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Interorganizational Crisis Management Olivier Berthod, Gordon Müller-Seitz und Jörg Sydow

Abstract

Crisis situations represent a key managerial concern, as they are heavily imbued with uncertainty, implying, in contrast to calculable risks, the necessity to deal with the unexpected. Previous management research has focused predominantly in this regard upon the way organizations face crises once they have occurred; that is, on the reactive measures of single organizations. Against this background, this chapter sketches extant research on these predominantly organizational crisis management activities and offers options for practice and for future research geared towards interorganizational constellations and how they can prepare proactively for such situations.

1 Introduction 9/11, the financial crises, swine flu, the oil catastrophe in the Gulf of Mexico, volcanic ash over Iceland, the dioxin scandal in northern Germany, the tsunami and subsequent nuclear power plant breakdown in Fukushima or the recent EHEC outbreak – such disruptive events not only affect people and local communities, but also organizations. With respect to private organizations, the consequences of such events often spread along the

O. Berthod (*) · G. Müller-Seitz · J. Sydow  Institut für Management, Freie Universität Berlin, Boltzmannstr. 20, 14195 Berlin, Deutschland e-mail: [email protected] G. Müller-Seitz e-mail: [email protected] J. Sydow e-mail: [email protected] A. Thießen (Hrsg.), Handbuch Krisenmanagement, DOI: 10.1007/978-3-531-19367-0_8, © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2013

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global and interlinked nature of production structures like complex supply chains and production networks, hence exacerbating the negative impact of local incidents on global operations. In face of this as it seems increasingly common phenomenon, extant approaches to crisis management frequently prove ineffective, sometimes even unrealistic, like those fantasy-recovery plans for cases of nuclear war or dramatic flooding that managers of private and public organizations produce in order to sustain the feeling that the impossible is, in fact, do-able – even when it is not (Lee et al. 2009). Crises not only have increasingly global implications; they also are imbued with a degree of uncertainty that is much vaster than their quantifiable risk. According to Frank Knight (1921), risk expresses the calculable probability for incidents to occur (‘known unknowns’), whereas uncertainty concerns – at least in its extreme form – all the remaining options that one does not, or cannot, expect (‘unknown unknowns’). Although John Maynard Keynes (1936) already highlighted the relevance of, as he coined it, true uncertainty for economies and economists, the uncertainty-laden nature of crisis situations has frequently been ignored in favor of calculable risk conceptions. At best, uncertainty has been translated into a kind of “residual” risk. This trend is sustained and sharpened by managerial terminologies such as risk management, as well as the related but broader conception of enterprise risk management (ERM)-systems. This practice is accurately marked as a disguised attempt to “organize uncertainty” (Power 2007). In point of fact, as he looked deeper into risk management practices, Power (2007) noticed that these measures are often of a more bureaucratic and legitimating nature than actually reducing uncertainty or making it manageable. Terror attacks often serve as a trigger for change in current thinking about crisis situations and crisis management and their impact on organizations (e.g. Comfort and Kapucu 2006). Research and managerial practices have started venturing beyond transforming the unexpected into calculable risks. 9/11 propagated across networks and relationships at tremendous speed, impacting companies, public authorities, airports, and all sorts of organizations all around the globe. This gave rise to discourses such as “supply chain risk management” (Paulsson 2004) or even “global supply chain risk management” (Manuj and Mentzer 2008), by now the subject of numerous edited volumes and handbooks (e.g. Zsidisin and Ritchie 2008). And yet, although the interconnected nature of crises is being acknowledged increasingly, crises remain an organization-centric management concern, addressing the question: how do we protect ourselves best? In other words, although interorganizational interdependencies are considered increasingly in this respect, the potential for interorganizational constellations to effectively deal with crises remains hardly acknowledged in research. Given this observation, the present chapter takes the differentiation between risk and uncertainty into account, and goes beyond classical risk management approaches by acknowledging interorganizational relations and networks as a potential problem amplifier during crises on the one hand, and a potential source of synergetic energy to handle interorganizational crises on the other. Consequently, this chapter also tries to identify interorganizational forms of governance and practices that help to deal with such crises,

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thus providing a more reflexive approach towards how to deal with crisis situations interorganizationally. In the next section, we start by defining key terms, including interorganizational crisis management, and then present some results of an intensive, systematic literature review on interorganizational relations (IOR) in connection with risk and uncertainty (Sydow et al. 2013). Based upon this review, we reflect on those conclusions and suggest three gaps in previous research on crises and IOR that merit specific scholarly attention. These gaps offer ample opportunities for future research. The chapter concludes with a brief summary and by stressing the necessity to engage with this highly relevant set of issues in a scholarly manner.

2 Interorganizational Crisis Management − Definition and Review Unexpected events often take organizations to their limits (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). Numerous studies on unexpected and detrimental events do not always explicitly address the term “crisis”, but use interchangeable and/or related terms, like catastrophe (e.g. Perrow 2011), surprises (Bechky and Okhuysen 2011), emergency (Waugh and Streib 2006) or disaster (e.g. Birkland 2006). Nonetheless, an underlying idea remains prevalent in almost all of these studies: the question of coping with the unexpected and the conviction that crisis management is indeed possible. A crisis is defined typically as “a low-probability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of the organization and is characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made swiftly” (Pierson and Clair 1998, pp. 60). For the purposes of this chapter, we add that crises are temporally and spatially limited occurrences that are, to some extent, characterized by a large degree of unpreparedness and uncertainty about the scope of their consequences for both the organization and society (thus excluding minor problems). In any case, a triggering event, a natural occurrence, like a volcanic eruption, or a clearly anthropogenic event, like a terrorist attack (or even a mix of both, like a hurricane following CO2-induced climate change), is needed to induce the crisis, the effects of which might be felt immediately or only after an incubation period. The same holds true for the end of the crisis: past its climax, the detrimental effects of crises may continue for some time but usually decrease along a similar slope and, at some point in time, may be perceived as terminated – a notion that often relies on arbitrary definitions. Crisis management, then, is an attempt and more or less effective action to cope with the consequences of such occurrences and to initiate and conduct relief operations. Respective management practices, however, are not restricted to dealing with the consequences ex post facto; rather, they may also be directed at averting crises and preparing the organization for coping with them before and when they occur (Pierson and Clair 1998).

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Fig. 1 Schematic representation of present research foci

interorganizational

e.g. task forces (Moynihan 2008)

e.g. resilient supply-chains (Sheffi & Rice 2005)

e.g. ephemeral relief organizations (Lanzara 1983)

e.g. high-reliability organizations (Weick et al. 1999)

reactive

proactive

Level of analysis organizational

Response

2.1 Crisis Management: The Absence of the Interorganizational Dimension Again this background, and as shown in Fig. 1, previous research has focused primarily on intraorganizational ways of dealing with crises, predominantly in a reactive fashion (the darker a cell in Fig. 1, the more previous research has focused upon the respective crisis-response theme). Comparatively few studies have looked at proactive approaches of single organizations with respect to potential crises or to uncertainty. Finally, even fewer studies have looked at the interorganizational level of analysis, where we found more reactive accounts than proactive ones, upon which we focus in Sect. 3 in this chapter. At the organizational level, research on reactive measures in face of crises (or, in more general terms, in face of unforeseen events) ranges from individual and team responses to the whole organization. Jett and George (2003), for instance, review interpersonal and team-oriented disruptions in the first place and subsume what they label interruptions at work into three categories: intrusions (i.e., another person interrupts work unexpectedly), distractions (i.e., externally induced phenomena that keep the person from working as scheduled), and discrepancies (i.e., a person faces an externally induced situation where the task ahead cannot be accomplished as s/he expected it). Notably, they point at both potentially positive and negative consequences of work interruption. Waller (1999) also observed by means of simulation that the performance of airline crew members facing non-routine events depends primarily upon the timing of their behavioral responses (and, implicitly linked, their training beforehand). As for the interpersonal and team levels of analysis, further empirical evidence is offered by Bechky and Okhuysen (2011), who report on ethnographic analyses of how SWAT teams and film crews deal with surprises. They stress the idea of “organizational bricolage” to show how the teams rearranged their activities in face of unexpected situations in order to better address the new challenges that emerge. More precisely, they insist on the necessity of role shifting,

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reorganizing existing routines, and reassembling the present work related task as means to face surprises. Another strand of the managerial literature begins a little later in the unfolding of the crisis and addresses activities geared towards change management ex-post (e.g. Isabella 1990) and learning from crises (e.g. Elliott 2009; Rerup 2009). Organizational learning issues in particular are deemed vital, as unintended events represent an opportunity to learn from or through these phenomena, not least about the organizations’ very limits (Lampel et al. 2009) and to implement new or optimize existent programs for crisis management. In particular, previous studies identified a broad range of barriers to organizational learning and subsequent failures to initiate change. For instance, Elliott (2009) reports on how child protection services in the United Kingdom failed to learn due to the separation of policy development from managerial practice. In a similar fashion, Hutter and Jones (2007) stress how little practitioners of the food industry actually know about regulation and promising practices in terms of food safety. Here too, studies on the matter point out problems and issues at the organizational level, excluding proactive change and planning for future crises and the need to do it interorganizationally. By contrast, there are also a number of studies that analyze how organizations prepare proactively for emerging and/or unexpected crises (Gephart et al. 2009; Hutter and Power 2005; Miller 2009; Shrivastava 1995; Starbuck 2009). One example in this regard is the work by Weick (1987), who suggests that a culture of reliability might have an effect upon an organization’s sensitivity to unexpected errors. Learning from exemplary and highly reliable organizations (Weick 1987; Weick and Roberts 1993; Weick and Sutcliffe 2007; Weick et al. 1999), he stresses, among other things, that the monitoring of failures, starting with the acceptance that they might (and will) occur, is influenced substantially by the organizational culture, thus exerting an impact upon how organizations deal with uncertainty more generally (cf. also March et al. 1991; Tamuz 1987), who discuss the relevance of near misses in this respect). Another stream of literature, along the same lines, addresses less the socio-psychological factors and more the organizational forms and issues of design, such as the well-known “adhocracy” (Mintzberg and Mac-Hugh 1985). One also refers to “fast-response organizations” (Faraj and Xiao 2006) when it comes to organizational preparation for unexpected events. Hospitals, at least in the case of major emergencies, cannot plan for new patients and must cope with the workflow as it comes. Also dedicated to the public good, Lanzara (1983) explicitly looked at how organizations can help to cope with crises via loosely-designed organizational forms like the adhocracy or the ephemeral organization. He investigated the aftermath of an unexpected earthquake in southern Italy, causing widespread devastation, and illustrated how spontaneous organizational forms (i.e. ephemeral organizations) emerged out of isolated initiatives, such as a group of students offering support and shelters. For the purposes of this review, it is interesting to note that he pointed out the ephemeral, fuzzy and ad-hoc nature of such organizational forms in the course of responding to a crisis. Finally, at the organizational level, other studies have worked to address the role of more specific processes in such crises, such as leadership (Boin and ‘t Hart 2003), collective sensemaking

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(Weick 1988) or framing in the decision-making process (James et al. 2011). In sum, crisis management research tends to concentrate upon operational issues of recovery and relief, and it does so predominantly in a reactive fashion. What is missing – again – is an interorganizational treatment of crises. For example, Staber and Sydow (2002) put forward a similar argument (although they do not write on crises in our specific sense), suggesting that organizations ought to build up what they call “adaptive capacity”, i.e. the ability of an organization to interact flexibly with its environment. In particular, they propose that learning from unexpected and detrimental events is possible and that potentially relevant measures comprise, among others, loose coupling, redundant ties and the use of slack resources.

2.2 Interorganizational and Proactive: Should Crisis Management Learn from Risk Management? A prominent, proactive approach of crises avoidance has taken the form of risk management. In point of fact, ever since the 1970s, researchers with a managerial stance have been conflating crisis management with risk management (cf. Herbane 2010 for an overview). Risk management is interesting to our discussion for two reasons: it is proactive in nature, and it tends to open its analyses to the risk entailed in interorganizational relations. But can we learn from risk management and use these approaches to develop proper interorganizational crisis management programs? Risk management approaches tend to rely on three key pillars, (1) the identification of risk sources, (2) the evaluation of the potential consequences once a risk turns into a crisis, and (3) measures to reduce the detrimental effects of a crisis, including risk communication (cf. Renn 2008). More recently, risk management approaches using an interorganizational perspective have received heightened attention, not least due to the global financial crisis and the increasing thirst for protection and regulation efforts in order to organize the latent feeling of uncertainty and lack of control over the markets (e.g. Keitsch 2000; Diederichs 2010). For instance, the “Enterprise Risk Management” (ERM) approach represents a much more integrative conception than classical risk management, looking at internal operations but also at the competitors’ actions, thus reckoning with (but not addressing) the potentially negative drive of interorganizational relations in the propagation of crises. However, despite having opened up, some have pointed out that these approaches still lack the necessary depth and breadth to account for interorganizational issues beyond the scope of monetary issues and competition and to fully address the complexity of the environments in which these organizations are operating (Power 2009). An indication of this superficiality can be found in the annual reports of multinational corporations, where the sections dealing with risk management are usually very short and use a byand-large standardized language shared by all other competitors. A second striking indicator of this trend is the fact that organizational responsibility for risk management is more often in the hands of the Chief Financial Officer than in those of the supply and

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operations departments (Müller-Seitz and Sydow 2012). Interorganizational interdependencies are usually left out, thus undermining the necessity to prepare for unforeseen risk propagation in one’s own lines of products or services. In line with the reasoning of Power (2009), it is safe to say that ERM conceptions in fact represent an enlargement of the traditional risk management approaches and not a paradigmatic change in terms of how risk and crises are conceived in (inter)organizational constellations. Moreover, as is often the case with management practices (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), such management fads tend to value formal requirements for compliance purposes more than they deal genuinely with crises and their potential. Consequently, these formal requirements appear to be used by and large for legitimation purposes in corporate communication. Looking at this with even more critical distance, traditional risk management presumes a coherent risk approach from the whole organization (in the form of a growing ‘risk appetite’), based on “accounting and auditing norms of control, with an emphasis on process description and evidence” (Power 2009, p. 850). This trend in fact supports “an accounting style of knowing and a logic of auditability [that] are responsible for restricting the development of a risk management which might have done a better job” (Power 2009, p. 854). It is no heresy to claim that ERM has degenerated. Although we do not argue that ERM approaches are entirely ineffective, they frequently address interorganizational issues at a very superficial level and are not sensitive to the un-expectable nature of crises. Against this background, one potentially fruitful avenue might be found in the idea of Business Continuity Management (BCM), a perspective that builds on refined ERM conceptions. It advances ERM concepts by taking ‘softer’ issues into account, and by venturing beyond solely quantifiable factors. However, there is no agreed definition of the concept yet, even though numerous standardization organizations are now trying to offer BCM definitions and prescriptions (Herbane 2010; Power 2009). Therefore, for the moment, we propose to rely on the definition issued by the British Standards Institution (2006); a definition which is often reverted to: holistic management process that identifies potential threats to an organization and the impacts to business operations that those threats, if realized, might cause, and which provides a framework for building organizational resilience with the capability for an effective response that safeguards the interests of its key stakeholders, reputation, brand and value-creating activities. (British Standards Institution 2006, p. 1).

Often, and as usual in risk management, BCM tends to focus on financial risk and currency volatility as measures for the impact of a crisis. However, these aspects, although important, are very organization-centric and therefore clearly not crucial when thinking in terms of interorganizational crisis management. Instead, the diverse forms of flexible work organization and subcontracting on which the organization potentially relies should represent the core interest of a proper interorganizational perspective. BCM seems to be nothing but the attempt to prepare the organization for flexible answers and for a smooth transition into business continuity and more resilience, even in the case of

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emergencies and long-lasting crises. While this perspective allows for more flexibility in planning and thinking (more on that later), it still lacks dedicated attention at the interorganizational level, since it focuses on the impact of potential crises on one’s own operations and does not take the positive drive of interorganizational ties into account: the possibility for a network to produce the necessary resilience, even when one of the partners has been badly hit.

3 Interorganizational Crisis Management – Beyond the Organizational Focus Crisis management deserves the attribute “interorganizational” when it is sensitive towards interorganizational interdependencies (and the embeddedness of a focal organization in IORs more generally) and when it delves into the potential of these same interorganizational relations to avert a crisis and/or counter its consequences. We define IORs as a linkage between two or more organizations that are formally independent legal entities, regardless of whether the linkage itself is based on a contract or not (Cropper et al. 2008). Existing IORs, especially if they represent such interdependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), often trigger or at least moderate crises. Hence, they may also be used for active or proactive (interorganizational-) crisis management. In most cases this requires more than the coordination of IORs in order to pursue joint objectives (Huxham and Vangen 2005; Ring and van de Ven 1994). Given this premise, our definition intentionally allows for a broad range of organizational forms including strategic alliances, joint ventures (Gulati and Singh 1998), and interorganizational networks (Provan et al. 2007). Interactions between organizations as a general means to face uncertainty represent a longstanding theme in the management literature, but it primarily addresses general questions of how to deal with interorganizational interdependencies (cf. again Fig. 1; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Provan 1982). One strand of the literature, however, concentrates on coping with crises interorganizationally in the field of public management. In particular, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have elicited a large amount of scholarly responses to the way organizations deal collaboratively with a crisis (e.g. Comfort 1988; Comfort and Kapucu 2006). These studies focus primarily upon how to restore interorganizational operations, which, as we just saw, is now sometimes addressed under the term business continuity management, and also tries to incorporate proactive measures (Herbane et al. 2004). Waugh and Streib (2006), for instance, review empirical evidence from the United States and find that the newly introduced Department of Homeland Security is problematic, as it causes severe coordination problems among agencies, despite its overarching objective to protect the public from unintended events like terrorist attacks or alleviate the subsequent suffering (Perrow 2011). Further crisis situations studied result in interagency coordination but concern disease outbreaks, where expertise from different public agencies was needed to track down the sources of the outbreaks and alleviate harm caused to the public (Moynihan 2008; Ondersteijn et al. 2006), political crises

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(e.g. Allison and Zelikow 1999) humanitarian aid (Nolte and Boenigk 2011) and natural disasters in general (auf der Heide 1989). Supply chain research is another line of inquiry in which unintended events are discussed with a focus upon interorganizational constellations, frequently referred to as supply chain disruptions (Bode et al. 2011, for an overview). The literature is usually applied more to specific empirical phenomena and specific contexts and, consequently, is more design-oriented in nature. This stream has also become quite popular since 9/11 (Brindley 2004; Paulsson 2004; Ritchie and Brindley 2007). One focus in this context concerns the ways of calculating risks ex ante and deriving conclusions in order to prepare for unintended events (Chopra and Sodhi 2004; Kleindorfer and Saad 2005; Ram and Talluri 2009; Tang 2006; Zsidisin et al. 2005. Another area of inquiry is resilience, i.e. the ability to restore the organization’s operations along the supply chain with most of the partners as quickly as possible once a disruption occurs (Blackhurst et al. 2011; Sutcliffe and Vogus 2003; Weick et al. 1999; Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). Similar to public management issues, building up redundancies, organizational control systems and cultural issues are discussed in empirical studies on what is referred to in the rather allencompassing concept “resilient supply chains” (Sheffi and Rice 2005). Management oriented contributions, especially from a BCM perspective, are sensitive by and large to interorganizational collaborations as they allow for thinking and planning collectively, at least at first sight. BCM offers an alternative and complementary perspective by specifically taking the resilience of the supply chain/network or, in more general terms, of the organization and its environment into account (Crichton et al. 2009; Sutcliffe and Vogus 2003). In BCM terminology, this results in an orientation towards value preservation and in competitive advantages through an increased “recovery advantage” (Herbane et al. 2004) Although BCM certainly does not represent a panacea for interorganizational crises in general, it appears to be the most promising perspective among current management approaches to global supply chains and production networks. Nonetheless, while this concept certainly represents an important step towards interorganizational crisis management, it should be considered with caution and only serve as basis for more interorganizational depth. In particular, BCM neglects the potentiality of IORs in general, and interorganizational networks in particular, as resources to overcome and prevent crises. The main reason for this is that BCM remains a very organization-centric perspective. ­Although it takes the risk of propagation into account, it does less (if not nothing) to prevent crises interorganizationally and more to monitor and control the network of partners.

4 Conclusions Reflecting on the insights gained from this review, we suggest that three gaps in previous research on crises and IOR merit specific attention from scholars and practitioners alike. First, most approaches of interorganizational crisis management target exclusively dyadic IORs. While this approach has resulted in some significant advances in the way

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we cope with crises, a dyadic focus limits the understanding of how complex multi-organizational arrangements, such as interorganizational networks, are and how they confront and respond to crises. Nowadays, private and public organizations, not least due to the globalization otherwise reigning, do face networked threats. With the increasing participation of organizations in so-called whole networks (Provan et al. 2007), visibility and transparency regarding the partners’ fair share of work and stability in processes diminish. In point of fact, networks differ significantly from dyadic IORs in a number of fundamental ways: in the flexibility they offer to the participating organizations, the relational dynamics organizations may build on, but also the more critical issues of power asymmetries, mutual dependencies, and overall leadership. In arrangements of three or more partners, relationships assume a different social quality and are far more ­complex to manage (Simmel 1950; Burt 1992; Müller-Seitz and Sydow 2012). One example of such a network-focused approach in practice is best illustrated by the US American Incident Command System (ICS) as reported by Moynihan (2008) in his study of animal diseases outbreaks, to which we refer in Fig. 1. Moynihan’s approach shows the necessity for practitioners to go far beyond a dyadic perspective, not only because more than two participating organizations are often liable to crises conditions (in this case: eight), but also because of the multilateral nature of their relationships, as members try to help each other by developing joint standard operating procedures, and by creating an interorganizational division of labor while pursuing joint objectives (Sydow and Windeler 2003). This brings concrete challenges: how can one construct goal consensus in face of a crisis in spite of diverging interests? Using the ICS, US public organizations developed a network memory that fostered the joint storage and retrieval of knowledge collectively gathered and utilized in the case of subsequent outbreaks. In face of this diversity in approaches, the challenge in practice remains to determine how much hierarchy is required (i.e. vertical or horizontal cooperation), how much depth should one strive for, how much shared standardized operating procedures are effective, and how to optimally integrate and exchange data and knowledge about what is going on. It appears that one good way to prepare for such questions is the use of discussion circles and the development of roadmaps during normal conditions. When these questions need to be addressed quickly during a crisis, relying on an ad hoc task force with clear operative needs seems to be more adequate. Second, most empirical research on IORs and crises relies on quantitative and ­theory-testing research focusing on whether or not a relationship exists and to what extent the partners know each other and use the relationship for knowledge exchange, for instance. Such work typically relies on large empirical datasets and samples, examining strategic alliances and networks, and then making assumptions about how the existence of IORs reduces uncertainty with regard to crises. Thus, the actual depth and extent of interorganizational connections, and the subsequent actions and activities engaged in by partners to address crises, are seldom analyzed. This has two implications for practice. First, actual networking practices remain a black box, thus diminishing the diffusion of knowledge gathered in the field by practitioners confronted with such

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situations and questions. Secondly, a large part of academic research on these issues, although addressing fundamental questions of theory, turns out to have little relevance for practice. Towards this end, we plead for more in-depth case studies covering longer periods of time. This makes it necessary to think of more effective collaboration among scholars and practitioners to advance the knowledge relevant for practice. Third, most of the studies reviewed have addressed governance related questions, with the presumption that solving governance issues will help alliances and networks to deal with the lurking threat of unforeseeable crises. In the majority of these studies, designing the most adequate contractual format is deemed to alleviate, if not prevent, problems regarding unpreparedness and a lack of sufficient knowledge, as the study by Carson and colleagues (2006) demonstrates. We submit that complementing these studies – but not substituting them – with a practice perspective (Giddens 1984; Feldman and Orlikowski 2011; Jarzabkowski 2008; Schatzki et al. 2001; Sydow et al. 2013; Whittington 2011) will help redirect the research agenda. Focusing on issues of governance obscures the fact that real processes will always bypass official agreements on centralized or decentralized governance and leadership. By contrast, we propose looking at social practices and paying attention to recurrent activities in the networks. This, however, may require more intensive collaboration between research and practice.

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