Lateranum 70 (2004): 313-52

1 downloads 0 Views 1MB Size Report
dualist framework in which a heavenly realm of light confronts an earthly realm of ... The evolution of Bultmann 's interpretation of john and Gnosticism. 315.
Lateranum 70 (2004): 313-52.

THE EVOLUTION OF BULTMANN'S INTERPRETATION OF JOHN AND GNOSTICISM Michael Waldstein

Bultmann's reading of John has a dramatic historyl. It begins with a reading quite close to Kasemann's in agreement with the History of Religions School and ends in a radically existentialist interpretation. The present essay offers a historical critical account of this evolution and raises the question of its "Sitz im Leben" or lifesetting. Following Bultmann's own exegetical technique according to which the Gospel materials about Jesus reflect the life of the early community rather than the life of Jesus, the essay considers Bultmann's reading of John as reflecting the concerns of late Nineteenth and early Twentieth century German culture rather than those of the Gospel of John 2 •

1. Ear!J Perspectives In one of his first contributions to Johannine studies, Bultmann gives a favorable review of the work of Gillis P. Wetter, a member of the "History-of-Religions School" 3 • Wetter argues that John must be 1 The present paper is conceived as a tandem piece to my critique of Hans Jonas's understanding of Gnosticism. See M. WALDSTEIN, Hans Jonas' Construct 'Gnosticism': Ana!Jsis and Critique, in journal o/ Ear!J Christian Studies 8 (2000) 341-372. Bultmann agrees in large measure with Jonas's interpretation of Gnosticism and is thus subject to the same critique. 2 A profound reading of Bultmann's John commentary is offered by Wolfgang Nethofel, Strukturen existentialer Interpretation: Bultmanns Johanneskommentar im Wechsel theologischer Paradigmen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Gottingen 1983. Neth6fel is excellent in bringing out the deep principles of Bultmann's late reading of John. He does not, however, offer an account of the evolution of Bultmann's reading. Other literature: W. VAUGHAN, Destructive Retrieval o/ John, in Encounter 60 (1999) 519-49. J. PAINTER, Inclined to God: The Quest for Eternal lift: Bultmannian Hermeneutics and the Theology o/ the Fourth Gospel in Exploring the Gospel rif'John,John Knox, Louisville, Westminster 1996,34668. M. TuRNER, Atonement and the Death o/Jesus in john: Some Questions to Bultmann and Forestell, in Evangelical-Quarter!; 62 (1990) 99-122. J. PAINTER, Theology as Hermeneutics: Rudolf Bultmann's Interpretation o/ the History o/Jesus, Almond Press, Sheffield 1987. 3 R. BULTMANN, Neues Testament: Biblische Theologie, in ThR 19 (1916) 113-126. Among the work reviewed in this article is Gillis P. WETTER, Die "Verherrlichung" im Johannesevangelium, Beitrage zur Religionswissenschaft 2/1, Leipzig, Hinrichs 1915, 32-113. On Wetter, see H. KoESTER, The History-of-Religions Schoo4 Gnosis and Gospel rif'John, in StTh 40 (1986) 115-136; here 116.

314

Michael Waldstein

read as a specimen of "hellenistic mystery piety (hellenistische A{ysterienfriimmigkeif) " 4• This piety, Bultmann agrees, is built on a dualist framework in which a heavenly realm of light confronts an earthly realm of darkness. Divine powers emanate from the realm of light and help to draw human beings up to their salvation or divinization. These powers are to be understood "quite realistically" as quasi substances; "a reinterpretation in spiritual or symbolic terms is not permissible" 5• Persons especially gifted with such powers are theioi anthropoi. Even less spectacular humans, however, can gain access to the divine realm through "the sacramental actions of the mysteries " 6 • Although Bultmann disagrees with Wetter's hypothesis of a specifically Johannine mystery cult reflected in John 12 in which the passage of the divine man Jesus through death· to the sphere of light was re-enacted, he agrees, with a positive reference to Bousset, that "the mystical piety of the Gospel of John is only possible as cultic piety" 7 • In accordance with this piety, the Johannine Jesus is "a man furnished with divine powers, theios anthropos, like the savior figures of Hellenism" 8 • Of course, there is also "a difference between the Johannine Jesus and those figures, and in general between Johannine and hellenistic piety", and Wetter, Bultmann applauds, presents the difference "clearly and in general correctly". "Characteristic for the Gospel of John is the influence of the concept of a personal God, the presence of ethical aspects, the linking of religious mysticism with orthodox faith, the importance of the historical person of Jesus and his uniqueness in the faith of the community. Much remains in common, however. In] ohannine piety as in Hellenism, the goal is the divinization of human beings through supernatural powers which have been brought by the redeemer and which are appropriated in the Christian sacraments" 9• R.BuLTMANN, Biblische Theologie, 124. R. BuLTMANN, Biblische Theologie, 123. Note that Bultmann's later existential reading of John involves precisely such a reinterpretation. 6 R. BuLTMANN, Biblische Theologie, 123. 7 R. BuLTMANN, Biblische Theologie, 125. The Bousset reference is to Kyrios Christos: Geschichte des Christusglaubens von denAnfiingen des Christentums bis Irenaeus, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Gottingen 1913, 190; ET: Kyrios Christos: A History ofthe Beliefin Christ from the Beginnings of Christianity to Irenaeus, Abingdon, Nashville 1970, 215. Note that cultic elements are almost completely suppressed in Bultmann's later interpretation. 8 R. BuLTMANN, Biblische Theologie, 126. Note that Bultmann later rejects an interpretation of the Johannine Jesus as a "divine man". 9 R. BuLTMANN, Biblische Theologie, 126. 4

5

The evolution

of Bultmann 's interpretation ofjohn and Gnosticism

315

It is difficult to imagine a greater distance from Bultmann's later existential interpretation of John in which virtually the only point left from both the negative and the positive side of this comparison is the uniqueness of Jesus in the faith of the community~

2. The First .$ynthesis Bultmann soon abandoned this reading of John. Two major factors were involved in this shift: the Gnostic redeemer myth hypothesis of the History of Religions School, and the concerns of dialectic theology10 • Between 1923 and 1925 Bultmann brought these factors together into a closely reasoned synthesis which provides the framework for all his further work on John. The new synthesis can first be observed in the essay, "The Importance of the Newly Discovered Mandean and Manichean Texts for Understanding the Gospel of John" 11 • (a) The Enigma of john: the essay begins by arguing that John's position in the history of early Christianity is still an enigma. "The gospel of John belongs neither to Palestinian Christianity, as attested by the Synoptics, nor to Hellenistic Christianity of the type of the Pauline communities, or of the type of Jewish-Hellenistic Christianity as attested by Clement, Hermas, Hebrews and Barnabas"12 •

John's distance from Hellenistic Christianity in particular is clear "in the absence of the kyrios title and any specifically cultic piety", 1°For an account of these shifts, see R. BULTMANN, Das Johannesevangelium in der neuesten Forschung, in Christliche Welt 41 (1927) 502-511, here 505 where Bultmann states that he adopted the Primal Man hypothesis between 1923 and 1925; and 510-511 where he expresses the emerging theological concerns not yet perceptible in the Wetter review. 11 Die Bedeutung der neuerschlossenen mandiiischen und manichiiischen Que/len for das V erstiindnis des johannesevangeliums, im ZNW 24 (1925) 100-146; reprinted in E. DINKLER (ed.), Exegetica, Mohr-Siebeck, Tiibingen 1967, 55-104. For a partial English translation see W. G. KCrMMEL, The New Testament: The History of the Investigation of its Problems, trans. S. MacLean Gilmour and Howard C. Kee, SCM, London 1970, 350-354; for a summary and analysis from a slightly different perspective than the one offered here see Meeks, The Prophet-King, 6-12. "Bedeutung der Quellen" is based on a lecture given in 1923. 1923 is also the year in which Heidegger joined Bultmann on the Marburg faculty. See the report in one of Bultmann's letters written in December of 1923, Bultmann Lemke, "Bultmann's Papers", in Bultmann, (ed. E. HoBBS (ed.), Retrospect and Prospect: The Centenary ~mposium at WeUes0, Fortress, Philadelphia 1985, 3-12; here 9-10. Heidegger's influence on Bultmann should not be exaggerated. "Bedeutung der Quellen" shows that the outlines ofBultmann's theological and exegetical synthesis were complete before Heidegger came on the scene. 12 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 56.

An*

316

Michael Waldstein

though it must be admitted that John still has "esteem for the sacraments " 13 • "Gnostic piety" is also not an appropriate classification, although Johannine christology "comes dangerously close to gnostic docetism" 14• Equally unresolved and enigmatic, Bultmann claims, is the basic point of Johannine theology. One thing, at least, is clear: John's basic point must lie in the idea that Jesus is the revealer sent from the Father. I want to draw special attention to this statement, because it locates the theme of mission squarely at the core of Johannine theology. "What is his Oohn's) central view, his basic conception (zentrale Anschauun& Gmndkonzeption)? Without doubt it must lie in the assertion which is repeated again and again that Jesus is the one sent from the Father (e.g. 17,3.23.25) who brings revelation through words and works" 15 •

However, the insight that the mission of Jesus as revealer is central, Bultmann argues, does not completely resolve the enigma of Johannine theology. For John is not interested in the revelation of anthropological, cosmological, or theological mysteries. If one asks what Jesus reveals, no satisfactory answer can be found. "(W)hat does the Jesus of the Gospel of John really reveal? In various versions only one thing: that he has been sent as the revealer. He reveals nothing which could be understood as a revelation" 16 •

Jesus does not even primarily reveal his own person. John does not give an image of his religious and moral personality. It must be admitted that he describes Jesus as a divine being in human form. "True, Jesus is largely the divine man (theios anthropos), omniscient and in possession of miraculous power. He is more, he is 'a divine being which majestically strides accross the earth like a stranger (ein gb'ttliches Wesen, das wie ein Fremder mqjestiitisch iiber die Erde dahini}eh!)"' 17 • 13 R. BULTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 56. Cf. 57: "despite all analogies, the Gospel of John cannot be taken as a representative of hellenistic mystery piety". Note that the shift away from the Wetter review of 1916 is not complete. The sacraments still play an important role. In his final synthesis Bultmann eliminates this remnant. 14 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 56. Note the surprising similarity with Klisemann's remarks on John's "naive docetism". E. KASEMANN, ]esu le~ifer Wtlle nach Johannes 17, Mohr-Siebeck, Tiibingen 197P, 61-62. ET: E. KAsEMANN, The Testamento/ Jesus: A Stucfy o/ the Gospel o/john. 15 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 57. 16 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 57. 17 R. BULTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 57. Bultmann is quoting from W. WREDE, Vorlrage und Studien (1907) 207. Cf. "he is the Son of God who walks over the earth (der

The evolution

of Bultmann's interpretation ofJohn and Gnosticism

317

Yet, despite John's stress on the divinity ofJesus, one cannot say that even this divinity is the true object of revelation. "All the miraculous and divine which appears in Jesus' life is obviously a mere means to an end. Granted, Jesus' humanity 'is merely the transparent medium (das Transparenl) for letting the divine light shine through on earth' (Wrede, ibid.) -if only one could say what it is that shines through. In fact, however, what is really transparent (das Transparenl) is not the humanity, but precisely the divinity of the Johannine Jesus. For, the divine which becomes visible in him is apparently not the true object of revelation" 18 •

Although Bultmann does not develop this point, and drops it in his later interpretation of John, I would like to draw special attention to it. It is, I believe, a crucial insight which can play a key role in deciphering the J ohannine christology: if the J ohannine Jesus is centrally described as the one sent,. then everything about him, including his divinity, is not an endpoint; if is transparent and points to something further. The question is: To what? In the remainder of the article, Bultmann proposes a resolution of the enigma of John in two closely intertwined steps: (1) John's position in. the history of religions: John adopted the Gnostic redeemer myth from the Mandean community of John the Baptist; (2) John's basic point: John critically transformed this myth and thereby achieved an understanding of revelation which converges with 'the concerns of dialectic theology. (b) John's Position in the History of Religions: Johannine christology comes into focus, Bultmann claims, when one sees it as an adaptation 'of the Gnostic redeemer myth 19• Bultmann follows Reitzenstein's reconstruction of this myth: A divine being, the Primal Man, falls at the beginning of time from the heavenly world of light into matter. He is overpowered by matter and breaks up into particles of light iiber die Erde wandelnde Gottessohn), especially in the Gospel of John". Bultmann, "Untersuchungen zum Johannesevangelium: B", 188. Note the continuity with the 1916 Wetter review. Note also the similarity with Kasemann, who attacks Bultmann's later existential interpretation by returning to "the liberal interpretation (e.g., Baur, Wetter, Liitgert, Hirsch) which is virtually unanimous in describing Jesus as the God who strides across the earth (a/s den iiber die Erde schreitenden Got!)". E. KAsEMANN,jesu let!{!er Wtlie, 26. 18 R. BULTMANN, Bedeutung der Quelien, 57. On the transparence of Jesus' humanity, in direct opposition to the later Bultmann, see E. KAsEMANN: "John is the first Christian who describes Jesus' earthly life only as a foil for the Son of God who strides through the human world and as the space for the inbreaking of heavenly glory" E. KASEMANN, Jesu let:ifer Wtlle, 34-35; ET: 13. Completely different from Kasemann, of course, is Bultmann's insistence on the transparence of the divinity of Jesus. 19 See R. BULTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 58-59.

318

Michael Waldstein

(human souls). This fall is the origin of the cosmos. So trapped are these souls that they have forgotten their origin. In the fullness of time a redeemer figure, identical with, or at least parallel to, the Primal Man, descends again into the world of matter and reveals himself to his lost fragments, to human souls. By revealing himself, he reveals thus the saving event which leads to the dissolution of the cosmos and the return of souls into the divine sphere. John adopted this myth and applied it to Jesus. Bultmann supports this claim by giving an extensive list of parallels between John and Gnostic sources, above all Mandean texts 20 • These sources, Bultmann notes, are later than the Gospel of John. The myth they contain, however, precedes the Gospel. One of the most important arguments for this conclusion, in fact the decisive proof (" der bestiitigende und durchschlagende Beweis" 21 ), is this: Many elements of the Gnostic myth are present in John, but the central idea which makes the myth work, namely, the parallel or identity of the redeemer with the redeemed souls, is absent. The elements present in John have their natural place in the complete myth, where alone they function properly. Therefore, John's version must be secondary, dependent upon the integral myth as a later transformation 22 • Bultmann observes that "of all sources used for comparison, the Mandean sources show by far the greatest affinity with the Gospel of John" 23 • The Mandeans are thus probably the community from which John adopted the redeemer myth. Although the extant Mandean texts are later than John, some of their strata are quite early. The Mandean community probably originated within Judaism as a baptismal sect on the Jordan around John the Baptist. It was a "phenomenon parallel to early Christianity" 24 inasmuch as it revered 20 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Quellen, 59-97. This collection is still a gold-mine and I will make much use of it below. For a translation of the 28 headings under which Bultmann makes the comparison, cf. Meeks, The Prophet-King, 7-8; the translation leaves out heading 20 (prayer of the emissary) and has heading 21 in 21 R. BULTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 97. 22 See R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Quellen, 97-99; cf. 98 where Bultmann claims that "the same thing is true of Jewish Apocalypticism which adopts the images of this myth, but drops the underlying anthropology". For a structurally similar argument, see Schenke's "natural context" argument for the priority of the myth contained in the Trimorphic Protennoia in comparison with the prologue to John, G. ScHENKE, Die dreigestaltige Protennoia: Eine gnostische Offenbarungsrede in koptischer Sprache aus dem Fund von Nag Hammadi, in 1LZ 99 (1974) 731-746. 23 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 100. 24 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Quellen, 100.

The evolution

rif Bultmann's interpretation rifJohn

and Gnosticism

319

"John the Baptist as the incarnate Son of God and revealer" 25 • Bultmann notes (before the discovery of Qumran) that a more detailed image of the Essenes would contribute much toward our understanding of Jewish baptismal sects 26 • The origin of J ohannine theology in the Mandean sect around John the Baptist suggests that Johannine christology is older than its Synoptic counterpart. In its present form, the Gospel of John certainly presupposes the Synoptics, particularly Mark, but Johannine christology may precede Synoptic christology. "Perhaps the public ministry and message of Jesus stood much more in the context of the Gnostic-baptismal movement which is the background of John than the Synoptic gospels would lead one to suppose" 27•

Synoptic christology may, in fact, be "a Judaizing reaction" 28 against the early incarnation-christology of the Gnostic redeemer myth. This would explain the "fragmentary traces of the redeemer myth in the synoptic tradition" 29 • It would also explain the continuity between Palestinian and hellenistic christianity, e.g., Pauline christianity and its strong christological parallels to John, without recourse to "mystical Easter complexes" as the source of a sudden high christology in hellenistic christianity 30 • (c) John's Basic Point: The main point of this reconstruction of John~s place in the history of religions is that, in Bultmann's mind, it helps us to understand the basic point of the Gospel of John, a point which would otherwise remain in the dark. If one wishes to give a name to the new interpretation of the Gospel of John, one can call it a history of mythology interpretation 25 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 101. Bultmann considers this hypothesis "almost demonstrated", if the Prologue originally applied to John the Baptist. SeeR. BULTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 101; cf. R. BuLTMANN, Der religionsgeschichtliche Hintergrund des Prologs ifJm johannesevangelium, in Eucharisterion II, FS Gunkel, 1923) 3-26; repr. in Exegetica, 10-35; here 33; ET: The History of Religions Background of the Prologue to the Gospel ofjohn, in, The Interpretation ofjohn, ed. and tr. J. Ashton, Fortress-SPCK, Philadelphia-London 1986, 1835; here 31. 26 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 101. 27 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 102. 28 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 102. 29 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 101. 30 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 102. In "Der religionsgeschichtliche Hintergrund des Prologs" Bultmann gives greater emphasis to the Jewish wisdom background of Johannine christology, see esp. 19 and 21, though he already links this wisdom background with Bousset's and Reitzenstein's hypothesis of the primal man myth, see esp. 26-27.

Michael Waldstein

320

(mythologie-geschichtliche Auffassung). However, even supposing the correctness of this interpretation, one should not be under the illusion that one has done more than preliminary work for exegesis. This preliminary work is, of course, indispensable and has decisive importance. For, it allows us to understand the language of the Gospel by showing us the presuppositions of the formation of its concepts 31 • John's basic point, Bultmann repeats, lies in the mission of Jesus as revealer. It is an enigmatic point, because Jesus reveals nothing but the fact that he is the revealer. This much is clear: John can use the Gnostic redeemer myth to express this point, because the Gnostic revealer does not need to reveal any doctrine, except himself, since his fate is parallel to that of the soul and thus salvific when revealed. However, the great enigma of John is not resolved but rather highlighted by this use, because the crucial element which makes the Gnostic myth work, namely, the redeemer/ redeemed identity or parallel, is absent in John. After stating this point, Bultmann concludes the article as follows: "The author is only interested in the that of revelation, not in the what. If faith is no longer content with myths as the objects of revelation and if no dogma suffices, rational knowledge or psychological experiences tend to take their place. But the author is equally far from both of these. One possibility still remains, however, that of construing the concept of revelation in a radical sense, i.e. without describing its content, whether by speculative propositions or psychic states, because both would pull down revelation into the human sphere. One cannot say of God how he is, only that he is. The divine is nothing which is in any way given and describable. And thus the Gospel of John speaks of God, not, of course, by the via negationis of the mystics (all mystical divine attributes are lacking), but in the only way in which one can speak of God, namely, through the depiction of the shaking and undermining (Erschiitteruni) of all that is human through revelation. The opposition (Gegensat~ between revelation and 'sound common sense' runs through the whole Gospel. The many misunderstandings in the dialogues are not a technical device of the author, but they are deeply rooted in his understanding of revelation. Revelation can only be depicted as the annihilation of all that is human, as the refusal af all human questions, as the rejection of all human answers, as that which puts the human person into question" 32• 31 32

R. R.

BULTMANN, BULTMANN,

Das johannesevangelium in der neuesten Forschung, 510. Bedeutung der Que/len, 103-104.

The evolution

rf Bultmann's interpretation rfjohn and Gnosticism

321

It is difficult to follow the argument of this text. The difficulty may partly be due to a curious shift in the basis of the argument. After eliminating myth, dogma, rational knowledge and psychological experience as appropriate categories for the center of J ohannine theology, Bultmann states that one possibility still remains, that of understanding the concept of revelation radically, without describing its content. Is Bultmann arguing from an exhaustive list of possibilities to the only one remaining? The argument could run like this: There are only five possible meanings John can attach to his idea of revelation, namely, myth, dogma, rational knowledge, and revelation in a "radical" sense 33 • John does not hold the first four of these; therefore he must hold the fifth. However, the text does not unfold this line of reasoning and there is a sudden curious shift to a more theological perspective. Speculative propositions and psychic states are not what John is after "because both would pull down revelation into the human sphere". The argument continues in the same vein: the divine can in no way be given or described; "and thus the Gospel of John speaks of God in the on!J way in which one can speak of God, namely, through the description of the shaking and undermining of all that is human by revelation". After briefly illustating this point with the Johannine "misunderstandings", Bultmann returns to the theological perspective: "Revelation can on!J be depicted". Note the curious logic: because it is true, according to Bultmann, that the only way in which one can speak of God is such and such, john speaks in this very way of God. John says X, because X is true. Who is speaking in "Bedeutung der Quellen"? John or Bultmann? Whatever the answer may be, the center of Johannine theology identified by "Bedeutung der Quellen" converges closely with the concerns of dialectic theology as articulated by Bultmann in several articles of the same period 34• 33 The list of five could be seen as comprehensive along the lines of four traditional exhaustive disjunctions. The interlocking of these disjunctions is most easily seen if one takes the list in inverse order. Revelation either does not have any describable content (5: revelation in a radical sense) or it does (1-4); revelation with a describable content is either subject-oriented (4: psychological experiences) or object-oriented (1-3); objectoriented revelation is either arrived at by reason (3: rational knowledge) or not (1-2); revelation not arrived at by reason is either propositionally developed (2: dogma) or not (1: myth). If mystical knowledge is a sixth category, it could be placed between the first two disjunctions as a kind of revelation which, though not without contents, transcends the subject-object distinction. Bultmann may have this or some similar schema in mind. 34 SeeR. BULTMANN, We/chen Sinn hates, von Gott i!' reden?, im Theologische Bliitter4 (1925)

Michael Waldstein

322

3. Under!Jing concerns The intimate interweaving between Bultmann's own convictions on "the only way in which one can speak of God" and John's speaking of God is, at least in principle, quite legitimate as an instance of the hermeneutical circle which forms itself when an exegete addresses the question of the truth of a text. "If we abandon neutrality vis-a-vis the text, then the question oftruth dominates exegesis. Ultimately, then, exegetes are not interested in the question, What does what is being said, as something merely said, signify in its historical place (zeitgeschichtliche Stelle), in its historical context? Ultimately, they ask, What matters (Sachen) are being spoken of? To what realities does what is being said lead? Historical exegesis asks, What is being said? We, on the other hand, ask, What is meant?" 35

Naturally, such an enterprise is immediately confronted with the question, "What is truth?" Gohn 18,38). In the period after his seminal essay "Bedeutung der Quellen", Bultmann addressed this question in a lengthy historical study 36 • In the same period he answered it as a philosopher and theologian in his own right 37 • (a) Truth: At the very foundations of Bultmann's thought there lies the first principle of existentialism: being human in the authentic sense does not mean being an object in the cosmos with a certain nature or essence; it means "existing"; and existing means being a historical possibility which continually realizes itself through decision. "[...] the free deed (die jreie Tat) is the expression of our existence (Existen:f); in fact, only in the free deed, and nowhere else, do we exist in the authentic sense (im eigentlichen Sinne), since the free deed is nothing but our existence itself [...] " 38 •

129-135; repr. in Glauben und Verstehen, I, Mohr-Siebeck, Tiibingen 1933, 26-37; ET: Wbat does it mean to speak of God?, in Faith and 35 R. BuLTMANN, Das Problem einer theologischen Exegese des Neuen Testaments, im Zwischen den Zeiten 3 (1925) 334-357; here 338. Note the close parallel between Bultmann's says/ means distinction and Krister Stendahl's meant/means distinction in Biblical Theology, Contemporary, in !DB 1 (1962) 418-432, esp. 421-422. 36 R. BULTMANN, Untersuchungen ~m Johannesevangelium: A. Aletheia, im ZNW (1928) 113-163; repr. in Exegetica, 124-173. 37 The answer is most fully presented in the notes for a course on the nature and foundations of theology, recently published as R. BULTMANN, Theologische Em;yklopadie. For a fuller presentation of the philosophical and theological aspects, including a historical analysis and critical discussion, see Michael Waldstein, "The Foundations of Bultmann's Work", in Communio 14 (1987) 115-145. 38 R. BuLTMANN, We/chen Sinn hates, von Gott ~ reden?, 35; ET: 62-63.

The evolution

rif Bultmann's interpretation rifJohn and Gnosticism

323

Bultmann's entire ontology is based on this existentialist principle. One can observe its crucial role particularly clearly in his doctrine of knowledge, and his correlative doctrine of truth. "If human existence (das Dasein) is temporal-historical, and thus concerned in every concrete Now (je im ]etzt) with itself, not merely by choosing in every concrete Now one among many possibilities that offer themselves, but, in doing so, by grasping ever again a possibility of, itself, -if, I say, the Being of human existence (das Stjn des Daseins) is thus Being-able-to-be (das Seinkiinnen), because each Now is essentially new and receives its meaning precisely now, now through its decision, and therefore not from a timeless meaning of the world, then the question of truth has meaning only as the question of the one truth rif the moment (des Augenbl/cks), my moment" 39 •

(I) "The truth of the moment" refers to something correlative to decision, namely, to a certain challenge in the light of which I understand myself in a concrete moment. Bultmann asserts that this sense of truth is the only meaningful one. "The original meaning of the question, What is truth?, as the question of the challenge (A.nspruch) of the moment, is the question, What should I do?, on the presupposition that at every moment I am at stake, that through my deed I become something. The whole truth, my truth is in question. I want to understand myse!f' 40 •

(II) Since the truth is identical with my existential selfunderstanding, I do not encounter an "object" when I encounter the truth. Truth is thus prior to the subject-object distinction. Anything "objective" or "subjective" is thereby not authentically true. (III) Since the truth is tied to my concrete understanding of myself at a particular moment, it is completely and radically concrete. It is that which challenges me, me alone, and me only in this concrete situation. Anything more general is thereby not authentically true. (IV) As the challenge of a particular moment, the truth is radically temporal or historical. It is not a timeless validity, but valid only now for that moment. (b) Sin: Human beings are not able, Bultmann argues, to live exclusively in the truth. They also live in "the sphere of the objective" which is cut off from the challenge of the moment. This sphere arises inexorably from the inner dynamism of knowledge. 39 R. BULTMANN, Theologische Enzyklopiidie, 48. Heidegger's terminology is palpable in this text. 40 R. BuLTMANN, Theologische Enzyklopadie, 48-49.

Michael Waldstein

324

"The possibility of distancing itself from life lies from the outset in knowledge (das W'issen), because knowledge lifts the being it encounters into the sphere of the objective (in die Sphare des Gegenstlindlichen) and thus preserves it and still 'knows' it, even when the present (aktuelle) relation to the being is no longer there" 41 •

The sphere of the objective derives thus from authentic truth by a certain corruption. Following the four characteristics of authentic truth listed· above, one can describe this corruption as follows: (I) When the encounter with truth is merely preserved and no longer lived, I can no longer see it as a challenge which issues in decision; I take a point of view outside the challenge and thus outside my self-understanding in decision. (II) This detachment from the challenge gives rise to a subject-object dualism. I no longer stand in the challenge, but I think about something. I confront an object that is separated off from me. I have thus ol:jecti.fted truth. (III) Objectification gives rise to the possibility of universal truth, truth which is no longer valid for me alone, but applies to a variety of objects. (IV) Objectification is also the basis for positing timeless truths, which are not valid only now, but always. Negatively, the corruption of authentic truth consists thus in a detachment from the challenge of the moment; positively, it consists in objectification, in the formation of a sphere of objective being and truth, with the possible accompanying features of universality and timelessness. Science can serve as an illustration of this corruption. Bultmann denies the existence of an objective natural world, real in itself and merely waiting, as it were, to be discovered by science. Far from discovering such a world, science constitutes it. When the mind forces the truth of the moment to hold still, when it thus lifts that truth into objectivity, it gives rise to the objective natural world. "In my historical reality (geschichtliche W'irklichkeit) I in no way encounter nature as an objective reality that follows certain laws. I encounter it as the fullness of possibilities for my action and suffering, for my decisions. Only when I disregard my existence do I see nature as an object, and inasmuch as I then place myself into a certain relation to it, I see myself as a thing of nature among others, as an object among others, standing with them in causal connection governed by law" 42 •

41 42

R. R.

BuLTMANN, BuLTMANN,

Theologische En?Jklopadie, 44. Theologische En?Jklopiidie, 107.

The evolution

rf Bultmann's intetpretation rfjohn and Gnosticism

325

"Objective" history, as a series of causally connected events in the past studied scientifically, is also covered by this statement. There is no series of causally connected events which "really" happened and to which the human mind must conform in receptive fashion. Like the world envisaged by natural science, history as studied by the scientific historian is an objectification. Science is by no means the only corruption of authentic truth. Other examples are myth and dogma, at least when these are taken primarily as objective representations (see below). The process of objectification, although inevitable, poses a grave threat to human existence. By living "according to" the objective world and its stable relations, I can evade the challenge of the moment to find security in objective truth. Again science can serve as an example of this evasion. "As soon as organized science, or culture, is taken as an idea which stands beyond life and dominates it, it is the organized flight of human beings away from themselves. Science is something standing vis-a-vis human beings into which they flee and to which they abandon themselves. Truth within this science is the general validity of its propositions, the general validity which is of no concrete concern to anybody [...]" 43 •

On this background one can grasp Bultmann's concept of sin. Sin is the refusal of the challenge of the moment, rooted in the desire for security and expressed in the flight away from the moment into the sphere of the objective 44 • (c) God: In the first two points of this sketch (truth and sin) I outlined the dialectic which lies at the roots of Bultmann's thought. This dialectic has two sharply distinct sides: one side is the nonobjectified challenge of the moment; the other is the sphere of objectified truth, the world of escape from the challenge. Given these two sides, it is clear that Bultmann must locate God exclusively on the first side, that of existential challenge. "What is the question of God if not the question, 'What is truth?' When the question of truth is posed accurately as the question of the moment, can it be anything but the question of God? For God, if he is thought at all, is thought as the power which rules the Now, as the challenge (Anspruch) spoken into the Now" 45 • R. BuLTMANN, Theologische Em;yklopadie, 39-40. See esp. R. BULTMANN, Theologische Enzyklopadie, 85; 91; 93; 131-132. 45 R. BULTMANN, Theologische Enzyklopadie, 50. 43

44

326

Michael Waldstein

This definition of God must be taken in its full philosophical rigor as an existentialist definition. One must resist the temptation of distorting it by conforming it to traditional metaphysical notions. For traditional theism, God exists "objectively", prior to the world and to human beings in particular. For Bultmann, by contrast, God does not exist objectively. God is not an objectively real being which, among other things, challenges me in the moment. No! God is the challenge of the moment and nothing besides. No being stands behind this challenge. For that being would be "objective", it would be something one can "talk about", something pulled down into the human sphere, something which is not necessarily felt as a challenge, something, therefore, which is contrary to the deepest nature of God as absolute Lord. "God is thus unknowable for science. And this unknowability does not mean that the object 'God' is too great, too vast, too incomprehensible. It does not mean that our knowledge is not "adequate". No idle talk about God's unknowability! God is not a complete or partial X, such that our lack of knowledge of him would have the character of a lack of knowledge of certain hidden things, of some hinterland or over-world. The knowledge of God is the knowledge of the challenge of the moment. His call becomes heard as the demand which the moment places on us. God is invisible for the objectifying vision of scientific research" 46 •

This existentialist understanding of God must be rigorously applied to all doctrines traditionally associated with God, such as the doctrine of creation. Understood properly, creation is nothing but the challenge of the moment; it is not an event whereby an objectively pre-existing God caused the objective world to be. Such a cosmological understanding of creation is excluded by Bultmann's basic ontology. Far from being caused by God, the objective cosmos arises as a self-enclosed objectification from the corruption of human knowledge; it has no outside cause 47 • (d) Scripture: The definition of God as the challenge of the moment does not imply that the voice of the moment is automatically God. If this were so, God would be available to philosophical analysis, because the moment is a universal human phenomenon. In R. BuLTMANN, Theologische EniJ!klopiidie, 51; 57. See R BuLTMANN, Theologische EniJ!klopadie, 106; cf. R. BuLTMANN, Der Sinn des christlichen Schopfungsglaubens, in ZMR 51 (1936) 1-20; ET: The Meaning of the Christian Faith in Creation, in Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings ofRudolf Bultmann (tr. Schubert Ogden; New York: Meridian, 1960) 206-225. 46 47

The evolution

of Bultmann's interpretation ofJohn and Gnosticism

327

fact, however, God is only available to faith in his historical revelation; he is a concrete historical word spoken from beyond the moment into the moment. "One can speak of God only as the How of our existence (das Wte unserer Existenf), as the one whom I encounter always anew in the moment. But in order for me to hear God in my moment, my moment must be determined by a fact (Tatsache), something factual (ein Faktisches). This happens when I encounter revelation as something spoken in the moment, or rather to the moment. From the standpoint of philosophical analysis, this is an accidental historical fact (iftfolliges geschichtliches Faktum)" 48•

Can this revelation be identified? Yes, God is scriptural; God is an event which occurs when the word of Scripture is preached. "[...] all proclamation points to Scripture, not as to its accidentally first stage, but as to that of which it speaks, namely, revelation. This first revelation, and nothing else, is tevelation. [...) Thus Scripture is the authority, the only authority for theology" 49 •

(e) Jesus: The definition of God as an event which occurs when the historical word of Scripture proclaimed into my moment can be further specified. Jesus Christ is this Word of God. "God's revelation as a historical (geschichtlich) event is thus Jesus Christ as the Word of God. This Word was instituted in the contingent historical (historisch) event Jesus of Nazareth and it is alive in the tradition of the Church. The fact of Jesus Christ does not take on importance as a fact which is visible outside of the proclamation, but only as a fact which we encounter in the proclamation, as a fact made present by the proclamation. Jesus Christ is the Word" 50•

Bultmann makes two fundamental assertions in this text. On the one hand he asserts that Jesus is the unique Word of God. On the other hand he excludes any objective or metaphysical implications from this assertion. Jesus is significant for faith, not as a person with certain objective characteristics, divine or otherwise, but as the preached Jesus. The traditional dogma of his divinity is contrary to the inner meaning of revelation, because it falsely objectifies God. In the world of objective history, Jesus is simply a mere man, one among other human beings, with no supernatural attributes. However, he does R R 50 R

48

BULTMANN,

49

BULTMANN, BULTMANN,

Tbeologjsche EniJklopiidie, 63. Theologjsche EniJklopiidie, 169. Theologische EniJklopiidie, 95.

Michael Waldstein

328

become significant when he is preached as God's definitive Word. As preached, his significance is indeed paramount and exclusive. "Theology is not a general human possibility such that besides Christian theology there could also be other theologies. Rather, theology, as a speaking of revelation and of faith, exists on!Jr as Christian theology, while all other supposed theology can only be talk about humanity, if God is really accessible only in his revelation through Christ. However deeply such talk may grasp human reality, it still does not reach the reality of God" 51 • "The idea of God is therefore determined from the outset by the idea of revelation. To speak of God, means: to speak of his revelation; and to speak of his revelation, means: to speak of God. And revelation is not here intended in any general sense; it is rather the saving will of God that can be experienced in the incarnate Revealer. God was always the God that was made known in the historical revelation, and he was this alone" 52•

Back to the question, What is truth? According to Bultmann, truth is the challenge of the moment in which I encounter the revelation of God as the scriptural proclamation of Jesus, the Word of God. Note that this definition is rigorously existentialist. It excludes all objective or metaphysical aspects.

4. Toward the Final .$ynthesis When read in the light of these philosophical and theological principles, Bultmann's final synthesis of Johannine theology as presented in his Theology of the New Testament is remarkably cohesive and clear. Before turning to this synthesis, let me return to "Bedeutung der Quellen" to trace some aspects of the trajectory which leads up to it. (a) The Instability rif the First .$ynthesis: Apart from the two main arguments contained in the final section of "Bedeutung der Quellen" (the exhaustive list of possibilities, and "John says X, because X is true"), the crucial argu'ment is contained in the observations about John's use of the Gnostic redeemer myth. R. BuLTMANN, Theologische Enzyklopadie, 159. R BuLTMANN, Johannes, 18; ET: 35. Before dismissing these statements as Biblebigotry running amok, one should consider that they are intended as existential statements which de iure cannot make any "objective" claims about the non-existence of God outside biblical revelation. For, one cannot speak of God "objectively". See R. BULTMANN, Theologische Enzyklopiidie, 82-83; 87-88. 51

52

The evolution

rf Bultmann 's interpretation rfjohn and Gnosticism

329

"The Gospel of John itself is no mythology; it merely uses the forms of expression of the myth as well as the forms of the older Gospel tradition in order to present its idea of the revelation of God in Jesus, and it does so with sovereign and sure purpose" 53 •

One can summarize the main features of this use as follows. John applies the Gnostic redeemer myth to Jesus, but he does not apply it in its original form. His true intentions can only be grasped if one sees this transformation as a critique. By removing the redeemer/ redeemed parallel as well as all speculation about the heavenly destiny of the soul, he removes the crucial elements which make the myth work as an oijective representation. In other words, he rejects the objective or metaphysical aspect of the myth. This shows that he understands revelation as something radically non-objective, as an existential impact which shakes human beings out of their flight into security in the sphere of the obj~ctive. What John really means can thus not be seen in what he leaves standing of the myth (the Son of God who descends from heaven to dwell among us), but in the hole, as it were, which he cuts into its original form. This highly sophisticated approach to John is basically an argument from silence. More precisely, it is an argument in which John's silence about some features of the reconstructed myth is given more weight than his speech about others. In purely logical terms, an argument of this sort is quite weak. How can one exclude the possibility that John is merely selecting a few apt elements of the myth to draw an equally mythical portrait of Jesus? Bultmann may have realized this problem. At any rate, in his final synthesis he reaches the same conclusion with somewhat different premises, above all with a considerably reduced role of the Gnostic redeemer myth. I turn now to this reduced role and to three related developments in Bultmann's history of religions analysis of John: the retreat from the hypothesis of the Mandean community of John the Baptist; the elaboration of the hypothesis of Gnostic revelation discourses; and the emergence of anti-Jewish polemic as central in John. (b) The Reduced Role if the Redeemer A{yth: In "Bedeutung der Quellen" Bultmann focuses primarily on the hole which John cuts 53 R. BULTMANN, Das Johannesevangelium in der neuesten Forschung, 510. Bultmann does not yet use the term "demythologizing" which Jonas developed in the late twenties. Cf. James Robinson's introduction to Hans Jonas, Augustin und das paulinische Freiheitsprob!em: Eine philosophische Studie tJ~m pelagianischen Streit, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Gi:ittingen 19652, 11-22; here 14-15. However, the hermeneutical concerns expressed by this term are already fully present.

Michael Waldstein

330

into the redeemer myth. He sees the material surrounding this hole as quite continuous with the original myth, though qualified by the hole: Jesus appears as the pre-existent Son of God striding over the earth; his humanity merely serves as the transparent medium of his divinity. In his final synthesis, on the other hand, Bultmann argues that John leaves nothing standing of the myth, but merely uses it as a schema to express the paradox of the incarnation. Instead of the hole cut into the myth, this paradox now becomes the axis of his interpretation. The paradox is this: The Johannine Jesus is a "mere man in whom nothing extraordinary can be perceived, except his claim that he is the revealer" 54• And yet, precisely as a mere man, he is proclaimed as the Word of God. "It finally becomes clear that the revealer is nothing but a concrete historical man, Jesus of Nazareth" 55 • The liberal reading is thus mistaken: "Is his human figure (Gestalt) the transparent medium (das as it were, through which his divine nature shines? At first glance one might think so" 56 • Transparen~,

As Bultmann goes on to argue, this impression is false. John empties the myth of all its objective content 57 • The Gnostic redeemer myth stands thus at a greater distance from the metaphysical constitution of Jesus. Its role is, in this respect, reduced. (c) Retreat from the Mandean 1-fypothesis: A related reduction can be observed in Bultmann's reconstruction of the community out of which John grew. In "Bedeutung der Quellen" he derives Johannine christology quite directly from the Mandean community of John the Baptist. Already in a 1931 review of Lietzmann's Beitrag zur Mandiieifrage he shifts away from this hypothesis. John the Baptist, he agrees now with Lietzmann, was introduced in Mandean literature 54 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie des Neuen Testaments, 0. Merk (ed.), Mohr-Siebeck, Tiibingen 19849 , 399 and 403; ET: Theology of the New Testament (2 vols; trans. Kendrick Grobel; New York: Scribner's, 1951-1955) 2.46 and 2.50. 55 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 421; ET: 2.69. Cf. "The revealer is nothing but a man". Bultmann,Johannes, 40; ET: 62. Cf. also the note on this statement: "Thus it is poindess to ask what happened in this 'became' (in 'the Word became flesh') or since when the Logos has been united with the man Jesus". R. BuLTMANN,johannes, 40, note 2; ET: 62, note 4. 56 R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 394; ET: 2.42. The question picks up Wrede's formulation almost verbatim, cf. above p. 57 See R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 394-399; 2.42-47. Cf. Human beings "will expect the humanity (of Jesus) to be no more than the visualization or the 'form' (Gestal~ of the divine. All such desires are cut short by the statement, 'The Word became flesh.' It is in his sheer humanity that he is the revealer", R. BuLTMANN,johannes, 40; ET: 63; emphasis added.

The evolution

rif Bultmann 's interpretation rif john and Gnosticism

331

only "in the Byzantine-Arabian period" 58 • Still, Gnostic baptismal movements may have played a role, but this role is less tangible and more oblique 59 • In his final synthesis, Bultmann still inclines toward the Baptist hypothesis. He tentatively proposes "that the Evangelist once belonged to the Baptist community", but he no longer identifies this community as Mandean 60 • Bultmann's new evaluation of the sacraments exemplifies the growing distance of John from Gnostic baptismal movements. In "Bedeutung der Quellen" he still gives an important role to sacraments. In his final synthesis he states, "At least in the original text of the Gospel, any reference to the cult and to the sacraments is missing. [...] The sacraments were only added by the redaction (3,5; 6,51b-58). The evangelist avoids speaking of them and is evidendy suspicious of sacramental piety" 61 • ~rios

A corrolary of the Mandean hypothesis in "Bedeutung der Quellen" is the hypothesis that the ministry of Jesus belongs closely to the Mandean context of John the Baptist and that Synoptic christology is a later judaizing reaction against this context. In his final synthesis, on the other hand, Bultmann argues that Synoptic christology is in greater continuity with Jesus while J ohannine christology stands further removed 62 • (d) Gnostic Revelation Discourses: While Bultmann cuts back the Gnostic hypothesis of "Bedeutung der Quellen" in the above respects (points b and c), he amplifies it in at least one respect, namely, by positing a source of Gnostic revelation discourses behind John. Already in 1923 he argues that "the whole Prologue has been adopted from a Baptist document" 63 • In his 1941 commentary he still maintains this hypothesis without identifying this source as Mandean 64• At the same time, he expands the source. "It will become evident that this procedure of the Evangelist is 58 R. BuLTMANN, Review o/ Lietzmann, in ThLZ 56 (1931) 577-580, here 577. "The most weighty argument is the fact that John the baptist is completely absent in the liturgical texts", Ibidem. Cf. H. LIETZMANN, Bin Beitrag zur Mandaerfrage, de Gruyter, Berlin 1930). 59 Cf. R. BuLTMANN, Review o/ LiefiJnann, 579-580. 60 R. BuLTMANN, johannes, 5; ET: 18. 61 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 361; ET: 2.9. Note the complete break with the Wetter review and with "Bedeutung der Quellen", cf. above pp. XXX. 62 Cf. R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 355-357; ET: 2.3-5. 63 R. BuLTMANN, Der religionsgeschichtliche Hintergrund des Prologs, 34-35; ET: 33. "Baptist" refers, of course, to the community of John the Baptist. 64 See R. BULTMANN, johannes, 4; ET 17.

332

Michael Waldstein not limited to the Prologue; the underlying source there stems rather from a collection of 'revelation-discourses', which are to be thought of as similar to the Odes of Solomon, and which the Evangelist has made the basis of the Jesus-discourses in the Gospel" 65 •

The genre of these Gnostic revelation discourses, Bultmann argues, is characterized by a tripartite schema: (a) self-presentation of the revealer (ego eimt) and description of the world which motivates his coming; (b) call to turn away from the cosmos toward the light; and (c) promises for those who follow the call and threats for those who do not 66 • It is also characterized by Semitic poetic style with frequent use of parallelism, especially of the antithetical kind. The anthitheses often reflects an underlying anti-cosmic dualism 67 • Here is Becker's construction of the ideal archetype of such discourses. I am the revealer who descended from heaven. I am from God, you are of the world. God is light, the world is darkness. Leave the darkness, approach the light! Let go of the world, and do the works of God! I am the helper sent from God. Those who listen to me will see the light; those who do not listen to me will sink into darkness 68 •

John, Bultmann argues, does not adopt the discourses source uncritically. Quite on the contrary, his often extensive interspersed comments stand in "marked contrast" to it69 • Generally speaking, "the source provides, as it were, the text for the evangelist's sermon. The evangelist 'historicizes' the revelation-discourses by working them into his portrait of the life of Jesus" 70 • R. BULTMANN, johannes, 4, note 5; ET: 17, note 5. See R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 363; ET: 10-11. Cf. H. BECKER, Die Reden des Johannesevangeliums und der Stil der gnostischen Offenbarungsrede, FRLANT 2/50, R. Bultmann (ed.), Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Gottingen 1956, 54. Becker wrote this work as his dissertation under Bultmann, accepted in 1941, the year in which Bultmann first published his commentary on John. 67 See R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 363; ET: 11; Becker, Die Reden des Johannes. 68 BECKER, Die Reden des johannesevangeliums, 57. 69 R. BuLTMANN,johannes, 177; ET: 238. 70 R. BULTMANN, johannes, 93; ET: 132. 65 66

The evolution

of Bultmann's interpretation ofJohn and Gnosticism

333

In agreement with Bultmann, Becker explains this interplay in more detail. Once the Gnostic source is reconstructed, he argues, one must ask, "Where is the specifically Christian element to be sought, or is it not to be sought at all? For it would be quite possible that the author of John left the source's mythological meaning intact and simply understood the myth as a Christ-myth. We think, however, that this is not the case. We must proceed from a radical reinterpretation of the source's content by the Evangelist, which is the basis for everything else. It consists in the demythologizing and historicizing of the Gnostic myth which is achieved by tying it to the historical figure of Jesus. That the Logos has become flesh in Jesus, this is the tremendous proclamation of the Evangelist. The mythological element is thereby eliminated. The concrete, visible, human appearance of the Logos is the decisive eschatological· fact" 71 •

Such an understanding of the interplay between John and his source indicates the direction, Becker concludes, "in which an existentialist and existential interpretation of John must proceed on the basis of John's own interpretation of his Gnostic source" 72 • (e) The Central New Role of jewish Opponents: In "Bedeutung der Quellen" Bultmann gives a central role to Gnosticism in John's historical situation. John's situation is one of intense interplay with the Mandean community of John the Baptist. In his final synthesis, Bultmann still considers the role of Gnosticism important, but he has difficulties in pinning this role down beyond the literary-theological intetplqy between John and his discourses source and the tenuous biographical intetplay between John's past in the Baptist community and his present in the Jesus community73 • After John 3, the Baptist and his community play no central role. At the same time a new player and a new issue As far as the situation of the community is mirrored in the Gospel of John, its problem is the controversy with Judaism and the theme of this controversy is faith in Jesus as the Son of God 74• It will become clear below, how Bultmann fits this new player into the overall schema of the Johannine "idea of revelation".

Die &den des Johannesevangeliums, 124-125. Die Reden des johannesevangeliums, 128. 73 For the biographical aspect, seeR. BULTMANN,johannes, 5; ET: 18. 74 R. BULTMANN, Theo/ogje, 357. 71

BECKER,

72

BECKER,

Michael Waldstein

334

5. The Final ~nthesis Bultmann's synthesis of Johannine theology in his .Theology rf the New Testament has a clear structure. After an historical introduction, the first of its three major sections lays out the two sides of John's dualist framework: one side is the escape into security in the sphere of the objective (in J ohannine terms: the world, sin, darkness, lie, death, etc.); the other side is the li~erating existential challenge of revelation (in Johannine terms: God, light, truth, life, etc.). Sections two and three unfold the second side as it overcomes the first. Section two does so with an emphasis on revelation as a challenge to authentic existence (in Johannine terms: the mission of Jesus as revealer and judge, etc.). Section three does so with an emphasis on authentic existence as standing under the challenge of revelation (in Johannine terms: faith, etc.). Of course, the foll6wing presentation is only a selection of some of the most important points which Bultmann makes in his rich synthesis. I will follow Bultmann's own three-part outline. (a) Dualism: (I) The Duali:rt Framework: John adopts a dualist framework from Gnostic thought1 5 • However, his understanding of this framework differs from the Gnostic understanding in two important respects. First, while the Gnostic understanding is "cosmological", John's understanding is existential: he understands the dualist framework as a "dualism of decision" 76 • "The concepts of light, truth, life, and freedom explain each other: so do the concepts darkness, falsehood, death, and bondage in the contrasting group. They all derive their meaning from the search for human existence (ExisteniJ - for 'life' as 'life eternal' - and denote the double possibility of human existence: to exist either from God, or from the human person itself'' 77 •

Thus the Johannine notion of "light" refers to the "illumination of human existence (Dasein), in which human existence understands itself, in which human beings gain a self-understanding which discloses their 'way' to them" 78 • "phos is not a mysterious substance which can be possessed as something objectively existing (vorhanden); it is the light of se!f R. R. 77 R. 78 R.

75

BuLTMANN,

76

BuLTMANN, BuLTMANN, BuLTMANN,

Theologie, Theologie, Theologie, Theologie,

369; ET: 2.17. 373; ET: 2.21. 372-373; ET: 2.20. 370; ET: 2.18.

The evolution of Bultmann's interpretation ofJohn and Gnosticism

335

understanding which human beings are challenged to embrace. It is the. light of·. the self-understanding which does not consist simply in knowing about the self as a neutral phenomenon, but in the knowing choice of one's self, which lies at the root of every particular act" 79 •

By contrast, "darkness" refers to an "illusory selfunderstanding''80. Second, John situates God differently in relation to "the world" than does Gnosticism, inasmuch as he understands the world as God's creature 8t. Of course, Bultmann insists, John's idea of creation must not be misunderstood as a cosmological "theory" about the causing of an objective cosmos; rather, it refers to authentic "existential self-understanding" 82 • By asserting that all things were created by God, John asserts that God is the authentic and original source of human existence and that the sphere of darkness is not a separate principle, but merely the escape from this light. "Darkness is nothing other than shutting one's self up against the light. It is the turning away from the origin of one's existence, away from that which alone offers the possibility of illumining one's existence" 83 •

This darkness arises when human beings give way to a false desire for security and attempt to fulfill their yearning for true life by things that are under their control, instead of being open in complete insecurity to the moment in which alone they encounter the divine Word. "The delusion that arises from the will to exist of and by one's self peroerts tmth into a lie, peroerts the creation into the 'world'. For in their delusion, human beings do not let their quest for life become a question about themselves so as to become aware of their creaturehood, but instead they give themselves the answer so as to have a security of their own" 84•

79 R. BULTMANN, Johannes, 27; ET: 47. Note the explicit contrast with the Wetter review, above note 3 "In its original sense light is not an apparatus for illumination, that makes things perceptible, but it is the brightness itself in which I find myself here and now; in it I can find my way about, I feel myself at home, and have no anxiety. Brightness itself is not therefore an outward phenomenon, but the illumined condition of human existence (Dasein), of myse(f'. R. BULTMANN, johannes, 22; ET: 41. 80 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 370; ET: 2.18. 81 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 369; ET: 2.17. 82 See R. BULTMANN, johannes, 25, note 3; ET: 44, note 2. 83 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 370; ET: 2.18. 84 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 379; ET: 2.27.

Michael Waldstein

336

(II) The Controverry Wtth the Jews: This general dualist framework takes on concrete historical form in John's controversy with the Jews. John, Bultmann argues, sees the Jewish religion as the concrete historical paradigm and epitome of the general perversion of truth into a lie. The Jews manage to pervert even the idea of God. "Taking the Jewish religion as an example, John makes clear through it how the human will to self-security distorts knowledge of God, makes God's demand and promise into a possession and thereby shuts itself up against God" 85 • The Jews oppose Jesus' claim to be the revealer by "objective" criteria furnished by the Jewish religion. They marshal arguments against him which they have brought into their possession by searching the Scriptures. "Their search of Scripture stands in the service of a dogmatics which gives them self-security by furnishing them criteria for judging the revelation, but this makes them deaf to the living word of the revealer" 86 • The controversy between John and the Jews is thus ultimately a controversy about the very nature of God. The Jews falsely objectify God; they think God has certain objective characteristics which would have to be verified in Jesus if his claim were legitimate. "How can you, a mere man, claim to be equal to God?" John, by contrast, breaks through any objectification. "In their dogmatics they (the Jews) conceive of the divine as a phenomenon (Phdnomen) whose divinity human beings can verify (konstatieren) by means of their criteria, rather than as an event (Geschehen) which nullifies those who attempt to verify it. Their protest fails to understand that the divine cannot be contrasted to the human in such a manner as they in the security of their judgment suppose: 'How can a mere man claim to be the revealer?' Just this- for human thinking an absurdity - is the mystery of the revelation, which is understood only when human beings let go of their self-security in which they suppose they can distinguish the divine and the human as verifiable (konstatierbare) phenomena. What 'the Jews' call mystery is no mystery at all; for in their mythologizing dogmatics they make the beyond (das jenseits) -Jesus' mysterious origin in God - into a thiswordly thing (i!'m Diesseits) which is subject to their evaluation. For those who wish to verify by criteria at their disposal whether and 85

R.

BuLTMANN,

86

R.

BuLTMANN,

Theologie, 380; ET: 2.27. Theologie, 381; ET: 2.28.

The evolution of Bultmann's interpretation ofjohn and Gnosticism

337

where God's mystery stands before them, there is no longer any mystery. For, what the recognition and acknowledgment (AnerkennuniJ of God's mystery presupposes that one be cast into doubt (I"ewerden) about the current standards. That is why the 'world' remains blind when faced with the revelation, and just by knowing something, it knows nothing" 87 •

It is not difficult to recognize Bultmann's basic theological concerns in this text: God is not an object of which human beings can in any way get an objective cognitive hold; he is the event which breaks any such cognitive hold. God is misunderstood as soon as he is expressed in dogmatic, i.e., objectified, terms. Such a misunderstanding is a sinful turning away from the true light. "The sin of the Jews lies in their dogmatics" 88 •

(b) The Mission of jesus as the Revealer. John's message, Bultmann claims, is that the darkness of escape into false security in the sphere of the objective is overcome by Jesus, the revealer and light of the world. The theme of the entire Gospel of John, Bultmann claims, is that Jesus is the revealer sent from God. "His Qesus') theme is always just this one thing: that the Father sent him, that he came as the light" 89 • Concretely, the Johannine theme of liberation from the sphere of the objective takes the form of incarnation: "The theme of the whole Gospel of John is the statement: 'The Word became flesh' Qohn 1,14)" 90 • Before turning to the meaning of the proclamation of the incarnation, let me discuss its mythological form. The central question raised by this form is this: To what extent are such statements, which speak of Jesus in mythological form as the pre-existent Son of God who became man, really to be understood in the mythological sense? 91 (I) Mjthological Form and Existential Sense: To unfold the meaning of this question, let me take a look at Bultmann's definition of "myth". "That mode of representation is mythology in which what is unworldly (das Unweltliche) and divine appears as what is wordly and R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 382; ET: 2.29-30. R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 380; ET: 2.28; emphasis added. 89 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 414; ET: 2.62. Note the central importance given to the theme of mission. C£. "In John, Jesus appears neither as the rabbi arguing". 9() R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 392; ET: 2.40. 91 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 385; ET: 2.33. 87

88

338

Michael Waldstein

human or what is transcendent (das jenseitige) appears as what is immanent (als Diesseitiges), as when for example, God's transcendence (jenseitigkeif) is thought of as spatial distance" 92 • The reference to "spatial distance" in this definition should not lead one to suppose that Bultmann defines "mythological" in the common fashion as gross or material storytelling about the divine in contrast to a spiritual understanding. He defines it in terms of the very precise and rigorous philosophical distinction between the existential and the objectified. "Diesseitig" includes the notion "objectified" while ''Jenseitig" is exclusively non-objective and existential. "Mythology is an objectifying way of talking (oijektivierendes Reden)" about God 93 • However, the definition of myth as an objectification of the divine is incomplete. It does not express the true intention or sense of myth which is not objective but existential. "Myth intends to talk about a reality which lies beyond the reality that can be objectified, observed and controlled, and which is of decisive significance for human existence. It is the reality that means for us salvation or damnation, grace or wrath, and that demands of us respect and obedience" 94• There is a tension between this intention of myth and its objectifying form: "its real intention to talk about a transcendent power to which both we and the world are subject is hampered and obscured by the objectifying character of its assertions" 95 • This tension calls for an interpretation which criticizes the objective form of myth and fastens on its existential sense. Bultmann calls this interpretation "demythologizing". "Demythologizing seeks to bring out the real intention of myth, namely, its intention to talk about human existence as grounded in and 92 R. BULTMANN, Neues Testament und j}fythologie (1941), in Kerygma und j}fythos (H.Werner Bartsch (ed), Reich, Hamburg 1960, 15-48; here 22, note 2; ET: New Testament and j}fythology, R. BuLTMANN, New Testament and j}fythology and Other Basic Writings, trans. and ed. Schubert M. Ogdenm, Fortress, Philadelphia 1984) 1-43; here 42, note 5. 93 R. BuLTMANN, Zum Problem der Entmythologisierung (1961), in G/auben und Verstehen, IIV, Mohr-Siebeck, Tiibingen 19844 , 4.128-137, here 4.135. ET: On the Problem of Demythologi::(jng, in New Testament and j}fythology, 155-163; here 161. 94 R. BULTMANN, Zum Problem der Entmytho/ogisierung, in G/auben und Verstehen, 4.133; ET 160. 95 R. BuLTMANN, Neues Testament und j}fytho/ogie (1941), 23; ET: 10.

The evolution

of Bultmann 's interpretation ofJohn and Gnosticism

339

limited by a transcendent, unworldly pow~r, which is not visible to objectifying thinking. Thus, negatively,.tiibmythologizing is criticism of the mythical world-picture insofar as .it·e;~ri~eals the real intention of myth. Positively, demythologizing is existentialist (existentiale) interpretation, in that it seeks to make dear the intention of myth to talk about human existence" 96 •

Back to the question: Are John's. statements about Jesus in mythological form to be understood in a mythological sense? The meaning of this question is now clear; ·Are John's objectifying statements to be understood in an objective or an existential · sense? (II) The Offense of the Incarnation: Bultmann, of course, emphatically affirms the existential sense of Johannine christology at the exclusion of any objective aspect. "It is clear that the mythological statements have lost their mythological meaning. Jesus is not seriously presented as a pre-existent divine being who came in human form .to earth to reveal unprecedented secrets. Rather, the mythological terminology is intended to express the absolute and decisive significance of his word. The mythological notion of pre-existence is made to serve the idea of revelation " 97 •

Here lies the central point of Bultmann's interpretation of Johannine christology. I have already sketched several auxiliary pillars of this interpretation: the interplay between John and the Gnostic discourses source; the existential meaning of Johannine dualism; the controversy between John and the Jews on the non-objective nature of God; the analysis of the objective form and existential sense of myth; and, beneath all these, Bultmann's own philosophical and theological convictions on the dialectic between objective and existential. The keystone on which all of these pillars converge is, without a doubt, the paradox of the incarnation. "In Jesus we encounter God himself, in a Jesus moreover in whom nothing extraordinary is perceptible except his bold assertion that in him we encounter God. In that fact lies the paradox of the idea of revelation, a paradox which John was the first to see with any distinctness" 98 • 96 R. BULTMANN, Zum Problem der Entnrythologisiemng, in Kerygma und Afythos, vol. 2, H.Werner Bartsch (ed.), Reich, Hamburg 1952, 179-195; here 184; ET: On the Problem of De"!)thologif(jng, in New Testament and Afythology, 95-130; here 99. 97 R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 414-415; ET: 2.62. 98 R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 403; ET: 2.50.

340

Michael Waldstein

The meaning of this paradox emerges when one grasps its nature as offtnse (Anstoss) in relation to John's immediate background, Gnosticism. The desire for revelation, Bultmann claims, is a basic human desire, identical with the desire for an authentic self-understanding. "The striving of human beings to have access to God is nothing but the expression of their yearning to have 'life' in the 'light' of a definitive self-understanding, and thus to be in the 'truth' in order that they may exist authentically (um wahrhqft ifJ sein)" 99 •

This desire is clearly expressed in the Gnostic ideal of gnosis as a liberation from the dungeon of the objective material cosmos in which knowledge of the divine and self-understanding are thought to coincide 100 • Desire for revelation includes, of course, a certain preunderstanding (Vorwissen or Vorverstandnis) of revelation 101 • Such a preunderstanding is reflected in the Gnostic idea that revelation must have an other-worldly origin and yet be an event which takes place in the human sphere 102 • This pre-understanding of revelation, although part of the uiversal human desire for authentic existence, is dangerous. In fact, it "can lead human beings to destruction" 103 • Goaded on by their desire for revelation and misled by inauthentic self-affirmation and selfsecurity, human beings can succumb to the temptation of constructing myths or other objectifications as anticipations of revelation. They think that their desire for authentic existence can come to rest in these myths, but in fact they merely become more deeply entangled in the inauthentic sphere of the objective. "God ceases to be God if he is thought of as an object. The desire to see God, when it becomes the desire to turn God into an object of our knowledge, inevitably leads human beings into a radically false self-understanding" 104•

This radically false self-understanding is exemplified by the Gnostic redeemer myth. The Gnostic myth deforms the preunderstanding of revelation by positing an oijective divine "substance" R. BuLTMANN, johannes, 54; ET: 80. See R. BuLTMANN, johannes, 24, note 4; ET: 43, note 2. tot SeeR. BVLTMANN,johannes, 39; ET: 61; cf. R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 379; ET: 2.26-27. toz See R. BULTMANN, johannes, 39; ET: 61. 103 R. BULTMANN, Johannes, 39; ET: 61. to 4 R. BuLTMANN, johannes, 55; ET: 81; cf. 39; ET: 61-62.

99

too

The evolution

rf Bultmann's interpretation rfJohn

and Gnosticism

341

around which a mythical drama of revelation revolves 105 • While providing a sham liberation from the earthly objective cosmos, this "substance" merely serves to entangle the Gnostics in a celestial objective cosmos. As Bultmann's analysis of the Johannine "Jews" shows, Gnosticism is not alone in such a radically false selfunderstanding. John's proclamation of the incarnation strikes at the very heart of the false self-upderstanding exemplified both by the Gnostic myth and the Jewish dogmatics. In terms of the measures of the world, as one sees them at work in the Gnostic myth with its dreams of an objective divine world above the human realm, as well as in the Jewish mythologizing dogmatics with its claims to secure knowledge of God, it is an intolerable rffense to proclaim that Jesus, in his sheer humanity, is the Word of God. This offense, as an offense, is the heart of John's proclamation. "The event of the revelation is a question, is an offense. This and nothing else is meant f?y 'The Word became flesh "'106. Exactly in its character as offense the incarnation is the liberating and saving event, because it explodes the false self-understanding of escape into the sphere of the objective. In this way it frees human beings from the "world". Here lies the true meaning of Johannine christology. Becker expresses this point in some admirably compact formulations: "The concrete, visible, human appearance of the Logos is the decisive eschatological fact. This historicizing radicalization of the myth, however, implies a further aspect which may seem surprising at first glance: historicizing becomes the basis for de-historicizing and freedom from the world (Entweltlichung). The possibility for such dehistoricizing lies in the radical historicizing eschatologizing of the unhistorical gnostic call. The appearing of the incarnate calls this world and all human beings into question; indeed, it signifies the end of the world. The coming of the revealer is the krisis in the authentic and exclusive sense" 107 •

(III) "Historisch" and "Geschichtlich ": This account of the core of Johannine theology can be clarified by focusing on Bultmann's distinction between two senses of "historical". Quite simply, the two senses follow the dialectic between the existential and the objective which is the omni-present framework of Bultmann's thought. In one SeeR. BVLTMANN,johannes, 39; ET: 62. BuLTMANN, johannes, 39; ET: 63. 107 BECKER, Die Reden des johannesevangeliums, 125. 105

106

6 .

R.

342

Michael Waldstein

way something can be historical (historisch) as an objectified thing of the past, subject to scientific historical criticism. In another way something can be historical (geschichtlich) as a concrete address which challenges me in my moment. Yet, since the sphere of the objective is not an autonomous sphere, but simply an inevitable objectification of existential challenge, historisch and geschichtlich remain tied to each other as inseparable sides of a single dialectic. "The one reality can be seen under a double aspect in accordance with our double possibility as human beings to exist authentically or inauthentically. In inauthentic existence we understand ourselves in terms of the world that stands at our· disposal, whereas in authentic existence we understand ourselves in terms of the futur~, of which we cannot dispose. Correspondingly, we can look at the history of the past in an objectifying way or else as personal address, insofar as in it the possibilities of human self-understanding become perceptible and summon us to responsible choice".

The relation of these two modes of self-understanding must be characterized as "dialecticat', insofar as the one is never given without the other 108 • On the basis of this distinction it is clear that the historical (historisch) Jesus as such is not, and never was, the revealer sent from God. He simply was one among other human beings. Yet the historical (geschichtlich) Jesus is the definitive revelation. Inasmuch as John preaches him as the Logos, Jesus is the revealer. The incarnation takes place, therefore, only in the preached text of Scripture, not in "objective" history. Nevertheless, given the dialectic between historisch andgeschichtlich, this preaching remains tied to the historical (historisch) Jesus. There is no inherent reason why this historical (historisch) Jesus should be preached as the decisive historical (geschichtlich) event, and this "unreasonableness" is an essential part of John's message, the "offense" of the incarnation. "It finally becomes clear that the revealer is nothing but a concrete historical (geschichtlich) man, Jesus of Nazareth. Why this specific man? That is a question that must not be answered- for to do so would destroy the offense which belongs ineradicably to Revelation. Of course this Jesus must encounter human beings in a concrete form (Gestalt), but John limits himself to letting only that about Jesus become visible which was an 'offense'. In any case, he does not 108 R. BULTMANN, Das Problem der Entmytho/ogisierung, in G/auben und Verstehen, 4,131-132; ET: 158; emphasis added.

The evolution

of Bultmann's intetpretation ofJohn

and Gnosticism

343

consider the task of the Church's proclamation to be the transmitting of historical (historisch) tradition abqut Jesus" 109 •

(IV) The Mission of jesus: The offense of the incarnation is understood properly, of course, only when one focuses on the authentic existence which issues from it. Before turning to authentic existence, however, let me dwell a little more on the figure of Jesus, especially on his mission. The claim that the Johannine Jesus is a mere man "in whom nothing extraordinary is perceptible except the bold assertion that in him we encounter God" 110 runs up against numerous "mythological" passages in the Gospel. Bultmann is quite aware of these difficulties and attempts to resolve them with considerable resourcefulness. In every case, the demythologized end-result is the same. Whatever appears to be an "objective" supernatural attribute of Jesus simply expresses the existential idea of revelation. "Jesus' person is described exclusively in terms of the revelation" 111 • Here are some representative examples: "On Jesus' pre-existence: 'The point of the statements about preexistence and mission is not that they describe things which in themselves are important for Jesus, but that they draw out the importance of his person and word. Thus the statement about the preexistence describes in mythological imagery the word which we encounter as a word whose origins are not in this world, and our situation as one where we must make the decision between life and death' 112 • "The mythological notion of pre-existence is made to serve the idea of revelation" 113 • "On his divine sonship: 'There can be no doubt that the Evangelist intends the title (Son of God) to outdo the messianic titles listed in John 1,20ff. It is characteristic of him that he should stress the relation to the Father which is expressed by the title 'Son of God' (cf. already John 1,14.18); thus what is important for him in the title is that it contains the idea that Jesus is the revealer in whom we encounter God" 114 • "On his heavenfy conversation with the Father. 'John 5,20 expresses the idea of revelation in the language of myth ... The Father 'loves' the Son and shows him everything that he does. [...] All these different phrases, that the Son does or says what he has seen or heard with the Father,

R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 421; ET: 2.69. R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 403; ET: 2.50. 111 R. BULTMANN, Johannes, 191, note 3; ET: 254, note 8. 112 R. BuLTMANN,johannes, 190-191; ET: 254-255. 113 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 415; ET: 2.62. Cf. R. BuLTMANN,johannes, 17-19; ET: 33-36. 114 R. BULTMANN, Johannes, 64, note 3; ET: 93, note 1. 109

110

344

Michael Waldstein give expression to the same idea, namely, that he is the revealer in whom we encounter God himse!f speaking and acting" 115 • "On jesus as omniscient theios anthropos: 'The Johannine Jesus is not however portrayed as a prophet, but in his omniscience he is more like a theios anthropos [...] whose miraculous knowledge is not based on a gift of God which has to be constantly renewed, but on his own personal divinity. [...] (f) he idea of omniscience belongs to the mythological elaboration of the idea of revelation, while the task of the theios anthropos motif is to help portray the idea of omniscience" 116 • "The omniscience of Jesus is therefore not understood to be his superhuman ability, but his knowledge which is transmitted to the believer: whoever has recognized him as the revealer knows everything by knowing this one thing" 117 • "On his miracles: 'Of course, they are extraordinary occurrences, but that only makes them indicators that the activity of the revealer is a disturbance of what is familiar to the world. They point to the fact that the revelation is no worldly occurrence, but an other-worldly one" 118 • "On the Jacts rf salvation': 'As we have seen, the 'facts of salvation' in the traditional sense play no important role in John. The entire salvation-drama - incarnation, death, resurrection, Pentecost, Parousia - is concentrated into a single event: the revelation of God's 'reality' (aletheia) in the earthly activity of the man Jesus" 119 •

Let me unfold Bultmann's interpretation of the mission ofjesus in greater detail. The difficulty is this: mission implies an "objective" distinction between a sender and a sent as well as a charge given by the sender to the sent, - all of which is, on Bultmann's terms, mythological. Bultmann's general resolution of the difficulty is quite simple. The theme of mission expresses the existential significance of Jesus as the eschatological event which breaks into the world of the objective. "The mission is the eschatological event, and the judgment of the world takes place .in it" 120• "In all that he Oesus) is, says and does, he is not to be understood as a figure of this world, but his appearing in the world is to be conceived as a sending from without, an arrival from elsewhere. He is the one 'whom the Father consecrated and sent into the world' Oohn 10,36)"121. R. BULTMANN,johannes, 189-190; ET: 252-253. R. BULTMANN, Johannes, 71, note 4; ET: 102, note 1. 117 R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 395; ET: 2.43. 118 R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 396-397; ET: 2.44. 119 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 411; ET: 2.58. 120 R. BuLTMANN, johannes, 111; ET: 154. 121 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 386; ET: 2.33. 115

116

The evolution

rif Bultmann 's interpretation rifjohn and Gnosticism

345

Bultmann attempts to sharpen this demythologized understanding of mission by integrating it into the paradox of revelation 122 • According to this paradox, we encounter God in the sheer humanity of Jesus. "John emphatically expresses this paradox. He accordingly presents the fact tl;lat in Jesus we encounter God in a seemingly contradictory manner: in one direction by statements that declare that Jesus has equal dignity and rights with God, or even that God has abdicated his rights to Jesus, so to speak. In the other 4irection, John declares that Jesus speaks and acts only in obedience to the will of the Father and does nothing of himself' 123 •

Two distinct groups of texts reflect these two directions. The first group states that God gave his "name" to Jesus (17,11); that he gave "everything" into his hands (3,35; 13,3); that he gave him "authority over all flesh" (17,2); that he gave him "to have life in himself'' as he himself has life in himself (5,26); and that, accordingly, he gave him power to do judgment (5,22.27) and power to raise the dead and bring to life whomever he wills (5,21). Jesus works like the Father (5,17) and claims the same honor (5,23). In the second group of texts one finds Jesus saying, "I have come down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of him who sent me" (6,38). "He acts in obedience to the 'charge' which he received from the Father (10,18; 12,49f; 14,31; 15,10)" 124• His whole existence lies in this obedience: "It is my food to do the will of him who sent me and to accomplish his work" (4,34). Accordingly, his last words are, "It is accomplished" (19,30). His work is to accomplish the task enjoined on him by the Father (5,36; 9,4; 10,32.37; 17,4) and he carries it out, not to serve his own glory, but the glory of his Father (7,18; 8,49f; cf. 11,4). Many negative formulations reinforce the second group of texts: Jesus did not come of himself, but the Father sent him (7,28; 8,42; 5,43); he cannot do anything of himself, but acts only according to the Father's instructions (5,19£.30; 8,28); he does not teach or speak of himself, but speaks only the words which the Father has given him (7,17f; 12,49; 14,10.24; 17,8.14). "Of course, the intent of such statements is not to .diminish the authority of Jesus and his words, but 122 The following sketch of this integration is drawn from Bultmann, in Theologie, 403-404; ET: 2.50-52. . 123 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 403; ET: 2.50. 124 R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 404; ET: 2.51; emphasis added.

Michael Waldstein

346

just the opposite: to establish it" 125 • Because Jesus does not speak his own words, he can speak those of God (3,34). Those who hear him hear God's words (8,47) and gain life by believing in them (5,24). The two groups of texts are, to repeat, apparendy contradictory. On the one hand Jesus is equal to God; on the other hand he is radically subordinate in the obedient accomplishment of his mission. It would be a misunderstanding, Bultmann claims, to interpret this obedience in ethical terms. "It is just this standpoint, from which Jesus' character would be measured by ethical standards, which is the wrong one; and what the author is trying to make clear is not Jesus' humility, but his authority: the paradoxical authority of a human being speaking the words of God. In other words, it is the idea of revelation that the author is setting forth" 126 •

The apparent contradiction resolves itself thus in the paradox of revelation. The idea of revelation implies that we truly encounter God himself (the first group of texts) and yet that we do so by encountering Jesus, a mere man, who, in his sheer humanity, is incomparably other than God (the second group of texts). As a particular theme within the second group, the theme of mission contributes, therefore, to express the paradox of revelation. (c) Authentic Existence:

(I) Faith as Freedom from the World: John's message, which is placed on the lips of Jesus, is that Jesus has been sent as the revealer who brings true life. This is why so many of Jesus' words are selfpredications. What is the content of these predications? "Practically all the words of Jesus in John are se!f-predications (Selbstaussagen) and no definite complex of ideas can be stated as their content and claimed to be the 'teaching' of Jesus. [...] His words are self-predications. This does not mean christological instruction or teaching about the metaphysical quality of his person. On the contrary, to understand them in that way would be to misunderstand them; for it would be a failure to understand that his 'words' are 'deeds"' 127 •

If Jesus' words have no objective content, is his claim to be the revealer merely an empty claim? R. R. 127 R. 125

BULTMANN,

126

BULTMANN, BULTMANN,

Theologie, 404; ET: 51. Theologie, 404; ET: 52. Theologie, 416; ET: 2.63.

The evolution

o/ Bultmann's interpretation o/john and Gnosticism

347

"It turns out in the end that Jesus as the revealer of God reveals nothing but that he is the revealer. In his Gospel John presents only the that of revelation without describing its what. He seems to retain only the empty that of revelation 128•

This impression is not completely accurate, however. True, on the object-side revelation is indeed empty, but it can be filled in existential terms. "If revelation is not to be presented as the communication of a definite teaching [...] then all that can be presented is its naked that (blosses Dass). This that, however, does not remain empty. For the revelation is represented as the shattering and negating of all human self-assertion and all human norms and evaluations. And, precisely by virtue of being such negation, revelation is the affirmation and fulfillment of human longing for life, fot true reality" 129 •

To accept this revelation in faith is to abandon "the whole edifice of security" and "to let it shatter"130 • As the acceptance of the offense of the incarnation, faith is a radical "turning away from the world, an act of freedom from the world (EntweltlichuniJ " 131 • In such freedom from the world, the offense of the incarnation is "overcome" inasmuch as the standards of the world are suspended in their validity. "Faith, then, is the overcoming of the offense - the offense that we encounter life only in the word addressed to us by a mere man, Jesus of Nazareth. It is the offense raised by a man who claims, without being able to make it credible to the world, that God comes to meet us in him. It is the offense of 'the Word became flesh'. As victory over this offense, faith is victory over the world (1 John 5,4)" 132•

As a "decision against the world" and effective victory over the world, faith is "eschatological existence: in the midst of the world, the believer is taken out of worldly existence (weltliches Sein)" 133 • (II) The Sitz im Leben of Bultmann 's interpretation of John: Why should the shattering and negating of all human standards be R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 418-419; ET: 2.66-67. R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 420; ET: 2.67-68. Note the continuity with "Bedeutung der Quellen", 103-104. 130 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 427; ET: 75. 131 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 428; ET: 75. Grobel translates "Entweltlichung" as "desecularization". 132 R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 428; ET: 74-75. 133 R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 430; ET: 78. 128

129

348

Michael Waldstein

experienced as the fulfillment of the deepest yearnings for true life? My goal in raising this question is not to decide whether the Johannine message is in fact such a fulfillment, but to understand why Bultmann thinks it is. When Bultmann embraces the Johannine message as a message which smashes the entire edifice of human security in an objective "world", what does "world" refer to in his own life-context? Who or what represents "the world"? On the level of the text, of course, Gnostics and Jews do. As historical groups, however, they are not part of Bultmann's own Sitz im Leben. But perhaps they function as "foils for an encoded portrayal" 134 of the true, i.e., contemporary, representatives of "the world". In one of this characterizations of the Johannine Jews, Bultmann brands "religion" as the most subversive opponent of God. "The world's resistance against God is based on its imagined security, which reaches its highest and most subversive form in religion and thus, for the Jews, in their pattern of life based on Scripture" 135•

"Religion with a pattern of life based on Scripture" applies, of course also to traditional Christianity, - certainly an opponent with which Bultmann had to deal at much closer range. In fact, his vehement critique of Catholicism and Protestant Orthodoxy in Theologische Enzyklopiidie is quite similar to his treatment of Gnosticism and the Jewish religion in his work on John 136 • In addition, the demythologizing debate pitted him in an often bitter struggle against the defenders of objective content and dogma. It can hardly be denied that the J ohannine Gnostics and Jews act as foils for B:ultmann's contemporary fellow-Christians. Nevertheless, the search for a Sitz im Leben cannot rest here. Bultmann clearly understands himself as standing in continuity with the Christian tradition, at least with its true existential meaning. It may be more fruitful to turn to existentialism, which is the foundation of his thought, and to ask, What is existentialism reacting against when it pits authentic existence against the entire objective cosmos? Hans Jonas's analysis may be helpful here. 134 These are the terms used by Dieter Georgi in his attempt to grasp Hegel's interpretation of the Johannine Jews. 135 R. BvLTMANN,johannes, 201; ET: 267-268. 136 See the chapter entitled, R. BULTMANN, The ecclesial idea o/ revelation and its decomposition, in Theologische Enzyklopiidie, 66-88. For Catholicism, see ibid. 67-71; for Protestant Orthodoxy, see ibid. 71-72; for a critique of both, see ibid. 72-76.

The evolution

of Bultmann 's interpretation ofJohn and Gnosticism

349

"A change in the v1s1on of nature, that is, of the cosmic environment of man, is at the bottom of that metaphysical situation which has given rise to modem existentialism and to its nihilistic implications. The essence of existentialism is a certain dualism, an estrangement between man and the world, with the loss of the idea of a kindred cosmos- in short, an anthropological acosmism" 137 •

Jonas argues that existentialism is, in this respect, similar to ancient Gnosticism. Like Gnosticism, existentialism sees authentic existence as trapped in the objective world. If anything, the existenceworld dualism in existentialism is more radical than the pneumacosmos dualism in Gnosticism. "There is no overlooking one cardinal difference between the gnostic and the existentialist dualism: Gnostic man is thrown into an antagonistic, anti-divine, and therefore anti-human nature, modern man into an indifferent one. Only the latter case represents the absolute vacuum, the really bottomless pit. In the gnostic conception the hostile, the demonic, is still anthropomorphic, familiar even in its foreignness, and the contrast itself gives direction to existence. Not even this antagonistic quality is granted to the indifferent nature of modem science, and from that nature no direction at all can be elicited. This makes modem nihilism infinitely more radical and more desperate than gnostic nihilism could ever be for all its panic terror of the world" 138•

Jonas's attempt to understand the Sitz im Leben of existentialism is strikingly confirmed by Bultmann himself. In the year before he died, he wrote to an American physician who had asked him about the meaning of hell. "The existential meaning of hell is not that of an image of a physical place below the world full of torments. Instead, it is the recognition of the power of evil, indeed, the evil of the poisoned and poisoning atmosphere which humankind has created for itself when we began to assume that we could create security through scientific knowledge and the ability to dominate the eaft4. With this attitude, the world does become hell. Such confusion leads to the battle of all against all. Here are the roots of our doubts, our questioning the meaning of life" 139• 137 H. joNAS, Gnosticism, Existentialism and Nihilism, in The Gnostic Religion: The Message o/ the Alien God and the Beginnings o/ Christianity, Beacon, Boston 19632, 320-340; here 325. 138 H. joNAS, Gnosticism, Existentialism, and Nihilism, 338-339. 139 BULTMANN LEMKE, Bultmann's Papers, 11-12; emphasis added.

350

Michael Waldstein

6. Some Critical Riflections On the positive side, one must acknowledge that Bultmann understood and lived central aspects of our modern situation with remarkable clarity and intensity. He did not blink at the clash between the modern scientific world-view and the Christian faith, but faced it head-on. In this respect he can contribute much toward understanding the situation of Biblical studies in the Twentieth Century. He himself played an important role in shaping this situation, but in doing so he was, in part, merely giving sharp and honest expression to forces that were at work quite apart from his contribution. But there are problems in the manner in which he interpreted these forces and attempted to bring them together into a new synthesis, most consummately in his reading of John. In attempting to resolve the clash between the scientific world-view and the Christian faith, Bultmann takes a violent short-cut: He uncritically accepts the scientific world-view and then stages an all-out witch hunt on it. By pressing it into such a Lutheran dialectic he grants it too much and too little. Too much because he does not criticize it in detail; and too little because he condemns it entirely as an expression of sin. Two further criticisms can be brought against Bultmann from the perspective of the Catholic tradition, focused on two central Catholic concerns: faith in the goodness of creation and respect for the normative status of biblical texts in their historical meaning. Of course, these are not exclusively Catholic concerns, but they do play a central role in the Catholic tradition. Perhaps the most central objection against Bultmann's reading of John from a Catholic perspective is that he abandons the Jewish and Christian assent to the fundamental goodness of the world as God's creature. His ontology does not allow any other position. The objective world is the result of an inauthentic mode of human knowledge. Far from being caused by God it arises as a self-enclosed objectification from human sin. In this respect Bultmann's ontology is closer to Gnosticism than it is to the biblical tradition. As a second criticism from the point of view of the Catholic tradition one can point out that Bultmann does not sufficiently respect the historical meaning of the biblical texts as normative. It may seem paradoxical to bring such a criticism against the foremost Lutheran Scripture scholar. Let me unfold it by raising some questions about demythologizing understood as an interpretive project. As pointed out above, Bultmann himself sees demythologizing as primarily interpretive or hermeneutical.

The evolution

of Bultmann's interpretation ofjohn and Gnosticism

351

This presupposes that myth indeed talks about a reality, but in an inadequate way140• The phrase "in an inadequate way" points to the following difficulty: To preach the word of God as something located in the non-objective sphere of existential challenge requires great conceptual clarity, a clarity which became possible only after the development of Bultmann's dialectical doctrine of knowledge, developed before and then in collaboration with Heidegger and Jonas. The ancient Christians in general and the Gospel of John in particular did not have this clarity. And so they inevitably and continuously confused the Word of God with something objective. Bultmann acknowledges their confusion when he notes that the false objectivity of New Testament myths must be eliminated. In an important text already quoted above, Bultmann says, "Demythologizing seeks to bring out the real intention of myth, namely, its intention to talk about human existehce as grounded in and limited by a transcendent, unworldly power, which is not visible to objectifying thinking. Thus, negatively, demythologizing is criticism of the mythical world-picture insofar as it conceals the real intention of myth. Positively, demythologizing is existentialist interpretation, in that it seeks to make clear the intention of myth to talk about human existence" 141 •

The problem lies in the negative aspect, that of deobjectification. If ancient Christian texts, and John in particular, are mired in objectification, then Bultmann gives them too much credit when he interprets them as really proclaiming the non-objective Word of God. He is engaged in over-benevolent apologetics and not in critical exegesis. In other words, demythologizing is not a hermeneutical procedure, but the expression of a disagreement with the text. In its de-objectifying aspect, it replaces the text's theology with an opposed theology. Bultmann protests emphatically, "Scripture is the authority, the only authority for theology" 142• But in fact, a dialectic doctrine of knowledge determines what can, and what cannot, be Word of God. From the standpoint of the Catholic tradition, this determination gives too normative a role to philosophy; it separates the Word of God too much from the historically concrete meaning of Scripture.

rif Delf(Ythologiifng (1961), 155. On the Problem o/ Delf(Ythologiifng (1952), 99. Theologische En1Jklopi:idie, 169.

140

R. BuLTMANN, On the Problem

141

R.

142

R. BULTMANN,

BULTMANN,

Michael Waldstein

352

Bultmann is both a deeply believing Christian and a radical rationalist critic of the New Testament. This apparent contradiction constitutes the systematic unity of his work which lies in his dialectic doctrine of knowledge. By demonizing the Enlightenment and turning it into his most implacable enemy, he thought he could make it, paradoxically, comfortable to live with. "I have never felt uncomfortable in my critical radicalism. As a matter of fact, I am quite comfortable in it. But I often have the impression that my conservative colleagues in New Testament studies feel quite uncomfortable, because I always see them engaged in salvaging operations. I calmly let things burn, because I see that what is burning is merely the imaginations and pictures produced by life of Jesus research and that this is 'Christ according to the flesh'. This 'Christ according to the flesh', however, is of no concern to us" 143 •

But if even flesh is created by God, and if faith sees God's glory in the Word made flesh, then Bultmann's comfort is too easy. The more difficult road must be pursued. What is needed for a constructive sifting of his legacy, I would suggest, is a more positive and more critical assessment of the Enlightenment which avoids both his demonizing and uncritical acceptance of it. What is needed is a renewed philosophy and theology of nature. Only in such a positive philosophy and theology of nature can one see the meaning of the central Johannine affirmation, the Word became flesh.

143

R.

BuLTMANN,

Gfauben und Verstehen, 1,101.