Institutionalizing Political Party Reforms in the ...

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Institutionalizing Political Party Reforms in the Philippines Julio C. Teehankee; De La Salle University The Federal Party was established in 1900 as the first Filipino political party. Today, over a hundred years later, political parties in the Philippines continue to be candidate-centered coalitions of provincial bosses, political machines, and local clans; anchored on clientelistic, parochial, and personal inducements rather than on issues, ideologies, and party platforms. Political parties have existed in one form or another since the first party system (1900–1941), dominated by the Nacionalista Party (NP) was established under the tutelage of the American colonial regime. Soon after, a formal two party system (1946–1972) buttressed the postcolonial liberal democratic regime with the NP and the Liberal Party (LP) alternating in power. This system was destroyed by Ferdinand Marcos and replaced with a one party dictatorship (1972–1986) under his Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL). The restoration of formal democracy in 1986 saw the emergence of a fluid multiparty system (Teehankee, 2002, 2012a). Since 1987, a number of parties and coalitions were organized and dissolved in successive local and national elections. The absence of strong and credible political parties continues to be a democratic deficit in the Philippine political system. The post-authoritarian party system has seen the rise and fall of dominant (albeit mostly short-lived) political parties in the past five presidential administrations: the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) during the term of Corazon Aquino; followed by Lakas National Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas NUCD) founded by Fidel Ramos; the Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino (LAMMP) of Joseph Estrada; the Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo; and the Liberal Party (LP) under Benigno Aquino III (Teehankee, 2012b). Despite a century of party politics, a history of four party systems, and a multitude of parties, the Philippines still suffers from a seeming lack of institutionalized parties. The dimension of party institutionalization is largely overlooked by the current literature on Philippine politics. This chapter will briefly assess recent attempts at political party institutionalization in the Philippines through the proposed “Political Party Development Act (PPDA)” pending in Congress.

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An Institutional View of Filipino Parties Political parties in the Philippines have essentially been an amalgamation of vote-generating machines, oriented towards putting its leaders in government, gaining access to patronage, and generally securing the benefits of public office. Hence, the seeming lack of individual party institutionalization has largely contributed to the de-institutionalized nature of the overall political party system. On the other hand, highly institutionalized political parties (that can be found in mature democracies) are most likely to be well-organized, possess strong linkages with citizens and society, and contribute to a more democratic and competitive political party system. Ultimately, the benefits of institutionalized parties and the party system are a continuity of alternatives that increase the prospects of electoral accountability. Political institutions are essentially formal, and often legal, components of the state machinery that employ explicit and usually enforceable rules and decision-making procedures (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013). Huntington (1968, 12) was the first to define institutionalization as “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability.” Focusing specifically on political parties, Panebianco (1988, 49) refers to institutionalization as “the way the organization solidifies.” Randall and Svåsand (2002) assert that political parties are “organizations, however rudimentary, set up more or less intentionally and with some kind of formal rules and objectives.” Drawing on the literature, they offered a simple analytic model of the central elements or dimensions of party institutionalization. The model distinguishes between internal and external dimensions, and within these, between structural and attitudinal aspects to yield four key elements: a) systemness – the increasing scope, density, and regularity of the interactions that constitute the party as a structure; b) value infusion - the extent to which party actors and supporters (whether or not falling into a more formalized category of membership) acquire an identification with and commitment to the party which transcends more instrumental or self-interested incentives for involvement; c) decisional autonomy - a significant degree of decisional autonomy, or freedom from interference in determining its own policies and strategies; and d) reification - the extent to which the party’s existence is established in the public imagination. (See Table 15.1)

310 Table 15.1: Dimensions of Party Institutionalization Internal

External

Structural

Systemness

Decisional Autonomy

Attitudinal

Value Infusion

Reification

Source: Randall & Svåsand, 2002, 13

Clearly, these four elements are significantly absent among the major political parties in the Philippines. Manacsa and Tan (2005, 759) contend that “the transient nature of Philippine political parties has been less the product of the resilience of patron–client ties and more the outcome of deliberate institutional choices.” They argue that the most acute social cleavages in the country have not been politicized and organized into political parties. They add “that certain types of institution can significantly inhibit the ability of parties to endow social conflicts with a political form.” (Manacsa and Tan, 2005, 750) This is evident in the House of Representatives, where an average of 33.5% of all lower house representatives elected since 1987 has switched parties in pursuit of resources allocated through clientelistic networks. It is telling that 60.2% of these party switchers usually jumped into the party of the sitting president, thereby producing short-lived dominant parties (See Table 15.2). Not surprisingly, 57% of the legislators from the dominant party belong to political clans. Around 160 of these political clans have had two or more members who have served in Congress, and they account for more than 400 of the 2,407 men and women who have been elected to the national legislature since 1907 (Teehankee, 2012b, 186–187).

Political Party Institutionalization: The Political Party Development Act The proposed “Political Development Party Act (PPDA)” had been filed five times in Congress. House Bill 6418 also known as “The Political Party Act of 2003” was passed shortly before the close of the 12th Congress, but the Senate failed to act in it. Upon the opening of the 13th Congress, then Speaker Jose De Venecia again filed the Party Reform Bill. After much debate and deliberation, the bill was consolidated with nine other

311 Table 15.2: Party Switching in the House of Representatives, Eight to Fifteenth Congress (1987-2010) 1987

1992

1995

1998

2001

2004

2007

2010

Total Number of District Reresentatives

200 (100%)

201 (100%)

203 (100%)

208 (100%)

211 (100%)

211 (100%)

219 (100%)

229 (100%)

District Representatives who shifted parties

154 (77.0%)

100 (49.8%)

39 (19.2%)

92 20 (44.2%) (9.5%)

77 (36.5%)

17 (7.8%)

55 (24.0%)

District 46 Representatives (23.0%) who did not shift parties

101 (50.2%)

164 (80.8%)

116 191 (55.8%) (90.5%)

134 (63.5%)

202 174 (92.2%) (76.0%)

District Representatives who shifted to dominant party

88 (43.8%)

14 (6.9%)

86 (41.3%)

38 (18.0%)

7 (3.2%)

150 (75.0%)

5 (2.4%)

28 (12.2%)

Source: Teehankee, 2012b, 199

similar proposed legislations into House Bill 5877, also known as “The Political Party Act of 2006.” Once again, the bill was passed by the House on Third Reading, but it was still not acted upon by the Senate. In the 14th Congress, House Bill 3655 renamed as “The Political Party Development Act of 2008” was principally sponsored by Representative Juan Edgardo M. Angara. A counterpart bill was also filed in the Senate by the congressman’s father—Senator Edgardo J. Angara. For the third time, the House passed the proposed legislation on Third Reading. However, objections coming from party-list representatives and other minority members led to the bill’s recall to the second reading, and to its eventual non-passage. Initially, there were high hopes that the bill would finally pass under the reformist administration of President Benigno S. Aquino III. In the 15th Congress, Senators Edgardo Angara and Jinggoy Estrada filed the Senate version of the bill, while the House version was filed by a number of congressmen, headed by Representatives Rufus Rodriguez and Juan Edgardo Angara. The House again passed the bill, but the Senate failed to pass its version due to the 2013 midterm elections. For the fifth time, the bill was filed in both chambers of the 16th Congress. In the House, the bill was refiled by several congressmen, led by Rufus Rodriguez, and was consolidated under the principal authorship of former President and incumbent Representative Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. In the Senate, the bill

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was refiled separately by Senators Antonio Trillanes, Jose Victor Ejercito, and Jinggoy Estrada. It is hoped that the co-sponsers will push the bill in both chambers, despite the detention of Arroyo and Estrada on separate plunder charges. The proposed PPDA seeks to promote the institutionalization of political parties in the Philippines by addressing four essential reform issues, namely, campaign finance reform, state subsidy to political parties, a ban on party switching, and strengthening citizen-parties linkages. The proposed law sets limits to the amount of campaign contributions made by individuals or juridical entities. In the Senate version, individuals may donate up to PHP100,000 while juridical persons, such as corporations, may donate up to PHP1,000,000 only. The House version raises the cap for individual donations to PHP1,000,000 and for juridical persons to PHP10,000,000. The cap was designed to minimize the risk of, if not totally prevent, capture of political parties by wealthy individuals and groups with vested interests. In addition, the bill also places a cap on the total amount a national political party can spend for every election (to be calibrated every three years based on the Consumer Price Index). In the Senate Bill, a national party may spend PHP20.00 for every voter, while in the House version, a party may only spend PHP11.00. In order to encourage Filipinos to contribute to political parties, the proposed law also seeks to exempt the said contributions from the imposition of a donor’s tax (SB 2635, Sec. 10). The proposed law also instructs the Commission on Audit (COA) to examine the financial reports of Accredited National Political Parties, similar to what is done with other government agencies. To ensure that individual and institutional contributions are within the limits of the law, these donations would likewise be subjected to COA examination. The primary modality for campaign finance reform advocated in the proposed law is the provision of a public subsidy to political parties through the creation of a “State Subsidy Fund.” The fund is to be utilized for party development and campaign expenditures. The bill proposes that funding be provided for party development activities like a) party administration, recruitment, and civic education; b) research and party development; c) education and training of its members; d) institution building and constituent outreach program; e) other reasonable logistical and operational expenses that are essential to strengthening the party. The Senate version limits access to the subsidy to “national” political parties. It also lists down more stringent party requirements compared to the House version.

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Most liberal democratic states have adopted direct public funding to political parties to reduce the influence of big donors, avoid corruption, and to cover the rising cost of media and party expenditures. First introduced in Germany in 1959, public subsidies to political parties are also in effect in France, Canada, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Japan, and other countries. (Nassmacher, 2006; Van Biezen, 2014). Direct State Funding (DSF) in these countries (See Table 15.3) may take the form of “cash grants disbursed to parties and/or candidates according to a public procedure laid down in the law” (Casas-Zamora, 2008, 9). While the jury is still out on the efficacy of public subsidies to political parties in these countries, recent research indicate that “that countries which provide subsidies to parties below the electoral threshold may actually help facilitate their organizational survival” (Van Biezen, 2014, 180). Consequently, the introduction of a similar scheme in the Philippines “is meant to provide the minimum resources for party-building, leverage for auditing, transparency, and accountability in the sourcing and expenditures of party and campaign funds, and for enacting party authority and influence on their candidates and members” (Casiple, 2008). The proposed law refers to party switching or “political turncoatism” as “the change of political party affiliation by any candidate whether or not elected” (SB 2635, sec. 5 para. L). The proposed law seeks to implement strict rules to curb the practice of political turncoatism by promoting party loyalty and discipline. Casiple (2008) noted “the bill provides the rationale for restricting turncoatism and against emasculating political parties and party-raiding by laying down the rules of behavior of political parties and politicians.” Under the bill, a member of a national political party who changes political party affiliations after being nominated by a political party is said to have committed political turncoatism. Senate bill 2635 specifies the following penalties for political turncoatism: a) Deemed to have forfeited his/her office, if he/she is an elected official who changes political party affiliation during his/her term of office; b) Disqualified from running for any elective position in the next succeeding election immediately following the act of changing political party affiliation c) Prohibited from being appointed or from holding any position in any public or government office for three (3) years after the expiration of his/her current term; d) Prohibited from assuming any executive or administrative position in his/ her new political party; and e) Directed to refund any and all amounts he/ she received from his/her political party, plus a twenty five percent (25%) surcharge thereon. It is hoped that these proposed sanctions would make

314 Table 15.3: Average Direct State Funding per year and registered voter in 25 democracies (1990s approx.) Country

USD ($)

Period

Austria

16.5

1995-1998

France

14.9

1995-1996

Sweden

12.1

1999

Israel

11.2

1996-1998

Mexico

3.3

1997-1999

Dominican Republic

3.2

2000

Japan

2.5

1995-1999

Germany

2.0

1995-1998

Australia

1.9

1996-1998

Panama

1.8

1999-2004

Uruguay

1.7

1999-2004

Costa Rica

1.6

2002-2006

Spain

1.6

1998-2000

Italy

1.4

1999-2001

Nicaragua

1.2

2001-2006

Portugal

1.0

1995-1996

Bolivia

0.6

1997-2002

El Salvador

0.5

1999-2004

Netherlands

0.4

1999

Honduras

0.2

2001-2005

United States

0.2

1992-1996

Canada

0.2

1993-1997

Denmark

0.2

1988-1990

Ecuador

0.2

1995-1997

Guatemala

0.02

1999-2003

Source: Casas-Zamora, 2008, 16

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politicians think twice before changing party affiliations. Sec. 8 of the proposed law also seeks to curb the practice of multiple party nominations by providing that “No political party shall nominate more candidates than the number of persons required to be voted for in an elective position nor shall any candidate be allowed to accept nominations from more than one registered political party, except in cases of aggrupations or coalitions thereof.” A major point of contention, however, for the Senate and House versions is the definition of “political turncoatism”. In the Senate version, it is defined as “the act of changing party affiliation by any candidate within eight (8) months prior to the elections”, while the House version defines it as “the act of changing party affiliation by an elected official, during his/her term, except within six (6) months prior to the end of his/her term.” Citizen participation is the critical foundation upon which democracy is built. Political parties are vehicles for enabling citizens to engage and reconnect with the institutions and processes of democracy. Citizenship is nurtured on values, knowledge, and practice. As part of their constituency building activity, parties can perform an integral function in citizen education and voters education activities. The proposed law provides a number of mechanisms to “encourage and support continuing voters’ education and civic literacy programs through the political parties” (Sec. 3, para. D).

Democratic Accountability Through Party Institutionalization A survey conducted by the Social Weather Station (SWS) in November 2006 reveals that 67% of respondents do not consider any political party as representing their welfare. The weak party linkage in society results in a regular split and merger of political parties into ad hoc coalitions and the replacement of “democratic accountability” with “clientelistic accountability.” Clientelistic accountability “represents a transaction, the direct exchange of citizen’s vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services” (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007, 2). The proposed PPDA seeks to promote democratic accountability through the institutionalization of campaign finance reforms, public subsidies, a ban on party switching, and strengthening citizen-party linkages. In turn, it is the hope of reform advocates that political parties

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will be institutionalized by revising the “rules of the game.” There are essentially two ways by which institutions can either restrict or mitigate political behavior. First, the “rules of the game” can provide incentives and disincentives for individuals to maximize their utilities. Secondly, institutional choices can influence future decision making of individuals through a process of path dependency. The proposed law seeks to curb the corrupting influence of “money politics” by setting a limit on the amount of campaign contributions made by individuals and juridical entities to political parties. Under existing election laws, individual candidates and political parties are required to submit a Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) after every electoral exercise. Requiring bank accounts for party funds and opening the financial records of the political parties to an audit procedure by the Commission on Audit (COA) will serve as an institutional reinforcement for transparency and accountability. While the proposed law can be seen as another positive step toward enhancing democracy in the Philippines, some caveats are in order. The unintended consequences of well-meaning reform initiatives in the past have uncovered the limits of a purely institutional approach to political and electoral reform. In recent years, decentralization has further empowered some local clans, term limits hastened generational shift among clans, and increased their numbers; the ban on political advertisement led to ascendance of celebrity politicians; and, party list elections have been coopted by local clans and non-marginalized sectors. Thus, strengthening institutional capabilities necessitates the enhancement of legitimacy by mobilizing popular support for particular policy choices. Without popular support, the proposed PPDA, which has been delayed for 12 years, will go the way of other reform bills. The Freedom of Information (FOI) bill has languished for over two decades and the Anti Political Dynasty (APD) bill has been delayed for over three decades (Lustre, 2015). The establishment of a well-defined and differentiated political party system will promote democratic accountability, contribute to the formation of government, and forge legislative majorities. To this end, the proposed PPDA seeks to build meaningful political identities, policybased platforms, and agendas; internal democratic structures; a reliable core of supporters and leaders; and the ability to raise funds to support party activities. Parties and candidates that demonstrate innovative approaches in gaining grassroots support should receive encouragement and incentives. t

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