Institutional effects on occupational health and ... - Wiley Online Library

Institutional Effects on Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems Robson Sø Rocha Copenhagen Business School—International Center for Business and Politics

Abstract Research analyzing the effects of occupational health and safety management systems (OHSMS) has been divided roughly between support for and criticism of these systems. This article adopts a new, explorative perspective by analyzing how different national institutional environments are likely to affect the functioning of OHSMS. The argument of this article is that such functioning is greatly dependent on the features of the national institutional environment in which such systems are implemented. The article discusses three ideal types of market economy (i.e., liberal market economy, coordinated market economy, and particularistic environment) in relation to industrial relations systems, prevailing organizational templates, and patterns of skills formation. It assesses the possible impact of these features on the functioning of OHSMS. C 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Keywords: OHSMS; Institutional theory; National institutions; Training; Industrial relations

1. INTRODUCTION Occupational health and safety management systems (OHSMS) constitute a systemic approach to the planning and implementation of continuous improvements in the area of occupational health and safety (OHS). The main ideas behind OHSMS are the continuous examination and improvement of work processes by organizational teams trained in problemsolving techniques and empowered to make decisions on the basis of their learning and experience (Gallagher, 2000). OHSMS have been implemented voluntarily by an increasing number of organizations all over the world (Frick et al., 2005; Redinger & Levine, 1998). It is important to note, however, that there are important differences between OHS management (with a limited number of mandated principles) and privately dissemiCorrespondence to: Robson Sø Rocha, Steen Blichers vey 22, Frederiksberg, 2000. Phone: 004538153560; e-mail: [email protected] Received: 2 January 2009; revised 4 May 2009; accepted 25 June 2009 Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10.1002/hfm.20176

nated, voluntary OHSMS. Within the European Union (EU), OHSMS are mandated by framework directive 89/391/EEC. There are OHSMS with varying levels of complexity, requirements, and degrees of being voluntary or mandatory (see Dalrymple et al., 1998). Mandatory OHSMS require that employers ensure the health and safety of workers in different aspects related to their work, but these requirements vary greatly among countries. Voluntary OHSMS (such as OHSAS 18000) specify that firms have to comply with the legal requirements (i.e., sufficient regulations on noise, chemicals, air pollution, and machine safety). This article is concerned with voluntary OHSMS, even though there is a conceptual confusion in the use of these terms (Frick et al., 2005), because they present overlapping principles in different national contexts. Redinger and Levine (1998) analyzed 13 different OHSMS and environment management systems (EMS) in an attempt to define the OHSMS universe. They present a general OHSMS model containing 27 elements. The 16 primary elements of their model are: management commitment and resources, employee participation, OHS policy, goals and objectives, performance measures, system planning and development, OHSMS manual and procedures, training

Human Factors and Ergonomics in Manufacturing & Service Industries 20 (3) 211–225 (2010)

c 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

211

Institutional Effects on OHSMS

system, hazard control system, preventive and corrective action system, procurement and contracting, communication system, evaluation system, continual improvement, integration, and management review (Redinger & Levine, 1998, p. 578). OHSMS outline broad work environment objectives for companies and require them to perform certain functions and employ specialized individuals. Firms need to comply with the minimum requirements of the standard and those imposed by national legislations, beyond the fact that firms need to establish performance targets for themselves, as well as decide what means they intend to employ to meet these targets. The process of how firms can improve their standards is to some extent open and undefined. Critics of OHSMS claim that their implementation will lead to the bureaucratization of health and safety issues, and that the results will be worthless or even disadvantageous for organizations (Kamp & Blansch, 2000; Quinlan & Mayhew, 2000). The idea of continuous improvement contained in these systems is criticized as being rather contradictory, as they do not support creativity and experiment, which are crucial prerequisites for learning (Kamp & Blansch, 2000, p. 420). Without explicit sanctions, it is argued, OHSMS will fall victim to opportunistic behaviour: OHSMS were created under the influence of rational bureaucratic theories, which are incompatible with genuine worker involvement (Nielsen, 2000). Else and Beaumont (2000) argue that “the use of an OHSMS can mask OHS problems, delude an organization into perceiving it is effectively managing OHS and distract effort and resources away from OHS towards the management system itself ” (Else & Beaumont, 2000, p. 36). OHSMS cannot be used as substitutes for regulation, for they will only work when explicit sanctions and state supervision are included, thus preventing opportunistic behavior among firms. Otherwise, companies can transmit a legitimized image to their external environment while at the same time displaying different actual behaviors. This would represent a type of decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Westphal & Zajac, 2001), in which organizations are able to signal the adoption of certain practices to the external environment while at the same time preserving internal structures which are not necessarily legitimacy driven and coherent with that external image. Supporters of the approach argue that OHSMS trigger a learning process which results in improvements to health and safety standards. Hudson (2000) argues 212

Rocha

that safety control has undergone a shift from an unsystematic, albeit well-meaning collection of processes and standards to a systematic approach specific to safety. OHSMS are designed to function as a benchmarking process, that is, as a method for identifying aspects of an organization’s activity that could be more efficient and/or effective by comparison with performance in other relevant departments and/or organizations (Borys, 2000; Gardner & Winder, 1999). Bunn and colleagues (2001) examined multiple outcomes of OHSMS (implementation, final OHS outcomes, economic outcomes) and showed that they had a significant impact in terms of reducing both direct health care costs and improved productivity, measured as absenteeism. A study by Walker and Tait (2004) investigated the effectiveness of an approach used in the United Kingdom that was designed to help small enterprises set up and operate a simple health and safety management system. This showed that the approach was effective in almost all the cases in helping enterprise managers to produce adequate policy statements and risk assessments and to introduce effective health and safety management systems. In this view, organizations will be inclined to use OHSMS as a searching map (Weick & Roberts, 1993) to improve health and safety performance and solve internal problems (Zwetsloot, 2000). Already during the implementation of OHSMS, different organizational groups will interact in the process and learn from it how to deal better with health and safety problems. This learning process would be facilitated by the current organizational paradigm, which advocates greater deliberation and influence at different hierarchical levels. Saksvik and colleagues (2003) argue that OHSMS and process evaluation may be the only kind of evaluation that will yield sufficient answers to OHS problems. Thus, OHSMS have the potential to be used by different groups interested in the improvement of their own OHS conditions. Whether such processes work in practice and are able to improve the performance of different areas remains unknown (King, Lenox, & Terlaak, 2005). Based on the evidence to date, Robson and colleagues (2007) argue that there is no clear indication that OHSMS represent a solution to OHS issues; the body of evidence is still insufficient to make recommendations either for or against OHSMS (Robson et al., 2007, p. 329). The causal chains between OHSMS regulations and health outcomes, however, is likely to be so complex and multifaceted (Eriksson, 2004) that it is hardly feasible to find the statistical evidence required by Robson and

Human Factors and Ergonomics in Manufacturing & Service Industries

DOI: 10.1002/hfm

Rocha


colleagues (2007). Instead of taking sides in this debate, the question addressed here concerns the effects of different institutional environments on the functioning of OHSMS. Institutions normalize behavior and shape the nature of much economic activity (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; North, 1990), thus regulating the potential and constraints for action of different economic actors in a given environment (Scott, 2000). As such, institutional arrangements affect the way firms organize their economic activities in different types of market economies. Therefore, there is a need to better understand how different institutional arrangements can shape the implementation and functioning of OHSMS. Because it is likely that different institutional environments transform international standards as OHSMS in different ways, it is necessary to understand not only its functioning, but also how the OHSMS itself is shaped by the institutional context. It is quite important to investigate this issue, but that goes beyond the aim of this article, which instead addresses the following question: How are different institutional environments likely to affect the functioning of OHSMS? This article adopts a new, explorative perspective by analyzing how different national institutional environments are likely to affect the functioning of OHSMS. The argument of this article is that the functioning of OHSMS is greatly dependent on the features of the national institutional environment in which such systems are implemented. This argument implies close connections between industrial relations, predominant organizational templates, patterns of skills formation, and the ways in which management systems are implemented and function in different institutional environments. Thus, the functioning of OHSMS is likely to be affected by the ways in which different kinds of labor power (in terms of both technical skills and individual attitudes and values) are developed (Whitley, 1999). This article discusses three ideal types of market economy (i.e., liberal market economy [LME], coordinated market economy [CME], and particularistic environment [PE]) in relation to industrial relations systems, prevailing organizational templates, and patterns of skills formation before assessing the possible impact of these features on the functioning of OHSMS. This article is organized into six sections. The next section introduces the institutional theory and explains how it analyzes the organizational search for legitimacy. The third section presents institutional differences between countries and how they have been characterized

according to LMEs, CMEs, or PEs. The fourth section discusses different industrial relations regimes. The fifth section discusses the links between the requirements of OHSMS in relation to workforce participation and the different organizational templates which characterize firms in different countries. The sixth section discusses how different institutional environments organize systems of skills formation and development, and the last section considers the implications of these differences among institutional environments for the functioning of OHSMS and indicates the implications for practitioners, policy makers, and future research.

2. INSTITUTIONS, THE SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY, AND DECOUPLING All economic activity is embedded within a national institutional context of social norms, rules, and expectations which define socially acceptable economic behavior. Institutions are settled habits of thought common to the generality of man, which impose restrictions by defining the legal, moral, and cultural boundaries that set off legitimate from illegitimate activities (Scott, 2000). Because organizations are embedded in institutional orders, they must transmit signs of legitimacy and normality to remain on favorable terms with their constituencies (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), convince larger publics that they are legitimate, and continually seek to enhance or protect their legitimacy (Scott, 2000), which is fundamental to extracting resources from their environments. Thus, legitimacy increases the possibilities for survival. As a consequence, organizations tend to conform to the environmental prescription of what is regarded and defined as appropriate and efficient. They can, as a result, largely disregard the actual impact of organizational changes on organizational performance (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Successful firms are legitimate models and, under conditions of uncertainty, other organizations tend to imitate them, creating bandwagon effects (Abrahamson, 1996; Schaefer, 2007; Staw & Epstein, 2000). For example, the introduction of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards has been seen as a necessity for business success, without any proof that these standards can be met or are met in reality. Public interest groups, local communities, and occupational and professional associations are constituents


DOI: 10.1002/hfm

213


of the institutional environment that delineates, diffuses, or imposes prevailing norms and requirements of acceptable company conduct (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) characterize three social processes through which organizations tend to become similar: mimetic isomorphism, a consequence of adopting the successful elements of other organizations when there is uncertainty about alternatives; coercive isomorphism, resulting from pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations on which they are dependent; and the normative transmission of social facts, generally from external sources such as professions. Institutions shape behavior by constituting the set of acceptable interpretations and actions available to social actors. In the volatile new economy, actors are continually dealing with novel situations. To craft responses, they base their choices of action on their set of existing understandings, which are furnished by the institutional environment in which they are embedded. Because firms have little available information and need to make suppositions about the actions of other firms, managers may decide to emulate the behavior of leading companies in the industry without fully considering the potential effects and problems involved in that process. Organizations adopt structures mandated by the organizations on which they are resource-dependent. Coercive forces for the diffusion of work EMS might come from the state, which expects their implementation as part of the regulatory regime. Another source of coercive pressure is the relative position of the firm in international supply chains. The internationalization of firms and the integration of supply chains often increase institutional and customer pressures on companies to go beyond local social responsibility requirements (Christmann & Taylor, 2001). Firms adopting international standards may be influenced by market forces and the fear of hostile consumer action (Gunningham & Rees, 1997). International standards legitimize the firm in relation to its customers. One source of normative pressure may be the high level of continuous education among workers, who become more conscious of their rights and the problems related to OHS. In periods of low unemployment, workers primarily look for jobs in firms which have an image of dealing well with work environment issues and working conditions. The introduction of new practices is driven by the need to conform, rather than by the necessity to achieve 214

Rocha

superior objective performance. In this respect, new managerial tools function as fashions, that is, as transitory beliefs that certain management techniques are at the forefront of management progress. As a consequence, their adoption can have quite undesirable effects on companies, employees, and managers. Indeed, there is research evidence that firms adopting new “fashions” achieve greater reputations, but do not necessarily perform better (Staw & Epstein, 2000). Kimerling (2001) suggests that decoupling is likely to occur in the adoption of ethics codes when external pressure for legitimacy is high. The introduction of new management systems has also been seen as a way of reaffirming control over workers (Knights & McCabe, 2000) or as a fashion-driven process that benefits only the consultants selling the new systems (Staw & Epstein, 2000). In a study of the chemical sector, King and colleagues (2005) argue that there is the potential for opportunism to overcome isomorphic pressures, and they suggest that effective industry regulation is difficult to maintain without explicit sanctions. Because firms embrace the system for reasons of conformity, its adoption may have no effect, or only negative ones, on working environment issues. The implementation of OHSMS thus functions as a fashion which is temporary and only likely to produce superficial effects. Once adopted, fashions will not actually be used outside relatively trivial matters of management, or else they are likely to become just another bureaucratic process which does not address the practical problems of OHS. This more general view of institutions sets the basis for analyzing how different national institutional environments are likely to affect the functioning of OHSMS.

3. NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS The historical neo-institutionalist approach treats social actors as acting within a framework of embedded economic relationships, influenced by a particular set of national institutional arrangements (Hollingsworth, 1997). The main idea is that the organization and control of work processes and of workplace relationships in capitalist societies are multifaceted, systemic phenomena which vary considerably between national institutional contexts (Whitley, 1999). Institutional arrangements as reflected in national legislation, the nature of property rights, and the nature of educational and


DOI: 10.1002/hfm

Rocha


vocational systems shape the boundaries and possible paths for legitimate action. National institutions create the “rules of the game” by which individuals and organizations operate, cooperate, and compete, forging the ways in which organizations come into existence and develop (North, 1990). Institutions represent shared, collective understandings or rules of conduct reflected in laws, governance mechanisms, and the functioning of financial markets (North, 1990; Scott, 2000), which help to define observed patterns of market exchange (Fligstein, 1996). For example, during the last century, the overlapping principles of Taylorism and Fordist mass production that spread in the United States were much studied by companies in Europe. The adoption of these principles in Europe, however, was slow, partial, and affected by institutional influences at the national level (Guillen, 1994). There is evidence to suggest that transfers of management systems are not always smooth and successful (Kostova, 1999, p. 308). Management systems are forged by the configuration of pre-existing institutions involved in industrial relationships, training systems, and state interventions (Boyer, 2005). Thus, the ways in which organizations function and change display features—-trengths and weaknesses—-re related to the institutions in which they are embedded. Institutional arrangements can both constrain and enable action by erecting barriers as well as by creating opportunities for the emergence of new ways of organizing economic activities and the working conditions under which these activities take place. Thus, different patterns of work organization and work conditions are deeply rooted in the history of industrial relationships in each country. Given the importance of different institutional arrangements, a large diversity of labor-market regulations can be observed. The implementation and functioning of OHSMS are likely to be strongly affected by the institutional context. Accordingly, we might expect different variants of OHSMS to be built on the basis of different institutional logics, that is, more or less based on bureaucracy or continuous improvements and learning, and focusing on different aspects of OHS. This implies not only that the OHSMS will differ, but also that the criteria for success will be defined within the systems themselves. As pointed out earlier in text, however, these issues must be addressed in another article. The dominant practices of firms in relation to work organization, working conditions, reward systems, and employee relations complement each other. The educa-

tion and training of managers and representatives constitute one of the most important institutional factors informing the behavior of firms. Linked to the formation and training of managers are the governance models that different societies have developed (Whitley, 1999). Each economy displays specific capabilities for the coordination of economic relationships that will condition what firms can do. Thus, because companies in different countries display systematic differences in their structures and strategies, the implementation of new management tools depends on institutions at the national level. Hall and Soskice (2001) characterize two main ideal types of capitalist economy: CMEs and LMEs. These ideal types are ends of a spectrum along which many nations can be arrayed (Hall & Soskice, 2001), but ideal types are simply a theoretical category and do not provide an accurate empirical description. Amable and colleagues (1997) examine the relationships between the innovation system and the mode of regulation, and point to the coexistence of four variants of capitalism: market, meso-corporatist, socialdemocratic and statist. When countries are compared and different factors combined, it is not surprising to find that developing countries exhibit quite distinct forms of capitalism as well. This is especially so in Latin America (Boyer, 2005; Quémia, 2001). Although the aim of this article is not to analyze the possible national variations of capitalism as such, it presents three different idealized forms of capitalism, which do not intend to be exhaustive. Rather, the intention is to frame how the institutional context is likely to influence the implementation and functioning of OHSMS. As already noted, the three different types are CMEs, LMEs, and PEs. In the next section, the differences between these three types of economy are presented in relation to industrial relations systems, predominant organizational templates, and training and education. The intention is to show the inherent differences within the three systems which are likely to affect how OHSMS function in different types of market economy.

4. CONTRASTING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEMS During the last decade, several studies have confirmed the argument that the most effective health and safety committees are those for which both employee representatives and management have been trained and


DOI: 10.1002/hfm

215


in which representation operates through established trade-union channels (James & Walters, 2002; Walters, 1996). Reilly, Paci, and Holl (1995) showed that injury rates tend to be highest in workplaces where there is a unilateral determination of health and safety by management, and lowest where mechanisms of unionbased representation are present. Consultative committees, in which all the employees’ representatives are appointed by unions, reduce workplace injuries relative to those establishments in which management alone determines health and safety arrangements (Eaton & Nocerino, 2000). Because we can expect national industrial relations arrangements to have important effects on the functioning of OHSMS, it is important to look at the differences in these features among the three types of market economy. CMEs are typified by a strong trade-union movement and a tradition of cooperation between labor market actors. The dominant form of corporate governance is a stakeholders’ model of governance in which the interests of labor are central, companies are required to serve a number of groups, and the latter’s rights to a fair share of surpluses and to industrial participation are emphasized (Lane, 2003). Nordic countries are examples of CMEs (Hall & Soskice, 2001), in which, among other features, participation in decision making has been an important component of national industrial regimes. In Germany, strong unions that prevent numerical flexibility strategies in the labor market are likely to encourage cooperation to improve quality and incremental innovations, as they restrict price-based competition. Linked to the strength of trade unions is public support for a highquality and highly regarded training system and strong incentives for individuals and employers continuously to improve their technical skills. CMEs are also characterized by high trade-union densities. In 2004, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland had the highest trade-union densities in Europe, with 80%, 77%, and 71% membership rates, respectively (European Foundation, 2007). In Germany since World War II, workers have had considerable collective influence over task allocation and work deployment (Whitley, 1999). These institutional features are likely to reduce the propensity of firms to pursue strategies downplaying workers’ interests. Frick and Walters (1998) showed that, in small enterprises in Sweden, regional safety representatives (RSRs) generally felt that they enjoyed a reasonable level of cooperation with employers in small enterprises. Swedish and Danish law 216

Rocha

gives employees the right to appoint local safety representatives in workplaces with as few as five employees. The widespread cooperation among labor-market actors reflects a strong trade-union movement, but cooperation does not mean subservient behavior—on the contrary, it is based on powerful actors with the ability to strongly influence each other’s destinies. The liberal model of corporate governance assumes norms of self-interest, opportunism, and enforced compliance (Lubatkin et al., 2005, p. 883). Organizations in LMEs operate within a shareholder-value governance system, the labor market generally being deregulated and characterized by weak trade-union movements and fragmented employer associations, a tradition of adversarial industrial relations, and a weak system of vocational training (Froud et al., 2000). Increasing shareholder value is an important driver of senior management decision making in Anglo-Saxon companies (Williams, 2000). In the United Kingdom, the shareholder value ideology, combined with a liberal framework of employment regulation, provides for a pattern of corporate governance and restructuring that is primarily determined by shareholders at the expense of employees (Almond, Edwards, & Clark, 2003, p. 437). LMEs present a strong anti-union tradition and a weak tendency for the participation of the workforce in decision making, and trade unions are generally weak at the workplace level. The literature points to several examples of American firms pursuing anti-union policies and even attempting to transfer these to their subsidiaries abroad (Ferner, Almond, & Colling, 2005; Muller, 1998). Over the past three decades, U.S. employers have demonstrated their capacity to develop a successful anti-union strategy, with spectacular results. They have pursued this strategy with the help of an extensive and sophisticated “union avoidance” industry, which is now worth several hundred million dollars per year (Logan, 2006), and companies providing these types of services have already expanded into the United Kingdom. In Britain, regulation concerning OHS has effectively excluded workers from OHS representation in firms where unions are not recognized (Robinson & Smallman, 2006). Even the new European regulations concerning employee rights to information have not fundamentally changed the features of the British system, which do not extend to the codetermination or joint decision making, which are the main features of the German and Nordic industrial relations


DOI: 10.1002/hfm

Rocha


systems and corporate governance models. Walters and Nichols (2006) found an alarmingly low level of arrangements allowing consultation and representation to occur meaningfully across all their case studies in Britain. Worker representation and consultation were quite severely constrained in delivering their potentially beneficial effects in some workplaces (Walters & Nichols, 2006, p. 248). Many industrializing countries, as well as those undergoing radical institutional change, such as former state socialist societies in central and eastern Europe (CEE), are examples of PEs in which the state is still a dominant economic actor, despite two decades of neoliberal policies. In these countries, significant differences are likely to exist between firms that are owned or supported by the state and those that are not. The former are likely to have cheaper credit and easier access to scarce resources, as well as access to new technologies, education, and training. The latter need to rely on their own resources and, consequently, are more likely to face problems in implementing innovative management systems such as OHSMS. These conditions will produce severe differences in the ability and willingness of firms to improve OHS issues. In PEs, industrial relations are generally quite adversarial, and the development and retention of employees is not perceived to be of strategic importance to most employers. For instance, Brazilian firms considered human resources to be abundant, easily obtained, and replaceable (Rocha, 2003), meaning that firms did not generally invest in the qualifications or development of an “easily replaceable” workforce. In CEE economies, working conditions for women have deteriorated in recent years in most cases (Pollert, 2005). In CEE countries, there has been a failure of tripartism (Cox & Mason, 2000; Ost, 2000), and industrial relations remain highly fragmented. In Poland, while 24,000 trade unions are registered, the two main trade unions, OPZZ and Solidarity, are still strong rivals (Meardi, 2002). CEE economies have underdeveloped recruitment, promotion, performance appraisal, and termination practices (Clark & Soulsby, 1999). The emergence of a large section of small and medium enterprises across the CEE economies implies a mainly non-unionised labor force (Pollert, 2000). It is necessary to reemphasize that emerging markets and CEE countries exhibit quite original forms of capitalism, which are likely to create many subdivisions within this group.

As I shall discuss in the next section, the dominant organizational templates around the world differ substantially; these differences are also likely to affect the implementation and functioning of OHSMS.

5. PREDOMINANT ORGANIZATIONAL TEMPLATES IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES As market conditions become more volatile, the abilities of firms to be innovative and to adapt flexibly to these conditions have become more central for organizations. These changes directly affect how work is divided and organized among different groups, and consequently impacts on OHS are at the core of these changes. The problem is that, under the new conditions, OHS issues cannot easily be treated as in the command and control models of organization which predominated in the past. The norms and routines used in dealing with OHS issues need to be continually worked out, and there are requirements for greater flexibility and for the ability to tailor solutions to the different needs of the groups involved, resulting in a wider variety of solutions. Organizations which support the goals of collective learning, continuous improvement, and innovation based on cooperative relationships are more likely to absorb the contributions of different organizational actors. These organizations allow employees to maximize their opportunities to contribute, which in turn attracts and promotes the retention of those employees who are capable of benefiting from the changes that have been implemented as a result of their own efforts. These new organizational templates or learning organizations, however, are not evenly distributed among different institutional environments. Lorenz and Valeyre (2005) compared the different forms of work organization among the 15 states that were EU members at that time. They found four different clusters of work organization, characterized as learning, lean, Taylorist, and traditional. Learning organizations are characterized by the overrepresentation of variables measuring autonomy, task complexity, and learning and problem solving, and to a lesser degree by an over-representation of the variable measuring individual responsibility for quality management. The variables reflecting monotony, repetitiveness, and work-rate constraints are underrepresented. The lean model is characterized by an over-representation of teamwork and job rotation,


DOI: 10.1002/hfm

217


quality management variables, and the various factors constraining work pace. Lean management displays strong learning dynamics and relies on employees’ contributions to problem solving. Autonomy in work is relatively low, however, and tight quantitative production norms are used to control employee effort. The Taylorist model is in general the opposite of that found in learning organizations, with minimal learning dynamics, low complexity, low autonomy, and an overrepresentation of the variables measuring constraints on the pace of work. Traditional forms of work organization are poorly described by work organization variables, which, with the exception of monotony in work, are all under-represented. This class presumably groups simple forms of work organization in which methods are for the most part informal and noncodified (Lorenz & Valeyre, 2005, pp. 429–430). Lorenz and Valeyre (2005, p. 435) found that, on average, in the EU-15 countries in 2000, only 13.6% of employees said they were working under conditions that could be characterized as Taylorist, whereas 28.2% were working under a lean and 39.1% under a learning form of work organization. The research also demonstrated important differences among European countries concerning the predominant organizational models in different countries. Denmark, The Netherlands, and Sweden presented the highest percentages of organizations characterized as learning forms: no less than 64% of Dutch and 60% of Danish employees worked in learning organizations. Smith and colleagues (2008) show that Sweden, Denmark, and The Netherlands score significantly better than other European countries on problem solving and learning. The United Kingdom presents significant negative scores for these characteristics. Gallie (2003) shows that employees in Denmark and Sweden (and to a lesser extent Finland) have a higher quality of work tasks and better opportunities for participation than do employees in other European countries. In the United Kingdom and United States, there has been some development of new forms of work organization (Appelbaum & Berg, 2000, pp. 122–124). In Britain, however, as Harley (2001) shows, new forms of work organization and teamwork do not considerably increase employee discretion. Pressures for rapid returns on investment stimulate the development of a more intensive form of mass production, rather than the emergence of flexible production or extensive process innovation (Appelbaum & Batt, 1994). The United Kingdom and Ireland present a percentage of learning 218

Rocha

organizations below the European average. Southern European countries present a high percentage of employees working in Taylorist forms of organization. Taylorism tends to predominate in PEs, despite the recent diffusion of the lean model. These business environments are more likely to be populated by highly Taylorist firms, which face severe difficulties in achieving collective learning and continuing improvements of work conditions based on employee involvement in problem solving. In Mexico, only small changes in the organization of work toward the lean model have been encountered (Toledo, 2002). The level of organizational capability tends to be highly variable, with few world-class plants and many others at a fairly mediocre level. Thus islands of competence (Evans, 1995), in the form of technologically advanced companies, survive and prosper in a sea of organizational and technological deficiency. Taylorism has also had a deep impact in CEE economies: During industrialization, communist countries praised the Taylor system as a path to rapid economic growth, and this is still the main way of organizing work in most CEE economies. According to Greenan, Kalugina, and Walkowiak (2007), in the Mediterranean area (Greece, Portugal, and Spain) working conditions are rather poor and job complexity weak. As is shown in the next section, predominant types of organization are linked to dominant patterns of skill formation and development, which may affect the functioning of OHSMS. Systematic research into the OHS effects of Tayloristic regimes among servicesector workers provides some additional evidence. The study by Sznelwar and colleagues (1999) of Brazilian call centers showed that work intensification, repetitive movements, and the long hours of Brazilian call-center workers resulted in a high incidence of musculoskeletal injury.

6. TRAINING AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT—CONTRASTING CASES A number of studies related to changes in production processes indicate that training is a key support for continuous improvement, as it is for OHS too (Eaton & Nocerino, 2000; Frick & Walters, 1998). It follows that resources invested in the training of health and safety representatives and other workers are likely to produce significant benefits in terms of a reduction in injuries and ill health and the economic costs associated


DOI: 10.1002/hfm

Rocha


with these. In their comprehensive study of the nature and effects of the Health and Safety at Work Act in Britain, Dawson and Clinton (1988) argue that effective OHS policies require people at work to be actively involved in the identification of hazards, the prescription and implementation of controls, and the maintenance and monitoring of standards and activities. Three elements are identified as crucial: knowledge, capacity, and motivation. Institutional environments which provide workers with greater opportunities to improve their skills are likely to produce a greater percentage of the workforce that is able to identify, and negotiate solutions for, a variety of organizational features which may affect OHS issues. Thus, it is important to compare how effective the different types of market economy are in enabling workers to upgrade their skills. Gustavsen and Hunnius (1981) found that, in Norway, the operation of direct forms of involvement in health and safety was strongly influenced by the broader patterns of employer–worker relationships within which they took place. They pointed out the centrality of skilled workers to the production process and their experience in recognizing and resolving problems as a facilitator in this process. In the Nordic countries, approximately 60% of workers with higher education participated in training, along with 40% of workers with craft skills and 30% of unskilled workers. The relationship between learning organizations and the educational level of the population seems to match, because the proportion of the population aged 25–64 with at least an upper secondary education is highest in the Nordic (75%) and continental (67%) countries, and lowest in the Anglo-Saxon (60%) and Mediterranean (39%) countries (Sapir, 2006). All Scandinavian countries and The Netherlands score very high in terms of the use of information technology, which indicates that they are more advanced in terms of technological revolution (European Foundation, 2007). Learning and skills upgrades are an individual’s responsibility, and, in general, LMEs are characterized by weak vocational systems. In Britain, there are many structural constraints on the development of a highskilled labor force, as many employers compete on the basis of relatively low-skill, standardized production strategies and price-based competition that require only a limited range of low-level skills from the bulk of the workforce (Lloyd & Payne, 2006). These features are also a reflection of profoundly embedded structural weaknesses in the British economy, including a propen-

sity to discourage employer demand for, and utilization of, skills (Lloyd & Payne, 2006). In the United Kingdom, pressures from outsider finance and governance systems have generated deficiencies in skills formation (Gospel & Glynn, 1993, pp. 115–124). In PEs the rate of turnover is generally high, obstructing the possibilities for investing in human capital. In most cases, the training and qualification of workers is the responsibility of the state, although the investment the state can afford is insufficient to solve the problem of the mismatch between the qualification structure provided and the skills demanded by the different economic sectors. The Programme for International Student Assessment/International Monetary Fund (PISA/IMF) study (OECD, 2006) showed that math and reading skills in Brazil are limited at the level of secondary education. The situation is comparable in Russia, where math and reading skills at age 15 are also low, which can compromise the skills of the future labor force, especially in attempts to pursue further education. As state elites are distant from the majority of firms, the qualifications provided by the state exacerbate the mismatch between the type of qualification acquired by workers and actual corporate needs.

7. DISCUSSION The previous sections have shown the clear differences among countries in relation to industrial relations systems and the organizational influence of different groups, prevailing organizational templates, and patterns of skill formation, development, and deployment (see Table 1). This is a central part of the Hall and Soskice (2001, p. 18) notion of “institutional complementarities”: “nations with a particular type of coordination in one sphere of the economy should tend to develop complementary practices in other spheres as well.” These differences in institutional complementarities enable and constrain nationally embedded firms and social actors in quite different ways (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999). Thus, it is expected that the implementation and functioning of OHSMS will be shaped differently according to the national context, and not only according to internal organizational capabilities. Whether management systems have intrinsic value and validity when they start being diffused from their originators is less important than the characteristics they may develop when they are interpreted by the national state agencies and organizational groups that


DOI: 10.1002/hfm

219


Rocha

TABLE 1. Differences between the Three Types of Market Economy CME

LME

Industrial relations Predominant forms of work organization Skill development patterns

Cooperative Learning organizations

Adversarial Lean

Continuous upgrading supported by collective means

Authority sharing

Lateral decision making

Trade unions

Strong

Individualized; relative autonomous educational institutions Hierarchical authority of management Weak at shop-floor level

interact during the process of translating, implementing, and running an international standard. It is necessary to analyze how different nationally embedded actors are able to influence the transfer and translation of international standards at the macro level, as well as how organizational actors are able to act on these standards at the micro level. To open up the black box of OHSMS, it is necessary to investigate to what extent OHSMS translations in different countries are similar to or differ from one another. When critics claim that OHSMS are ineffective, they forget to ask what social processes are triggered by these standards and what permanent effects may be achieved with unintended consequences. Organizational processes reflect the “emergent collective preferences” of organizational groups in the search for new techniques which can function as maps for learning organizational processes—provided that they appear both rational and progressive (Abrahamson, 1996). Supporters of OHSMS usually forget that management systems do not respond equally in different sectors and industries, and that the workforce is differently educated across countries. Established mechanisms of workforce participation in decision making do not exist everywhere, which makes the participation of the workforce in organizational issues highly problematic in countries with no traditions of participation and no mechanisms to support participation. The participation of the workforce in the continuous improvement of OHSMS is highly dependent on the organizational templates that dominate in specific countries, which in turn are highly dependent on the institutional environment that surrounds organizations. Institutional environments which are not supportive of participa220

PE Adversarial Taylorism moving toward Lean Weakly developed

Direct control by owners Institutionally weak

tion may develop other new forms of managing with OHSMS. The implementation of OHSMS is demanding for both individuals and organizations: It requires sustained partnership, extensive training and support, and organizational receptivity to change. As shown earlier in text, however, the institutional features supporting these conditions are not to be found evenly in all countries. As a result, the functioning of OHSMS and the mechanisms of enforcement will necessarily present different complementarities within different institutional frameworks. To improve the performance of OHS indicators in firms, the ways in which OHSMS and the necessary enforcement mechanisms need to be combined will also differ. In LMEs, OHSMS have been introduced against a background of weak trade unions and weak labor coalitions. In CMEs, despite recent changes in industrial relationships, the participation of employees in decision making is still an important organizational feature. It is interesting to observe that the Nordic countries lack what have been identified, in LMEs, as factors undermining the effectiveness of worker representation in joint committees for OHS, namely, declining union density and limited worker and management training (Haynes, Boxali, & Macky, 2005; Storey & Tucker, 2006; Tucker, 1992; Walters, 1996; Walters & Nichols, 2006). At the same time, the percentage of learning organizations in Europe is highest in the Nordic countries. Some characteristics may differentiate the Scandinavian countries from most countries in Europe: higher levels of education of the workforce, flatter organizational structures, strong influence in corporate governance and blurred organizational boundaries, making


DOI: 10.1002/hfm

Rocha


workers more able to contribute to improvements in production processes and management more receptive to this. In Scandinavia, OHSMS can partly be interpreted as a success (Frick & Wren, 2000). More participatory and flatter organizational structures in CMEs, especially in the Nordic countries, enable organizational actors to have greater influence on organizational matters and, consequently, on OHS issues. The greater opportunities to upgrade skills continually enable a larger proportion of the workforce to acquire and exchange knowledge which contributes to the continuous improvement system of OHSMS. Cooperative relations among labor-market actors make it possible for workers to become co-designers of work organization, which in turn facilitates organizational change for the improvement of OHS issues. These three features together are likely to create a virtuous circle facilitating the diffusion, implementation, and better functioning of OHSMS, which in turn will lead to improvements in OHS performance. This does not mean that conflicts are not generated in these organizations, and it would be na¨ıve to expect that the managers and owners of firms will openly adhere to often costly changes in the work environment. Strike rates in Denmark are much higher than the European average. Also, it would be na¨ıve to assume that OHSMS should work smoothly in all firms in CMEs. This is not the argument pursued in this article. Instead, I claim that the different institutional environments facilitate and constrain the participation and cooperation of labor-market actors in different ways, which have significant effects on the functioning of OHSMS. Different institutional environments facilitate workers in having a say on OHS issues and, if not prevent, at least constrain employers from saving money on OHS issues. The same mechanisms which support the participation of the workforce in OHSMS can also create problems in some sectors and industries. For instance, cooperation between labor and management in CMEs, combined with the potential simply to conform to the minimal requirements for OHS, can generate the conditions to reproduce the lack of attention to OHS issues in companies and sectors dominated by a “macho culture,” or where labor is too compliant with management. These conditions are actually likely to generate decoupling, because OHSMS may not be considered important by both management and labor. In other words, as cooperation between labor and management is usually linked to a less active role for state agencies, this can become a hazard for labor when neither group

is attentive to continuous improvements in health and safety, or when they decide that health and safety represent secondary issues in relation to, for instance, competitiveness. In CMEs, powerful economic actors can also dominate the use of collective resources, with negative impacts on smaller companies. The participation of the labor force in managerial issues is not a common feature of firms in LMEs and PEs, as many examples in this article have shown. The gaps which exist between ideas concerning the participation of the workforce in OHSMS and its current possibilities, however, may become an important source of dissatisfaction among employees and their trade unions, and consequently a source of institutional pressure for organizational change. Future research should address this gap between the aims of OHSMS and the real possibilities for workforce participation and how this may affect organizational change. It is important to study the many positive experiences with OHSMS which have been reported, taking an institutional perspective to understand these experiences. Research must be conducted to determine how the institutional macro environment shapes the translation of these management models, as well as the different national complementarities between the macro environment and the organizational processes at the micro level. This article has compared the different institutional features which are likely to affect the implementation and functioning of OHSMS, but as it is not based on empirical research, it presents limitations. One limitation is its reliance on three ideal-type models of economies based on the varieties found in the capitalism literature. The problem in comparing capitalist systems is that the simple contrast between these market economies obscures important variations in the combinations of institutions which constrain and enable commitment among different economic actors in a greater variety of countries. The expectation is that the institutional features addressed here and their combinations vary across market economies and significantly affect the introduction and functioning of management systems. As the institutional characteristics and their combinations vary across market economies, we can expect greater and more significant variations across developed and developing countries than those presented here. This article presents several implications for practitioners, policy makers, and researchers in the field of OHS. Practitioners in different countries need to pay


DOI: 10.1002/hfm

221


greater attention to the mechanisms which support the participation of the workforce in the continuous improvement of OHSMS. As different systems of skills formation forge different capabilities among distinct work groups, practitioners need to be attentive to how the functioning of OHSMS can be affected by these capabilities. Policy makers need to pay more attention to how new forms of regulation for the work environment are absorbed by firms. As the article shows, firms in different countries have distinct possibilities to deal with the requirements of OHSMS, which in turn demands distinct institutional enforcement regimes for OHS: For instance, institutional mechanisms which compensate for the weak abilities of workers to interfere in OHS issues must be established. To minimize the possibilities of failure, it may be necessary to increase the social visibility of firms, for example, by introducing “rightto-know” provisions on behalf of trade unions. This article indicates that the effects of institutional environments can be better analyzed through comparative cross-national research. Most research dealing with OHSMS, however, has been single country– focused: Future research should overcome this limitation in research design, replacing it with a crosscountry comparative methodology, and looking at 1) the ways in which comparable firms in the same sector and industry implement OHSMS and 2) their resulting effectiveness. There is a need to explore the linkages between workplace organization and the dynamics of OHSMS functioning at the level of the firm, as well as at the sectoral, regional, and national levels. Theoretical development regarding the effects of OHSMS on the performance of OHS would gain from cross-national and comparative studies. The search to explain crossnational differences and similarities with regard to the effects of OHSMS would lay the foundations for theoretical development, thus shedding light on the necessary mechanisms of enforcement which need to be designed in different institutional frameworks to cope with varying organizational templates and different national industrial relations regimes affecting OHS issues. Thus, the task of researchers is not to assess OHSMS by referring to some idealized management system which is expected to impact equally across national and organizational boundaries. Instead, what researchers must try to explain are the preconditions, strengths, and weaknesses of each configuration and how they affect the implementation and functioning of OHSMS.

222

Rocha

References Abrahamson, E. (1996). Management fashion. Academy of Management Review, 21, 254–285. Almond, P., Edwards, T., & Clark, I. (2003). Multinationals and changing national business systems in Europe: Towards the ‘shareholder value’ model? Industrial Relations Journal, 34, 430–445. Amable, B., Barré, R., & Boyer, R. (1997). Les systèmes d’innovation a` l’ére de la globalisation. Economica, Paris. Appelbaum, E., & Batt, R. (1994). The new American workplace: Transforming work systems in the United States. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press. Appelbaum E., & Berg, P. (2000). High performance work systems: Giving workers a stake. In M. Blair & T. Kochan (Eds), The new relationship: Human capital in the American corporation. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Borys, D. (2000). Seeing the wood for the trees: A systems approach to OH and S management. Proceedings of the First National Conference. University of Western Sydney, Australia, July 2000. Boyer, R. (2005). How and why capitalisms differ. Economy and Society, 34, 509–557. Bunn III, W. B., Pikelny, D. B., Slavin, T. J., & Paralkar, S. (2001). Health, safety, and productivity in a manufacturing environment. Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 43, 47–55. Christmann, P., & Taylor, G. (2001). Globalization and the environment: Determinants of firm self-regulation in China. Journal of International Business Studies, 32, 439–458. Clark, E., & Soulsby, A. (1999). Organizational change in post-communist Europe: Management and transformation in the Czech Republic. London: Routledge. Cox, T., & Mason, B. (2000). Trends and developments in east central European industrial relations. Industrial Relations Journal, 31, 97–114. Dalrymple, H., Redinger, C., Dyjack, D., Levine, S., & Mansdorf, Z. (1998). Occupational health and safety management systems: Review and analysis of international, national, and regional systems and proposals for a new international document. Geneva: International Labour Organization. Dawson, B., & Clinton, W. (1988). Safety at work: The limits of self-regulation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48, 147–161.


DOI: 10.1002/hfm

Rocha


Eaton, A., & Nocerino, T. (2000). The effectiveness of health and safety committees: Results of a survey of public sector workplaces. Industrial Relations, 39, 265– 290. Else, D., & Beaumont, P. (2000). Expect the worst, achieve the best. Proceedings of the First National Conference. University of Western Sydney, Australia, July 2000. Eriksson, O. (2004). Evaluation of interventions in the government sector in Sweden: A need for change. Policy and Practice in Health and Safety, 2, 75–89. European Foundation. (2007). Fourth European working conditions survey. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. Luxembourg. Evans, P. (1995). Embedded autonomy and industrial transformation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ferner, A., Almond, P., & Colling, T. (2005). Institutional theory and crossnational transfer: The case of “workforce diversity” policy in US multinationals. Journal of International Business Studies, 36, 304–321. Fligstein, N. (1996). Markets as politics: A politicalcultural approach to market institutions. American Sociological Review, 64, 656–673. Frick, K., Jensen, P. L., Quilan, M., & Wilthagen, T. (2005). Systematic occupational health and safety management. Perspectives on an international development. Oxford: Pergamon. Frick, K., & Walters, D. R. (1998). Worker representation on health and safety in small enterprises: Lessons from a Swedish approach. International Labour Review, 137, 367–389. Frick, K., & Wren, J. (2000). Reviewing occupational health and safety management: Multiple roots, diverse perspectives and ambiguous outcomes. In Frick, K., Jensen P. L., Quilan M., Wilthagen, T. (Eds.). Systematic Occupational Health and Safety Management. Perspectives on an International Development. Pergamon. Oxford. pp. 17–42. Froud, J., Haslam, C., Johal, S., & Williams, K. (2000). Restructuring for shareholder value and the implications for labour. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 24, 771–797. Gallagher, C. (2000). New directions: Innovative management plus safe place. Occupational health & safety management systems: Proceedings of the First National Conference. University of Western Sydney, Australia, July 2000. Gallie, D. (2003).The quality of working life: Is Scandinavia different? European Sociological Review, 19, 61– 79. Gardner, D., & Winder, C. (1999). Using benchmarking to improve communication. Quality Assurance, 6, 201– 211.

Gospel, H., & Glynn, S. (1993). Britain’s low skill equilibrium: A problem of demand? Industrial Relations Journal, 24, 112–126. Greenan, N., Kalugina, E., & Walkowiak, E. (2007). The transformation of work? WORKS Project, WP9, CEE: Paris. Guillen, M. F. (1994). Models of management: Work, authority, and organisation in a comparative perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gunningham, N., & Rees, J. (1997). Industry selfregulation. Law and Policy, 17, 363–414. Gustavsen, B., & Hunnius, G. (1981). New patterns of work reform: The case of Norway. Oslo: The University Press. Hall, P., & Soskice, D. (Eds.). (2001). Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Harley, B. (2001). Team membership and the experience of work in Britain: An analysis of the WERS98 data. Work, Employment and Society, 15, 721–742. Haynes, P., Boxali, P., & Macky, K. (2005). Non-union voice and the effectiveness of joint consultation in New Zealand. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 26, 229– 256. Hollingsworth, J. R. (1997). Continuities and changes in social systems of production: The cases of Japan, Germany and the United States. In J. R. Hollingsworth & R. Boyer (Eds.), Contemporary capitalism: The embeddedness of institutions (pp. 265–310). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hudson, P. (2000). Safety management and safety culture the long, hard and winding road. Proceedings of the First National Conference. University of Western Sydney, Australia, July 2000. James, P., & Walters, D. (2002). Worker representation in health and safety: Options for regulatory reform. Industrial Relations Journal, 33, 141–156. Kamp, A., & Blansch, K. L. (2000). Integrating management of OHS and the Environment–participation, prevention and control. In K. Frick, P. L. Jensen, M. Quilan, & T. Wilthagen (Eds.), Systematic occupational health and safety management. Perspectives on an international development (pp. 413–436). Oxford: Pergamon. Kimerling, J. (2001). Corporate ethics in the era of globalization: The promise and peril of international environmental standards. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 14, 425–455. King, A. A., Lenox, M. J., & Terlaak, A. (2005). The strategic use of decentralized institutions: Exploring certification with the ISO 14001 management standard. Academy of Management Journal, 48, 1091–1106. Knights, D., & McCabe, D. (2000). Ain’t misbehavin’? Opportunities for resistance under new forms of “quality” management. Sociology, 34, 421–436.


DOI: 10.1002/hfm

223


Kostova, T. (1999). Transnational transfer of strategic organizational practices: A contextual perspective. Academy of Management Review, 24, 308–324. Lane, C. (2003). Changes in corporate governance of German corporations: Convergence to the Anglo-American model? Competition and Governance, 7, 79–100. Logan, J. (2006). The union avoidance industry in the United States. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 44, 651–675. Lorenz, E., & Valeyre, A. (2005). Organizational innovation, human resource management and labour market structure: A comparison of the EU-15. Journal of Industrial Relations, 47, 424–442. Lloyd, C., & Payne, J. (2006). The high skills project and the limits of possibility: A response to Coffield. Journal of Education Policy, 21, 471–483. Lubatkin, M. H., Lane, P., Collin, J. S. O., & Very, P. (2005). Origins of corporate governance in the USA, Sweden and France. Organization Studies, 26, 867–888. Meardi, G. (2002). The Trojan horse for the Americanization of Europe? Polish industrial relations towards the EU. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 8, 77– 99. Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83, 440–463. Muller, M. (1998). Human resources and industrial relations practices of the UK and US multinationals in Germany. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 9, 732–749. Nielsen, K. (2000). Organizational theories implicit in various approaches to OHS management. In K. Frick, P. L. Jensen, M. Quilan, & T. Wilthagen (Eds.), Systematic occupational health and safety management: Perspectives on an international development (pp. 99– 124). Oxford: Pergamon. North, D. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. OECD. (2006). Assessing scientific, reading and mathematical literacy: A framework for PISA 2006. Paris: OECD. Ost, D. (2000). Illusory corporatism in Eastern Europe: Neoliberal tripartism and postcommunist class identities. Politics and Society, 28, 503–530. Pollert, A. (2000). Ten years of post-communist central eastern Europe: Labour’s tenuous foothold in the regulation of the employment relationship. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 21, 183–210. Pollert, A. (2005). Gender, transformation and employment in central eastern Europe. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 11, 213–230. Quémia, M. (2001). Théorie de la régulation et développement: Trajectoires latino-américaines. 224

Rocha

L’Anneé de la régulation, volume V (57–104). Paris: Presses de Sciences-Po. Quinlan, M., & Mayhew, C. (2000). Precarious employment, work re-organisation and the fracturing of OHS management. In K. Frick, P. L. Jensen, M. Quilan, & T. Wilthagen (Eds.), Systematic occupational health and safety management. Perspectives on an international development (pp. 175–198). Oxford: Pergamon. Redinger, C. F., & Levine, S. P. (1998). Development and evaluation of the Michigan occupational health and safety management system assessment instrument: A universal OHSMS performance measurement tool. American Industrial Hygiene Association Journal, 59, 572–581. Reilly, B., Paci, P., & Holl, P. (1995). Unions, safety committees, and workplace injuries. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 33, 275–289. Robinson, A., & Smallman, C. (2006). The contemporary British workplace: A safer and healthier place? Work, Employment and Society, 20, 87–107. Robson, L., Clarke, J., Cullen, K., Bielecky, A., Severin, C., Bigelow, P., et al. (2007). The effectiveness of occupational health and safety management system interventions: A systematic review. Safety Science, 45, 329–353. Rocha, R. S. (2003). Work systems transformation and factory re-organization in multinational corporation. PhD Series. Copenhagen Business School. Saksvik, P. Ø., Torvatn, H., & Nytrø, K. (2003). Systematic occupational health and safety work in Norway: A decade of implementation. Safety Science, 41, 721–738. Sapir, A. (2006). Globalization and the reform of European Social Models. Journal of Common Market Studies, 44, 369–390. Schaefer, A. (2007). Contrasting institutional and performance accounts of environmental management systems: Three case studies in the UK water and sewerage industry. Journal of Management Studies, 44, 506–535. Scott, W. R. (2000). Institutions and organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Smith, M., Burchell, B., Fagan, C., & O’Brien, C. (2008). Job quality in Europe. Industrial Relations Journal, 39, 586–603. Staw, B. M., & Epstein, L. D. (2000). What bandwagons bring: Effects of popular management techniques on corporate performance, reputation, and CEO pay. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45, 523–556. Storey, R., & Tucker, E. (2006). Worker participation and occupational health and safety regulation in Ontario, 1970–2000. In V. Mogensen (Ed.), Labor, capital, and the politics of workplace safety in a deregulated world (pp. 157–186). Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. Sznelwar, L., Mascia, F., Zilbovicius, M., & Arbix, G. (1999). Ergonomics and work organization: The relationship between Tayloristic design and workers’ health


DOI: 10.1002/hfm

Rocha


in banks and credit card companies. International Journal of Occupational Safety Ergonomics, 5, 291–301. Toledo, E. G. (2002). Free trade and labour relations in Mexico. International Labour Standards Conference. Stanford, CA: Stanford Law School. Tucker, E. (1992). Worker participation in health and safety regulation: Lessons from Sweden. Studies in Political Economy, 37, 95–127. Walker, D., & Tait, R. (2004). Health and safety management in small enterprises: An effective low cost approach. Safety Science, 42, 69–83. Walters, D. R. (1996). Trade unions and the effectiveness of worker representation in health and safety in Britain. International Journal of Health Services, 26, 625–641. Walters, D., & Nichols, T. (2006). Representation and consultation on health and safety in chemicals. An exploration of limits to the preferred model. Employee Relations, 28, 230–254.

Weick, K. E., & Roberts, K. H. (1993). Collective mind in organizations: Heedful interrelating on flight decks. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 357– 381. Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. (2001). Decoupling policy from practice. Administrative Science Quarterly, 46, 202–128. Whitley, R. (1999). Divergent capitalisms: The social structuring and change of business systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Williams, K. (2000). From shareholder value to presentday capitalism. Economy and Society, 29, 1–12. Zwetsloot, G. I. J. M. (2000). Developments and debates on OHSM system standardisation and certification. In K. Frick, P. L. Jensen, M. Quilan, & T. Wilthagen (Eds.), Systematic occupational health and safety management: Perspectives on an international development (pp. 391– 412). Oxford: Pergamon.


DOI: 10.1002/hfm

225