Najib must demonstrate that he has the personal qualities and moral integrity to lead. Merely denying that he had nothing to do with Saiful Bukhari, the man who accused the opposition leader Anwar of sodomizing him, or that he knew nothing of the brutal murder of the Mongolian model Altantuya and the involvement of his close advisor Razak Baginda, is not enough (Musa, 2009: 1-5). If Najib succeeds in implementing the measures mentioned above, he would not only be carving out a new identity for himself but also bringing fundamental changes in the party apparatus and the system of governance. In that case, metaphorically his tenure could very well be ‘new wine in a new bottle’.
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