Institutionalised Participation in Processes Beyond the PRSP Study Commissioned by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH
“Responsive and accountable institutions of governance are often the missing link between anti-poverty efforts and poverty reduction.” (UNDP 2000: 11)
Dr. Walter Eberlei Institute for Development and Peace (INEF) Gerhard-Mercator-University, Duisburg
[email protected] September 2001
List of Contents 0. Summary of the Results.................................................................................................3 1. Participation in PRS Processes.....................................................................................4 2. Participation in the Development of Poverty Reduction Strategies - Overview ........7 2.1.
Participation in the Current PRS Processes ..........................................................7
2.2.
First Steps Towards Institutionalising Participation................................................8
3. Institutionalising Participatory Poverty Reduction ....................................................11 3.1.
Aspects and Dimensions of Institutionalised Participation ...................................11 3.1.1. Forms of Participation.............................................................................11 3.1.2. The Actors Participating in the PRS Process ..........................................12 3.1.3. Dimensions of Institutionalised Participation ...........................................14
3.2.
Political Processes and Participation...................................................................17 3.2.1. Participation in Future PRS Cycles .........................................................17 3.2.2. The National Budget...............................................................................21 3.2.3. Shaping Macro-economic Policy.............................................................26 3.2.4. Sectoral Policymaking ............................................................................27 3.2.5. Political Processes at Sub-National Levels .............................................27
3.3.
Institutionalised Participation – the Role of the Legislature..................................30
4. Recommendations for Technical Cooperation...........................................................32 4.1.
First Step: Clarify and Define Roles ....................................................................32
4.2.
Systematically Evaluate Experiences with Participation ......................................32
4.3.
Improve Donor Coordination ...............................................................................33
4.4.
Promote Participatory Governance .....................................................................34
4.5.
Promote Individual Actors / Institutions................................................................35
4.6.
Concluding Statement.........................................................................................37
5. Annex ............................................................................................................................38 5.1.
References .........................................................................................................38
5.2.
List of Abbreviations............................................................................................41
Boxes: Countries with Poverty Reduction Strategies..........................................................................4 Participation in PRS Processes in Africa: A first (provisional) assessment .............................8 Participation in the processes of the four African countries with full PRSPs .........................10 Forms of participation...........................................................................................................11 What do “the poor” think?.....................................................................................................18 IMF demands for transparent budget processes (extracts)...................................................22 The role of the judiciary ........................................................................................................26
3
0.
Summary of Results
(1) In the theory and practice of developing Poverty Reduction Strategies, participatory elements play an important role. Most PRS processes to date have been founded essentially on participatory structures formed on an ad hoc basis. The institutionalisation of participation is still in its infancy. In view of the intended PRS cycles, these beginnings are very encouraging, and offer numerous points of departure for consolidation and expansion. (2) In the majority of cases, the forms of participation established have involved consultations designed to allow an exchange of opinions and information between the government and non-governmental national actors. Collaboration has been less frequent, and joint decision-making on relevant aspects of pro-poor policy extremely rare. In that connection: (3) Political participation in the form of (joint) decision-making raises the issue of the legitimation of the participating actors. Parliaments, which in many countries of subSaharan Africa are institutionally weak, but usually possess at least a formally legitimate mandate, have in most cases been only marginally involved in the PRS processes to date. By contrast, civil society and private sector actors do not possess the democratic legitimation to determine political decisions that are binding upon a government. Therefore: (4) At the core of institutionalised participation, the parliaments of the countries concerned should play a significantly greater role in the future than hitherto. Having said that, there are several reasons why participation in political processes by civil society and private sector actors remains an absolutely essential element in the development and implementation of pro-poor policies. The ideal scenario would therefore be a close cooperation between parliaments and the respective societal actors vis-à-vis the governments. (5) The present study proposes focusing on ten specific aspects or dimensions of an (idealised) institutionalised participation. Institutionalised participation is: sustainable, structurally integrated, thematically embedded, politically relevant, broad-based and inclusive, decentralised, qualified, representative, conflict-aware, and safeguarded by the rule of law. Institutionalised participation thus understood leads to open, learning societies that develop their own potentials. (6) All five of the political processes of major relevance to poverty reduction that are covered by the study – PRS cycles, budgeting cycles, macro-economic policymaking, development and implementation of sector policies, and political processes at subnational levels – offer numerous points of departure and potentials for institutionalised participation. The scope for participation in the poorest countries is greater today than every before – and the options for development cooperation to promote political participation more diverse than every before. The paper concludes with proposals for Technical Cooperation to promote institutionalised participation, and in particular to support parliaments, and help create networks between parliaments and civil societies.
4
1.
Participation in PRS Processes
60 to 70 of the poorest countries (all IDA-only) will be drawing-up Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) in the next few years, which will then be documented in corresponding papers (PRSPs). As at early September 2001, five countries had completed this task, and a further 35 had already produced an interim PRSP (see list of countries in Box 1). 24 of these 40 countries are in sub-Saharan Africa. It is required that both civil societies and the private sector participate in the PRSP development process, in order to guarantee country ownership of the respective strategies, as well as to raise their quality and effectivity. Meanwhile, first experiences are being gained with these national participatory processes. First studies and reports concerning participatory processes for initial PRS design have already been published.1 By contrast, the question of how participatory processes can be realised during the follow-on phase subsequent to completion of the PRSPs, i.e. during the future segment of what would ideally be a PRS policy cycle recurring at three-yearly intervals (and comprising implementation, monitoring, evaluation, policy reform, PRSP reformulation), has yet to be systematically addressed. Box 1 Countries with Poverty Reduction Strategies (As at: 12/09/2001) Countries with interim PRSPs (35)
Sub-Saharan Africa (20): Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Zambia Other regions (15): Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Georgia, Guyana, Honduras, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao, Macedonia, Moldova, Nicaragua, Tajikistan, Vietnam, Yemen
Countries with full PRSPs (5)
Sub-Saharan Africa (4): Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Uganda, Tanzania
Other regions (1): Bolivia Source: Based on schedule at www.worldbank.org/prsp / accessed on 12/09/2001
It is undisputed amongst development professionals that sustainable and comprehensive participation by people in developing countries is a key prerequisite for successful
1
These include the studies coordinated by the Overseas Development Institute in eight African countries, commissioned by SPA (cff. ODI 2001), as well as a number of case studies commissioned by NGOs (e.g. four reports initiated by Misereor and EED, and completed in 2000 on Uganda, Mozambique, Cameroon and Bolivia). The European Network on Debt and Development (EURODAD) has set-up a mailing list via which it often distributes informative reports and small studies on PRS processes, at least some of which can be downloaded from the EURODAD website (www.eurodad.org). The reader is also referred to the reports at the World Bank website: http://www.worldbank.org/participation/goodless3.htm.
5 poverty reduction.2 The German Government also leaves no one in any doubt on this issue. It sees good governance, including social participation, as a “key precondition for achieving development progress” (BMZ 2001b: 18). BMZ’s Participation Concept published in 1999 underlines this point (BMZ 1999). The debate concerning participation thus does not address the question of whether, but how. It will be recalled that the notion of participation in development processes emerged during the 80s, first of all in relation to development projects. During the 90s the concept was broadened to encompass sector-wide activities. Finally, in the last few years, it has also appeared on the agenda at the level of national development. One key source of impetus for this was the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen, which helped generate corresponding processes in various countries (cf. UNDP 2001). The 1999 G-7 Summit in Cologne, followed by IMF and World Bank, tied the extension of debt relief and the granting of future concessionary development assistance to the presentation of national Poverty Reduction Strategies developed on a participatory basis (cf. Eberlei 1999: 35 f.). The fact, that this is a pretty new development can help dampen somewhat the expectations of rapid results from PRS processes. Participation is not a short-term instrument that can be swiftly applied to raise the efficiency of development measures. The institutionalisation of participation within the political processes of a country is a development goal in its own right. This, however, is not a new insight. As early as the mid-70s, Nohlen/Nuscheler integrated participation into their “five magical cornerstones of development” (cf. Nohlen/Nuscheler 1974). And in some developing countries, participation was already seen as a basic element of political rule, at least at the rhetorical level, e.g. in Zambia’s “participatory democracy” during the time of the 2nd republic (cf. Meyns 1995: 11). This recent linking of participation to the PRS process thus offers a twofold opportunity. Firstly: Only institutionalised, sustainable participation can guarantee the medium- and long-term success of PRS processes. A new World Bank study correctly advises the governments of the PRS countries as follows: “Create administrative structures, procedures, and mechanisms that will facilitate the institutionalization of policy participation. Participation works best when it is built into ongoing public institutions and decision-making procedures. While examples can be found where temporary or ad hoc efforts worked to engage citizens in macroeconomic management and reform, the most successful cases are those where participation becomes institutionalized.” (Brinkerhoff / Goldsmith 2001: 9) From this can be inferred the second aspect of the opportunity: The fact that the development of a Poverty Reduction Strategy is not a one-off exercise, but involves an ongoing policy cycle, improves the likelihood of the actual developmental goal of participation being attained on a sustainable basis. According to this understanding, participation is by no means confined to the more or less intensive participation of people and institutions in the preparation of strategies and papers. BMZ makes the following far-reaching statement on this: 2
Key papers by donor organisations include OECD / DAC 1995 and OECD / DAC 2001 (there e.g.. 34 ff.), as well as the relevant publication by World Bank.
6
“Participatory development is defined as a process which involves people actively and substantially in all decisions that affect their lives.” (BMZ 1999: 2) And the aforementioned World Bank study states similarly: “Participation can be defined as a process through which stakeholders shape and share control over development initiatives.” (Brinkerhoff / Goldsmith 2001: 4) Nohlen / Nuscheler define: “Participation means political and social participation in the material and cultural goods of a society, and is therefore the opposite of marginality.“ (1992: 71) Just how such a broad understanding of participation can be realised will be discussed below. Yet this also means that the present study will not be confined to the currently ongoing processes to produce first PRSPs, which are occasionally very short-term processes. Instead, it will address the issue of how participation can be institutionalised within the scope of the cyclic PRS processes (which include implementation). In doing so, it will not neglect the obstacles and problematic aspects that have so far come to light. Pursuant to the Terms of Reference, the study is designed first of all to serve as a basis for advisory services to be delivered by German Technical Cooperation (TC) to partner countries undergoing PRS processes. Secondly, it is designed to provide a contribution to the international debate among donors concerning the future promotion of PRS processes, and especially donors in the context of the Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA). The latter context, plus the fact that most of the “PRS countries” are located in sub-Saharan Africa, explain and justify the fact that the study focuses on trends in African countries, though without entirely omitting relevant experiences from other regions. In conducting the study the author evaluated the existing PRSPs and IPRSPs of the African countries (as well as several other countries). Furthermore, various current publications reflecting the international development debate were also considered (see References contained in Annex). Finally, the author was also able to draw on his own studies conducted on participatory aspects of the PRS processes in Uganda and Kenya.
7
2.
Participation in the Development of Poverty Reduction Strategies – Overview
2.1. Participation in the Current PRS Processes The donors and creditors have made the participation of civil society in the development of a PRS a precondition for acceptance of a PRSP. Accordingly, all 40 countries that have so far prepared an interim PRSP or a full PRSP have, in one way or another, participatory elements to show in their processes. Since the IMF and World Bank have not set any minimum standards for participation by social actors, but rather evaluate participation in relation to existing participatory practices in the respective country, there is a very considerable natural variation in the spectrum of participation in countries. On the basis of information contained in the I-PRSPs and PRSPs (all papers are required to include information on planned or completed participation), countries can be broadly divided into three groups (see Box 2). Here it should be noted (and studied in the context of those countries which have produced PRSPs) that the participatory processes have also gained a substantial momentum. In other words, the actual processes may positively diverge from the plannings described in the interim PRSPs. (Another possibility, though one which first impressions suggest is less common, is the converse case: Bold announcements made in the IPRSP are not translated into practice). A. Countries with low participation: Here, PRS participation has (to date) been limited to minimal forms, usually involving information sharing, and at most consultation (in a sense of raising opinions). The participatory process is narrow in scope. Only a limited group of national actors are involved. B. Countries with medium participation: The participatory processes are significantly broader in scope than in the first group of countries. Efforts are undertaken to initiate broad-based participation (parliament, civil society, private sector, national and sub-national levels). An array of instruments are deployed over a prolonged period (including information sharing employing a variety of methods; public debate; workshops at the national and regional levels; PPAs or other participatory survey methods; codetermination going beyond opinion polls). C. Countries with – in relation – well-developed participation: Participatory activities go beyond those in country group B: participation by parliament; broad-based inclusive participation of social actors; open and continuous public debate (including media reports) on poverty reduction; regular participatory surveys amongst poor groups; participation of social actors in steering committees for the PRS process; integration of the process into longer-term participatory methods of policymaking, i.e. also including institutionalised forms of participation etc..
8 Box 2 Participation in PRS Processes in Africa: A first (provisional) assessment Relatively low participation to date Medium participation to date Relatively welldeveloped participation
Guinea Bissau, Sao Tomé and Principe, Gambia, Central African Republic, Guinea, Ethiopia Lesotho, Rwanda, Niger (?), Madagascar, Mali, Chad, Benin, Senegal, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Ghana, Cameroon Countries with Full-PRSP (see Box 3 for details): Burkina Faso (?), Mauritania, Tanzania (?), Uganda
This assessment is based on an evaluation of the IPRSPs and PRSPs. In other words, the assessment is based on the official information presented by the respective governments, which does not necessarily represent actual trends. The present study was unable to verify these data by evaluating corresponding reports prepared by civil society actors or independent observers. The criterion applied in categorising the countries into the above three groups was the scope of participation (actors involved, duration, number of events, participatory instruments going beyond workshops etc.). Neither can the actual influence of participation on the content of the PRS and on the degree of actual country ownership of the strategies be evaluated on the basis of the available database. The question marks indicate that the countries concerned might conceivably be more appropriately placed in a lower category of participation.
Uganda is considered a model example of participatory processes in the context of poverty reduction strategies in Africa. As early as in 1997, the country put forward a Poverty Eradication Action Plan, which in 1999/2000 was subjected to a participationoriented revision process. The ensuing document was recognised as a PRSP in spring 2000. Uganda is indeed able to demonstrate relatively very well-developed participation by civil society (cf. Eberlei 2000). Yet even in countries with less well-developed democratic traditions and governments that tend to act in an authoritarian spirit, participatory process have succeeded in gaining significant momentum, for instance in Kenya (cf. ODI 2001). Here, however, the level of ad hoc participation is higher, and incorporation into institutionalised political processes is lower, which means that the issue of sustainable, structurally integrated participation remains a very open question. Instances of superficial participation (often further induced by externally imposed pressure of time) suggest that participation may in some cases serve as an alibi and/or a means to consolidate power. At the same time, numerous weak points have also been recognised in PRS processes to date, and specifically identified in particular by NGOs.3 The World Bank and IMF intend to conduct a comprehensive review of these processes in early 2002.
2.2. First Steps Towards Institutionalising Participation Do the PRSPs / IPRSPs put forward to date include procedures already applied to institutionalise participation, or proposals, models or arrangements for institutionalised participation in the follow-on processes? It goes without saying that in the case of countries which have only an IPRSP (which means the great majority), little can be ex3
See corresponding reports at the EURODAD website www.eurodad.org
9 pected in terms of proposals, let alone decisions. The present section will therefore focus on the four African countries with a full PRSP (cf. Box 3). Three aspects are worth mentioning here. Firstly: The institutionalised form of societal participation in democracies – the management of political issues through parliament – has played a relatively minor role in all four countries. Parliamentary involvement seems to have played the most prominent role in Mauritania, and was least prominent in Tanzania (only a single debate). The tendency to involve parliaments only marginally is also evident in other African countries (cf. ODI 2001: 7). Secondly: Participation by civil society and private sector actors en route to the PRSP was achieved very largely through workshops. These have the advantage of being simple to organise, but also involve the very major drawback of being more ad hocoriented and non-sustainable. The number and evident intensity of the workshop consultations in some countries suggest a certain “event culture”. Nevertheless, this might point to a slowly emerging permanent dialogue between governments and other national actors. More firmly institutionalised forms of participation were reported less frequently. In a number of countries, societal actors were members of PRS steering committees or official PRS working parties. These practices already constitute first steps towards institutionalisation, and offer at least points of departure for future structural cooperation that goes beyond mere information-sharing. Thirdly: For the ongoing process beyond the PRSP, agreements were reached (and implemented) at least in Uganda. Here, institutionalised participation has actually commenced on several levels. Beside standard consultations conducted where new policymaking decisions need to be taken (e.g. sector programmes) and intensive involvement in participatory surveys, the following mechanisms are particularly worthy of mention: - involvement in decision-making within the scope of the Poverty Action Fund (PAF), a fund integrated into the budget that is channelled into welfare expenditure (now equivalent to around 1/3 of the national budget); - involvement in a working group formed to prepare the budget such that all its elements can be reviewed with respect to their poverty-reducing impacts. Burkina Faso and Mauritania have at least agreed upon continuous participation after completion of the PRSP, whilst no such undertaking has yet been documented in Tanzania.
10
Box 3 Participation in the processes of the four African countries with full PRSPs Participation by parliament Uganda
Burkina Faso
Tanzania
Mauritania
Participation by civil society and the private sector involvement in national workshops (including preparation) preparation of written position papers based on regional consultations undertaken by civil society involvement in implementation papers, e.g. sector programmes, and the Poverty Action Fund (PAF)
Aspects of institutionalisation beyond the paper
regular collaboration within the scope of the Poverty Action Fund continuous involvement in participatory research (UPPAP: lead agency!) involvement in the poverty reduction working group to prepare the budget regular consultation on sectoral implementation of PEAP consultation on progress reports. action plan is designed to two workshops, one in PRSP presented to both chambers of parliament for the North and one in the more clearly define the roles of individual actors in various West; ratification prior to its offiobjective: to share infor- PRS phases; to systematise cial submission to World further consultations; to demation and consult with Bank velop mechanisms to ensure civil society, decentralthat priorities are also reised governments, private sector, cooperatives flected in the budget (producers’ groups) no information available involvement of civil presentation and discussociety in 7 regional sion of results of regional workshops, in some workshops in parliament cases with representatives in key positions involvement of the private sector and NGOs in the national workshop declared will to continue diaRepresentatives of the Specialised NGOs second chamber were are members of technical logue local communities, private-sector actors and civil members of the working working parties. parties and of the comThe draft PRSP was society during the implementation phase, in order to mittee monitoring the presented to NGOs at PRSP process. two one-day workshops. monitor and evaluate the There had already workshops organised process, although no conbeen debates on the basic by civil society crete agreements reached orientation of poverty reregional workshops duction. involving civil society Prior to completion of debate parliament – the PRSP a debate was civil society held in parliament with NGOs, other civil society organisations, partners in development and individuals. Parliament gave its approval of the PRSP. presentation and discussion of the PRSP in parliament shortly before submission
-
th
Compiled on the basis of the PRSPs of the respective countries as at September 12 , 2001. Thanks are due to Gertrud Falk, INEF, for her contribution to the evaluation of the documents.
11
3.
Institutionalising Participatory Poverty Reduction
3.1. Aspects and Dimensions of Institutionalised Participation Before turning to the potentials for institutionalising participatory governance, this Chapter will first address a number of fundamental aspects.
3.1.1. Forms of Participation Which form of participation should be institutionalised? In the recent literature, between four and six degrees of participation are usually distinguished: Box 4 Forms of participation BMZ Participation Concept (1999: 7)
Brinkerhoff/ Goldsmith (2001: 5)
information-sharing consultation collaboration joint-decision making
information-sharing information-sharing consultation consultation collaboration joint-decision making joint-decision making
empowerment empowerment control by stakeholders
McGee / Norton (2000: 14-16)
initiation and control by stakeholders
Bliss (2000: 8)
information-sharing consultation participation co-determination joint responsibility partnership control by stakeholders
In most cases these degrees of participation were first developed in project/programme contexts. The question is not only which degrees of participation would be desirable and realistic for PRS processes, but also which are appropriate. With other words: What are roles and responsibilities of governments in PRS countries? Whereas the World Bank and others at first always used to say that the PRS was not about achieving government ownership, but about achieving country ownership, it is now being made clear that the respective government in the PRS is “the principal agent” (according to McGee / Norton 2000: 9). It is with good reason that the governments of PRS countries cannot be relieved of their responsibility for national poverty strategies – which also means that they must have the final say in decision-making. So what then would be the correct measure of checks and balances, what would the right balance between power and “counter-power” or controlling power, such as to guarantee country ownership? It will be virtually impossible to provide a universally valid answer to these questions. The present study proposes defining “country ownership” as follows: A (clear) majority of the population and their representatives (democratically legitimated representatives as well as representatives of pressure groups) have participated in the development of the strategy, identify with the goals and elements of the strategy, and will participate in implementation and ongoing development of it. The form of participation in PRS processes will thus fall between stage 1 – pure information-sharing (which all concerned agree is too little) – and the stage mentioned last – control by stakeholders. Chapter 2 makes it clear that a spectrum of forms or de-
12 grees of cooperation were observed in the PRS processes to date. The form and the degree of future institutionalised participation will also depend on which actors or stakeholders are being referred to.
3.1.2. The Actors Participating in the PRS Process It should first of all be noted that the government, which is ultimately supposed to be sitting in the driver’s seat, is not a single, homogeneous institution. The issue of intragovernmental participation clearly arises, not least because it cannot be assumed that interests will converge even at the central level. On the contrary – it needs to be taken into account that actors at the central level of government are also engaged in a struggle for power and influence. In most countries the ministry for financial affairs is the lead agency in the PRS process. Ultimately, however, it is the head of the government and the cabinet who are responsible for basic policy decisions, and they have usually discharged this responsibility in the wider context of the PRC processes. Regarding the question of who within the government is ultimately responsible for the PRS processes, in a number of countries the ministries for financial affairs are competing with the planning ministries, and/or the presidential offices. Also to be involved are the sectoral ministries. As well as this more or less horizontal institutional coordination, there is also vertical participation in countries with more decentralised government structures. Here too there is a need to translate the theory of participation into practice (see 3.2.5 below). Alongside the government, parliament forms the second key body in a democracy – and in its capacity as legislative authority it is also the highest authority, which could claim to be responsible for decision-making concerning society’s fundamental strategies. In practice, things are different. In none of the PRS processes to date has the parliament concerned staked a special claim in the process. The sovereignty of government remains intact, and the degree of parliamentary involvement varies. In a number of cases parliament was involved as a single institution, whereas in other cases either committees or simply individual members of parliament were involved. Having said that, the parliaments in the PRS countries can only be described as representative to a limited extent. In most of these countries, there are for instance barely any female members of parliament – a reflection of gender power relations in the countries concerned (see Section 3.3 for further discussion of the role of parliaments). In the context of PRS processes, the term participation is often used to refer largely or exclusively to participation by the civil society – though without there being any precise definition of who or what the latter is.4 The term civil society is used to mean very different things in different discourses. On the one hand, Kößler/Melber avail themselves of a rather static definition: They understand civil society as a “network of organisations and informal associations suited to acting as a counterbalance and an an-
4
As is also the case in the Report of G7 Finance Ministers on the Köln Debt Initiative, which states that: “Throughout program design and implementation, there should be consultations with broader segments of the civil society.“ (quoted in Eberlei 1999: 36).
13 tagonist of the respective state apparatus“ (1993: 93).5 On the other hand, the authors also outline a dynamic or process-based understanding of civil society. Based on the thinking of Antonio Gramsci, civil society is then defined as a field of political and social interaction and exchange within which actors compete for the basic societal consensus and the cultural hegemony through which the respective goals of development are then defined (ibid.: 81). An understanding of civil society developed along these lines would offer an opportunity not only to take a look at institutions, but also to focus more sharply on national debates concerning future strategies. It would be desirable that a dynamic understanding of this kind be harnessed to nurture the debate on social trends in Africa. In a study on Zambia, for instance, Peter Meyns uses the phrase “contested terrain” – borrowed from the South African Monty Narsoo – to describe civil society, which he elaborates on as follows: “a sphere in which both the dominant group and other political and social forces wrestle for influence” (Meyns 1995: 81). Nevertheless, analyses of civil society (similar to Meyns’ analysis of Zambian civil society) will take institutions as their point of departure. The present study for instance will understand the term “civil society” to cover all non-governmental and primarily non-profit-oriented actors who participate in the national political debate. These include above all the non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the community-based organisations (CBOs), women’s groups and associations, youth associations, the churches, the media and the academic community. Private-sector actors, who unlike civil society actors are profit-oriented and thus motivated by their legitimate economic self-interest, should for clarity’s sake be considered a segment of society in their own right.6 Trade unions and employers’ associations can be seen as mediators operating in a transitional zone linking the private sector and civil society. The poor are occasionally also termed “stakeholders”. This view is not entirely unproblematic. The poorest sections of the population in particular possess a minimum level of self-organisation. A self-initiated participation in political processes thus tends to be the exception. A further problematic aspect is the fact that there is no such thing as a homogeneous group who are “the poor”. Even amongst the poor a large number of divergent interests are to be found (e.g. between women and men; between the rural and urban poor; between poor people who are relatively well able to secure a livelihood in the informal sector, and those with no work who have to struggle to survive on a daily basis etc.). It is necessary to draw analytical distinctions between the divergent interests of different groups of poor people. Nevertheless: It seems highly appropriate to listen to the voices of the poor using participatory methods to diagnose poverty and develop possible solutions. Furthermore, the implementation of Poverty Reduction Strategies in particular is difficult to imagine without the active participation of the poor themselves. In its Action Programme 2015, BMZ states:
5
Similar notions are to be found in recent studies in the PRS context, e.g. McGee / Norton 2000: 9 or Osmani 2000: 21. 6 This division (state – private sector – civil society) makes use of the categories customarily used in the debate (cf. for instance statements of VENRO as well as the joint statement of the German political foundations in a parliamentary hearing on civil society, in: Friedrich-EbertStiftung 2001, p.13 / p. 29).
14 “Poor women and men are actors too. They are not the problem, but also part of the solution they seek to bring about by harnessing their creative powers and their will to help themselves, and by fighting for their rights. Self-help, selforganisation and participation by people living in extreme poverty are basic principles of poverty reduction. Poverty reduction does not seek to give alms; it aims to help develop the productive potentials of the poor.” (BMZ 2001a: 5) Finally, in the relevant World Bank documents and in various studies, international donors are also referred to as stakeholders in the PRS process. In view of the fundamental principle of ownership, this understanding is by definition a problematic one. On the other hand it would be rather naive to assume that donors do not play an active role in poverty reduction in the PRS countries (especially in cases where they finance 75% or more of the national budget). This balancing act has yet to be conceptually resolved.7
3.1.3. Dimensions of Institutionalised Participation Most of the participatory processes associated with PRS development to date have been ad hoc events initiated on a relatively spontaneous basis. Only Uganda, which had developed its first Poverty Eradication Action Plan back in 1997 and then availed itself of a revision in 1999/2000 in order to put forward a PRSP, underwent a very well prepared and structured participatory process (cf. Eberlei 2000). Building on the experience now available and in some cases on earlier participatory processes8, most PRS countries are only now deliberating on the issue of long-term dialogues between their governments and other actors. When embarking on this debate concerning the institutionalisation of participation, it is useful to bear in mind the following ten dimensions: (1) Sustainable participation: The participatory processes to develop a PRS were or are focused entirely on the production of a paper.9 Theoretically, a PRSP should also include a “Participation Action Plan” that relates to processes beyond the paper, involving implementation and monitoring (cf. Robb 2000). In practice, however, there is a risk that the dialogue between the governments and other actors will be discontinued or at least decrease significantly. By contrast, institutionalised participation must have at its disposal instruments and/or fora for continuous dialogue. The Poverty Action Fund (PAF) in Uganda is an exemplary case in point. Here, an array of instruments
7
The image of the “country in the driver’s seat” is occasionally the subject of ridicule and mockery. In Africa for instance it is jokingly considered normal for the owner not to be sitting at the wheel, but a driver, whilst the “boss” makes himself comfortable on the back seat. 8 Following the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen, a number of countries underwent participatory processes to elaborate national poverty reduction strategies (cf. UNDP 2001). 9 What Désirée Dietvorst has to say about participatory processes in sector programmes, also applies to national strategy processes: “It should be recognised that a sector policy document is nothing but a skeleton. The actual programme consists of the combined and complementary action of all stakeholders in the sector. It is not so much a matter of ‘getting stakeholders on board of the programme’ than it is to adopt the notion that the stakeholders are the programme. Effective stakeholder participation goes beyond getting one’s views incorporated into the sector plan; it has to be about tangible results rather than good intentions.” (Dietvorst 2001:3)
15 have been successfully employed to establish regular dialogue between the government and other actors that is not of limited duration (cf. Eberlei 2000). (2) Structurally integrated participation: In theory it is clear that “building on existing political processes...is a key factor” (World Bank 2001a: 14). In practical PRS activities to date, new structures for participatory processes were created – often under donorinduced pressure of time – which were not structurally integrated, but were rather of a limited-term nature. This weakens existing participatory structures, and limits the sustainability of participation. (3) Thematically embedded participation: In numerous countries there already existed prior to the PRS other national strategies and strategic processes with a pro-poor focus (e.g. national poverty eradication action plans following the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen), or with a broad-based focus on development (e.g. National Strategies for Sustainable Development). Institutionalised participation integrates the PRS process into the broader development debate, and builds on existing expertise. (4) Politically relevant participation: The dialogue between government and other national actors must embrace all key spheres of policymaking, and must not be confined to social policy in the strict sense. Key policy fields include macro-economics and – associated with that – the fiscal and budgetary policies of the government. (5) Broad-based, inclusive participation: The circle of participating actors established must now be gradually and systematically expanded, in order to broaden the scope of the dialogue and make it largely inclusive, i.e. tending not to exclude any actors (cf. McGee / Norton 2000: 65-67). This applies explicitly to the gender aspect of participatory processes: Participation can only be described as inclusive if women are involved on a broad basis. (6) Decentralised participation: The processes to date had a clear bias towards capital cities, despite some efforts to hold both rural and local consultations (“helicopter consultations” as they were called in Malawi). Institutionalised participation must organise the networking of the national and local levels, and must create scope for bottom-up processes (cf. Osmani 2000; cf. Kitz 1998 concerning the GTZ approach pursued in Kenya). (7) Qualified participation: In almost all countries, the ongoing processes have been conducted under enormous pressure of time. National actors were often inadequately prepared. Information was lacking, or came too late, or when it did come it came only in the official national language, of which not all or not even the majority of the population possess a (good) command. Occasionally, these and other factors led to a lack of quality in the participatory processes. A qualified institutionalised participation will require the appropriate material and human resources, as well as sufficient time (cf. inter alia ODI 2001; McGee / Norton 2000: 65).
16 (8) Representative participation: Little attention has been paid to the criterion of representativity in the PRS processes to date. In many cases, the government invited only those civil society and private sector actors to participate which it already knew, without asking (or, to put it another way: without being able to ask due to the pressure of time) which actor was representing whom and whose interests. Country ownership cannot be achieved by the government inviting a number of organisations to a workshop. In this context, future institutionalisation will require at least the following steps: • Civil society and private sector actors should be involved in processes more according to whether they are actually capable of representing broad sections of the population. In highly positive scenarios there will for instance be national NGO networks or a national association of women’s groups. • The truly representative institution of a society – its parliament – should be granted greater rights of control and decision-making. Otherwise, PRS processes will run the risk of undermining the institutionalised democratic development of a country. Other forms of participation (see above, Box 4) would increasingly come to demand decisionmaking rights. • It must be ensured that traditionally powerless, weak or marginalised sections, groups and strata of the population are appropriately represented. This applies for instance to women (McGee / Norton 2000: 66 f.; Rodenberg 2001), and to youth (the majority of the population in PRS countries are under 18 years old!, cf. GTZ 2000). And ethnically-based disempowerment must also be compensated through appropriate mechanisms. If this does not occur, then “participatory” processes will run the risk of further strengthening already powerful groups, and consolidating their domination, possibly also against the wishes of the majority, i.e. in that case illegitimately (cf. Cooke/Kothari 2001: 13). • Countrywide representation should be ensured on as broad a basis as possible (see point on decentralisation). (9) Conflict-aware participation: A more continuous participation will increasingly generate social conflict, inter alia because it will elicit opposition from those “who have benefited from rents in the public or private sector under a non-participatory regime” (Schneider 1999: 25). The balanced and resolution-oriented social negotiation of conflicts will become a key aspect of future institutionalised participation – especially in light of the acknowledged fact that the problem of poverty cannot be solved solely through economic growth, but requires a distribution of resources. (10) Participation safeguarded by the rule of law: Effective and sustainable participation requires a number of fundamental rights and safeguards. These include: • Guaranteed access to information and transparency of government action (cf. McGee / Norton 2000: 39; World Bank 2001a: 10 f.; Cagatay et al 2000: 21-23). In some countries, corresponding “freedom of information” legislation is in place. • Participation requires freedom of opinion, and especially freedom within the media. • Elementary principles of the separation of powers must be accepted. • Rights of participation, e.g. in consultative processes or e.g. in local committees which take decisions on development funds, must be clearly provided for in law.
17 In summary: Institutionalised participation creates a space for societies to debate their development status, goals and priorities, and to take democratically legitimate decisions on those issues. Societies which create this space for themselves institutionalise not only participation rights, but also the exchange of expertise and ideas on solving their problems. They therefore institutionalise learning processes, i.e. they become learning societies – an excellent basis for successful steps of development, including sustainable poverty reduction.
3.2. Political Processes and Participation 3.2.1. Participation in Future PRS Cycles On the basis of approaches already identified and a number of good practises, this section will explore the possibilities for consolidating and institutionalising participation in future PRS cycles. a. PRS as a cycle: The drafting of interim PRSPs (in a first step) and full PRSPs is followed by implementation of the programmes, the monitoring of implementation (input, output, outcome), and evaluation (including impact assessment). Finally – and ideally after three years – this is followed by a revision or development of a new PRSP, at which point the cycle begins again. Uganda is the first country to have already undergone this 3-year cycle (cf. Eberlei 2000). It is important that PRS processes should not (be able to) take place entirely independently of the other political processes within a country. On the contrary: They will not be able to generate sustainable impacts unless the actors remember that “the PRS process will take place against a backdrop of the normal political and budgetary cycles of the respective country, and should iterate with them” (McGee / Norton 2000: 16; see similar ideas in Meyer/Schmidt/Schmitt 2001: 31, who use the term “compatibility”). b. Participation in the development of the I-PRSP: Pursuant to the IMF/World Bank directives, the development of interim PRSPs does not require any detailed participatory elements. Nevertheless, a number of countries (such as Kenya) did hold consultations when preparing their I-PRSP. With respect to the I-PRSPs still under preparation it is important to remember that they are required to include a “Participation Action Plan” (World Bank 2001a: 24-26). The quality of this plan will be a not insignificant factor affecting the success of the participatory process towards the full PRSP. It is problematic that this part of the I-PRSP can also be laid down by the government without other actors being consulted. It would be more generally conducive, as well as more conducive to the success of PRSP design, if the forms of participation, roles, competences, expectations etc. of the participating actors were to be negotiated and defined at the beginning of the processes. c. Participation in the analysis of the initial situation: Formulation of the full PRSP and the strategy which it expresses is preceded by an analysis of the initial situation. Participatory approaches are also practicable in this setting:
18 • Regular inputs should be channelled into the policy cycle from participatory research activities and surveys (such as PRA, PPA) (cf. inter alia McGee/Norton 2000: 26-30; BMZ 1999: Annex 1; World Bank 2001a: 28 f., 31; see also Box 5). One particularly successful model is to be found once again in Uganda. The Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project (UPPAP) succeeded in completing a carefully targeted and complex participatory survey prior to production of the second National Poverty Eradication Plan (which at the same time became the PRSP), and in integrating the results into the strategy development process (see detailed report UPPAP 2000). Box 5 What do “the poor” think? Anyone who wants to reduce poverty needs to know what poverty is. Conventional debates have usually construed and continue to construe poverty in static terms as poverty of income: Those forced to live on less than an average of one dollar a day (converted into local purchasing power parity) are considered to be living in absolute poverty. The World Bank has recently documented in a comprehensive study how the poor themselves experience their state of poverty. More than 60,000 poor people were asked what they would consider to be a good life, and how they felt about not having one. According to the study, the poor consider a good life or well-being to comprise several dimensions, including both material and psychological. In their view, well-being includes for instance good health and nutrition, the sense of belonging to a community, security, the freedom to lead a self-determined life, a reliable livelihood or a regular income, but also general contentment. Poverty, understood as the opposite of the good life or well-being, is described by the poor as a lack of material goods (especially food), bit also as a lack of work, money, housing and clothing. A further aspect of poverty is life in an unhealthy, polluted, dangerous setting often characterised by violence. Such states, perceived as the poor life, are also often associated with negative feelings and feelings of depression. Perceived powerlessness and an inability to even articulate one’s own interests are also elements of poverty, as are daily fears concerning one’s livelihood or fear of the future. For information on "Voices of the Poor" go to www.worldbank.org/wbp/voices/
• Independent scientific studies should be systematically utilised in order to gain a deeper understanding of the poverty situation in a country. The establishment of independent national research capacities can thus be seen as a key contribution to producing poverty diagnoses that are independent of the government, thus helping enable all national actors to put the information gained to good use in informed political debates. • Experiences gained in earlier participation-oriented processes – where available – should be systematically utilised. Regrettably, donor coordination in this field is also weak. A large number of excellent analyses and informative studies are being “lost” because there are no systematic databases in which to pool expertise on poverty situations and possible solutions. d. Participation in the formulation of the PRSP: As well as the usual governmentinitiated consultation processes, a further future option would be for the participating actors to strengthen their capability to self-reliantly develop alternative proposals.
19 • The capacity of parliaments to collaborate in the formulation of PRS needs to be strengthened. This will begin with a clear-cut decision to have PRSPs negotiated and decided on in parliaments (cf. McGee / Norton 2000: 12). A further institutional initiative could be to establish within parliaments a cross-sectoral committee on the theme of poverty reduction, which would actively ensure the role of parliament throughout the PRS cycle, also in cooperation with other national actors (cf. Parliamentary Centre 2000: 10). • With regard to participation by civil society, it has proved helpful e.g. in Bolivia, Uganda and Zambia for participatory processes to be initiated on a self-reliant basis independent of governments (involving representatives of the civil society at the local level). These processes have led to numerous supplementary or alternative proposals for the poverty strategy. In other cases (e.g. Kenya), the consultation process has been under government control from the outset. Naturally, this narrows the scope for actors to develop their own ideas and approaches.10 • The national debate on poverty-related issues can be institutionalised if governments supply the public with timely, constant, systematic, relevant and comprehensible information on corresponding developments (cf. inter alia McGee / Norton 2000: 3440). Popular versions of the draft IPRSPs or PRSPs can help make the national debate on poverty-related issues better informed, thus facilitating inputs to development of the strategy. An important role is also played here by media which report on an independent and professional basis. e. Participation during the PRS Implementation Phase: PRS implementation takes place on several levels, whose participatory potentials will now be explored. • One absolutely essential prerequisite for the national debate on implementation of the poverty strategy to remain sustainable is first of all publication of the PRSP. That is to say publication not only of the document in its entirety (which is usually very extensive and therefore likely to be of interest to experts only). Popular versions are also required. The Government of Uganda for instance has published a highly simplified of its paper in five national languages (cf. World Bank 2001a: 11). This provides readers with an opportunity to compare intentions with actual policy implementation. • One of the key instruments for PRS implementation is the government’s expenditure policy, which is reflected in the annual budget (see Section 3.2.2). • One form of PRS institutionalisation consists in scope for collaboration and shared decision-making on concrete projects, programmes or funds for poverty reduction. Uganda’s Poverty Action Fund (PAF) is a case in point. This mechanism not only guarantees greater control over government implementation of poverty reduction measures, but also creates an opportunity for concrete participation in political decision-making concerning priorities etc. during implementation. Another mechanism creating opportunities for and incentives to participation are special funds (e.g. District Development Funds), decision-making on the use of which can be shared by non-
10
When developing their own positions, actors can discuss e.g. the following issues (cf. Foster / Fozzard 2000: 38-41): the geographical distribution of measures and funds; the broad-based and country-wide introduction of basic services (or prioritisation, where funds are not available from the outset); analysis and discussion of who actually profits from public services; genderrelevant budget issues (e.g. how do women view the priorities for expenditure); etc..
20 governmental actors at the regional level (cf. Dietvorst 2001: 26 f.; see also GTZ activities in Kenya to help support a decentralised social fund). f. Participation in the Monitoring of PRS Processes: Proposals put forward to date concerning the monitoring of PRS processes after approval of the paper are thin on the ground, and barely go beyond the continuation of standard procedures (cf. ODI 2001). In the World Bank’s view (World Bank 2001a: 46), preconditions conducive to positive results of participation monitoring include: • The government and other actors reach agreement on a set of clear indicators. • A joint baseline is defined. • Institutional capacity-building for collection and evaluation of the relevant data occurs swiftly. With respect to the indicators, it is very important that not only input and output indicators be defined, but also outcome indicators that are able to trace actual and mensurable progress in poverty trends (cf. Foster / Fozzard 2000: 30 f. with examples). An institutionalisation of participatory monitoring procedures might for instance be promoted by creating a working group to address monitoring procedures during preparation of the PRSP (one such example being Kenya, where not only the government but also donors and NGOs were involved). Conceivably, a working group of this kind could also be mandated to continuously facilitate operative monitoring (which certainly needs to be performed essentially by governmental agencies). A small number of countries, for instance Zambia, regularly conduct Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs), supplemented by regularly conducted household surveys, and are thus able to monitor trends in the poverty sphere relatively accurately (McGee / Norton 2000: 30). The combination of traditional, quantitative-cum-statistical household surveys with PPAs or other forms of participatory survey is increasingly being tried-out in other countries, and might in the long run also become a way of capturing the effects of poverty reduction strategies. The GTZ is gaining experience with participatory impact analyses. The Qualitative Impact Monitoring (QUIM) method developed in Malawi has been part of the national monitoring system for many years, and has now been harmonised with PRS development. QUIM operates with opinions of the poor, which are obtained through qualitative interviews. First results were published as “Consultations with the Poor”, fed into the PRS consultations, and integrated into the budgetary and sector policy development process. An adapted version of the QUIM approach is also being used in Kenya’s consultations concerning a participatory monitoring strategy. The role of parliament in the future institutionalisation of monitoring should not be underestimated. Regular reporting to parliament or parliamentary committees can energise national debates on poverty reduction strategies, and initiate and promote support for instance for poor-oriented reallocations in the government budget. Parliamentary monitoring should not just monitor poverty trends, however. It should also – and perhaps most importantly – monitor pro-poor government action.
21 Civil society can also play an important role in monitoring government action. The Uganda Debt Network for instance, an association of around 70 NGOs, is currently engaged in establishing a countrywide network of observers to monitor selected financial flows from the government to the districts and local authorities. The Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development regularly publishes information on what sums have been transferred to districts for which sectoral projects and programmes, in advertisements in daily newspapers. Civil society observers are now attempting to monitor the flow of money from Kampala down to the local level, in order to ensure that funds are used for their designated purpose. g. Participation in the Evaluation of PRS Processes: As the World Bank puts it: “Finally, it is essential to set up feedback mechanisms, which allow participatory inputs to be incorporated into the next round of policy making and make the PRSP an iterative process.” (World Bank 2001a: 10) It is not intended that these feedback mechanisms be utilised only three years later for revision of the PRSP. A first progress report is required to be submitted after one year, demonstrating how implementation of the PRS has progressed. Being the first country with a full PRSP (accepted in March 2000), Uganda submitted a relatively detailed progress report in the spring of 2001 (Uganda/MoFPED 2001). The submission of these reports could be used both by civil society and by parliaments to discuss the povertyorientation of government policy, and where appropriate to call for changes in course. This form of institutionalised participation has not become established to date. Especially in cases where a civil society alliance (possibly also involving the private sector) has been formed in the course of a PRSP production process, which then continues to work on the theme after completion of the paper, the revision process can lead to exciting national debates on the correct paths to poverty reduction. It was already evident in Uganda’s revision process in 2000/2001 that the “second-round effect” helped generate increased participation through well-prepared networking and capacity-building by the civil society: It was also evident that a growing body of experience in dialogue with the government pays dividends (cf. Eberlei 2000). Positive impacts on institutionalised participation might also be generated if consultation processes for PRSP revision – unlike in the first PRS round – were to commence early on (at least one year prior to the planned completion date). They could be institutionalised at the same time (e.g. regular workshops on specific topical issues over an extended period).
3.2.2. The National Budget a. The budget cycles: The annual government budget, with its planning of revenues and expenditures, is the key instrument for any government to shape its pro-poor policy. Now the critique of a poverty strategy debate that is too firmly fixed on public expenditures is understandable, because other, equally important structural reforms are supposedly or actually being lost sight of in the face of the budget debate (cf. e.g.
22 Meyer/Schmidt/Schmitt 2001: 33). Nevertheless, it would be wrong not to focus significant attention on the government budget, as the government’s use of funds has practical impacts on most other reform activities. The budget process is also relevant to the issue of institutionalised participation because, similar to the PRS process, this too is a recurrent (and in some senses iterative) political and policymaking cycle that allows systematic learning processes to unfold (affecting both politics and policies). The main actors in the budget-making-process of a democratic society are the government and the parliament: “The budget process ensures that the people’s representatives scrutinise and approve the raising of taxes, the contracting of debt and the application of public funds by government. This is achieved through a formal separation of powers: government proposes the budget, which is approved by parliament, then executed by government, and finally subject to monitoring and appraisal by parliament to ensure compliance.” (Foster / Fozzard 2000: 8). Fundamental prerequisites for pro-poor budget processes are significantly better transparency, as well as increased and more precisely defined accountability. Even the IMF, which was for many years the incarnation of secretmongering and poorly transparent, technocratic decision-making behind closed doors, has now moved on to support democratic transparency. In its “Code of Good Practises on Fiscal Transparency” (IMF 2001) adopted in the spring, the Fund makes far-reaching demands, including providing the public and parliament with full, timely and regular information (see extracts in Box 6).
Box 6 IMF demands for transparent budget processes (extracts) -
The public should be provided with full information on the past, current, and projected fiscal activity of government. The budget documentation should specify fiscal policy objectives, the macroeconomic framework, the policy basis for the budget, and identifiable major fiscal risks. Budget information should be presented in a way that facilitates policy analysis and promotes accountability. There should be regular fiscal reporting to the legislature and the public. A mid-year report on budget developments should be presented to the legislature. More frequent (at least quarterly) reports should also be published. Final accounts should be presented to the legislature within a year of the end of the fiscal year. Results achieved relative to the objectives of major budget programs should be presented to the legislature annually. Fiscal information should be subjected to independent scrutiny.
(Extracts from IMF 2001)
b. Participation in the Preparation of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework: In most PRS countries the annual budget is now also integrated into a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). Various interventions by the parliament or civil society would also be conceivable within the MTEF production process (cf. Foster / Fozzard 2000: 27):
23 • Expenditure limits need to be defined for the individual sectors. An active parliament might make this the subject of debates, recommendations and resolutions. A civil society might ensure through its advocacy work that the MTEF process pays due attention to poverty reduction concerns. • In the context of MTEF development and sectoral expenditure, sectoral ministries usually submit sector plans. These too should not be prescribed by the executive, but should be the subject of broad national and parliamentary debate. • An MTEF should be subject to parliamentary approval. In South Africa and Ghana for instance, medium-term expenditure frameworks are presented to parliament; for the first year of the 3-year outlook its approval is required, whilst for the two following years the plans are merely noted (Foster / Fozzard 2000: 27). c. Participation in Annual Budgeting: World-wide, there are now a range of initiatives and examples of participatory contributions to the budgeting process. These document not only the importance of the budget, but also the scope for parliament, civil society and other actors to influence government policy via this route. Budgets are also highly significant for poverty reduction: “they are powerful policy tools with profound implications for social equity outcomes” (Cagatay et al 2000: 1). However, in many countries budgeting is still relatively untransparent. At the same time, the pressure on governments to make budget planning more transparent has increased significantly, as demonstrated not only by the quoted IMF demands: “Participatory approaches to budgets, which are becoming more widespread in many countries, reflect a new understanding of governance and democracy (...).” (Cagatay et al 2000: 16). A prominent example of how pressure exerted by an active civil society can lead to greater transparency is provided by the “rights to information” movement in Rajasthan, India (Goetz / Jenkins 1999; Cagatay et al 2000: 21-23). This NGO network first of all succeeded in its struggle for the right to inspect budget documents. It took years for them to be even able to copy those documents. Using various participatory methods, supposed flows of government funds were checked, in order to follow the tracks of the pro-poor or non-pro-poor expenditure policy. Public hearings were held in order to expose cases of corruption and mismanagement, but also as a means to promote empowerment of the people concerning issues of budgetary policy. Over the years, the movement was often successful in achieving specific results with regard to pro-poor budgeting, though these were not its only successes. The spark that motivated people to work for greater transparency also caught on in other Indian states. The central government is now preparing a freedom of information law. The transparency of budgetary planning and implementation is increasing, as are the analytical capabilities of national actors. One outstanding example of this is provided by post-apartheid South Africa: “South Africa is lifting the shroud of secrecy that obscured public finances in the apartheid years” (Fölscher et al 2000: 52). The legal framework for transparency and government information policy have been considerably improved.11 The new transparency and awakening following the change of government 11
According to Fölscher et al., however, much still remains to be done. Concrete proposals for reform include e.g. creating an agency officially mandated to disseminate information on budgetary processes, attached to parliament or the auditor general; legal provision for minimum
24 was very successfully utilised by the South African Women’s Budget Initiative (WBI). This alliance of women from NGOs and parliament joined forces to analyse and debate politically the gender-related aspects of the budget (cf. World Bank 2001a: 39 f.). This resulted in several budget decisions in favour of women. There are numerous similar initiatives world-wide (cf. www.internationalbudget.org ; see also: Cagatay et al 2000): “They also demonstrate the potential for democratizing decision-making processes and transforming economic frameworks and policies into instruments of people-centred development” (Cagatay et al 2000: 3). Probably one of the most successful models of participatory, pro-poor budgeting is provided by Porto Alegre, where for more than ten years hundreds of organisations and thousands of people in the Brazilian city with more than a million inhabitants every year participate in the production of the budget (cf. McGee / Norton 2000: 54; Cagatay et al 2000: 24-26; World Bank 2001a: 38 f.). Although the final decision rests with parliament, there is intensive public participation by civil society actors and broad sections of the population in the budgeting process. For years, notable successes have been achieved in a propoor expenditure policy. This has involved redistribution mechanisms, e.g. higher taxes for the well-off, and more public service benefits for the less able (water supply improved; health and education systems developed). In the course of a year, sometimes more than 10,000 come together at workshops and other events to discuss priorities for expenditure. Using a particular system for the annual election of delegates to the budgetary consultations, votes are prepared and cast for the budgetary consultations of the local parliament. The cooperation between civil society groups and local parliamentarians in this context works excellently. A number of conceivable reform proposals can be derived from the above examples, and numerous other examples, to help promote institutionalised participation for propoor government budgeting in the PRS countries: • The process begins and ends with increased transparency. Realisation of the aforementioned IMF demands would be a key step forward in many countries. • Analytical capacities within the academic community and civil society should be strengthened, enabling those institutions to contribute towards “demystifying the budget” (World Bank 2001a: 36). Successful examples of this can be found in Bangladesh (cf. Cagatay et al 2000: 27 f.), and in Gujarat, India (cf. World Bank 2001a: 36 f.). • The role of parliament in the budgeting process is often only a very formal one. In the African countries formerly colonised by Britain the Westminster model, which allows parliament relatively little scope to influence the budgeting process, is cumbersome (cf. Parliamentary Centre / World Bank Institute 2001: 26; ODI 2001: 7); the situation in the French-penetrated states is no better (by contrast, the US American and German systems offer the respective parliaments considerably greater scope to influence budgeting). Nevertheless, in many countries there is a growing will amongst parliaments to no longer merely “fold-up” the budget (cf. Parliamentary Centre / World Bank Institute 2001: 7). Instruments might include the creation (or further strengthening) of an indetransparency requirements; six-monthly publication of actual budgetary expenditure and reveue figures; improved timing of the process, including more time for parliament; regular informationsharing on budget-related issues.
25 pendent auditor reporting to parliament, and the appointment of an ombudsperson who would be available as interlocutor between parliament and the population. The creation of a National Budget Office attached to the parliament, as recently occurred in Nigeria (cf. Parliamentary Centre 2000: 26), would also be a way to strengthen parliamentary capabilities. • Civil society advocacy work for pro-poor budgeting might energise parliamentary involvement, however, as the example of South Africa demonstrates. Yet civil society actors can also influence governments themselves. Uganda provides one example: Here, a Poverty Eradication Working Group (comprising representatives of the government, donors and civil society) was formed last year to help prepare the budget. “The group reviews each sector working papers for the poverty focus. It then makes recommendations on inter and intra sectoral allocations of resources and poverty focused output indicators utilizing the latest poverty analysis.” (Robb 2000: 5). • Popular versions of the budget or simple presentations of information on the budgeting process can disseminate, both amongst the population and amongst NGO staff, journalists and other multipliers, the information base needed for interventions. • The influence of non-governmental actors grows with their capacity to form alliances which bring together an array of capabilities (e.g. research, campaigning, broadbased information and education work; cf. Cagatay et al 2000: 45 f.). • The systematic evaluation of PPAs for budgeting has also led to pro-poor decisions in various countries (e.g. Viet Nam, where PPAs were fed into the national policy debate, leading to shifts in the budget; cf. McGee / Norton 2000: 44; or Zambia, where PPAs also led to adjustments in sectoral allocations, cf. Foster / Fozzard 2000: 33). d. Participation in the Monitoring and Evaluation of the Budget: Finally, a number of institutionalised participatory methods for monitoring have already been developed and successfully tested. On the basis of experiences, the World Bank proposes inter alia the following (World Bank 2001a: 40 ff.) : • The creation of independent monitoring bodies (audits), whose reports are made available to the parliament (for similar proposals see also Foster / Fozzard 2000: 8; Ghana already provides a good example, mentioned in Parliamentary Centre 2000: 24); • Scholarly studies of individual segments of expenditure or on other issues of budget implementation; • Mobilisation of the public through broadly disseminated information on the budget policy of the government; • Elaboration of concrete proposals for reform within the policymaking apparatus and the administration; • Civil society initiatives to review budget-based public payments (e.g. report cards in Bangalore, India). The latest PRSP report issued by the IMF and World Bank (2001) attaches major significance to the Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA), indicating that implementation of this approach will be intensified. It contains very few participatory elements, however.
26 Box 7 The role of the judiciary One key prerequisite for political participation is that it be protected by the rule of law. (including guaranteed freedom of opinion and association, and freedom to engage in political activity etc.). “The poor should be free of fear that they may suffer from any sanction or disadvantage when they take an initiative with a view to improving their situation” (Schneider 1999: 15). This also requires independent courts, so that the law can be invoked and asserted where necessary. A functioning judiciary is necessary not only with respect to political participation, however. It is also required for poverty reduction. This relates to the fact that the poor perceive the problem of legal uncertainty to be a characteristic feature of poverty (cf. World Bank, Voices of the Poor, Box 5), which a functioning police force acting in accordance with the rule of law can help alleviate. It also relates to public prosecutors’ offices and other authorities which in many countries are attempting to fight corruption (for instance the Kenyan Anti-Corruption Authority, whose legal status as an institution is still uncertain).
3.2.3. Shaping Macro-economic Policy Whilst budget policy remains comparatively transparent and comprehensible, general macro-economic policy is shrouded in an aura of mystery. As UNDP see it for instance, structural adjustment policy has been characterised by an “add-on approach” (Cagatay et al 2000: 10), in which a “sound macro-economic policy” was first formulated, and then supplemented by social policy measures. This procedure should be fundamentally altered in the PRS context, such that social and poverty-reducing objectives are integrated into macro-economic policymaking right from the start. “Thus, at issue is the democratization of the process of macro-economic policymaking“ (Cagatay et al 2000: 11). Other observers also see a need to initiate a demystification of macroeconomics (cf. among others McGee / Norton 2000: 38 f.) through information and education, communication, capacity-building, and the comprehensible public presentation of economic processes and decision-making etc.. Whilst the IMF has bluntly refused to engage in any debate on macro-economic principles in the context of practical PRS processes (e.g. in Bolivia), a cautious process of re-thinking has become evident at least within the World Bank: “Recent experience has shown that participation in macro-economic policy is feasible and that it helps to off-set some of the harsher side effects of these policies (...)” (World Bank 2001a: 17), even though this remains reminiscent of the add-on concept.12 Nevertheless, the World Bank does see various options within monetary and fiscal policy to at least create a broader base for policymaking in this field through information-sharing and consultation (cf. World Bank 2001a: 32). A supplementary World Bank study (cf. Brinkerhoff / Goldsmith 2001: 6) indicates that a further way to achieve greater participation might be parliamentary hearings. There is also a detailed report on Ireland as an example of a successful participatory process involving basic economic and social policy (cf. World Bank 2001a: 33-35). Whether and to what extent the Irish example (which includes 12
This is also evident in other sections of the quoted World Bank text, for instance where it states that budget policy must be “based on the macroeconomic policies“ (World Bank 2001a: 18), without making any reference to the social, gender or human rights policy underpinnings of a budget whatsoever. At another point it states in a similar vein that: “Macro-economic policies are the basis upon which governments make decisions regarding budget formulation, public actions and poverty reduction monitoring.” (World Bank 2001a: 32). These quotes demonstrate how wide the gap is between PRS theory (all policies, including macro-economic policy, should be pro-poor), and practice.
27 decidedly long-term participatory processes) is really appropriate to serve as a model for PRS countries must be open to doubt. Nevertheless, individual aspects of this experience can also be debated in the context of the South. There are no known examples of participatory macro-economic policymaking processes in the PRS countries. The SAPRI initiative nevertheless demonstrates that countries of Africa do possess analytical capabilities with regard to this theme (cf. the World Bank’s SAPRI website13).
3.2.4. Sectoral Policymaking The value of participation in the development and implementation of sector reform programmes and sector policies has been highly acknowledged for many years – even though the practical lessons learned have not yet been sufficiently evaluated and the issue of institutionalised participation has not yet been adequately addressed. This conclusion can be drawn from the GTZ study by Désirée Dietvorst (2001) that has just appeared. The author of the study herself draws a number of notable and indeed remarkable conclusions concerning the future development and implementation of sector programmes (ibid.: 23-37, summary 38 f.). These make splendid reading as a complement to the present discussion of the political processes surrounding the development and implementation of multisectoral national strategies and policies, and therefore require no further comment here.14 The author would draw the reader’s additional attention only to the sector-specific aspects of MTEF development as discussed above (see 3.2.2).
3.2.5. Political Processes at Sub-National Levels In the view of many observers, one of the key political developments in poorest countries is the transfer of political tasks, competences and decision-making processes to sub-national levels. This Section will need to briefly cover at least two aspects relevant for the institutionalisation of participatory governance: • decentralisation itself, and thus the decision-making processes at sub-national level that are relevant to local poverty reduction; • the emergence of bottom-up planning and strategic development methods, e.g. for developing Poverty Reduction Strategies at the national level. a. Decentralisation as an instrument of institutionalised participation: Decentralisation is considered “the framework for participatory local development” (Fastenau et al. 1998: 197; similar phraseology in Agrawal 2000: 59). In a number of African countries this process has made significant progress in recent years, after the “classic” decentralisation following the end of the colonial period or early on during independence had brought little real decentralisation of competences and resources to subnational levels (cf. Osmani 2000: 5). In the successful ongoing processes, e.g. in 13
Go to http://www.worldbank.org/research/sapri/ For a discussion of further aspects of partcipation in sector programmes, cf. World Bank 2001a, Technical Note 16; Schneider 1999: 20 (concerning an approach for institutionalised participation in agricultural policymaking in the Philippines); Foster / Fozzard 2000: 57 f. (critique of the fact that non-governmental actors are often neglected in sectoral decision-making). 14
28 Ghana (cf. Fastenau et al. 1998), clear legal underpinnings have ensured that districts have democratically elected parliamentary institutions. “The fact that the district has an elected assembly provides an ideal forum for a genuinely democratic development process with close linkages to the communities in each of the districts.” (ibid. 208) This is conducive to institutionalised participation, even though in reality a number of difficulties have to be solved (cf. ibid.: 211-214). In other countries this de facto decentralisation has not taken place, however. One example is Kenya. In this case the structure of government was decentralised which after independence had more or less completely taken on board the countrywide network of power already established during the colonial period. The District Commissioner, appointed by and accountable to the Office of the President, ensures at the decentral level that decisions taken in the capital are implemented. Although the value of “truly participatory decentralisation has thus been firmly established”, the fact remains “that the history of attempts to institutionalise participatory decentralisation on a wide scale is replete with many more cases of failure than of success” (Osmani 2000: 9). The basic reason for this is the fact that the slogan of “decentralisation” has often been used by politicians as a rhetorical device to strengthen their own power at the head of government (e.g. in Senegal, Kenya, Tanzania, Nepal, among others) (Osmani 2000: 9-13). Osmani concludes: “that not only is the centre generally reluctant to relinquish power on its own, it will not hesitate to usurp people’s power if grassroots initiatives at creating decentralised governance structures threaten to dilute its power” (Osmani 2000: 13). Agrawal soundly argues that the central or national level should not be conceived of as a single, homogeneous whole, and that it is not merely a matter of conflicts of interest between the central and decentral levels. Conflicts of interest and power at the central level can also crucially influence the success of decentralisation and local opportunities for participation. And more than that: As Agrawal sees it, a process of decentralisation designed to increase opportunities for participation would presuppose that such a process were in fact desired by powerful actors at the central level, and could be successfully pursued in the face of contrary interests on the part of other central actors (cf. Agrawal 2000: 63-67). Furthermore, empowerment of the weak and the poor is also considerably more difficult than might be assumed at first glance. Equal rights and broadly institutionalised participation do not result automatically from decentralisation. The power structures and power gaps that are found countrywide are also duplicated at the local level. For instance, women at the local level are not automatically more easily able to participate in political decision-making processes (cf. Osmani 2000: 13-18). “After all, the politics of local government can hardly be divorced from the politics of national government. If graft, patronage and rent-seeking characterise the political process that determines the distribution of power in the centre, local-level government can hardly be an arena of popular participation just because it is local.” (Osmani 2000: 23)
29 In true decentralisation, possible solutions would also need to be sought by power and resources (i.e. to include “fiscal decentralisation”!). They would also need to be legitimated, and monitored by democratic structures at the community level. NGOs might perform a key catalytic role in this process. However, it should be acknowledged that: “Neither the politician-bureaucratic nexus nor the traditional elite will voluntarily share power, let alone relinquish it, unless the poor themselves can exercise enough bargaining power to make them do so. The empowerment of the poor thus becomes the central agenda item in any programme for decentralising governance in a pro-poor manner.” (Osmani 2000: 23; similar views also expressed by Agrawal 2000: 68)
b. Bottom-up Planning and Strategic Development Methods: In some of those cases where PRS processes have been brought down to local levels, they have aroused and fostered an interest in participation in political decision-making. In a number of Kenyan districts, for instance, the view is now being clearly expressed that the consultation process should not be seen as a one-off exercise, but should be conducted on a regular basis. The favourable circumstance that work is beginning on the District Development Plans six months after completion of the PRS consultations, led to numerous proposals that the consultation mechanisms which had emerged (e.g. District Forum) be utilised for discussion of these plans. In their PRS consultation processes, the District Forums also in some cases formulated explicit demands for political decentralisation. One example was Kilifi: “Authority and responsibility should be decentralised to districts to pave way for an elected self-governing council in future.” (Kenya / Ministry of Finance and Planning 2001: 21). One key contribution to the institutionalisation of participation might be to use the ad hoc structures which arose in the district consultations once again in the near future, which would tend to institutionalise them. At the very latest, the progress report after one year might again be discussed at the decentral level, and considered in the light of regional experiences. Attempts and considered attempts to strengthen bottom-up planning procedures (or a “scaling up from village to national level” - Kitz 1998), are not new. The pilot project in Kilifi, Kenya promoted by GTZ for many years was for instance quite successful in institutionalising democratically elected institutions at the local level, and thus in strengthening political participation by the population. However, first of all the Kenyan government is showing no interest in extending the pilot project on a countrywide basis. Secondly, there is also considerable resistance to helping the existing local committees gain more influence and to establishing democratically legitimated bodies at higher levels, mainly the district level (cf.. Kitz 1998; Kilifi District Development Programme / Interviews March 2001). In the PRS processes to date, a number of countries have held consultations at the regional and local levels. These, however were initiated and dominated on a top-down basis. For future institutionalised participation on a decentralised basis, approaches such as the one pursued in Ghana would need to be promoted in other countries. True decentralisation remains a highly promising way to strengthen political participation.
30
3.3. Institutionalised Participation – the Role of the Legislature Parliaments could in future play a much greater role in the institutionalisation of participation. This was made clear in the discussion of various political processes in the previous Section. The manner in which parliaments have hitherto been involved in PRS processes is in participatory terms the weakest point in the process. As shown in Chapter 2, parliaments have been involved either very superficially in dealing with the PRS, or not at all, and essentially have never been asked to take serious decisions. And more than that: ”The actual PRSP processes in practise have tended to marginalize Parliament (...)“ (Parliamentary Centre / World Bank Institute 2001: 7) – because all the attention with respect to the required participation has been and still is being focused on civil society and the private sector. In the context of PRS, it is becoming clear that donors have obviously a lot of problems to cooperate with parliaments, and even in understanding their role. In various official documents, parliaments are referred to as stakeholders (cf. as one example World Bank 2001a: 4) – a basic error. Parliaments are not pressure groups. They constitute a society’s democratic forum for the reconciliation of interests. In some donor documents parliaments are even defined as a part of the government (cf. again World Bank 2001a: 13; or IMF/World Bank, no date). A view of this kind reflects considerable deficits in the fundamental understanding of a democracy based on the separation of powers. Not infrequently, parliaments are simply forgotten. In the BMZ Participation Concept, for instance, parliaments are not mentioned (BMZ 1999). It is of course correct to say that in many developing countries, and especially in the poorest countries of Africa, parliaments lead a shadowy existence, are often powerless, and in not a few cases represent interests of patrons and clienteles. The weakness of many parliaments also applies to macro-economic, development and poverty reduction policymaking. “In many parliamentary systems, legislators only have pro forma approval powers over these decisions made elsewhere—often by the finance minister.” (Brinkerhoff / Goldsmith 2001: 6) In many African countries the representative nature of many parliaments is also limited. In all African parliaments, women for instance are dramatically underrepresented. Directly elected women are the absolute exception. Most women in parliaments have gained their seats through reserved mandates (although in Uganda they are quite a strong group with just under 40 women). Other sections of the population are also underrepresented, e.g. young people and generally speaking people from the lower social strata. Nevertheless: After the first phase of democratisation of many African countries in the late 80s / early 90s, parliaments did develop slowly but surely. In the last two years, the Kenyan parliament for instance has made significant efforts to strengthen its rights vis-à-vis the government. The Parliamentary Service Commission is endeavouring with some success to pursue parliamentary capacity-building. The parliament has taken a stance against the government on several political issues (whether the positions taken were sound or not would be another matter). Trends in Kenya – not a
31 country with a conducive democratic setting – demonstrate that the institutional development of parliaments is possible, although this will require stamina. The World Bank and IMF are beginning to take more notice of parliaments, and to think about their role with respect to poverty reduction strategies. The executive committees of both organisations recently stated “that participation should not undermine Parliaments and other locally elected bodies” (IMF / World Bank 2001: 4). The World Bank began with first measures to promote capacity-building.15 In July 2001, an intensive training seminar for parliamentarians was held for the first time on issues of poverty reduction (cf. Parliamentary Centre / World Bank Institute 2001). The IMF is also calling for the rights of parliaments to be strengthened (see Box 6). World Bank studies see the possibility that “legislatures may have a role in receiving interest group input on concerns and demands, and in setting or influencing budgetary priorities. To the extent that CSOs can get poverty and equity issues onto the agendas of those committees [of parliaments, WE], poverty-focused macroeconomic policy becomes more likely.” (Brinkerhoff / Goldsmith 2001: 6) On this understanding, parliaments and their members can “serve as policy brokers between civil society and government” (Parliamentary Centre 2000: 19 f.). There are reports from Ethiopia that just such a broker role did exist (ibid.). There are cases of the structures for such a role being created, e.g. in South Africa, where an Office for Public Participation is functioning as a link between parliament and the population (Parliamentary Centre / World Bank Institute 2001: 18). Alongside this function, the potential or actual role of parliaments in budget processes is receiving increasing attention. Finally, parliaments could also play positive roles in the empowerment of the people whom they represent. They could for instance use their access to information and influence to help the poor claim their rights in their constituencies. They might also hold consultations in their constituencies before taking important decisions (cf. Parliamentary Centre 2000: 18; 27 ff.; 33).
15
One example being Chad, go to www.worldbank.org/participation/chadproposal.htm
32
4.
Recommendations for Technical Cooperation16
4.1. First Step: Clarify and Define Roles Participatory processes in the context of PRS development and implementation are designed to increase the country ownership of poverty reduction. The role of international donors needs to be seen against this background. This also applies to external academics and consultants. This means: Although this study contains a number of proposals and lists a number of good practises, it is important always to keep in mind the idea of country ownership, which is fundamental to PRS and participatory processes.17 Donors need to remember that the boundaries necessitated by the required ownership should not be crossed. Though support of participatory processes may be appropriate, an over-zealous, one-sided involvement would be counter-productive. If PRS papers are being written by external consultants or if consultation processes are being financed in full by donors, then the question of ownership should be easy to answer – the answer presumably being a negative one.
4.2. Systematically Evaluate Experiences with Participation To date, experiences with participation have been acquired largely at the project and programme level (cf. BMZ 1999, Meyer 1999), and in recent years also increasingly within the scope of sector policies (cf. Dietvorst 2001). Are the lessons learned being systematically taken into account for the participatory PRS processes? GTZ and all other donors are now acquiring broad experience with PRS processes and the promotion thereof. It is urgently recommended that the expertise thus acquired be pooled, evaluated and made available. With respect to GTZ this applies especially to those countries where German development cooperation intends to become particularly closely involved in PRS processes (13 countries in sub-Saharan Africa18). The establishment of an appropriate Intranet or open Internet database providing all actors with rapid access to the relevant information, ideas, proposed solutions, good practises etc. might soon prove to be a sound investment.
16
The following recommendations for the German TC can and should identify only conceivable options. Fundamental decisions concerning individual strategic steps would need to made on the basis of regionally adapted and then clearly concretised concepts. With respect to individual proposals it is not always possible to clearly decide whether they should be pursued within the scope of a TC measure, or whether they need to be promoted e.g. within the scopew of policy dialogue. The answer to this question will differ from country to country, e.g. depending on what relationships exist between TC actors in-country (e.g. government advisors) and the key governmental actors. 17 Concerning the role of donors in PRS processes, cf. (all short references). World Bank 2001a: 27, McGee/Norton 2000: 21 f.; Schneider 1999: 24 f.; IMF / World Bank not dated: 3. The ODI/SPA study (cf. interim report, ODI 2001) will contain in its final report, expected in October 2001, conclusions concerning the role of donors in the PRS processes of the eight African countries studied. 18 Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Senegal, Zambia
33 The systematic evaluation of experiences to date is a particularly sound investment given that GTZ, in promoting political participation, is finally moving explicitly onto political terrain. (In this context it is quite correct to say that there is no such thing as apolitical terrain in development cooperation, cf. Diaby-Petzlin 2000). Having said that, the degree of penetration into the political arena of a country is quite considerable in this case.
4.3. Improve Donor Coordination The coordination of donor inputs to PRS processes must be improved significantly. At least in PRS development to date, the impression has been created that most bilateral donors are very reluctant to address and become actively involved in the processes, whilst the multilateral donors World Bank and IMF have adopted a form of behaviour considered – politely put – to be “inconsistent with the new country-ownership agenda” (ODI 2001: 4). There are also significant variations amongst the bilateral donors: Whilst some bilateral donors (most notably DFID) are investing in some cases considerable resources in helping shape PRS processes, others remain in some cases entirely uninvolved. A few basic steps to improve donor coordination would be : (1) A systematic and comprehensive exchange of information on what projects donors are planning in the context of PRS processes, and how such projects are being implemented, needs to be further developed or, in certain countries where it does not yet exist, established. (2) To discuss donor policies affecting PRS processes, forums involving all donors should be held regularly in all countries. In almost all countries, these forums exist more or less formally. However, they should institutionalise their exchange on PRSP. A key future task of these forums will be: Donors must avoid pursuing different strategies to promote different stakeholders within the government, thus in the worst case scenario even playing these actors off against each other. (3) Closer harmonisation of bilateral donors is required in connection with the assessment of PRSPs. The fact that these assessments are left almost exclusively to World Bank and IMF (whose “Joint Staff Assessments” are then commented on by the individual bilateral donor governments) cannot be an appropriate state of affairs in the long run. (4) With regard to institutionalised participation, it would seem very important that donors, also jointly, enter into more intensive dialogue with parliaments and civil societies. Here too a coordinated – meaning at least reciprocally informed – approach would seem absolutely imperative. The fact that representatives of civil society in a number of countries have been granted access to the Consultative Donor Group Meetings is a logical step. This procedure should be institutionalised and broadened (e.g. representatives of the parties represented in parliament might be invited).
34
4.4. Promote Participatory Governance Section 3.2 identified a large number points of departure and possibilities for increased institutionalisation of participation, the promotion of which would need to be considered on a case-by-case basis in the countries concerned. It is recommended that GTZ identify its comparative advantages for intended advisory service offerings. These will differ from country to country, depending on the nature of the respective political processes, but also on the existing structure and experiences of cooperation, the existing programmes and projects from which approaches might be developed, the key strategies etc. etc.. In addition, German TC might possess regional comparative advantages where other donors have less to offer or have left “blind spots” untouched. Against this background, the following recommendations are made: (1) The participatory character of PRS processes should be strengthened even more systematically. It is a welcome development that the World Bank and IMF plan to conduct a review of existing experiences in early 2002. This review (cf. IMF / World Bank 2001) should also be systematically prepared by the bilateral actors (for GTZ: e.g. by collating the experiences to date of GTZ in the promotion and facilitation of PRS processes. Related experiences of German NGOs might also be systematically collated and made available to the international debate). – Already it has been acknowledged for instance that the enormous pressure of time to which the processes were and are exposed is incompatible with satisfactory participation (cf. IMF / World Bank 2001: 4). Also the occasionally highly static processes are not conducive to a participatory approach. NGOs have also for instance criticised the too powerful role of IMF and World Bank in many processes. They also criticise the fact that local civil society organisations are not given a sufficient hearing.19 The bilateral donors could become more active than hitherto in facilitating participatory processes, if necessary also as a complement to IMF and World Bank. (2) In future, greater attention should be focused on the budget process. Other strong bilateral donors (e.g. DFID) and World Bank have to date focused essentially on the government – and often even more closely on the ministry of finance – as an actor in the budget process (mainstreaming poverty reduction in the budget). In the case of British development cooperation, this is certainly linked to the Westminster tradition, which assigns the parliament a far smaller role in the budget process than for instance the German (or the American) system. Here, German TC – provided that parliaments in the South so desire – could play an important role in promoting parliaments, especially in transferring expertise on negotiation processes and national budgeting which other donors are poorly able or unable to provide in this form. – Furthermore, all donors can help foster greater participation in the budget process by always presenting transparently their financial inputs, credits and subsidies in the countries themselves (cf. McGee / Norton 2000: 37). (3) Points of departure for promoting processes of social negotiation should be identified, and systematically developed. “Adequate political TC must expand the for19
Cf. IMF / World Bank 2001: 4; as well as corresponding comments, to be found e.g. at the EURODAD website (www.eurodad.org).
35 mal political approach to include processes of social negotiation. (...) The promotion of 'political participation' is the greatest conceptual challenge. (...) GTZ has great potential to promote political participation, especially outside the formal political sphere.” (DiabyPentzlin 2000: 7). This is based inter alia on a recognition of the fact that the stakeholders in PRS processes will naturally have various, and often divergent interests. Neither are “the poor” a homogeneous group – they themselves often have conflicting interests. In further PRS processes, greater attention should be paid to identifying different groups among “the poor”, and dealing with them accordingly. (4) The many years of experience in promoting political participation through decentralisation and local institutions should neither be overrated (“Those are the really important reform processes!”), nor should their significance be underestimated (“What we need now is national mainstreaming!”). Instead, experiences and insights should be utilised in order to make decentralised, institutionalised participation a fertile force for national strategy-building. The systematic analysis of existing experiences might also be the first step in this direction. Donors should also ensure that the agenda for structural reform, including sectoral decentralisation, is not constrained or even displaced by short-term PRSP processes geared to dent relief and new funds (as noted by Meyer/Schmidt/Schmitt [2001: 33] with some concern). The issue of how an increasing fiscal decentralisation can proceed and be conducive to poverty reduction, needs to be pursued further. The example of the Ugandan Poverty Action Fund, which contains key elements of both decentralisation and institutionalisation, might also be a model for other countries. It is important that locally established, democratically legitimated forums have the opportunity to take decisions on the use of funds, and to monitor their flow.
4.5. Promote Individual Actors / Institutions (1) Generally speaking, the promotion of parliaments should be accorded higher priority than hitherto. Despite all the weaknesses of parliaments listed in Section 3.3: Those seeking sustainable and structurally institutionalised participation in developing countries must not ignore parliaments. Especially the cyclically recurring policymaking processes – which include the PRS and budget processes – offer significant opportunities to gradually help parliaments achieve greater power and, associated with that, reforms and ongoing development. At present, civil society and private-sector actors may be the more flexible and uncomplicated partners for participatory processes – but ultimately they will not be able to claim that they represent the population on a comprehensive basis. In the long run they will not be able to develop the potential which parliaments in developed democracies possess to help build a system of checks and balances which can effectively keep government in check. Only democratically constituted parliaments possess the legitimation (and – hopefully – the capability) in the long run to address and debate divergent interests, and take decisions based on societal majorities. Proposals to strengthen parliaments (among others Parliamentary Centre / World Bank Institute 2001: 33) include:
36 • strengthening the institutional planning capacities of parliaments and parliamentarians; • initiating, promoting and supporting committee work for poverty reduction; ideally a Standing Committee on Poverty Reduction would be especially worthy of support (capacity building; infrastructure; advisory services etc.); • promoting parliamentary watchdog committees (e.g. budget committees) to strengthen the monitoring and oversight functions of parliaments (here too: capacity building; infrastructure; advisory services etc.); • strengthening research capacities to support parliamentarians; • ongoing development of the legal underpinnings of parliamentary work, e.g. of standing orders, so that oversight functions can be better performed (The reader is also referred to the example of Kenya: There, the parliament is disputing the existing sovereignty over the schedule of sessions and agendas. To date, these competences have rested with the President.). • promoting the international exchange and networking of parliamentarians interested and involved in poverty reduction. (2) Higher priority should be attached to the networking of parliament and civil society. Not least as a result of the diversity of instruments, promotion strategies and funds employed, parliaments (where they are promoted at all) and civil society actors are usually viewed and treated separately. The networking and productive interaction of these two collective agents as a complementary force to government might offer considerable benefits and facilitate progress in the institutionalisation of societal participation in poverty reduction. Despite the difficulties to compare different regional and historical experiences, it should be remembered that political parties in Europe emerged from social milieus, and were then able to translate “civil society” concerns into parliamentary work. Furthermore, cooperation with parliaments might provide civil society with greater security and independence from what are often too-powerful governments. (N.B.: Whereas civil society organisations in Africa are usually required to register with government agencies, politically active associations in Germany – apart from e.g. their establishment under association law – are registered not with the government, but with parliament.) (3) A number of aspects should be mentioned with respect to an increased promotion of civil society: • Based on experiences in cooperation with NGOs to date, above all at the project level (cf. Hinrichsen 2000), cyclical policymaking processes offer a large number of possibilities, especially for capacity-building for advocacy interventions (cf. McGee / Norton 2000: 74; Cagatay et al. 2000: 35). • In the context of PRS, second-round effects are to be anticipated, i.e. a second round of the processes of organisation and networking on poverty policy issues within civil society seen in the first round of PRS processes (examples include Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, see also ODI 2001). It seems appropriate to strongly recommend promotion of these processes. Generally speaking, there should be a move away from supporting individual NGOs or groups (as is done by German NGOs, also using public funds, but also by political foundations in the natural
37
•
•
•
course of events), and higher priority should be attached to the institutionalisation of societal networking and participatory dialogues. It is appropriate to promote individual groups or civil society actors in cases where their work helps reduce power asymmetries within society. Thus NGOs working for women’s rights are highly significant for “political” poverty reduction. (It should be noted that within civil society agencies, women are often also underrepresented and are denied access to participation for various reasons, cf. also McGee / Norton 2000: 67). A similar thing applies to the urban-rural divide amongst the poor. In other words, the rural poor have fewer opportunities to articulate their interests. Through targeted promotion of civil society actors, a contribution can be made to giving voice to the heterogeneous interests amongst “the poor”. A vital and competent media landscape supports societal debates, increases transparency, creates additional hurdles against corruption, provides diverse pressure groups with a forum etc.. – In short, it fosters a political process that is conducive to poverty reduction. TC already has broad experience in supporting media. This experience can be further consolidated and expanded by adding-on components of poverty-reduction-oriented media development. This might involve corresponding training for journalists, media access for the poor or the representatives of their interests (open channels), or more intensive promotion of democratically-oriented media in rural regions etc.. Donors can also support civil society actors by – as is done in some countries – opening-up meetings of the Consultative Donor Groups (CDG) with governments to participants from the civil society, and by keeping the media well-informed on debates and decisions within the CDG or similar conferences.
(4) Finally: The promotion of institutionalised participation within the executive should be accorded (continued) high priority. Donors should first of all continuously promote sectoral ministries, in order to counterbalance the “current monopolist stance of Ministries of Finance”, which is seen by a number of observers as counterproductive to the broad-based development of a country (Meyer/Schmidt/Schmitt 2001: 33). At the same time, they should also initiate and promote forms of institutionalised and multisectoral cooperation. The example of Uganda’s Poverty Eradication Working Group (see above), which even builds a bridge to the civil society, is one example of the form which this can take. Donor coordination is an absolute must, especially in the promotion of intra-governmental participation.
4.6. Concluding Statement When promoting participation in political processes for poverty reduction, positive results should not be expected too quickly. Schneider (1999: 23) quite rightly states that participatory governance is now acknowledged as a prerequisite for effective poverty reduction. Yet at the same time he continues: “However, while intellectually one may switch paradigms quickly and without pain, in practice this is a learning process implying change in the behaviour of all actors.” In other words, the PRS process also requires us to continue “Drilling through thick boards with a keen eye, and with a passion” (Max Weber).
38
5.
Annex
5.1. References Agrawal, Arun (2000): The Politics of Decentralization – A Critical Review. In: WeltTrends No. 25, Winter 1999/2000, 53-74 Alff, Uli / Ay, Peter / Bauer, Eberhard (1998): Partizipation – Mit offizieller Anerkennung ins Abseits. In: Peripherie, 1998, No. 72, 71-81 Bliss, Frank (2000): Von der Mitwirkung zur Selbstbestimmung. Grundelemente einer partizipativen Entwickungszusammenarbeit. In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 2000, H. B 9, 3-8 Brinkerhoff, Derick W. / Goldsmith, Arthur A. (2001): Macroeconomic Policy, PRSPs, and Participation. (World Bank Paper) www.worldbank.org/participation (Page numbers rtefer to the online version) Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) (1999): Übersektorales Konzept Partizipative Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (Partizipationskonzept). (= BMZ konzepte Nr. 102). Bonn Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) (2001a): Armutsbekämpfung – eine globale Aufgabe. Aktionsprogramm 2015. Der Beitrag der Bundesregierung zur weltweiten Halbierung extremer Armut. Bonn Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) (2001b): Elfter Bericht zur Entwicklungspolitik der Bundesregierung. Berlin/Bonn Cagatay, Nilüfer / Keklik, Mümtaz / Lal, Radhika / Lang, James (2000): Budgets As If People Mattered: Democratizing Macroeconomic Policies. (= UNDP/SEPED Conference Paper Series # 4). New York www.undp.org/seped/publications/conf_pub.htm Cooke, Bill / Kothari, Uma: The Case for Participation as Tyranny. In: dies. (ed.): Participation: The New Tyranny? London / New York 2001, 1-15 Dietvorst, Désirée (2001): Participation in sector reform. Tentative guidelines based on field experience from sub-Saharan Africa. Eschborn/GTZ Diaby-Pentzlin, Friederike: Technical Co-operation consciously turns political. In: GTZ (eds.): Youth between political participation, exclusion and instrumentalisation. Eschborn 2000, 6-7 Eberlei, Walter (1999): Schuldenkrise ärmster Länder gelöst? Die Ergebnisse des Kölner G-7-Gipfels. (= INEF-Report, 40). 2., Updated edition October 1999 Eberlei, Walter (2000): Beteiligung der Zivilgesellschaft im Rahmen des Poverty Eradication Action Plans (PEAP) Ugandas. Gutachten im Auftrag von Misereor, Aachen. August 2000 Fastenau, Axel / Hammer, Dorothee / Schall, Nikolaus: Decentralisation and the Institutionalisation of Participation. The Programme for Rural Action Ghana. In: Foster, R. et al (eds.): Beyond the Tool Kit. Experiences with institutionalizing participatory ap-
39 proaches of GTZ supported projects in rural areas. Eschborn/GTZ (04/402/42), 195216 Fölscher, Alta / Krafchik, Warren / Shapiro, Isaac: Transparency and Participation in the Budget Process. South Africa: A Country Report. Download at: www.internationalbudget.org Foster, Mick / Fozzard, Adrian (2000): Aid and Public Expenditure: A Guide. (ODI Working Paper 141). London Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (eds.): Zivilgesellschaft und Entwicklung. Beiträge für eine Anhörung des Deutschen Bundestages über die „Bedeutung der Zivilgesellschaft für nachhaltige Entwicklung in den Entwicklungsländern“. Bonn 2001 Goetz, Anne Marie / Jenkins, Rob: Accounts and accountability: theoretical implications of the right-to-information movement in India. In: Third World Quarterly, 1999, No. 3, 603-622 GTZ (eds.): Youth between political participation, exclusion and instrumentalisation. Eschborn 2000 Hinrichsen, Isabel: Armut, Süd-NRO und TZ. Orientierungen und Leitfragen zur Diskussion. Eschborn/GTZ (Abt. 4201), February 2000 www.gtz.de/forum_armut/download/bibliothek/NROLeitfaden.pdf International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2001): Revised Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency. (Approved March 2001). Washington D.C. http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/code.pdf International Monetary Fund (IMF) / World Bank (no date): Guidelines for Joint Staff Assessment of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Washington D.C. International Monetary Fund (IMF) / World Bank (2001): Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers – Progress in Implementation. Draft. Washington D.C., August 21, 2001 Kenya / Ministry of Finance and Planning (2001): Kilifi District PRSP Consultation Report. Part 1. Executive Summary. Unpublished document. Kitz, Martin (1998): Challenges in Scaling Up from Village to National Level. Endeavours to Institutionalize Participation in Kenya. In: Foster, R. et al (eds.): Beyond the Tool Kit. Experiences with institutionalizing participatory approaches of GTZ supported projects in rural areas. Eschborn/GTZ (04/402/42), 173-194 Kühl, Stefan: Wann Partizipation zum Problem wird. Die begrenzte Nützlichkeit von Partizipation in Entwicklungshilfeprojekten. Erfahrungen aus Zentralafrika. In: Peripherie, 1998, No. 72, 51-70 McGee, Rosemary / Norton, Andy (2000): Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategies: a synthesis of experience with participatory approaches to policy design, implementation and monitoring (IDS Working Papers, 109). Brighton 2000 Meyer, Kerstin / Schmidt, Annette / Schmitt, Gerald (2001): PRSP and Participation in Relief. The Point of View of German Technical Cooperation. Draft 07.05.2001 Meyer, Kerstin (1999): Sector-Wide Assistance, Sector Reform and Participation. What reform policy can learn from projects. Eschborn
40
Meyns, Peter (1995): Zambia in der 3. Republik. Demokratische Transition und politische Kontinuität. Analyse und Dokumentation. (= Hamburger Beiträge zur AfrikaKunde, 48). Hamburg Nohlen, Dieter / Nuscheler, Franz: Handbuch der Dritten Welt, Band 1, Hamburg 1974 (2. Auflage 1982, 3. Auflage 1992) OECD / DAC (1995): Guidelines on Participatory Development and Good Governance, Paris OECD / DAC (2001): DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction. Paris http://www.oecd.org/dac/pdf/G-pov-e.pdf Osmani, S.R. (2000): Participatory Governance, People’s Empowerment and Poverty Reduction. (= UNDP/SEPED Conference Paper Series # 7). New York www.undp.org/seped/publications/conf_pub.htm Overseas Development Institute (ODI) (2001): PRSP Institutionalisation Study. Third Progress Report. Prepared for the Strategic Partnership with Africa. London http://www.odi.org.uk/pppg/progress_report3.pdf AND http://www.odi.org.uk/pppg/progress3_annex.pdf Parliamentary Centre (2000): Handbook on Parliamentarians and Policies to Reduce Poverty. Draft. Ontaria, December 2000, Parliamentary Centre / World Bank Institute (2001): Development of a Course for Parlamentarians on Parliament and the PRSP process. Draft. 2001 Robb, Caroline (2000): Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Draft. Washington D.C./ Africa Department IMF. August 2000 Rodenberg, Birte (2001): Die HIPC-Initiative und Strategien von Entwicklungsländern der Armutsbekämpfung (PRSP): Zur Integration von Gender in PRSP. Das Beispiel Ghana. Gutachten im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung. Entwurf, Bonn 2001 Schneider, Hartmut (1999): Participatory Governance: The Missing Link for Poverty Reduction (= OECD Development Centre, Policy Brief No. 17). Paris Uganda / MoFPED (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development) (2001): Uganda Poverty Status Report 2001. Kampala (available at the World Bank PRSP website; http://www1.worldbank.org/prsp/uganda_ppr.pdf Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project (UPPAP) (2000): Learning from the Poor. Kampala UNDP (2000): Overcoming Human Poverty. Poverty Report 2000. New York UNDP (2001): Choices for the Poor. Lessons from National Poverty Strategies. New York. See http://www.undp.org/dpa/publications/choicesforpoor/ENGLISH/index.html World Bank (2001a) (S. Tikare, D. Youssef, P. Donnelly-Roark, P. Shah): Organizing Participatory Processes in the PRSP. Draft for Comments, April 2001 http://www.worldbank.org/participation/web/webfiles/partprsp.pdf
41
5.2. List of Abbreviations BMZ CDG CSOs DFID DIE EED G-7 GTZ IDA IMF INEF IPRSP MoFPED MP MTEF NGOs ODI OECD/ DAC PAF PEAP PPA PRA PRS PRSP SAPRI SPA QUIM TC UNDP UPPAP
Federal German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development Consultative Donor Group Civil Society Organisations Department for International Development (UK) German Development Institute, Bonn German Protestant Development Service, Bonn Group of 7 (economically strongest industrialised countries) Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH International Development Association International Monetary Fund Institute for Development and Peace, Duisburg Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (Uganda) Member of Parliament Medium Term Expenditure Framework Non-Governmental Organisations Overseas Development Institute, London Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development / Development Assistance Committee Poverty Action Fund (Uganda) Poverty Eradication Action Plan (Uganda) Participatory Poverty Assessment Participatory Rural Appraisal Poverty Reduction Strategy Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper The Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative Strategic Partnership with Africa Qualitative Impact Monitoring Technical Cooperation United Nations Development Programme Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project
