NOTE: This is a print copy that does not include final corrections or copy Editing. The final paper has been published as Goetz, Ariane: How different are the UK and China? Investor countries in comparative perspective. Canadian Journal for Development Studies/Revue canadienne d’études du développement, 2015, Vol. 36, No. 2, 179–195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02255189.2015.1030370.
How different are the UK and China? Investor countries in comparative perspective Ariane Goetz
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ABSTRACT This article compares the “land grab” activities of two major capital exporting countries, China and the United Kingdom. I argue that specifics such as the home country’s industrial set-up, development challenges and ideological framing are critical to understanding what is occurring from an investor country perspective, while explanations based on differences between the countries’ political-economic systems are overrated. For both countries, projects considered to be land grabs are part of a range of distinct, often conflicting project-level rationales. And these rationales fit equally as well within the liberal development paradigms of efficiency, productivity and growth as they do within the resource security paradigm prevalent in the land grab debate. Keywords: investor country; land grabbing; United Kingdom; China; comparative political economy
1. Introduction The 2008 publication “Seized!”, by the non-governmental organisation GRAIN, brought international attention to the phenomenon of “land grabbing”, framed as the acquisition of large areas of farmland by foreign corporations or states on a long-term basis for the production of basic foods for export (GRAIN 2008, 2011). Referring to over 100 cases of “offshore food production”, GRAIN argued that the governments of food-insecure countries, namely China, Saudi Arabia, Japan, India, Korea, Libya and Egypt, were “snatching up vast areas of farmland abroad for their own offshore food production” and food security, as the food price crisis and food export bans in 2008 indicated the market’s failure to provide for cheap and secure food commodities. Foreign agribusiness and private investors were also identified as acquirers of farmland, but for different reasons: namely the search for profitable investment opportunities at a time of financial crisis and the interest to expand corporate control over the supply chain 1
Wilfrid Laurier University/Balsillie School of International Affairs, Political Science Department, Waterloo, ON, Canada, Email:
[email protected]
from field to fork (GRAIN 2008). Since then, the meaning of the term “land grabbing” has broadened to include investments in other sectors that contribute to these events of rural dispossession, land use change and ownership concentration that the 2008 publication highlighted (Zoomers 2010; Anseeuw et al. 2012; Borras and Franco 2012). Simultaneously, the political framings of food sovereignty and resource security that informed the initial assessment have been confronted with de-politicised framings of mainstream economics that focus on productivity and efficiency gains and discuss the potential of these “investments” as a “development opportunity” for host countries (Cotula et al. 2009; Borras and Franco 2010; Deininger et al. 2011). Concerning the role of investor countries, however, the original narrative still predominates (Hall 2011, 194; Borras and Franco 2012, 38; White et al. 2012, 627). Yet, those studies of the phenomenon from an investor country perspective call into question related explanations. For instance, research on Chinese “land grabs” in African countries suggests that they are not intended for food security back home, as would be expected from the common narrative about state-driven investments (Alden 2007; Brautigam 2009; Jansson 2009; Rosen and Hanemann 2009; Stensrud Ekman 2010; Smaller, Wei, and Liu 2012). This article aims to contribute to a better understanding of how and why international land acquisitions have occurred, from an investor country perspective. It assesses and compares the reported “land grab” activities since 2000 of two major capital exporting countries: China and the United Kingdom. Both countries seem relevant due to the scale of their companies’ operations abroad (see the global map of investments published by the online public database Land Matrix [2015]) and also because they are often referred to in the land grab narrative. The regional focus is on sub-Saharan Africa.1 The region has been exposed to the largest overall share of foreign land grabbing activities since 2000, which have reportedly implicated 134 million hectares (ha) (Anseeuw et al. 2012, 4). The research project is aware that the comparative findings about Chinese and British “land grabs” in African countries cannot be expanded to other regions. The article argues that both country cases are characterised by a complexity of (f)actors at play that is not adequately accounted for in the orthodox explanations outlined above. Specifically, the details of the home country’s industrial set-up, development challenges, ideological framing and political economy – as well as significant events – are critical to understanding what is occurring. Major findings of the comparative assessment of each country’s activities are as follows. (1) Key
differences in how these occur are indeed related to the specific political economy of each investor country. Accordingly, the state plays a strong role in Chinese land acquisitions, while in British land acquisitions, the private sector seems to be shaping private and public sector interests. However, (2) these differences in political economy reflected in the investments do not necessarily signify a difference in the investments’ purposes (to which end) or other aspects relevant for “land grabbing”. Moreover, many commonalities are observable. In both cases, projects listed as “land grabs” are part of a range of distinct, and often conflicting, development(al) and project-level rationales. Also, they relate equally strongly to liberal development paradigms of efficiency, productivity and growth as they do to the resource security paradigm that is often found in the land grab debate. Actors engage in these investments because they are interested in markets, business opportunities and, in the British case, speculative assets, not just resources. In the Chinese case, outward investment reflects the interests of the country’s resource-intensive and export market-dependent manufacturing industry, and is part of economic upgrading and state-driven entrepreneurialism. In the case of the UK, these investments have been driven by a highly diverse private sector in search of new growth markets. More recently, outward investments have been promoted by the acting government as an attempt to facilitate reindustrialisation. Overall, (3) the findings suggest we need to move beyond “catch-all” explanations and own up to the complex nature of investor countries’ investment activities, which are a function of multiple purposes, policies, actors and dynamics, rather than a single mastermind (be it “the market” or “the state”). In the comparative assessment that follows, I begin by explaining my terminology, conceptual choices and methodology. The next section presents the main empirical characteristics of the land acquisitions of both investor countries, focusing on the investor legacy, sectoral distribution, land use, timing of investments, public policy, political economy, guiding ideology and relevant home country measures in turn. The concluding section discusses these characteristics in relation to differences and commonalities between China and the UK, and to how and why these investments are made. 2. Background on terminology, concepts and methodology The diverse analytical frames applied in the land grabbing debate result in a terminological ambiguity and in imprecise data, which prove challenging for the researcher. From a food sovereignty perspective, it can be difficult to determine when a foreign investment is not a land grab; and a mainstream economic approach largely blocks out the negative repercussions of what it frames as “FDI [foreign direct investment] in land”. By 2010, Borras and Franco (2010, 2) concluded that “the ‘global land grab’ has become a catch-all to describe and
analyze the current explosion of large scale (trans)national commercial land transactions”. While the initial focus in studies of land grabbing lay on the agricultural sector, later, empirical research came to include non-agricultural forms of land grabbing (Zoomers 2010; Anseeuw et al. 2012). For the purpose of this article, first I will use the term “land-consuming investments” (more than 100 ha) to describe the FDI projects investigated. This term best captures the finding that the primary purpose of many Chinese and British projects that are termed “land grabs” might be neither the acquisition of land nor the investment in agricultural production. Instead, a shared characteristic of these investments from a home country perspective is that they consume large areas of land in their operations. Also, (inter)national law categorises and governs land grab projects as investment; and the supporting institutions in the home country largely do not distinguish land-consuming FDI projects from those going into non-land-consuming activities. For instance, policies promoting overseas investments in agriculture usually do not specify what kind of FDI is being promoted: extension services, food manufacturing or agricultural operations. Importantly, the use of the terminology in this article does not include the normative statements of many policy makers and/or theoretical discussions about investment. It is important to note that, by definition, FDI (land-consuming as well as nonland-consuming) differs from portfolio investments in its intent to establish a long-lasting interest and significant control over a particular enterprise overseas. From the investor perspective, then, land grabbing might be best described as an interest in the power to consume or control land-based wealth (stemming from different land uses and activities) (GRAIN 2008; Borras and Franco 2010). This finding supports the view of Borras and co-authors that land grabbing needs to be seen in the context of the power of national and transnational capital and their desire for profit, which overrides existing meanings, uses and systems of management of the land that are rooted in local communities. (2012, 3). However, from an investor country perspective, this definition needs to be expanded to include a wider range of drivers and motivations than (project-level) profit that are part of the (temporary) exercise of power to consume or control land-based wealth through land-consuming investments, such as geopolitical considerations or developmental aspirations. Second, in this assessment I compare (poor) land-consuming investment data with official Chinese and British FDI data to detect the scale of overall investment activity occurring in a particular country, region or sector, of which land-consuming FDI forms a part. This seems important to detect whether, for instance, agricultural land-consuming investment is part of a greater investment trend in that region’s agricultural sector by that investor country. Together with
trade data, this comparison complements the assessment of the purpose, political economy and policy context of the investigated land-consuming investments, and it allows the deliberation of the significance of land-consuming FDI projects in a particular sector from a home country perspective. Third, regarding the actor analysis, this article applies several terms that necessitate a brief explanation, namely investor, investor country and home country government. While the study started out by sorting actors into major interest groups of production relations and political action groups related to the structures of political authority, neither actor group is ultimately understood as unitary during the process of assessment and analysis, nor is a strict normative distinction between private and public actors upheld (Katzenstein 1977). In this context, the term “investor” applies to the particular actor of a particular investment project, while the term “home country government” refers to the state’s administration and involvement in these investments. Moreover, the article wraps up findings using the term “investor country”. This broader term encompasses the private and public sector. Defining China and the UK as investor countries captures the particular history of bilateral economic and political relations between the investor and host country that might be important for a better understanding. Moreover, this term points to the interplay of influential factors that together explain what is happening. It highlights the complexity of the phenomenon of land grabbing, for which it is impossible to identify any single cause-and-effect relation. The assumption is that private and public interests of actors engaging in land-consuming investments are not fixed, but take shape in a particular context, namely the structures, ideas, actor constellations and events that are in play in the respective investor country (Katzenstein 1977; Barnett and Duvall 2005). Finally, the available databases on land grabs, of which the Land Matrix is the most comprehensive, have severe shortcomings, all of which limit the scope of conclusions that can be drawn from the empirical assessment of the cases analysed in this article. For instance, most databases lack rigorous fact checking of reported projects. In the case of the Land Matrix Database, the number of projects and hectares of land acquired by China and the UK (globally) differed greatly between May and September 2012 (see Table 1), which was related to the fact of incorrect listings. Available databases also do not update the projects’ status, and their ahistorical approach ignores land banks accumulated by foreign companies prior to 2000, posing a particular challenge for the balanced comparative research of new and latecomer investor countries, such as China and the UK. Consequently, the research for this article takes as its starting point the main
characteristics of selected British and Chinese investments in sub-Saharan Africa that are listed in three influential land grab reports published in 2009–2010. These reports were produced by the International Food Policy Research Institute (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009); the Global Land Project International Project Office2 (Friis and Reenberg 2010); and a consortium of the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (Cotula et al. 2009). Each project listed in any of the three reports has been process traced, trying to retrieve as much information as possible in the form of official documentation, corporate reports, published interviews of involved actors, interviews/email requests and field reports. Each project has also been checked by triangulating the information obtained from the different sources. Moreover, most later publications and listings (Land Matrix 2015) have been reviewed in the assessment of each country’s overseas investment projects to detect changing trends. Table 1. Land Matrix listingsa for the UK and China, published online in May and September 2012 (number of projects and total hectares).
UK China
May 2012
September 2012
46 projects, 3,008,472 ha 51 projects, 3,482,616 ha
41 projects, 2,736,104 ha 46 projects, 2,068,796 ha
Note: aWhen the information was downloaded in 2012, the online database looked very different from today. Source: Land Matrix (2012a, 2012b)
3.
China and the UK in Africa: main characteristics
Investor legacy China and the UK differ greatly in their history of economic and political relations with sub-Saharan countries. In the case of China, modern relations with African countries go back to the 1950s, yet the country is a newcomer as investor. Following China’s opening in the late 1980s, and particularly the implementation of its “go global” policies in 1999, China’s interaction with African countries has increased significantly. By 2010, China had become Africa’s third-largest trading partner, while Chinese investment activities (outward foreign direct investment, OFDI) reached a new height of USD 2,111.99 million by 2010, up from USD 317.43 million in 2004. Also, Africa became the primary target of Chinese Official Development Aid (ODA) in the mid-1990s, receiving 46.7 per cent of
total ODA in 2008 (State Council 2010; MOFCOM 2011). However, in regional comparison, the continent continues to rank at the bottom of Chinese OFDI destinations (fifth), after Asia (especially Hong Kong), Latin America, Europe and North America (State Council 2010). As part of the intensified cooperation, China’s foreign policy has been reformed, moving away from the prior emphasis on unilateral assistance toward a focus on “mutually beneficial cooperation”, according to which Chinese economic interests as well as those of African countries shall be accounted for (State Council 2005; MOFA 2006; Gouraud 2011). New forms of development finance have been introduced and aid projects have been reconceptualised as profitable economic cooperation projects, whereas the previous focus on “self-reliance” has been abandoned (Li 2006, 2010). Different from China’s budding investor status, the UK has an extensive investor history in Africa. British companies have long been dominant players in African economies, and they continue to rank among the top five investors and trading partners in former dependencies (Ernst and Young 2012). Several of the companies listed in the “land deal” entries in the reports that served as my data sources (see methodology section above), particularly those in the food manufacturing, construction and financial sectors, have been active on the continent for over a century. At the same time, the degree of British economic activity has varied greatly. Trade and investment flows declined following decolonisation, and only re-intensified after the late 1990s. More recently, the financial crisis in 2007 has raised the volume of trade and investment going to the region. While the UK’s economic activity with other regions since 2007 has been characterised by divestment or declining investment flows, UK direct investments to Africa increased by 27per cent between 2007 and 2011, and exports to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have risen as well (Cargill 2011; Allen and Dar 2013). Concurrently, imports from SSA to the UK have nearly tripled between 1990 and 2004, reaching USD 11 billion in 2004; however only a number of countries (South Africa, Botswana) are involved (Allen and Dar 2013). In regional comparison, Africa holds a similar low position as in the Chinese case, ranking fourth (together with Oceania) among recipients of British investments, after Europe, the Americas and Asia (as of 2010) (Allen and Dar 2013). Sectoral distribution Focusing on sectors, empirical evidence from databases such as the Land Matrix suggests that both countries’ companies pursue a wide range of landconsuming projects, from mining and manufacturing to construction and agriculture. Since available databases rely on crowdsourcing rather than
systematic reporting schemes to collect information about land-consuming investments, it is impossible to draw broad conclusions about sectoral trends. Chinese land-consuming investments mentioned by the three reports that served as my data source (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; Cotula et al. 2009; Friis and Reenberg 2010) strongly focus on food production and the rehabilitation of wasted farmland; but they also involve projects that produce cement or oil, or construct public and private infrastructure such as roads, schools, hospitals, dams or “Special Economic Zones” (Brautigam and Tang 2011; Land Matrix 2015). The process tracing I conducted shows that most projects produce for local, regional or international markets, rather than for export to China. In the context of official investment data of China’s State Council, it is noteworthy that the large share of agricultural projects found in databases on land-consuming investments make up a minor share of the broader investment patterns. According to the State Council (2010), only 3.1 per cent of Chinese overseas investments were actually in the agricultural sector (of which the landconsuming agricultural projects should form a part), while the largest share was in the mining industry (29.2%), the manufacturing sector (22%), the construction sector (15.8%) and the financing sector (13.9%).3 Clearly, the official investment records do not tell us anything about the sectoral distribution of land-consuming investments. However, these patterns are in accord with this article’s finding that Chinese land-consuming investments in African countries are not for resources alone, underlining the breadth of Chinese investment activities in Africa. Regarding agriculture, these figures support empirical assessments that question the significance of Chinese agricultural land-consuming FDI for the home country (Brautigam 2009). Also, British land-consuming investments comprised multiple sectors, such as food production and mining. A large share focused on biofuels production. The focus on natural resources that characterizes the sectoral composition of the land-consuming investments seems to match the broader investment trends. According to UK government statistics (personal communication4), investments in natural resources (oil, mining) continue to be exceptionally high, amounting to 42.5 per cent of outward FDI to the continent; clearly a remnant of the colonial investor legacy. Biofuel production perfectly fits this British focus on natural resources in Africa. Several of the investigated companies pursuing land-consuming biofuels and food production projects were originally active in the oil and mining sector prior to shifting toward biomass production. Land use The comparative assessment highlights two main uses of land, namely land as a
natural resource with particular qualities (arable soil, minerals) and land as a basis for industry or construction projects. In the case of the UK, land has taken on a third function as strategic asset. Financial investors have started to invest in land holding and “efficient” land management, arguing that this is a profitable alternative at a time of eco-scarcity, and against the background of the financial crisis that resulted in a massive loss of wealth in other areas of equity investment (Collinson 2010; Onstad 2012). The empirical evidence on the utility that was derived from the various uses of land and its distribution remains ambiguous. Chinese land-consuming investment projects in the agricultural sector are primarily intended for domestic and regional markets, with the exception of biofuels and industrial products such as cotton which are directed toward international markets or for export to China (Smaller, Wei, and Liu 2012). Nevertheless, these investments might negatively impact on local food security due to the related land use and (de facto) ownership changes, or the dominance of Chinese producers in the domestic market of host countries. For instance, the diversion of food resources such as cassava for the production of biofuels in Benin resulted in local price hikes (Nonfodji 2011). In projects that utilise land not as natural resource but as productive space in the form of construction sites or for Special Economic Zones, land remains under the control of the respective host governments, and Chinese companies derive benefits from its use. Moreover, British biofuels investments highlight that the actual utility of a land-consuming investment project might differ greatly from its intended utility. British investments were mostly geared toward international export markets; however, difficulties of various kinds (no pricing mechanism, transport problems, low output) resulted in keeping the harvest in the domestic and regional markets of the host countries (Hawkins and Chen 2011). The scale of both countries’ investment operations in sub-Saharan Africa varies greatly. In the Chinese case, land-consuming projects range between 100 ha and 100,000 ha of land, with the majority of projects using less than 10,000 ha.5 British investments secured between 100 ha and 495,000 ha. In particular, investments in biofuels and palm oil production, many of which have failed since, seem fairly large-scale, with Equatorial Palm Oil securing a total landholding of 169,000 ha in Liberia (Equatorial Palm Oil 2013; Global Witness 2013; Rights and Resources Group 2013, 267). The project assessment revealed great inconsistencies between announced, acquired and actual area under operation. For example, SINO CAM IKO, a Chinese company operating in Cameroon, was only using 100–150 ha of the originally envisioned 10,000 ha three years into the project (Brautigam and
Zhang 2013, 1684–1685); and Sun Biofuels, a UK company that went into administration, only managed to secure approximately 13,000 ha, although its business plan had envisioned 20,000 ha (Hawkins and Chen 2011, 29–30). These discrepancies relate to the operational and administrative challenges largescale investment projects pose and they reflect unrealistic business expectations. They indicate that the commercial pressure on land will continue in the future, since companies that have not reached their envisioned scale continue to voice their intention to expand. At the same time, these discrepancies show that foreign investors might be displacing people who live on the land without putting it to best use. Concerning the access to land, both British and Chinese companies have relied on leasing contracts, contract farming schemes, public–private partnerships (PPPs), concessions, special agreements with county districts and communities or joint ventures with domestic companies that have access to land (farmer pool). Hardly any instances are known in which Chinese investors and officials have demanded and negotiated large-scale land leases with host governments (Putzel and Kabuyaya 2011, 34–35; Brautigam and Zhang 2013, 1686). At the same time, field research and statements by Chinese and African officials at the Forum on China–Africa Development Cooperation highlight several cases in which African governments demanded that China invest in and rehabilitate former state farms or tendered land to Chinese investors directly, in exchange for exporting their resources to China (Stensrud Ekman 2010). Similar engagement by African government officials can be observed with regard to British investments, and has been highlighted in various aggregate reports that assess land grabbing in the context of the political economy of host countries (Cotula et al. 2009; Cotula 2012). Nevertheless, whether an investment occurs depends on the final decision and commitment of the particular investor or the investor country. Timing of investments The specific timelines of investments can often be traced back to particular domestic or transnational events that are important in the investor country context. In the Chinese case, many agricultural projects are the continuation or rehabilitation of Chinese agricultural aid programs, and clearly predate the 2000 starting point of existing databases (Brautigam and Tang 2011; Land Matrix 2015). Also, projects in manufacturing, construction and energy/mining often date back to before the 2000–2012 time frame (Brautigam 2009). Investments picked up speed after the implementation of the “Go Global” policies (initiated in 1999) and the establishment of an elaborated framework of home country measures in support of Chinese overseas investment that has emerged over time
(Rosen and Hanemann 2009). The majority of British projects reviewed in this assessment took place post2000. A large share of these investments involves early-stage companies, while firms that have a long history on the continent, such as Unilever, are hardly mentioned. This oddity might be explained by the fact that projects in the land grab databases I investigated are primarily connected to two transnational events: the climate negotiations since 1997; and the financial crisis that has spurred the search for alternative investment options, namely landholding and agriculture, starting in 2008. Public policy in investor countries The above information shows that a meaningful understanding of the global commercial pressure on land has to account for the particular histories, policies and socio-economic dynamics within investor countries that are partially shaping what is happening. In this context, the role of public policy is important. Alterations in the scale and nature of Chinese economic presence in subSaharan Africa over the last three decades are closely connected to reforms in the country’s public and foreign policy. Key elements are the shift in the country’s development approach after 1989 (adoption of an urbanbiased, inward foreign investment-led growth and exportoriented development approach post-1989, which increased the country’s dependency on external resources and markets); the reform of aid programs since the mid-1990s, to facilitate the economic transformation back home; the related reconfiguration of foreign policy and intensified commercial diplomacy; and, most recently, the introduction of “Go Out” (zou chuqu) policies starting in 2000, encouraging Chinese companies to globalise their operations (Li 2006; Xue and Han 2010; Wilkes and Huang 2011; State Council 2011a). Rather than occurring suddenly in the context of the 2007–2008 crises of food, energy and climate, current landconsuming investments are the outcome of a long-term reform process since the late 1980s. Ho and Hofman (2011) see Chinese land-consuming investments as part of a process of “globalisation with Chinese characteristics”, involving the transnationalisation of state-owned companies. At the same time, they have cautioned against concluding from this observation that China’s projects overseas operate differently. On the contrary, the operational similarities with projects of other countries seem to outweigh the differences (see below). Particular developments in the public policy also help to understand certain aspects of British land-consuming investments in Africa. A significant number of listed land-consuming projects post-2000 have been composed of newly founded “clean energy” companies investing in biofuels production. This trend can be clearly associated with international, European and national renewable energy and climate policies, namely directives, targets and carbon credits as a way
to achieve CO2 emission reduction targets that were negotiated under the Kyoto Protocol (Tietenberg 2012; UKTI 2012). The trend was amplified by public concerns over energy security that had resulted from the growing dependencies on external supplies together with supply interruptions, all of which had led the UK government to undertake an Energy Review in 2006 and adopt the Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation in 2008 (DECC 2006, 2007). More importantly, however, it was certain private sector trends since 2000 that led to changes in public policy that might be relevant for future land-consuming investment dynamics. Since 2000, the private sector has identified Africa as a new growth region. Following the financial crisis of 2007–2008, the Eurozone crisis and the recession of the British economy, financial investors and companies started to look for alternative investment options and markets. In this context, the soaring food prices, the expectation of aggravating eco-scarcity pressures and predictions that Africa was the new growth region all seem to have contributed to a general interest in the continent and in agricultural production (Akram-Lodhi 2012; Ernst and Young 2012). Consequently, a significant number of investors began investing in agriculture or started to seek investment possibilities that would allow them to participate in the continent’s growth. In 2011, the government under Cameron picked up on this private sector trend, announcing policies and intensifying commercial and resource diplomacy on a bilateral basis. To date, British (land-consuming) investment in African countries is promoted as a way to access resources and new (growth) markets (DTI 2004). Thus, different from the Chinese case, in which specific policy changes encouraged investors to go overseas, in the UK official investment policy jumped on a private sector trend. This inverse relationship of the state and the private sector that emerges from the comparison of Chinese and British investments strengthens those accounts of land-consuming investments that differentiate investor motives according to a (simplified) scheme in which Chinese investments are government-driven to secure resources and British investments are private-sector driven to seek profit (Magdoff 2013). However, the empirical evidence presented above does support such conclusions. A greater presence of the state in economic overseas activities by itself does not explain to which end these investments occur or whether they are in the interest of the central government. Furthermore, this narrow focus easily obscures the complexity of actors and rationales at play. Investor country political economy For a better understanding of the investor country perspective, therefore, the particular political economy deserves closer scrutiny. Three aspects of today’s
state–market relations are crucial for a contextualisation of Chinese landconsuming investments in the investor country’s interest structures and actor arrangements. First, the ongoing political reform process since the 1980s has led to a rising degree of decentralisation and fragmentation of the state in its administrative processes, particularly in governance areas such as energy, investment or agriculture relating to land-consuming investment (Yu 2008; Xue and Han 2010). The supportive policy stance and framework regulating overseas investments (see discussion of home country measures below) has emerged from this reform process, particular features being the engagement of multiple actors from the public and private sector, the decentralisation of approval processes to lower levels of government, a certain degree of rule by regulation in the governing of policy areas or the rise of sub-state actors, namely provinces and municipalities, with their own agendas not necessarily in accord with the central government’s (Yu 2008; Chen and Jian 2009). Second, the strong interconnection of political power and economic riches has made state officials interested in profitable forms of investment. Over time, the party itself has also begun to open up to private entrepreneurs, all of which has brought a certain convergence of private and public actors’ interests under the heading of growth and profit (Cheng 2001; Rudman 2006). Finally, management reforms of state-owned enterprises since the 1980s have alienated certain government functions from business operations. State-owned enterprises are often able to select their chief executive officer (CEO) or decide on the use of their profits, but they also bear responsibility for their actions; to the degree of going into administration. So (2009, 59) concludes that, despite adoption of neoliberal policies since the 1980s, China’s “latest development pattern is closer to that of East Asian developmental state than to the neoliberal state”, with a “strong tendency towards entrepreneurship”, making it unique in regional comparison. Together, these aspects point at state–market relations and interest structures that are far more complex than the stereotype that equates land-consuming investments of state-owned enterprises with central government interests and control. For instance, Chinese public investments in sub- Saharan Africa involve multiple actors and they are largely for profit. Even agricultural cooperation projects are operated by Chinese state farms (central and municipal) with the aim of generating sustainable revenues, as they often lack financial support by the government (Brautigam 2009). Chinese construction companies pursue their own profitable business strategies and act as contract bidders for various sources of funding, multilateral or national. And China’s policy banks6 have to run profitably, not being permitted to accumulate debt (Brautigam 2011). Also, these investments are embedded in forms of development finance and mainstream economic thought that clearly transcend the Chinese context. At the same time, the growing economic presence of China on the African continent seems to feed into the “rise of China” scenario (So 2009, 62). Established powers
such as the UK have started to strengthen their political and economic networks in and with African countries in the “fight with China over control of the market, resources [ … ] and territory”, all of which adds to the commercial pressure on African lands (So 2009, 62). Descriptions of the UK as a liberal economy also cannot capture in a meaningful way what is happening with British land-consuming investments in SSA. It would be misleading to conclude that these investments are primarily driven by the dominant finance sector. Instead, the dominance of the financial sector is related to the intermingling of interests and frames of seemingly different actor groups, public and private, and characterised by the phenomenon of revolving doors; a growing dependency of the state on the financial sector to balance negative trade accounts; the reliance on this sector for party funding; and the embrace of the financial sector by politicians as a model for how an economy can profit from globalisation (Brown 2004). Only after the financial crisis and the failure of the financialisation-led development approach to produce economic growth has the UK government begun to question this development path. Guiding ideology Investments not only reflect a particular political economy and public policy orientation. They are accompanied by a guiding ideology, or narrative, that is to be found in official documentation such as white papers, government speeches or bilateral agreements, and that reveals and serves their rationalisation and justification. China sees its growing presence in Africa in the context of the country’s economic transformation and liberalisation (State Council 2011a), and asserts this presence is of “mutual benefit” for all partners involved (State Council 2011b). While this relatively new discourse clearly reflects the “win– win” analytical frame of today’s mainstream economics, it also makes a stand against the widespread opinion that China’s economic expansion and industrial restructuring might be done violently, following the paths of old economic powers of the West (State Council 2011b). In the case of the UK, the government changed its narrative in 2010. All British investments in Africa are now part of the government’s pursuit of national development, wealth and power. The narrative openly associates aid programs with the UK’s trade and investment interests (DTI 2004). Simultaneously, it employs the “mutual benefit” rhetoric of the Chinese government (Bellingham 2010; UKTI 2011). Prior to 2010, the UK government largely employed a “traditional” narrative of humanitarianism and security that has characterised UK–Africa relations since decolonisation and largely avoided associating aid programs with national economic interests (DFID 1997, 2000). Landconsuming biofuel and food production investments have also been embedded
in a transnational discourse of “clean energy”, “food security” and ecoscarcity that has been used by the companies themselves to advertise their projects in search of funding. Home country measures Finally, it has to be noted that the outcomes of overseas investments are also dependent on how they are governed in their respective home countries. Home country measures can range from being restrictive to being highly supportive, depending on the investor countries’ perception of capital outflows as beneficial or harmful for domestic development. The Chinese government has introduced a set of policies and administrative reforms to govern, promote and support OFDI since its opening in 1980s. Over time, it has adopted the most elaborate set of policies among the emerging economies. Key elements of this framework are encouragement policies, simplified approval processes and regularised supervision (Xue and Han 2010). With regard to Africa, several measures and institutions are important: negotiation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with African countries; introduction of an information platform for companies to report country-specific difficulties and learn from each other; regularised supervision of OFDI through an annual reporting requirement and the publication of a host country catalogue with information about available projects. Moreover, several political and financial instruments play a major role in formalising China– African relations. Politically, the Forum of China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC, zhong fei hezuo luntan), a formal platform for intergovernmental exchange that has taken place every three years since 2000, allows better coordination and cooperation between China and African countries. Major economic and aid cooperation projects have been announced at FOCAC, and important white papers released (MOFA 2006). Financially, several financing mechanisms are relevant in African investments (Brautigam 2011). These mechanisms, which are embedded in the “Go Out” framework and located in the aid, trade and investment policy field, comprise: export buyers credits by China’s Export–Import Bank (since 2005); bank loans by major policy banks (China Development Bank [CDB] and the Export–Import Bank), which have to be profitable yet “are heavily influenced by government policies and are not to operate in full compliance with market rules” (that is, the credit rating of Chinese government) (Brautigam 2011); the equity fund China– Africa Development Fund (CADF) which supports Chinese companies trading and investing in/with Africa since 2007 (overseen by CDB); special loans for African small and medium-sized enterprises (since 2009), in selected eligible industries such as export and agriculture; special funds of foreign economic and technical cooperation (by the Ministry of Commerce) which
support companies in realising China’s economic diplomacy, paying preinvestment costs and interest rate subsidies for bank loans and, since 2011, also for activities outside of agricultural cooperation, such as buying and leasing land (Brautigam 2011); and grants, zero-interest loans and concessional loans for aid projects under supervision by the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (since the 1990s), provided by CDB and China’s Export–Import Bank (see Brautigam 2011). These mechanisms allow Chinese investors to take a long-term perspective while applying criteria of profitability (Brautigam 2011). Chinese land-consuming projects also rely on financial resources of multilateral institutions, cooperate with companies of other countries, access funding through national banks of the recipient countries and participate in inter-governmental credit agreement or cooperation programs. Importantly, China’s emerging governance system of OFDI has just been catching up to international standards of highly industrialised countries, while Chinese entrepreneurs continue to face unforeseeable difficulties due to political interference (Te Velde 2007; Xue and Han 2010). Regarding British investments in sub-Saharan Africa, it is noteworthy that investment-related bilateral aid, which positively correlates with outward investment flows, increased from 18 per cent in the 1980s to 30 per cent in 2002, as share of total aid (Te Velde 2007), and that the UK’s development finance institution, the CDC Group,7 has changed its geographical focus toward Africa and south Asia as of 2011, concentrating on intermediary and increasingly direct equity investments. There are the nine offices of the UK Department of Trade and Investment in SSA supporting outward missions of UK companies (Te Velde 2007; Cargill 2011). Moreover, the UK government makes use of high-level commercial diplomacy initiatives in the form of bilateral investment forums (Weimer and Vines 2011). Furthermore, the wider set of UK home country measures includes the EU–Africa Strategic Partnership and related summit and action plans (since 2007) and the G8’s “New Alliance to Improve Food and Nutrition Security”, which encourages UK companies to invest overseas as part of PPPs (Te Velde and Bilal 2003). 4. Conclusion The above assessment shows that neither Chinese nor British investments happen in a vacuum, but are embedded in guiding ideologies and domestic development approaches, influenced by specific events, supported by government measures and reflective of the particular country’s political economy. Returning to the questions posed in the introduction, this article’s conclusion will try to answer how different the UK and China are, and address the practical implications of these findings with regard to land grabbing governance and debates.
The comparison has shown that the two investor countries do differ in many respects reflected in land-consuming investments, such as the investor legacy, political economy, development discourses, relevance of specific events, particular home country measures or certain aspects of land use. At the same time, the assessment has also identified a lot of commonalities. Both countries have an elaborate system of home country measures in place to promote outward FDI; neither prioritises Africa over other regions in their trade and investment relations; and their land-consuming investments have become part of a narrative that stresses the benefits of outward FDI for domestic development(al) interests at home while framing them as “mutually beneficial”. Moreover, companies in both countries invest in multiple sectors, focus on profit and involve a variety of actors and factors that excludes a monocausal explanation of how and why these investments take place. Therefore, I argue that while there are differences in how British and Chinese investments occur, many of those differences might not necessarily be significant in explaining the purpose of these investments, neither on a project level nor on the aggregate level. At the same time, the investment details and state–market relations show that the differences between the two countries are clearly overstated. Clearly there are more public actors involved in the Chinese case and a greater presence of financial investors in the UK case. However, this does not mean that Chinese investments are not for profit or located outside mainstream economic thought. Instead, it reflects China’s role as a newcomer in the international economic realm, which requires it to rely more strongly on government to open markets for expansion and resources, as well as the Chinese domestic set up that clearly favours state enterprises. And in the UK case, private investments do not happen in a “free market” vacuum. Instead, the lower degree of public involvement seems related to the fact that the UK has long-established ties with and private presence on the continent already. These investments are embedded in (inter)national public policy frameworks and supported by government in the form of home country measures as well as numerous financial actors, which reflects the “embedded financial orthodoxy” that has guided the UK’s domestic development policies since the Thatcher era (Cerny and Evans 2004). So, what do the findings contribute to the broader debate on land grabbing? From the perspective of the investor country, the finding that these investments are embedded in domestic development paradigms deserves greater attention. In the current debate this insight is largely discussed from a historical materialist perspective. However, it would be desirable to address land grabs from multiple analytical angles and in view of a wider range of investor countries. The
explanation of investor motives through international events and single mastermind-like strategies overlooks a significant share of context-specific drivers, processes of interest formation and geopolitical aspects that together contribute to land-consuming investments. Moreover, the same investor country might have different context-specific drivers in different regions (Ho and Hofman 2011, 21). Also, a normative discussion of home country responsibility would be useful, particularly in those cases in which national development ambitions factor in foreign land and labour for their achievement.
Acknowledgements This article is based on research that I have done for my doctoral dissertation on international land acquisitions from an investor country perspective. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisors Professor Frederick Bird and Professor Derek Hall, and to doctoral committee member Professor Jennifer Clapp. I am highly indebted to them for their support, insight, and critical advice, all of which have been invaluable for this research. I also thank the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful critique, and all those who generously shared their knowledge and perspective during the research process. The first draft of this paper was written for and discussed at the 2012 Land Grabbing conference at Ithaca, Cornell University. All analytical and empirical mistakes are solely mine.
Funding This work was supported by a doctoral fellowship from the Balsillie School of International Affairs.
Notes 1. The author acknowledges that “sub-Saharan Africa” encompasses very diverse countries. This article does not take up the debate over whether it is useful to apply this term to the region. The term is primarily used to subsume a set of countries, rather than listing them separately each time. 2. The Global Land Project (GLP) is a joint research project of the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (IGBP) of the International Council of Scientific Unions and the International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change (IHDP). 3. Data in this report is from 2009. 4. Supplied to the author in a 2008 email from the UK’s Official National Statistics, in response to an inquiry.
This information is concluded from the assessment of listed and processedtraced cases; see the second section of this article, on terminology and methodology. 6. Three “policy” banks, the Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC), China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export–Import Bank of China, were established in 1994 to take over the governmentdirected spending functions of four state-owned commercial banks which were responsible for financing economic and trade development and state-invested projects. ADBC provides funds for agricultural development projects in rural areas, the CDB specialises in infrastructure financing and the Export– Import Bank specialises in trade financing. 7. CDC Group plc (formerly the Commonwealth Development Corporation, and previous to that, the Colonial Development Corporation) is a development finance institution owned by the UK Government. The Department for International Development is responsible for CDC. 5.
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