Half a Chance: Youth Bulges and Transitions to ...

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Half a Chance: Youth Bulges and Transitions to Liberal Democracy

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s it over? Has democracy’s “third wave”— the virtually uninterrupted uptick in the number of democracies since the early £™ÇäÃÊ `iÃVÀˆLi`Ê LÞÊ ->“ÕiÊ ՘̈˜}̜˜Ê (1991)—finally spent all of its momentum? Some analysts contend that it has, and that a ÀiÛiÀÃiÊÜ>Ûiʜvʘiœ‡>Õ̅œÀˆÌ>Àˆ>˜ˆÃ“ʈÃÊ>Ài>`ÞÊ œ˜Ê̅iÊÀˆÃiÊ­ ˆ>“œ˜`]Ê£™™ÈÆÊ >ÀœÌ…iÀÃ]ÊÓääÓ®°Ê ˜Ê̅ˆÃÊ>À̈Vi]ÊÊ>À}ÕiÊ̅>ÌÊ̅iÊÀiVi˜ÌʏiÛiˆ˜}‡ off in measures of global democracy is tempo‡ rary, and that as youthful demographic profiles mature, new and more stable liberal democ‡ À>VˆiÃÊ>ÀiʏˆŽiÞÊ̜Ê>ÀˆÃiÊLivœÀiÊÓäÓäʈ˜Ê>̈˜Ê
“iÀˆV>]Ê œÀ̅Ê
vÀˆV>]Ê>˜`Ê
È>°Ê 7…ÞÊÃÕV…Êœ«Ìˆ“ˆÃ“¶Ê iV>ÕÃiʓÞÊ>˜>ÞÈÃʜvÊ recent demographic and political trends shows that countries with a large proportion of young >`ՏÌÃʈ˜Ê̅iÊܜÀŽˆ˜}‡>}iÊ«œ«Õ>̈œ˜Ê­ÀiviÀÀi`Ê to as a “youth bulge”) are much less likely to attain a stable liberal democracy than countries with a more mature age structure. If fertility continues to decline and age structure contin‡ ues to mature in many of the world’s current

RICHARD P. CINCOTTA

The Youth Bulge: Constraining Liberal Democracy?

Clues to the relationship between the youth bulge and liberal democracy can be seen in the wake of demographic changes that swept ̅ÀœÕ}…Ê“ÕV…ÊœvÊ >ÃÌÊ
È>Ê>˜`Ê>̈˜Ê
“iÀˆV>Ê Richard P. Cincotta ˆÃÊ̅iÊVœ˜ÃՏ̈˜}Ê ˆ˜Ê ̅iÊ >ÌiÊ £™näÃÊ >˜`Ê £™™äÃ°Ê ˜Ê Ài뜘ÃiÊ ÌœÊ Ê`i“œ}À>«…iÀÊ̜Ê̅iÊœ˜}Ê,>˜}iÊ
˜>ÞÈÃÊ declines in women’s fertility, the proportion 1˜ˆÌʜvÊ̅iÊ >̈œ˜>Ê˜Ìiˆ}i˜ViÊ œÕ˜Vˆ°ÊˆÃÊ œvÊޜ՘}ÊܜÀŽˆ˜}‡>}iÊ>`ՏÌÃʈ˜Ê>LœÕÌÊ>Ê`œâi˜Ê ÀiÃi>ÀV…ÊvœVÕÃiÃʜ˜Ê̅iÊ«œˆÌˆV>]ÊiVœ˜œ“ˆV]Ê VœÕ˜ÌÀˆiÃÊ`Àœ««i`ÊÃÌii«Þ]Ê̜ÊLiÌÜii˜Êä°ÎÈÊ>˜`Ê i˜ÛˆÀœ˜“i˜Ì>]Ê>˜`ÊÜVˆ>Êˆ“«ˆV>̈œ˜ÃʜvÊ̅iÊ ä°{Ó°Ê7…i˜ÊˆÌÊ`ˆ`]ʏˆLiÀ>Ê`i“œVÀ>VˆiÃÊiۜÛi`Ê `i“œ}À>«…ˆVÊÌÀ>˜ÃˆÌˆœ˜Ê>˜`ʅՓ>˜Ê“ˆ}À>̈œ˜°Ê in most of these countries, with little of the ­*…œÌœÊLÞÊ >ۈ`Ê>Ü݅ÕÀÃÌ]Ê7œœ`ÀœÜÊ7ˆÃœ˜Ê military preemption and backsliding that pre‡

i˜ÌiÀ® viously typified their regions—with the recent ˜œÌ>LiÊiÝVi«Ìˆœ˜ÊœvÊ/…>ˆ>˜`Ê­Ãiiʈ}°Ê£®°Ê In contrast, where liberal democracy emerged before a large youth bulge declined—

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ޜÕ̅‡LՏ}iÊVœÕ˜ÌÀˆiÃ]Ê>˜>ÞÃÌÃÊŜՏ`ÊiÝ«iVÌÊ most of these states to ultimately attain and maintain liberal democracy. Of course, there ܈ÊLiÊiÝVi«Ìˆœ˜ÃÆÊȘViÊ̅iÊi>ÀÞÊ£™ÇäÃ]ÊV…>À‡ ˆÃ“>̈VÊ>Õ̅œÀˆÌ>Àˆ>˜Êi>`iÀÃÊ>˜`ÊȘ}i‡«>ÀÌÞÊ ideological elites have demonstrated a capac‡ ity to resist democratization, persisting even as their countries’ age structures matured. In my analysis, I compared two measures: ­£®Ê̅iÊޜÕ̅‡LՏ}iÊ«Àœ«œÀ̈œ˜p`iw˜i`Ê>ÃÊ̅iÊ «Àœ«œÀ̈œ˜ÊœvÊޜ՘}Ê>`ՏÌÃÊ­>}iÃÊ£xÊ̜Êә®Êˆ˜Ê̅iÊ ÜœÀŽˆ˜}‡>}iÊ«œ«Õ>̈œ˜Ê­>}iÃÊ£xÊ̜ÊÈ{®p܅ˆV…Ê ˆÃÊ`iÀˆÛi`ÊvÀœ“ÊiÃ̈“>ÌiÃÊ>˜`Ê«ÀœiV̈œ˜ÃÊ«ÕL‡ ˆÃ…i`ÊLÞÊ̅iÊ1 Ê*œ«Õ>̈œ˜Ê ˆÛˆÃˆœ˜Ê­ÓääÇ®ÆÊ and (2) liberal democracy, which is identified LÞÊ>ÊÀ>̈˜}ʜvʺÀii»Êˆ˜ÊÀii`œ“ÊœÕÃi½ÃÊ­Óään®Ê annual evaluations of political rights and civil ˆLiÀ̈iÃÊ­vÀœ“Ê£™ÇÓÊ̜ÊÓääÇ®°1

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2008–2009

>Ãʈ˜Ê œœ“Lˆ>]Ê VÕ>`œÀ]ʈˆ]ʘ`ˆ>]Ê>>ÞÈ>]Ê *>«Õ>Ê iÜÊՈ˜i>]Ê*iÀÕ]Ê-ÀˆÊ>˜Ž>]Ê/ÕÀŽiÞ]Ê Venezuela, and numerous others—regimes failed to stabilize, retreating to less democratic practices and institutions of governance. In some cases, deliberalization occurred periodi‡ V>Þ]Ê>Ãʈ˜Ê/ÕÀŽiÞÊ>˜`ʘ`ˆ>°Ê˜ÊœÌ…iÀÃ]ÊÃÕV…Ê>ÃÊ >>ÞÈ>Ê>˜`ʈˆ]Ê̅iÊ«Àii“«Ìˆœ˜Ê…>Ãʏ>ÃÌi`ÊvœÀÊ decades.

The Youth Bulge and the Hobbesian Bargain Why should a youthful age structure influence political regimes? Numerous studies have con‡ VÕ`i`Ê̅>ÌÊVœÕ˜ÌÀˆiÃÊ܈̅Ê>ʏ>À}iÊޜÕ̅‡LՏ}iÊ proportion experience a high risk of political ۈœi˜ViÊ >˜`Ê VˆÛˆÊ ÃÌÀˆviÊ ­i>…ÞÊ iÌÊ >°]Ê ÓääÇÆÊ 1À`>]Ê ÓääÈÆÊ iõՈ`>Ê EÊ 7ˆi˜iÀ]Ê £™™È®°Ê
ÃÃՓˆ˜}]Ê>ÃÊ/…œ“>ÃÊœLLiÃÊ`ˆ`ʈ˜Ê̅iʓˆ`‡ `iʜvÊ̅iÊ£Ç̅ÊVi˜ÌÕÀÞ]Ê̅>ÌÊVˆÌˆâi˜ÃÊ>ÀiÊ܈ˆ˜}Ê to relinquish liberties when faced with threats to their security and property, it is not sur‡ prising that support for authoritarian regimes should rise—especially among the commer‡ cial elite—during a large youth bulge, when “ÕV…ÊœvÊ̅iÊ«œ«Õ>̈œ˜ÊˆÃÊޜ՘}Ê>˜`ʍœLiÃÃ°Ê 9œÕ̅ÊLՏ}iÃÊÌi˜`Ê̜Ê}ˆÛiÊÀˆÃiÊ̜ÊޜÕ̅ÊVՏÌÕÀiÃÊ that coalesce around distinctive identities and untempered ideologies, and find expression ̅ÀœÕ}…ÊiÝ«iÀˆ“i˜Ì>̈œ˜Ê>˜`ÊÀˆÃŽ‡Ì>Žˆ˜}°Ê-ÕV…Ê conditions, some theorists argue, facilitate the political mobilization and recruitment of young >`ՏÌÃp«>À̈VՏ>ÀÞÊޜ՘}ʓi˜pLÞʘœ˜‡ÃÌ>ÌiÊ >˜`Ê ÃÌ>Ìi‡ÃÕ««œÀÌi`Ê œÀ}>˜ˆâ>̈œ˜ÃÊ V>«>LiÊ œvÊ political or criminal violence (see Goldstone, £™™£ÆÊœiÀ]Ê£™ÈÇÉÈn®°Ê /…iʈ˜yÕi˜ViʜvÊ>ÊޜÕ̅vՏÊ>}iÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀiʜ˜Ê Ài}ˆ“iÊÌÞ«iÊV>˜ÊLiÊ՘`iÀÃ̜œ`Ê>ÃÊ>ÊÌܜ‡ÃÌ>}iÊ process.2 Countries with a large proportion of young adults find themselves in the first stage: /…iÞÊ >ÀiÊ Ã>``i`Ê ÜˆÌ…Ê >Ê ÃœVˆ>Ê i˜ÛˆÀœ˜“i˜ÌÊ where the regime’s legitimacy is strained and the political mobilization of young men is relatively i>ÃÞ°Ê/…iÊÀiÃՏ̈˜}Ê«œˆÌˆVÃÊÌi˜`Ê̜ÊLiÊvÀ>V̈œÕÃÊ and potentially violent. In this stage, regimes typically concentrate resources on preserving

œÕ˜ÌÀˆiÃÊ܈̅Ê>ʏ>À}iÊ«Àœ«œÀ̈œ˜ÊœvÊޜ՘}Ê >`ՏÌÃʈ˜Ê̅iÊܜÀŽˆ˜}‡>}iÊ«œ«Õ>̈œ˜Ê­ÀiviÀÀi`Ê ÌœÊ>ÃÊ>ʺޜÕ̅ÊLՏ}i»®Ê>ÀiʓÕV…ʏiÃÃʏˆŽiÞÊÌœÊ >ÌÌ>ˆ˜Ê>ÊÃÌ>LiʏˆLiÀ>Ê`i“œVÀ>VÞÊ̅>˜ÊVœÕ˜ÌÀˆiÃÊ ÜˆÌ…Ê>ʓœÀiʓ>ÌÕÀiÊ>}iÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀi°

their position by limiting dissent and maintain‡ ing order, a focus that engenders the support of commercial elites and other propertied seg‡ ments of society. States can make democratic gains during this stage, and are sometimes pressured into politi‡ V>Ê ÀivœÀ“ÃÊ LÞÊ ÞœÕ̅‡i`Ê `i“œVÀ>VÞÊ “œÛi‡ “i˜ÌðÊ9iÌÊ VœÕ˜ÌÀˆiÃÊ ÜˆÌ…Ê >À}iÊ ÞœÕÌ…Ê LՏ}iÃÊ do not usually attain a high level of civil liber‡ ties and political rights. When they do—when enlightened authoritarians impose a “demo‡ VÀ>̈VÊ i}>VÞ»Ê Õ˜`iÀÊ ÞœÕ̅‡LՏ}iÊ Vœ˜`ˆÌˆœ˜Ã]Ê or when democratic institutions are imposed at independence or as part of a treaty—these gains face unfavorable odds. Countries that sustained >ʏˆLiÀ>Ê`i“œVÀ>VÞʜÛiÀÊ«iÀˆœ`ÃʜvÊޜÕ̅‡LՏ}iÊ Vœ˜`ˆÌˆœ˜ÃÊ­ÃÕV…Ê>ÃÊ œÃÌ>Ê,ˆV>]ʘ`ˆ>]Ê>“>ˆV>]Ê >˜`Ê -œÕ̅Ê
vÀˆV>®Ê …>ÛiÊ Ã…œÜ˜Ê iÝÌÀ>œÀ`ˆ˜>ÀÞÊ dedication to maintaining democratic insti‡ tutions under the stresses of ethnic violence, intense criminal activity, or external threat. In the second stage, the dissipation of a large youth bulge tends to yield relative political calm and a “demographic dividend”: a decline in the number of children each working adult has to ÃÕ««œÀÌÊ>˜`Ê>ÊLՏ}iʈ˜Ê̅iʓˆ``i‡>}i`ÊÃiV̈œ˜Ê œvÊ̅iÊܜÀŽˆ˜}‡>}iÊ«œ«Õ>̈œ˜]Ê܅ˆV…ÊÀiˆiÛiÃÊ pressure on child health and educational ser‡ vices, stimulates savings, contributes to produc‡ tivity, and facilitates increased human capital investment and, ultimately, wage growth (see

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ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM


Êܜ“>˜Êˆ˜ÊˆLiÀˆ>ʅœ`ÃÊÕ«Ê …iÀʈ˜Ži`Êvˆ˜}iÀʈ˜`ˆV>̈˜}Ê Ã…iÊۜÌi`ʈ˜Ê̅iÊvˆÀÃÌÊ democratic elections in ˆLiÀˆ>ÊvœœÜˆ˜}Ê£{ÊÞi>ÀÃʜvÊ VˆÛˆÊÜ>À°Ê
VVœÀ`ˆ˜}Ê̜Ê̅iÊ º…>vÊ>ÊV…>˜Vi»ÊLi˜V…“>ÀŽ]Ê ˆLiÀˆ>½ÃÊ`i“œVÀ>VÞʈÃʜ˜iÊ of the most fragile. (© ÓääxÊ"“>ÀÊ ˆ`]ÊVœÕÀÌiÃÞʜvÊ *…œÌœÃ…>Ài®Ê

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`i“œVÀ>VÞÊ œ˜ViÊ ˆÌÃÊ ÞœÕ˜}‡>`ՏÌÊ «Àœ«œÀ̈œ˜Ê `Àœ«ÃÊ̜Ê>LœÕÌÊä°{ä°4 /…ˆÃʺ…>v‡>‡V…>˜ViÊLi˜V…“>ÀŽ»Ê…>Ã]ʈ˜Ê̅iÊ recent past, provided a fair indication—plus or minus a decade—of when a country will become a stable liberal democracy. Equipped with this basic statistic, as well as population estimates >˜`Ê«ÀœiV̈œ˜Ã]ÊÊ>ÀÀ>˜}i`Ê>Ê̈“iÌ>Liʈ`i˜Ìˆvއ ing each country’s current probability of liberal `i“œVÀ>VÞÊ>˜`Ê̅iÊÞi>Àʈ˜Ê܅ˆV…Êi>V…ÊޜÕ̅‡ LՏ}iÊ VœÕ˜ÌÀÞÊ «>ÃÃi`]Ê œÀÊ ˆÃÊ «ÀœiVÌi`Ê ÌœÊ «>ÃÃ]Ê Ì…iʅ>v‡>‡V…>˜ViÊLi˜V…“>ÀŽ°Ê/…iʓ>«Ê­ˆ}°ÊÓ®Ê highlights five categories of interest to analysts: v F ragile liberal democracies (probability of ˆLiÀ>Ê`i“œVÀ>VÞʈÃÊ{äÊ̜ÊÈäÊ«iÀVi˜Ì®Æ v /…iʓœÃÌÊvÀ>}ˆiʏˆLiÀ>Ê`i“œVÀ>VˆiÃÊ­«ÀœL‡ >LˆˆÌÞʏiÃÃÊ̅>˜Ê{äÊ«iÀVi˜Ì®ÆÊ v "̅iÀÊÀi}ˆ“iÊÌÞ«iÃÊ«ÀœiVÌi`Ê̜ʅ>ÛiʓœÀiÊ Ì…>˜ÊxäÊ«iÀVi˜ÌÊ«ÀœL>LˆˆÌÞʜvÊ>ÌÌ>ˆ˜ˆ˜}Ê ÃÌ>LiʏˆLiÀ>Ê`i“œVÀ>VÞÊLivœÀiÊÓäÎäÆÊ œœ“ÊiÌÊ>°]ÊÓääÓÆÊiiÊEÊ>ܘ]ÊÓääÈ®°Ê v "̅iÀÊÀi}ˆ“iÊÌÞ«iÃÊ܈̅Ê>ʏiÃÃÊ̅>˜ÊxäÊ«iÀ‡ With much of society’s political volatility cent probability of attaining stable liberal depleted, authoritarian executives tend to lose `i“œVÀ>VÞÊLivœÀiÊÓäÎäÆÊ>˜`Ê the support of the commercial elite, who find v Other regimes that are demographically the regime’s grip on communication and com‡ long overdue for liberal democracy (prob‡ merce economically stifling and the privileges >LˆˆÌÞʈÃÊ}Ài>ÌiÀÊ̅>˜ÊÇäÊ«iÀVi˜Ì®p̅ˆÃÊ granted to family members and cronies of the V>Ìi}œÀÞʈ˜VÕ`iÃ]Ê>˜`ʅi«ÃÊ`iw˜i]ʘiœ‡ «œˆÌˆV>ÊiˆÌiÊw˜>˜Vˆ>ÞÊ`iLˆˆÌ>̈˜}°Ê
ÃÊLœÌ…Ê authoritarian regimes. ՘̈˜}̜˜Ê­£™™£®Ê>˜`Ê-V…“ˆÌÌiÀÊ­£™nä®Ê…>ÛiÊ noted, political calm and improved economic Outliers: Resistant Authoritarians and social conditions—which usually advance and Persistent Liberal Democracies …>˜`‡ˆ˜‡…>˜`Ê܈̅Ê̅iʓ>ÌÕÀˆ˜}ʜvÊ>}iÊÃÌÀÕV‡ tures—provide authoritarians with opportuni‡ How well does this timetable work? It performed ties to make a deal for a safe exit. most accurately when forecasting liberal democ‡ racy among states ruled by military “caretaker” The Probability of Liberal regimes, weak personal dictatorships, or partial Democracy: A Schedule democracies. However, a close inspection of this method’s failures suggests that the demographic ÞÊ `ˆÛˆ`ˆ˜}Ê Ì…iÊ ÜœÀ`Ê ˆ˜ÌœÊ wÛiÊ Ài}ˆœ˜ÃÊ >˜`Ê changes (and associated social and economic analyzing data every five years beginning in changes) it tracks are too weak to undermine £™Çx]Ê Ê vœÕ˜`Ê ­ÜˆÌ…Ê ÃÕÀ«ÀˆÃˆ˜}Ê Vœ˜ÃˆÃÌi˜VÞ®Ê regimes dominated by a strong and charismatic that as the regional average of the proportion >Õ̅œÀˆÌ>Àˆ>˜]ÊÃÕV…Ê>ÃÊ,ÕÃÈ>½ÃÊ6>`ˆ“ˆÀÊ*Ṏ˜]Ê of young adults declined, the number of liber‡ ÕL>½Ãʈ`iÊ >ÃÌÀœ]ʜÀÊ-ˆ˜}>«œÀi½ÃÊiiÊÜ>˜Ê al democracies grew.3Ê
ÛiÀ>}ˆ˜}Ê>ÊVœÕ˜ÌÀˆiÃ]Ê 9iÜÆʜÀÊLÞÊ>Ê՘ˆwi`ʈ`iœœ}ˆV>ÊiˆÌiÊ`ii“i`Ê I found that a youthfully structured country synonymous with the state, such as the Chinese …>ÃÊ>ÊxäÊ«iÀVi˜ÌÊV…>˜ViʜvÊLiˆ˜}ÊÀ>Ìi`Ê>ʏˆLiÀ>Ê Communist Party. Interestingly, these regimes’

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2008–2009

0.6

1

Rep. of Korea

0.6

2005-07

2000-04

1995-99

1990-94

1985-89

1980-84

1975-79

1972-74

2005-07

2000-04

1995-99

1990-94

1985-89

1980-84

1975-79

1972-74

ˆ}ÕÀiÊ£\ÊÀii`œ“Ê-VœÀiÃÊ>˜`Ê̅iÊ*Àœ«œÀ̈œ˜ÊœvÊ9œÕ˜}Ê
`ՏÌÃÊ ˆ˜Ê̅iÊ7œÀŽˆ˜}‡
}iÊ*œ«Õ>̈œ˜Ê

1

Indonesia

2

2 0.5

0.5

3

3 0.4

4

0.4

4 5

5 0.3

0.3

6

6 0.2 0.6

7 1

Chile

0.2 0.6

7 1

Brazil

2 0.5 3

3 0.4

4

0.4

4 5

5 0.3

0.3

6

6 0.2 0.6

7 1

Thailand

0.2 0.6

7 1

Taiwan

2

2 0.5

0.5 3 4

0.4

3 0.4

4

5

5 0.3

0.3 6 0.2 0.6

Àii`œ“Ê-VœÀi

7 1

Mexico

6 0.2 0.6

7 1

Albania

2 0.5

2 0.5

3 4

0.4

3 4

0.4

5 0.3

5 0.3

6

Half-a-chance benchmark: proportion of young adults associated with a 50-percent probability of liberal democracy.

7

2005-07

2000-04

1995-99

1990-94

1985-89

1980-84

0.2

1975-79

2005-07

2000-04

1995-99

1990-94

1985-89

1980-84

1975-79

Young adults: average proportion of young adults (15 to 29 yrs) in the working-age population (15 to 64 yrs).

6

1972-74

7

0.2

1972-74

9œÕ˜}Ê
`ՏÌÃʈ˜Ê7œÀŽˆ˜}‡
}iÊ*œ«Õ>̈œ˜

2 0.5

Freedom score: averaged political rights and civil liberty scores. Free (1.0 to 2.5) [assumed as liberal democracy] less than Free (>2.5 to 7.0)

13 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM

ˆ}ÕÀiÊÓ\Ê i“œ}À>«…ˆV>ÞÊ iÀˆÛi`Ê >Ìi}œÀˆiÃÊ­Óään®

Liberal Democracies Least fragile Demographically Derived Fragile Categories (2008) Most fragile Liberal Democracies Least fragile Fragile Others / Chances of Stable Liberal Democracy Most fragile Possible before 2030

Unlikely until after 2030

Others / Chances of Stable Liberal Democracy

Long overdue Possible before 2030 Unlikely until after 2030 Long overdue Difficult to Assess

Source:Ê >Ì>ÊvÀœ“ÊÀii`œ“ÊœÕÃiÊ­Óään®ÆÊ1 Ê*œ«Õ>̈œ˜Ê ˆÛˆÃˆœ˜Ê­ÓääÇ®°Ê>«Ê«Àœ`ÕVi`ÊLÞÊ Ã̅iÀÊ
ŽˆÌœLˆ]ÊÀiÃi>ÀV…Ê>ÃÈÃÌ>˜ÌÊ>ÌÊ*œ«Õ>̈œ˜Ê
V̈œ˜Ê˜ÌiÀ˜>̈œ˜>° Note: /…iÊ>}iÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀiÃʈ˜ÊVœÕ˜ÌÀˆiÃʓ>ÀŽi`ʺ`ˆvvˆVՏÌÊ̜Ê>ÃÃiÃûÊ>Àiʅi>ۈÞʈ“«>VÌi`ÊLÞÊ6É
 -ʜÀʈ““ˆ}À>̈œ˜°Ê

The dissipation of a large ޜÕ̅ÊLՏ}iÊ Ìi˜`ÃÊ̜Êވi`Ê Ài>̈ÛiÊ«œˆÌˆV>Ê calm and a “demographic `ˆÛˆ`i˜`°»

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institutions and policies may have evolved, and may continue to evolve, to withstand and coun‡ ÌiÀÊ̅iʏˆLiÀ>ˆâˆ˜}ÊÈ`i‡ivviVÌÃʜvÊ`i“œ}À>«…ˆVÊ >˜`ÊÜVˆœ‡iVœ˜œ“ˆVÊV…>˜}iÃ°Ê /…iʓi̅œ`Ê>ÃœÊˆ`i˜ÌˆwiÃÊÃÌ>ÌiÃÊ̅>ÌÊLiV>“iÊ ˆLiÀ>Ê`i“œVÀ>VˆiÃÊv>ÀÊ>…i>`ʜvÊÃV…i`Տi°Ê>̈˜Ê
“iÀˆV>˜Ê VœÕ˜ÌÀˆiÃÊ …>ÛiÊ Ìi˜`i`]Ê >ÃÊ >Ê }ÀœÕ«]Ê to embrace liberal democracy while hosting a large youth bulge, which may partly explain ܅ÞÊÈäÊ«iÀVi˜ÌʜvÊ̅iÃiÊÃÌ>ÌiÃʅ>ÛiÊyˆ«‡yœ««i`Ê between a liberal democracy and a less demo‡ VÀ>̈VÊÀi}ˆ“iÊ>Ìʏi>ÃÌʜ˜ViÊȘViÊ̅iÊi>ÀÞÊ£™ÇäÃ]Ê far more than any other region.

A Test: Eastern Europe and Former Soviet States /…iÊޜÕ̅‡LՏ}iʓi̅œ`ÊV>˜ÊLiÊÌiÃÌi`ÊLÞÊ«Ài‡ `ˆV̈˜}ÊÀi}ˆ“iÊ«>ÌÌiÀ˜ÃÊ>“œ˜}Ê̅iÊ >ÃÌiÀ˜Ê œVÊ ÃÌ>ÌiÃ\Ê̅iÊvœÀ“iÀ‡Vœ““Õ˜ˆÃÌÊÃÌ>ÌiÃʜvÊ >ÃÌiÀ˜Ê

ÕÀœ«iÊ >˜`Ê Ì…iˆÀÊ i݇-œÛˆiÌÊ ˜iˆ}…LœÀðÊ7…ˆiÊ these 28 states are quite different, their collec‡ ̈ÛiÊiÝ«iÀˆi˜ViÊ>ÃÊȘ}i‡«>ÀÌÞÊ>Õ̜VÀ>VˆiÃÊ«Àœ‡ vides some common starting points.5Ê/œÊ«ÀœÛiÊ useful, the method I have outlined should pre‡ dict, with reasonable accuracy, the proportion and distribution of liberal democracies among

U

2008–2009

these states, with some allowance for delays and Vœ“«ˆV>̈œ˜ÃÊ`ÕiÊ̜Ê̅iÊ«iÀÈÃÌi˜ViʜvÊ-œÛˆi̇ era political institutions and instabilities. œiÃÊ̅iÊޜÕ̅‡LՏ}iʓi̅œ`Ê«>ÃÃÊ̅ˆÃÊÌiÃÌ¶Ê 9iÃÆÊLÞÊÓääÇ]Ê̅iÊ>ÛiÀ>}iÊޜ՘}‡>`ՏÌÊ«Àœ«œÀ‡ ̈œ˜Ê >“œ˜}Ê Ì…iÊ >ÃÌiÀ˜Ê œVÊ VœÕ˜ÌÀˆiÃÊ …>`Ê `iVˆ˜i`Ê̜Êä°ÎÈ°Êi>˜Ü…ˆi]Ê̅iÊÀi}ˆœ˜½ÃÊ«Àœ‡ portion of liberal democracies plodded upward ̜Ê{ÈÊ«iÀVi˜ÌÊȘViÊ̅iÊi>ÀÞÊ£™™äÃpVœÃi]ÊLÕÌÊ still short (by three liberal democracies) of the xÇÊ«iÀVi˜ÌÊ̅>ÌÊÜ>ÃÊ«Ài`ˆVÌi`°Ê iÌÌiÀÊÞiÌ]Ê̅iÊ distribution of regimes that emerged is consis‡ Ìi˜ÌÊ ÜˆÌ…Ê Ì…iÊ “i̅œ`½ÃÊ iÝ«iVÌ>̈œ˜Ã\Ê ˆLiÀ>Ê democracies dominate the category with the œÜiÃÌÊޜ՘}‡>`ՏÌÊ«Àœ«œÀ̈œ˜ÃÊ­ˆ}°Êή°Ê Is this evidence sufficient to claim that a youthful age structure is the sole constraint to greater political liberalization in the lag‡ }ˆ˜}Ê >ÃÌiÀ˜Ê œVÊ ÃÌ>ÌiÃ¶Ê œ]Ê ˜œÌÊ >ÌÊ >ÆÊ Ì…iÊ countries that, so far, have not attained liberal democracy show geographic affinities and simi‡ larities in their per capita income and urbaniza‡ tion—factors that are also associated, to some degree, with the pace of demographic transi‡ ̈œ˜°Ê iV>ÕÃiʈ˜Vœ“iʓi>ÃÕÀiÃÊ>ÀiÊ`ˆvwVՏÌÊÌœÊ predict, they do not provide a simple means to «ÀœiVÌÊ>Ê̈“iÌ>LiÊvœÀʏˆLiÀ>Ê`i“œVÀ>VÞ°Ê

ˆ˜`ÕÊ«ˆ}Àˆ“ÃÊ«ÀœÌiÃÌÊ against the local }œÛiÀ˜“i˜Ì°Ê
VVœÀ`ˆ˜}Ê ÌœÊ̅iʺ…>vÊ>ÊV…>˜Vi»Ê Li˜V…“>ÀŽ]ʘ`ˆ>½ÃÊ `i“œVÀ>VÞʈÃʜ˜iʜvÊ̅iÊ “œÃÌÊvÀ>}ˆi°Ê­^ÊÓääÇÊ
ÀÕ«Ê>`>À]ÊVœÕÀÌiÃÞʜvÊ *…œÌœÃ…>Ài®

Forecasting Liberal Democracy If this relationship continues to hold, demo‡ }À>«…ˆVÊ«ÀœiV̈œ˜ÃÊVœÕ`ʅi«Ê>˜>ÞÃÌÃʈ`i˜ÌˆvÞÊ regions, and states within regions, that in the near and medium term are likely to experience population age structures that are conducive to liberal democracy—and those where liberal democracy is at risk. Nearly all of the coun‡ ÌÀˆiÃʈ˜ÊÌܜÊ}iœ}À>«…ˆV>ÊÃÕL‡Ài}ˆœ˜ÃÊ>ÀiÊ«Àœ‡ iVÌi`Ê̜ʫ>ÃÃÊ̅iʅ>v‡>‡V…>˜ViÊLi˜V…“>ÀŽÊLÞÊ ÓäÓä\Ê̅œÃiÊ>œ˜}Ê̅iʘœÀ̅iÀ˜ÊÀˆ“ÊœvÊ
vÀˆV>Ê ­œÀœVVœ]Ê
}iÀˆ>]Ê/՘ˆÃˆ>]ʈLÞ>]Ê>˜`Ê }Þ«Ì®Ê and along the northwestern rim of South
“iÀˆV>Ê­ œœ“Lˆ>]Ê6i˜iâÕi>]Ê>˜`Ê VÕ>`œÀ®°Ê œ˜iʜvÊ̅iÃiÊ œÀ̅Ê
vÀˆV>˜ÊÃÌ>ÌiÃʅ>ÃÊ«ÀiۈœÕÇ ly attained liberal democracy, while Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador reached these heights i>ÀÞ]Ê >˜`Ê Ì…i˜Ê ÀiÌÀi>Ìi`°Ê
˜>ÞÃÌÃÊ Ã…œÕ`Ê expect one or more liberal democracies arising ˆ˜Êi>V…ÊœvÊ̅iÃiÊÃÕL‡Ài}ˆœ˜ÃÊLÞÊÓäÓäʜÀÊLivœÀi°Ê Other countries, which are not currently lib‡ iÀ>Ê`i“œVÀ>VˆiÃ]Ê̅>ÌÊ>ÀiÊ«ÀœiVÌi`Ê̜ʫ>ÃÃÊ̅iÊ …>v‡>‡V…>˜ViÊLi˜V…“>ÀŽÊLivœÀiÊÓäÓäʈ˜VÕ`iÊ
L>˜ˆ>]Ê
À“i˜ˆ>]Ê
âiÀL>ˆ>˜]ÊÀ>˜]Ê>â>Ž…ÃÌ>˜]Ê

ÞÀ}ÞâÃÌ>˜]Ê iL>˜œ˜]Ê >>ÞÈ>]Ê Þ>˜“>À]Ê /ÕÀŽiÞ]Ê/ÕÀŽ“i˜ˆÃÌ>˜]Ê>˜`Ê6ˆi̘>“°
`“ˆÌÌi`Þ]ÊÃiÛiÀ>ÊœvÊ̅iÃiÊÃÌ>ÌiÃÊv>ViÊ`>՘̇ ing impediments to completing their demo‡ VÀ>̈VÊ ÀivœÀ“Ã°Ê œÀÊ œœ“Lˆ>]Ê
}iÀˆ>]Ê >˜`Ê iL>˜œ˜]ÊvÕÀ̅iÀʏˆLiÀ>ˆâ>̈œ˜ÊˆÃÊ՘ˆŽiÞÊ܅ˆiÊ ˜œ˜‡ÃÌ>ÌiÊ >V̜ÀÃÊ Ì…Ài>Ìi˜Ê ˆÛiÃÊ >˜`Ê «Àœ«iÀÌÞ]Ê Vœ˜ÌÀœÊÌiÀÀˆÌœÀÞ]Ê>˜`ʜ«iÀ>ÌiÊÃÌ>Ìi‡ˆŽiʈ˜Ã̈ÌՇ ̈œ˜ÃÊ>˜`ʓˆˆÌˆ>ðÊ9iÌÊ̅iÊ>}i‡ÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀ>ÊVœVŽÊ is ticking; as fertility declines and populations mature, recruitment will likely become more difficult and more expensive, helping diminish ̅iÊ>Ài>`އ`܈˜`ˆ˜}Êwi`ÊÃÌÀi˜}̅ʜvʈ˜ÃÕÀ‡ gencies, whittling them to a small criminalized core, or pressuring them to focus their resourc‡ es on electoral politics (as in the evolution of œÀ̅iÀ˜ÊÀi>˜`½Ãʺ/ÀœÕLiû®°Ê In several states, regimes will be able to stall or resist. For example, Vietnam’s communist «>ÀÌÞÊ>˜`ÊÀ>˜½ÃÊViÀˆV>Ê˜œ˜‡iiVÌi`ʏi>`iÀň«Ê bear similarities to other state elites that have ܈̅Ã̜œ`Ê Ì…iÊ Ìˆ`iÊ œvÊ >}i‡ÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀ>Ê V…>˜}i°Ê On the other hand, Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez, having lost a constitutional referendum ˆ˜Ê œÛi“LiÀÊÓääÇÊ̅>ÌÊܜՏ`ʅ>ÛiÊ>Õ}“i˜Ìi`Ê

15

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM

Figure 3.

ˆ}ÕÀiÊÎ\ÊÀii`œ“Ê,>̈˜}ÃʜvÊ ÓnÊœÀ“iÀÊ œ““Õ˜ˆÃÌÊ >ÃÌiÀ˜Ê

ÕÀœ«i>˜Ê>˜`Ê
È>˜Ê-Ì>ÌiÃÊ

Countries

“œÃÌÊ ÃiÀˆœÕÏÞÊ
 -‡>vviVÌi`Ê ÃÌ>ÌiÃp܅ˆiÊ the source of great suffering among individu‡ als, families, and communities—has not led to the state failures that analysts once feared, but instead to a confusing mélange of out‡ 20 comes. Four states are rated liberal democra‡ Free (liberal democracy) VˆiÃÊ­ œÌÃÜ>˜>]ÊiÜ̅œ]Ê >“ˆLˆ>]Ê>˜`Ê-œÕÌ…Ê 15 Partly Free
vÀˆV>®]Ê܅ˆiÊÌܜʜ̅iÀÃÊ>ÀiÊ>“œ˜}Ê̅iʓœÃÌÊ Not Free >Õ̜VÀ>̈VÊ ­-Ü>∏>˜`Ê >˜`Ê LÜi®°Ê ˜Ê 10 ̅iÊ œˆ‡ÀˆV…Ê ՏvÊ -Ì>ÌiÃ]Ê Ì…iÊ Vœ“«œÃˆÌiÊ >}iÊ 5 ÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀip̅iÊÃՓʜvÊ>ÊvœÀiˆ}˜‡ÜœÀŽiÀÊ«œ«‡ Տ>̈œ˜Ê œÛiÀ>ˆ`Ê œ˜Ê >Ê “ÕV…Ê ޜ՘}iÀ]Ê ÃœVˆœ‡ 0 _.35–.40 >.40–.45 >.45 economically and ethnically separate age Proportion of young adults (15–29) structure of citizens—produces misleading in the working-age population (15–64) ˆ˜`ˆV>̈œ˜ÃÊ œvÊ >}i‡ÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀ>Ê “>ÌÕÀˆÌÞ]Ê >˜`Ê therefore overlooks both the political volatil‡ ˆÌÞʜvÊ
À>LÊޜÕ̅ÊVՏÌÕÀiʈ˜Ê̅iÊՏvÊ-Ì>ÌiÃÊ Data sources:ÊÀii`œ“ÊœÕÃiÊ­Óään®ÆÊ1 Ê*œ«Õ>̈œ˜Ê and grievances arising among foreign workers ˆÛˆÃˆœ˜Ê­ÓääÇ®°Ê ­i˜`iÀܘ]ÊÓääÈ®°
ÃÊ>}iÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀiÃʅ>Ûiʓ>ÌÕÀi`]Ê̅iÊëii`Ê œvÊi̅˜ˆVÊňvÌÃʅ>ÃʵՈVŽi˜i`°Ê/…iʏˆÃÌʜvÊ̅iÃiÊ his constituency by lowering the voting age to relative shifts is long, including: increased £È]ʈÃʏivÌÊ܈̅ʜ˜Þʘœ˜‡iiV̜À>Ê“i>˜ÃÊ̜Ê`ˆÃ‡ proportions of indigenous populations in “>˜ÌiÊV…iVŽÃʜ˜Ê…ˆÃʜܘÊ>Õ̅œÀˆÌÞp>ʅi>Ûއ >̈˜Ê
“iÀˆV>˜Ê ÃÌ>ÌiÃÆÊ }ÀœÜˆ˜}Ê ˜Õ“LiÀÃÊ œvÊ handed tactic that, when previously applied by
À>LÃÊ>˜`ÊՏÌÀ>‡"À̅œ`œÝÊiÜÃʈ˜ÊÃÀ>iÆÊ>˜`Ê larger populations of Muslims in Western Chávez, has alienated influential supporters. Europe. How will democracies respond to the emergence of ethnic groups who previously Beyond Prediction: Southern have been political outsiders? Will the liberal Africa, the Gulf States, and the democracies of European welfare states retain Future of Europe their suite of liberties and generous social /ÜœÊ VÕÃÌiÀÃÊ œvÊ VœÕ˜ÌÀˆiÃÊ ÜˆÌ…Ê iÝÌÀ>œÀ`ˆ˜>ÀÞÊ programs as they undergo dramatic ethnic age structures were omitted from this analy‡ ňvÌÃ¶Ê "˜Ê ̅iÃiÊ Üiˆ}…ÌÞÊ Ìœ«ˆVÃÊ Ì…iÊ ÞœÕ̅‡ ÈÃ\Ê­£®Ê̅iÊÃiÛi˜Ê“œÃÌÊÃiÀˆœÕÏÞÊ
 -‡>vviVÌi`Ê bulge method is unresponsive. VœÕ˜ÌÀˆiÃÊ­ œÌÃÜ>˜>]ÊiÜ̅œ]Ê >“ˆLˆ>]Ê-œÕ̅Ê
vÀˆV>]Ê -Ü>∏>˜`]Ê “Lˆ>]Ê >˜`Ê LÜi®]Ê Summary where premature adult mortality buoys a high «Àœ«œÀ̈œ˜ÊœvÊޜ՘}Ê>`ՏÌÃÆÊ>˜`Ê­Ó®Ê̅iÊÈÝʜˆ‡ ÞÊ vœVÕȘ}Ê iÝVÕÈÛiÞÊ œ˜Ê ̅iÊ ˆ˜Ã̈ÌṎœ˜>Ê ÀˆV…ÊՏvÊ-Ì>ÌiÃÊ­ >…À>ˆ˜]ÊÕÜ>ˆÌ]Ê"“>˜]Ê+>Ì>À]Ê reforms and changes in political leadership that ->Õ`ˆÊ
À>Lˆ>]Ê>˜`Ê1˜ˆÌi`Ê
À>LÊ “ˆÀ>Ìiî]Ê܅iÀiÊ precede political liberalization, analysts have large populations of foreign workers mask more overlooked the influence of population age ޜÕ̅vՏʈ˜`ˆ}i˜œÕÃÊ«œ«Õ>̈œ˜Ã°Ê/…ˆÃÊ`i“œ‡ structure on the timing and stability of liberal graphic method provides little insight about democracy. My analysis provides evidence sug‡ gesting that a youthful age structure—indicated governance in either of these clusters. For example, highly elevated death rates by a large proportion of young adults in the >“œ˜}Ê«iœ«iÊÓäÊ̜ÊxxÊÞi>ÀÃʜ`Ê>˜`Ê̅iÊ«iÀ‡ ܜÀŽˆ˜}‡>}iÊ«œ«Õ>̈œ˜pV>˜ÊVœ˜ÃÌÀ>ˆ˜ÊˆLiÀ>Ê sistence of very youthful age structures in the `i“œVÀ>VÞÊ>˜`Ê`iÃÌ>Lˆˆâiʈ̰Ê/…ˆÃÊÀiÃi>ÀV…Ê>ÃœÊ

16 ECSP REPORT

U

ISSUE 13

U

2008–2009

ŜÜÃÊ̅>ÌÊ̅iÊV>VՏ>̈œ˜ÊœvÊ>ÊVœÕ˜ÌÀÞ½ÃÊޜÕ̅‡ bulge proportion can be used to assess a liberal democracy’s fragility, identify uncommonly per‡ sistent authoritarian regimes, and generate rea‡ sonable and testable expectations for the advent and stability of liberal democracy.

Notes £°Ê/…ˆÃÊ>˜>ÞÈÃʈ˜VÕ`iÃÊVœÕ˜ÌÀˆiÃÊ܈̅Ê>ʓˆ˜ˆ“Õ“Ê ÓäÓäÊ«œ«Õ>̈œ˜ÊœvÊxää]äääÊ«iœ«iÊ>˜`ÊÕÃiÃÊÀii`œ“Ê House composite scores, which are the average of «œˆÌˆV>ÊÀˆ}…ÌÃ]ʺ*,»Ê­ÃV>i`Ê£Ê̜ÊÇ]Ê܈̅ʣÊLiˆ˜}Ê̅iÊ maximum realization of political rights), and civil ˆLiÀ̈iÃ]ʺ »Ê­Ãˆ“ˆ>ÀÞÊÃV>i`Ê£Ê̜ÊÇ®°Ê/…iÊV>Ìi}œÀÞÊ “Free” is assigned to assessments where the average of *,Ê>˜`Ê ÊÃVœÀiÃÊÀ>˜}iÃÊvÀœ“Ê£°äÊ̜ÊÓ°x°Ê Ó°Ê/…iÊ̅iœÀïV>ÊLÀi>Ž`œÜ˜ÊœvÊ̅ˆÃÊ«ÀœViÃÃÊÜ>ÃÊ first presented by Jack Goldstone at a seminar on democratization processes sponsored by the National ˜Ìiˆ}i˜ViÊ œÕ˜Vˆ]Ê>ÀV…ÊÓään° ΰÊ/…iÊwÛiÊÀi}ˆœ˜ÃÊ>Ài\Ê œÀ̅Ê>˜`Ê-œÕ̅Ê
“iÀˆV>]Ê

ÕÀœ«iÊ­ˆ˜VÕ`ˆ˜}Ê,ÕÃÈ>®]ʈ``iÊ >Ã̇ œÀ̅Ê
vÀˆV>]Ê ÃÕL‡->…>À>˜Ê
vÀˆV>]Ê>˜`ʜ̅iÀÊ
È>‡"Vi>˜ˆ>°Ê/…ˆÃÊ analysis omits two sets of countries with irregular ­˜œ˜‡ÌÀ>˜ÃˆÌˆœ˜>®Ê>}iÊÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀiÃ\Ê̅iÊÃiÛi˜ÊVœÕ˜ÌÀˆiÃÊ ÜˆÌ…Ê…ˆ}…ÊÀ>ÌiÃʜvÊ6É
 -Ê>˜`Ê̅iÊÈÝÊՏvÊ-Ì>ÌiÃÊ with a large immigrant population. {°Ê/…ˆÃÊ>˜>ÞÈÃÊi“«œÞÃÊÜiˆ}…Ìi`ʏi>Ã̇õÕ>ÀiÃÊ regression to determine regression coefficients and intercepts for linear models generating the proportion œvʏˆLiÀ>Ê`i“œVÀ>VˆiÃÊiÝ«iVÌi`ʈ˜Ê>ÊÀi}ˆœ˜Ê­9®ÊvÀœ“Ê the average proportion of young adults (X) among VœÕ˜ÌÀˆiÃʈ˜Ê̅>ÌÊÀi}ˆœ˜Ê­˜œÌÊ̅iÊÀi}ˆœ˜>Êޜ՘}‡>`ՏÌÊ proportion). Seven regressions were generated, one vœÀÊi>V…ÊwÛiÊÞi>ÀÃ]ÊvÀœ“Ê£™ÇxÊ̜ÊÓääx°Ê œ˜iʜvÊ̅iÊ regression parameters from these were statistically `ˆvviÀi˜Ì°Ê/…iÊÀi}ÀiÃȜ˜ÊiµÕ>̈œ˜ÊvœÀÊ̅iÃiÊVœ“«œÃˆÌiÊ `>Ì>Ê>Ài\Ê Êrʇä°äÎέ9
I£ä䮳£°nÎ]Ê܅iÀiÊ ʈÃÊ the expected proportion of liberal democracies in a Ài}ˆœ˜>Ê}ÀœÕ«ˆ˜}ʜvÊVœÕ˜ÌÀˆiÃÊ>˜`Ê9
ʈÃÊ̅iÊ«Àœ«œÀ‡ ̈œ˜ÊœvÊޜ՘}Ê>`ՏÌÃ]Ê>}iÊ£xÊ̜Êә]ʈ˜Ê̅iÊܜÀŽˆ˜}‡ >}iÊ«œ«Õ>̈œ˜]Ê£xÊ̜ÊÈ{°Ê/…ˆÃÊ>˜>ÞÈÃÊ>ÃœÊ…>ÃÊLii˜Ê performed using Polity IV data, assuming liberal `i“œVÀ>VÞÊ>ÃÊ«œˆÌÞÊÃVœÀiÃÊvÀœ“ʳnÊ̜ʳ£ä]Ê܈̅ÊÛiÀÞÊ similar results. x°Ê/…iÊvœÀ“iÀÊ >ÃÌiÀ˜Ê œVÊÃÌ>ÌiÃÊ>ÀiÊ
L>˜ˆ>]Ê
À“i˜ˆ>]Ê
âiÀL>ˆ>˜]Ê i>ÀÕÃ]Ê œÃ˜ˆ>Ê>˜`ÊiÀâi}œÛˆ˜>]Ê Õ}>Àˆ>]Ê Àœ>̈>]Ê âiV…Ê,i«ÕLˆV]Ê Ã̜˜ˆ>]ÊiœÀ}ˆ>]Ê ՘}>ÀÞ]Ê>â>Ž…ÃÌ>˜]ÊÞÀ}ÞâÃÌ>˜]Ê>Ìۈ>]ʈ̅Õ>˜ˆ>]Ê Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, -œÛ>ŽÊ,i«ÕLˆV]Ê-œÛi˜ˆ>]Ê,œ“>˜ˆ>]Ê,ÕÃÈ>]Ê/>ˆŽˆÃÌ>˜]Ê /ÕÀŽ“i˜ˆÃÌ>˜]Ê1ŽÀ>ˆ˜i]Ê>˜`Ê1âLiŽˆÃÌ>˜°Ê

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References œœ“]Ê >ۈ`Ê °]Ê >ۈ`Ê >˜˜ˆ˜}]ÊEÊ>Þ«iiÊ-iۈ>°Ê ­ÓääÓ®°ÊThe demographic dividend: A new perspective on the economic consequences of population change. ->˜Ì>Êœ˜ˆV>]Ê
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>ÀœÌ…iÀÃ]Ê/…œ“>ðʭÓääÓ®°Êº/…iÊi˜`ʜvÊ̅iÊÌÀ>˜ÃˆÌˆœ˜Ê paradigm.” Journal of Democracy 13­£®]Êx‡Ó£°

ˆ˜VœÌÌ>]Ê,ˆV…>À`Ê*°Ê­Óään]Ê>ÀV…É
«Àˆ®°ÊºœÜÊ democracies grow up: Countries with too many young people may not have a fighting chance for freedom.” Foreign Policy, 165]Ênä‡nÓ° ˆ>“œ˜`]Ê>ÀÀÞÊ°Ê­£™™È®°ÊºÃÊ̅iÊ̅ˆÀ`ÊÜ>ÛiʜÛiÀ¶»Ê Journal of Democracy 7­Î®]ÊÓä‡ÎÇ° Àii`œ“ÊœÕÃi°Ê­Óään®°ÊFreedom in the world: Selected data from Freedom House’s annual global survey of political rights and civil liberties. Washington, DC: Freedom House. œ`Ã̜˜i]Ê>VŽÊ
°Ê­£™™£®°ÊRevolution and rebellion in the early modern world°Ê iÀŽiiÞ]Ê
\Ê1˜ˆÛiÀÈÌÞʜvÊ California Press. i˜`iÀܘ]Ê-ˆ“œ˜°Ê­ÓääÈ®°Êºˆ}…ÊÀˆÃiÃÊ>˜`ʏœÜÊÜ>}iÃ\Ê iÝ«>ÌÀˆ>Ìiʏ>LœÀʈ˜ÊՏvÊ
À>LÊ-Ì>Ìið»ÊPolicyWatch ­ œ°Ê£ä™£®°Ê7>ň˜}̜˜]Ê \Ê7>ň˜}̜˜Ê Institute for Near East Policy. Huntington, Samuel P. (1991). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. i>…Þ]Ê ˆâ>Li̅]Ê܈̅Ê,œLiÀÌÊ ˜}i“>˜]Ê >ÀœÞ˜Ê°Ê 6œ}i]Ê->À>…Ê>``œVŽ]ÊEÊ/œ`Ê*ÀiÃ̜˜°Ê­ÓääÇ®°ÊThe shape of things to come: Why age structure matters to a safer, more equitable world. Washington, DC:

17

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM

REPORT ONLINE Two graphics accompanying Richard Cincotta’s Foreign Policy magazine article, “How Democracies Grow Up,” are available online: A map of “The Young World” indicates the year when each country is projected to pass the “half-a-chance” benchmark based on the proportion of young adults in the working-age population: www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4199 “Where Youth and Freedom Collide” illustrates the likelihood of liberal democracy at various youth-bulge proportions: www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4174 Freedom House rates countries as “free,” “partly free,” or “not free” based on assessments of their political rights and civil liberties: www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/FIWAllScores.xls Map of Freedom in the World, 2008 edition: www.freedomhouse.org/template. cfm?page=363&year=2008 Along with fellow Report 13 author Jack Goldstone, Cincotta assessed the evidence for “the security demographic” at the Wilson Center in June 2006: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index. cfm?topic_id=1413&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=205876 Two previous ECSP Report articles by Cincotta analyze different aspects of the links between age structure and conflict: “Population Age Structure and Its Relation to Civil Conflict: A Graphic Metric” (coauthored by Elizabeth Leahy): http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/PopAgeStructures &CivilConflict12.pdf “Demographic Security Comes of Age”: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ ecspr10_C-cincotta.pdf

*œ«Õ>̈œ˜Ê
V̈œ˜Ê˜ÌiÀ˜>̈œ˜>° ii]Ê,œ˜>`]ÊEÊ
˜`ÀiÜÊ>ܘ°Ê­ÓääÈ®°Êº7…>ÌʈÃÊ̅iÊ demographic dividend?” Finance and Development 43­Î®]ʣȇ£Ç° Mesquida, Christian G., & Neil I. Wiener. (1996). ºՓ>˜ÊVœiV̈ÛiÊ>}}ÀiÃȜ˜\Ê
ÊLi…>ۈœÀ>ÊiVœ‡ ogy perspective.” Ethology and Sociobiology 17, Ó{LJÓÈÓ° œiÀ]ÊiÀLiÀÌ°Ê­£™ÈÇÉÈn®°Êº9œÕ̅Ê>ÃÊ>ÊvœÀViʈ˜Ê̅iÊ modern world.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 10­Î®]ÊÓÎLJÓÈä° ,i«ÕLˆVʜvÊ …ˆ˜>Ê­," ®]Ê ˆÀiV̜À>ÌiʜvÊ̅iÊ Õ`}iÌ°Ê

18 ECSP REPORT

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ISSUE 13

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2008–2009

­ÓääÈ®°ÊStatistical yearbook of the Republic of China, 2005.Ê/>ˆ«iˆ\Ê ÝiVṎÛiÊ9Õ>˜]Ê," ° -V…“ˆÌÌiÀ]Ê*…ˆˆ««iÊ °Ê­£™nä®°ÊSpeculations about the prospective demise of authoritarian regimes and its possible consequences. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 1 Ê*œ«Õ>̈œ˜Ê ˆÛˆÃˆœ˜°Ê­ÓääÇ®°ÊWorld population prospects: The 2006 revision°Ê iÜÊ9œÀŽ\Ê1 Ê i«>À̓i˜ÌʜvÊ Vœ˜œ“ˆVÊ>˜`Ê-œVˆ>Ê
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ÊV>ÅʜvÊ}i˜iÀ>̈œ˜Ã¶Ê9œÕÌ…Ê bulges and political violence.” International Studies Quarterly 50]ÊÈäLJÈә°