Local Economy, Vol. 20, No. 3, 266–279, August 2005
Information and Communication Technologies and their Role in Urban Regeneration ALAN SOUTHERN* & ALAN TOWNSEND** *University of Liverpool Management School, Liverpool, UK **International Centre for Regional Regeneration and Development Studies, Wolfson Research Institute, University of Durham, UK
ABSTRACT The idea that information and communication technologies (ICT) can provide a means to regenerate deprived urban areas is still a relatively new concept in the United Kingdom. There is in fact little empirical evidence to demonstrate what actually happens when ICT projects are designed with regeneration in mind. A case study of ICT regeneration is examined here, one funded through the Single Regeneration Budget and operational in an urban area in the North East of England. What became apparent during this study is how the changing policy environment meant other types of ICT initiative came on-stream before the project could firmly establish a position within its community. The authors challenge the logic of this form of activity and demonstrate that even when there seems to be a need to support ICT-led development the sustainability of such projects is highly problematic. KEY WORDS: Information and communication technologies, regeneration, Sunderland, policy
Introduction Using information and communication technologies (ICT) to support urban regeneration is problematic. This field has been led by a ‘learning by doing’ philosophy that encourages initiative while simultaneously being grounded on a conceptually weak basis for development. One consequence has been a set of unrealistic expectations placed on those neighbourhoods involved in ICT-led initiatives, particularly on users and providers. During this type of development user groups include the unemployed, those in Correspondence Address: Alan Southern, University of Liverpool Management School, Chatham Street, Liverpool L69 7ZH, UK. Email:
[email protected] ISSN 0269–0942 Print/ISSN 1470–9325 Online ß 2005, LEPU, South Bank University DOI: 10.1080/02690940500191109
Technologies in Urban Regeneration 267 education, the community and small firms. Providers are not, as might be expected, telecommunications firms, but project workers and local government managers from regeneration programmes. Our aim in this article is to provide an evidence-based investigation into an ICT regeneration initiative operational in an urban location in the North East of England. We reflect here on a recently completed project that took place in the City of Sunderland from 1998 to 2003. During this time there was a city-wide, regional and national focus on ICT as a means of social and economic development (Southern, 2000). The initiative, funded through the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB), and aptly named Connect @ Sunderland, is relevant because of the increased attention paid since 1997 to social exclusion as part of neighbourhood renewal policy. While the article is consistent with other work in this area, such as that of Scho¨n et al. (2001), who make an initial attempt to comprehend the relationship between low-income communities and ICT, and of Graham (2002) with his focus on the digital divide, it differs because it places the operational experience of the initiative at the centre of development rather than the technology. ICT regeneration initiatives such as the Connect project are socially constructed phenomena (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999). We regard this as an essential starting point to help critically evaluate the progress and localized dynamics of such initiatives. Few commentators have considered empirically ICT as a means of regeneration. However, while associating this particular technology with social, economic and even physical regeneration is a relatively new phenomenon it has already attracted the attention of practitioners and policy-makers in the UK. We show early in the article how, on a regional and local scale, a number of like-minded ICT initiatives provided a public sector environment and therefore policy context for the Connect project. This context proved to be an intriguing part of the study, particularly because the partners and stakeholders of the project, while generally being supportive, subsequently acted as a barrier to the success of Connect. The project seemed destined to satisfy a latent demand for ICT services in the city, but as it coincided with a distinctive policy push that involved central government agencies such as the Office of the e-Envoy with ambitious targets to encourage ICT use, it became operational in a very congested policy environment. Far from the provision of ICT being led in a private sector market, it was a space crowded with public sector and quasi-public sector organizations and agencies. We bring the article to a conclusion by questioning whether ICT-led regeneration is achievable. We show how, ultimately, the Connect project became unsustainable, ironically during a period of emphasis on similar ICT-led development and a broader policy push driven by the post 1997 Labour administration. The Context and Method Adopted in this Study The study formed the focal point of two evaluation reports of the Connect initiative. This evaluation has enabled an in-depth perspective of events
268 Alan Southern & Alan Townsend and interactions that took place in the regeneration process. We can, with hindsight, emphasize the importance of context here and because of the nature of the investigation, can delineate the project specifically, with a clear start and end (Yin, 1993). This approach placed the role of the researcher central to the evaluation, and through a series of semistructured interviews, participant and non-participant observations we were able to gather qualitative information that demonstrated the relationships between actors important to the development of the Connect project. A review of internal project and local authority documentation is provided here, and along with local and national policy documents has helped to corroborate, or find difference between sources of information. Based on previous research, we might also suggest that this case is typical of other ICT-led initiatives (see for example Southern, 2001). So, for example, while we can point to the fact that the City of Sunderland has a clear need for regeneration, an area under social and economic stress since the introduction of the Special Areas Act of 1934, our emphasis is on understanding processes as they occur in their context as a means to comprehending what happened in this particular initiative (Hartley, 1994). In this regard, the 2000 Index of Multiple Deprivation showed the City as among the most deprived 20 districts of England (DETR, 2000). In addition, examination of ward deprivation indicated 11 wards were among the most deprived 10% and no less than 20 among the worst 20%. This context is sharpened by the fact that deprivation in the city has been, and continues to be, particularly concentrated among the large peripheral housing estates within the former Sunderland County Borough boundary. As Figure 1 shows, this boundary follows alongside the A19, from Thorney Close in the south of the city to Townend Farm and Southwick, residing north of the River Wear and the site of the Connect@Sunderland premises. The context of deprivation using the 2000 Index of Multiple Deprivation is relevant as a measure as it coincides with the operational timeline of the Connect project. As a local authority district, the City of Sunderland was ranked 21st from 356 in the Index of Local Deprivation in 1998. The 2004 Indices of Deprivation continue to indicate that Sunderland falls within the most deprived districts in England, ranked 22nd from 354 in the rank of average score of deprivation. Changes in the compilation of the 2004 figures make ward comparison difficult. This context is essential as it demonstrates how the enduring nature of an adverse labour market structure and city-wide levels of deprivation have laid the basis for a particular type of regeneration found in the Connect project. Even the changing industrial and occupational structure in the city, which was characterized by the arrival of the Nissan motor vehicle plant in the 1980s, and through new dedicated enterprise locations such as Doxford Park, situated to the south of the river adjacent to the A19, has failed to alleviate this perception, but both prove to be influential with the project. In fact it led to a belief among local politicians and policy officers that they had to advocate a wider take-up of new technologies, and this
Technologies in Urban Regeneration 269
CONNECT@SUNDERLAND
Town End Farm
Ri
ver
Southwick
We
ar
City Centre
Thorney Close
A19
Worst wards in England Worst 5% Worst 10% Worst 20% Others
City of Sunderland Source: 2000 Index of Multiple Deprivation, Department of Environment, Transport & the Regions
Figure 1.
The location of the Connect project and ward deprivation in Sunderland
stemmed from the fear of being left behind in the ‘knowledge economy’. Both context and method coexisted in the initial evaluations, and in subsequent reflection on the development of Connect in this article.
The Emergence of Connect in a Like-minded Environment The Connect@Sunderland initiative was an attempt to combine the need for regeneration with the desire to utilize ICT in ways that supported social and economic development. Connect aimed to deliver ICT education,
270 Alan Southern & Alan Townsend training and technical services to schools, local people and small firms by providing Internet access, PC control technologies, including CADCAM software and textile design software, graphical design and multimedia, scanning facilities, digital photography and food technologies. Indeed, during the 1990s, locally based ICT initiatives such as Connect were a response to industrial restructuring within the North East of England, not only in Sunderland but across the region (Southern, 1997). It was at this time that a number of loosely coupled partnerships emerged with the stated intention of broadening ICT take-up for social and economic aims. The intended recipients of these initiatives were often the businesses within the region that, it was argued, lagged behind other regions in the UK in terms of ICT use (CURDS, 2000). Typical of these partnerships were Northern informatics and County Durham On-Line. Their formation was a response to a general impression that places such as the North East were being categorized as having a low level of ICT use value by global corporate players. It was this latter elite who, according to Castells (1996, and later Graham, 2002) were shaping the knowledge society. This led to local policy makers placing their faith in the notion of social and economic inclusion through learning, self-empowerment and confidence building, that could emerge from the way ICT provides everyone with an equal chance to communicate with others who share the same interests and ideals (cf. Mitchell, 2001; Scho¨n & Sanyal, 2001). This inherent equity that many commentators associate with ICT (cf. Kotval, 1999; Van Winden, 2001) lay behind the emergence of the Sunderland Telematics Working Group, who met regularly in the mid 1990s and developed the Sunderland Telematics Strategy (Southern, 2000). The Working Group became part of the main regeneration coalition at the time. It showed how regeneration and ICT ought to be deliberately harnessed with the partnership involving Sunderland University, the local authority and invited private sector representatives. What the Group aimed to achieve was a commitment to ICT-led regeneration. They brought together the public, private and voluntary sectors to engage as they saw it, with the knowledge-based economy and bring its benefits to the city. Electronic Village Halls and a specific ‘Teleport’ facility located at the Doxford Park site both provided dedicated ICT sites and ICT training for those in employment. Initiatives such as these became integral parts of the first Sunderland Telematics Strategy in 1996 (City of Sunderland Partnership, 1996). Four themes were pursued in Sunderland to encourage ICT-led regeneration: building up the electronic infrastructure; skills and learning; inward investment; and the public provision of information services. In this like-minded environment, the idea for Connect began to emerge in 1995. Funding allocated to the ‘Work and Learn’ programme through the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) began in 1996 and, in a short time, was to work its way through to the Connect project. Situated on the site of a local comprehensive school—the Red House Comprehensive (for ages 11 to
Technologies in Urban Regeneration 271 16 years)—the project was allocated physical space that previously had been used as classrooms. As one aspect of the broader Work and Learn programme, Connect began some years later in April 1999 and lasted for 48 months, coming to an end in March 2003. Even in its origins, Connect had broad aims of expanding well beyond the educational world to serve business-training needs and provide IT training to resident members of the public (City of Sunderland, 1998). The peak period of work for the project came during the three years 2000, 2001 and 2002. Delays, such as a final installation of telecommunications lines, meant it was January 2000 before the project became fully operational. There was an official launch in the spring, and by May 2000 the Project Manager was able to provide an accredited further education course, under the auspices of the City of Sunderland Further Education College, but delivered entirely by Connect staff. Rhodes et al. (2003) suggest that SRB finance has offered a degree of flexibility, by allowing larger organizations, such as local government, to underpin spending while at the same time leveraging in private funds. Connect was in the fortunate position of having local authority support that eased financial ebb and flow. The project had sound financial management directed from the local authority. This ensured prudent expenditure that included initial capital outlay on ICT equipment, while revenue spending was mainly on three full-time and one part-time staff, plus rent and maintenance expense. From the initial starting point to the penultimate quarter of the project, total expenditure amounted to £646,188. The breakdown of this expenditure fell into three income categories, of which the majority was public sector finance. Over this period, total SRB funding amounted to £455,988 some 71% of the total, direct local authority financial input amounted to £33,750 amounting to 5% of the total, and finance from the private sector came to £156,450, 24% of the total.1 In contrast, the effects of markets and competition within the public sector, in a manner experienced by Connect, saw the project taking on the form of a small and medium public enterprise with a business-like manner (Hoggett, 1996). So while the initiative developed in an environment of local and regional like-minded projects, the lead-in time to get Connect operational lasted over four years. This reflected the flexible manner in which the project was pursued with strong local backing, particularly from the local education authority. In its inception, the main partners in the Connect project were identified as the local authority, the City of Sunderland Training and Enterprise Council, the City of Sunderland Further Education College, Sunderland University, Northern informatics, representatives from local schools and, from the private sector, also including the telecommunications company, BT. These partners were invited to form the project Steering Group. 1
Drawn from the financial monitoring reports for the Connect project, various.
272 Alan Southern & Alan Townsend Connect Partners, Stakeholders and Users The local authority, or more specifically the Education and Community Services Department in the local authority were the lead body on the Steering Group. The Group aimed to make the Connect project independent and financially viable by the time regeneration funding came to an end in April 2003 (Connect, 2000). They believed this to be achievable because of the latent demand for services that the project could satisfy, and the policy push emanating from various departments and levels of government. Sustainability, it seemed, was a feasible outcome. Given the rhetoric of the time, about the dotcom era, this was a local project with leading technology that provided Internet access, control technologies including CADCAM software and hardware, scanners, and food technology. The provision of this technology had the added-value of support offered from well-trained staff. As the project got underway, it was able to provide expertise through interactive practical sessions with small groups of students or teaching staff. Connect began operation with three main stakeholder groups in mind. There were the schools within the city, the local community initially around the Red House estate focusing particularly but not exclusively on the immediate neighbourhood and finally businesses in the city. Early objectives were largely focused on helping to prepare the emerging workforce in Sunderland for new roles in the labour market. The provision of ICT training and education was an explicit reaction to the occupational and industrial restructuring taking place in the city (City of Sunderland, circa 1997). There was a strong view that ICT training was required by industry, to be supported by business and education mentors, and for individuals in local neighbourhoods who had difficulty in accessing ICT training, and local firms—in particular owner managers and employees of smaller firms (City of Sunderland, circa 1997; City of Sunderland, 1998). Connect offered a facility that was well received by its users. The physical presence of the project allowed staff and pupils from City schools to use the resources and support their own curriculum and professional development. Teachers from local schools regarded Connect as an independent provider of ICT and technology training. This was important for teaching staff as it made them feel they were able to learn new skills in a place they regarded as relaxed and supportive. Connect came to be seen as a self-sufficient space that offered teachers the scope to explore a greater range of professional development centred around, but not exclusively focused on, ICT. In effect, Connect were reliable, less hindered by bureaucracy and presented themselves as independent brokers of ICT support. The project was also able to forge links between business and education professionals through Connects’ association with the local quasigovernment agency, known as Education Business Connections (EBC). EBC became members of the Steering Group prior to the project start. They saw in Connect an opportunity to provide business mentors to local schoolchildren. Their belief was that Connect could offer the technology
Technologies in Urban Regeneration 273 as a conduit that would bring together disaffected youth from disadvantaged neighbourhoods, who were perhaps on the verge of disengaging from secondary school, with vocational opportunities. Mentors, EBC suggested, could represent and explain the benefits of a range of skills and show how ICT was being employed in various occupations, thereby encouraging young people to see education in a positive manner. In this way the project would meet the needs of young people previously identified in the broader Work and Learn programme as a key target group (City of Sunderland, 1998). To its users Connect, appeared to be running successfully. The formal processes of monitoring and evaluation required through the SRB funding programme also seemed to demonstrate this. The Steering Group was able to point to ‘on target’ financial management and to demonstrate through its formal monitoring how initial project milestones and outputs were consistently met. Positive user views and experiences were also evidenced through monitoring questionnaires and through class observation. During the main period of full operation the project outperformed forecast targets time and again. Trainees who obtained qualifications, for example, outperformed expectations over a two-year period and, on occasion, enhanced attainment (for instance concerning new skills and capacity building among local people) reached a level of three times what was initially expected. Only towards the end of 2002, as the final allocation of SRB funding approached, did outputs begin to perform less well than expected. During its operation Connect exhibited all the signs of good practice that would be expected in a regeneration project that provided a high-quality provision of facilities. Despite this, a number of factors emerged that proved to be too much of a challenge for the limited resources Connect had to offer. On one hand, while the national policy push provided a motive for Connects’ existence, it nevertheless provided a series of threats through local duplication of the initiative. The other aspect was much more subject to the control of the Connect Steering Group. What became clear early on were different levels of involvement and commitment from the wider partnership and stakeholder grouping. The failure to broaden the base of involvement by Steering Group members and users over the lifetime of the initiative resulted in the buoyancy of Connect being compromised. It was essential that Connect achieved a greater level of commitment from these stakeholder groups. In this sense, the project manager had freedom to search out new avenues of funding, including the ‘sale’ of Connect services to a wider constituency. It was a competitive element of the regeneration practice that came to act as an extremely powerful form of practice which shapes the behaviour even of those whose value systems embrace traditional notions of public service rather than the new values of public enterprise. (Hoggett, 1996, p.15)
274 Alan Southern & Alan Townsend Yet this practice was also shaped through a sense of initiative fatigue. Steering Group partners began to experience a number of external and internal events that threatened the fragile existence of Connect and it meant ideas about succession remained the concern of a small number of people. The project closed upon the ending of SRB funding in April 2003, and, subsequently, use of the assets fell to the adjoining school. Discussion: Can ICT-led Regeneration be Achieved? Because ‘ failure’ of regeneration projects are typically experienced in communities across the UK case studies offer the chance for considered reflection. In the case of Connect, it was notable that the medium and larger size businesses were engaged differently by the project workers in comparison to smaller firms. Larger businesses began to contribute to the portfolio of services the project was able to offer through the mentoring programme for school pupils or through the provision of ICT and literacy training. The latter, for example, involved Nissan. In contrast, the small business sector was considered as a potential client base for Connect services. Owner managers of small firms in Sunderland, and their employees were seen as groups who needed to be able to exploit ICT. At this particular time, the commercial opportunities from the technology seemed to be limitless (UK Online, 2001) and local policy officers were concerned that Sunderland’s private sector would miss out (Southern, 2000). While both types of private business were approached for sponsorship, this type of provider-client demarcation proved problematic as Connect developed. Over the lifetime of the project there was no small firm use of Connect facilities in the way originally envisaged. At the same time, wider concerns about the delivery of regeneration initiatives, as the new Labour administration rolled out its programme, offered both opportunities and threats to Connect. The post-1997 Government emphasized education, talked about devolved governance (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998) and argued ICT would enable better provision of government services (Southern, 2002). New opportunities for publicly funded ICT initiatives emerged and the general perception of new development challenged the continued commitment of Steering Group members to the project. Local initiatives underway elsewhere, in the shape of dedicated community centres that provided innovative drop-in ICT facilities, meant duplication rather than complementary service. One such centre was running five community courses as part of their franchise agreement with the City of Sunderland Further Education College. It also seemed logical for Connect to operate in such a way. However, the criteria attached to regeneration funding meant that, although local residents taking courses were considered to be a part of Connect core business, there came with this a major challenge of evidencing such work in SRB returns for project outputs. Simply put, the project did not have the capacity to track which former students from the local neighbourhood subsequently accessed employment.
Technologies in Urban Regeneration 275 Connect could offer ICT services that could more than match other local initiatives but they were generally regarded as another local provider. This perception would ultimately be debilitating as it undervalued their role as experts in ICT provision and support for local communities. The Connect project came at a time of many new regeneration initiatives. It also emerged at a time when ICT was felt to be changing the economic and social landscape of the globe. This meant that there was a policy push from central government which, essentially, resulted in a wave of new initiatives founded on a doctrine that social and economic benefits would accrue from ‘the spillovers and positive externalities associated with diffusion and greater use of ICTs and related improvements to the skill base’ (OECD, 2001, p. 6). For Connect, the policy push had serious detrimental effects, an irony given the messages emerging from the Office of the e-Envoy and the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU). National policy aimed to stimulate ICT-led regeneration and this produced other local initiatives that subsequently came to operate in the same environment and target the same stakeholders as Connect (UK Online, 2002). By the early years of the second Labour government, a new framework to pursue ICT-led social and economic development had been planned. Two aspects stood out: on the one hand was the notion of delivering the UK as a leading player in the global knowledge-driven economy as set out by the Office of the e-Envoy (UK Online, 2001). On the other, the SEU instigated work that suggested ICT could be used to combat neighbourhood decline, deprivation and poverty (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998). The association of economic incentives with socially acceptable initiatives became a feature of the ‘third way’ imperative driven by the Labour administration. As this emphasis has grown, many regeneration initiatives have sought to deliver ‘solutions’ for both business and communities. The Department of Trade and Industry, and particularly the Office of the e-Envoy regarded access (to the technologies) and the skills agenda as key ICT themes (UK Online, 2002). The emergence of the ‘brand’ UK Online was a bold step in addressing these points and, by establishing a network of 6000 UK Online centres, a range of ICT-based services were offered. Meanwhile, when the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal set out a series of challenges to be addressed through 18 Policy Action Teams, one was specifically aimed at access and use of ICT by those living in the poorest neighbourhoods (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998). The Policy Action Team (PAT) 15 were required to develop a planned approach to increase the take-up of ICT for people in those neighbourhoods defined by the 2000 Index of Multiple Deprivation as the most deprived. PAT 15 argued that market forces will not address the problem of access to ICTs in disadvantaged neighbourhoods in a reasonable time, nor should private enterprise be expected to fund the important social benefits of community access. (PAT 15, 2000, p. 38)
276 Alan Southern & Alan Townsend The case for intervention was made from many perspectives and from different arms of UK Government. Connect came to represent an explicit and universal promise of support for those local communities regarded as socially and economically excluded and for businesses that seemed to be lacking in competitiveness. Significantly, this was a project that emerged prior to the work of PAT 15, the SEU and UK Online. A second example of excess policy was even more painful for the Connect project to come to terms with. A national ICT policy push from central government was launched in the shape of the ‘Excellence in Cities’ (EiC) initiative. EiC was launched in 1999 aimed at establishing area-based education partnerships responsible to the (then) Department of Education and Employment (DfEE). While the Local Education Authority would play a role in local partnerships, the focus was on collaboration between schools, with individual schools able to exercise greater flexibility in the management of initiatives (Excellence in Cities, 2003). In March 2000, just as Connect had become fully operational, the EiC programme was expanded with some £58 million of new money focused on 22 new authority areas. In this phase, Sunderland and the adjoining districts of Gateshead and North Tyneside received funding. One aspect of EiC affected Connect sharply; the City Learning Centres in each authority were to be a central ICT ‘hub’. This central government funded initiative therefore provided the means for a physically located hub, with a dedicated ICT resource that included a 100 Mb ICT connection to all secondary schools in the partnership area, who would act as ‘spokes’ connected to the hub. This almost exactly replicated what was initially regarded as the ideal outcome from what Connect were seeking to achieve (Connect, 2000). However, there were aspects of this development that prevented the integration of Connect with the EiC programme. On the one hand was the element of expediency. The pressures felt by the EiC partnership in Sunderland meant the need for them to consult with Connect became less and less of a priority as pressure on time to deliver their own specified outputs increased. This took place while a small number of actors operated in both the Connect Steering Group and the EiC partnership. On closer examination, a further barrier preventing integration of the two was simply technology. With some degree of foresight, this could have been easily addressed, specifically the lack of a broadband telecommunications link and the appropriate video broadcasting equipment. It added to the difficulties of Connect seeking to link up with the City Learning Centre in Sunderland, but as these events were evolving, it did not entirely rule it out. Given the general roll out of broadband across the UK, particularly since the demise of Connect, it is ironic that this was a technologically induced barrier. What this tends to suggest is that there was a social shaping of technological applications in Sunderland with a range of social and political aspects of the initiative holding greater relevance than the technology itself (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999). At the time of Connect’s early operations for example, the schools in the Sunderland area were generally unaware of what ICT support was available, either from Connect or elsewhere. It
Technologies in Urban Regeneration 277 then emerged that the City Learning Centres’ services were to be made available free for all schools, operating from designated school premises that were able to act as ICT spokes. The national drive that enabled such a development, through EiC, was at odds with the business model that Connect had previously adopted and were pursuing, funded through a previous system of regeneration finance and administrated from a different central government department. Other developments saw the Training and Enterprise Council pulling back from city-wide ICT initiatives, prior to its displacement by the Learning and Skills Council, while, at the same time, the City of Sunderland Further Education College failed to maintain its interest in Connect. The role of the City of Sunderland Further Education College tended to demonstrate the complexity and even competitive nature of ICT provision and IT training among state-run, state-sponsored or quasi state-sponsored providers. It led to a situation where Connect was increasingly being crowded out, appearing to be an initiative supported by an older form of regeneration policy. Concluding Remarks The City of Sunderland stands as an illustration of the industrial restructuring that has hit many northern towns and cities in the UK. The demise of manufacturing, the successful attraction of major inward investors such as Nissan and the designation of Enterprise Zone status at sites such as Doxford Park have produced a typical example of the strains and stresses shared by many urban areas. It is little wonder then that policy officers and politicians in comparable towns and cities have reacted by seeking regeneration funding for ICT projects of a similar nature. During the 1990s, these were often supported through the SRB or through European funding. The Connect project is one example of such an ICT-led initiative. To all intents and purposes, it would have appeared at the outset of this initiative that there was a latent need for the services that a project such as Connect could offer. So much so, that if both the facilities and the expertise could be provided, the potential for a sustainable project beyond regeneration funding could be met. The first point of conclusion therefore concerns the timing of the Connect project. It was born from an idea that emerged prior to the dotcom boom and before the election of a new Labour administration. At this time, concern over how places such as Sunderland could engage with the knowledge economy were apparent. When the policy push emerged, with some vigour given the abundance of ideas about ICT-led economic growth, it became difficult to align and accommodate the objectives of Connect with the development of later initiatives. A related point is that while it was acknowledged by users, particularly staff from local schools, that Connect had a number of useful resources, the project came to lack anything in the way of specialist up-to-date hardware and software that ultimately set it apart from the provision that now exists in schools,
278 Alan Southern & Alan Townsend particularly in secondary schools, as the technologies have become more widely dispersed across the education sector. Furthermore, while staff at Connect were experts in the delivery of ICT education, and because of this many local people enjoyed visiting Connect, there also appeared to be limitations as to what support other ‘partners’ could offer. For example, the City of Sunderland Further Education College restricted the release of new and popular courses through Connect because it sought to maintain its own client base first and foremost. Additionally, the potential of ICT was never realized for what was originally considered a most important stakeholder group: the local small business sector. The project was never able to convince this group that there was added value for their business to be obtained from the services and expertise Connect could offer. Although the basic management of this regeneration project was of more than a satisfactory standard there was a discernable failure to develop a range of succession alternatives. It could well be that a skills deficit exists among regeneration professionals that ensures regeneration projects can be sustained. Alternatively, maybe those working in regeneration need to be given the scope to manage projects that ‘fail’ as part of a broader effort to support social and economic development. These generalized assumptions require much more considered reflection than is afforded within the immediate remit of this article. The reality of Connect differs, for example, from the hypothetical claims that ICT can act as an empowering means of development (Graham, 2002). Nor has this case study shown an egalitarian character of ICT use (Scho¨n & Sanyal, 2001). In addition, the belief that places like Sunderland fail to exploit ICT-led regeneration because of supply-side limitations that are based on a simple assessment of short run market conditions, which make ICT investment an unattractive option for the private sector (Mitchell, 2001), would surely tend to suggest that Connect would last longer than it did. Of more relevance is how the groups served by Connect became part of a regeneration initiative that was subject to the political manoeuvrings of national policy resulting in local actors pursuing different paths. For now, the lesson for policy makers is not only to avoid the rhetoric that accompanies technology initiatives and to recognize the pervasive character of the information technology evolution, but to carefully take account of regeneration projects operating in a rapidly changing policy environment. References Castells, M. (1996) The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford: Blackwell). City of Sunderland (circa 1997) Economic Development Initiatives (The City of Sunderland Council: Chief Executive’s Department). City of Sunderland (1998) Single Regeneration Budget Project Appraisal for Round 2 The Live Wire Centre, internal document. City of Sunderland Partnership (1996) Telematics Strategy: City of Sunderland. . . Virtually Unbeatable, October (The City of Sunderland Council: Chief Executive’s Department). Connect (2000) The Connect Project Business Plan October 2000–March 2003, internal document.
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