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Journal Title: Oxford handbook of positive psychology / Rev. ed.
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Article Title: Wehmeyer, m.l., Little, t.d ., and
Sergeant, j.; self-determination
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Imprint: Oxford; New York; Oxford University Pr
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C H A P T ER
33
5elf- D etermination
Michael L. Wehmeyer, Todd D. Little, and Julie Sergeant
Abstract Self-determination is a general psychological construct within the organizing structure of theories of human agency which refers to self- ('Is. other-) caused action--to people acting volitionally, based on their own will. Human agency refers to the sense of personal empowerment involving both knowing and having what it takes to achieve goals. Human agentic theories share the meta-theoretical view that organismic aspirations drive human behaviors. An organismic perspective of self-determination that views people as active contributors to, or "authors· of their behavior, where behavior is self-regulated and goal-directed. provides a compelling foundation for examining and facilitating the degree to which people become self determined and the impact of that on the pursuit of optimal human functioning and well-being. Further. an organismic approach to self-determination requires an explicit focus on the interface between the self and context. This chapter discusses the self-determination construct within an organismic perspective, surveys the construct's history and usage in philosophy and psychology, and summarizes four overarching theories of self-determination that are applicable to the field of positive psychology, as well as examining a number of complementary views of human agency as a process of self-determination. Finally, research implications based upon existing knowledge and research in self-determination and positive psychology are identified. Keywords: causal agency, human agency, self-determination. self-determination theory, volitional action
Self-Determination and Human Agency
J
Positive psychology is the pursuit of under standing optimal human fun ctionin g and we ll being. Ryan and Deci (2000a) as se rted that in thi s pursu it for understanding optimal hum an /11Oc [ioni ng and well-bein g, res earchers must take into aCCOUnt the agenti c nature of human acrion. Th is chapter introd uces self-determin ation as a general Psychological construct with in the organizing struc ~ure of rh eo ries of hum a n age ncy. Human agen cy is the sense' of person:tl empowerment, wh ich invoh~s both knowing and having wha t it takes to ach ieve one's "'oal," (Little, Haw ley, Henrich , & Mars land, 2.002, p . .390). An age ntic pe rson is the
individual ca n be a pawn
origi n of nis o r ner ac tions , nas ni gn as pirations, perseve res in tne b ee of obstacle;, sees more and va ried Optio ns tor Jetio n, lea rns fcom failures, and overal l, has
greatC[ se nSe of w ell bein g. In contrast, a non -agenti c
(0
unknown ex tra-perso nal
influence·, h as low as pirati o ns, is nindered wi tn
problem-so lving blinde rs, onen fecls nelpless and ,
ove rall , has a greater sense of ill-being.
(Link et at., 2002, p. 390 )
Human a~,_: nri c th eo ries "share tne meta- theo re ti cal vi ew that organismiC as pira tion s driv e hum an behaviors" (Little, Snyder, & Wehmeyer, 2006 , p. 61). An organismic pers pective views people a.s ac tive co ntributo rs to, or "autho rs" o f thei r behavior, whe re behavior is described as self-regulated and goal -directed "acrion. " Unlike stim ulus- response acco unts of behavior, actions are defined a.s purpo si ve and self-initi ated activities (8 ran dtstadter, 1998; C hapm an, 1984 ; Ha rter, 1999). fu outlined by Li ttle et aJ. (2 006) , human agemi c action s are
357
1. motivated by biological and psychological needs (Oeci & Ryan, 2002; Hawley, 1999; Hawley & Little, 2002; Litrle et al., 2002); 2. directed roward self-regulated goals that service shon- and long-term biological and psychological needs; 3. propelled by undersrandings of links among agems, means, and ends (Chapman, 1984; Lirtle, 1998; Skinner, 1995, 1996), and guided by general action-conuol behaviors mat email self-chosen forms and functions (Lirtle; Lopez, & Wanner, 2001; Skinner & Edge, 2002; VanJede, Lirtle, & Card, 2006); 4. mose mat precipirate self-determined governance of behavior and developmem, which can be characterized as hope-related individual diKerences; 5. uiggered, executed, and evaluated in conrexts that provide suppons and opporrunities, as well as hindrances and impedimems ro goal pursuit. Furrher, an organismic approach ro self-determina tion requires an explicit focus on me inrerface between me self and conrext (Little et al., 2002). Organisms influence and are influenced by the con texts in which they live and develop. Through this person-conrext inreraction people become agenrs of meir own action.
Self-Determination in Philosophy J.I
The construct's origins lie in philosophy and discourse about me docrrines of "determinism" and "free will." Oeterminism is me philosophical doc trine positing mat evenrs, such as human behavior, are effects of preceding causes. John Locke (1690) provided a synopsis of me "free will problem": this proposition "men can derermine rhemselves" is drawn in or inferred from this, "mar mey shall be punished in rhe orner world." For here me mind, seeing me connexion [sic] mere is between me idea of men's punishment in the orner world and me idea of God punishing; between God punishing and me justice of the punishment; between jusrice of punishment and guilr; between guilt and a power [0 do omerwise; between a power (0 do ornetwise and freedom; and between freedom and self-derermination, sees the connexion [sic] between men and self-derermination. Locke was a soft determinist; that is, someone who saw both causality and volition or will at work in human behavior. According ro Locke, the human mind has me "active" power of beginning or ceasing its own operations as activated by a preference. The exercise of mat power is volition or will. Freedom or liberty is "the power ro act on our
358
SELF-DETERMINATION
volition, whatever it may be, without any external compulsion or resrraint" (Locke, 1690). Human beings act freely insofar as they are capable of translating their menral preferences imo actual per formance of the action in question (Kemerling, 2000-2001). Freedom is conceptualized as me human capacity ro act (or not) as we choose or prefer, wimout any external compulsion or resrrainr. Locke's pwposals about the causes of human action as bom caused and volitional are imporrant ro an organismic meory of self-determination, as is his soft deterministic distinction mat it is the "agent" (the person) who is free ro act, not the action itself (since it is "caused" by perception or sensation).
Self-Determination in Personality Psychology In Founddtions for a science ofpersonality (1941), Angyal proposed mat an essenrial feature of a living organism is its auronomy, where auronomous means self-governing or governed from inside. According ro Angyal, an organism "lives in a world in which mings happen according ro laws which are heteronomous (e.g., governed from outside) from the poinr of view of me organism" (p. 33), and mat "organisms are subjected ro the laws of me physical world, as is any other object of nature, with me exception that it can oppose self-determination ro external determination" (p. 33). Angyal (1941) suggested that me "science of personality" is me srudy of two essential determinants ro human behavior: auronomous determinism (self~ determination) and heteronomous determinism (omer-determined). Angyal placed primary importance for laying me foundation for a science of personality in me faCt mat a cenrral process of an organism is the movemenr roward auronomous determination, noting mat "wimout autonomy, wimout self-governmenr, the life process could nor be undersrood" (p. 34). Funher, An gyal ,s (1941) use of the term moved away from the hard determinism mat dominated psychology, led by Skinner and operant psycholo gists, roward a soft determinism that considered the imporrance ofbom acror and conrex[. This trend has conrinued in effons ro explain human agency, as evidenced by Bandura's (1997) discussion con cerning determinism and human agency: When viewed from a sociocognitive perspective, mere is no incompatibility between freedom and determinism. Freedom is nor conceived negatively as exemption froJJl social influences or situational constraints. Ramer ir is defined positively as the exercise of self-influence to bring about desired resu.lts. (p. 7)
Self-determinati( refers ro self- (vs. ( people acting volir Volition is me capal and "intention" (C men, implies inrem tional, intentional, ;
Theories of Self Self-Determinat. The most visib tion as a psychol( determination thec proposed ro explail vioral self-regulatic innate and envir. social contexts (R: basis in various su~ Oeci, 2002), SOT tendencies, social ( human action ro ill one's basic needs ; agency that, ultima SOT proposed t competence, auton either supponed 0 (see Little et al., mese psychological based biological ne( ming from SOT I environment create these psychological The conrext also extrinsic motivarort conscious or unCOl views me process 0 tional function ma viors and serves as . the sense of self (Ry Early work on S COntexts in supp' motivation and fo autonomy and cor ciated with intrinsic motivated behaviort more likely ro integr when the social con petence, and relate Recent SOT researc between implicit/e unconscious) and (R.Yan & Oeci, 200,
any external 10) . Human capable of ) actual per (Kemerling, ized as the 'e choose or lor restraint. s of human re important ination, as is .s the "agent" : action itself nsation).
.Psychology !ality (1941), .re of a living >mousmeans According to which things eteronomous the point of It "organisms cal world, as he exception \ to external "science of determinants minism (self determinism ry irn porrance .personality in ganism is the nation,noting verrunenr, the
.34). !
term moved
at dominated
ant psycholo onsidered the fhis trend has an agency, as ;cussion cy:
Self-determination, as a psychological consuucr, refers to self- (vs. other-) caused action-it refers to people acting volitionally, based on their own will. Volition is the capability ofconscious choice, decision, and "intention" (Gove, 1967). Volitional behavior, then, implies intent. Self-determined behavior is voli tional, intentional, and self-caused or self-initiated.
Theories of Self-Determination Self-Determination Theory The most visible application of self-determina tion as a psychological construct has been "self determination theory" (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 2002), proposed to explain facets of personality and beha vioral self-regulation through interactions between innate and environmental determinants within social contexts (Ryan & Deci, 2000a). With its basis in various sub theories (for details see Ryan & Deci, 2002), SDT brings together innate human tendencies, social contexts, and the motivarors for human action to illustrate how congruence between one's basic needs and core values spur individual agency that, ultimately, results in overall well-being. SDT proposed three basic psychological needs competence, autonomy, and relatedness-that are either supported or challenged by social contexts (see Little et al., 2002, for a discussion of how these psychological needs mesh with evolutionary based biological needs). Much of the research stem ming from SDT has focused on ways the social environment creates barriers to the integration of these psychological needs (Ryan & Deci, 2002). The context also contributes to intrinsic and extrinsic motivators that are self-regulated at either conscious or unconscious levels. This perspective views the process of self-regulation as an organiza tional function that "coordinates" systemic beha viors and serves as a foundation for autonomy and the sense of self (Ryan & Deci, 2004) . Early work on SDT focused on the role of social COntexts in supporting or thwarting intrinsic motivation and found that conditions fostering autonomy and competence were positively asso ciated with intrinsic motivation. When extrinsically motivated behaviors were acted on, individuals were mOre likely to integrate the behavior with core values when the social context supported autonomy, com petence, and relatedness (Ryan & Deci, 2000a). ~ecent SDT research has examined the relationship etween implicit/explicit motives (conscious or unconscious) and intrinsic/extrinsic motivation (RYan & Deci, 2004).
As noted, three basic psychological needs (i.e., autonomy, competence, and relatedness) are the driving forces in SDT. SatisfYing these needs enhance well-being and contribute to the efficacy of other model components (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Within SDT, autonomous actions express integrity and are based on one's core or "higher-order values" (Ryan & Deci, 2004). Sometimes, outside influences (e.g., social context) force values to conflict and a choice must be made that reflects the true self. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation plays a role here and these moti vators are not simply polar opposites (see Walls & Lirrle, 2005). Instead, the rationale and outcome of negotiating and integrating the demands of intrinsic and extrinsic sources of motivation determines the autonomy of an action (Ryan & Deci, 2004). Thus, an autonomous action is one in which the rationale behind an action response (behavior) to an extrinsic pressure reflectS one's core values. Research stemming from SDT has identified conditions that facilitate autonomy and the effect of autonomy on daily func tioning and daily life experiences. For example, Sheldon, Ryan, Deci, and Kasser (2004) demon strated that autonomous motives (e.g., personal ide~ ti6cation and enjoyment) and controlled motives (e.g., external rewards and guilt) were associated with higher and lower levels of well-being, respectively. In SDT, the inherent psychological need for com petence refers to the motivation to be effective within environments, which, in rum, stems from the theory of effectence motivation that describes an innate drive for environmental mastery (Deci & Ryan, 2000; White, 1959). This drive leads to behavioral responses that sustain and augment individual cap abilities (Ryan & Deci, 2002). The psychological need for relatedness is the sense of connectedness and belonging with others. This sense is distinct from the status of role identification or group membership, as the focus is on personal perceptions of relatedness instead of goal outcomes (Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan, 2000) . Variously, competence, relatedness, and autonomy needs may complement each other, or they may conflict (Deci & Ryan, 2000) . More information on SDT research and instruments to assess it can be found at http://www.psych.rochester.edu/SDT/index.html and http://www.agencylab.ku .edu.
Functional Self-Determination Theory Wehmeyer and colleagues (Wehmeyer, 1996, 2001, 2005) proposed a functional theory of self determination (fSDT), in which self-determination is conceptualized as a dispositional characteristic that is WEHMEYER, LITTLE, AND SERGEANT
359
A functional model 01 self-determination
Environment
Development
..,>--- - Experience
Learnin a-- -- ·.
Fig. 33.1
WehmeyCf', fu ncrio nJ! model of sdC·dc.ermina[ion.
based on me "h.mctioo a behavior serves [or rhe individual (Figure 33.1). Self-derermined beflavior refc [~ ro "volirional aerions mar enable one [0 acr as rhe primary causal agenc in one's life and [0 mainr.
