Individualism and Interdependence - PsycNET - American ...

Individualism and Interdependence ALAN S. WATERMAN

ABSTRACT: The value system of individualism underlying many contemporary psychological theories has been criticized on grounds that it is antithetical to social interdependence. The critics have developed a philosophical analysis that links individualism to unscrupulous competition, atomistic self-containment, and alienation. In contrast, the principles espoused by the proponents of individualism in psychology are derived from a philosophical orientation defined by eudaimonisrn, freedom of choice, personal responsibility, and ethical universality. Within this framework, the holding of individualistic values is hypothesized to facilitate, not inhibit, helping, cooperation, and other prosocial behaviors. A review of the research literature provides extensive support for this hypothesis. Psychology is a field that lends itself to the task of social criticism. In recent years the psychological literature has contained several critiques of the implications of individualism for social functioning. Critics claim that individualistic values promote conditions under which persons become egocentric, atomistic, narcissistic, and alienated. Individualism is seen as fundamentally antithetical to cooperative interdependence. These assertions are derived from a conceptualization of individualism very different from that actually used by its advocates within psychology. The thesis to be presented here is that the holding of individualistic values, far from promoting social estrangement, greatly enhances the likelihood that persons will engage in productive and satisfying interdependent behavior.

Critiques of Individualism Before considering the psychological theories and empirical data bearing on the relationship of individualistic values to interdependence, it is necessary to understand the arguments made by the critics of individualism. M. Brewster Smith (1978), in his presidential address to the APA, described the problem as follows: "The individualistic version of selfhood that has characterized our Western tradition since the Renaissance, which we Americans have managed even to exaggerate, seems an 762 « JULY 1981 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST

Trenton State College

increasingly poor fit to our requirements for survival in unavoidable interdependency" (p. 1062). Others have been more extreme. Consider, for example, the following statements by Hogan (1975): An individualistic perspective, with its concomitant suspicion of traditional norms and cultural values, both reflects and contributes to this general erosion of confidence in civilization, (p. 539) The ideology of individualism and the personal conscience orientation that characterize much American psychology appear symptomatic of a sick society, (p. 539)

The critiques of individualism contain three common themes, each with its roots in philosophy. The first is the belief that individualism necessarily entails unscrupulous competition. People's interests are seen as incompatible; positive outcomes for one are tied in either an absolute or a comparative manner to negative outcomes for others. Life is thought analogous to participation in a zero-sum game. This view derives from Hobbes's conception that the natural condition of humankind is a noholds-barred struggle of each against everyone else. (It should be recognized that Hobbes was not advocating individualistic values, but rather was trying to provide a secular justification for the absolute power of government as personified by the sovereign.) The view that unbounded competition is the natural state of humans is also associated with the social Darwinists, who saw the struggle among species for survival mirrored in human economic and social competition. Among the contemporary critics of individualism, Lasch (1978) echoes Hobbes's concern over "a war of all against all" (p. xv), Slater (1976) refers to "a jungle of competing egos" (p. 11), and Sampson (1977) contends that individualists "require strong, autocratic governance to control their appetites" (p. 779). The second thread in the critiques is that individualism holds as its ideal the person who is selfThis article was prepared while the author was a Liberty Fund fellow in residence at the Institute for Humane Studies during the summer of 1979. Requests for reprints should be sent to Alan S. Waterman, Department of Psychology, Trenton State College, Hillwood Lakes, CN 550, Trenton, New Jersey 08625.

Vol. 36, No. 7, 762-773 Copyright 1981 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/81/3607-0762500.75

contained, self-sufficient, and therefore isolated. Sampson (1977) writes,

on others but to find a meaning in life. Liberated from the superstitions of the past, he doubts even the reality of his own existence, (p. xvi)

A predominant theme that describes our cultural ethos is self-contained individualism. . . . The self-contained person is one who does not require or desire others for his or her completion or life; self-contained persons either are or hope to be entire unto themselves, (pp. 769-770)

The claim that individualism eventually results in alienation is associated with both socialist and existential philosophy. For Marx, this alienation is an imposed consequence of economic exploitation to Our contemporary psychological ideal is the person who which a revolutionary response is required. For fights against interdependent collective activity, (p. 778) Sartre, the victimization is of our own doing, and the response to it is an implacable pessimism. Social relationships are represented as entangleThese three themes come together in the claim ments that inevitably interfere with the pursuit of that individualism is fundamentally antithetical to self-chosen goals. Thus, it is reasoned that individinterdependence. Whether for reasons of unscruuation can only be attained at the expense of cutpulous competition, atomistic self-containment, or ting oneself off from others. Help should not be alienation, individualism is said to cause persons requested from others because it creates obligato look inward toward self-interests to the exclusion tions, nor should assistance be offered because it of an awareness of the interests of others. The condetracts from one's own living. cern is that as long as people are engaged in the The writings of John Locke have been interpursuit of personal goals and strive to live in acpreted as providing the philosophical roots of selfcordance with personal values, they will be either contained individualism (Strauss, 1953). Norton unable or unwilling to act cooperatively to meet (1976) describes the individuation concept of the needs that are held in common. Thus, social comperiod as reaching mentators attribute the growth of privatism (Senno deeper than the merely numerical, as befitted its phil- nett, 1977), narcissism (Lasch, 1978), and selfism osophical mechanism. . . . This mechanistic individu- (Vitz, 1977) in contemporary society to our herialism could be unabashedly egoistic on the strength of its doctrine that all relations are purely external and can tage of individualism. The critics of individualism maintain that the have no essential effect upon the entities related. By such a doctrine egoism is endorsed, for nothing else is possible. field of psychology is implicated in the creation Persons are self-enclosed, atomic particulars; what is to and perpetuation of this state of affairs by the valbe done for each must be done by each, and the devil ues that it promotes, either implicitly or explicitly, take the hindmost, (pp. 43-44) through theory and research. The value implicaThe self-contained individual is also the philo- tions of psychological concepts, particularly those sophical ideal associated with Nietzsche in his char- in the areas of personality, social, and developacterization of the Ubermensch. mental psychology, have been traced back to the The third, and related, theme in the critiques sociohistorical context of emerging individualism is the belief that individualism produces a state of (Buss, 1975; Hogan & Emler, 1978; Riegel, 1972). alienation from society and, ultimately, from one- Gergen (1973) suggests that our current terminolself. Individualistic values are seen as embodying ogy reflects an arbitrary labeling bias expressing "an antipathy toward culture, tradition, custom, our value preferences: "For example, high self-esand historically sanctioned modes of thought and teem could be termed egotism; need for social apbehavior" (Hogan, 1975, p. 536). By pursuing such proval could be translated as need for social invalues the person is cast out of the social matrix tegration; creativity as deviance; and internal at cost to both the individual and the society. Fur- control as egocentricity" (p. 312). More specifither, the pursuit of self-interest is thought to entail cally, contemporary psychological theories emtreating others as objects to be manipulated for bodying the concept of self-expression, in its varpersonal ends. In turn, one is treated as an object ious manifestations, are seen as contributing to by others. Not only does this lead to social es- social disruption because of the implied ideal of trangement, but. via-G. H. Mead's social mirror, self-interest. Such personality constructs as self-aceach person begins to perceive himself or herself tualization, self-acceptance, self-esteem, identity, as an object. The cultural historian Christopher autonomy, internal locus of control, and principled Lasch (1978) depicts self-alienation as follows: moral reasoning have all come Under attack. Despite the many differences in the orientations of The psychological man of our times—the final product of bourgeois individualism . . . is haunted not by guilt Maslow, Rogers, Fromm, Erikson, Branden, Rotbut by anxiety. He seeks not to inflict his own certainties ter, and Kohlberg, their work shares the common AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • JULY 1981 • 763

criticism that it has fostered the emergence of an individualistic social ethos through the stress placed on self-knowledge and self-direction. The qualities of human functioning these theorists view as optimal are labeled individualistic and are therefore presumed to be incompatible with cooperative interdependence. It may well be, as the critics of individualism contend, that the malaise of contemporary American society can be traced to unscrupulous competition, atomistic self-containment, and alienation. An unwarranted inferential leap is made, however, in the rejection of the ideals and objectives espoused by proponents of individualism in psychology. The critical analysis rests on the undocumented assumption that the individualistic values implied in the constructs of self-actualization, internal locus of control, principled moral reasoning, and so on are causally related to the development of unscrupulous competition, selfcontainment, and alienation. This assumption fails on both conceptual and empirical grounds. First, the philosophical foundations on which the proponents of individualism in psychology have built have not been accurately identified. As is demonstrated here, the individualistic values advocated are themselves incompatible with the three concerns raised by critics. Second, the critics have failed to examine the existing evidence regarding the relationship of individualism and interdependence.

Normative (Ethical) Individualism The psychological values espoused by such theorists as Maslow, Erikson, Rotter, and Kohlberg may be most appropriately understood in terms of the philosophical framework of normative (ethical) individualism. Its defining features are (a) eudaimonism, (b) freedom of choice, (c) personal responsibility, and (d) universality involving respect for the integrity of others. The implementation of normative individualism entails the pursuit of personal goals (self-interest) through self-chosen, prosocial interdependencies reflecting a sensitivity to the needs and values of others. EUDAIMONISM

Eudaimonism refers to a person's efforts to recognize and live in accordance with the "true self" and has a tradition that can be traced to classic Hellenic philosophy. The true self, or daimon, in764 • JULY 1981 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST

cludes both those potentials that are shared by all humans by virtue of their common specieshood and those unique potentials that distinguish each person from all others. It is an ideal in the sense of being a perfection toward which one strives, and it can thus give form and direction to one's life. The daimon is seen not as something characteristic of only a few great men and women, but as universal, possessed in varying forms by all, though expressed in widely varying degrees. Eudaimonism is reflected in such injunctions as "Know thyself" and "Become what you are." Norton (1976) provides a more contemporary presentation of this concept: Literally, eudaimonia is the condition of living in harmony with one's daimon or innate potentiality, "living in truth to oneself." It is marked by a distinctive feeling that constitutes its intrinsic reward and therefore bears the same name as the condition itself. Provisionally we will describe the feeling of eudaimonia as "being where one wants to be, doing what one wants to do." (p. 216)

In psychology, the concept of daimon has been discussed most directly by May (1969) and indirectly in the work of many others. Despite its seeming insubstantial nature, it has been a perennial concern in psychological theory under such labels as self, ego, and identity. Indeed, the search for identity described by Erikson (1968) reflects an effort to identify those potentials which, by their expression, can provide purpose and meaning to life. It is to living in truth to one's daimon that Maslow (1968) refers when he defines self-actualization as the "ongoing actualization of potentials, capacities and talents, as fulfillment of mission (or call, fate, destiny, or vocation), as a fuller knowledge of, and acceptance of, the person's own intrinsic nature, as an unceasing trend toward unity, integration or synergy within the person" (p. 25). The meaning of eudaimonia is misinterpreted when self-actualization is characterized as "following the dictates of what immediately feels right and joyful" (Smith, 197Sa, p. 469). The tasks of recognizing and finding expression for one's personal potentials are not so easily pursued. In common with other growth experiences, these can be quite stressful. To know oneself is to know not only one's psychological strengths but also the limits of one's capabilities. To become what one is requires the surrendering of fantasies of omnipotentiality. In this eudaimonia is the antithesis of narcissism. Self-acceptance is not achieved without costs. Selfactualization should be recognized as having its Apollonian as well as Dyonysian elements (Smith, 1973b). The telic value of eudaimonic feelings rests

in the ability to sustain directed action despite the obstacles and setbacks inevitably encountered in the pursuit of those goals deemed to be personally expressive.

been eliminated, or has been threatened with elimination, they are likely to engage in actions to recover, or maintain, that freedom. PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY

FREEDOM OF CHOICE

If one is to be able to strive for the fulfillment of personal potentials, one must be free to choose those courses of action seen as most promising for furthering actualization. It was this freedom that was central to the philosophies of Henry David Thoreau and John Stuart Mill. Mill (1859/1961) wrote, The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest. (p. 266) It should be noted that within the framework of normative (ethical) individualism, freedom of choice is defined as the absence of coercive constraints imposed by others. There is no asserted requirement that others support or otherwise actively cooperate with an individual in pursuit of personal goals. Of course, people can and do voluntarily choose to work together for the attainment of common goals and for the fulfillment of complementary needs. The contemporary philosopher Nozick (1974) has described the ideal society as one in which there is the freedom to choose among, or to create, stable associations judged to be desirable for meeting individual needs. There has been a growing interest among psychologists regarding freedom of choice, for example, in research designed to identify the circumstances under which people perceive their actions to be freely chosen (Lefcourt, 1973; Mandler & Kessen, 1974; Steiner, 1970). Of particular relevance to the present analysis is the observation that the perception of freedom of choice "is likely, though not certain, to bring some increment to the quality of the final choice" (Mandler & Kessen, 1974, p. 316). Easterbrook (1978) contends more strongly that freedom of choice is a principal facilitating condition for the development of cognitive and interpersonal competencies. The importance of freedom as a psychological value is reflected in the phenomenon of psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966; Wicklund, 1974). When individuals perceive that a particular freedom has

Closely allied with perceptions of freedom of choice are feelings of personal causation and personal responsibility (Rychlak, 1979), Under conditions in which one is free to act, the outcomes experienced will be perceived as being at least partially under one's own control. To the extent that one's decisions and abilities are seen as contributing to those outcomes, there will be an accompanying sense of responsibility. Because of their importance in psychological functioning, personal causation and personal responsibility have received extensive theoretical and research attention. For example, Erikson (1963) speaks of autonomy, deCharms (1968) makes the distinction between the person as actor and the person as pawn, and Rotter (1966) distinguishes between generalized expectancies of internal control of reinforcement related to skill and effort and external control of reinforcement involving attributions to chance, fate, or powerful others. Perceptions of personal causation and responsibility have been demonstrated to be related to measures of psychological well-being (Lefcourt, 1976; Phares, 1976), A related psychological concept is self-esteem. A positive outcome supports a sense of self-esteem only if one can feel that some credit devolves from a personal contribution to that outcome. A negative outcome will spur activity to overcome obstacles only where there is a belief that a more favorable result would be a function, at least in part, of one's own efforts. Where outcomes are perceived to be beyond one's personal influence, feelings of helplessness, apathy, depression, or resignation are likely consequences (Seligman, 1975). UNIVERSALITY

It is the principle of universality involving respect for the integrity of others that provides normative individualism with its specifically ethical dimensions (Norton, 1976). Each person is viewed as an end in himself or herself and not as a means toward the fulfillment of the interests of someone else. Every person has an equal right to strive for the attainment of personal goals, and hence there is the requirement that one not interfere with the rights of others in their similar strivings, a view

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expressed by Mill (1859/1961) in the passage previously cited. But the critics of individualism have raised the Hobbesian objection that the pursuit of uniquely personal goals necessarily sets each person against every other and, thus, is socially destructive. This is not the case if universality incorporates a respect for the integrity of others. Adam Smith argued that by means of an invisible hand of the market, each person working toward self-interest was working for the interests of all. Norton (1976), however, focusing on the active awareness implied in a respect for the integrity of others, believes that the argument here does not imply an "invisible hand," for the self-actualizing individual who knows his destiny [daimon] knows as well his dependence upon the excellence of others, and the worth of his excellence to them. It is true that neither the good society nor the good of others is his explicit aim, but that the good society is attained by the fulfillment of individuals would occasion in him no surprise, but only the confirmation of what he knew. (p. 143)

May (1969) goes further in describing the importance of the confluence of personal goals and "the expansion of interpersonal meaning" as the criterion for recognizing the positive or moral aspects of one's daimon. This principle of universality involving respect for the integrity of others underlies what Kohlberg (1969) labels principled moral reasoning. At Stage 5, the notion of social order becomes a notion of flexible contract or agreement between free and equal individuals. . . . At Stage 6, moral principles are formulated as universal principles of reciprocal role-taking, e.g., the Golden Rule or the categorical imperative "So act as you would act after considering how everyone should act if they were in the situation. "At the principled level, then, obligation is to the principles of justice lying behind the social order rather than to the order itself, and these principles are principles of universalized reciprocity or role-taking, (pp. 398-399)

In a related manner, the values of normative (ethical) individualism may be seen to be associated with the social exchange norms of reciprocity and equity (Gouldner, 1960; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). One-sided, inequitable social arrangements entail outcomes to the participants that are not proportional to the nature and extent of their respective inputs, that is, unequal relative gains. The subjective discomfort experienced with regard to such arrangements may result from the perception that they involve the manipulative use of others in ways inconsistent with universality and respect. The maintenance and restoration of social 766 • JULY 1981 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST

equity thus become part of the framework under which personal goals may be ethically pursued.

Individualism and Interdependence: Conceptual Links By maintaining an outmoded 17th-century conception of individualism, its critics persist in making a dialectical dichotomy between individual and social interests. The potential for transcending this dichotomy is offered by a recognition that the ethical pursuit of self-interest can simultaneously provide benefits to others. According to the proponents of normative (ethical) individualism in both philosophy and psychology, the value system promotes rather than hinders social well-being and cooperative interdependence. These aims are furthered by (a) the benefits deriving from each individual's living in accordance with personal values and potentials, (b) the reduction in the barriers to establishing trust, and (c) the mutual advantages associated with interdependent activities directed toward similar or compatible objectives. SOCIAL BENEFITS OF INDIVIDUAL ACTION

May (1953) has written, "Finding the center of strength within ourselves is in the long run the best contribution we can make to our fellow men" (p. 79), Advances in the evolution of civilization, whether in the arts, the humanities, the sciences, technology, or other fields, have come from the striving of individuals to find solutions to the problems of the human situation experienced on a personal level. The creations brought forth through the expression of unique individual potentials are not just for private use and appreciation, but may be to the benefit of all. Such creativity appears to be facilitated by social conditions that provide personal freedom and encourage the difficult task of individuation. The creativity of others benefits us not only through our access to their creations but in the psychological effect their work has on our activities in our own spheres of endeavor. This idea is described philosophically in the principle of the complementarity of excellences: "It affirms that every genuine excellence benefits by every other genuine excellence. It means that the best within every person calls upon and requires the best within every other person" (Norton, 1976, p. 10). This involves, in part, the value of having as models those who are succeeding in the expression of their in-

dividuality. The availability of models worthy of emulation is instructive both of what constitutes the fullest potential of human life and of the pathways by which it may be approached. No less important is the power of such models to inspire faith in our own potentials. REDUCTION OF THE BARRIERS TO TRUST

absent), cognitive dissonance likely provides a presumption of trustworthiness to the parties selected, (d) Trust will exist if a person perceives that the outcomes of cooperative endeavors will be equitably distributed. The subjective discomfort associated with inequity appears incompatible with developing or maintaining trust in those seen as potentially overbenefiting from cooperation.

A key problem in trying to establish cooperative, INCENTIVES FOR COOPERATION interdependent activity is the development of trust. As Staub (1978) notes, "All forms of trust are The critics of individualism believe this value syslikely to contribute to a person's willingness to ini- tem is antithetical to cooperative interdependence tiate positive behavior toward others and/or re- because they link it with the "self-contained ideal" spond positively to others' initiatives" (p. 375). that blinds a person to the benefits of cooperation. What is important for our purposes is to identify It should be obvious that self-containment is a practhe conditions that lead to trust and mistrust among tical impossibility. No individual has the time or potential participants in a joint endeavor. In this the talent to develop all of the knowledge, skills, regard, Easterbrook (1978) concludes that when and personal qualities that could be enjoyed or important life outcomes are perceived to be outside found useful in the pursuit of personal goals. Thus, a person's own control, determined by the actions a person acting in the pursuit of self-interest is of others, apprehension and mistrust are likely con- motivated to join together with others having comsequences. This is particularly true when the de- patible desires so that by working toward their pendency is involuntary and the others involved common interests all may increase the probability are not personally known, for example, in inter- of achieving the quality of life that each desires. actions with bureaucracies. Under such circum- Such cooperation develops not just for material stances, actions become guarded and self-protec- gain but also for the satisfaction of other needs, for tive, and the quality of interdependent activities example, in the areas of aesthetic pursuits, athletsuffers. ics, and recreation. Several hypotheses regarding the facilitation of The incentives for cooperation inherent in an interpersonal trust can be derived from an indi- individualistic value system extend beyond exvidualistic value orientation: (a) Trust is most likely changes convenient for mutual benefit. When one to emerge when a person feels competent and con- chooses to engage in activities with others, the opfident. High self-esteem reduces the tendency to portunity to share experiences with those to whom see others as a threat to oneself. In contrast, low one feels a psychological attachment often yields self-esteem is associated with feeling vulnerable to greater personal gratification than would the same manipulation and exploitation, (b) Trust will be activities carried out alone. Seeing a person toward greatest when the decision to participate in co- whom one has emotional ties succeed'in some projoperative activity is voluntary, that is, without ect produces a sense of personal pleasure even coercive constraints on participation. The presence when one does not in any direct way benefit from of choice accentuates feelings of personal causation the other's success. As every parent, teacher, or (self-attributions of actor rather than pawn). An therapist knows, this feeling is enhanced when important function is served by the knowledge that there is the knowledge that one has helped to faone can withdraw from participation if the others cilitate the other's accomplishment. It is not being involved do not behave in an appropriate fashion. claimed that psychological sharing, support, and When freedom is limited, a person may account aid are engaged in for the purpose of obtaining for feelings of psychological reactance by devel- such gratification, but it is clear that these personal oping concerns over the trustworthiness of the outcomes contribute much to maintaining and enpartners, (c) Trust is most readily established when hancing social interaction. What is important here there is personal input into the selection of partners is that when social behavior is voluntary, efforts for a joint enterprise. Where previous common to achieve personal well-being are advanced by experiences exist, people tend to choose others they promotion of the well-being of others. In contrast, already consider trustworthy. Where information when interdependent behavior is constrained, the about potential partners is more limited (but not outcome is likely to be psychological reactance and AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • JULY 1981 • 767

resentment at comparative advantages derived by others. Of all social relationships, those involving the most extensive mutuality and interdependence are friendship and romantic love. The rewards of friendship and love can only be realized through a meshing of the needs, interests, and goals of the partners; a coordination of their activities; reciprocal self-disclosure; and mutual respect, trust, and support. Viewed thus, friendship and love are the antithesis of atomistic sejf-containment. Yet, selfknowledge and self-respect are widely viewed as directly related to the capacity to form successful friendship and love relationships. This principle, consistent with the framework of individualism, has been propounded by such diverse theorists as Sullivan (1953), Fromm (1956), Erikson (1968), Branden (1969), May (1969), and Maslow (1970). In friendship and love relationships, the pursuit of self-interest does not preclude acting for the benefit of the partner. This is the case even under circumstances that entail some personal cost because in a meaningful way the interests of one's partner become integrated into one's self-interest. Truly reciprocal deferring to the needs of the other, as appropriate, is likely to reflect both an acknowledgment of the importance of the relationship to each partner and an awareness of the conditions necessary to sustain it. In turn, success in maintaining a genuinely mutual relationship no doubt enhances feelings of self-respect.

Individualism and Interdependence: Research Evidence To this point, my concern has been to clarify the philosophical and psychological foundations on which individualism rests and to trace its theoretical links to social functioning. There is general agreement among both proponents and critics that individualistic values underlie such personal qualities as identity, self-actualization, autonomy, internal locus of control, self-acceptance, self-esteem, and principled moral reasoning. As long as individualism is defined in terms of unscrupulous competition, atomistic self-containment, and alienation, however, the question of its relationship to cooperative interdependence is prejudged. Critics have presumed that the personality variables associated with individualism are antithetical to cooperative interdependence. Yet, as has been demonstrated, the advocates of normative (ethical) individualism place the value system within a 768 • JULY 1981 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST

wholly different ideological context. The same variables decried by critics of individualism are seen by its proponents as most likely to promote productive social functioning. The issue is clearly joined. It is an empirical question and it is to the research evidence that I now turn. IDENTITY

Of the psychological components described by Erikson (1963, 1968) as fundamental to the development of personality, two that bear special relevance to individualism and interdependence are identity and intimacy. Identity refers to a sense of personal self-definition, that is, knowing who one is, where one is going, and the goals, values, and beliefs to which one is unequivocally committed. Intimacy is the capacity to be emotionally self-disclosing about those aspects of one's identity that are most important and personal and to respond to the efforts of others to share their sense of identity. Erikson (1968) hypothesizes that establishing a firm sense of identity is a necessary foundation for the development of the capacity for intimacy: "It is only when identity formation is well on its way that true intimacy—which is really a counterpointing as well as a fusing of identities— is possible. . . . True 'engagement' with others is the result of firm self-delineation" (p. 135). In con-, trast, the critics of individualism have been concerned that those with a strong sense of personal goals and values will be less motivated to form close, meaningful relationships with others. The results of a variety of studies using both paper-and-pencil measures (Simmons, 1970; Yufit, 1956) and interview techniques (Hodgson & Fischer, 1979; Kacerguis & Adams, 1980; Marcia, 1976; Orlofsky, Marcia, & Lesser, 1973) have all demonstrated a positive association between identity and intimacy. Orlofsky et al. (1973) have provided the most detailed presentation of results. They compared the social relationships of male college students at four different levels of identity formation. As predicted from Erikson's theory, individuals who had gone through an identity crisis and who had emerged with firm commitments (identity achievers) were the most likely to have "successful, mature, intimate" relationships. Those who were still in an identity crisis and who had not yet formed commitments (moratoriums) were predominantly preintimate; they had close relationships with friends of both sexes, but had not yet ventured into an enduring love relationship. Persons who had established their identity com-

mitments at relatively early ages, mainly through identification with parents, and who had never seriously considered alternative possibilities (foreclosures) were mainly involved in stereotyped relationships lacking depth and genuine closeness. It should be noted that the process of identity formation shown by foreclosures is far less individuated in approach than that shown by either identity achievers or moratoriums. Finally, individuals who lacked a firm sense of identity and who were not striving to develop personal commitments (identity diffusions) were the most likely to be isolates. At best, their relationships were stereotyped or preintimate. Consistent results were obtained by Hodgson and Fischer (1979) and Kacerguis and Adams (1980) with samples of both sexes. SELF-ACTUALIZATION

Self-actualization, as the pursuit of personal goals and fulfillment of personal potentials, is directly related to the concern of individualism's critics that persons who seek self-expression will be insensitive to the needs and interests of others. Maslow (1970), in his study of the lives of persons most deserving of the label self-actualizing, describes them as having a feeling for humankind (Gemeinschaftsgefiihl) and a genuine desire to contribute to the human species. The subjects of Maslow's study tended to keep their circles of friends relatively small, but these friendships were deeper and more profound than those of other adults. In another context, Maslow (1968) relates self-actualization to "B-love": B-lovers are more independent of each other, more autonomous, less jealous or threatened, less needful, more individual, more disinterested, but also simultaneously more eager to help the other toward self-actualization, more proud of his triumphs, more altruistic, generous and fostering, (p. 43) A perennial research topic in the field of counseling has been the identification of those personality characteristics of the counselor that facilitate growth experiences. A review of the studies on selfactualization and helping behavior reveals that in a clear majority of instances, self-actualization, as measured by the Personality Orientation Inventory (Shostrom, 1965), was positively related to helping behavior. This relationship was found for the effectiveness of counseling graduate students (Foulds, 1969; Selfridge & Vander Kolk, 1976), of clergy in counselor training (Jansen, Bonk, & Garvey,

1973), of teachers (Dandes, 1966), and of dormitory assistants (Graff & Bradshaw, 1970). INTERNAL LOCUS OF CONTROL

To have an internal locus of control is to see oneself as possessing the capacity to determine one's personal outcomes (reinforcements). As such, internal locus of control resembles the concept of self-containment that has been used to attack the values of individualism. The concern is that an internal locus of control (eads either to cutting oneself off from others in order not to be affected by external influences on outcomes or to a manipulative use of others in order to maintain control. From an individualistic viewpoint, in contrast, an internal locus of control is seen as related to feelings of competence (Easterbrook, 1978) rather than dependency. A person may thus feel capable of taking an active role in using abilities not only for personal ends but for the benefit of others as well. Feelings of internal control should also reduce the likelihood that others will be perceived as a threat and with it the need to act manipulatively toward them. The research on the locus of control variable reveals that an internal orientation is associated with participation in group activities (Brown & Strickland, 1972; Strickland, 1965). "Internals" feel greater social responsibility for coming to the aid of others (E. Midlarsky, 1971) and, in fact, in a face-to-face situation more often provide help to others in difficulty, even when aiding results in some personal discomfort (E. Midlarsky, 1971; E. Midlarsky & Midlarsky, 1973; M. Midlarsky & Midlarsky, 1976). When placed in a supervisory position over others, internals were less likely to use coercive techniques of control (B. E. Goodstadt & Hjelle, 1973). Their less manipulative use of others is also reflected in lower scores on Machiavellianism (Miller & Minton, 1969; Solar & Bruehl, 1971). SELF-ESTEEM

Self-esteem is not a unitary construct. Branden (1969) has described it in terms of two interrelated aspects: a sense of personal efficacy and a sense of self-worth. The sense of personal efficacy involves a recognition of one's fundamental capacities to cope effectively with the world. The sense of selfworth is derived from the holding of a set of ethical standards that one feels is deserving of respect. Where there is a high level of self-regard based AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • JULY 1981 • 769

on competence, there is little need to make invidious social comparisons and thus a greater likelihood of accepting others as they genuinely are. Social relationships are more likely to be characterized by respect, authenticity, and mutuality. The implicit theory of self-esteem held by the critics of individualism is quite different. They see self-esteem as based on a process of zero-sum social comparisons such that another's loss is as good as a personal gain. If they were correct, then high levels of self-esteem would be associated with manipulative competition and defensive self-containment. The results of numerous studies using a variety of research strategies provide evidence in support of the individualistic hypothesis relating self-esteem to prosocial attitudes and cooperative behaviors. Wylie (1961) conducted a review of the research on self-acceptance and acceptance of others and found a positive association between the two. When an individual's perceived level of competence is experimentally raised, the result is a greater willingness to act in a cooperative, interdependent manner (see Staub, 1978, for a review of this literature). Further, when persons high in esteem needs are compared with those high in safety and security needs, it is esteem motivation that is consistently associated with helping behavior (Haymes, 1976; Michelini, Wilson, & Messe, 1975; Wilson, 1976). PRINCIPLED MORAL REASONING

Some of the sharpest criticism of the psychological qualities associated with individualism has been directed against Kohlberg's (1969) discussion of principled (postconventional) moral reasoning (Hogan, 1975; Sampson, 1977). Sampson (1977) writes, The cognitive-developmental thesis itself is rooted to a self-contained, individualistic context; as it is applied, therefore, to issues of moral growth and development, it disposes us to view the moral ideal as one who can stand up in defiance of the group and collective rather than as one who can successfully work within the interdependent context of the group, (p. 777)

This concern is related to the finding that principled moral reasoning (both Stage 5 and Stage 6) is associated with engaging in a variety of political protest activities (Haan, Smith, & Block, 1968). This participation in protest is not indiscriminant, however: "Those who have reached higher levels are likely to act in the service of their principles— protesting when their principles are at issue; re770 • JULY 1981 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST

fusing, also for reasons of principle, to take part in other protests and forms of activism" (Keniston, 1970, p. 583). When a society is lacking in justice or compassion, protest can become a profoundly more prosocial undertaking than compliance. Using a paradigm similar to the Milgram (1974) compliance paradigm, Kohlberg (1969) found that only Stage 6 participants, as compared with those at other stages of moral reasoning, showed a strong probability of refusing to comply with authority in the administration of severe shock (78% of the Stage 6 participants vs. 13% of the others refused). But what of the relationship of principled moral reasoning to the willingness to work with and assist others? To be consistent with the values of individualism, a belief in the universality of moral principles accompanied by respect for the integrity of others should be positively associated with prosocial action. The research results support this view. Using a Prisoner's Dilemma situation, Jacobs (1976) found that while women at both the conventional and the postconventional levels honored a commitment to behave in a cooperative manner when the partner behaved cooperatively, only the higher stage participants behaved cooperatively when interacting with a partner who sometimes defected to a competitive strategy. Similarly, Anchor and Cross (1974) report that postconventional males were least likely to use maladaptive aggressive responses in a modified Prisoner's Dilemma game. With respect to providing help, Staub (1974) describes two studies which demonstrated that persons at the postconventional level are the most likely to render assistance to someone in need. In another study, McNamee (1972) found that individuals at the Stage 6 level showed the most consistent willingness to help.

Freedom, Reactance, and Helping Also of relevance to the relationship of individualism and interdependence is the reactance theory hypothesis that if constraints on freedom are imposed in an attempt to produce cooperation or helping, the resulting feelings of psychological reactance will actually reduce the probability of prosocial behaviors. The research literature provides extensive support for this hypothesis. High-reactance (low-freedom) conditions result in less willingness to make charitable contributions (Eraser & Fujitomi, 1972; Willis & Goethals, 1973), less willingness to serve as a medical donor (Schwartz, 1970), less compliance with a supervisor's work

norms (Organ, 1974), and less willingness to provide help and assistance to another person (Brehm & Cole, 1966; M. S, Goodstadt, 1971; Horowitz, 1968).

doer and the other—a mutuality which strengthens the doer even as it strengthens the other. . . . Understood this way, the [Golden] Rule would say that it is best to do to another what will strengthen you even as it will strengthen him—that is, which will develop his best potentials even as it develops your own. (p. 233)

Toward an Interdependent Society

It should be recognized that a defining feature of a synergistic society is that participation in it is voluntary. If people do not choose to engage in a given cooperative activity, the implication is that they do not perceive that activity to be helpful, either for themselves or for others. Efforts to promote social cooperation within a synergistic society may appropriately include such techniques as education, persuasion, and negotiation. However, the use of political force to compel cooperation represents the abandonment of the synergistic ideal. The research is so consistent in indicating that the synergistic fusing of personal interests and prosocial cooperation is most expressed by individuals with such characteristics as identity, self-actualization, and principled moral reasoning that the question arises as to how critics could have arrived at a conclusion so at variance with the empirical evidence. I suggest that their error stems from the mistaken belief that the values implicit in our psychological theories are the same as those embodied in our contemporary social institutions. A few examples of the discrepancies between the two should suffice. Where normative (ethical) individualism places a value on the discipline essential to sustained effort toward personal expression through creation, the message in our media is one of shortrun hedonism, of happiness through material consumption. Where the values of individualism include personal freedom and personal responsibility, our society has established a network of social service bureaucracies that, while intended to be helpful, actually serve to limit both freedom and responsibility. Where individualism implies the universal value that each person is an end in himself or herself (rather than the means to fulfill the interests of someone else), the practices of our political system foster competition among special interests for governmental favors at taxpayer expense. Given these discrepancies, it is not surprising that our society is creating not individualists, but narcissists. The psychological theories and research regarding individualism and interdependence reviewed here point to two areas in which psychologists might contribute toward improved social functioning. First, since prosocial cooperation is to be achieved by facilitating, not eschewing, personal

Both the proponents and the critics of individualism are seeking a just, productive, and interdependent society, but they differ fundamentally in how they conceptualize such a society. Along with Hobbes, the critics contend that an interdependent society requires the suppression of individual expression, while the proponents find in personal expression the very foundation of cooperative interdependence. The empirical data generated from psychological research on this question provide clear and compelling evidence of the socially adaptive advantages of individualism. Since making a dialectical dichotomy between individual and social interests has been found to be neither conceptually necessary nor predictively useful, a societal ideal entailing the compatible incorporation of both interests appears increasingly plausible. An initial exploration of such a societal ideal has been provided by Ruth Benedict. In contrasting societies that differed markedly in levels of aggression, she made the following observations: From all comparative material, the conclusion that emerges is that societies where non-aggression is conspicuous have social orders in which the individual by the same act and at the same time serves his own advantage and that of the group. . . . Non-aggression occurs (in these societies) not because people are unselfish and put social obligations above personal desires, but when social arrangements make these two identical. . . . I shall speak of cultures with low synergy where the social structure provides for acts which are mutually opposed and counteractive, and cultures with high synergy where it provides for acts which are mutually reinforcing. (Benedict, cited in Maslow, 1972, p. 2Q2)

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