How global is the Global Compact? - Wiley Online Library

Business Ethics: A European Review Volume 17 Number 3 July 2008

How global is the Global Compact? Jennifer Ann Bremern Launched by the United Nations in 2000, the Global Compact (GC) promotes private sector compliance with 10 basic principles covering human rights, labour standards, the environment, and anticorruption. Its sponsors aim to establish a global corporate social responsibility (CSR) network based on a pledge to observe the 10 principles adopted by companies across the range of company size and regional origin, backed by a modest reporting system and collaborative programmes. The author analyzes the GC’s progress toward building a global network from its launch through 2006 and finds that, while the GC’s nominal membership base of nearly 3000 companies makes it the largest system among collective action institutions (CAIs) for corporate responsibility, the GC has not reached ‘critical mass’. Deficiencies in its nascent global network include limited market penetration among the largest corporations, a membership heavily weighted toward Western European companies, and major weaknesses in compliance with its reporting system. The author concludes that the GC must improve both penetration and compliance if it is to succeed in building a global standard for CSR.

The Global Compact (GC): a new institutional model for global corporate social responsibility (CSR) As pressure on corporations to practise CSR has grown over the past 10 years, a new set of institutions has evolved to promote, standardize, measure and monitor corporate compliance with CSR principles. These institutions constitute an extension of the industry self-regulation model to address a new set of concerns. Structurally, they may extend membership1 beyond corporations to include non-government organizations (NGOs) and even government agencies as members or participants in the system. Because these new CSR institutions, like earlier self-regulatory models, rely on collective action as their central organizing principle, but, departing from earlier Associate Professor of Management, Jameel Management Center, American University, Cairo, Egypt.

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models, extend membership beyond the regulated companies, they require a new term, collective action institutions (CAIs), to describe them and to distinguish them from earlier models. Prominent examples of CAIs formed to foster CSR include the United Nations’ GC, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), Social Accountability International (SAI), the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) (2006) and the Fair Labor Association (FLA). The CAI model has evolved in part to meet corporations’ need for clarity regarding CSR standards and for mechanisms to measure and document their compliance with these standards. Corporate self-reporting on CSR, while widely practised by major multinationals (MNCs), inherently cannot command credibility with NGOs and stakeholders sceptical of corporate motivations. While leading corporate CSR practitioners have sought to address such doubts through broader disclosure in their CSR reports (Gap 2006) and/or by engaging stakeholders to review

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internal reporting (Nike 2006), these measures are not a true substitute for outside validation. Thus, corporations, NGOs and other stakeholders have turned to the CAI model to set standards, encourage voluntary adoptions, support compliance with the standards, monitor performance and provide reporting (though not all CAIs perform all of these functions). The GC is the first large-scale CAI created by the leading global governance institution, the UN. It therefore represents an especially important example of the new CAI structure. Following a brief review of the GC and its operations, this paper will examine GC performance from several perspectives. First, the paper examines whether the number of companies signing on to the GC and their collective weight within the global population of corporations has reached a level consistent with establishment of a global standard. Unlike a government standard, which by definition applies universally (although compliance may not be universal), CAI standards apply only to those that have signed on to the standard, which is generally voluntary.2 CAIs, by virtue of this voluntary structure, are unlikely ever to command universal compliance on a global scale; nonetheless, if only a small minority of companies participate, and if these participants do not include a large share of the leading corporations (with or without midsize and smaller companies), then the fact of participation or non-participation conveys little information regarding CSR performance. Low participation does not equate to low impact in other areas. For example, a CAI with only a few members may still deliver value by highlighting the commitment of those that participate in the system or may provide other benefits such as new compliance tools. It cannot, however, overcome broader scepticism regarding corporate compliance with CSR standards nor reliably convey information on the standard of compliance of non-members or the corporate community overall. The achievement of this broader impact on private sector performance – and on public perception of such performance – is particularly important in the case of the GC because rebuild-

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ing trust in private sector-led development ranked among the foremost motivations for establishing the GC, as articulated by then UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan. When he announced the GC’s founding in 1999, he stated that: Globalization is a fact of life. But I believe we have underestimated its fragility. The problem is this. The spread of markets outpaces the ability of societies and their political systems to adjust to them, let alone to guide the course they take. History teaches us that such an imbalance between the economic, social and political realms can never be sustained for very long. The industrialized countries learned that lesson in their bitter and costly encounter with the Great Depression. In order to restore social harmony and political stability, they adopted social safety nets and other measures, designed to limit economic volatility and compensate the victims of market failures. That consensus made possible successive moves towards liberalization, which brought about the long postwar period of expansion. Our challenge today is to devise a similar compact on the global scale, to underpin the new global economy. (United Nations 1999, emphasis added)

This first criterion is assessed by examining the GC’s growth from recruitment of the first members in 2000 through to the end of 2006. We examine the GC’s overall growth rate, its performance in recruiting companies with a broad geographic base and its market penetration among the world’s largest corporations. The basis for this analysis is the membership roster provided by the GC on its website. The analysis gives particular attention to the GC’s success in enlisting the world’s leading corporations as participants. To examine this issue, the analysis relies on a prominent global listing of major corporations, the Russell 10000 (as listed on the Russell website, Russell Investment Group 2006). The companies making up this list are selected by Russell based on an analysis of all companies listed on all global exchanges, screened to identify ‘[e]very publicly traded company around the world that could merit investment by a global institutional asset manager by meeting minimum size and investability standards’ (Russell Investment Group 2007). r 2008 The Author Journal compilation r 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.


Russell then aggregates the largest of those stocks to assemble a list of 10,070 corporations with the largest capitalization, based on their listings on global stock exchanges. While Russell estimates that the aggregate value of these corporations accounts for 98% of the ‘investable universe’ on global exchanges, the limitations of the list must also be recognized. It does not, by definition, include privately held or wholly state-held corporations,3 nor those organized as partnerships, such as the global accounting firms, which do not trade on global exchanges. The Russell 10000 nonetheless represents the most widely accepted global listing of the leading corporations and thus offers an appropriate universe for assessing the GC’s reach into this key population of firms. A comparison of participation levels in the GC with membership in the Russell 10000 thus permits definitive statements regarding the rate of participation by the largest global firms. Parallel conclusions regarding other size classes or those firms that are not publicly traded are not feasible, however, because no global listing of such firms exists. The GC defines a ‘company’, as opposed to an SME, as one with 250 or more employees on a global basis, a huge universe of firms for which no comprehensive listing has been established. From a strategic standpoint, moreover, the Russell 10000 represents the priority grouping for the GC, because it represents the largest and most global publicly traded firms, constructed on a consistent basis. The greater transparency and stakeholder engagement expected of publicly traded firms should translate into greater attention to CSR compliance and thus to a stronger business case to join CAIs such as the GC. Second, we explore whether the level of compliance with the GC’s standard, as defined and measured by the GC itself, is sufficiently high that membership in the GC conveys information regarding corporate performance. Regardless of the level of corporate participation in the GC, if those signing on do not comply with the obligations of membership, then the core mechanism whereby the GC encourages and ensures better corporate performance must be judged nonfunctional. Such an outcome would undermine r 2008 The Author Journal compilation r 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

the GC objectives of building trust in private sector-led globalization and promoting higher standards of corporate performance. This analysis relies on the same listing of participating companies as on the GC’s website, but examines the data provided on each member’s compliance with the GC’s reporting requirements. The GC’s complete and transparent reporting of membership and compliance, which sets a standard that many other CAIs do not yet meet, makes it possible to conduct a detailed assessment of compliance that is not feasible for other CAIs that lack the transparency of the GC regarding their own performance. Before turning to the analysis of GC performance against these two criteria, we briefly review the GC’s evolution over its first six years, both to set the context for the assessment and to introduce the programme to those unfamiliar with it.

Overview of the GC Launched by the UN in 2000 and managed from its inception by the UN, the GC is at once a network of corporations and a multi-sectoral organization with NGOs and associations as implementing partners alongside corporations. The GC is one of the highest-profile CAI initiatives launched in the past decade and the first serious foray of an international governmental institution into CAI formation for CSR on a global scale.4 Together with its global scope and broad reach, its association with the UN makes it a unique and important example of this new institutional form. Before turning to the analysis of the GC’s reach and performance, it will be helpful to describe the workings of the GC in somewhat more detail, particularly as the organization has recently changed its governance structure and procedures to enhance its credibility and to strengthen its internal management structures to deal with the growth experienced. The GC does not establish a formal code of conduct, in contrast to CAIs such as FLA and SAI, nor does it establish a detailed reporting standard, as does the GRI. Instead, it enlists corporations of all sizes and home-country

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identities5 to ‘embrace, support and enact’ 10 broadly stated principles (United Nations, Global Compact Office 2005b). These principles articulate behavioural norms that the GC organization describes as ‘enjoy[ing] universal consensus’6 and that are grounded in widely accepted international statements, such as the International Declaration of Human Rights and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. The 10 principles cover human rights, labour, environment and anticorruption (see note 5 for the principles’ full text). Companies join the GC by providing a letter signed by their most senior officer and thereafter maintain active membership status by renewing their commitment in writing and providing an annual report on their efforts to adhere to the principles and to encourage other companies, such as suppliers, to comply, termed the ‘Communication on Progress’ or COP. No mandatory format for the COP has been articulated. There is no external verification process nor are there any fees associated with joining the GC. In addition to these requirements, participating companies are encouraged to support UN programmes, such as the Millennium Development Goals, and to take part in national and regional networks organized by the GC organization to promote the principles and to assist companies in applying them. The GC thus maintains an extremely low barrier to entry and imposes minimal costs on its members (considering only the costs of reporting and membership, rather than any costs that might be associated with coming into compliance with the principles, such as investments in environmental technology). This strategy is consistent with the GC’s aim of building a large and global membership. It reflects practical limitations on the UN as an institutional home, recognizing that a UN system to audit performance of individual companies on a global basis would be impracticable and, arguably, would reach beyond the UN’s mandate. Following a review of GC governance in 2005, the GC formalized and strengthened its governance structure by creating an advisory board and a number of other management bodies. The GC continues to be implemented by a special unit within the UN, the GC Office. It is not an

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industry self-regulatory institution and it is not governed by its stakeholders in any meaningful sense. As a result of the review, the GC also made other changes to respond to criticism from NGOs that lack of verification permitted corporate bad actors to hide behind the UN logo. The CG modestly strengthened its reporting requirements, tightened the timeframes for reporting, and for the first time, formally classified member companies as ‘non-communicating’ if they had not complied with the reporting requirement for a specified period and as ‘inactive’ if they had not complied for a longer period. It also created a limited complaints mechanism. The GC thus has moved toward the middle of a continuum emerging in the new CSR CAI sector, falling somewhere between a purely aspirational model that imposes no formal requirements on its adherents (e.g. the Caux Roundtable and the Global Sullivan Principles) and a model based on a rigorously articulated and enforced code (e.g. SAI). Membership in the GC has been actively promoted by the UN and other partners through conferences and other events around the globe, as well as through the formation of national and regional networks to promote institutional learning and collaboration within the membership. Forty such networks were reported by the GC to be operational as of mid-2007 (GC website 2007). The GC’s membership strategy The GC’s focus on growing rapidly to scale reflects the initial impetus cited by SecretaryGeneral Annan at the launch of the Compact. Whereas many CAIs seek to buttress the reputation of the member companies or of a specific industry, the GC’s aim is to build trust in the business sector overall, in order to preserve and strengthen the consensus for globalization, as noted above. Thus, the building of a large base of participants is central to its strategy. The GC cannot hope to have a significant impact on business–society relations or on perceptions of ‘big business,’ unless a substantial proportion of big businesses join the GC. There is no magic number that defines how large this portion must be for the GC to attain the reach and credibility it r 2008 The Author Journal compilation r 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.


seeks. If the GC were to achieve even 5–10% participation by the largest companies, this would have to be considered a major achievement, but it would not be enough to argue that MNCs as a group had embraced the principles. A participation rate of 20–30%, however, would arguably approach the ‘tipping point’ level, at which belonging to the GC would be perceived by both business and civil society as an affiliation expected of companies committed to responsible behaviour (Gladwell 2000). Georg Kell, the first Director of the GC, wrote in 2002 in an article co-authored with David Levin that, ‘We would estimate that, if these early efforts are successful, the critical mass of truly committed leaders necessary to fully implement and maintain the goals of the Compact will be reached within two years’ (Kell & Levin 2002). Neither document defines what level of participation would constitute ‘mainstreaming’ or ‘critical mass’, however, a topic that we will explore further below in the context of the GC’s membership composition and its market penetration among the world’s largest corporations. More recent GC strategy documents continue to emphasize the need for growth in order to achieve ‘scale’. A strategy document produced in June 2005 describes this challenge as follows: The Global Compact is a voluntary initiative promoting responsible global corporate citizenship. It operates on a leadership model in that it aims to bring a critical mass of business leaders on board to build a sustainable movement. (United Nations 2005b)

The document highlights the ‘opportunities and challenges of scale’ and repeatedly uses the size of the Compact’s membership roster as an implicit measure of its success. Independent observers of the GC have also looked to its size as a measure of its success. Sandra Waddock noted that, by 2002, . . . hundreds of companies globally had submitted letters of commitment to upholding the nine principles of the Global Compact. But the Global Compact had not yet reached a ‘tipping point’. One of the unspoken questions underlying the Global Compact conference, thus, was the funda-

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mental question: what will it take to create this tipping point for corporate responsibility especially among US firms? That is, what will it take to make managing corporate responsibility into what colleagues and I have elsewhere termed the ‘new business imperative?’ (Waddock 2002: 2)

Waddock’s article explores a number of criteria that may influence the GC’s success in reaching this tipping point, such as transparency, accountability and integration into management practices, but, although she defines its failure to reach the tipping point in terms of the number of companies signing on, she does not define a criterion for success in quantitative terms. Her image of success, as articulated in this article, clearly envisions a successful GC as one that would involve widespread participation by both MNCs and their suppliers: ‘Imagine a world in which major corporations that had signed onto the GC required their suppliers to also do so’ (Waddock 2002: 9). Given that the GC has, in comparison with competing CAIs, based its strategy much more heavily on growing its membership as opposed to rigorously measuring compliance with its principles, the GC is under even greater pressure than competing systems not only to establish and maintain a rapid rate of growth, but also to expand its reach broadly, both geographically and across the size range of global firms, to clearly differentiate and distinguish itself from competing systems. As part of its strategic review, the GC adopted a policy of focusing more attention on larger industrialized country firms and LDC-based firms, particularly those that are active across borders. Its strategy document states that it: . . . will focus on the challenges associated with global firms entering emerging markets and national firms in developing countries seeking to participate in the global marketplace. (UN 2005a: 10)

This statement suggests that the GC has recognized that it cannot realistically hope to attract to its ranks a large share of the uncounted hundreds of thousands or millions of developing countrybased supplier firms, nor could it manage even a modest reporting system involving such a diverse

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and far-flung network of firms, should it succeed in attracting them. Thus, the GC’s leadership is focusing to a greater degree on those firms that contract with and buy from these SMEs and that have international operations themselves, rather than on recruiting SMEs as members. In light of this shift, which might roughly be characterized as focusing on the firms that matter most in shaping globalization, the following discussion of the GC’s growth experience will give particular attention to its success in enlisting members from the ranks of larger firms based in developing countries, as well as looking at the overall size and regional distribution of membership and the evolution of the Compact’s growth performance. The GC’s membership strategy departs from those of other CAI models in two respects. First, as further discussed below, the GC actively seeks to recruit a broad-based membership with representation from emerging market country MNCs (EMC MNCs) as well as the industrialized world. The GC is the first CAI to have made significant inroads into the ranks of MNCs based in developing countries, an important step for global CSR. This comparatively new group of corporations is of vital importance in shaping global CSR practices, not only because EMC MNCs are growing rapidly as a group and becoming leaders in their respective national economies, but also because their generally weaker governance standards and lower levels of stakeholder scrutiny compared with OECD MNCs will shape the competitive environment in which global CSR must operate. While several of the CAIs certify suppliers on a global basis, their MNC membership, if any, has in most cases been drawn from the OECD countries. The GC is the first CAI to break this mould, launching a system with broad global membership from the strong base of the UN’s global presence. Second, as discussed in the following section, the GC places significant emphasis on growing to scale as a central element in its strategy and has done so since its inception. This aim is reflected in many of its core documents. The GC organization and recognized CSR experts associated with the GC alike have defined success for the GC in terms

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of ‘mainstreaming’ the GC principles in global business, reaching a ‘critical mass’ or ‘tipping point’ where participation in the Compact is ‘considered essential to doing global business’ (Waddock 2002). One of the two stated objectives of the GC is to work on a voluntary basis to ‘mainstream the ten principles in business activities around the world’,7 which suggests broad participation in the programme as essential to its success. Experience of the GC in achieving growth to scale The GC has adopted an explicit strategy of growing rapidly to scale. Its definition of scale encompasses not only the number of companies participating, but the achievement of a membership base that is large, diverse and truly global. Such a membership is described by the organization’s leaders as giving the organization a ‘critical mass’ (Kell & Levin 2002). As the largest CAI, the GC’s experience in this regard provides important insights into the potential for CAIs to fill the gap in global governance left by the limited capacity of developing country governments to ensure minimum compliance with labor and environmental standards. The GC and other CAIs, such as the GRI, ETI and FLA, are progressively being seen by activists and globalization scholars as core elements in what one noted globalization scholar, Ann Florini, has termed the ‘new framework for transnational governance.’ Florini argues that ‘. . . corporations are also taking an increasingly large part in global governance by lobbying governments, regulating themselves through industry associations, and establishing codes of conduct for their own behavior’ (Florini 2003: 5). CAIs can fill the governance gap to a meaningful degree, however, only if they can recruit a large membership base, particularly among companies based in or operating in those developing countries where the governance gap is greatest. Even if a CAI has established a very high standard for its members, backed by a strong enforcement system, such a system remains a footnote to global governance efforts if it cannot r 2008 The Author Journal compilation r 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.


extend its system to encompass a large membership as well. In the case of the GC, building a large membership base takes on additional importance, because it lacks the rigorous, detailed standard or extensive enforcement system of other CAIs. Its 10 principles, though covering the essential governance areas, are couched in general, unquantified terms. Its reporting system, though now mandatory, does not establish a required format nor call for detailed compliance reporting. Although the GC has recently strengthened its verification system, as well, it does not make provision for on-the-ground verification or thirdparty audit. The GC model can thus be seen as one that pursues membership growth by posing very low barriers to entry or to remaining a member, while progressively tightening the standard and reporting/compliance systems.8 This strategy places high premia on, first, delivering a large membership and, second, achieving compliance with its requirements, modest though they may be. Failure to meet either or both of these standards would undermine, if not vitiate entirely, any GC claim to have a significant impact on corporate performance. The GC is not the only CAI seeking a crosssectoral, global membership, but the others pursuing global membership have, by contrast, adopted more detailed codes (e.g. SAI’s SA-8000) and/or reporting procedures (e.g. GRI’s system). Other CAIs confine their membership target to a single sector (toys, jewellery, apparel, etc.). However a CAI defines its membership target, its reach into the target group and the degree of compliance it commands with its standard are intrinsically linked to the CAI’s potential impact, its value for its participants (its ability to convey credible information on their level of responsibility, for example), and its sustainability (notably, its revenue base). The GC case sheds valuable light on the CAI scalability issue not only because its strategy is based on achieving such scale but also because it has in fact built the largest membership of any CAI to date. Whether measured by overall membership numbers, by the geographic and r 2008 The Author Journal compilation r 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

sectoral diversity of its members, or by the size range represented (from small and midsize firms (SMEs) to global corporations), the GC is larger than any other CAI by a large margin. Although the GC initiated operations somewhat later than other CAIs (in 2000 rather than in the mid-1990s, when such leading CAIs as GRI, SAI and ETI were launched), the GC has signed up more formal adherents than any other system. Although official league tables on CAIs are not yet produced, the author’s examination of the websites of the leading CAIs indicates that the GC’s business sector membership, with 2933 business sector participants at the end of 2006, far exceeds that of the other leading systems pursuing a worldwide, multi-sectoral strategy. The GRI (launched in 1997/1998) listed 1033 entities as adherents to its system as of March 2007 (most, but not all, are companies).9 SAI (also launched in 1997) cited a figure of 1112 facilities as having been certified using its SA-8000 standard as of September 2006, the latest data available (although it should be noted that a larger number of factories are applying the standard but have not yet achieved certification). The GC’s combination of comparatively low barriers to entry and large membership base also permits us to extract useful insights into regional and OECD-LDC differences in attitudes toward CSR and CAIs, because, as will be further discussed below, participation and compliance are far from uniform despite the ease of entry and low demands placed on members.

The GC: assessing progress towards building the first global CSR standard The overall picture of the GC that emerges from this analysis is of a CAI that has made considerable progress toward institutionalization but faces several major challenges. The following sections analyze the GC’s aggregate performance in building a membership that is both global and geographically diverse, its success in attracting leading MNCs (represented by the Russell 10000), and the quality of membership as measured by compliance with GC reporting requirements.

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Aggregate membership performance of the GC Table 1 shows the membership of the GC at the end of 2006 and the number of firms newly committing to the GC principles yearly since its founding in 2000. These data show a monotonic increase in membership and, with the exception of 2005, in the rate of membership growth. The GC’s growth pattern is not evenly distributed across firm size and geographic category, however. After a predictably slow start during the first two years, membership first began to grow rapidly among companies in the industrialized world, followed two years later, in 2004, by a burst of membership growth among LDC companies and SMEs. New members from the ranks of the industrialized world fell off somewhat during the 2005–2006 period, however, failing to reach levels set in the two previous years. The regional data present a different picture. Looking only at the company members (i.e. excluding SMEs), the data show disproportionate participation from Western Europe. Membership within the developing world is more diverse, with Latin America and the Caribbean and developing Asia each accounting for large groups. Table 2 displays annual membership and cumulative

membership as of 2006 for companies by region and grouped by industrialized vs. developing countries. This performance suggests that the GC has done a creditable job of extending the pledge to adhere to basic principles in both developing and industrialized countries. Developing country companies account for more than half of the total companies signing on to the principles. The performance in the most recent year is even more strongly tilted in this direction, with 377 of the 505 total new companies coming from developing countries. The regional pattern is less encouraging. The difference between low levels of participation in the United States and Canada, on the one hand, and higher levels in Western Europe is particularly noteworthy. This difference may be partially explained by concern among US firms during the early years of the GC with the legal implications of signing on to the principles. This issue was largely resolved in 2004, however, after considerable effort by the GC Office and partners in the United States. US participation has continued to lag far behind that in Western Europe, with fewer than one-tenth as many companies signing on from the United States compared with Europe (51

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Table 1: Annual and cumulative membership of companies and SMEs in the Global Compact, 2000–2006 Membership class

Year joined 2000

Members joining in year shown Companies (4250 employees) Of which: Industrialized world Developing world Small and midsize enterprises (10–249 employees) Total Cumulative membership Companies (4250 employees) Of which: Industrialized world Developing world Small and midsize enterprises (10–249 employees) Total

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

40

96

152

179

355

242

505

30 10 0 40

32 64 11 107

101 51 41 193

143 36 64 243

169 186 377 732

124 118 257 499

128 377 614 1119

40

136

288

467

822

1064

1569

30 10 0 40

62 74 11 147

163 125 52 340

306 161 116 583

475 347 493 1315

599 465 750 1814

727 842 1364 2933

Source: GC website and author’s calculations. ......................................................................................................................................

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Business Ethics: A European Review Volume 17 Number 3 July 2008 ......................................................................................................................................

Table 2: Annual and cumulative 2006 membership of companies by region and development grouping Region and development grouping

Year joined 2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Total

Industrialized country companies Africa Americas Asia Australia–New Zealand Europe MENA Total

NA 1 0 0 29 NA 30

NA 10 1 1 20 NA 32

NA 9 4 2 86 NA 101

NA 7 2 1 133 NA 143

NA 16 14 0 139 NA 169

NA 9 10 3 102 NA 124

NA 14 12 0 102 NA 128

NA 66 43 7 611 NA 727

Developing country companies Africa Americas Asia Australia–New Zealand Europe MENA Total

1 3 5 NA 1 0 10

3 36 23 NA 2 0 64

1 10 33 NA 7 0 51

3 8 16 NA 5 4 36

11 120 29 NA 15 11 186

1 44 27 NA 41 5 118

38 151 122 NA 55 11 377

58 372 255 NA 126 31 842

All companies Africa Americas Asia Australia–New Zealand Europe MENA Total

1 4 5 0 30 0 40

3 46 24 1 22 0 96

1 19 37 2 93 0 152

3 15 18 1 138 4 179

11 136 43 0 154 11 355

1 53 37 3 143 5 242

38 165 134 0 157 11 505

58 438 298 7 737 31 1569


American companies compared with 611 Western European companies). Further research is needed to explain this observation. Three possible hypotheses, briefly reviewed below, are suggested by global experience with CSR. First, it may be that US corporations are less supportive of multilateral collaboration or partnering with government organizations, such as the UN, than are their European counterparts. Second, it may be that support for CSR programming is simply lower in the United States than it is in Europe. A third hypothesis to be tested through future research is that US companies, while supporting CSR programming within their own operations (where they have a greater degree of control), are less r 2008 The Author Journal compilation r 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

likely to support collective action programming to set global CSR standards. Such broad-based collaborative systems subject participants’ performance to third-party judgment from NGOs that the participants do not themselves select, giving participants less control over both process and outcome. Although generalization across such a diverse grouping of nations and corporations is problematic, participation in other CAIs offers some evidence that the overall interest and support for CSR is indeed higher in Europe than in the United States. SAI, for example, has certified 488 factories in Western Europe (44% of its global total of 1112), compared with just two factories in the United States. The corporate ranks of GRI’s

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organizational stakeholders (the system’s financial supporters) include just 21 from the United States, compared with 96 from Western Europe – well over half the global total of 170. This finding, if borne out by further research, would lend support to the second hypothesis. The analysis of participation in the GC among the Russell 10000, presented below, further substantiates the difference between Western Europe and other regions with respect to collective CSR actions, as does the literature. As early as 1992, when CSR as a concept was just beginning to attract widespread acceptance, Henzler (1992) commented on the more sociallyoriented and collaborative nature of ‘Eurocapitalism’, compared with the US variant. Although Henzler presented little concrete evidence in support of this difference, it has intuitive appeal and accords with the experience of other CAIs, briefly discussed above. Additional research is needed to explore and explain US–European differences in CSR participation. Whatever its roots, however, the differential has important implications for development of truly global CSR standards. If Western European companies are more likely to participate in CSR systems, then, given the large base of companies in this region, they will tend to dominate any system that is established. To the extent that Western European firms also display a greater willingness to collaborate across sectors

and respond more actively to home country consumers, investors and governments that themselves pay more attention to CSR, early dominance of a CAI by Western European firms may result in standards and procedures out of alignment with values elsewhere. Heavy Western European participation may thus undermine efforts to build a system with widespread acceptance globally. With 611 of the total 1569 company members in the GC coming from Western Europe (nearly 40%), the latter region has a strong plurality, but not to the degree that others are bystanders. The following analyses of Russell 10000 participation and member compliance indicate that Western European predominance in the GC is higher than these raw membership numbers suggest, however. Participation in the GC by Russell 10000 corporations The analysis of Russell 10000 participation in the GC demonstrates, first, that overall participation by these leading corporations is quite low. Table 3 shows GC participation by Russell 10000 firms in both absolute and percentage terms. These data provide further evidence of a wide difference between Western Europe and the rest of the world. With the exception of the former region, the proportion participating falls far short of a level consistent with the GC’s stated goal of

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Table 3: Participation by Russell 10000 corporations in the GC by region and development grouping Region

Africa Americas Asia Australia– New Zealand Europe MENA Total

Number of Russell 10000 companies

Number of Russell 10000 in Global Compact

Industralized countries 0 3510 1783 242

Developing countries 112 277 1576 0

Total

2155 0 7690

106 309 2380

2261 309 10070

112 3787 3359 242

Percent of Russell 10000 participating in Global Compact

Industralized countries 0 28 36 3

Developing countries 6 6 50 0

Total

196 0 263

3 3 68

199 3 331

6 34 86 3

Industralized countries NA 1.9 2.4 2.9

Developing countries 5.4 2.2 3.2 NA

Total 5.4 0.9 2.6 1.2

28.4 NA 9.5

2.8 1.0 2.9

8.8 1.0 3.3

Source: GC and Russell websites and author’s calculations. ......................................................................................................................................

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achieving a ‘critical mass’ such that participation becomes the norm for corporations wishing to be judged responsible. While there is no accepted standard for market penetration level required to achieve such ‘norming’, the GC, with a total of only 331 adherents among the 10,070 largest listed global corporations at the end of 2006, clearly falls short of that point. Whereas an overall participation rate of nearly 10% among industrialized-world Russell companies might arguably be rated quite respectable for a programme only in its seventh year, participation rates outside Europe of well below 3% do not support a view that the GC has found acceptance among global corporations generally. The gap between participation by the largest industrialized-world companies and those in developing countries is also noteworthy. The low rates of Russell participation in the developing world, averaging o3% across the globe, indicate that the GC is simply not meeting with strong support and participation by corporate leadership in the developing world, at least not as yet. This is a major shortcoming for a programme that seeks to become a global network. Further evidence that the GC is not on a path toward critical mass among the largest companies is offered by analysis of membership performance over time. Russell 10000 membership in the GC has grown continuously throughout the period, a positive sign, but the rate of new membership has not accelerated as it has for other categories, such as SMEs. Table 4 shows the distribution of GC Russell 10000 participants by the year that they joined the system. While the rate of new Russell companies joining after the first two years does not show an upward trend, there is an encouraging upsurge in new participants from the developing world in 2006. Further evidence should be collected in coming years to determine whether this is a one-time phenomenon or a true increase in support for the GC among this crucial group. This one-year improvement does not change the overall picture, however. At the average rate of new membership of about 50 companies per year, it would take 460 years for the GC to reach a one-third participation rate among the Russell 10000. r 2008 The Author Journal compilation r 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

................................................................

Table 4: Membership in the GC by Russell 10000 companies by year that they signed on Year

Number of Russell 10000 companies

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total

Industrialized countries 25 17 32 67 50 30 42 263

Developing countries 1 10 6 3 8 9 31 68

Total 26 27 38 70 58 39 73 331

Source: GC and Russell websites and author’s calculations. ................................................................

................................................................

Table 5: Proportion of Global Compact ‘company’ participants drawn from Russell 10000 (%) Region

Industrialized country company members NA 42.4 83.7 42.9

Africa Americas Asia Australia– New Zealand Europe 32.1 MENA NA Total 36.2

Developing country company members 10.3 1.6 19.6 NA 2.4 9.7 8.1

All company members 10.3 7.8 28.9 42.9 27.0 9.7 21.1

Source: GC and Russell websites and author’s calculations. ................................................................

Table 5 examines participation by the Russell 10000 from a different perspective: what proportion of GC ‘company’ participants are drawn from the ranks of the largest corporations. In other words, to what extent is the GC’s emerging network made up of major companies, those likely to be most influential with their suppliers, best able to network on a global basis, most able to provide significant support to UN programming, and most likely to establish a standard that others will follow?

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These data offer a more hopeful perspective on the GC’s success in engaging major companies, at least from the industrialized world. Overall, more than a third of the company participants from industrialized countries are drawn from the Russell 10000’s ranks. This proportion is highest in Japan (the only Asian industrialized country), but all of the rates in the industrialized countries support a preliminary conclusion that the network has a healthy base of large companies, even though total membership and participation levels remain low relative to the size of the global private sector. On the developing country side, however, these rates are minuscule, indicating that the largest corporations in the developing world remain on the sidelines. While it is possible that the lower levels of participation in stock markets among developing country companies make the Russell a less applicable standard than in industrialized countries, and that GC developing country members are indeed among the largest companies but simply not listed, it seems more likely that the lower levels reflect membership drawn primarily from the ranks of midsize companies. Further research is needed, however, to determine whether the non-Russell companies from developing countries are indeed mostly midsize companies or include substantial numbers of large, privatelyheld corporations, government-owned enterprises and major partnerships that, while they do not trade on exchanges, are leaders in their respective countries’ or regions’ private sector. The pattern of dominance by Western European firms holds even more strongly in the Russell 10000 dataset than for the company dataset as a whole. Three-quarters of all Russell 10000 GC members from industrialized countries and 59% of all Russell 10000 GC members globally are based in Western Europe. Western European Russell 10000 GC members outnumber developing country Russell 10000 GC members by almost three to one. Western Europe is thus the only region where GC participation might be said to be approaching critical mass among the largest corporations. Whereas in all other regional groupings, GC participation languishes between 1% and 5% of

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the Russell 10000 population, it reaches 28% among the Western European Russell 10000 contingent. Quality of membership: rates of non-compliance and expulsion The picture of Western European predominance also holds true when measured by reporting compliance. The more disciplined and highly transparent reporting system created by the GC after its internal review in 2005 makes it possible to draw preliminary conclusions regarding the extent to which a company’s initial signing-on to the GC is reflected in actual compliance with the system and thus more transparent disclosure of its adherence to the principles. Such enhanced reporting is central to the GC’s strategy and to its objective of global impact on company performance. The GC reporting system calls for each participating company to submit an annual COP.10 While there is no set format for this reporting, and companies already addressing CSR through existing reporting may submit such reports to comply with GC requirement, the GC now provides some guidance as to what is acceptable. A review of the reports for a single country (Egypt, as presented below) suggests that reporting falls short of the GC’s stated guidelines, however, even though these are much more permissive than those of other systems, such as the GRI. This review also provides intriguing hints that reporting may be encouraging companies to be more proactive on CSR issues generally, however. In principle, companies are expected to submit a report shortly after joining and then to submit annual updates. Companies that fail to submit their first COP report within two years of joining the GC or that fail to submit an updated COP within two years of a previous report (without making alternative arrangements) are classified as ‘non-communicating.’ This designation is posted on the GC website. Companies that fail to submit their first report and then also fail to submit a second report by the end of the third year after joining are classified as ‘inactive’ and removed from the GC roster. r 2008 The Author Journal compilation r 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.


Companies that provide a first report but then fail to submit a subsequent report within two years of the previous report are also classified as inactive. A list of inactive firms is also maintained on the website. Analysis of information on the GC website demonstrates that 2004 was the first year in which the policy of classifying firms as ‘non-communicating’ or ‘inactive’ was fully implemented (one firm was so classified in 2003). The GC system for designating firms does not fully consider the quality of the compliance

actions reported, nor is there a broadly applied validation system. Nonetheless, the high degree of transparency, with all firms identified by status and date of classification, provides a great deal more information than many other systems provide and deserves commendation. An analysis of the rate of non-compliance with GC reporting requirements nonetheless suggests that compliance has deteriorated since the programme’s beginning. In other words, the growth in the number of adherents has come at the cost of lower levels of reporting. Table 6 compares

......................................................................................................................................

Table 6: Status of members joining in 2004 or earlier, by year of joining Status and company category

2000

2001

Number of companies Active members in good standing All companies 36 63 Of which: Industrialized country companies 29 28 Developing country companies 7 35 Members in non-communicating status All companies 4 33 Of which: Industrialized country companies 1 4 Developing country companies 3 29 Inactive members All companies 1 78 Of which: Industrialized country companies 0 7 Developing country companies 1 71 All companies joining, regardless of status All companies 41 174 Of which: Industrialized country companies 30 39 Developing country companies 11 135 Active members in good standing as a percentage of: All active members All companies 90.0 65.6 Of which: Industrialized country companies 96.7 87.5 Developing country companies 70.0 54.7 All companies ever joining All companies 87.8 36.2 Of which: Industrialized country companies 96.7 71.8 Developing country companies 63.6 25.9

2002

2003

2004

Cumulative 2000–03

Cumulative 2000–04

107

148

178

354

532

89 18

121 27

109 69

267 87

376 156

45

31

177

113

290

12 33

22 9

60 117

39 74

99 191

163

84

NA

326

NA

38 125

35 49

NA NA

80 246

NA NA

315

263

NA

793

NA

139 176

178 85

NA NA

386 407

NA NA

70.4

82.7

50.1

75.8

64.7

88.1 35.3

84.6 75.0

64.5 37.1

87.3 54.0

79.2 45.0

34.0

56.3

NA

44.6

NA

64.0 10.2

68.0 31.8

NA NA

69.2 21.4

NA NA



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companies by status at the end of 2006 (active in good standing, active but non-communicating, and inactive) and by the year in which they joined the GC for all companies joining between 2000 and 2004. It is not possible to analyze reporting compliance by companies joining in 2005 and 2006 because they were still within their two-year initial grace period. Similarly, companies joining in 2004 have not yet reached the three-year point at which they can be declared inactive. These data indicate that compliance is declining year to year. Whereas 97% of all industrialized country companies that joined in 2000, the GC’s first year, remained fully compliant by the end of the period studied, only 65% of industrialized country companies joining in 2004 were still complying with reporting requirements only two years later. Many of those joining in the first year were CSR leaders, such as Nike, Unilever and Dupont, which may account for some of the difference in quality of participation, but the overall trend would appear to fall short of the performance needed to establish a strong global system. Given that the GC has only recently instituted this more formal system of accountability, there is an opportunity for the UN’s GC Office to respond to the trend toward non-compliance before it threatens the system’s long-term viability. Compliance and persistence rates were lower for companies from developing countries and generally declined over the period, as well. By 2006, only 64% of developing country companies joining in 2000 were still active and in good standing. This figure drops by half, to 32%, for those joining in 2003 (the last year that can be analyzed). Overall, less than half of all companies joining between 2000 and 2003 (45%) and only one in five companies from developing countries (21%) remained active and in good standing by the end of 2006. Although not shown in the tables, performance for SMEs was on a par with that of developing country companies. Only about a quarter (26%) of all SMEs joining through 2003 remained active and in good standing by the end of 2006. The regional pattern, shown in Table 7, presents a pattern of wide variation in compliance that reinforces the overall patterns identified earlier.

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At one extreme, 100% of the Asian companies joining the GC through 2003 from industrialized countries remained active and compliant at the end of 2006, although it should be noted that this amounts to just seven companies, all from Japan. At the other extreme, only one-third of Australian/New Zealand companies and about twothirds of North American and Western European companies could make the same claim. Again, performance was much worse among developing country companies. Only 14% of Asian and Eastern European companies remained in compliance. Latin American companies (at 42%) did somewhat better and African and Middle Eastern companies fell between the two extremes, with about a quarter of those joining from 2000 to 2003 still in good standing at the end of 2006. Taken as a whole, this level of compliance does not support a hypothesis that the GC is emerging as a strong global standard. The low and falling levels of compliance will tend to undermine the credibility of the GC if strong management action is not taken to reverse this situation. The measures adopted in 2005 represent a useful move in this direction, but more aggressive enforcement of the standard is likely to be needed to achieve credibility. The low levels are particularly worrisome in view of the comparatively modest requirements that the GC imposes on its participants relative to the more specific standards, such as the GRI and SA-8000. Of equal concern in gauging progress toward becoming a global standard, the compliance analysis further reinforces the dominance of Western European companies in the GC. Western European countries did not outperform their peers in terms of compliance (indeed, they performed on a par with other industrialized country participants, with about two-thirds of all companies remaining in compliance by the end of the period), but, because the number of Western European members joining was so much higher and because, as a group, their compliance rates were far above those of developing country members, Western European firms dominate those in good standing. Thus, whereas Western European companies account for 42% of all companies joining the r 2008 The Author Journal compilation r 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.


Table 7: Status of members joining in 2003 or earlier, by region Status and company category

Africa

Americas

Number of companies Active members in good standing All companies 6 61 Of which: Industrialized country companies NA 23 Developing country companies 6 38 Members in non-communicating status All companies 2 23 Of which: Industrialized country companies NA 4 Developing country companies 2 19 Inactive members All companies 15 43 Of which: Industrialized country companies NA 9 Developing country companies 15 34 All companies joining, regardless of status All companies 23 127 Of which: Industrialized country companies NA 36 Developing country companies 23 91 Active members in good standing as a percentage of: All active members All companies 75.0 72.6 Of which: Industrialized country companies NA 85.2 Developing country companies 75.0 66.7 All companies ever joining All companies 26.1 48.0 Of which: Industrialized country companies NA 63.9 Developing country companies 26.1 41.8

Asia

Australia– New Zealand

Europe

MENA

Total

40

2

241

4

354

7 33

2 NA

235 6

NA 4

267 87

44

2

42

0

113

0 44

2 NA

33 9

NA 0

39 74

158

2

97

11

326

0 158

2 0

69 28

NA 11

80 246

242

6

380

15

793

7 235

6 NA

337 43

NA 15

386 407

47.6

50.0

85.2

100.0

75.8

100.0 42.9

50.0 NA

87.7 40.0

NA 100.0

87.3 54.0

16.5

33.3

63.4

26.7

44.6

100.0 14.0

33.3 NA

69.7 14.0

NA 26.7

69.2 21.4


GC through 2003 (337 out of 793), they account for very nearly two-thirds of such companies still active and in good standing by the end of 2006 (235 out of 354 companies, or 66.4%).

Evolution of the GC at the country/ regional level: Egypt and the Middle East A more detailed look at GC performance at the regional level presents a somewhat more nuanced picture. As of mid-2007, 82 Middle Eastern r 2008 The Author Journal compilation r 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

companies and SMEs had joined the GC (45 companies and 37 SMEs). As shown in Table 8, Egypt accounted for the largest share in both categories, with 49% of the companies and 40% of the SMEs. Overall, the picture with regard to compliance levels is not dissimilar from that in other developing regions. Of the 25 companies that joined before 2004 (and have therefore become subject to assessment for compliance), only five are active and in good standing, two are classified as non-communicating, and 18 are inactive.

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Table 8: The Global Compact in the Middle East National composition (% of total) Country

Companies

SMEs

All participants

Bahrain Egypt Jordan Kuwait Morocco Qatar Saudi Arabia Syrian Arab Republic Tunisia United Arab Emirates Total

4.4 48.9 4.4 0.0 4.4 6.7 0.0 0.0 24.4 6.7 100.0

0.0 40.5 5.4 2.7 10.8 2.7 5.4 2.7 18.9 10.8 100.0

2.4 45.1 4.9 1.2 7.3 4.9 2.4 1.2 22.0 8.5 100.0

Percentage of companies that are: All active companies in good standing 4.0 28.0 8.0 0.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 44.0 8.0 100.0

Active in good standing

Noncommunicating

Inactive

50.0 31.8 100.0 NA 100.0 0.0 NA NA 100.0 66.7 55.6

0.0 9.1 0.0 NA 0.0 0.0 NA NA 0.0 0.0 4.4

50.0 59.1 0.0 NA 0.0 100.0 NA NA 0.0 33.3 40.0


Egypt’s nine actively participating companies (not all in good standing) have produced a total of 11 COPs since 2002. A review of these documents indicates that they generally cover each of the 10 principles, but that their discussions of performance are long on assertions of compliance and almost entirely lacking in quantitative measures. Discussions of specific issues suggest that the Egyptian companies’ concept of such core issues as labour rights differs from international practice, with several companies asserting (in nearly identical language) that workers have freedom of association and collective bargaining rights because they are able to discuss any concerns they may have with the company’s human resources staff. At the same time, however, the companies have clearly made the effort to assess their compliance levels and several cite specific measures (such as workforce training, philanthropic activities in the local community, or waste reduction) that show that they are going beyond rhetoric to introduce compliance-related programming. The mere requirement to report thus may have a salutatory impact in motivating companies to examine their operations and to take action on some level to improve their profile in the GC’s 10 areas. This is

242

a small step forward, perhaps, but progress nonetheless.

Conclusions and future research agenda This preliminary review of the GC’s membership structure and compliance record demonstrates that the GC, although the largest CAI yet to emerge in the nascent CSR field, has not yet achieved the ‘critical mass’ that its founders defined as essential to its success. Even among the world’s largest firms, the GC has enlisted only 3% overall. Participation is heavily concentrated in Western Europe according to each of the measures examined here and membership growth is lagging in other industrialized and developing regions, particularly among leading corporations. Recent improvements have strengthened the GC’s reporting system, but this enhanced system only highlights the extent to which compliance with the GC’s modest requirements remains low. Fewer than half of all companies that joined before 2003 have achieved and maintained compliance. The GC’s implicit strategy – setting a tightly focused but modest standard to encourage rapid, broad-based membership growth and r 2008 The Author Journal compilation r 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.


gradually tightening standards – will produce the looked-for results only if the GC can elicit a higher degree of compliance from its members and ensure that compliance improves as the system grows. At present the converse holds: compliance is lower among members joining more recently, and lower in developing countries – to which the GC looks for its future growth – than in the industrialized world. The challenge of ensuring compliance will only increase as the GC grows, particularly as it extends further into developing countries. This issue must be addressed if the GC is to achieve its important objective of becoming a truly global standard that supports broad application of core CSR principles by industrialized and developing country corporations alike. Further research is needed to understand and assess the GC’s performance, particularly companies’ decision-making process with regard to joining the GC, regional differences in participation and compliance, and the GC’s impact on company transparency and CSR performance. Despite its limitations and evident growing pains, the GC’s first six years have established it in a lead role among CAIs that promote and sustain CSR. In the coming years, the GC must both expand its reach and deepen the rigour of its reporting system if it is to evolve into the truly global standard that its founders envisioned.

Notes 1. For example, it describes the GC’s success in terms of its size, stating that ‘the Global Compact has become the world’s largest and most widely embraced corporate citizenship initiative’ (p. 1), referring to the Compact as ‘an impressive network of nearly 2000 companies’ (p. 9), and discussing the strategies that the GC will use as it ‘seeks to manage growth and scale up efforts’ (p. 10). 2. Some of the newest CAIs (such as ICTI-CARE, the system established by the International Council of the Toy Industry) make participation mandatory for all members of the founding industry association, although such systems retain an element of voluntariness in that companies have


3.

4.

5.

6.

the option of withdrawing from the association if they do not wish to comply with the CAI standard. The distinction between privately held and stateowned, on the one hand, and publicly traded, on the other, is no longer a clear-cut one, particularly for the largest firms in these categories. Many of the leading parastatals and family firms in both the developing world and the OECD countries have chosen to list a portion of their shares on global exchanges, and thus would potentially fall within the Russell universe. Both the World Bank and its sister institution, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), have been active for several years in promoting public– private partnerships for CSR. The Equator Principles, a CAI established to promote CSR standards among banks engaged in project finance, is among the most successful of these initiatives. The World Bank and IFC also supported for several years a series of public–private partnership CAIs through the Business Partnerships for Development programme, which launched partnerships in such areas as road safety and natural resource management. Some of these partnerships have continued to operate without World Bank/IFC involvement. The term ‘home country’ refers to the country where a multinational is headquartered and incorporated, as opposed to the ‘host countries’ where it has operations. The 10 principles are grouped into two human rights principles, four labour standards, three environmental standards and a principle on anticorruption, as follows: Principle 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights; Principle 2: [Businesses should] make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses; Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; Principle 4: [Businesses should uphold] the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour; Principle 5: [Businesses should uphold] the effective abolition of child labour; Principle 6: [Businesses should uphold] the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation; Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges; Principle 8: [Businesses should] undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; Principle 9: [Businesses should] encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies;

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7.

8.

9.

10.

and Principle 10: Businesses should work against all forms of corruption, including extortion and bribery. United Nations, Global Compact Office (2008, 14). The other objective is to ‘catalyze actions in support of UN goals’. Further research is needed to determine whether this strategy was explicitly adopted internally or whether the progressive strengthening of the standard has been a reluctant response to NGO pressure. Based on a search of the GRI web-based directory (www.globalreporting.org) for all entities having filed reports following the GRI format, conducted in March 2007. For further details on the reporting process and links to other guidance, see the GC’s ‘Guidance on Communication on Progress’ (United Nations, Global Compact Office, 2007).

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Nike. 2006. Innovate for a Better World: Nike FY0506 Corporate Responsibility Report. http://www. nike.com/nikeresponsibility/pdfs/bw/Nike_FY05_ 06_CR_Report_BW.pdf Russell Investment Group. 2006. ‘Russell indices membership list as of June 30, 2006’, http://www. russell.com/Indexes/pdf/membership/global.pdf, accessed January 2007. Russell Investment Group. 2007. ‘Russell equity indexes membership’, http://www.russell.com/Indexes/mem bership/default.asp#Section1, accessed 27 March 2007. United Nations. 1999. ‘Secretary-General proposes Global Compact on human rights, labour, environment, in address to World Economic Forum in Davos’. Press Release SG/SM/6881, 1 February 1999, quoted in http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990201. sgsm6881.html, accessed 26 March 2007. United Nations, Global Compact Office. 2005a. ‘The Global Compact’s next phase’. 6 September 2005, http://www.globalcompact.org/docs/about_the_gc/ 2.3/gc_gov_framew.pdf, accessed 26 March 2007. United Nations, Global Compact Office. 2005b. ‘The United Nations Global Compact: advancing corporate citizenship’. June 2005, http://www.globalcompact. org/docs/about_the_gc/2.0.2.pdf, accessed 24 March 2007. United Nations, Global Compact Office. 2007. ‘After the Signature: A Guide to Engagement in the United Nations Global Compact’, http://unglobalcompact. org/docs/news_events/8.1/GC_welcome_kit_final_ 260307.pdf, accessed 28 April 2008. United Nations, Global Compact Office. 2008. ‘What is the UN Global Compact?’ 28 March 2008, http:// www.globalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html, accessed 28 April 2008. Waddock, S. 2002. ‘Creating the tipping point towards corporate responsibility: reflections on meeting expectations in the global economy’. Conference paper presented at University of Notre Dame, 21–23 April 2002, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/News AndEvents/articles_and_papers/university_of_notre_ dame_on_global_economy.html
