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Illiberal Democracy and Normative Democracy: How is Democracy Defined in the Americas?

Julio F. Carrión Department of Political Science and International Relations University of Delaware [email protected]

Draft. Please do not cite without permission

This paper is Chapter 2 of Challenges to Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from the AmericasBarometer 2006, edited by Mitchell A. Seligson.

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Illiberal Democracy and Normative Democracy: How is Democracy Defined in the Americas? Julio F. Carrión University of Delaware The analysis of public opinion and its attitudes toward democracy has recently become a subject of much interest in Latin America. Without doubt, the efforts of the AmericasBarometer conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) will encourage further interest in this important topic. An important milestone in the analysis of public attitudes towards democracy was the publication by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) of Democracia en América Latina (PNUDPRODDAL 2004). This report offers a gloomy assessment of Latin Americans’ commitment to democracy. Although it finds that a majority of the respondents support democracy as an ideal form of government, it argues that this support is shallow. According to the study (PNUD-PRODDAL 2004, 132), a significant segment of the public is willing to sacrifice a democratic government in favor of real socioeconomic progress. This report (PNUD-PRODDAL 2004, 134) classifies 43 percent of Latin Americans as “democrats” and 26 percent of them as “non-democrats.” The UNDP identify a category for those who are “ambivalent,” that is, have contradictory views about democracy: they choose democracy as their preferred system of government but are also willing to support authoritarian or “delegative” acts “when circumstances merit it.” According to this report (PNUD-PRODDAL 2004, 137), what differentiates democrats from those who are ambivalent is their attitude toward the tension between democracy and economic development: “democrats” are not willing to sacrifice the former for the latter whereas the “ambivalents” are. Based on the UNDP study, it appears that the commitment to democracy among many Latin Americans is, to use the term developed by Bratton and Mattes (2001a), merely instrumental. That is, people support democracy because of the material benefits expected from it and not because of the normative values that democracy embodies. In their study of public attitudes toward democracy in Africa, Bratton and Mattes (2001a) confront this issue of the “instrumental versus normative” foundations of support for democracy head on, and find contradictory evidence. On the one hand, they report (2001a, 473) that “[t]he fact that African survey respondents support democracy while being far from content with its concrete achievements suggests a measure of intrinsic support for the democratic regime form that supersedes instrumental considerations.” On the other hand, they also argue (idem) that “the general public in African countries thinks instrumentally: in other words, support for democracy hinges critically upon popular approval of government achievements.” Echoing this ambivalence about the foundations of the support for democracy, Bratton and Mattes (2001b, 118-119) write in another article that “in at least five of our six countries [in Africa], popular support for democracy has a strong instrumental

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component. Citizens extend support to a democratic regime in good part because they are satisfied with its performance in delivering desired good and services. Yet 21 percent of all survey respondents…say that they support democracy in principle even though they are dissatisfied with the performance of their own regime. These citizens value democracy intrinsically, that is, not merely as a means of delivering development but as an end in itself.” A more recent study (Mattes and Bratton 2007), confirms that support for democracy is driven by both normative concerns and instrumental considerations. Two conclusions can be made from the previous discussion. First, stating that the majority of people support democracy in Latin America is not the end of the analysis but the beginning of it. What kind of democracy do people have in mind when they say they support democracy? What important cross-national variations in these definitions and in the levels of support for democracy can be found in Latin America? How deep and consistent is the commitment to democracy? What are the factors that foster a stronger commitment to democracy? The second point to be made is that we do not need to ask whether support for democracy in Latin America is driven by normative commitments or instrumental considerations. Clearly, it is driven by both. What we need to do is “unpack” the idea of instrumental support. For instance, do people accept democracy because they like the incumbent, or perceive an improvement in their economic condition, or because they trust their political institutions? Is it the perception of personal threat that drives their attitudes towards regimes, or is it people’s satisfaction with the way democracy is working in general? In the following pages I address the previous questions. I start the analysis by examining people’s conceptualizations of democracy. Then I examine how these conceptualizations relate to support for democracy. After that, I examine the depth of democratic commitments, exploring mass support for liberal and illiberal forms of democracy. In this section I propose a more robust way to measure attitudinal support for democracy. I conclude the analysis by identifying the factors associated with support for liberal democracy. A summary section ends the chapter.

Mass Conceptualizations of Democracy Before proceeding with the analysis of the conceptualizations of democracy among the public, it is important to examine first the overall degree of support for democracy in the region. For the entire Latin American and Caribbean sample, 65.7 percent prefer democracy while 14.6 percent support an authoritarian government, and 11 percent are indifferent (an additional 8.7 percent does not answer the question). When those who don’t answer the question are removed from the calculation, support for democracy rises to 72 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean. In some countries, however, people are quite reluctant or unable to declare a regime preference. In Guatemala almost 20 percent of the respondents refuse to answer the question. In Mexico, Colombia, and Nicaragua, ten percent or more of the respondents are in similar situation (Haiti is a borderline case, with 9.6 percent declining

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the answer the question). One could hypothesize that these countries have large rural and/or poorly educated populations that do not have the sophistication of expression to answer a question like this. This, however, does not explain why refusal rates are much lower in countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, or Honduras, which also have large rural and poorly educated populations. Maybe support for democracy is related to the ability to define it, as Mattes and Bratton (2007) argue. This section explores this hypothesis. The 2006 LAPOP questionnaire asked the following open-ended question: “In a few words, what is the meaning of democracy for you?” Respondents could provide up to three different definitions. They were then asked to specify (if they mentioned more than one definition) which of their definitions was the most important. Table I.1 reports the summary of the multiple answers given to this question (the table does not include respondents from Canada and the United States). Three quarters of Latin American and Caribbean respondents were able provide a definition of democracy. Surprisingly, this is almost the exact proportion of respondents who could provide a definition of democracy in a study of six African nations in 1999-2000 (Bratton and Mattes 2001b, 108). In Canada, however, only 15.5% could not provide any response, while in the U.S. it was only 8.5%. Among the different meanings assigned to democracy, the single most important was “freedom of expression” (19.5 percent) followed by “liberty” (9.4 percent). Before grouping all these definitions into more recognizable clusters it is necessary to examine cross-national variations in the ability to provide any definition of democracy. To analyze cross-national variations, I collapse the information provided in Table I.1 into two groups. The first group is composed by all the respondents who provided a definition of democracy, even if it had a negative connotation. The other group was composed of all of those who could not assign a meaning to the term. Figure I.1 gives the distribution of this variable (“ability to define democracy”) in the countries in which this question was asked in 2006.

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Table 0-1 Mass Conceptualizations of Democracy, 2006

Count

Percent

Valid Percent

It does not have any meaning

4995

22.2

25.6

Liberty (without specifying what type)

1841

8.2

9.4

Economic liberty

387

1.7

2.0

Liberty of expression, voting, choice, and human right

3793

16.9

19.5

Liberty of movement

363

1.6

1.9

Liberty, lack of

118

.5

.6

Being independent

400

1.8

2.1

Well being, economic progress, growth

465

2.1

2.4

Well being, Lack of, no economic progress

89

.4

.5

Capitalism

27

.1

.1

Free trade, free business

96

.4

.5

Employment, more opportunities of

301

1.3

1.5

Employment, lack of

169

.8

.9

Right to choose leaders

714

3.2

3.7

Elections, voting

376

1.7

1.9

Free elections

318

1.4

1.6

Fraudulent elections

14

.1

.1

Equality (without specifying)

900

4.0

4.6

Economic equality, or equality of classes

219

1.0

1.1

Gender equality

170

.8

.9

Equality before the laws

193

.9

1.0

Racial or ethnic equality

81

.4

.4

Equality, Lack of, inequality

73

.3

.4

Limitations of participation

52

.2

.3

Participation (without saying which type)

380

1.7

1.9

Participation of minorities

63

.3

.3

Power of the people

361

1.6

1.9

Human rights, respect rights

600

2.7

3.1

Disorder, lack of justice, corruption

156

.7

.8

Justice

238

1.1

1.2

Obey the law, less corruption

171

.8

.9

Non military government

52

.2

.3

Live in peace, without war

713

3.2

3.7

War, invasions

18

.1

.1

Other answer

596

2.6

3.1

19500

86.7

100.0

Total Missing Total

3000

13.3

22500

100.0

5

100.0% 8.5

12.5 12.8

15.5

19.3 21.3 21.8 23.0 25.0 27.1

80.0%

31.3 31.4 32.0 32.1 33.5 34.6 34.6

Yes No

%

60.0%

91.5

40.0%

87.5 87.2

84.5

80.7 78.7 78.2 77.0 75.0 72.9

68.7 68.6 68.0 67.9 66.5 65.4 65.4

20.0%

0.0% r do va al s lS E ura lic d ub on ep H .R om D a an a uy gu G a ar la ic a N m te ua ia G b om ol ay C u ag ar P ca ai m Ja ti ai a H am an P o ic ex M u er P a ad an C le ca hi i C R ta os C A

S U

Figure 0-1 Ability to Define Democracy

Figure I.1shows two clusters, one in which 80 percent or more of the respondents can provide a definition of democracy (Peru, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, and the United States), and another where less than 70 percent of the interviewees can do so (Colombia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Honduras). In the first group, with the exception of Peru, we have countries with a strong tradition of democratic rule (despite the 1973-1990 interregnum in Chile). The second group, with the exception of Colombia and Guyana, is composed by Central American countries. Bratton and Mattes (2001b, 117) argue that “individuals who cannot define democracy are much less attached to it as a preferred form of regime.” The overall evidence from the Americas seems to support this view. When the entire pool data (without including respondents from the United States and Canada) are analyzed, the ability to define democracy is found to increase support for it, 1 and the effect is moderately strong. For instance, 65 percent of those who cannot provide a definition of democracy are quite willing to say that they prefer it over authoritarianism. 2 Among 1

For purposes of this analysis, non support for democracy is defined as those who did not choose the option “democracy is always preferable.” Those who did not answer the question on support for democracy were removed from the analysis. 2 Support for democracy is measured by agreement with the following option: “Democracy is preferable to any other form of government.” Support for authoritarianism is measure by agreement with the following: “Under some circumstances an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one.” Regime

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those who can define it, support for democracy rises to 74 percent. The difference is 9 percent points and although statistically significant, it is not overwhelming. In some countries in the Americas, however, the impact of the ability to define democracy on its support is quite strong (Figure I.2). In the advanced democracies, we see a very strong correlation between the ability to define democracy and support for it. In the United States, for instance, those who can provide a definition of democracy were twice as likely to support it as those who cannot define it. In Canada, the difference in the levels of support for democracy between those who can define it and those who can’t is about 30 percent points. In Latin America and the Caribbean, we also find that some countries exhibit a strong correlation between the ability to define democracy and support for it. In Peru support for democracy is 19 percent points higher among those who can offer a definition than it is among those who cannot. In Paraguay the difference is 27 percent points; in Colombia the difference is 15 points. In other countries, such as Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, and Costa Rica there is no statistically significant difference in the levels of support for democracy between those who can define it and those who cannot. No pattern is immediately clear to explain why in some countries the ability to define democracy is so intertwined with its level of support.

Can define democracy

102% 96%

No

90%

Yes

84%

% Support Democracy

78% 72% 66% 60% 54% 48% 89 88

42% 75

36% 30% 24% 18%

64

79 79

82

61

62

65

66

84

80 81 80

76

72 71

75

74

71

69

66

66 61

59

81

77 70

61 53

52

40 32

12% 6% 0% A S U a ad an C a an uy G ca ai m Ja lic tí ub ai H ep .R om D le hi y C ua ag ar P u er a P bi om ol C a am a an ic P R ta a os u C ag ar ic s N ra du r on do H va al a lS al E m te ua G o ic ex M

Figure 0-2 Support for Democracy by the Ability to Define it indifference is measured by agreement with the following: “For people like us, a democratic regime is the same as a non-democratic one.”

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Let’s return to the definitions of democracy listed in Table I.1. These can be grouped in more meaningful ways to facilitate the analysis. The question is what categories to use? Democracy is a concept with multiple meanings that is the product of more than 2,500 years of history (Dahl 1989; Dunn 2005; Held 1996; Touraine 1997). There are many ways to classify the multiplicity of its definitions. One is to group all the possible definitions into the traditional meanings associated with democracy: liberty, equality, protection against arbitrary rule, and participation. This is the strategy that, in general terms, was initially adopted by C. B. Macpherson (1977) and later developed by Held (1996). Another way is to follow Dalh’s (1956) insight, and define democracy in either procedural or substantive terms. Yet another way of approaching this task is to define democracy based on the source of rationality underscoring the belief (Bratton and Mattes 2001a; Mattes and Bratton 2007; Sarsfield 2003; Sarsfield and Echegaray 2006; Sarsfield and Carrión 2006). One could hold a given belief, in this case democracy, because it is associated with certain values that are considered to be desirable (i.e., liberty, equality, justice). Alternatively, one could hold that belief because it produces certain goods or utilities (i.e., economic progress, development). In the first case, the commitment with democracy is normative because it is based on an axiomatic rationality; in the second case, it is instrumental because it is based on a means/end rationality. Democracy can also be defined, from this perspective, in pejorative or negative terms, because it “produces” an undesirable outcome (i.e., civil war, violence, disorder). And, of course, people could have no conceptualization of democracy at all (an “empty” definition). This is the classificatory strategy that it will be followed here because it builds on Bratton and Mattes’s successful and pathbreaking analyses of African public opinion. Table I.2 lists the definitions presented in Table I.1 and how they relate to our four definitions of democracy based on the rationality of the belief. We can now examine if the way people define democracy is related to its support. The data show that those who define democracy in normative terms are only slightly more likely to support it than those who define it in instrumental terms (76 and 71 percent, respectively). The most important difference in the levels of support for democracy is found between those who define it in negative terms and those who conceptualize it in normative terms: 63 percent and 76 percent, respectively (Figure I.3; data from the U.S. and Canada are not included in this figure). In only a handful of countries, the difference in the level of support for democracy between those who define it in normative terms and those who define it in instrumental terms exceeds 10 percent points. These countries include the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Chile. In seven countries, the differences between those who see democracy in normative ways and those who define it instrumentally are less than 5 percent points. Thus, while one can perceive an association between certain definitions of democracy and support for it, one can conclude with a certain degree of confidence that support for democracy in Latin America is not primarily determined by the way people define it but rather by the ability to define it (in either positive or negative ways).

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Table 0-2 Conceptualizations of Democracy Based on the Rationality of the Belief Normative -Liberty (without specifying what type)

Instrumental -Free trade, free

Empty -It doesn’t have

Pejorative -Lack of liberty

-Liberty of expression, voting, choice and human rights

business

any meaning

-Lack of well

-Liberty of movement

-Economic liberty

-Other answer

being, no

-Liberty, lack of

-Well being, economic

-DK/NA

economic progress

-Right to choose leaders

progress, growth

-Lack of

-Elections, voting

-Capitalism

employment

-Free elections

-Employment, more

-Fraudulent

-Equality (without specifying)

opportunities of

elections

-Economic equality, equality of classes

-Lack of equality,

-Gender equality

inequality

-Equality before the laws

-Limitations of

-Racial or ethnic equality

participation

-Participation (without specifying which type)

-Disorder, lack of

-Participation of minorities

justice, corruption

-Power of the people

-War, invasions

-Respect for human rights -Justice -Obey the law, less corruption -Non-military government -Live in peace, without war

84% 80%

Pejorative

76%

Empty Instrumental

72%

Normative

68% 64% 60% 56% 52%

%

48% 44% 40%

75.7%

36%

70.9%

32%

63.4%

65.8%

28% 24% 20% 16% 12%

36.6%

34.2% 29.1% 24.3%

8% 4% 0%

Doesn't Support Democracy

Support Democracy

Figure 0-3 Conceptualizations of and Support for Democracy

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How Consistent is the Support for Democracy? It should be said from the outset that an expressed preference for democracy does not inoculate the Latin American public from embracing illiberal or even outright authoritarian alternatives. The inconsistencies of mass preferences for democracy are not a novel finding. In a pioneering and classic study, James Prothro and Charles Grigg (1960) found that people who manifest support for democracy in the abstract do not always endorse democratic choice in more concrete domains. What we need to ask is, then, how deep or consistent is expressed support for democracy, and what factors make people more consistently supportive of democracy? To answer this question I will, first, explore the extent to which self-professed democrats 3 also endorse authoritarian and illiberal choices. In the next section I explore what factors are associated with preference for liberal forms of democratic rule. A traditional threat to democracy in Latin America has been the sudden overthrow of civilian governments by a military coup. One would expect that those who endorse democracy over authoritarianism would be less reluctant to support a potential coup d’état. This is indeed the case. Figure I.4 reports the mean scores of support for military coups by regime preference. As expected, the strongest support for military coups is found among those who declare a preference for an authoritarian regime and the lowest is reported among those who declare a preference for democracy. But the important point of this figure is that a sizable portion of self-professed democrats are ready to support military coups under some circumstances. 4 For instance, 18 percent of those who endorse democracy declare that a military coup to confront high unemployment would be justified. Similarly, and more worrisome, 47 percent of self-declared democrats would justify a military coup to fight delinquency. In similar vein, 42 percent of those who endorse democracy would justify a military coup to fight excessive corruption. Clearly, determining the proportion of people who endorse democracy as an ideal form of government is a necessary first step in our efforts to examine the diffusion of democratic attitudes in the region. But the data just presented also suggest that to determine how deep democratic attitudes are in the region, we need to look beyond the formal endorsement of democracy as an ideal form of government.

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Those who choose the option “Democracy is preferable to any other form of government” in the question described in footnote 2 are considered “self-professed democrats” here. 4 Our survey asked a series of questions, including whether a military coup will be justified under a series of circumstances: to confront high unemployment, to control social protest, to stop delinquency, to fight inflation, and to fight corruption. For each positive answer, a score of one was assigned. The resulting index was then transformed so it would range from zero (no support for coups under any circumstances) to 100 (support under all circumstances).

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52

Mean Scale of Support for Coups

48 44 40 36 32 28 24 43.6

20 16

36.5 31.1

12 8 4 0

Democracy is always preferable

For people like us, it doesn't matter

Authoritarian government could be preferable

With which phrase are you most in agreement? Barras de error: 95% IC

Figure 0-4 Mean Scores of Support for Military Coups by Regime Preference

Today, the authoritarianism that Latin America faces is different from the traditional military coup. In a disturbing development, some Latin American democracies seem to have been at least partially undermined by elected presidents who use their considerable popular support to erode the precarious democratic foundations of their respective nations. This situation is a manifestation of a larger trend of democratic devaluation in the developing world, a phenomenon characterized by Diamond (1999) as “the globalization of hollow democracy.” While externally maintaining formal democratic institutions, many elected governments systematically engage in antidemocratic behaviors aimed at the elimination of credible challenges to their rule. The emergence and growth of these regimes have led some observers to characterize them as electoral or competitive authoritarianism (Carrión 2006; Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2006). Democratic reversals in Latin America are more likely to come today from publics who elect and reelect overbearing presidents bent on aggrandizing their own powers at the expense of the legislature and the courts than from traditional military coups. Until recently, former President Alberto Fujimori of Peru was the best example of this emerging authoritarianism, but the 2000 reelection of coup-plotter Hugo Chávez in Venezuela along with subsequent developments there suggest the establishment of another electoral authoritarian regime in the region. Recent political crises in Bolivia and Ecuador have at their root the fears of the opposition that a similar path may be engulfing their countries, as presidents use their popularity to undermine existing (and very unpopular) legislatures. In extreme cases, elected presidents have openly assumed dictatorial powers, as was the case in Peru in April of 1992 and in Guatemala in May of 1993 (an attempt that was eventually defeated). Evidently no single reason can explain why the presidential authoritarian takeover was successful in Peru and not in Guatemala, 11

but popular support/opposition was certainly an important factor in these diverging outcomes. Whereas Fujimori’s self-coup generated significant public approval in Peru (Conaghan 1995; Carrión 2006), Serrano’s similar action was rejected outright in Guatemala (Cameron 1998, 133). This discrepancy highlights the risks of mass support for civilian forms of authoritarianism. As the PNUD-PRODDAL report concludes (2004, 137), “democracies become vulnerable when, among other factors, authoritarian political forces find in citizens’ attitudes a fertile ground to act.” For this reason, the AmericasBarometer 2006 probes potential mass support for illiberal acts against the legislatures, the courts, the opposition, and the laws in general by elected chief executives. In order to do that, the 2006 questionnaire developed a new series, asking the following questions: I am going to read out several pairs of statements. Taking into account the current situation of this country, I would like you to tell me with which of the following two statements you agree with the most? POP1. [Read the options] 1. It is necessary for the progress of this country that our presidents/prime ministers limit the voice and vote of opposition parties [or, on the contrary] 2. Even if they slow the progress of this country, our presidents should not limit the voice and vote of opposition parties. POP2. [Read the options] 1. The Congress hinders the work of our presidents/prime ministers, and should be ignored [or, on the contrary] 2. Even when it hinders the work of the president/prime minister, our presidents/prime ministers should not bypass the Congress. POP3. [Read the options] 1. Judges frequently hinder the work of our presidents/prime ministers, and they should be ignored. [or, on the contrary] 2. Even when judges sometimes hinder the work of our presidents/prime ministers, their decisions should always be obeyed. POP4. [Read the options] 1. Our presidents/prime ministers should have the necessary power so that they can act in the national interest. [or, on the contrary] 2. The power of our presidents/prime ministers should be limited so that they do not endanger our liberties POP5. [Read the options] 1. Our presidents/prime ministers should do what the people want even when laws prevent them from doing so. [or, on the contrary] 2. Our presidents/prime ministers should obey the laws even when the people don’t want them to.

It is encouraging to report that in all five questions, the liberal answer (presidents should follow the law) prevailed over the illiberal response. Without including those who did not volunteer an answer, 73 percent declared that presidents should not limit the opposition, 80 percent asserted that they should not bypass the Congress, 80 percent demanded that they obey judges, 58 percent wanted their powers to be limited, and 70 percent thought that they should obey the laws. 5 5

All these five questions were added in a summary index of support for liberal rule. When a respondent answered four of these questions, the average value of these questions was imputed to the missing fifth answer. This was done in an effort to keep as many valid cases as possible. To facilitate the analysis, each question was numerically transformed so that the resulting index will have a range from 0 to 100. Values below 50 indicate low support for liberal rule, and consequently values at or above 50 indicate high support

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Despite these encouraging figures, it is also clear that many self-professed democrats chose the illiberal response in these questions. For instance, 24 percent of those who chose democracy as the ideal form of government selected the illiberal answer in question POP1. In POP4, 41 percent of self-professed democrats chose the illiberal answer. This, of course, raises the issue of how deep or consistent is their democratic commitment. One way to measure support for democracy in a more robust fashion is to combine regime preferences with attitudes about how political authority should be exercised. If we take regime preferences, 6 collapsing the three choices into two, one for the democratic choice and the other for those who prefer authoritarianism (or are indifferent) and combine them with the index of support for liberal rule (dichotomizing the index into low and high support) we obtain the following theoretical situations (Table I.2).

Table 0-3 Conceptual Relationship between Regime Preference and Constraints on Political Authority Regime Preference Constraints on political authority

Democracy

Non Democracy

Liberal rule

Liberal democracy

Liberal authoritarianism

Illiberal rule

Illiberal democracy

Illiberal authoritarianism

The optimal choice for the consolidation of a healthy democracy is the combination of attitudes that favor democratic rule with constraints on the power of presidents or prime ministers to exert their political power. Those who exhibit such a combination of preferences are labeled here “liberal democrats.” I will center the analysis on them. All the other choices are sub-optimal for the prospects of democratic rule, but the worst possible combination is the one that pairs preference for authoritarian forms of government (or indifference between them) with support for the illiberal exercise of executive power. The distribution of these attitudes for the entire sample is shown in Table I.4. While 73 percent of the respondents favor democracy (this figure excludes those who do for liberal rule. For the entire sample, 82 percent of the respondents have values at or above 50 in the scale. These questions were not asked in Bolivia and Ecuador. 6 Measured by the responses to the following question: With which of these phrases are you most in agreement? Democracy is preferable to any other form of government; under some circumstances an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one; for people like us, a democratic regime is the same as a non-democratic one.

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not answer the question), 60 percent of all respondents can be labeled as liberal democrats, that is, they support democracy and constraints on the exercise of political power. It is encouraging to find that less than 10 percent of those interviewed in 2006 favor the worst possible combination of support for illiberal rule and preference for non democracy.

Table 0-4 Support for Liberal Democracy and Illiberal Democracy

Support for Democracy Constraints on Power

Total

Democrats

Non Democrats

Total

Liberal Rule

59.8%

20.2%

80.0%

Illiberal Rule

13.1%

6.9%

20.0%

72.9%

27.1%

100.0%

Is this a valid or useful classification? One way to validate it is by using it to predict certain attitudes that are related to support or rejection of democratic values. If the classification has validity, it should help us predict, for instance, levels of political tolerance, with liberal democrats being more tolerant that illiberal non democrats. Similarly, if this is a valid classification it should be able to differentiate between those who endorse social authoritarian values from those who do not, with liberal democrats being less socially authoritarian than illiberal authoritarians. 7 Figures I.5 and I.6 display the means of political tolerance and authoritarian values for each our four “regime x authority” groups. In each case, the results are in the expected direction and, more importantly, they are monotonic, meaning than liberal democrats are more tolerant and less socially authoritarian than illiberal democrats, and in turn illiberal democrats are more tolerant and less conservative than liberal authoritarians, with the illiberal authoritarians ranking last in both attitudes.

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It should be noted that the questions utilized to measure social authoritarianism do not have a political content. They ask whether the respondent agrees with the following statements: “a very effective way of correcting employees’ mistakes is to criticize them in front of other employees;” “the person who contributes the most money to the home is the one who should have the final word in household decisions;” “at school, children should ask questions only when the teacher allows it;” “when children behave badly, parents are justified in occasionally giving them a spanking.”

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Mean Scale of Political Tolerance

60

55

59.6

55.4

50

54.8

51.6

45

Liberal Democrats

Illiberal Democrats

Liberal Authoritarians

Illiberal Authoritarians

Barras de error: 95% IC

Figure 0-5 Political Tolerance by Regime Preference and Support for Liberal Rule

Mean Scale of authoritarian values

35

30 33.4

31.6 30.2

28.2

25

Liberal Democrats

Illiberal Democrats

Liberal Authoritarians

Illiberal Authoritarians


Figure 0-6 Social Authoritarianism by Regime Preference and Support for Liberal Rule

As expected, there is important cross-national variation in the distribution of liberal democrats (Figure I.5). Countries with strong democratic traditions, such as Costa Rica, and those with strong parliamentary histories, such as Jamaica, report the highest number of liberal democrats. Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, and Chile follow. On the other hand, Haiti, that has the third highest percentage of people declaring

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a preference democracy over authoritarianism, falls to next to last place when we qualify preference for democracy with support for liberal rule. Paraguay exhibits the lowest levels of attitudinal support for liberal democracy. Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru, all countries with spotty democratic records, follow Paraguay and Haiti as having the lowest percentages of liberal democrats. To have a better understanding of the factors that help discriminate between liberal democrats and those who have other regime/authority preferences it is necessary to go beyond national differences. It is imperative to explore the personal characteristics of each of these groups. This is what it is done in the next section. 84 80 76

Mean Support for Liberal Democracy

72 68 64 60 56 52 48 44 40 36

73.9

71.9

71.3 65.6

32 28

64.0

61.4

59.3

58.7

58.3

57.3

55.3

24

51.1

50.0

49.0 42.7

20 16 12 8 4 0

y ua ag ar P ti a ai al H m te ua ua

G

ic N

ag ar

u er a P bi om ol C a am r an do P va al lS E o ic ex M le hi C a lic an ub uy G ep .R om s D ra du on H ca ai m a ic Ja R

ta os

C


Figure 0-7 Distribution of Liberal Democrats by Country

Who Is More Likely to Embrace Liberal Democracy? An attitude, such as support for the liberal exercise of democracy, cannot have just one single factor determining it. Attitudes are influenced by personal characteristics, such as gender, education, and place of residence, as well as formative life experiences, personality traits and other attitudes such as, in this particular case, evaluations of the political system. It is useful to distinguish all these different influences when trying to determine their impact on support for liberal democracy. Thus, I develop five models that explain membership in the “liberal democracy” cell as opposed to those who fall in

16

the “illiberal democracy” cell or the “authoritarian” cells (to simplify the statistical analysis and the discussion, liberal and illiberal authoritarians are aggregated into a single category). The first model includes sociodemographic characteristics: gender, age, education, material wealth (a way to measure socioeconomic status), residence in rural or urban areas, and whether the respondent grew up in a rural area or in a town or city. In addition to these factors, I include two variables associated with interest in and knowledge of politics. 8 This is our baseline model. The second model includes, in addition to the previous variables, a series of questions associated with Putnam’s work on social capital (Putnam 1993) and Inglehart’s (1977; 1988) theory that general satisfaction with one’s life is associated with stronger democratic attitudes. The core of the social capital theory is that a stronger associational life and trust in others foster the development of democratic values. Accordingly, I include a scale of participation in civil society organizations, a question probing the respondent’s level of interpersonal trust, and another inquiring about the respondent’s level of satisfaction with his or her life. The third model tries to determine whether perceptions of personal or economic threat affect our redefined regime choices. The underlying theory is that threat perception increases a person’s propensity to support authoritarian alternatives (Altemeyer 1996; Fromm 1941; Stenner 2005). The longing for security and predictability is thought to be a psychological mechanism that leads people with an elevated threat perception to endorse authoritarianism. To measure the sense of personal security I employ three variables. The first question asks the respondent to assess how safe she feels in her neighborhood. The second question probes whether the respondent has been a victim of a crime in the previous year. The last variable is an index of the total number of corruption acts that the respondent experienced in the year previous to the survey. To measure economic insecurity, two standard questions are utilized: the respondent’s retrospective assessment of both his or her personal situation and the country’s. The assumption is that those who have negative views of their personal or the country’s economic situation will have a lower sense of economic security than those who have a more positive evaluation of the economy. While the previous model centers on threat perceptions, the fourth model focuses its attention on evaluations of political performance. As Bratton and Mattes (2001a; 2007) argue, there is evidence that support for democracy is partially driven by assessments of how well the political system is functioning. The impact of two types of political assessments, one that is specifically related to the incumbent’s performance and 8

Interest in politics is measured by the answer to two questions: a) “How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none;” b) “How frequently do you watch the news on TV: every day, one or twice a week, rarely, or never?” The responses were recoded so they would go from low to high interest. Political knowledge was measured by a scale that added the correct answers to five questions of general political knowledge (see battery of “GI” items in the questionnaire). Political knowledge has been found to be an important predictor of many political attitudes (Althaus 2003; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Grofman 1995).

17

the other that is more generally related to the performance of the political system is explored. In the latter case, three variables are used: a scale of system support, a scale of trust in political institutions, and a question that measures the respondent’s satisfaction “with the way in which democracy functions” in his or her country. Finally, the fifth model adds to all the previously mentioned influences two variables that measure ideology (on the traditional left-right scale) and a scale of social authoritarian values (which, as I mentioned before, it is not “contaminated” with political content). Following the work of Altemeyer on conventionalism (1996), I hypothesize that those who are on the socially authoritarian side the spectrum (displaying support for patriarchal and authoritarian conventions) are more likely to support authoritarian forms of government. The table reporting the full results for the five models is attached at the end of the chapter. Table I-5 summarizes the results in a non-technical fashion, providing the sign of the relationship for only those predictors that turn out to be statistically significant. Predictors that are not significant are noted as “ns.” The reference category in the table is those who support authoritarianism (whether in its liberal or illiberal variants). To analyze the results, I will compare, first, the factors that differentiate those who support liberal democracy from those who endorse authoritarian forms of government. After that, I will analyze the differences between those who support illiberal forms of democracy versus those who endorse authoritarianism. The summary table suggests that three sociodemographic factors are consistent predictors of support for liberal democracy. Older citizens are more likely to be classified as liberal democrats (based on their answers to the questions on regime preference and how executive power should be exercised) than younger voters (Figure I8). This finding is entirely understandable but nonetheless troublesome. Older citizens grew up in a period when many Latin American countries were experiencing military rule. They probably remember well the abuses associated with these regimes and the citizens’ efforts to dislodge them from power. Younger citizens, on the other hand, were socialized in a different environment. They never experienced regimes other than the often weak and troubled democratic governments that characterize a good part of the region; therefore they lack the comparative reference afforded to those who had lived under authoritarian regimes. Not surprisingly, the association between age and regime choice is very consistent and remains significant even when variables associated with political performance and democratic values are introduced in the analysis. The evidence also shows that liberal democrats, in comparison to authoritarians, are more educated and more likely to have spent their formative years in towns or cities than authoritarians. These findings are consistent with what one would expect, as both education and early socialization in urban areas are thought to be related with stronger democratic preferences.

18

Table 0-5 Predictor Variables of Support for Liberal and Illiberal Democracy (Summary) Baseline Model

Social Capital

Threat Perception

Political Performance

Values

Age in years

+

+

+

+

+

Gender (0=Women)

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

Education in years

+

+

+

+

+

Material wealth

+

ns

ns

ns

ns

Hometown (0=countryside)

+

+

+

+

+

Hometown (0=city)

ns

ns

ns

+

ns

Place of residence (0=rural areas)

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

Watch news on TV

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

Interest in politics

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

Political knowledge

+

+

+

+

+

Associational life

ns

ns

ns

ns

Interpersonal trust

+

+

ns

ns

Life satisfaction

+

+

ns

ns

Feels safe in his/her neighborhood

ns

ns

ns

Has been a victim of crime (0=No)

ns

ns

ns

Index of corruption victimization

-

ns

ns

Retrospective eval. of personal economic situation

ns

ns

ns

Retrospective eval. of country’s economic situation

-

-

-

Presidential approval

ns

ns

System support

+

ns

Trust in political institutions

ns

ns

Satisfaction with the way democracy works

+

+

Predictor Variables I. Liberal Democrats

Ideology

ns

Scale of authoritarian values

-

Scale of political tolerance

+

II. Illiberal Democrats Age in years

+

+

+

+

+

Gender (0=Women)

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

Education in years

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

Material wealth

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns


ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

Hometown (0=city)

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns


-

-

-

-

-

Watch news on TV

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns


ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

Political knowledge

+

+

+

+

+

19

Associational life

ns

ns

ns

ns

Interpersonal trust

+

ns

ns

ns

Life satisfaction

+

ns

ns

ns


ns

ns

ns


ns

ns

ns


ns

ns

ns

Retrospective eval. of personal economic situation

ns

ns

ns

Retrospective eval. of country’s economic situation

-

-

-


-

-

System support

ns

ns


ns

ns


+

+

Ideology

ns


-

Scale of political tolerance

+

Reference category: Authoritarians; ns=no significant. Variables not included in the model are shaded.

Neither TV news watching nor interest in politics increases the likelihood of choosing liberal forms of democracy over authoritarian governance. On the other hand, and consistent with our previous finding about the role of education, having higher levels of political knowledge is associated with a greater likelihood of belonging in the liberal democracy cell. Turning to variables associated with the social capital approach, the data show very mixed support for the view that interpersonal trust or membership in civil society organizations strengthen commitment to democratic values. When included along with the variables that constitute our baseline model, both interpersonal trust and associational life emerge as significant predictors of membership in the liberal democracy group. They are also significant when they are included in the perception of threat model. However, when political performance, ideology, political tolerance, and social authoritarianism variables are taken into account, the effect of social capital variables disappears. A similar pattern can be detected when the impact of life satisfaction on support for liberal democracy is analyzed. The impact is positive and significant when it is first introduced, but when performance and other attitudinal variables are included, its influence vanishes.

20

39 38

Mean Age

38 38 37 36 36 Liberal Democrats

Illiberal Democrats

Authoritarians

Figure 0-8 Regime Preference/Support for Liberal Rule by Age

There is also mixed support for the thesis that elevated levels of threat perception depress support for liberal forms of democracy. Whether a person has been victim of a crime does not make him or her less likely to support democracy. Nor is the sense of personal insecurity associated with regime preferences. This is relatively good news because it implies that the increase in crime that the region is experiencing is not affecting, at least not yet, attitudes towards liberal democracy. On the other hand, I do find that greater personal experience with corruption and negative evaluations of the national economy diminish the likelihood that a respondent will prefer liberal democracy over authoritarianism. While the impact on corruption on preference for democracy is not consistent across all models, negative retrospective evaluations of the national economy are. People who believe that the country’s economic is worse today than it was in the previous are less likely to support liberal democracy and more likely to embrace authoritarianism (Figure I-9). This effect does not disappear when political performance and other attitudinal variables are included in the analysis.

21

72% 68%

Better

64%

Same

60%

Worse

56% 52% 48% 44%

%

40% 36% 32% 28%

63.0%

62.4% 56.5%

24% 20% 16%

30.5%

12%

23.7%

8%

13.3%

13.0%

24.6%

13.0%

4% 0%

Liberal Democrats

Illiberal Democrats

Authoritarians


Figure 0-9 Regime Preference/Support for Liberal Rule by Retrospective Evaluations of the Country’s economy

Model 4 examines how important are assessments of the political system, trust in political institutions, presidential approval and general satisfaction with the way democracy is working in the support for liberal democracy. The results indicate that preference for liberal democracy is not affected by assessments of the incumbent performance or trust in political institutions. Similarly, while system support emerges as a positive, significant predictor in one model, its effect vanishes when ideology, political tolerance, and the scale of authoritarian attitudes are included in the analysis. Of the political performance variables, only one exhibit a consistent influence on regime choice, namely satisfaction with the way democracy is working: a generalized sense that democracy is not functioning properly makes people more likely to support authoritarianism (Figure I-10). Finally, while we fail to find a relationship between ideology (measured on a leftright scale) and our redefined regime categories, we do find that both greater political tolerance and rejection of social authoritarian values increase support for liberal democracy.

22

49

Mean Satisfaction with Democracy

48 47 46 45 44 43 42 Liberal Democrats

Illiberal Democrats

Authoritarians

Figure 0-10 Regime Preference/Support for Liberal Rule by Satisfaction with the way Democracy is Working

Turning our attention to the differences between illiberal democrats and authoritarians, the following can be said. First of all, many of the factors that help us discriminate between liberal democrats and authoritarians help us also discriminate between illiberal democrats and authoritarians. As the summary table suggests, older citizens with levels of political knowledge higher than the average, who have positive assessments of the country’s economy, generally satisfied with the way democracy works, and who are also politically tolerant and less inclined to support social authoritarianism are more likely to endorse democracy in illiberal variants than to support authoritarianism. However, some of the factors that make people choose liberal democracy as opposed to authoritarianism do not help us distinguish between those who prefer illiberal forms of democracy and authoritarianism. For instance, while having early socialization experiences in towns or cities as opposed to rural areas lead people to endorse liberal democracy, these socialization experiences do not help us distinguish between illiberal democrats and authoritarians. In similar vein, while people with more material possessions are more likely to choose liberal democracy as opposed to authoritarianism, economic wealth does not help us discriminate between authoritarians and illiberal democrats. This means that authoritarians and illiberal democrats tend to have similar early socialization and economic wealth backgrounds. On the other hand, there are two variables that are significant predictors of membership in the group of illiberal democrats as opposed to authoritarians. The first is the area of current residence, with illiberal democrats being more likely to live in cities 23

than authoritarians are. The second variable is presidential approval. Those who are unsatisfied with the job of the president are more inclined to support authoritarianism than to endorse illiberal forms of democracy. Those who approve of the job the president or the prime minister is doing are more likely to endorse democracy but in its illiberal variant. This makes sense because illiberal democrats are the ones willing to grant extraordinary powers to presidents or prime ministers. Liberal democrats, on the other hand, may or may not support the president. Whether they do or do not has no bearing on their disposition to prefer one type of rule over other.

Concluding Remarks I find that the majority of Latin Americans define democracy in normative terms, and that those who do so are more likely to endorse it than those who define it in instrumental or negative terms. But I also find that the effect is not very strong. The data show that the majority of Latin Americans endorse democracy, but that there are important cross-national variations. Moreover, the study finds that this support is rather shallow. Many of the self-declared democrats hold views that are inimical to democratic rule, such as endorsement of military coups or willingness to support illiberal exercises of political power. I find that depending on the question, as few as 18 percent and as many as 47 percent of self-declared democrats are ready to justify a military coup. I also find that a quarter of those who endorse democracy have no problem agreeing with the statement that presidents should limit the voice and vote of the opposition if “it is necessary for the progress of this country.” Given these inconsistencies, I proposed a typology that seeks to provide a more robust conceptualization of support for democratic rule. I did so by combining regime preferences (for democracy or authoritarianism) with attitudes about how political power should be exercised (with constraints or without constraints). Liberal democrats, in this conceptualization, are those who support democracy in principle and are unwilling to grant unchecked powers to presidents or prime ministers. Illiberal democrats are those that while preferring democracy are also willing to endorse the illiberal exercise of power. Liberal and illiberal authoritarians are, for purposes of this article, grouped into a single category. While 73 percent of the respondents declare a preference for democracy over other regimes, the analysis conducted in this chapter shows that only 60 percent of all respondents could be classified as liberal democrats. The latter figure probably provides a more realistic picture of the extent of attitudinal support for democracy than the former. Even then, and as the subsequent analysis makes clear, some liberal democrats are not completely exempted from the temptation of endorsing some authoritarian positions. To identify who are those more likely to be classified as liberal democrats, a series of models were developed. The main findings are that endorsement of liberal democracy is driven by both instrumental and normative considerations. On the instrumental side, the data show that positive evaluations of the country’s economy and general satisfaction with the way democracy is working increase support for liberal forms

24

of democratic rule. On the normative side, the data show that greater levels of political tolerance and low predispositions to social authoritarianism increase support for liberal democracy. In addition to these utilitarian and normative considerations, certain demographic characteristics such as age and material wealth, as well as political information, affect the degree of support for liberal democracy, with older, more affluent and more politically informed citizens being more likely to prefer liberal democracy than authoritarianism. The general conclusion of this chapter is that mass support for democracy is not as high or robust as one would expect or hope. On the other hand, it is clear than a majority of Latin Americans look with sympathy on the liberal exercise of democratic rule. Even if this support is at times inconsistent, it provides a core from which stronger and more consistent democratic attitudes could be encouraged.

25

Appendix. Modeling Support for Liberal Democracy Table 0-6. Predictors of Support for Liberal Democracy Predictor Variables

Baseline Model

Social Capital

Threat Perception


Values

I. Liberal Democrats Constant

-10.448 (.985)**

-10.419 (.994)**

-10.418 (1.018)**

-10.287 (1.041)**

-7.856 (1.161)**

Age in years

.014 (.001)**

.013 (.001)**

.014 (.001)**

.014 (.002)**

.015 (.002)**

Gender (0=Women)

.036 (.039)

.049 (.040)

.048 (.041)

.049 (.042)

.043 (.046)

Education in years

.031 (.006)**

.029 (.006)**

.029 (.006)**

.030 (.006)**

.020 (.007)*

Material wealth

.024 (.012)*

.022 (.013)

.023 (.013)

.019 (013)

.017 (.014)


.188 (.055)**

.189 (.055)**

.175 (.056)*

.176 (.058)*

.188 (.064)*

Hometown (0=city)

.077 (.055)

.095 (.056)

.103 (.057)

.128 (.059)*

.116 (.064)


-.058 (.049)

-.071 (.049)

-.061 (.051)

-.060 (.053)

-.041 (.058)

Watch news on TV

-.017 (.022)

-.020 (.022)

-.024 (.023)

-.024 (.024)

-.010 (.026)


.013 (.021)

.015 (.021)

.010 (.022)

.006 (.023)

.004 (.025)

Political knowledge

.124 (.018)

.119 (.018)**

.117 (.018)**

.118 (.019)**

.087 (.021)**

Associational life

-.044 (.095)

-.016 (.098)

-.040 (.102)

.013 (.111)

Interpersonal trust

.085 (.022)**

.063 (.023)*

.041 (.024)

.022 (.026)

Life satisfaction

.078 (.026)*

.058 (.027)*

.025 (.028)

.011 (.031)


.001 (.001)

.001 (.001)

.001 (.001)


.094 (.053)

.063 (.055)

.077 (.060)


-.067

-.040

-.025

26

Threat Perception


(.026)*

(.028)

(.031)

Retrospective evaluation of personal economic situation

-.024 (.032)

-.004 (.033)

.000 (.036)

Retrospective evaluation of country’s economic situation

-.179 (.033)**

-.163 (.035)**

-.190 (.038)**


-.003 (.026)

-.011 (.029)

System support

.003 (.001)*

.003 (.001)


.000 (.001)

.000 (.001)


.007 (.001)**

.007 (.001)**

Predictor Variables

Baseline Model

Social Capital

Values

Ideology

.001 (.009)


-.170 (.018)**

Scale of political toletance

.008 (.001)

II. Illiberal Democrats Constant

-10.206 (1.275)**

10.334 (1.292)**

-10.589 (1.319)**

-10.910 (1.349)**

-8.761 (1.508)**

Age in years

.010 (.002)**

.010 (.002)**

.010 (.002)**

.011 (.002)**

.012 (.002)**

Gender (0=Women)

.000 (.056)

.017 (.056)

.022 (.057)

.021 (.060)

.012 (.066)

Education in years

.004 (.008)

.001 (.008)

.001 (.008)

.000 (.009)

-.007 (.010)

Material wealth

.008 (.018)

.005 (.018)

.004 (.019)*

.002 (.019)

.010 (.021)


.113 (.075)

.130 (.076)

.117 (.078)

.102 (.081)

.105 (.088)

Hometown (0=city)

-.076 (.078)

-.059 (.079)

-.037 (.080)

-.022 (.083)

-.064 (.089)


-.183 (.069)*

-.214 (.070)*

-.201 (.071)*

-.183 (.075)

-.179 (.082)*

Watch news on TV

-.013 (.031)

-.019 (.032)

-.026 (.032)

-.026 (.034)

-.023 (.037)


.007 (.029)

.009 (.030)

.008 (.031)

-.004 (.032)

-.008 (.035)

27

Threat Perception


.099 (.026)**

.101 (.026)**

.106 (.027)**

.074 (.030)

Associational life

.041 (.134)

.084 (.138)

.121 (.144)

.187 (.156)

Interpersonal trust

.069 (.031)*

.038 (.032)

.022 (.034)

.005 (.037)

Life satisfaction

.096 (.036)*

.062 (.038)

.028 (.040)

.045 (.044)


.001 (.001)

.001 (.001)

.001 (.001)


.145 (.076)

.109 (.079)

.119 (.086)


-.067 (.036)

-.059 (.039)

-.030 (.043)

Retrospective evaluation of personal economic situation

-.008 (.046)

.013 (.048)

.015 (.052)

Retrospective evaluation of country’s economic situation

-.229 (.047)**

-.205 (.050)**

-.194 (.054)**


-.147 (.038)**

-.118 (.042)*

System support

-.002 (.002)

.000 (.002)


-.002 (.002)

-.003 (.002)


.007 (.001)**

.006 (.002)**

Predictor Variables Political knowledge

Baseline Model

.102 (.025)**

Social Capital

Values

Ideology

.016 (.013)


-.135 (.026)**

Scale of political toletance

.003 (.001)**

Pseudo R square

.074

.076

.081

.088

.101

-2 log likelihood 27816.6 27294.3 26504.6 24742.4 20800.1 Reference category: Authoritarians Entries are multinomial logistic regression coefficients. Corresponding standard errors are between parenthesis. *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .001. Country effects are omitted to save space.

28

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