Implementing Floodplain Land Acquisition Programs in Urban Localities
James Fraser Rebecca Elmore David Godschalk William Rohe The Center for Urban & Regional Studies University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill December 2003
Report prepared for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Science Foundation, supported through FEMA grant number EMW-2002-GR-0037 and NSF grant number NSF-20010109423.
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Implementing Floodplain Land Acquisition Programs in Urban Localities
James Fraser Rebecca Elmore David Godschalk William Rohe
The Center for Urban & Regional Studies Hickerson House, 108 Battle Lane Campus Box 3410 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3410 919-962-3074
[email protected]
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*We would like to thank Deb Ingram for her guidance throughout the project. Cover photos: Kinston home after flooding from Hurricane Floyd. In the background is the same property after the home has been removed as part of the buyout process. Source: FEMA. ISBN 0-9728693-3-6
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Table of Contents ______________________________________________________________________
Executive Summary
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Chapter 1:
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Implementing Land Acquisition Programs in Floodplains
Evolution of Federal Hazard Mitigation Policy Exploring the Context of Buyouts Chapter 2:
Study Methodology
Study Sites
Chapter 3:
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Greenville, North Carolina / Hurricane Floyd Kinston, North Carolina / Hurricane Floyd Grand Forks, North Dakota / The Great Flood of 1997 San Antonio, Texas / Flood of October 1998
13 14 17 20
Perceived Factors Affecting Land Acquisition Efforts
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Risk Neighborhood Attachment Timing Communication Trust
22 25 29 33 39
Chapter 4:
Life After the Buyout
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Chapter 5:
Conclusions
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Chapter 6:
Recommendations
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Risk Assessment Neighborhood Attachment Buyout Process
50 51 52
References
56
Appendices
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Appendix A: Key Informant Interview Guide Appendix B: Buyout Participant Survey
58 60
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Executive Summary For most of the twentieth century, flood control policy in the U.S. has focused on taming rivers with structures such as dams, floodwalls and levees. More recently, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has adopted a policy of voluntarily buying property located in hazard-prone areas; however, the impact of these land acquisition programs (buyouts) has been mixed. The lack of full participation in a buyout program means that some homes remain vulnerable to flooding and that local governments must continue to provide services to those that remain. Homeowner decision-making about whether or not to participate in a buyout depends on a host of social, economic, cultural and political factors including the extent of the flood damage, the likelihood of future flooding and homeowner’s ties to the neighborhood. In this paper we report on a study conducted in four different urban areas that experienced flooding and subsequently decided to conduct a buyout program, highlighting the key factors that were found to influence homeowners' decisions about participating in a buyout program as well as buyout staff reports of these programmatic efforts. Our analysis shows that people have varied expectations and frames of reference for buyout programs. The three general categories that we use to order these are risk assessment, neighborhood attachment, and program process. Findings show that there were substantial differences in the ways in which different stakeholders constructed risk, with many buyout staff relying on the probability of future flooding, and with resident groups and other agencies constructing a more complex notion of risk that include: concerns over going into debt; finding affordable housing; and losing the neighborhood-based social networks that have been so important in some residents lives. Moreover, while city officials and buyout staff viewed their roles as being sympathetic to some of these additional concerns, at times many residents reported feeling that there was truly no alternative to participating in a buyout and felt pressured to participate, regardless of their unique situation. That said, many of the programmatic staff reported general concern for the flooded households, but few explicitly acknowledged the significance of the fact that many of the flooded households were occupied by either low-income and/or racial minority group members. Our conclusion is that this acknowledgement, and what it means in particular localities, needs to be factored into the process of conducting a buyout:
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Grand Forks, North Dakota and communities in Eastern North Carolina differ significantly in terms of demographics and extent of flooding. Our findings demonstrate that many residents, in all localities in the study, considered neighborhood attachment and all that this entailed, to be as important, if not more important, than the probability of future flooding in making their decision to participate. Residents in all localities report that being a part of their neighborhood was sometimes both positive and negative. Residents noted that neighborhoods provide a sense of community and of “home,” and access to familiar resources such as transportation; shopping and commercial centers; banks; schools and child care; and employment, recreation, and places of worship. For many older residents, leaving their community and sense of “history” or family roots was particularly difficult, but for some there was optimism at the opportunity to leave their current neighborhoods, due to growing concerns over crime, vandalism and drug use. Others noted that their neighborhoods had suffered from neglect for years, commenting that their city had not maintained roads, streetlights, and public parks. Although some residents were glad for the opportunity to move out of a neighborhood at risk of flooding, the majority welcomed the opportunity to move from a neighborhood in decline. Our findings suggest that as cities conduct buyout programs, they move beyond economic concerns to an awareness, sensitivity, and understanding of the importance of neighborhood and community. Buyout participants’ motivations and level of overall program satisfaction were heavily influenced by how successful they felt they were likely to be in recreating a sense of neighborhood “identity” in their new homes. Finally, both residents and buyout staff report that the process was both extremely sensitive and contentious at times due to the following major factors: length of time between buyout agreement and settlement/relocation; miscommunication between buyout staff, agencies, and residents; respondents lack of trust in buyout staff, city officials, and the process in general; and, the respondents overwhelming feeling of pressure to sell as their only alternative although selling was presented as a voluntary option. Interestingly, 42% of the households interviewed in our random sample reported that, if given the opportunity, they would have stayed and rebuilt. That said, just as many respondents reported that buyout staff were trustworthy, the process was satisfactory overall, and that they were appreciative of having the opportunity to participate in the program. One of the most significant findings is that the vast majority of respondents
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reported that they had no input in the actual design of the buyout and what that meant for overall city-wide planning. Our findings suggest that when localities conduct buyouts, additional strategies be employed to assure that residents understand alternatives to participating in the buyout, and that more effort be focused on making the buyout process participatory, so that residents are able to have more meaningful input throughout the buyout process. While buyout staff have typically stressed the need for homeowners to participate due to level of future flooding risk, our research indicates that more outreach be conducted with residents at the grassroots level--preferably, prior to an actual flood--so that more positive, equitable, and trusting relationships (that will only serve to increase levels of participation) can be built. As our study findings indicate, simply advertising the technical aspects and benefits of the program are not enough to get full participation and resident satisfaction so critical to overall program success.
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Chapter 1:
Implementing Land Acquisition Programs in Floodplains
For most of the twentieth century, our nation’s policy toward controlling floods has focused primarily on taming rivers with structures such as dams, floodwalls and levees. While this structural approach undoubtedly reduced the severity of flooding in many communities, it also destroyed the natural capacity of floodplains to attenuate floods. Dams, floodwalls and levees gave people a false sense of security that previously flood-prone areas were safe for development (White 1945; Burby et al. 1985; Burby et al. 1988). In addition, these structural controls are enormously expensive. Despite billions spent on flood control measures, flood losses continue to occur, as more people and property become exposed to flooding (Godschalk et al. 1999). Since 1968, with the creation of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), U.S. national policy began to shift, albeit slowly, toward nonstructural measures such as land-use controls and building standards. More recently, FEMA has adopted a policy of buying property located in hazard-prone areas. After the record-breaking Midwestern floods of 1993, voluntary buyouts, (including the purchase of vacant property in floodplains to prevent it from future habitation, purchase and relocation of existing structures, and purchase and demolition of flooddamaged structures, have become a major new focus in FEMA's overall strategy to mitigate flood losses (FEMA 1998). While these land acquisition efforts have the ability to break the cycle of developmentdestruction-redevelopment, there are few studies which focus on the way these efforts are conceived of and enacted in localities, the ways in which the conduct of these initiatives affects people’s decision-making, or the wide range of effects that may be attributed to these spatial practices. Evidence suggests that homeowner decision-making about whether or not to participate in a buyout depends on a host of social, economic, cultural and political factors including the extent of the flood damage, the likelihood of future flooding, and personal acceptance of risk (FEMA, 1998). Other findings suggest that the meanings people inscribe into the space they inhabit effects their willingness to relocate to another area (Handmer 1985). In this paper we draw upon and extend these lines of inquiry by demonstrating how a wide range of stakeholders in four cities across the U.S. created a definition of the post-flood situation in their locales, how these various groups defined themselves in relation to the buyout programs that were initiated, and the ways in which the conduct of these buyout efforts were
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viewed as simultaneously addressing and neglecting important issues regarding the welfare of people who had experienced flooding. Evolution of Federal Hazard Mitigation Policy
U.S. policy toward reducing flood losses has evolved through three broad phases. The first phase (1917-1965) focused on structural flood control measures. The second phase (19661992) focused on building regulations and insurance, in addition to flood control. In the third and current phase, (1993-present) the focus is on mitigating the impacts of floods by moving existing structures out of harm’s way and avoiding future development in flood-prone areas. The federal government’s participation in the construction of flood control works (dams, locks, reservoirs, levees, dikes, etc.) began in 1917, following a series of floods on the Mississippi River. Congress enacted the Flood Control Act in 1936, which established the principle of cost sharing with local interests. Cost sharing requirements were reduced sharply by subsequent flood control acts in 1937 and 1938 (Burby and Kaiser 1987). Local governments took little interest in restricting the use of land within their own floodplains, since the federal government provided protection (Platt 1978). Unfortunately, federal flood control projects facilitated development in flood-hazard areas by reducing property owners’ fears of flood losses (White 1958; Burby and French 1985; Burby and Kaiser 1987). Flood control measures lead to heightened property value expectations on the part of landowners. Thus, where flood control expenditures are made, pressure from investors for additional floodplain encroachment is likely to follow (Burby et al. 1988). As a result, flood losses continued to rise. The second era of federal flood hazard management began in 1966, with the completion of a report by the Task Force on Federal Flood Control Policy, commissioned by the federal Bureau of the Budget. The report strongly recommended that local planning and land use management decisions give “proper and consistent” recognition to flood hazards. This report, along with a companion report on flood insurance by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, recommended the establishment of a federal flood insurance program to: (1) meet insurance needs in floodprone areas; (2) shift the costs of floodplain development from the federal government to private landowners; and, (3) encourage the enactment of local land-use and building regulations. Fearful that the availability of federal flood insurance would stimulate
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a boom in development in floodplains, the study recommended that local governments be required to adopt and enforce floodplain regulations as a condition of participation by their residents in a federal flood insurance program (Burby and Kaiser 1987). In 1968, Congress acted on the recommendations of the two studies and enacted the National Flood Insurance Act. The act conditioned eligibility for flood insurance on community adoption of building regulations to reduce the susceptibility of new construction to flood damage (Burby and Kaiser 1987).1 Floodplain land use regulations, as required for participating communities under the NFIP, are aimed primarily at reducing the susceptibility of new development to flooding, rather than solving problems due to past floodplain development (Burby et al. 1988). The NFIP does not require communities to adopt land use controls that steer development to areas outside of the floodplain. As a result, floodplain regulations have generally been ineffective in reducing flood losses to existing uses (Kusler 1976; Burby and French 1981; Burby and Kaiser 1987). Critics have argued that federal flood control efforts along with the availability of relatively cheap federal flood insurance have facilitated development in floodplains, putting more people and buildings at risk and perpetuating a cycle of development, flood damage, flood control, further development, further flood for flood-damaged homes to be repaired or rebuilt, only to be damaged or destroyed again by a subsequent flood. In the early 1990s, U.S. national policy entered the “mitigation era,” (Godschalk et al. 1999), as FEMA shifted way from structural measures and toward programs that move people out of harm’s way. FEMA’s creation of the Mitigation Directorate in November 1993 represented a fundamental change in disaster and emergency management. For the first time in the history of federal disaster assistance, mitigation became a cornerstone of emergency management (FEMA 1995). Under its Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), FEMA provides grants to state and local communities to reduce the risk of damage from natural hazards. Grants can be used for a variety of activities, including acquiring, elevating or relocating homes. The amount of money available under the program varies by location: up to 20% of the total disaster assistance awarded by FEMA to a particular area may be used for the HMGP.2 1
By 1985, over 17,000 local governments (well over 90% of the flood-prone jurisdictions in the nation) were taking part in the NFIP (Platt 1986). Currently, nearly 20,000 communities participate (Mileti 1999; NWF 1998). 2 Buyouts are not new. Since the early 1970s, acquisition and relocation programs have been implemented in a number of communities across the United States, including the purchase of 1, 400 parcels in Rapid City, South
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While different in each community, buyout programs typically operate as follows. Local officials evaluate the community’s mitigation options, including land acquisition. If there is sufficient support within the community for a buyout, local officials submit an application for HMGP funds to the state. The application must show that a buyout is a cost-effective mitigation strategy. The state reviews the application, prioritizes projects, and forwards the application to FEMA, usually to the regional office. FEMA reviews the application to ensure that it meets the eligibility criteria, e.g., is environmentally sound, cost-effective, and reduces the future risks from natural hazards. Typically, acquisition of substantially damaged homes, that is, where the cost to repair the home is more than 50% of its value before the flood, are deemed cost-effective. Once the application is approved, the state, working through the local government, begins the buyout process. States are responsible for administering the program, although FEMA retains regulatory oversight. Individual homeowners do not apply directly to FEMA for funds. In addition, HMGP funds are available only in communities that lie within areas officially declared by the President as a disaster area. FEMA contributes 75% of the total cost of a buyout and the state or local governments must provide the remaining 25%, which can include cash or in-kind contributions. Money from other federal sources cannot be used for the match, with the exception of Community Development Block Grant funds from the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Buyouts are strictly voluntary. Homeowners are offered pre-flood fair market value for their home, as determined by a licensed appraiser. In addition, the community pays all closing costs and real estate transaction costs, including appraisals, title searches, surveys, etc. The process takes time. Under the best of circumstances, it may take at least seven to 18 months to complete the buyout process—applying for funds, obtaining approval, transferring funds, conducting appraisals, and closings (FEMA, 1998). Structures purchased with HMGP funds must be demolished or moved out of the floodplain. By law, any property purchased under the program must remain as open space in perpetuity. The community can use the land to create public parks, wildlife refuges, or camping
Dakota following the 1972 flood and relocations 80 families from the Salt Creek floodplain in DuPage County, Illinois (Burby et al. 1988). It was not until 1993 that buyouts became a key component of FEMA's strategy to mitigate flood losses (FEMA 1998, 2000). Since 1993, FEMA has purchased, from willing sellers, approximately 20,000 properties in 36 states and one territory and acquired easement on approximately 400,000 acres of floodprone farmland in 14 states (NWF 1998).
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areas, but it cannot develop the land or sell it private individuals, develop the land or sell it to private individuals.
An open lot in Kinston shows where the home pictured on the right once stood. The homeowner participated in the flood buyout program after Hurricane Floyd. Source: FEMA. Exploring the Context of Buyouts
Given the increased role of land acquisition programs designed o relocate people out of the floodplains, it is important to examine the factors that impede or facilitate this process. Moreover, since the underlying principle of these efforts is one of getting people out of harm’s way, we need to understand how participating in a buyout effort can be made more beneficial to potential participants. Studies examining residential mobility and decision-making find that economic and social factors are significant (Shaw 1974). A more recent study, employing a large sample of respondents from a metropolitan area, finds that relocation decisions are predicted by residential satisfaction as well as neighborhood social ties (Price-Spratlen and Barrett 1994). Studies on residential relocation and decision making of individuals living in a perceived risk area find that multiple sets of predictors are significant to an individual’s decision to move. One study conducted in a “high-risk” area of Israel finds that two significant sets of predictors of moving out of the area are the level of belief of potential harm to oneself or one’s children and belief in potential economic loss (Kirschenbaum 1996). Another study of decision making and relocation during a mass disaster finds that neighborhood social networks and degree of support provided by neighbors were significant predictors of relocation (Kirschenbaum 1992). Taken together, these studies on relocation in general and of people living in a “high-risk” area in
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particular suggest that both economic and social factors are worthy of attention in decisionmaking models. When the search for literature is narrowed to focus on the main reasons why some people participate in buyout programs while others do not, there is considerably less knowledge. Only one exploratory study has been conducted on this topic, and it suggests that residents will support acquisition when: (1) they are well aware of the flood risk; (2) they believe they will benefit personally; and, (3) they have a low attachment to the community. Other factors include the acquisition price, availability of equivalently priced houses out of the floodplain, severity of the flood, and flood frequency (Smith and Handmer 1986; Handmer 1985). While these findings are suggestive, their application is limited for three reasons: 1) the convenience sample employed was not representative of an entire community; 2) there were no comparison communities, indicating that the results may be site specific rather than common to many communities; 3) the methodology did not permit a sample large enough to make generalizable statements; and 4) the sample was drawn from Australia thereby not being reflective of the context in the United States. In addition to these limitations, a shortcoming of the broader literature on post-flood recovery efforts is the lack of attention to the population demographics. Low-lying, flood-prone land is typically occupied by low-income people, racial minorities, and the elderly. These groups are the least equipped to recover from the trauma of having their homes flooded and proportionately suffer the most (Petak and Atkisson 1985). Low-income, minority, and elderly residents have fewer options than high-income residents. For example, in Kinston, North Carolina, (where approximately 15 percent of the town lies in the 100-year floodplain3), most of the residents in the floodplain are poor. Moreover, low-income residents that participate in a buyout are often priced out of their community, leading to criticism that buyouts are simply a veiled attempt to rid a community of its low-income residents. To remain in the community, some buyout participants may even buy land elsewhere in the floodplain, thus undermining the goal of the buyout program. Yet, these factors have not been examined in the context of buyout programs. The current study proposes a slightly different strategy to evaluate buyout programs and understand the factors that effect people’s experiences after a flood. While it is important to
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understand the experiences of the minority of households that choose not to participate in buyout programs, a greater gap exists in the literature concerning the decision making and experiences of households who do decide to participate in buyout programs. It is this population that provides insight into a wider range of issues concerning not only initial decision making, but also actual experiences throughout the process of being involved in a buyout program. Using a representative and comparative sample of respondents in four cities across the country, we examine these topics. The findings highlight three interrelated areas of importance concerning buyouts the effects of neighborhood and community attachment; the ways in which people perceive and construct risk; and how flood victims experienced the implementation of the buyout programs.
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The 100-year floodplain is the area adjoining a river, stream, or watercourse covered by water in the event of a 100-year flood. FEMA has defined a 100-year flood as the 1% annual chance flood. This is the standard used by most federal and state agencies, and the National Flood Insurance Program (FEMA).
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Chapter 2:
Study Methodology
The study design included initial site visits to interview regional, state, and local officials interviewed about the buyout programs. The interviews were transcribed, coded for content, and studied. Project staff examined the data and held weekly meetings during the initial nine months of data collection and analysis. The project team identified several key factors that interviewees discussed as affecting the ways in which the buyout programs were conducted, and drawing on their direct interactions with residents, they characterized some of the central challenges to persuading people to participate in relocating outside of the 100-year floodplain. After interview data was analyzed for themes, the project team conducted a telephone survey of representative households in each site that were eligible to participate in their city's buyout program. The population was determined by the geographical boundaries employed by each locality to determine household eligibility (i.e., 100-year floodplain maps), and we obtained complete lists of all the households that fell within this area. From these lists we selected households randomly. The selection of respondents from within each household was the adult, over the age of eighteen, who actually made the decision of whether or not the household would participate in the buyout program. Total sample size from all cities was 316 respondents, with a response rate of just over 70%. The survey asked respondents a series of questions on the following topics: their attachment to the neighborhood prior to the flood, including household characteristics; the amount and type of flood damage they experienced during the most recent flood; their perceptions of future risk of flooding; the complexity of their decision making as it related to seeking input from others including neighbors, family, government officials, city planners, faithbased organizations, and other community-based groups; their experiences with staff operating the buyout programs; and demographic information on the individual household respondents. In the findings section, we first provide the overall context of each program by describing the flooding that occurred at each site and the unique issues that contributed to the response of the local government. The qualitative and quantitative findings from our key informant interviews and surveys of households is presented side by side to highlight similarities and discrepancies between the staff and city officials who were responsible for implementation of the buyout programs and those of the household respondents.
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Study Sites The study sites were Greenville, North Carolina, Kinston, North Carolina, Grand Forks, North Dakota, and San Antonio, Texas. Each site had experienced a major flood and subsequently participated in a land acquisition (buyout) program. Sites chosen represented different geographical regions of the country, were different sizes, had large buyout programs (over 300) still in operation, and began within two years of each other. At each of the four sites, we spent a week conducting interviews with key informants at the state and local level. We interviewed city planners, town managers, mayors, directors of public works and public health, tax assessors, building inspectors, business owners, social service agencies, faith-based organizations and emergency management personnel.4 Interview questions were asked to elicit information about the people and organizations involved in conducting each buyout program, perceptions as to how the buyout process worked in their city, and how buyout participation might be improved. The aim of the research was to better understand how the buyout process affects various stakeholders--city staff, buyout administrators, and flooded residents--and how it might be improved. Greenville, North Carolina / Hurricane Floyd
On September 15, 1999, much of eastern North Carolina was devastated by Hurricane Floyd. In Greenville, the Tar River crested around 30 feet, after getting as much as 15 inches of rain. Over 1,800 homes in Greenville were damaged by the floodwaters, with over half deemed uninhabitable. In economically depressed eastern North Carolina, Greenville has been one of the few cities to experience growth during the 1990s. The city has been somewhat sheltered from this economic downturn, thanks largely to the presence of East Carolina
Greenville rental property condemned after Floyd. Source: FEMA.
University and its medical school. However, as has been true for the entire eastern part of the
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Our sample includes municipal and state government officials, nonprofit staff from a range of organizations, as well as community development corporation staff involved as housing counselors. In all, 60 interviews were conducted. In a few instances where key informants were not available, interviews were conducted by telephone. The average interview length was 1.5 hours.
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state, mounting job losses, a series of hurricanes, hog lagoon spills, and the suffering manufacturing and agricultural industries, have not left Greenville unscathed. The economic and social burden placed upon the city following Hurricane Floyd left Greenville scrambling to find affordable housing stock and money to provide relief to homeowners, renters, and business owners left stranded by the flood. To date, Greenville's buyout program has bought out over 450 homeowners at a cost of $24.5 million. One of the major challenges Greenville city staff have faced has been removing properties from the floodplain, particularly due to the large number of rental properties. With a steady number of student renters from East Carolina University, the demand for rental property in the city remains high, and landlord-owners are not as likely to participate in a buyout, as they will lose future income on their properties. Furthermore, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) chose to elevate a low-income housing complex, rather than remove the structure. In addition, the city has had difficulty finding affordable housing for flooded residents, since the flood damaged or destroyed much of the area's affordable housing stock. As noted by an official in the Greenville Housing Authority, the agency's waiting list doubled after Floyd. Fortunately, the state provided supplemental funding to flood victims, to push them above the pre-flood market value so that they could meet the gap between the value of their flooded property and market rents. The city has also pushed to relocate flood victims as well. Many public housing units will be elevated, and others within the 100-year floodplain will not be rebuilt. Floodplain maps are currently out of date, and with continued development upriver from eastern North Carolina, there is the fear that Greenville has not faced its last disaster. Kinston, North Carolina / Hurricane Floyd
Hurricane Floyd hit eastern North Carolina in September 1999, bringing torrential rains, tornadoes, and winds that snapped power lines, washed out roads, and felled trees across the region. Over 20,000 residents were left without power, and hundreds of stranded residents had to be rescued by National Guard troops called in to assist. The city of
Kinston home condemned after being hit by Hurricane Floyd. Photo
Kinston, settled in the mid 1700s, had faced other
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hurricanes, but none had matched the level of devastation caused by Floyd. In Kinston, the Neuse River crested at above 28 feet (double that of flood stage), wreaking havoc on the city, and substantially damaging over 400 homes and 200 businesses. Flooding from Floyd hit Kinston particularly hard, because it came at a time when the city had just received heavy rains from Hurricane Dennis and was still struggling to recover from the impact of Hurricane Fran just three years earlier. The eye of the hurricane passed just 20 miles to the east of Kinston, bringing sustained winds of 75 miles per hour and flash floods, turning the city into a virtual island as all major roadways became impassable with floodwaters. To make matters worse, the town's two sewage plants flooded, causing sewage to spill into the Neuse. This "500-year" flood5 was particularly devastating to neighborhoods along the Adkin Branch of the Neuse, from Mitchell Wooten Apartments on the east side to Heritage Court Apartments on the west side. On the city's east side, a historic black neighborhood known as "Lincoln City" to its residents, became a flooded wasteland. Many of these residents were old enough to have been flooded back in 1954 by Hurricane Hazel, yet many were unaware they were living in a floodplain. As city officials worked to evacuate over 450 residents--many of whom had up to five feet of water in their homes--they made it their mission to move everyone out of the floodplain. They did not want to go through such devastation ever again. Yet, in spite of their drive to complete the buyout, buyout staff faced many challenges in their efforts to move people out of the floodplain. Many residents resisted leaving neighborhoods where they had lived for so long, where they knew their neighbors, or where their children had been born and raised. Buyout staff also met with some mistrust among residents who felt that the flooding in Kinston had been caused by officials releasing water from Falls Lake Dam in Raleigh, to prevent the dam from bursting. Many residents felt Lenoir County officials were privy to this information, but did not let the public know. In spite of the challenges, buyout staff in Kinston viewed the buyouts in Fran and Floyd as an opportunity for community and economic development. City staff worked hard to keep relocated residents inside the city limits, and they structured their program in such a way that residents could maintain their social contacts and their children would still have the same friends 5
A "500-year flood" is a flood event that has a 0.2% annual chance of occurrence.
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in their new schools. The city secured federal tax credits for a private developer to add 44 apartments to an existing complex; a former high school was turned into apartments for the elderly; a 50-acre mobile home park was created to accommodate 110 homes; a program was expanded to identify vacant lots and empty buildings that could be used for new housing; and the city created a pilot program that built homes on vacant lots using volunteer and prison labor. Kinston also plans to use much of the property purchased in the buyout as open space that will be turned into Kinston used prison labor to help build affordable housing and reduce the costsand of construction. PhotoWar credit: FEMA. a park with a nature trail, picnic area, paths for hiking and biking, a tourist Civil site.
Kinston city staff has been able to buy out approximately 700 homes, many due to the fact that people previously flooded in Fran wanted out. To date, the buyout has not been completed, and the city still faces a shortage of affordable housing, and a manufacturing-based economy on the decline. However, in spite of these challenges, city officials and many Kinston residents feel that Once a neighborhood, the future site of the Kinston greenway project will eventually include a series of biking and walking trails. Photo credit: FEMA.
there is hope for their community. Many residents note that the flood
brought residents closer together, and created a sense of unity. One of the stories highlighted in the local press was that of members of the Tabernacle Free Will Baptist Church, putting up plywood barriers, pumping water, and piling sandbags to fight back the waters as they did in Fran, ultimately saving their church. As Kinston residents slowly rebuild their lives, some fear that they have lost much more than their homes. Elderly residents of "Lincoln City" hope to save some memory of their community, which they fear may have washed away with the floodwaters. As one resident noted, he would like an opportunity for people to remember the strong sense of place and history
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of Lincoln City: "I have seen people come back here and cry…people from New York, and across the street. Unless something is preserved, it will eventually just die." Grand Forks, North Dakota / The Great Flood of 1997
The winter of 1996-97 hit the Red River Valley hard, with a series of eight blizzards, some of the coldest temperatures on record, and a cumulative snowfall of over 100 inches. The eighth and final blizzard, Hannah, called "one of the worst winter storms of the century," by President Bill Clinton, struck in early April, knocking out power to nearly 300,000 people, some for up to one week. While city officials and residents were well aware of the likelihood of springtime flooding, few could have been truly prepared for what was to come: The Great Flood of 1997 was labeled "the worst disaster ever per capita." Just one year earlier, after the National Weather Service predicted that the Red River would crest at 43.5 feet, residents of Grand Forks and East Grand Forks, Minnesota, mobilized to fill nearly 300,000 sandbags to fight the rising water. The river crested at 45.8 feet, the second highest crest of the twentieth century to date, but the waters were held back and residents could breathe a sigh of relief. This sense of security, however, was short-lived; in the spring of 1997 the extensive efforts to keep the Red River at bay failed, as the Red crested at an incredible 54 feet--26 feet above flood stage. On April 18, 1997, water overtopped the
Lincoln Drive home in Grand Forks after the Red River Flood of 1997. Photo credit: Alan Draves ©
city's dikes, rushing into the Lincoln Drive neighborhood, leaving nearly 300 homes partially or totally submerged. Riverside and Central Park neighborhoods were the next to go, and in what was deemed the largest evacuation of an American city since the Civil War, 90% of the city's 52,500 residents were evacuated, as storm sewers overflowed and filled the downtown area with water four feet deep. Adding insult to injury, fire broke out in the historic business district, and 11 buildings in downtown Grand Forks were gutted. Downtown Grand Forks looked like a war zone. Images of the burned out Security Building flashed across national TV and appeared on the front page of newspapers across the country, including the Grand Forks Herald, which continued to operate up to the very last minute.
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Flood damage in Grand Forks was estimated at nearly $2 billion; 8,600 homes were damaged, and residents went 23 days without drinkable water. The response to the disaster in North Dakota was unprecedented. Grand Forks received $171 million from Housing and Urban Development (HUD). At the time it was the largest entitlement received by any U.S. city. HUD money came directly to the city of Grand Forks rather than being run through the state of North Dakota or the regional office in Denver, which allowed the city to respond more quickly to residents' needs than would otherwise have been possible. This money was instrumental in allowing the city to rebuild its downtown and to provide assistance to small businesses and homeowners not in the dike line or those without flood insurance. Grand Forks received over $13 million in Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) funds, and the city's buyout program purchased over 800 properties, one of the largest and most successful buyouts in the nation's history. The buyout, as stressed by Mayor Pat Owens, was an effort to help rebuild the city so it was "bigger, better, stronger" and to help people start on the long road to recovery. When President Clinton came to Grand Forks to survey the devastation, he agreed that what made the city great was the spirit and strength of its people: "What makes a community a place to live is not the buildings, it's the people, the spirit and faith that are in those people. Water cannot wash
Homes in the Congressional I and II subdivisions did not sell as well as anticipated after the flooding in Grand Forks. Photo credit: ©Alan Draves, 1997.
that away, fire cannot burn that away, and a blizzard cannot freeze that away. And if you don't give it away, it will bring you back better than ever." Grand Forks faced many challenges during its fight to rebuild. One of the greatest obstacles was the negotiation over the dike line placement, which was hotly contested (and still remains an issue of contention) among residents, city staff, and the Army Corps of Engineers.
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Another controversial issue was the building of subdivisions at the west end of the city, which did not sell as well as had been anticipated. Despite the challenges faced, the city has worked hard to rebuild. The Lincoln Drive neighborhood will become the Lincoln Drive Memorial Park, part of the Greenway, a recreation area running along both sides of the river where homes will not be built again. City staff noted that having regular, ongoing communication with residents, and having a central emergency operations center were key to the success of their buyout program. Good working relationships already established between key city agencies and players such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Small Business Administration (SBA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), allowed for better coordination and helped the city avoid duplication of benefits. Using local assessors to set the value of properties also helped gain the trust of residents. City staff worked hard to get money into people's hands as quickly as possible, to help them move on with their lives as soon as possible. While they recognized that they could not be everything for everyone, they saw the flood as an opportunity and not simply as a disaster. In spite of the
challenges
faced in its recovery, Grand Forks has indeed built back better. It has now
This home in Grand Forks shows how high floodwaters reached in 1997. Source: ©Alan Draves, 1997.
been over five years since the flood, and the city has been able to rebuild and revitalize the downtown area, which has new and better buildings and an improved infrastructure that it did not previously have. New businesses have come to the city, and the population has not changed much in Grand Forks. What was considered a city in decline, is now a city reborn, and residents are thankful for the support they received from across the country. Although there is still work to be done, city officials have come far enough now to be able to share their experiences and lessons learned about what it takes to rebuild a community. After Hurricane Floyd hit North Carolina in 1999, the former mayors of Grand Forks and East Grand Forks shared their experiences in
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Greenville and Rocky Mount, urging the North Carolina communities to see the buyout as an opportunity for recovery and continued growth by moving people out of harm's way. San Antonio, Texas / Flood of October 1998
On October 17, 1998, southeastern Texas was pummeled by severe storms, flooding, and tornadoes. In a city with an annual rainfall of less than 30 inches a year, San Antonio received 20 inches of rain in a 24-hour period, resulting in severe flooding from Salado Creek, Upper Olmos Creek, Leon Creek, and the San Antonio River. "Labeled a "500-year" storm in some watersheds, the deluge of storm water runoff quickly rose out of normally dry creek beds and raged into areas where those creeks had never been known to go before" (Pasley, 1999). Hundreds of homes and businesses were flooded, many beyond repair. The City of San Antonio, facing potential backlash from advocates of low-income housing and criticism that it had not acted quickly enough, went out on a limb and moved ahead with its buyout program within two months. This action took place, in spite of the fact that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) confirmed the city would not be reimbursed for its expenditures for another year. The city's buyout, off to an unprecedented start, would ultimately receive nearly $10 million to help buy out over 400 structures in the floodplain, one of the nation's largest buyout programs. Among the neighborhoods hardest hit were the primarily low-income Wheatley Heights and Plumnear neighborhoods. Briarglen and Martinez Creek, two working class neighborhoods were hit less severely. The neighborhood of Wheatley Heights, a predominantly AfricanAmerican neighborhood of homes built in the 1950s, received a great deal of publicity. Many of these homes had been flooded by five to six feet of water, others were knocked off their foundation, and many were rendered uninhabitable. Martinez Creek, a predominantly Hispanic working-class community on the northwest side, was also in the spotlight, as its strong neighborhood association was quite vocal about requesting city assistance. City officials faced many challenges in administering the buyout and attempting to meet the needs of flooded residents. One of the greatest challenges was the difficulty of having to wait for the federal government to provide assurances regarding the availability of funds. City staff were extremely frustrated by the length of time and amount of red tape necessary to move ahead with the buyout and felt they should not be penalized for going out on a limb to put up the
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money needed for the buyout. In addition, city staff expressed frustration at having to go through the Texas Division of Emergency Management; getting different responses from different people in different agencies; and difficulty in coordinating activities among so many agencies. Buyout staff also faced challenges in finding some homeowners who had left the area; handling offers to purchase; and difficulty getting some homeowners to participate in the program, partly due to mistrust among residents who were fearful that their land would be given to someone else for development. In Wheatley Heights, there were rumors of a class-action lawsuit over the claim that the city had purposely flooded their neighborhood. In spite of these hurdles, the City of San Antonio managed to complete a successful buyout program, acquiring over 400 properties, moving residents out of the floodplain, and doing it very quickly. One of the highlights of the San Antonio buyout was how effectively they used housing counselors to help advertise the program and also communicate residents' concerns to city staff. The fact that buyout staff included housing and community advocates whom were already actively working in the affected neighborhoods is a tribute to their program and helped ease many residents' concerns. The city was able to create public space that would ultimately include park space, hiking and biking trails that could be enjoyed by all. As former mayor Howard Peak noted, the city's goal was to turn the community's view of creeks from a negative into a positive. Instead of seeing creeks as a source of flooding, pollution, and crime, they instead could become a source of recreation and pride, similar to the famed San Antonio River Walk. In addition, as a result of the disaster and resulting buyout, San Antonio has now become more focused on storm water management and hazard mitigation. As noted by FEMA Regional Director, R.L. "Buddy" Young, this approach will only serve San Antonio well as it looks to the future: "We commend the City of San Antonio for making the City more disaster-resistant. When we take structures out of the floodplain that have repeatedly flooded, we reduce the chance that someone might die or that they might lose their family possessions from a disaster. We also reduce the cost to taxpayers if another flood disaster hits that area."
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Chapter 3:
Perceived Factors Affecting Land Acquisition Efforts
Through our interviews with local government officials, community service providers, and flooded residents, we identified factors that impacted the success of buyout programs in each site. Key factors affecting the overall success of a buyout program were risk, neighborhood attachment, and buyout process factors including timing, communication, and trust. While these factors are described separately here for presentation purposes, they are not mutually exclusive or exhaustive. Issues and perceptions of risk, neighborhood attachment, timing, communication, and trust were mentioned repeatedly in each site by individuals administering the buyout program, those counseling and providing community services to flooded residents, and by flood victims. The way in which local officials and residents perceived these issues largely determined whether flood victims eligible for the buyout decided to participate in the program, or chose not to participate. Gaining a clearer understanding of how residents’ make this decision is of great importance to city and local government officials, and to individuals and agencies advocating on flood victims’ behalf, as it will allow for improved coordination of services in the event of a future disaster. Risk
The ways in which various stakeholders in the buyout process view risk differ. To buyout staff, risk is typically viewed in terms of the probability of future flooding and the economic and physical damage that stems from flooding. While this view of risk is also a part of residents’ perceptions, for many flood victims, risk involves the possibility of losing a safe place to call home, along with their financial and social stability. As noted in our interviews with buyout staff and flood victims, residents’ ties to their neighborhood and community often played a more pivotal role in their personal decision about participating in the buyout program than the likelihood of future flooding. Being part of a known terrain and having a sense of familiarity about one’s place were key factors in residents’ decisions about participating, particularly for elderly homeowners. Many residents felt anxiety and fear about leaving a home and neighborhood where they grew up, where their children were born, or where they knew their neighbors and felt connected. This fear of facing the unknown in a new home and neighborhood was a tangible issue that many homeowners viewed as a significant risk. In spite of their reticence, the majority of homeowners surveyed did participate in the buyout, although most did not claim they were motivated to participate by past or possible future flooding events.
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In order to gauge residents' perceptions of flooding risk, several questions were asked about homeowners' previous experiences with flooding in their home, how extensive damage was to their home and neighborhood, and how likely they felt they were to be flooded in the future if they remained in their home. Residents were also asked questions regarding what individual and neighborhood factors impacted their decision to participate or decline participation in their city's buyout program, such as mortgage, employment, and income status. The majority--80% of residents--surveyed had not experienced previous flooding in their home, while 17% reported having experienced earlier flooding, most only once before. The level of damage to respondents' neighborhoods and homes was very extensive, 84% and 82%, respectively. While the level of damage varied by site, the majority of respondents indicated that they were extremely hard hit by flooding; even in San Antonio, Kinston and Greenville, floodwaters frequently rose as high as structures' second stories or up to rooftops. In Grand Forks, the level of damage was devastating. Even with basements, many homes were completely destroyed. The majority of homeowners (70%) were unable to return to their homes because their homes were either condemned or the homes were simply uninhabitable. Many homes were structurally unsound, needed complete gutting, had warped walls or floors, floors had collapsed, or had completely separated from their foundations. Over half of the respondents (60%) owed money on their mortgages, with the mean being 17 years remaining on their mortgages. Thirty-seven percent of homeowners held clear titles to their homes at the time of the flood. The factors influencing homeowners' decisions to participate in the buyout included: the likelihood of future flooding; the ability to find affordable housing; fear of going into
Many homes simply sustain too much damage to be repaired. Photo credit: FEMA.
greater debt; and loss of rental income. The likelihood of future flooding was an important consideration for some participants, while for others it was not. Over one-third (37%) of survey respondents stated that the
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likelihood of future flooding was very important in making their decision to participate in the buyout program. Thirty-two percent reported it was not an important consideration. For some Kinston residents, who had experienced prior flooding from Hurricane Fran in 1996, the flooding from Floyd was the last straw. "I was hit by Fran not so long before and I just knew that after this one [Floyd], I was done. I had to get out…it was just too much to bear. It wasn't an easy decision, but it was just the right thing for me to do, I just couldn't bear no more of this" (Kinston resident). For others, the emotional toll from the flood event, combined with anxiety over the possibility of future flooding, made the decision a fairly simple one. Two Greenville residents noted: "I just wanted to get my wife out of the home because she was afraid it would flood again every time it rained" (Greenville resident). "The street flooded every time it rained…it's sad, people want to come back but they can't, because it always floods more" (Greenville resident). One Kinston resident felt that the city would dredge the river and that flooding would not happen there again. Over half, or 60% of respondents, reported being very concerned or somewhat concerned about being able to find affordable housing. Likewise, over half (54%) reported being very concerned or somewhat concerned that they might go into greater debt after participating in the buyout. As a flood victim from San Antonio commented, concern over increased debt made the decision about participating in the buyout incredibly difficult: “It was so tough to make the decision. I thought it was a good decision, but I was terrified of taking on a new mortgage and didn’t know how we’d be able to handle the debt. On top of the debt we had already, it was absolutely terrifying. I didn’t know if the increased financial strain would ruin us or not…” (San Antonio resident). For many older residents, having to take on a new mortgage was especially difficult after having paid off a previous mortgage. The majority--65% of residents--were employed when they made their decision whether to participate in the buyout or not, had an average number of five years in their job, and had a mean total household income, before taxes, of $39,000 for the year of the flood event. Interestingly, while many homeowners reported that they were reluctant to want to leave their neighborhoods, others were happy to have the opportunity to leave. In Kinston and Greenville in particular, several residents commented that prior to Hurricane Floyd, their
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neighborhoods had been in a general state of decline. Older residents had died off and many properties had become rentals. Residents also noted that drugs and crime were on the rise, that the city had generally neglected their neighborhoods for years, leaving roads unpaved or being slow to repair damaged roads, and neglecting the upkeep of public spaces in spite of community objections. Many of these residents viewed the buyout as a good opportunity to move out, as one Kinston homeowner stressed: "The neighborhood had been changing for years before the flood…there were lots of boarded up windows, my house had been broken into, there was some drug activity, and lots of trash and too many dogs around…. I was happy to get out of the old neighborhood, no matter what the reason" (Kinston resident). In Greenville, several homeowners also noted that they were living in areas heavily populated by students attending nearby East Carolina University, and they were happy to have the chance to move away from their sometimes "noisy" or "rowdy" neighbors: "The neighborhood was full of college kids, and it was all rental properties nearby, so we were happy to move into a new part of town. We wanted to get away from the noise and parties from the student apartments anyway…" (Greenville resident). For these homeowners, the possibility of moving to a new location was a big selling point for the buyout. As noted repeatedly by flooded residents, risk is a multidimensional concept to people. In a buyout, risk involves having to leave one's home and community and go through the process of creating a new home. Buyout staff, charged with their mission of moving people out of the floodplain (and therefore reducing their chances of future flooding risk), recognized the need to acknowledge that residents viewed their mission through different eyes. In order to achieve their mission they had to understand they were doing more than moving people out of a house or structure. Neighborhood Attachment
In addition to working to understand past and future risk to flooded residents, buyout staff also had to understand and acknowledge the impact of neighborhood attachment on homeowners. Buyout and nonprofit staff repeatedly mentioned the importance of neighborhood attachment to the residents they assisted. Not only did individuals have ties to people where they lived, they also had strong ties to the land. Particularly in Greenville and Kinston, there were
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residents who lived in homes or on land that was part of their family history for generations. The issue of their property was often a strong factor that influenced homeowners not to participate in the buyout. One respondent stated: "I don't know why it is important to live on the family farm that is not an active farm anymore, but my grandpa farmed it a hundred years ago. We don't have cotton and tobacco anymore, but I got aunts and uncles that still live on the farm, and they couldn't imagine living anywhere else" (Pitt County official). The meaning and sentimental attachment to land and property may be difficult to quantify, and sometimes difficult for buyout officials to really grasp when they are focused on getting people out of the floodplain. Particularly for the elderly, change may be difficult, and when you have worked years to pay off your mortgage and are then faced with moving into a home where you will have to pay off another mortgage, the option may not seem desirable: "Here I am, paid off my house, and they come in and tell me I should move out and start over? I don't know about you, but I wasn't too happy about that. I know I'm getting money to get another house, but I didn't work this hard this long to have to go back to work to pay off a mortgage so I can leave my grandkids something" (San Antonio resident). In Greenville, where the flooding affected many rental properties, there was some difficulty getting landlords to participate. They did not want to lose the rental income and they were not faced with a shortage of renters, due to the proximity to East Carolina University and the shortage of low-income housing in the city. People were hesitant to leave their property not only because it was worth money, but also because they had a certain comfort level and degree of knowledge about where they lived. They had a sense of well-being and set of expectations that they knew would be met where they lived. When faced with the decision whether to relocate or rebuild, they faced the unknown. As one city official noted, some homeowners expressed it in this way: "I'd rather bring in a modular home where I am on my existing lot than to leave my community identity behind." As noted by a city official in Greenville, it would be hard to explain community identity in quantifiable terms, but that it was very "real" to people: "You've always been in Grifton. You don't want to live in Ayden. You want to live in Grifton and there aren't any houses in Grifton because they're hard hit. It is a very important thing. I want my kids to go to Grifton Elementary. I want my kids to go to Grifton Middle. It's that, I want to live in Greenville versus Winterville…there's a lot of that. It's kind of like you're in Chapel Hill versus Raleigh. There's a difference. You see that here, especially in the small towns, you know, they know everybody in town, they have their annual little festivals. You are very identified with the little town."
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For some homeowners, keeping ties to their community was even more critical after a disaster. Although their lives were chaotic, keeping ties to their community provided a way to retain a sense of normalcy: "I know one lady who, -- her temporary housing was all the way in Ayden. She drove back to Stokes, which is all the way across the county every morning so that her daughter --her same friends, same teachers, same school, so she drove 35 minutes every morning to take her to school. When you live in a big city, 35 minutes isn't a lot, but she used to have a five-minute bus ride, and she's coming clear across the county. She said that she needed something in her life that was normal" (Pitt County official). The depth of such attachment was evidenced by the North Carolina town of Princeville's decision not be bought out after being devastated by flooding from Hurricane Floyd in September 1999.6 In one San Antonio neighborhood, a group of residents relocated directly across the street from their flooded homes (an area not designated as floodplain) in order to retain their sense of home. Recognizing the importance of these social ties, Kinston city officials were able to relocate some neighbors as a unit so they could stay together in their new housing. Of course, not every city had the ability to relocate entire neighborhoods or streets as a unit, and there was always the possibility that residents would not be happy with their new housing options. Many people noted that flooded residents did not want to move to housing built or made available by the city due to its location, appearance, construction, or other factors, including price, as one Grand Forks homeowner noted: "No one wanted to live in those houses they built out there. They were too far away from town--from work, from school, from shopping, everything. Plus, there were no trees and the prices were way too high. The city had a heck of a time getting flooded folks to buy those units" (Grand Forks resident). While buyout staff acknowledged the importance of moving people out of the floodplain, some also noted their struggle to reconcile residents' community identity and their right to the land with the mission of the buyout: "No, we don't even talk the "zoning" word in Pitt County because that's taking away the peoples' rights to their land…that's unique to Pitt County because you don't usually find a 6
Located on the Tar River, the town of Princeville is a historic African-American community founded by ex-slaves. After being devastated from Hurricane Floyd fooding, the town decided to rebuild rather than participate in the buyout.
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county our size that doesn't have zoning in place. We hear it a lot: 'It's their land, they should be able to do whatever they want on it.' So, we have one area in the county that's zoned out of all 635 square miles" (Pitt County official). As noted by the majority of buyout staff, it was challenging to understand and address residents' sense of attachment to their community within the context of their own project mission--to remove people from the floodplain and remove them from future harm. Recognizing the importance of social networks in residents' decision-making process, homeowners were asked several questions to determine their level of neighborhood attachment. They were asked how many years they have lived in their neighborhood and in their home, and what type of home they lived in prior to the flood. Residents were also asked how satisfied they had been with their neighborhood and home prior to the flood, and were asked to list the three things they liked and disliked most about their old neighborhood. Prior to the flood, 93% said they were very satisfied or satisfied with the home they lived in. Residents were asked to comment on the things they most liked about their old neighborhood. Responses included: the close-ness of the neighbors; the quietness of the neighborhood; the trees; closeness to their workplace; presence of relatives in area; the proximity to the river; and the fact that the majority of residents were homeowners. Many people felt they were a part of their neighborhood since they had grown up there, their children had grown up there, and they had a family history in the area. The majority of survey respondents (88%) said they lived in a close-knit neighborhood prior to the flood, could recognize most of the people who lived in their neighborhood (90%), felt they were an accepted part of the neighborhood (91%), and were attached to their neighbors (92%). Many homeowners talked about the fact that neighbors looked out for one another or took care of each other: "There was nothing but love in the neighborhood…people took care of each other" (Kinston resident). One San Antonio homeowner decided not to participate in the buyout program due to the fact that he did not want to risk losing his sense of belonging in the community: "You can't place a price on it…people just looked out for you, for one another. We cared about each other's welfare…it can take a lifetime to get that, so I didn't want to take the chance of missing out on that" (San Antonio resident). Over half the respondents (53%) stated they were very concerned or somewhat concerned about leaving their neighborhood when making their decision about participating in the buyout
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program. Nearly half (42%) said they would have stayed and rebuilt their home if they had been given the opportunity. Fifty-five percent said they would not have stayed and rebuilt, primarily because they felt the damage to their home was simply too great. Timing
Timing was another key issue impacting overall buyout program success. The length of time it took to receive and process information affected how quickly each individual buyout could be completed, and how soon residents and buyout administrators could return to their regular, pre-flood activities and to a sense of normalcy. Clearly, the sooner a buyout program can be completed, the better for everyone involved. However, while everyone agreed that moving forward quickly after a disaster was important, completing buyout programs quickly was easier said than done. The length of time needed to complete the buyout programs was affected by several factors including: political structures and bureaucracy; the quality of existing relationships among key players and flooded residents; organizational capacity to handle emergency response; previous hazard mitigation experience; and expectations of government officials, buyout staff, and residents. Municipalities administering buyout programs were faced with many challenges, including the daunting task of dealing with immediate disaster response while also working to gather information necessary to process each individual buyout. These tasks were frequently made more difficult due to the level of red tape buyout staff faced, and were impacted by the quality of relationships between local government and state or federal FEMA representatives. As one city official in San Antonio noted, moving from disaster recovery into the buyout program phase took longer than necessary because FEMA sent out an initial response team consisting of individuals who were not local and were, therefore, not familiar with San Antonio. City officials we interviewed noted that theirs was a particularly difficult and stressful position to be in -- they were faced with flooded residents asking when they would receive assistance, while at the same time working to negotiate rules and regulations of a buyout program. As noted by a city official in San Antonio, this extremely difficult process was slowed down by having to negotiate with various federal and state agencies, which inevitably slowed down the recovery process: "And I will tell you that was probably the most frustrating part of the whole exercise [buyout], was the discussion with the state FEMA or state groups and federal folks. How 29
do you respond to someone who has been dislocated from their house? Many of these people had been around and lived in their homes for many, many years but were fairly low income; they really didn't have any other options…so there was a tremendous amount of pressure to do something quickly, which was nearly impossible" (city official, San Antonio). City officials often complained that their progress was impeded by the high degree of bureaucracy among partnering state and national agencies, and that flooded residents did not understand the amount of work and time that a buyout demanded. One respondent claimed: "I went to several meetings with the FEMA staff that had come into San Antonio to try to explain to people the process; it was very frustrating. I'll have to tell you, I think it's just the nature when you're in disaster and people are desperate. And I know what it's like just trying to spend money out of the city, appropriate it, then everybody has criteria and rules that you have to go through. But these people are like, 'You don't understand. I need it like yesterday. I'm desperate.' And you're saying, 'Okay, do you meet this guideline? I need to get an appraisal.' At that point, the systems don't match up very well" (city official, San Antonio). San Antonio city officials became so frustrated with the length of time it took to develop a buyout program that they decided to move ahead with the process, spending city money and asking to be reimbursed by FEMA afterwards. As one city official noted, the decision to move forward and use city funds up front caused the city a great deal of stress, but city leaders felt such a decision was needed to respond to the needs of flooded residents: "The City Council was able to make the decision that we needed to do something, even without any guarantee that there would be any backup from the state or federal level. Now, that was a very scary proposition, I will tell you…and I will say we are still paying the price today for having gone out front like that, but I don't think we would have done it any other way…I think it was the right thing to do at the time, because it at least sent a signal to those neighborhoods and those individuals, that somebody was going to try and help them" (city official, San Antonio). While San Antonio was the only site to put up their own money and later ask for reimbursement, city officials and other agency staff members from each study site expressed frustration with the length of time the buyout program took at all levels--from planning and design to implementation. One nonprofit staff member noted that the length of time to complete the buyout program not only hurt residents by keeping them in a state of limbo, but also kept them in a state of poverty, and made it difficult for them to receive additional services they needed:
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"The way the recovery process is handled pushes low-income people back into poverty. It holds them hostage. Most recovery operations are closed up after two years and buyouts aren't processed in that time. By then, community responsiveness is gone and people think the disaster is over" (nonprofit staff member, Greenville). In addition to the level of bureaucracy involved with the buyout process, city staff noted that residents' lack of understanding of this bureaucracy and how it slowed down the buyout process often caused friction between homeowners and buyout staff. While some residents were frustrated due to a lack of understanding of the timing of the buyout process, those having a better understanding still often felt that the buyout simply took too long. Some homeowners became so frustrated with the process that they decided not to participate and instead stayed and rebuilt their homes, or left their home and community without selling. As one San Antonio resident commented, she decided not to participate in the buyout because she wanted to “get on with her life” as quickly as possible: "The city didn't know what was going on, and it was just taking forever to figure out what was happening and when I'd get my money. I may have lost a lot of money, but I decided to just stay in my home and take my chances. I just went ahead on my own because I wanted to get on with my life" (San Antonio resident). Many agency staff involved in advertising and administering the buyout commented that they understood residents' frustration and desire to move on with their lives, forgoing the buyout. Some homeowners also felt that the length of time it took for them to receive information about the buyout in general was too long. The length of time it took before flood victims were approached to participate in the buyout program differed in range: from less than one month (24%); one to three months (31%); four to six months (17%); and over six months for (23%). The longer people had to wait to get information about the buyout, the more complacent they became about the possibility of future flooding, and the less likely they were to participate in the buyout. Once homeowners were approached about the buyout, it did not take them long to decide whether they wished to participate or not; the mean length of time taken to make this decision was seven days. When respondents were asked to state how many months it took from the time they signed up for the buyout until they received a check for their home, the mean response was nearly ten months. Interestingly, while nearly everyone interviewed agreed that the buyout process took too long, a few city and nonprofit staff stressed that there were times when it was important to take a
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step back and not rush the process too much. As noted by a nonprofit agency director in Grand Forks, it was a fine line between pushing the buyout and taking advantage of flood victims by asking them to make monumental decisions when they are under a great deal of stress: "One of the biggest challenges too when you're under that much stress and you're grieving, cognitively you aren't functioning very well. So you had people making decisions about buyouts and other things that, you know, weren't always well equipped to be making--life-altering decisions, and you know, some people just forged ahead and really didn't think things through well, and oh, maybe regretted things later" (nonprofit staff member, Grand Forks). Another interviewee in Grand Forks noted that it was also important for cities not to rush to judgement, and to think through each step of the buyout clearly to determine what the long-term impact would be on the city. In Grand Forks, there was heated debate over the placement of a dike alignment line. The placement was negotiated and moved
Having to cope with a disaster and also decide whether or not to leave one’s home can be overwhelming to many flood victims. Photo credit: FEMA.
several times. Some flooded residents felt the city and Army Corps of Engineers pushed too aggressively to have the dike line drawn quickly, and even contested its placement. According to a city official that fought the dike line placement (and whose home was threatened by the dike line), the city would have been better served to take more time making such an important decision: "…as time went on, we ended up buying property that we didn't need because the dike line as the Corps looked at it more, realized that it didn't have to be as aggressive as it was. So people sold their homes and left town…lost that tax base, and now the line is being built closer to the river because as we have suggested, the land may be more stable than you think…I guess my point is that unless something is really, honestly timesensitive, that it's best for cities and governments to let things settle before you start putting a line in place and buying everybody out" (city official, Grand Forks). In every site, state and local officials had to work to come up with strategies and procedures that worked well for them in order to try and move the buyout along more quickly. Due to a shortage of appraisers and the wait to receive property appraisals several sites
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experienced buyout delays. In Grand Forks, some aappraisals were conducted by Army Corps of Engineers staff. City staff double-checked the figures. In Grand Forks, city officials also had great difficulty getting title documentation, due the extent of the flooding, which devastated the downtown, including city hall and the county register of deeds office. If it had not been for a private company's records that did title work in town, Grand Forks would not have been able to provide certificates of clear title. Based on this experience, Grand Forks now uses a computerized system to back up title work and does not store documents on lower level floors or in basements. In Kinston, city officials shortened the buyout process by conducting simultaneous closings, where buyout participants signed paperwork for the sale of their flooded property and the purchase of their new property at the same time. Back-to-back closings simplify project accounting and ease the transition process. One respondent stated: "We tell people, you're going to walk in here with a house that had water six feet deep; when you leave here, you're going to own the house you have chosen, because we don't select it for them, and it'll all be over and done with in an hour and a half. We're going to take you right down there, get your utilities cut on, and when you leave you're going to have a key, and you're going to own a new home, and it's not going to cost you a dime" (Kinston city official). Cities faced with administering a buyout program stressed that they had to develop strategies that worked well for their particular locale. Staff from all four project sites worked to find practical ways to shorten the length of time to move from disaster to recovery, while also recognizing the need to make time to allow residents to voice their opinions. In each city, getting accurate information out to residents quickly was a critical factor in the ultimate success of their buyout program, but it was a challenging task given the scope of disaster they faced. Communication
Another issue critical to the success of any buyout program was the level of communication among all parties involved. This included communication among federal, state and local officials, city staff, nonprofit and interfaith agency staff, and flooded residents. When communication was poor or broke down at any level, the buyout process took longer, and there was misunderstanding and resentment among key players, particularly flood victims. In every locality, communication was mentioned as an extremely important factor to running a successful buyout program. When communication among key staff and residents was good, the program 33
was much more likely to run smoothly and residents' perceptions of the buyout were more positive. Factors impacting communication noted by buyout staff were: (1) the quality of existing relationships among agencies and individuals involved; (2) having to go through the state as a point of contact; (3) the level of bureaucracy among emergency management agencies; (4) a perceived lack of consistency and guidance from FEMA; (5) the number and goals of various agencies involved in the buyout; and (6) the use of housing counselors. One of the most important factors that affected communication in the sites' buyouts was the quality of existing relationships among agencies. Greenville city officials noted that having positive interagency work relationships prior to the flood was critical to the success of their buyout program. If agencies and individuals administering disaster recovery assistance and buyout programs already had established positive working relationships, they carried over into the buyout program. Likewise, those having negative interactions found it more difficult to run their buyout program smoothly. According to one respondent: "And with those past relationships we kind of work as a team right from the start. You know, we all knew each other and we all had very good work relationships before, and were just able to continue that" (Greenville official). In every project site, buyout staff noted that turf battles or a lack of information sharing impacted their administration of the buyout. In every study site, the relationship between the local city governments and the state and federal emergency management representatives was extremely important. For the most part, localities were frustrated that they had to go through the state to get information from FEMA regarding the buyout, and noted that doing so generally only served to slow down the buyout and added to the potential for misunderstandings to occur. While localities recognized that the state has an important role to play in helping with disaster recovery and buyout administration, they clearly felt that the state was one more hoop they had to jump through. In some sites, the topdown, "militaristic" management style of FEMA was also noted as being a barrier to effective communication. In San Antonio, some city officials complained that they received different information from state and federal FEMA representatives: "…we had the finance department calling different people in Public Works, the City Manager's office, different offices calling the state office and then also calling the main office in Washington, and getting different responses to the same question -- and we're setting policy based on one response over here, and then we'd get another response from the state level, and it was getting very difficult to implement, and so there was sort of a
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gag order put on…that made everyone look bad…we would lose credibility" (city official, San Antonio). This miscommunication caused a lot of stress and frustration among those administering the buyout, and was likely to have slowed down program implementation as well. Another frustration to staff administering the buyout was that many of the lessons they learned were through trial and error. This sense of uncertainty and lack of direction from the state or FEMA caused great anxiety among officials, as one Kinston city official described when discussing handling the buyout after Hurricane Fran: "We had assumed that after the Missouri floods in '93 that FEMA and everybody knew the protocol, had developed the protocols. We were absolutely stunned to find out that nobody knew a thing…it was a crusher for us, because it meant we had no guidance from those who were providing the funding. And when people have money under their control, or responsibility for money, and no knowledge, they're scared of everything" (Kinston city official). Another Kinston city official noted that they decided to simply put their best foot forward and hope that things worked out: "There was no clue. And even up the road with FEMA there was no direction or instruction. It didn't come with a manual, believe me. We could not get any definite answers from anyone, ever. Basically, we just decided with our knowledge of real estate that we were just going to launch and if we did it wrong, we were going to do it wrong consistently, and that's what we've done, and thank God." In an effort to address this problem, Kinston city officials created many forms to facilitate buyouts, and have shared those forms with cities across the country. They also created a short video explaining the buyout process to homeowners. Following the flood the video was broadcast repeatedly on the local access channel and given to local housing counselors to communicate to flood victims the purpose of the buyout. The video served as a tool to help build familiarity and trust: "We decided that if they understood one thing out of ten things, that their comfort level is going up and they would feel better about being in here and having seen our faces on the tube. And when they would come in to close, somebody would say well, yeah, I remember that from the video" (Kinston city official). One Kinston homeowner commented that he had a copy of this video and that he had watched it several times so he could better understand the buyout.
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One barrier to effective communication that residents and buyout administers identified was the fact that there were so many different agencies involved with disaster relief and other assistance related to the buyout program. It often became difficult for residents to understand what services different agencies provided, and to distinguish one agency from another. A staff member from one Greenville nonprofit noted that residents would occasionally confuse staff members from her nonprofit with buyout staff or FEMA officials. She commented that while having so many different agencies doing outreach with flood victims was a positive thing in many ways, it also caused confusion at times: "What happens when a disaster hits is Many states utilize mobile communications offices to help communicate with residents after a natural disaster. Photo that there's a lot of groups starting to do credit: FEMA. things and it takes a little while to get those organizations together, and that's difficult for the clients…I have been places where they [clients] have called me FEMA and have been angry at me because I didn't do more or I did more for their neighbor than for them or whatever reason" (nonprofit staff member, Greenville). In each study site, there were several instances where misinformation and miscommunication about the buyout hampered program administration. Sometimes buyout staff felt that nonprofit agency staff inadvertently gave out incorrect information as a result of their not understanding buyout requirements. According to buyout administrators, miscommunication most frequently occurred regarding the interpretation of buyout rules and restrictions. At times, residents going through the buyout felt that different agencies or locales handled the buyout differently. In Greenville, the city and county handled State Acquisition and Relocation Fund (SARF)7 payment eligibility differently, whereby residents moving outside the city limits would lose eligibility for SARF payments, but county residents would not. According to one Pitt County official, the county's understanding from the state was that there was some flexibility regarding SARF, and that they decided to broaden their eligibility criteria so as not to penalize those moving outside the county limits:
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"We just sort of felt the money followed the person, regardless of where they landed, because it was there to help them relocate. That was the whole purpose of it, that financing to get them into a home." Pitt County staff noted that having this flexibility was important to the success of their buyout program. In Grand Forks, some residents felt that the buyout was being handled differently in the town of East Grand Forks, which sits just across the Red River Bridge. Part of this perception stemmed from the fact that the cities of Grand Forks and East Grand Forks, though so close geographically, are in different states, are different FEMA regions, and have different FEMA representatives. Such misinformation and miscommunication not only caused headaches for buyout staff, but it also prevented eligible homeowners from completing the buyout process or signing up at all. As this respondent notes: "I know there has been some confusion about, well, if your house was worth $30,000, then you can only get $30,000, which is not the case. I know that has caused some difficulties for some folks…having that type of limitation you can't buy anything for the square footage; you can get a two-car garage, and that's about it. That may have been part of what has discouraged people from even signing up for the program" (nonprofit staff member, Kinston). According to one Kinston city official, some residents going through the buyout were confused by the way some officials and consultants explained the acquisition and relocation phases: "People actually thought that they could keep their money from acquisition and that this cap, this $75,000 was going to be provided to them at the time of relocation" (Kinston city official). This confusion over the technical aspects of the buyout led to confusion and tension in all program sites. In North Carolina and in San Antonio, housing counselors were employed to act as impartial advocates for flooded residents, with mixed success.8 In North Carolina, buyout staff noted that the idea of using housing counselors was a good one, but that in practice, it only served to impede their progress. In San Antonio, the experience with housing counselors was
7
The State Acquisition and Relocation Fund (SARF) program provides funding for recovery efforts that cannot be financed by federal Hazard Mitigation Grant (MMGP) funds. SARF funds are used to fill any gaps between the price of the original home and the price of a comparable home outside of the floodplain. 8 There were no housing counselors in Grand Forks, North Dakota.
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very positive, partly due to the fact that the city already had individuals doing housing-related outreach with residents. Moving them to work on the buyout was seen as a natural progression. One community advocate recommended to city officials that housing counselors be involved early on in the buyout process, because much of the work they did was similar to outreach needed to advertise and facilitate the buyout: "So, as they were getting that [buyout] stuff together, we just sort of recommended that housing counselors would be good folks to have talk to these people [flooded homeowners] because it meant there was going to be relocation, they were going to have to sign over their homes, get new homes…and that's what our housing counselors did on a daily basis. So, we sort of threw them in the mix" (community advocate, San Antonio). Furthermore, as noted by city staff, housing counselors also worked well because they were from the community, were familiar with the neighborhoods affected, and they had established good working ties with neighborhood residents and buyout staff before the flooding occurred. In North Carolina, housing counselors were funded by the state through local Community Development Corporations (CDCs) that had existing--and adversarial--relationships with city and county agencies. According to those running the buyout in Greenville and Kinston, the housing counselors were frequently incompetent, did not share information, and were not accountable to anyone: "You hire a third party who is responsible only to themselves, who provides part of the information, and then leaves the scene" (Pitt County official). CDC and some nonprofit staff in Greenville and Kinston countered that housing counselors were in the best position to advocate for residents because they were from the same racial background, could gain trust among residents more easily, were more easily trusted by residents because they were not employed by the city, and that they could provide impartial information on all options, including the buyout. Housing counselors in North Carolina also commented that they made repeated efforts to contact staff administering the buyout, but that they were turned away and completely shut out of the process. One housing counselor noted that whenever they implemented a project or tried to work with the city, the city "took them over" and that buyout staff were "not comfortable with a partnership" with counselors. Residents were surveyed about the clarity of the information presented: 37% said it was very clear; 30% said it was somewhat clear; 20% said it was not very clear; and 11% said it was not at all clear. Although 23% said they felt they were provided with alternative choices to the
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buyout, 75% said they were not presented with alternative choices. Furthermore, respondents who stated they felt they were provided with alternatives to the buyout indicated that these options were not really worthwhile or realistic choices. "It was really no choice--the neighborhood was gone…the damage was too extensive…" (Kinston resident). Many residents noted that the choice was simple: take the buyout money and go, or get nothing and be driven out. For many residents, the choice to leave was essentially made for them due to the extent of destruction to their home and neighborhood. Trust
Some residents also mentioned feeling coerced into participating in the buyout, noting that the city would not issue permits to clear land or rebuild, would threaten to foreclose on a property, or that utilities would be turned off if they remained on the land. In addition, the city could always rely on eminent domain to seize properties. As one Greenville resident stated, the city made it very difficult for people not to participate: "There was pressure…you had to jump through all kinds of hoops if you didn't want to participate. They pressured you to go through the inspection…" (Greenville resident). A Grand Forks homeowner also talked about feeling forced into participating in the buyout: "The Corps of Engineers bullied us into signing a contract to have the home demolished, we had no choice. It was shoved down our throats--you can't go back so you can take the money and go, or just go…I would have liked the option to go back and clean up things and live there again" (Grand Forks resident). This perception of being coerced into participation among residents clearly impacted the participation rate in each site. The majority of flood victims (61%) said they felt that flooded residents had very little or no input in the way the buyout program was implemented. Twentyfour percent said they felt that residents had some input. At times, conflicting goals of buyout and nonprofit programs heightened the sense of mistrust some flood victims had of the buyout program. If a nonprofit provided home repair assistance to a buyout participant, this benefit was deducted from the buyout payment, because it was considered a "duplication of benefits" (DOB) or double-dipping. This issue was raised as a major point of contention and misunderstanding in all project sites, particularly concerning flood
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insurance. Homeowners having flood insurance often misunderstood the benefit of having the insurance, and felt they were somehow being penalized for having purchased the insurance: "I feel cheated. I think flood insurance is a joke…I'm $20,000 in the hole--I lost a lot" (Grand Forks resident). "They stole $53,000 from me and I will be bitter for the rest of my life. The city lied continually and this was proven in Federal District Court. There was a big lack of communication" (Grand Forks resident). In fact, animosity over the double-dipping rule became such a point of contention in Grand Forks, that some residents filed a class-action lawsuit against the city. Although this lawsuit was dismissed, this confusion over "double-dipping" cultivated a great deal of mistrust among some residents. As one Grand Forks homeowner noted, this resentment and mistrust remained long after the buyout process ended. Many residents felt the payment they received for their home was unfair due to the low home appraisals they received. Other residents felt payment was unfair because flood insurance premiums were deducted from this amount. Some residents said they did not receive the full amount they were originally promised or quoted from their home's appraised value. (A few residents even asked our project staff to help them get some of their money back.) In Greenville, some homeowners were angered that they did not receive compensation for vacant land they owned next to their property purchased in the buyout: "I am angry that the city didn't buy the vacant land I had next to my property…I just gave that land away for free" (Greenville resident). Still other residents felt that if they had held out longer, they would have received more money from the city through the process of eminent domain. One Kinston homeowner felt that residents were cheated because they did not receive any relocation assistance in addition to the buyout: "I feel that we were cheated because there was no relocation allowance…relocation money was offered in the newspaper, but no one got it" (Kinston resident). In Grand Forks and Kinston, there were residents who believed that city officials were aware that a flood was coming ahead of time, yet did not warn residents. Some residents were not confident that city officials had the best interests of their community in mind. In each site, there were residents who expressed concern over what the city would do with their property.
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Some residents felt that the city did not have to split up their neighborhoods and were angry because they felt forced to leave their communities: “The buyout was really bad…it just displaced people. People were forced to leave their neighborhoods when they didn’t want to. It’s really a shame” (Kinston resident). One of the reasons effective and open communication was so vital to the success of a buyout was that it can create, sustain, or destroy trust between buyout staff and residents. Buyout administrators worked to gain trust of other agency staff members and flooded residents, and noted that gaining residents' trust could be particularly difficult. Buyout administrators commented that factors impacting residents' trust levels included past experiences with federal, state, and local government; experiences with other agencies; and experiences with individual agency staff members. Buyout staff also noted that if residents had been directly or indirectly discriminated against, they were more likely to mistrust buyout staff and government officials. Particularly in cities such as Greenville and Kinston, where many of the flooded residents were elderly African-Americans and the majority of buyout staff were younger whites, the influence of past history and cultural experience could not be ignored. As one community activist noted, there was a sense that local government officials did not have the best interest of the community at heart, and that some officials were trying to keep residents down: “I feel there’s a personal and political agreement not to improve the quality of life for certain people. I’ve never been anywhere that a politician stated they didn’t want their constituents not to be better off…they’re not comfortable with a true partnership, and we don’t have real leaders; we don’t have strong advocates, so they move to isolate you and they move other people in” (Greenville CDC staff member). Individuals administering a buyout must consider that some residents may not trust the government in general, that residents may not trust the information they receive, or residents may question whether the buyout is being conducted fairly. In each project site, buyout officials mentioned instances in which residents did not feel they were being treated fairly. In each study site there were homeowners who felt the price being offered for their home was not fair. When residents were asked how fair they felt the price offered for their home was, 35% said they felt the price was not at all fair or not very fair; 65% felt it was somewhat or very fair. While cities provided avenues for residents to contest damage assessments or pre-flood property appraisals, some homeowners remained skeptical or angry. In some sites, buyout staff noted that the goals
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of the buyout staff and nonprofit staff sometimes clashed, which caused mistrust among residents: "…the interfaith can really relate to and understand what's happening with a family that wants to be repaired rather than move out. And it really is, it is kind of contradictory to the mission of the interfaith--the interfaith finds itself at a little stress point there--having to make decisions. If that local city or county is saying to the interfaith, 'We don't want anything fixed there,' and that's our directive, that's a tension point…" (interfaith staff member, Greenville). In order to build trust among buyout staff and flooded residents, it is important for the entire buyout process to be transparent and open. Residents must be helped to walk through the process, and buyout staff must be responsive to residents' concerns without being condescending or dismissive to what may seem to be annoying or time-consuming questions. As noted by city officials in San Antonio, one way to create good ties and trust within the community was to hire and promote individuals from the affected communities to make regular visits to the neighborhoods, follow through, and respond to the community's needs. The city's success in using housing counselors is a testament to their recognition that building trust with residents is a process that takes time. It does not happen instantaneously. In Kinston, city officials also acknowledged the importance of building trust to develop relationships with residents prior to a disaster. Buyout staff in Kinston noted that they were able to capitalize on the trust and relationships that had been built after Hurricane Fran in 1996. As a result, some of the earlier barriers had been broken down and relationships already had been established to make the Floyd buyout process more successful. Buyout staff also gained renewed confidence in the goals of the buyout, and residents not convinced of its purpose after Fran were often convinced after Floyd, as this respondent illustrates: "Probably the biggest thing we had going for us in Floyd is we had Hurricane Fran in 1996, three years earlier. We had a buyout going on at the time when Floyd hit, so in essence, we had a plan as to what we wanted to do if we had another flood after Fran. We knew that we wanted a buyout program because our Fran program was already successful and we saw the benefits of it. We saw that people that had relocated after Fran were not flooded, but we saw that people that we were not able to get to yet in Fran…ended up getting flooded. We knew we wanted to get everybody out; we had a lot of momentum from the people in the floodplain because they wanted to get out" (city official, Kinston).
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Of course, trust can be undermined by poor communication. When there was misinformation among agencies, resentment and mistrust built up among residents, and agencies had to work to repair the damage, as one respondent noted: "We didn't negotiate contracts; Public Works did that, but the housing counselor would go with him at times and let the folks know their rights and responsibilities, and then we'd hear things like it'd come back, and that was not the right amount or this and that and the other…so that they would have to go back and re-inform folks, and then that made everyone look bad…so we would lose credibility" (nonprofit staff member, San Antonio). In one North Carolina project site, a county official commented that several residents contacted their office to verify information they received from the city's buyout staff. While buyout staff in each site felt that there were specific instances in which residents did not trust them or the process, in general they felt that lack of trust was not a major problem. While this was the perception, there were clearly some instances in which residents did not trust or agree with buyout staff. When residents were asked how much they trusted the people running the buyout program, 39% said not at all or not very much. When residents were asked how confident they were that local government officials had the best interest of their neighborhood in mind, 44% said they were not at all confident or not very confident. In most sites, buyout staff noted that some residents participating in the buyout were fearful that the government might allow others to rebuild where they had once lived, or believed that if they held on to their property and refused the buyout they would go through the condemnation process and receive more money for their property. While city officials did note that they could invoke the power of condemnation, they also said they did not take advantage of that power. After Hurricane Floyd, North Carolina passed legislation that gives cities condemnation power over property based on its likelihood of being flooded. In San Antonio and North Dakota, residents brought lawsuits against the city over buyout-related concerns. While both lawsuits were dropped, this shows how deep mistrust and resentments can develop. When residents were asked how much opposition, if any, was voiced by residents regarding how the buyout was handled, 48% said there was a great deal or some opposition. This suggests that while the buyout process was serving many people well, there was still a significant population of households who lacked confidence in the process and the people who were operating the buyout.
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Chapter 4:
Life After the Buyout
Even given some amount of distrust among residents, the majority ended up participating in the buyout. Many residents recognized that the buyout process, while not perfect, did provide them with a good opportunity to move out of a difficult situation. Many residents felt their city did the best they could handling the buyout: "I can't blame anyone. FEMA and the city had never encountered anything like this before" (Grand Forks resident). The majority of homeowners interviewed did relocate, while some were left behind. For most that participated in the buyout, life was still getting back to normal, and residents felt a mixture of relief and sadness over
Although many homeowners felt the buyout was a good opportunity, leaving home was extremely emotional. Photo credit: Mary Ann Draves. ©Alan Draves 1999
their new start and the community and connections they left behind. For some homeowners, moving into a new home was a blessing. Many residents noted that they were in better quality housing, in a better neighborhood or more desirable location, or were closer to family members: "The new neighborhood is nice because it's newer and I have a better, more modern home now and live in a better neighborhood" (Grand Forks resident). Several Kinston and Greenville homeowners said they were pleased because their new neighborhood was quieter, had well-maintained roads, and had less drug use and crime:
Some buyout participants were particularly pleased because they were able to move into better quality housing and neighborhoods. Photo credit: FEMA.
"It's quiet, near other senior citizens, and there aren't any drugs around" (Greenville resident).
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Several Kinston residents were also pleased because they were relocated along with many of their old neighbors, and were able to retain some neighborhood cohesiveness. Other residents expressed that they were slowly fitting into their new neighborhood, were getting to know their neighbors, and were finding ways to contribute to their community. One Kinston homeowner was particularly happy that his neighbors were proud of his “handyman abilities.” Complaints residents had about their new neighborhoods included: being farther away from old neighbors or family members, church, shopping facilities, or their place of employment; a lack of transportation; and increased traffic or noise. For many residents the most difficult aspect of their relocation was feeling they were not a part of the neighborhood, and lacked the sense of home they felt before. Two residents expressed: "Now I'm farther away from my family and I don't know anyone" (Kinston resident). “To be honest, I don’t really mind the moving, because I’ll adapt. The hardest thing is that it doesn’t feel like home, or even look like home. Here I am with all these people I don’t know, and it will take years to get to know them. It’s very difficult to pick up and start over” (San Antonio resident). Local officials administering the buyout noted that the buyout had important community benefits, such as making homeowners out of some renters, moving people out of the floodplain, renewing a sense of community pride and connection, and changing some individuals’ perceptions of local government for the better. As lessons were learned that could be applied to assist in the next disaster, buyout administrators added that as a result of the buyout, cities were able to acquire property to be used for community recreation, they were able to improve downtown infrastructures, and they were able to revitalize public housing while saving money in the long run. In addition, many city staff commented that positive working relationships among agencies and residents were built and cultivated and that, in some cases, community residents were able to organize around the buyout issue and create new leadership. Negatives of the program highlighted by buyout staff include: the loss of much-needed, affordable housing stock; a heightened mistrust of government by residents; and the inability to remove everyone from the floodplain. Some officials also noted that the time and effort needed to administer the program took away from the provision of normal city services, and took a heavy toll emotionally on residents and buyout staff.
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Interestingly, most residents interviewed felt that they were unable to advocate for themselves regarding buyout participation. The vast majority (79%) stated they felt they had no choice but to participate in the program, since any options presented to them were simply not practical or financially feasible. Many residents also felt they had no say in where they could relocate and were angered that there was no discussion over this issue. While some neighborhoods, such as Martinez Creek in San Antonio, were able to advocate on their behalf and get action, most residents, particularly those in Kinston and Greenville, felt they had no opportunity to make their own decision. Although many viewed the buyout as a good opportunity, most felt the choice had been made for them. If buyout programs are to be truly voluntary and participatory, the feeling of lack of empowerment among residents is an issue to be addressed in the future,
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Chapter 5:
Conclusions
Land acquisition programs have been used by localities as an effective strategy to mitigate the effects of flooding, and have been inscribed with the power to get people out of harm’s way. However, these programs are complex because they have multiple meanings for the people who conduct them and for those who participate in them. This was illustrated in this study by the different ways people experienced these initiatives. All of these groupings speak to the ways in which government at the federal, state, county, and municipal levels, intersect with each other and with citizens. While buyout programs have the ability to create positive effects, including the reduction in private and public risk, respondents reported that it is critical that individuals affected by buyout programs are able to have a voice in the process. The respondents in this study reported that risk, neighborhood attachment, program process timing, communication, and trust, were important factors in their decision making about what to do after being flooded. For example, considering constructions of risk, city officials and flooded residents clearly had different perceptions of what risk constituted, the different forms of risk, and how it impacted the overall decision to participate or decline participation in the buyout process. Household respondents and buyout staff both provided recommendations about developing processes to enhance communication and trust, as well as strategies to facilitate timely delivery of services. Many respondents stated that local agencies needed to develop processes ensuring that there were ample opportunities for residents to participate in decisionmaking during buyout programs. While these programs have been structured by FEMA to be voluntary, most respondents felt they were provided few, if any, alternatives to participation. In part, this raises the question of whether the federal government has devolved authority to the localities, regardless of the capacity of municipal government to adequately create and maintain democratic processes between itself and a wide variety of citizens--including many low-income minority populations that have been marginalized in other political contexts. The only statute around public participation in buyouts, that surpasses the status of a suggested guideline, is that these programs are voluntary. Many residents reported that this was not sufficient, and that relationships between local officials and certain groups of citizens were not positive. At other levels, the quality of existing relationships affected the buyout process. Sites noted that key relationships with different levels of government were not in place when the
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flooding occurred in their locality, and that this negatively affected the amount of time it took to conduct the programmatic efforts. In part, this was due to the initial time period that it took to create and foster working relationships. In some cases the lack of communication channels were never fully developed between levels of government and other key stakeholders including faithbased nonprofits, community development corporations, and other neighborhood-based organizations. Some of the sites reported better relationships and channels of communication than others. The recommendation of many respondents in the study was to include an ongoing assessment and monitoring of government-citizen relations especially in at-risk neighborhoods. Respondents said that this strategy would facilitate ongoing relations so that when a natural disaster occurred, the ramp-up time would be minimal because communication and trust would already be established. Developing strategies for ongoing relationship building between government and citizens is especially significant when dealing with populations that have been part of a historical legacy of discrimination. It is not uncommon for flooding to affect low-income and minority neighborhoods. Respondents reported that the flooding and relocation efforts in three of the four sites resurrected issues of discrimination that many people said continued to exist in their cities. Two points were made about the significance of dealing with racial and class issues in buyout programs. First, since the purpose of relocation is to move residents to safer ground, respondents felt that buyout staff needed heightened sensitivity and awareness that some may feel it is safer to live where they are than to feel exclusion and discrimination if relocated to a neighborhood that is demographically different. Second, buyout program issues that are commonly thought to be purely technical--like determining costs and benefits of program participation--were considered inherently political and social by residents. This report has provides a treatment of a variety of social, political, and technical issues which constitute land acquisition (buyout) programs that have been largely missing from the hazard mitigation literature. We found these aspects are closely intertwined, and issues which are treated primarily as technical aspects of the buyout process are, for resident stakeholders, social and political issues as well. Although many respondents believed that people affected by flooding should have a role in the planning and implementation of these urban land-use decisions that will alter their lives, they reported that meaningful processes were not developed in many places. The long-term effectiveness of buyout programs will depend largely upon a redoubling
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of participatory planning efforts that give homeowners a central role in orchestrating buyouts. In conclusion to this report we provide effective practice and policy recommendations to guide future efforts.
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Chapter 6:
Recommendations
The following recommendations stem from the study of four cities in which buyout programs were evaluated. We have presented them under the categories from which they were created including risk assessment, neighborhood attachment, and factors of the buyout process (timing, communication, and trust). Risk Assessment
•
Provide an opportunity to conduct an assessment of resident’s construction of risk. This would include asking a battery of questions related to their current situation and concerns for the future beyond flooding. Dimensions, for which items need to be created, include a standardized set of questions about housing options, economic outlook and employment situation, as well as resident’s existing social networks and how these have provided support. Beyond these topics sites need to develop items that will tap into the unique circumstances of their locality, acknowledging how sense of place impacts groups differentially. An example of this would be using available data to determine the characteristics of existing neighborhoods and infrastructure (for example, transportation) and how these areas might be affected by absorbing displaced populations. In addition, when new developments are built, cities need to anticipate what the costs, benefits, and challenges will arise for relocated households. Collecting this information will serve to assist the planning process in ways that may lead to more effective relocation efforts. In addition, buyout staff, including city planners and politicians, will be able to gauge what types of risks are attributed to relocation. This permits a wide range of potential strategies to be developed to serve the different populations that are potential buyout participants, and it strengthens the ability of staff to effectively mediate these resident concerns. While there are many ways that information for this set of recommendations might be collected, it would require localities to identify what data are available for their city, ideally constructing a “data warehouse” so the information would be accessible immediately after a flood. Data from residents reflecting their situation and concerns would need to be collected after the flood, although an ongoing strategy that would provide much of this data and assist in developing pre-disaster relationships, would be for localities to assign neighborhood
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liaisons. These individuals might be community/neighborhood members or communitybased organization personnel who already have relationships with residents of a neighborhood. In order for this ongoing strategy to be effective, these liaisons would need to be recognized as having authority, legitimacy, and autonomy in the political processes that occur in the locality, in order to advocate for residents without the threat of being marginalized or circumvented by buyout staff and local officials. Neighborhood Attachment
•
Factor in people’s attachment to neighborhood by recognizing what tangible effects it has on residents. This is more than being empathetic with people. Similar to risk assessment, neighborhood attachment has multiple dimensions, some of which may be captured by standardized measures, while others will be unique to the locality. A battery of items needs to be developed in order to measure people’s concerns over leaving their neighborhood including: what the neighborhood has provided them; how placed-based their social networks are; the potential effects of leaving their neighborhood; and their level of opposition to leaving their neighborhood. Collecting this information will prepare buyout staff and local officials to develop targeted interventions to acknowledge and mediate some of the potential negative effects that relocation might have for households and individuals. In addition, it will serve as a mechanism to determine whether a particular neighborhood needs to be included in the buyout application and, if so, whether or not certain neighborhoods will need more intensive opportunities for coming to that conclusion themselves. While it may seem undesirable to public officials and planners, some neighborhoods may not be ready for full-scale participation in a buyout. Part of the process may require flexibility on the part of other stakeholders. The collection of this data would be similar to risk assessment in that while some information would need to be gathered after the flood, a locality could choose to develop strategies that would serve to create an ongoing dialogue with neighborhoods. This could be achieved in a variety of ways including the appointment of neighborhood liaisons as we suggest the above risk assessment recommendations. As the same caveats apply, a board might be comprised of a range of stakeholders from the neighborhood and community-based
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organizations. In addition, it might be beneficial to include other stakeholders on a board in order to foster ties between different networks of leaders. Given that all localities have some issues related to a lack of leadership, networks between neighborhoods and other stakeholders that are charged with decision-making and planning, it serves localities well to foster a governance structure connecting groups that might not necessarily have a history of working or working well together. Baseline information would be added to the "data warehouse" suggested previously, and reviewed periodically. Buyout Process
•
Create relationships between all potential stakeholders at the federal, regional, state, and local levels in order to prepare for the implementation of buyout programs. As this report shows many localities had to wait additional periods of time to make application for buyout funds due to gaps in interagency networks. These gaps produced serious and costly delays. Ideally, there would be ongoing dialogue between all levels of government in order to reduce such delays in the delivery of buyout program services. While San Antonio, choose to "go it alone" prior to receiving state and federal authorization, many agreed it was not the ideal choice. In developing strategies to maintain ongoing relationships, all parties must recognize that personnel turnover is a reality, so periodic checks are necessary. Strategies need to be developed to monitor how changes in personnel or other contextual factors might necessitate revisiting a planning process as to a community's ability to handle a disaster, such as flooding, prior to the event. Developing networks and relationships would serve to reduce confusion over issues of what agency has authority in different domains. This would lessen the bureaucratic stagnation that experienced by each study site. In addition, we found that "turf battles" emerged due to the lack of clarity over buyout processes. Having a network of relationships accompanied by a plan serves to eliminate confusion as all stakeholders participate in the planning process prior to emergency situations inherently characterized by emotion and stress. In addition to simply maintaining ongoing relationships, localities need to develop, as part of a hazard mitigation plan, a plan of action that incorporates the input of all levels of government. This should be reviewed on a yearly basis in order to reflect any changes that
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may have occurred in an agency’s ability to implement the plan. The taskforce charged with this undertaking is chosen locally but needs to include those who are expected to lead buyout efforts in the case of a flood, enter this information into a data warehouse, and review it annually. •
To the best of their knowledge, localities must determine, the organizations to be involved in a post-flood recovery effort, and specifically, the organizations and activities to intersect with the implementation of a buyout program. Many residents and staff members reported that confusion emerged during buyout efforts due to the wide range of organizations and agencies interacting with residents and the wide-ranging and, sometimes crosscutting goals and activities of these groups. Part of developing a hazard mitigation plan needs to involve the specification of groups who will play significant roles in post-flood recovery efforts and how these groups' activities relate to the buyout program. Similar to the point above, a taskforce may be assigned to develop this information, add it to a data warehouse, then perform annual updates. Implementing strategies to accomplish this recommendation would decrease miscommunication between stakeholder groups, assist in determining the appropriate services needed for households, and help coordinate their delivery. In addition, it would assist in providing a set of clear and consistent guidelines for residents in order to decrease the probability that they might receive conflicting information. This was found to be especially significant with regard to the elderly and the general population of buyout participants who were not clear on issues such as flood insurance coverage, duplication of benefits, and the regulations for receiving supplementary state funds for participation in the buyout.
•
Develop a data warehouse at the city/county level that would house all pertinent data necessary to conduct a buyout program. This would include all additional data that is associated with the recommendations in this report, as well as available data that already has been collected for other purposes. This data warehouse would be a repository for pertinent information and would be organized in such a way as to permit a wide range of analyses comparing resident characteristics, parcel-level data, and neighborhood and citywide data, across a host of relevant domains from hydrological data to economic information.
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Each locality would need to develop a team of experts that would be able to conceptualize this ‘data warehouse’, conduct analyses as needed, and manage the data manipulation from entry and updating to retrieval. This would permit local officials, buyout staff, and residents to request data analysis for issues that they deem important. In addition, it would provide a mechanism to assist in building relationships between neighborhoods, their recommended liaisons, city officials, and buyout staff. Moreover, it would be a resource that could be employed for other planning purposes. •
Create a participatory planning taskforce for buyout programs that includes neighborhood leaders and liaisons, as well as city officials and professionals engaged in planning. Trust was a central issue in the conduct of all of the buyout programs, as noted in the findings. One of the strongest recommendations of this study is that the planning efforts must include residents in a meaningful way, not only as bearers of their neighborhood's rights, but citizens who participate in the overall vision of the buyout and and what citywide effects it may have. A central component of this recommendation is providing residents decision-making authority whereby they are treated as capable of analyzing risk assessment to develop potential solutions, some of which may be implemented side-by-side with buyout efforts or alternative solutions and strategies. While this may be the least expensive recommendation economically, it represents a major shift in orientation on the part of credentialed professionals and officials. In all of the sites we visited none had a system in place for residents to be directly involved in the planning and implementation of buyout programs in a meaningful way. Rather, residents were considered recipients whose roles were to voluntarily sign-up for the buyout and to then relocate. Simply put, this caused a significant portion of residents to report feeling pressured into participating, resentful of how the buyout programs were handled and, ultimately in some cases, willing to take legal action. We believe that forming a taskforce that has authority to make decisions will reduce resident dissatisfaction with the process, the leading factor that explained dissatisfaction with buyout programs in our study. All of the other recommendations have been aimed directly at localities that experience flooding in coordination with other levels of government. This recommendation, we believe, needs to be mandated by FEMA in order to share the responsibility for assuring that buyout programs are implemented with checks and balances for issues that have heretofore been
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considered local. We find that this is especially significant due to over-representation of low-income and racial minority group members who are victims of floods in the U.S., and the reality that many of the reasons that these groups have found themselves located in such geographical regions, some produced by yet other localities upstream, is linked to practices that many residents and some buyout staff have suggested are discriminatory in origin.
These recommendations provide a comprehensive strategy to improve buyout implementation based on the findings in this study. Throughout the report we have highlighted other findings that suggest their own smaller-scale recommendations. It is important to remember that while many respondents reported challenges and unresolved issues related to the conduct of buyout programs, these programmatic efforts were applauded by just as many participants and staff. Most people in the study reported that buyout programs are a significant tool that localities can use to mitigate the probability of future flood-related disasters and to provide for the well-being of people’s lives.
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References Burby, Raymond and Steven French. 1981. Coping with Floods: The Land Use Management Paradox. Journal of the American Planning Association 47, 3:289-300. Burby, Raymond, and Steven P. French, with Beverly Cigler, Edward J. Kaiser, David H. Moreau and Bruce Stiftel. 1985. Floodplain Land Use Management: A National Assessment. Boulder: Westview. Burby, R., and E. Kaiser. 1987. An Assessment of Urban Floodplain Management in the United States: The Case for Land Acquisition in Comprehensive Floodplain Management. Technical Report No. 1, Madison, Wisconsin: Association of Floodplain Managers. Burby, R., S. Bollens, J. Holloway, E. Kaiser, D. Mullan, and John Sheaffer. 1988. Cities Under Water: A Comparative Evaluation of Ten Cities’ Efforts to Manage Floodplain Land Use. Institute of Behavioral Science, Monograph # 47, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 1995. National Mitigation Strategy. Washington, D.C. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 1998. Property Acquisition Handbook for Local Communities. FEMA, Washington, D.C. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 2000. The Link Between Hazard Mitigation and Livability: Planning for a Sustainable Future. FEMA, Washington, D.C. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Press Release. 2000. Three Years After the Flood Grand Forks Surviving and Rebuilding Better. FEMA, Washington, D.C. Available [online]: http://www.fema.gov/nwz00/nwz00_11.shtm Godschallk, D., Brower, D., and T. Beatley. 1989. Catastrophic Coastal Storms: Hazard Mitigation and Development Management. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. Godschalk, D., T. Beatley, P. Berke, D. Brower, and E. Kaiser. 1999. Natural Hazard Mitigation: Recasting Disaster Policy and Planning. Island Press: Washington, D.C. Handmer, John. 1985. Acquisition and Relocation: The Australian Experience. Center for Resource and Environmental Studies, Australian National University, Canberra. Kusler, Jon A. 1976. A Perspective on Floodplain Regulations for Floodplain Management. Washington, D.C. Department of the Army. Mileti, D. 1999. Disasters by Design. John Henry Press: Washington, D.C.
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National Wildlife Federation. 1998. Higher Ground: A Report on Voluntary Property Buyouts in the Nation’s Floodplains. NWF, Washington, DC. North Carolina Division of Emergency Management. 2000. Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. 2000. Status of Hurricane Floyd HMGP Applications, June 21, 2000. NCDEM, Raleigh, N.C. Pasley, Dave. 2001. “Getting Out from Under,” Planning. November 2001: 18-21. Petak, W., and A. Atkisson. 1985. “Natural Hazard Losses in the United States: A Public Problem.” Policy Studies Review 4(4):662-669. Platt, R. 1986. “Metropolitan Flood Loss Reduction Through Special Districts,” Journal of the American Planning Association 52(4): 467-479. Platt, R. 1978. “Coastal Hazards and National Policy: A Jury-Rig Approach.” Journal of the American Institute of Planners 44(2): 170-180. White, Gilbert. 1945. Human Adjustments to Floods. Department of Geography Research Paper No. 93. Chicago: Department of Geography, University of Chicago. White, Gilbert. 1958. Changes in Urban Occupance of Floodplains in the United States. Research Paper #57. Department of Geography, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL.
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Appendix A: Key Informant Interview Guide ______________________________________________________________________ Relocation and Decision Making of Natural Disaster Victims Key Informant Interview Guide
In this survey you will be asked to discuss some background information about yourself and your organization, how the buyout process works in your community, and how buyout participation might be improved. The purpose of this research is to better understand why community residents choose or decline participation in flood buyout programs. Your answers will be used to develop program recommendations and further understanding of community resident participation in buyouts. Please answer the following questions fully and in as much detail as possible, to provide us with an in-depth understanding of the buyout process.
I.
Program Background
A. Organizational Role 1. Please describe your organization’s role in the flood buyout process and in flood relief in general. 2. What has been the role of other organizations, such as faith-based and other non-profits, in buyout efforts? B. Participation & Recruitment 1. How would you describe the outreach activities in your community? 2. What tools have been used to recruit participants to buyout efforts? 3. What are the main factors influencing flood victims’ decisions about whether or not to participate in a buyout? C. Organizational Relationships 1. Who are the key players in the community’s buyout process? 2. Describe the relationships your organization has with other organizations on buyouts. a. What challenges do you face in working with other organizations involved in the buyout process? b. What are the benefits of working with these other organizations? 3. How would you describe organizational coordination of the buyout program in your community? a. What are the factors that have impacted program coordination? b. How could coordination be improved?
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II. Program Effectiveness A. How well do you think the buyout process has worked in your community? 1. How has the buyout program helped flood victims? 2. How has the buyout process helped your community? 3. How many people have participated in buyouts in your community? How many are eligible? Are there any documents that provide information on buyout participants as well as people who decided not to participate? 4. Where have most participants moved? Are they staying within the community or moving elsewhere? Does the town track where buyout participants move? Do they offer any incentives to encourage participants to stay in the community? 5. What are the key factors that have determined the effectiveness of the buyout process? 6. What are your recommendations for improving program effectiveness? a. What would you like to change about the buyout process? b. Are there any services that you would like to see made available to community members to facilitate/clarify the flood buyout process? c. Are there any organizations or community groups that you would like to see participate in the buyout process that don’t currently participate? III.
Additional Resources
A. Please list any documents or resources regarding buyouts that your organization can provide for our study. B. Can you recommend any other key players/organizations we should contact regarding buyouts?
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Appendix B: Buyout Participant Survey
____________________________________________________________ Implementing Floodplain Land Acquisition Programs in Urban Localities
BUYOUT PARTICIPANT SURVEY
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Center for Urban and Regional Studies Hickerson House, 108 Battle Lane Campus Box 3410 Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27599-3410
James C. Fraser, Ph.D. (919) 962-6835
[email protected]
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Flood Event: Hurricane Floyd, September 1999 The Impact of Property Acquisition Programs on Participating Communities Community Member Survey Questions
Hello, my name is ________________. I am not trying to sell anything or ask for a donation. I am calling on behalf of the Center for Urban and Regional Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. You should have received a letter from us recently about our flood buyout study. We are working with the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to learn ways to improve the flood buyout and relocation process. In order to do this, we need some information from residents who took part in the buyout process or who were eligible but chose not to participate. The following questions will take about 20 minutes to answer. While this is completely voluntary, we hope that you will assist us in learning more about the buyout program. All of your answers will be kept confidential. Interviewer Name: ________________________________________ (First) (Last) Study Site: _______________________________________________ Telephone Interview Date: __________________________________ Month/Day/Year Name of Interviewee: ______________________________________ (First) (Last) Flooded Address:__________________________________________ Current Address: _________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ Telephone Number: ________________________________________ (Area Code) Telephone Number
PLEASE MARK "DK" FOR "DO NOT KNOW" RESPONSES, OR "R" FOR REFUSAL TO ANSWER.
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I. Buyout Status Verification First, I need to verify this information: After the flooding from Hurricane Floyd in September 1999, did you participate in the city's buyout program, YES or NO? YES______Use THIS Survey. NO_______ Use NON-PARTICIPANT Survey.
II.
Neighborhood Assessment (Pre-Flood)
A. Neighborhood Satisfaction Now I am going to ask you a few questions about the neighborhood and home you lived in before Hurricane Floyd hit. 1. Before flooding from Floyd, how many years had you lived in your neighborhood? Number of Years: __________ 2. Before flooding from Floyd, how many years had you lived in your house? Number of Years: __________ 3. What type of home did you live in? Was it a… [ ]Single Family Home, Detached [ ]Duplex, Row or Townhouse [ ]Mobile Home/Trailer/Manufactured Home Other:________________________________ 4. Including yourself, how many people lived in your household at the time when Floyd hit? Response: _________People-------How many were Adults over 18?__________ 5. At the time of the flood, was your home completely paid off, or did you owe money on your mortgage? Home Paid Off___________ Owed Money____________ How Many Years Left on Mortgage?______________
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6. Prior to the flood, how satisfied were you with the house you lived in? [ ]Very Satisfied [ ]Satisfied [ ]Somewhat Satisfied [ ]Not Satisfied 7. Had your home been flooded before Hurricane Floyd? YES__________How Many Times?__________Times NO__________ 8. Prior to the flood, how satisfied were you with your neighborhood as a place to live? [ ]Very Satisfied [ ]Satisfied [ ]Somewhat Satisfied [ ]Not Satisfied B. Neighborhood Attachment Now I would like to ask you a few more questions about the neighborhood you lived in when Hurricane Floyd hit. 1. Can you please tell me the three things you liked most about your old neighborhood? 1__________________________________________ 2__________________________________________ 3__________________________________________
2. Please tell me the three things you disliked most about your old neighborhood. 1__________________________________________ 2__________________________________________ 3__________________________________________ Now please tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements. Here's the first statement: 3. I lived in a close-knit neighborhood. Would you say you… [ ]Strongly Agree [ ]Agree [ ]Disagree [ ]Strongly Disagree 4. I could recognize most of the people who lived in my neighborhood. Would you say you… [ ]Strongly Agree [ ]Agree [ ]Disagree [ ]Strongly Disagree 5. I felt I was an accepted part of the neighborhood. Would you say you… [ ]Strongly Agree [ ]Agree [ ]Disagree [ ]Strongly Disagree
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6. Now, before the flood, how attached were you to your neighborhood? Would you say you were… [ ]Very Attached [ ]Attached [ ]Somewhat Attached [ ]Not Attached
III. Flood Damage Now I am going to ask you some questions about how Floyd affected your neighborhood and your home. 1. How extensive was the damage to your neighborhood due to flooding from Floyd? [ ]Very Extensive [ ]Somewhat Extensive [ ]Not Very Extensive [ ]Not at All Extensive 2. How extensive was the damage to your home due to the flooding? [ ]Very Extensive [ ]Somewhat Extensive [ ]Not Very Extensive [ ]Not at All Extensive 3. How many inches of water did you have in your home? Response: _________________Inches 4. Were you able to live in your home after the flood? YES_________ NO_________ 5. Was your home condemned after the flood? YES__________ NO___________ 6. Did you make any repairs to your home after the flood? YES__________ NO___________ 7. How long did it take after the flood until you were approached to participate in the buyout? [ ]Less Than 1 Month [ ]1-3 Months [ ]4-6 Months [ ]Over 6 Months
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8. How many months did it take from the time you signed up for the buyout until you received a check for your home? Response*:__________________________ Months *If response is given in years, write in the margin and calculate the number of months.
IV. Complexity of Decision-Making We are interested in knowing how you made the decision to participate in the buyout. Please tell me how much influence the following people had as you were making your decision about participating in the buyout program. A. People 1. How important were the opinions of your neighbors in making your decision about participating in the buyout program? [ ]Very Important [ ]Somewhat Important [ ]Not Very Important [ ]Not at All Important 2. …Family Members/Relatives/Kin? [ ]Very Important [ ]Somewhat Important [ ]Not Very Important [ ]Not at All Important 3. …Local government officials -- such as the city attorney or mayor's office staff? [ ]Very Important [ ]Somewhat Important [ ]Not Very Important [ ]Not at All Important 4. …Housing counselors? [ ]Very Important [ ]Somewhat Important [ ]Not Very Important [ ]Not at All Important 5. …City planners? [ ]Very Important [ ]Somewhat Important [ ]Not Very Important [ ]Not at All Important 6. …Church or religious organization staff? [ ]Very Important [ ]Somewhat Important [ ]Not Very Important [ ]Not at All Important 7. …Other neighborhood or community organization staff? [ ]Very Important [ ]Somewhat Important [ ]Not Very Important [ ]Not at All Important B. Considerations Now I am going to ask you to think about some of the factors you took into consideration when you were deciding whether to participate in the buyout program or not. 1. How important was the likelihood of future flooding in making your decision about participating in the buyout program? [ ]Very Important [ ]Somewhat Important [ ]Not Very Important [ ]Not at All Important
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2. How concerned were you about being able to find affordable housing? [ ]Very Concerned [ ]Somewhat Concerned [ ]Not Very Concerned [ ]Not at All Concerned 3. How concerned were you about leaving your neighborhood when making your decision about participating in the buyout program? [ ]Very Concerned [ ]Somewhat Concerned [ ]Not Very Concerned [ ]Not at All Concerned 4. How concerned were you that you might go into greater debt after participating in the buyout program? [ ]Very concerned [ ]Somewhat Concerned [ ]Not Very Concerned [ ]Not at All Concerned 5. Were there any other important considerations you had when deciding whether to participate in the buyout program or not? If so, what were they? List:________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________
V. Confidence in Knowledge About Relocation Now I am going to ask you some questions about the information you received about the buyout program. 1. How clear was the information presented to you about the buyout? [ ]Very Clear [ ]Somewhat Clear [ ]Not Very Clear [ ]Not at All Clear 2. Were you provided alternative choices to the buyout? YES__________What were they? ___________________________________ NO___________ 3. Would you have stayed and rebuilt your home if you had been given the chance to? YES___________ NO____________ 4. Did you feel that participation in the buyout program was voluntary? YES__________ NO___________Why Not?_____________________________________________ 5. How much pressure, if any, did you feel to participate in the buyout program? [ ]A Great Deal of Pressure [ ]Some Pressure [ ]Not a Lot of Pressure [ ]No Pressure
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6. How much input did you feel flooded residents had in the way the city's buyout program was run? [ ]Very Much Input [ ]Some Input [ ]Very Little Input [ ]No Input 7. How much did you trust the people running the buyout program? [ ]Very Much [ ]Somewhat [ ]Not Very Much [ ]Not at All 8. How confident were you that local government officials had the best interests of your neighborhood in mind? [ ]Very Confident [ ]Somewhat Confident [ ]Not Very Confident [ ]Not at All Confident 9. How much opposition, if any, was voiced by residents regarding how the buyout was handled? [ ]A Great Deal [ ]Some [ ]Very Little [ ]None 10. In your opinion, how fair was the price offered for your home? [ ]Very Fair [ ]Somewhat Fair [ ]Not Very Fair [ ]Not at All Fair 11. How difficult was it for you to make your decision to participate in the buyout? [ ]Very Difficult [ ]Somewhat Difficult [ ]Not Very Difficult [ ]Not at All Difficult 12. From the time you heard about the buyout, how long did it take you to make the decision to participate? Response:________________________________ 13. How satisfied would you say you were with how the buyout went overall? [ ]Very Satisfied [ ]Somewhat Satisfied [ ]Not Very Satisfied [ ]Not at All Satisfied
VI. Demographic Information The next questions are asked only to be sure we get a wide range of experiences in our study. This information is confidential and your name will not be used in any of our published documents. 1. In what racial category would you classify yourself? [ [ [ [ [ [
]Caucasian ]African-American ]Asian or Pacific Islander ]Native American, American Indian, Aleut or Eskimo ]Multiracial ]Other_________________________________
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2. Are you of Hispanic/Latino origin or descent? YES___________ NO____________ 3. Now I'd like to know your age. I am going to read a series of age ranges; please stop me when you hear the range that includes your age. Are you: [ [ [ [
]18-30 ]31-40 ]41-50 ]51-60
[ [ [ [
]61-70 ]71-80 ]81-90 ]91 or older
If specific age is mentioned, note here: __________Years 4. What is the highest level of education you have completed? Response: ______________________________________ 5. At the time you made your decision to participate in the buyout program or not, were you employed or not employed? _____Employed _____Not Employed* --SKIP TO QUESTION 7 6. How long had you been in your job at the time of the flood? [ ]Less Than One Year [ ]1-5 Years [ ]6-10 Years [ ]11-15 Years [ ]Over 15 Years 7. Now I'd like to know your total household income, before taxes, for the year of the flood. I am going to read a series of income ranges; please stop me when you hear the range that includes your total household income for 1999. Was it: [ [ [ [
]Under $10,000 ]$11,000-$20,000 ]$21,000-$30,000 ]$31,000-$40,000
[ [ [ [
]$41,000-$50,000 ]$51,000-$60,000 ]$61,000-$70,000 ]$71,000 and up
If specific income is mentioned, note here: $___________________________ 8. Did you or a household member fill out and return your 2000 U.S. Census forms? YES_______Which address did you write on the census forms? Was it your… [ ]flooded address [ ]current address [ ]a temporary address -- GO TO QUESTION 9 NO________Why Not?_________________________GO TO OPEN-ENDED Qs.
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9. How did you receive your 2000 U.S. Census forms? [ ]By mail at my flooded home address [ ]By mail at my new home address [ ]A census worker came to my temporary residence [ ]I picked up a To Be Counted form [ ]Other______________________________________________________________
VII. Open-Ended Questions Okay, we're almost done! The last questions are about your overall impression of the buyout program. 1. Can you tell me, from your own perspective, how you feel the buyout program went overall? (Explain).
2. How could the buyout program have worked better for you? [Probes: What could have been done differently? What could have been improved?]
3. Can you tell me the three things you like most about where you live now? 1____________________________________________ 2____________________________________________ 3____________________________________________
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4. Can you tell me the three things you dislike most about where you live now? 1____________________________________________ 2____________________________________________ 3____________________________________________
Thank you very much for your time! Would you be willing to talk more, face-to-face, about your experiences in the buyout with someone in the future? YES_________IF YES, BE SURE TO NOTE GOOD TIMES TO CALL BACK NO__________
Would you like to receive a summary of our study results when it is complete? YES___________ NO____________
INTERVIEWER NOTES/OVERALL COMMENTS:
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