infections, as well as having severe social and economic implications, have ... A(H1N1) outbreak on the Mexican tourism industry as reported by the media. .... of famous cities such as Toronto, which was normally regarded as a safe destination, ..... Other measures such as that of cancelling Mexican tourism campaigns.
THIS IS THE PRE-PUBLISHED VERSION For final version see: Monterrubio. J.C. (2010) Short-term economic impacts of influenza A (H1N1) and government reaction on the Mexican tourism industry: an analysis of the media. International Journal of Tourism Policy, 3(1): 1-15.
Abstract Travel, tourism, and epidemics are intrinsically linked. Although travel may significantly contribute to the actual paths an infection may take, the former may eventually become the victim of the latter. Past experiences have revealed epidemic infections can have negative economic impact on the tourism industry. Based on the analysis of newspaper articles and other media reports, this paper aims to identify the short-term economic impacts of the influenza A(H1N1) epidemic on the Mexican tourism industry, with particular emphasis placed on the role of government overreaction. The study reveals that the hotel, restaurant and aviation industries were the most affected in Mexico during the first weeks of the outbreak. The impacts experienced by the industry were of an unprecedented nature and seem to have derived widely from international travel restrictions, the media’s alarmist tones, and government measures.
Introduction Tourism has long been regarded as a key sector in government development strategy for development. Its economic importance around the world has been the reason why many countries have selected tourism as a key option for economic growth. In recent decades, tourism has experienced a constant increase. It has become one of the fastest growing economic sectors in the world and has thus been recognised as “one of the most important global industries” (Page and Connell, 2006: 5). International tourist arrivals reached 903 million in 2007, a 6.6 per cent increase with respect to 2006, and international tourism revenues increased to US$ 856 billion in 2007. By 2010, international tourist arrivals are expected to reach one billion. As far as long-term prospects are concerned, by 2020 international arrivals are expected to reach 1.6 billion, and the top three receiving regions will be Europe, East Asia and the Pacific, and the Americas (UNWTO, 2008). While economic forecasts are based on past and present tourism development figures, it must be acknowledged that such estimates, regardless of their statistical accuracy, do not take into account the negative influence of exogenous factors, whether natural or human-induced. Tourism is a volatile economic activity that can be greatly influenced by natural, economic, safety, and health issues. Undoubtedly, climate change and natural
disasters such as floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes in certain tourism destinations will be crucial elements in negatively shaping tourism flows in the short term (Mather, Viner, and Todd, 2005). Similarly, unpredictable global financial crises may significantly diminish travel mobility since it is an exogenous factor affecting the global economic demand for tourism (Ryan, 2003). Issues such as terrorist attacks like the 11 September 2001 in New York, the 2002 bombing of a tourist-filled night club in Bali, and the 2004 bombing of commuter trains in Madrid, can all seriously affect the tourism industry worldwide (Page and Connell, 2006). In addition to natural, financial, and safety factors, international public health concerns have become an important element affecting tourism flows, and therefore the tourism industry. Health issues, particularly those related to contagious diseases and international epidemics, have had significant impact on the tourism industry. Epidemic infections, as well as having severe social and economic implications, have caused, under certain conditions, devastating results in the tourism industry (Mason, Grobowski, and Du, 2005). While travellers may be those primarily affected in the early stages of epidemic infections and become vectors of the disease, travel and tourism themselves may eventually become the main victims (Wilder-Smith, 2003). By recognising that epidemic infections may severely affect travel and tourism, the present paper aims to identify the short-term economic impacts of the influenza A(H1N1) outbreak on the Mexican tourism industry as reported by the media. Particular attention is paid to the reaction of the government during the outbreak and how this contributed. In order to do so, it first analyses existing theoretical evidence on the role that travel has allegedly played in the spread of infectious diseases. In addition, the paper analyses the effects that epidemic diseases have on the tourism industry. In particular, the impacts on the Chinese tourism industry caused by the SARS outbreak and governments’ overreactions are analysed. Finally, the methods used for the present paper and corresponding findings are described. Literature Review The role of travel in the spread of epidemic infections The role that travel plays in the spread of contagious diseases is well documented. Travel and contagious diseases are intrinsically linked (Wilder-Smith and Freedman, 2003). Particularly, international travel has been regarded as an important factor contributing to emerging infections. This is because international travel and commerce have modified the size and mobility of human populations, bringing some environments, humans and other animal species into contact with each other like never before (Tapper, 2006). Similarly, travel strongly influences the actual routes a disease will take, the time periods in which the disease reaches different parts of the world, and the specific way in which it is transmitted. While the traveller may acquire the infection in his/her respective country, (s)he may also be infected in the receiving community, and spread it further if (s)he visits other destinations. Due to the great development and increase in air transportation, the international and in-flight spread of contagious diseases by air travellers have been reported as ways in which infections can be transmitted (Mangili and Gendreau, 2005).
By regarding travel as a potential vector of international epidemic outbreaks, one of the strategies adopted by government authorities during epidemic outbreaks is that of travel restrictions. The actual effects of travel restrictions have not been studied indepth. However, such restrictions are often regarded as an efficient way to reduce the spread of epidemic infections (Camitz and Liljeros, 2006). This assumption is clearly exemplified by the World Health Organization’s (WHO) travel advisories emitted in previous international epidemic outbreaks as a way to stop international transmissions. For example, in April 2003, the WHO advised international travellers to consider postponing all but essential travel to Beijing and Toronto when the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) outbreak took place. The advice was based on the assessment of the risk that travellers to these cities could become infected during their stay and carry the infection to another country (Rodier, 2003). Other measures were taken at airports, seaports, and road entries. Visual and temperature screening and completion of a health declaration card for all passengers arriving from SARS-affected areas, for example, were some of the specific procedures adopted (Wilder-Smith, Goh, and Paton, 2003). While a few studies have revealed the benefits that travelling restrictions may have on the spread of contagious diseases (Camitz and Liljeros, 2006), recent analyses have shown otherwise. It has been claimed that “[s]cientific research based on mathematical modelling indicates that restricting travel will be of limited or no benefit in stopping the spread of disease. Historical records of previous influenza pandemics, as well as experience with SARS, have validated this point” (WHO, 2009a: 1). More specifically, travel restrictions are shown to have limited benefits in delaying the spread of contagious infections and that measures should instead be those of providing international travellers with preventive information before departure (Lam, 2008). Historical data, for example, have revealed no change in the speed of influenza spread over recent centuries, despite the massive proliferation in travel (MacKellar, 2007: 435). Instead of imposing travel restrictions, more effective strategies should be adopted to reduce infectious spread possibilities. These include, for instance, health announcements on flights and distribution of useful information such as that related to personal hygiene. Regardless of the actual effect that travel has on the spread of epidemic infections, international organizations and government authorities have adopted travel restrictions in previous global epidemics. A clear example is the travel advisory emitted by the WHO mentioned above and other drastic measures such as those of denying entry to hotels and cruises and stopping the issuing of visas for citizens of affected nations (see McKercher and Chon, 2004). International travel restrictions and psychological effects, based either on actual facts or solely on perceived threats, have had a significant impact on the tourism industry worldwide in previous experiences (Wilder-Smith, 2003). The impact of epidemic diseases on travel and tourism The outbreak of epidemic diseases may create international anxiety because of its novelty, its ease of transmission in certain settings, and the speed of its spread through air travel, combined with extensive media coverage (Wilder-Smith, 2003). Undoubtedly, this may have a considerable impact on the economy of affected nations. Although the direct economic impacts of diseases such as hospital costs, lost days of work, and costs of medication have been widely studied (MacKellar, 2007), very little has been written on the impacts of epidemic infections on tourism.
Although limited in number, existing works (Dombey, 2004; Mason et al., 2005; McKercher and Chon, 2004) have documented the effects that epidemic infections may have on the dynamics of tourism. The warning about travel to affected tourism destinations may disrupt visitor flows in both developed and developing countries, thereby affecting the global tourism economic dynamics. Research has demonstrated that the impacts of epidemic diseases may be reflected severely in different sectors of the tourism industry. Previous epidemic outbreaks, for example, have directly impacted on the aviation industry since the air passenger numbers may drop by as much as 80 per cent, and hotel occupancy rates may drop to less than 10 per cent in some cases. Such reductions have further implications (Pine and McKercher, 2004). Within the local arena, epidemic threats may keep leisure activities to a strict minimum. In the case of epidemics, recreation spaces such as shops, restaurants, supermarkets, shopping malls, clubs, bars, parks, and streets have been reported almost empty. This has a direct effect on tourism since the attraction of recreation alternatives in some countries is one factor in the rise of domestic travel and in the increase in international visits (Goeldner and Ritchie, 2009: 226). In addition to the short-term economic impacts on the tourism industry, epidemic infections may negatively affect the tourism image of a destination in the long run. The tourism image of a destination is determined by the perception of several attributes such as natural and cultural resources, the social and natural environment, and tourism and recreation facilities. However, issues related to safety such as crime rates, terrorist attacks and, of course, health risks, also become crucial in the perceived tourism destination image. Because the tourism destination image is one of the most influential factors in the consumer’s choice of destination (Page and Connell, 2006), the perceived health risks in the destination may reduce tourism flows. Once an unfavourable reputation has been created, the tourism destination image is hard to change. In the case of famous cities such as Toronto, which was normally regarded as a safe destination, epidemic infection made it get a reputation of being a “dangerous” place to visit and of being “off limits” (Mason et al., 2005: 14), an image that will not change for perhaps some time. Although the unfavourable image of tourism destinations may be largely based on real facts of infectious diseases, it should be mentioned that the effects may also come from the perceived threat of the disease, rather than from its real danger. In such cases, the media and the government play a crucial role. The media has tended to act in a largely sensationalistic role (Mason, 2003: 96) and therefore can increase or diminish the degree of the real impacts that epidemics may have. The fact that the global media may release alarmist and sensationalist notes has contributed to overall epidemic effects on tourism (McKercher 2003, cited in Mason et al., 2005). Furthermore, the negative impact on tourism may be more a consequence of government reactions to the perceived threat of epidemics. In international crises, “over-reaction, lack of coordination and wellmeaning (but ultimately misguided) actions can affect tourism flows” (McKercher and Chon, 2004: 716). Previous experience: the impacts of SARS on the Chinese tourism industry SARS has been reported as the first severe and easily transmissible new contagious disease of the 21st century (Venkatesh and Memish, 2004). As such it is taking full advantage of the opportunities for rapid international spread afforded by a closely
interconnected and highly mobile society (Rodier, 2003). SARS first appeared in midNovember 2002 in Guangdong Province in China. However, it was not until 11 February 2003 that the WHO received the first official report of an outbreak of atypical pneumonia. From this Province, the SARS virus spread along international travel routes to 29 countries on most continents and became deeply embedded in 6 of them, infecting about 8,422 patients and causing over 900 deaths (Abdullah, Thomas, McGhee, and Morisky, 2004). Although there may be discrepancy on how exactly the disease was first passed on to other regions, it was commonly reported that the infection was introduced to Hong Kong by a physician from Guangdong. The physician, Dr Liu, had been experiencing symptoms before travelling to Hong Kong. While in Hong Kong, Dr Liu stayed in a local hotel and infected other guests from Hong Kong, China, Vietnam, Singapore, and Canada. These travellers subsequently spread the infection when they returned to their respective countries, thereby starting the international SARS epidemic (Abdullah et al., 2004). Although the economic costs of epidemics are somewhat surreal, outbreaks of contagious infections can possibly have unfavourable consequences not only on the affected nations but also on the global economy (MacKellar, 2007). In this regard, the economy of China, as reported by Dombey (2004), did not suffer considerably as a consequence of the SARS outbreak (see however Hai, Zhao, Wang, and Hou, 2004). The epidemic did not cause any permanent damage to economic growth or the investment dynamic on the mainland, for the affected industries only represent 5 per cent of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, the Chinese tourism industry, one of the first seriously affected industries, did show significant economic effects. Mostly derived from the WHO’s two-month advisory warning against non-essential travel to China (and the active participation of global media), the Chinese travel and tourism industry sectors lost an estimated US$ 20.4 billion (Dombey, 2004). Specifically, the Chinese travel and tourism industry was severely affected in terms of flight cancellations, a drop in domestic tourism, and a hotel occupancy rate decrease. Within the first three months of the outbreak, 130,000 overseas travellers cancelled scheduled trips to Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong. Tourism agencies reported that the country’s outbound tourism business showed a decrease of 80 per cent and experienced a drop in business of 80-90 per cent. The aviation industry also experienced serious harm. Many airlines cancelled more than half of their flights, reduced staff salaries by about 20 per cent and cancelled or delayed investment projects. The hotel industry experienced a worse situation (never before experienced), since some reported only a one-digit occupancy rate (Dombey, 2004). Although the tourism industry was considerably affected by SARS and, as suggested by Mason et al. (2005), perhaps even more due to the fear of it, this did not result in a real threat to the Chinese economy. This is mainly due to the fact that the affected industries, particularly the travel and tourism sectors, represent only a small part of Chinese GDP. This therefore suggests that the less the dependence a country has on the travel and tourism industry, the less the economic effect will be in health crisis conditions. While this was allegedly the case of China, the effects of international public health issues on other nations such as Mexico, where tourism is one of the major economic activities of the country, could be more threatening. The setting
The influenza A(H1N1) epidemic Influenza is a serious infectious disease killer. The virus, which may be of type A, B or C, is transmitted by direct contact with secretions, large droplets, and aerosols, each of which requires its own response – hand washing, surgical masks, and respirators, respectively. Influenza has repeatedly appeared in the cold months of the year. However, pandemics can occur at any time of the year. “Pandemic influenza refers to a situation in which a new and highly pathogenic viral subtype, one to which no one (or few) in the human population has immunological resistance and which is easily transmissible between humans, establishes a foothold in the human population, at which point it rapidly spreads around the world” (MacKellar, 2007: 430). Therefore, it has been recognised that nearly everyone in the world is vulnerable to influenza infection. It is precisely this almost universal vulnerability that makes influenza pandemics so disruptive (WHO, 2009b). The WHO has classified influenza into six phases, in which the sixth is the recognition of a pandemic. Level six is a phase in which increased and sustained transmission has been detected in the general population. In April 2009, a new unpredictable virus was officially detected in Mexico and the USA. Although the media reported that Mexico was most likely the origin of the virus, the first case of A(H1N1) infection was allegedly detected in September 2008 in a ten-year-old boy in Texas, USA. However, at the time of writing the present paper, October 2009, no official confirmation of scientific value had been offered. What was confirmed, though, was the fact that massive transmission of infection took place first in Mexico and then in the USA. On 13 April 2009, the Mexican Health Ministry issued a national epidemiological alert informing of severe respiratory infections in the country. Four days later, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that on 28 and 30 March 2009, the USA identified two cases of influenza caused by a new virus. On 20 April, the CDC confirmed the existence of a new virus type A(H1N1) having a swine component. Afterwards, the infection was internationally known as “swine influenza”. However, the infection was then renamed influenza A(H1N1) after confirmation that the virus was not related at all to swine components. As of 23 April, once the Canadian government confirmed the existence of the virus in Mexican specimens, the Mexican government declared a health emergency, and suspended school activities in three states. One day later, 1004 infected people and 60 deaths were reported in Mexico. This figure, however, was later modified and reduced once official laboratory confirmation was carried out. Based on the national alert, the Mexican government decided to cancel public events and close places in which massive transmission of the virus was highly possible. This included, for example, stopping all academic and some government activities, closing recreational, cultural, food and entertainment spaces, and urging people to remain at home. On 24 April 2009, the WHO started issuing “updates” about the infection’s status through its website (www.who.int). By this time, cases of influenza-like illness had been identified in two countries only, Mexico and the United States. The Mexican government reported 18 laboratory confirmed cases while the United States government reported seven. It was also reported that influenza normally affected the very young and adults, but that such age groups had not been heavily affected in Mexico. One day later, the WHO declared this situation a Public Health Emergency of International Concern but did not recommend any travel or trade restrictions. Regarding a travel advisory, the WHO
specifically advised no restriction of regular travel or closure of borders. The WHO (2009a: 1) claimed that “[t]oday, international travel moves rapidly, with large numbers of individuals visiting various parts of the world. Limiting travel and imposing travel restrictions would have very little effect on stopping the virus from spreading, but would be highly disruptive to the global community”. Yet, it considered it prudent for people who were ill to delay international travel and for people developing symptoms following international travel to seek medical attention, in line with guidance from national authorities. As of 27 April 2009, the WHO raised the global pandemic alert from phase 3 to phase 4. On 29 April, it decided to raise the influenza pandemic alert from phase 4 to phase 5 and recognised that the situation continued to evolve rapidly. Such a change was a signal that certain actions should then be undertaken with increased urgency, and at an accelerated pace. By this time, nine countries had officially reported 148 cases of “swine” influenza. In addition to Mexico and the USA, Austria, Canada, Germany, Israel, New Zealand, Spain, and the United Kingdom reported infections in their respective territories. Five days later, on 4 May 2009, twelve more countries officially reported cases of infected people. This summed a total of 1085 cases of influenza around the world. Out of these, 590 cases were confirmed in Mexico, with 25 deaths, and 286 in the United States, with one death. On the same day, the Director-General of the WHO, Dr Margaret Chan, claimed that the greatest disruption of the economy would come from the uncoordinated efforts of the general public, and she made a strong plea to countries to refrain from introducing measures that were economically and socially disruptive, but had no scientific justification and brought no clear public health benefit (WHO, 2009b). By late May, the infection had spread to 40 countries in different continents, and a total of 9830 laboratory confirmed cases of infection and 79 deaths had been reported. By then, the three most affected countries were the USA, Mexico, and Canada, with 5123, 3648 and 499 laboratory-confirmed cases, respectively. Research methods The aim of this paper was to identify the short-term economic impacts of the influenza A(H1N1) epidemic on the Mexican tourism industry as reported by the media. The study herein presented is not an economic research project but an analysis of information reported by the media and additional sources. Specifically, the paper analyses the economic effect that the international contagious infection and government reaction had on the tourism flows to and from Mexico, and their implications on the aviation, hotel and restaurant sectors. The findings herein presented were obtained from a detailed and critical analysis of a well-known Mexican newspaper, La Jornada (also available at www.jornada.unam.mx). Twenty-five issues of the newspaper (25 April – 19 May 2009) were scrutinised in detail to identify the most relevant pieces of news related to tourism, influenza A(H1N1), and government reaction in Mexico. Over 60 relevant full reports were selected for analysis. Due to the possible alarmist nature of some articles and the difficulty of knowing whether the account can be relied upon as having been written by someone in a position to provide an accurate version of events (Bryman, 2004), the selected reports were corroborated with those of TV news programmes and other news media such as radio programmes and internet news sites. This was done on a day to day basis. In necessary
cases, particularly when concerning statistical data, visits to websites of official organizations such as the WHO (www.who.int) and the UNWTO (www.unwto.org) were preferred. This methodological approach was adopted considering the effectiveness of the use of secondary data sources in previous studies. Secondary data sources in tourism research have been acknowledged due to their retrospective character, quick and easy accessibility, low cost, non-reactivity and possibility of retesting (Jennings, 2001). This has been evidenced in previous studies identifying the effects of epidemic diseases on tourism. The works of Dombey (2004), McKercher and Chon (2004), Pine and McKercher (2004) and Mason et al. (2005), most of whose data sources come from newspapers and other forms of news media, are clear examples of how fruitful newspaper reports are when examining this topic. For data analysis, the following procedure was adopted. First, all newspaper issues were revised in detail to select those articles that related tourism and the infection, both at the national and international levels. Then, according to the specific information the articles reported, and as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994), they were classified into four categories; i) the alleged role that travel had in the spread of the influenza A(H1N1) infection, ii) measures taken by the international tourism industry, iii) measures taken by international and national governments, and iv) economic impacts on the Mexican tourism industry. Findings Travel and the international spread of influenza A(H1N1) Regarding the role that travel plays in the spread of epidemic diseases, the study revealed that international travel seems to have contributed to the international spread of influenza A(H1N1). A considerable number of first cases of infection in different countries were mostly related to travel from the first affected countries, mainly Mexico and the USA. As of 30 April, Spain confirmed that out of ten confirmed infection cases, nine had recently travelled to Mexico. Similarly, Japan reported that the first three cases of infection in the country were a teacher and two students who had travelled to Canada through the USA. Norwegian health authorities confirmed infection in two people who in previous days had travelled to Mexico. Furthermore, while in Australia the first case was a woman who travelled from Los Angeles to Queensland, in China the first case was a 30year-old man who had just returned from the USA. Similar cases were reported by Italy, Brazil, Taiwan, and Cuba. This concurred with the literature stating that travel plays a crucial role in determining the international routes a disease can take. International travel restrictions Despite the WHO’s travel advisory to avoid travel restrictions, many countries did implement these and other restrictions on international travel to and from Mexico. Such measures assumed that restricting travel to and from the country would be an effective way to avoid infection. As of 27 April, the Sate Department alerted US citizens of the health risks of travel to Mexico. It also recommended avoiding all nonessential travel to the affected country at the time of the epidemic. Similarly, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office advised against all but essential travel to Mexico and stated that British nationals resident in or visiting Mexico should consider whether to remain in Mexico. Other European Union and Asian countries such as Spain, Germany, Rumania,
France, Italy, Japan, and China also urged their citizens to avoid non-essential travel to Mexico and the USA. In addition, international travel and tourism companies cancelled trips to Mexico. Following the travel advice of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Thomas Cook UK made the decision to cancel holidays to Cancun, Mexico, up to and including 5 May 2009. At the same time, some Canadian charter tourist airlines temporarily suspended all their flights to Mexican beach destinations. Some German tourism operators also cancelled trips to the affected country. Additionally, cruise companies like Royal Caribbean and Carnival decided to cancel trips temporarily to Mexican tourism ports. While some governments just advised to avoid travel to Mexico, others took more radical steps. As of 29 April, Cuba cancelled all flights to and from Mexico for forty-eight hours; however, cancellations continued for an indefinite time. Some flights from Mexico to the island were allowed, but only to repatriate Mexican travellers. Argentina adopted similar measures by cancelling all flights coming from and going to Mexico City for seventeen days. Peru and Ecuador temporarily followed similar policies. Besides, some countries such as Bolivia implemented plans that included the implementation of strict control procedures for foreigners at airports as well as special restrictions for people coming from Mexico. Asian countries such as Japan and Singapore reinforced conditions for issuing visas and started requiring visas for Mexican travellers. Mexican measures In addition to the travel restrictions adopted by international governments and tourism companies, the Mexican government made important decisions on issues related to and affecting the tourism industry. Due to the growing number of infections, and the intention to avoid further spread, on 28 April over thirty-five thousand restaurants were first closed temporarily in Mexico City, which is one of the most important tourism destinations in the country. The following day, one hundred and seventy-five archaeological zones and museums around the country were also closed by the national government in order to avoid virus transmission. Places such as restaurants, bars, night clubs, and other recreational spaces where high risk of infection was likely were instructed to close. This included a large number of tourism services suppliers across the nation. Other measures such as that of cancelling Mexican tourism campaigns around the world and advising citizens to remain at home were also introduced by the government. Impacts on the Mexican tourism industry The measures taken by international governments and travel and tourism companies, together with the decisions made by the Mexican administration combined with the fear and lack of confidence of travellers, had an immediate and direct effect on the tourism industry in the country. Since tourism generates over US$ 12 thousand million for the Mexican economy and about 2 million 200 thousand direct jobs, the economic impact on the travel and tourism industry was extremely harmful. Particularly, because international tourism in Mexico was almost inexistent during the first days of the outbreak, the hotel, restaurant, and aviation sectors were the most economically affected. This can be clearly evidenced by the decrease in international tourist arrivals to the country (see Figure 1). As of 9 May, it was estimated that the Mexican tourism
industry would lose about US$ five thousand million, and 150 thousand jobs were at risk. Of course, it is quite difficult to generate accurate figures of both direct and indirect economic impacts on each sector in the country. However, initial data could suggest the level to which such sectors were immediately impacted upon. Impacts on the hotel and restaurant sector By 15 May, twenty-two days after the Mexican government issued the first national health alert, the hotel industry was the hardest hit sector. Although different figures were experienced by several tourism destinations, national hotel occupancy rates declined significantly. On average, it was concluded that national hotel occupancy was between 4 and 30 per cent compared to the 80 per cent recorded on these dates the year before. The drop in hotel occupancy was primarily experienced in forty-three cities and seventeen sea and sun destinations. In Mexico City, for instance, hotel occupancy was between five and 10 per cent, and massive cancellations were recorded. This had not been experienced since the earthquake of 1985. Similarly, tourism destinations such as the southern town of San Cristobal, popular among European tourists, experienced only five per cent occupancy in hotels and around fifty thousand cancellations for May and June. Similarly, hotel occupancy in some northern cities was five per cent. The hotel sector in beach resorts was also severely affected. In Cancun, Cozumel, and the Riviera Maya, one of the most important tourism regions visited by international travellers, over 30 per cent of hotels suspended activities temporarily due to low occupancy. By 11 May, the estimated economic loss in this area was US$ 3.8 million, and the number of people losing their jobs was over 10 thousand. North-western resorts such as Los Cabos also reported hotel occupancy of 20 per cent. In addition, the restaurant industry was also affected. Approximately ninety-nine per cent of restaurants had to close temporarily due to the government strategy for reducing massive virus transmission. Once restaurants were allowed to operate again, the sector experienced sale decreases of up to 90 per cent. This led the sector to reduce the number of jobs available. For the people keeping their jobs, incomes were significantly reduced for a large number due to the lower earnings from tipping. Together with low hotel occupancy, the sector reported a loss of approximately US$70 million during the first days of the influenza outbreak, and an estimated number of 100 thousand people were at high risk of losing their jobs. This took place mainly in small and medium size enterprises. Impacts on the aviation industry The number of airline passengers, both national and international, was significantly reduced during the first days of the epidemic in Mexico. Inevitably, this had an immediate impact on the Mexican air travel industry. Mexican airlines reported a drop in national flight sales of 50 percent. Due to the low number of passengers, the number of flight cancellations was historically high and was considered an emergency situation. The international airport of Mexico City, for example, reported the unprecedented cancellation of 229 departing and arriving flights in one day. This meant an estimated cancellation of over 25 percent of the average daily total. The low number of passengers, the high number of cancellations, and the decrease in reservations caused a 70 percent reduction in profits for national companies. Accordingly, by 14 May, almost half the
personnel of national airlines, both mechanics and crews, received “forced holidays”. The operating flight crews reported a loss of 50 percent of their income due to the decrease in the number of flights. Impacts on related sectors Further activities and tourism-related services in Mexico were also affected. Airport services, for example, were highly affected by the lack of flight demand. These included mainly those provided by money exchange companies, fast food establishments and taxi drivers. Taxi companies reported a fall of 50 percent in rides. Other jobs affected at airports were those of shoe-shine boys, waiters, and baggage handlers. Additionally, tour operators, particularly those providing guided-tour services within archaeological zones, were severely hit. Some important sites such as Teotihuacan stopped receiving around 15 thousand visitors during the first week of May. Schools providing Spanish lessons to foreign students in Mexican tourism destinations also experienced losses. Over 15 Spanish schools in some states had to cancel activities since over 10 thousand USA and Canadian students left the country right after the outbreak. This caused a loss of almost US$ five million during these days. Mexican government’s immediate response By recognising the importance of tourism in the Mexican economy and the severe effects of the influenza epidemic on the industry, the Mexican government designed strategies to reduce the economic impact. On 6 May, the federal government claimed it would provide over US$ 2740 million to support the most affected sectors. These included mainly hotels, restaurants and leisure spaces. Small and medium size businesses were the priority. Additionally, tax cuts were adopted to minimise economic damage to hotels, restaurants, airlines and recreational service companies. Furthermore, the government stated that US$ 1200 million would be invested in tourism campaigns promoting the top 110 tourism destinations in Mexico. Conclusion and discussion This paper aimed at identifying the short-term impacts of the influenza A(H1N1) epidemic and government reaction on the Mexican tourism industry as presented in the media. As the findings revealed, the tourism industry in the country was severely damaged right after the epidemic outbreak and government decisions. Hotels, restaurants, and air travel companies were the hardest hit. This supports the idea that diseases can have significant impacts on the dynamics of tourism (Mason et al., 2005). However, when compared to previous experiences, the study suggests that the effects the tourism industry may experience might widely differ from country to country. Unlike the effects of SARS on the Chinese economy, for example, the impacts of influenza A(H1N1) on the Mexican economic system were far more damaging. This is mainly because, unlike the tourism sector in China, the tourism industry in Mexico does play a crucial role in the economic dynamics of the country. Regarding previous theoretical propositions, the study provides evidence to suggest that the relationships between travel and the spread of diseases are close. However, it can be concluded that travel and tourism per se do not contribute significantly to the massive spread of infectious diseases. Instead, travel and tourism play a major role in
determining the routes an infection takes, and the time periods in which the disease reaches different parts of the world. Therefore, the present academic investigation strongly supports the idea that during epidemics, travel restrictions should be avoided. The effects that travel restriction measures have on the spread of diseases are minimal, yet these may become economically, socially and psychologically disruptive. Unfortunately, epidemiologists have stated that further epidemics are expected to occur in the near future (MacKellar, 2007). Consequently, there are lessons that should be learnt from the analysis of the initial effects of influenza A(H1N1) on the Mexican tourism industry. In particular, government decisions such as those of travel restrictions and discouragement of leisure activities in public spaces should be based on scientific bases. Similarly, discriminatory measures, such as those allegedly applied to Mexican travellers in countries like China during the first days of the epidemic, should be discouraged. While the benefit of such measures is minimal, diplomatic relations among nations may become damaged. Also, the costs and benefits of implementing measures such as those of reinforcing visa conditions or practising passenger screening at airports should be reviewed. Rather than investing in airport screening measures to detect infected travellers, other measures should be taken. For instance, as Wilder-Smith (2003) suggests, investment should be increased to strengthen screening and infection control capacities at points of entry into the health care system. Implementation of these methods has reported no further importation of infected travellers. Likewise, policies should also consider advising travellers to adopt low-risk behaviours. Although this was not notoriously implemented by governments during the beginning of the epidemic, providing travellers with adequate information may become a more fruitful strategy in reducing transmission. This is based on the idea that the knowledge, attitudes, and practices of travellers play a pivotal role and need to be known to allow for the development of preventive activities to control imported diseases (Castelli, 2004: 1) Similar attention should be paid to the role of the media and governments’ reaction to the perceived threat of epidemic infections. The effects experienced by the Mexican tourism industry, it can be concluded, did not derive from the actual impacts of the infection. Instead, these were partly a consequence of the alarmist tones of the media and, as in previous cases (see McKercher and Chon, 2004), the over-reactions of the Mexican and other governments. In the case of SARS, the impacts on global tourism did not emerge just from the fact that the infection was reported by the media, but the way that it was reported, in terms of the sheer volume of coverage and the often sensationalist and alarmist tones (Mason et al., 2005: 15). In the case of influenza A(H1N1), it seems that the way the global and national media reported alarmist information contributed significantly to a feeling of panic amongst potential and actual travellers to and inside Mexico. Additionally, the unconfirmed data reported by the federal government and the implemented measures based on such data enhanced panic among travellers. As of 28 April, the federal government reported 1995 cases of infection and 149 deaths in the country. One week later, however, the WHO stated that Mexico had reported only 590 laboratory confirmed human cases of infection including 25 deaths. However, federal measures such as closing all restaurants in Mexico City had been taken based on the former figures. Although the actual effect of such measures in reducing the number of infections is unclear, the economic impact not only on the travel and tourism but other industries (e.g. swine production) was unquestionably disruptive.
Like in many investigations, the results herein presented should be taken with caution. It must be considered that the research was mainly based on newspaper reports. Although efforts were made to reduce possible bias, the often alarmist figures and specific interests of the newspaper may have shaped them somehow. Also, it must be acknowledged that the economic impacts reported may also be the result of other exogenous factors. Specifically, the economic impacts identified could be, in part, a consequence of the current international financial crisis. Tourist perception towards the lack of safety in some Mexican destinations may also have relevant effects on the dynamics of tourism flows into the country. Unfortunately, it is hard (if not impossible) to unmistakably identify which impacts come from the infection, from other factors, or from the combination of the two. Finally, the findings of this study provide ideas for further research. First, similar studies, especially those of a quantitative nature, are needed to confirm or reject the figures herein provided. Economic research projects may be of particular relevance for such a purpose. In addition, long-term impact studies on both Mexico and other international destinations are also required to assess the effect of the infection on the dynamics of global tourism. Of similar importance is the analysis of the costs of discriminatory measures taken by some countries towards Mexican travellers when regarding them as “virus carriers”. The impact of the epidemic infection on the international tourism image of Mexico would also be useful for planning and management decisions. Only by scientifically analysing the procedures adopted and by assessing the impacts of influenza A(H1N1) can tourism experts contribute significantly to diminishing the effects of future pandemics on tourism, one of the most important yet volatile global industries today. References Abdullah, A., Thomas, G., McGhee, S., and Morisky, D. (2004) ‘Impact of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) on travel and population mobility: Implications for travel medicine practitioners’, J Travel Med, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp.107-111. Bryman, A. (2004) Social research methods, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Camitz, M., and Liljeros, F. (2006) ‘The effect of travel restrictions on the spread of a moderately contagious disease’, BMC Medicine, Vol. 4, NP. Castelli, F. (2004) ‘Human mobility and disease: A global challenge’, J Travel Med, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp.1-2. Dombey, O. (2004) ‘The effects of SARS on the Chinese tourism industry’, Journal of Vacation Marketing, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp.4-10. Goeldner, C. R., and Ritchie, J. R. B. (2009) Tourism: Principles, practices, philosophies (11 ed.), John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New Jersey. Hai, W., Zhao, Z., Wang, J., and Hou, Z. (2004) ‘The short-term impact of SARS on the Chinese economy’, Asian Economic Papers, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp.57-61. Jennings, G. (2001) Tourism research, John Wiley and Sons Australia, Ltd., Milton.
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Figure 1 International visitor arrivals in Mexico, January - May 2009 (thousands)
Source: SECTUR - The National Ministry of Tourism (www.sectur.gob.mx)
