Byzantine history, like all of ancient history, as part of Classical ... ofthe Roman Empire, thought Byzantium rep- ..... ual activities, which under Byzantine law were.
Late Ancient and Byzantine History Today Warren Treadgold
Historically Speaking, Volume 3, Number 4, April 2002, pp. 20-22 (Article)
Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: 10.1353/hsp.2002.0051
For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hsp/summary/v003/3.4.treadgold.html
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20
Historically Speaking
April 2002
Warren Treadgold Late Ancient and Byzantine History Today
round 1970, when I entered graduate school, my chosen subject oflate ancient and Byzantine history
tium and Its Neighbours," which gave more space to the empire's relations with other cul-
seemed to have a bright future. Though the
as Brown referred to religion, it was something vaguely New Age that he called "the holy." His work won acclaim chiefly from historians outside the field, who found its depic-
tion ofLate Antiquity intriguing even ifthey
universities and even some smaller ones had
which was thematic rather than chronological. Both works showed a growing tendency to go beyond political history and literary sources.
Byzantine historians. Harvard's opulently
higher education ended. At first Byzantium
?
field had traditionally been strongest in Britain, by then nearly all major American
endowed Center for Byzantine Studies at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, D.C., had a half-dozen research professors and sponsored several archeological projects and many
publications. The standard history, the revised German edition ofGeorge Ostrogorsky's His-
tory ofthe Byzantine State, appeared in Eng-
lish translation in 1969, and important books in English were published every year. Particularly notable were two massive British projects (each over 1500 pages): A. H. M.Jones's The Later Roman Empire, 284-602: A Social, Economic, andAdministrative Survey (1964) and a new Byzantine volume of the Cambridge Medieval History by a team of British, American, and other historians (1966-67).
tures than to its internal history, and a part on "Government, Church, and Civilization,"
But around 1970 the boom in American
and Late Antiquity seemed to be keeping thenshare of the reduced job market, perhaps because they linked ancient, medieval, Muslim, and Slavic history, any ofwhich a Byzan-
tinist might teach. On the other hand, aca-
demic fashions were turning against Classical
. . . neglect ofthe
ment was then about a twentieth of the uni-
versity's billion-dollar total. According to wellinformed reports, the Harvard administration wanted to invoke an escape clause in the original donors' will, which would allow Harvard to use the endowment as it saw fit and in par-
ticular to move the Byzantine Center to Cam-
bridge. After partial disclosure of this plan attracted adverse publicity, the newly named
sics and an unwilling-
there had never been such a plan. But he soon
ness to take Christian
beliefs seriously have
Ages, was after all just the Eastern Roman Empire under a modern name (the Byzantines always called themselves Romans), and
understanding Western
become obstacles to civilization . . . .
its rulers spoke first Latin and then Greek.
director of Dumbarton Oaks, the Harvard medievalist Giles Constable, declared that
stopped using the name of the Center for Byzantine Studies, abolished its by now depleted faculty, and ended its archeological program. Constable, whose own specialty was French monasticism, advocated a compara-
tive approach that would stress Byzantium's similarities to medieval Western Europe and Islam.
Soon afterward the academic popularity
of Byzantine history began to wane, as meas-
ured by positions retained or created in Amer-
Most late ancient and Byzantine historians still admired Edward Gibbon's Decline and Fall
studies as traditionalist and elitist, and that
ofthe Roman Empire, thought Byzantium rep-
could only be bad for the study ofByzantium. Meanwhile, however, the fashionability of
resented a decline from the early empire in
changes at Dumbarton Oaks, whose endow-
Greek and Latin Clas-
At that time most scholars still thought of Byzantine history, like all ofancient history, as part of Classical studies. The Byzantine
Empire, though it lasted through the Middle
rejected poststructuraÜsm in their own scholarship. In 1977, Brown became a professor at Berkeley, where his popularity increased. Also in 1977, Harvard made some major
ican universities. Byzantinists departed without being replaced at Yale, Stanford, Columbia, UCLA, Indiana, North Carolina,
Texas, and elsewhere. Eventually no major American university had a full-time, senior
many respects, and mainly wrote political history based on literary sources. Such was Ostrogorsky's excellent History, originally prepared in 1940 as a volume ofa Classical hand-
Late Antiquity, and with it the earlier part of Byzantine history, found a champion in the Byzantine historian training graduate stu-
Yet the field was developing. Jones's subject was how the later Roman Empire's soci-
versities, but only one of these resulted in a
book.
British historian Peter Brown, who applied the poststructuralism of Michel Foucault to
Late Antiquity. According to Brown, people in Late Antiquity cared most about power, sexuality, and rhetoric, and not really (as previ-
ety, economy, and institutions functioned, and
ously believed) God, morality, and chariot racing. Brown attached far more importance than
tions, letters, papyri, or inscriptions than his-
earlier historians to living holy men (not dead saints), whom he saw as combining the roles
his sources were more often saints' lives, ora-
torical texts. The Cambridge MedievalHistory volume was divided into a part on "Byzan-
of politician, psychiatrist, and guru. Insofar
dents. Dumbarton Oaks sponsored some joint appointments combining research fellowships with assistant professorships at different unipermanent appointment in Byzantine history (at Rutgers). Several of the most promising junior Byzantinists left academics. Late Antiquity did little better, except for a few students of Peter Brown (who moved to Princeton).
Byzantine studies suffered particularly from
April 2002
the signal sent by Harvard's treatment of Dumbarton Oaks. The new subsidized positions seem to have reinforced impressions of a sick institution and a failing field, especially because Dumbarton Oaks avoided any commitments that cost much money or lasted more than a few years. Efforts by some historians, especially desperate ones seeking jobs, to follow either the postmodernism ofBrown or the comparative approach promoted by Constable had, at best, mixed success. Brown's combination ofa sense for academic fashion with a selective use of
the sources proved hard to imitate or to expand upon. Much of what Brown wrote would have been sharply criticized as unfounded or erroneous ifpublished by anyone with less prestige. The trouble with the
comparative approach was that most of Byzantium's supposed similarities to the West and Islam turned out to be superficial. The fact that Roman rule and Greek culture sur-
vived in Byzantium but not in Western or Muslim lands made Byzantine society profoundly different from both. In the end, the comparative approach dissociated Byzantium from ancient history without securing its place in medieval history.
Probably the most favorable development
in American Byzantine studies at this time was the arrival of the productive and perceptive Russian Byzantinist Alexander Kazhdan, who in 1978 took a position at Dumbarton Oaks without faculty rank or administrative authority. Though the books he published in America were all co-authored (one with Consta-
ble), his collaborators served mainly to help
him with his English. Finding comparisons of Byzantium with Antiquity dangerous
because they tended to imply that Byzantium was decadent, Kazhdan avoided them by arguing that the Arab and Slavic invasions of the 7th century had essentially destroyed the continuity of the empire, making way for a new society and culture. Kazhdan had little interest in Peter Brown's work, or in comparisons of Byzantium to the West or Islam. His main interest was the large and largely unfinished business of learning about Byzantium itself. Kazhdan's great monument is the threevolume Oxford Dictionary ofByzantium (1 991). While many scholars contributed to it, Kazhdan planned it in detail, wrote a large share of its articles, and edited, revised, or rewrote
many of the others. The Dictionary reflects his vision and shows his strengths. Without
paying much attention to problems ofcontinuity or decline, it illustrates Byzantine cultural ingenuity and social resilience, and catalogues and explains the insights and discoveries of Kazhdan's lifetime of research
on Byzantium. Without distorting the evi-
dence, it makes Byzantium look interesting and Byzantine studies look vigorous, though the vigor was mostly Kazhdan's. Kazhdan died suddenly in 1997, leaving unfinished a History ofByzantine Literature that is as illuminating a collection of information as the Dic-
tionary, ifalmost as episodic. Though his ideas have been influential, they provide little overall framework for Byzantine history, and even suggest that none may be applicable. Meanwhile publication of scholarship in late ancient and Byzantine history has continued, largely without reference to post-
modernism, comparative approaches, or any overarching interpretive frameworks. Much of it, especially on the European continent, consists of editing, translating, and commenting on texts and creating research tools like catalogues and prosopographies. This specialized work is often well done, and seldom distorted by scholarly fashions. However, it seems always to be preparing for more general work that, ifit ever comes, is liable to be overwhelmed by more tools and information than it can use. Therefore, for better or
worse, a fairly small group ofBritish, Ameri-
can, and German historians are chiefly responsible for the scholarship that shapes current conceptions of Byzantine history. The largest part of it has been on Late
Antiquity, the period from about 300 to 600
A.D. that may also be called early Byzantine. Some outstanding studies have been published, notably by Ramsay MacMullen and Roger Bagnali in America, Alan Cameron and John Matthews first in Britain and then in
America, and Timothy Barnes in Canada.
These and other historians have built upon the work ofA. H. M.Jones (who died in 1970) to provide a detailed and rounded picture of late Roman cities, government, culture, religion, and society in general. Yet most oftheir work has more or less ignored private behavior and beliefs, while Brown and his disciples
have more or less ignored everything else. The division has been unhealthy for both sides, because it permits Brown's views to
stand as an unquestioned orthodoxy in their own sphere and prevents a full understanding of late ancient Christianity, which was
»
Historically Speaking21
more than just a matter of power or psychiatry.
The middle Byzantine period, from about 600 to about 1000, has developed another orthodoxy that often goes unchallenged, this time a Marxist one. Its main proponents are Paul Speck and Ralph-Johannes LiUe in Germany, John Haldon in Britain, and their stu-
dents. It begins not with a misreading of the sources but with a radical distrust of them—
as Speck once remarked to me, "They all lie!" At its best, this attitude leads to criticizing sources that are clearly tendentious. At its worst, it leads to dismissing sources simply
because they fail to fit such ideological pre-
conceptions as skepticism about religious motives, minimization of the importance of individuals in history, or emphasis on the role of the state.
Haldon, in particular, argues that Byzantium survived the 7th-century invasions by increasing state control. Yet any coherent reading of the sources shows that the state, having lost the greater part of its productive land to the Arabs and Slavs, was forced to
reduce its control, notably by giving its soldiers state land to replace most of their pay. Haldon can avoid this conclusion only by assuming that the army was much smaller than all the sources indicate. His work, like
Peter Brown's, has won acceptance from some
scholars who seem unaware of how much it
depends on an ideology they do not share. For example, the British historian Mark
Whittow has used Haldon's criticism of the
sources for a large army to argue that the Byzantine state was small and disorganized,
though Haldon's reason for disregarding the sources was to show that the state was large
and powerful. The next Byzantine period, from about 1000 to 1200, has attracted a good deal of interest recently. Traditionally historians had seen this as a period of inexorable decline
leading up to the empire's crushing defeats by the Seljuk Turks in 107 1 and the Fourth Cru-
sade in 1204. Kazhdan and others, notably Michael Angold and Paul Magdalino in Britain, have instead stressed the growing strength ofthe empire's economy and culture
throughout the period. Yet, apparently out of reluctance to consider evidence ofByzantine
weaknesses that imply at least political decline,
they give no clear explanation of why this thriving state lost to the Turks and Crusaders. During the final period of Byzantine his-
22
Historically Speaking
·
April 2002
Michel Foucault, especially for his homosexual activities, which under Byzantine law were punishable by castration in the 6th century and execution in the 8th century. Another leading generalist is the British Byzantinist Michael Hendy, whose lengthy Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy (1985) has been more often praised than read and used. It makes a practically conclusive case that the empire's survival in the 7th century came about through a deliberate reduc-
and not particularly favorable, though I was heartened by how few errors the reviewers
ica has led many scholars to follow academic
Nevertheless, if one follows the reigning fashions, late ancient and Byzantine history looks something like this: a period of poststructuralist holy men from 300 to 600, a period of Marxist social forces from 600 to 1000, an economic and cultural golden age
. . . thefragmentation ofAmerican higher education seems to have gone sofar as to provoke a longingfor
1204, then a decline down to 1453. AU this
more coherence . . . .
Western civilization, whether premodern or modern. What happened to Dumbarton Oaks, though even more specific to Byzan-
tinuity" in Byzantine history, and seems to
tine studies, is a far from uncommon exam-
justify his lack ofenthusiasm for any general
tion ofthe role ofgovernment, though by premodern standards Byzantium continued to be
narrative history of Byzantium. Yet even Kazhdan was bothered by the combination of
an organized state. Hendy was the first to
demonstrate, in an article in 1970, that the
tory, up to the fall ofConstantinople in 1453, the political (though not cultural) decadence of the empire became so obvious that no one
feels able to deny it. Perhaps not by coincidence, the period is the subject ofthat rarity in Byzantine studies, a satisfactory comprehensive history, the British historian Donald Nicol's The Last Centuries ofByzantium (rev. ed., 1993). Ofcourse, a number of historians
have done important work on subjects not directly embroiled in the scholarly controversies mentioned here. Examples in America are Clive Foss's studies of Byzantine cities and forts, Mark Bartusis' work on the late
Byzantine army, andJohn Nesbitt's catalogues ofthe Byzantine seals at Dumbarton Oaks.
from 1000 cut short by inexplicable defeat in
fits passably with Kazhdan's ideas of"discon-
some ofthese discordant elements, and a few others have tried to make a little more sense out of the whole.
Byzantine economy was thriving in the 1 1th and 12th centuries, and long before. But he realized that the state often failed to tap the
The best alternative to Peter Brown's
strength of the economy, so that the state
views is in the work of Cyril Mango, who moved in the opposite direction from Brown,
could go bankrupt while its subjects grew rich.
from America (Dumbarton Oaks) to Britain
(Oxford). The index of Mango's Byzantium:
The Empire ofNew Rome (1980) lacks entries
for such subjects as "holy man," "oratory,"
"body," or "sexuality," which Brown considers vital but Mango finds of little significance in Byzantine civilization. Mango's Byzantines
are much the same from Late Antiquity to
1453: conservative, religious, puritanical, and
Hendys book, though long, was meant only as a preliminary study for a full history of the Byzantine economy, which remains to be written and is much needed.
In my own History ofthe Byzantine State and Society (1997), I tried to tie up some ofthe
suggests that the academic job crisis in Amer-
fashions that are irrelevant to their fields, to
become apologists for their subjects to the point of distortion, and to concentrate on selected topics that sound interesting at the expense of a coherent larger picture. Somewhat more specifically to Byzantine studies,
neglect ofthe Greek and Latin Classics and an unwillingness to take Christian beliefs seri-
ouslyhave become obstacles to understanding
ple ofwhat happens whenuniversities think of themselves as businesses managing resources, not communities dedicated to scholarship. Are there any positive signs? At least in
the study of Byzantium and Late Antiquity,
academic feds do seem to have become some-
what less popular as they lead to intellectual
dead ends. Harvard appears to have got little
good out of gutting Dumbarton Oaks, now mostly deserted except for underemployed librarians and visiting European scholars. Recently the job market in late ancient and Byzantine studies has improved slightly, as some universities have found that Antiquity,
dreaded phenomenon ofdecline, and tried to consider both social and political historywith-
ence, which in turn may attract more attention both to the Classics and Christianity and to Late Antiquity and Byzantium.
most people in predominantly agricultural
declining economically in the 7th century but
proved of sex, preferred dead saints to living holy men, and found formal oratory incomprehensible. They would have detested
seems still to be waiting for a postmodern, Marxist comparativist who believes in discontinuity but not decline. What wider issues can the fate of Byzantine and late ancient history during the last thirty years illuminate? In the widest sense, it
the Middle Ages, Islam, and modern Eastern Europe are hard to study apart from Late Antiquity and Byzantium, which join them all together. Finally, die fragmentation ofAmerican higher education seems to have gone so fer as to provoke a longing for more coher-
main secondary literature. I discussed Byzantine weaknesses, even those that imply the
and illiterate societies everywhere. But it is worth noting that most Byzantines disap-
I disagreed with the secondary literature, especially that written by the reviewers. The field
remaining loose ends. I relied on Mango and Hendy, and often on Kazhdan, but, as I have already suggested, no one could write a coherent general history while following all the
inward-looking. Unlike Kazhdan and many others, Mango sees no reason to deny that Byzantium declined. He may overemphasize the Byzantines' backwardness, because what he says of most Byzantines was equally true of most ancient Greeks and Romans, and
found. The most common criticism was that
out confusing the two. Thus I saw no contradiction in concluding that Byzantium was
was rescued by competent administration, or
that Byzantium was expanding economically in the 11th and 12 th centuries but was
wrecked by incompetent administration.
Reviews ofmy book have been relatively few
Warren Treadgold isprofessor oflateAncient
and Byzantine history at Saint Louis University and the author ofseveral books on Byzantine history and literature.
